AMES HARRINGTON

John M. Lea.

THE

OCEANA

OF

James Harrington, Esq;

And His Other.

WORKS:

With an ACCOUNT of his LIFE Prefix'd,

By *JOHN TOLAND.*

To which is Added,

PLATO REDIVIVUS:

OR, A

DIALOGUE concerning GOVERNMENT.

RESPUBLICA *Res* est *Populi* cum benè ac justè geritur, sive ab uno Rege, sive a paucis Optimatibus, sive ab universo Populo. Cum vero injustus est Rex (quem Tyrannum voco) aut injusti Optimates (quorum Consensus Factio est) aut injustus ipse Populus (cui nomen usitatum nullum reperio, nisi ut ipsum Tyrannum appellem) non jam vitiosa sed omnino nulla Respublica est, quoniam non RES est POPULI cum Tyrannus eam Factióve capessat; nec ipse Populus jam Populus est si sit injustus, quoniam non est Multitudo Juris consensu & Utilitatis communione sociata.

Fragmentum Ciceronis ex lib. 3. de Republica, apud Augustin. de Civ. Dei, l. 2. c. 21.

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1737

UTOPIA
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TO THE

LORD MAYOR, ALDERMEN, SHERIFFS, and COMMON COUNCIL of *LONDON.*

IT is not better known to you, moſt worthy Magiſtrates, that Government is the preſerving Cauſe of all Societies, than that every Society is in a languiſhing or flouriſhing condition, anſwerable to the particular Conſtitution of its Government: And if the Goodneſs of the Laws in any place be thus diſtinguiſhable by the Happineſs of the People, ſo the Wiſdom of the People is beſt diſcern'd by the Laws they have made, or by which they have choſen to be govern'd. The truth of theſe Obſervations is no where more conſpicuous than in the preſent State of that moſt Antient and Famous Society you have the honour to rule, and which reciprocally injoys the chearful influence of your Adminiſtration. 'Tis ſolely to its Government that *London* owes being univerſally acknowledg'd the largeſt, faireſt, richeſt, and moſt populous City in the World; all which glorious Attributes could have no Foundation in Hiſtory or Nature, if it were not likewiſe the moſt free. 'Tis confeſt indeed that it derives infinite Advantages above other places from its incomparable Situation, as being an inland City, ſeated in the middle of a Vale no leſs delicious than healthy, and on the Banks of a Noble River, in reſpect of which (if we regard how many ſcore miles it is navigable, the clearneſs and depth of its Channel, or its ſmooth and even Courſe) the *Seine* is but a Brook, and the celebrated *Tyber* it ſelf a Rivulet: Yet all this could never raiſe it to any conſiderable pitch without the ineſtimable Bleſſings of LIBERTY, which has choſen her peculiar Reſidence, and more eminently fixt her Throne in this place. LIBERTY is the true Spring of its prodigious Trade and Commerce with all the known parts of the Univerſe, and is the original

Planter

Planter of its many fruitful Colonies in *America*, with its numberleſs Factories in *Europe*, *Aſia*, and *Africa*: hence it is that every Sea is cover'd with our Ships, that the very Air is ſcarce exempted from our Inventions, and that all the Productions of Art or Nature are imported to this common Store-houſe of Mankind; or rather as if the whole Variety of things wherewith the Earth is ſtockt had been principally deſign'd for our profit or delight, and no more of 'em allow'd to the reſt of Men, than what they muſt neceſſarily uſe as our Purveyors or Labourers. As LIBERTY has elevated the native Citizens of *London* to ſo high a degree of Riches and Politeneſs, that for their ſtately Houſes, fine Equipages, and ſumptuous Tables, they exceed the Port of ſome Foreign Princes; ſo is it natu ally become every Man's Country, and the happy Refuge of thoſe in all Nations, who prefer the ſecure injoyment of Life and Property to the glittering pomp and ſlavery, as well as to the arbitrary luſt and rapine of their ſeveral Tyrants. To the ſame Cauſe is owing the Splendor and Magnificence of the publick Structures, as Palaces, Temples, Halls, Colleges, Hoſpitals, Schools, Courts of Judicature, and a great many others of all kinds, which, tho' ſingly excel'd where the Wealth or State of any Town cannot reach further than one Building, yet, taking them all together, they are to be equal'd no where beſides. The delicate Country Seats, and the large Villages crouded on all hands around it, are manifeſt Indications how happily the Citizens live, and makes a Stranger apt to believe himſelf in the City before he approaches it by ſome miles. Nor is it to the felicity of the preſent times that *London* is only indebted: for in all Ages, and under all Changes, it ever ſhew'd a moſt paſſionate love of LIBERTY, which it has not more bravely preſerv'd than wiſely manag'd, infuſing the ſame Genius into all quarters of the Land, which are influenc'd from hence as the ſeveral parts of the Animal Body are duly ſupply'd with Blood and Nouriſhment from the Heart. Whenever therefore the execrable deſign was hatcht to inſlave the Inhabitants of this Country, the firſt Attempts were ſtill made on the Government of the City, as there alſo the ſtrongeſt and moſt ſucceſsful Efforts were firſt us'd to reſtore Freedom: for we may remember

member (to name one inſtance for all) when the late King was fled, and every thing in confuſion, that then the chief Nobility and Gentry reſorted to *Guild-hall* for protection, and to concert proper methods for ſettling the Nation hereafter on a Baſis of Liberty never to be ſhaken. But what greater Demonſtration can the World require concerning the Excellency of our National Government, or the particular Power and Freedom of this City, than the BANK of *England*, which, like the Temple of SATURN among the *Romans*, is eſteem'd ſo ſacred a Repoſitory, that even Foreigners think their Treaſure more ſafely lodg'd there than with themſelves at home; and this not only done by the Subjects of Abſolute Princes, where there can be no room for any publick Credit, but likewiſe by the Inhabitants of thoſe Common-wealths where alone ſuch Banks were hitherto reputed ſecure. I am the more willing to make this Remark, becauſe the Conſtitution of our Bank is both preferable to that of all others, and comes the neareſt of any Government to HARRINGTON's Model. In this reſpect a particular Commendation is due to the City which produc'd ſuch Perſons to whoſe Wiſdom we owe ſo beneficial an Eſtabliſhment: and therefore from my own ſmall obſervation on Men or Things I fear not to propheſy, that, before the term of years be expir'd to which the Bank is now limited, the deſires of all people will gladly concur to have it render'd perpetual. Neither is it one of the laſt things on which you ought to value your ſelves, moſt worthy Citizens, that there is ſcarce a way of honouring the Deity known any where, but is either already allow'd, or may be ſafely exercis'd among you; Toleration being only deny'd to immoral Practices, and the Opinions of Men being left as free to them as their Poſſeſſions, excepting only POPERY, and ſuch other Rites and Notions as directly tend to diſturb or diſſolve Society. Beſides the political Advantages of Union, Wealth, and Numbers of People, which are the certain Conſequents of this impartial Liberty, 'tis alſo highly congruous to the nature of true Religion; and if any thing on Earth can be imagin'd to ingage the Intereſt of Heaven, it muſt be ſpecially that which procures it the ſincere and voluntary reſpect of Mankind. I might here

diſplay

diſplay the Renown of the City for Military Glory, and recite thoſe former valiant Atchievements which our Hiſtorians carefully record; but I ſhould never finiſh if I inlarg'd on thoſe things which I only hint, or if I would mention the extraordinary Privileges which *London* now injoys, and may likely poſſeſs hereafter, for which ſhe well deſerves the name of a *New Rome in the Weſt*, and like the old one, to become the Soveraign Miſtreſs of the Univerſe.

THE Government of the City is ſo wiſely and completely contriv'd, that HARRINGTON made very few Alterations in it, tho' in all the other parts of our National Conſtitution he ſcarce left any thing as he found it. And without queſtion it is a moſt excellent Model. The Lord Mayor, as to the Solemnity of his Election, the Magnificence of his State, or extent of his Authority, tho' inferior to a *Roman* Conſul (to whom in many reſpects he may be fitly compar'd) yet he far out-ſhines the figure made by an *Athenian Archon*, or the grandeur of any Magiſtrate preſiding over the beſt Cities now in the World. During a vacancy of the Throne he is the chief Perſon in the Nation, and is at all times veſted with a very extraordinary Truſt, which is the reaſon that this Dignity is not often confer'd on undeſerving Perſons; of which we need not go further for an Inſtance than the Right Honourable Sir RICHARD LEVET, who now ſo worthily fills that eminent Poſt, into which he was not more freely choſen by the Suffrages of his Fellow-citizens, than he continues to diſcharge the Functions of it with approv'd Moderation and Juſtice. But of the great Caution generally us'd in the choice of Magiſtrates, we may give a true Judgment by the preſent Worſhipful Sheriffs, Sir CHARLES DUNCOMB and Sir JEFFERY JEFFERIES, who are not the Creatures of petty Factions and Cabals, nor (as in the late Reigns) illegally obtruded on the City to ſerve a Turn for the Court, but unanimouſly elected for thoſe good Qualities, which alone ſhould be the proper Recommendations to Magiſtracy; that as having the greateſt Stakes to loſe they will be the more concern'd for ſecuring the Property of others, ſo their willingneſs to ſerve their Country is known not to be inferior to their Zeal

for

for King WILLIAM; and while they are, for the Credit of the City, generouſly equalling the Expences of the *Roman Prætors*, ſuch at the ſame time is their tender care of the Diſtreſt, as if to be Overſeers of the Poor were their ſole and immediate Charge. As the Common Council is the Popular Repreſentative, ſo the Court of Aldermen is the Ariſtocratical Senate of the City. To enter on the particular Merits of thoſe Names who compoſe this illuſtrious Aſſembly, as it muſt be own'd by all to be a labour no leſs arduous than extremely nice and invidious, yet to paſs it quite over in ſuch a manner as not to give at leaſt a Specimen of ſo much Worth, would argue a puſillanimity inconſiſtent with LIBERTY, and a diſreſpect to thoſe I wou'd be always underſtood to honour. In regard therefore that the eldeſt Alderman is the ſame at *London* with what the Prince of the Senate was at *Rome*, I ſhall only preſume to mention the Honourable Sir ROBERT CLAYTON as well in that capacity, as by reaſon he univerſally paſſes for the perfect Pattern of a good Citizen. That this Character is not exaggerated will be evident to all thoſe who conſider him, either as raiſing a plentiful Fortune by his Induſtry and Merit, or as diſpoſing his Eſtate with no leſs liberality and judgment than he got it with honeſty and care: For as to his publick and private Donations, and the proviſion he has made for his Relations or Friends, I will not ſay that he is unequal'd by any, but that he deſerves to be imitated by all. Yet theſe are ſmall Commendations if compar'd to his ſteady Conduct when he ſupply'd the higheſt Stations of this Great City. The danger of defending the Liberty of the Subject in thoſe calamitous times is not better remember'd than the courage with which he acted, particularly in bringing in the Bill for excluding a Popiſh Succeſſor from the Crown, his brave appearance on the behalf of your Charter, and the general applauſe with which he diſcharg'd his Truſt in all other reſpects; nor ought the Gratitude of the People be forgot, who on this occaſion firſt ſtil'd him *the Father of the City*, as CICERO for the like reaſon was the firſt of all *Romans* call'd *the Father of his Country*. That he ſtill aſſiſts in the Government of *London* as eldeſt Alderman, and in that of the

the whole Nation as a Member of the High Court of Parliament, is not ſo great an honour as that he deſerves it; while the Poſterity of thoſe Families he ſupports, and the memory of his other laudable Actions, will be the living and eternal Monuments of his Virtue, when time has conſum'd the moſt durable Braſs or Marble.

TO whom therefore ſhou'd I inſcribe a Book containing the Rules of good Polity, but to a Society ſo admirably conſtituted, and producing ſuch Great and Excellent Men? That elſewhere there may be found who underſtand Government better, diſtribute Juſtice wiſer, or love Liberty more, I could never perſuade my ſelf to imagine: nor can the Perſon wiſh for a nobler Addreſs, or the Subject be made happy in a more ſuitable Patronage than THE SENATE AND PEOPLE OF *LONDON*; to whoſe uninterrupted increaſe of Wealth and Dignity, none can be a heartier Well-wiſher, than the greateſt admirer of their Conſtitution, and their moſt humble Servant,

JOHN TOLAND.

THE

THE PREFACE.

HOW allowable it is for any man to write the Hiſtory of another, without intitling himſelf to his Opinions, or becoming anſwerable for his Actions, I have expreſly treated in the Life of JOHN MILTON, and in the juſt defence of the ſame under the Title of *AMYNTOR*. The Reaſons there alledg'd are Excuſe and Authority enough for the Taſk I have ſince impos'd on my ſelf, which is, to tranſmit to Poſterity the worthy Memory of JAMES HARRINGTON, a bright Ornament to uſeful Learning, a hearty Lover of his Native Country, and a generous Benefactor to the whole World; a Perſon who obſcur'd the falſe Luſtre of our Modern Politicians, and that equal'd (if not exceeded) all the Ancient Legiſlators.

BUT there are ſome People more formidable for their Noiſe than Number, and for their Number more conſiderable than their Power who will not fail with open mouths to proclaim that this is a ſeditious Attempt againſt the very being of Monarchy, and that there's a pernicious deſign on foot of ſpeedily introducing a Republican Form of Government into the *Britannick* Iſlands; in order to which the Perſon (continue they) whom we have for ſome time diſtinguiſht as a zealous promoter of this Cauſe, has now publiſht the Life and Works of HARRINGTON, who was the greateſt Common-wealthſman in the World. This is the ſubſtance of what theſe roaring and hoarſe Trumpeters of Detraction will ſound; for what's likely to be ſaid by men who talk all by rote, is as eaſy to gueſs as to anſwer, tho' its commonly ſo ſilly as to deſerve no Animadverſion. Thoſe who in the late Reigns were invidiouſly nicknam'd *Common-wealthſmen*, are by this time ſufficiently clear'd of that Imputation by their Actions, a much better Apology than any Words: For they valiantly reſcu'd our antient Government from the devouring Jaws of Arbitrary Power, and did not only unanimouſly concur to fix the Imperial Crown of *England* on the moſt deſerving head in the Univerſe, but alſo ſettled the Monarchy for the future, not as if they intended to bring it ſoon to a period, but under ſuch wiſe Regulations as are moſt likely to continue it for ever, conſiſting of ſuch excellent Laws as indeed ſet bounds to the Will of the King, but that render him thereby the more ſafe, equally binding up his and the Subjects hands from unjuſtly ſeizing one another's preſcrib'd Rights or Privileges.

'Tis confeſt, that in every Society there will be always found ſome Perſons prepar'd to enterprize any thing (tho' never ſo flagitious) grown deſperate by their Villainies, their Profuſeneſs, their Ambition, or the more raging madneſs of Superſtition; and this Evil is not within the compaſs of Art or Nature to remedy. But that a whole People, or any conſiderable number of them, ſhou'd rebel againſt a King that well and wiſely adminiſters his Government, as it cannot be

inſtanc'd out of any Hiſtory, ſo it is a thing in it ſelf impoſſible. An infallible Expedient therefore to exclude a Common-wealth, is for the King to be the Man of his People, and, according to his preſent Majeſty's glorious Example, to find out the Secret of ſo happily uniting two ſeemingly incompatible things, Principality and Liberty.

'TIS ſtrange that men ſhou'd be cheated by mere Names! yet how frequently are they ſeen to admire under one denomination, what going under another they wou'd undoubtedly deteſt; which Obſervation made TACITUS lay down for a Maxim, That *the ſecret of ſetting up a new State conſiſts in retaining the Image of the old.* Now if a Common-wealth be a Government of Laws enacted for the common Good of all the People, not without their own Conſent or Approbation; and that they are not wholly excluded, as in abſolute Monarchy, which is a Government of Men who forcibly rule over others for their own private Intereſt: Then it is undeniably manifeſt that the *Engliſh* Government is already a Common-wealth, the moſt free and beſt conſtituted in all the world. This was frankly acknowledg'd by King JAMES the Firſt, who ſtil'd himſelf *the Great Servant of the Common-wealth.* It is the Language of our beſt Lawyers, and allow'd by our Author, who only makes it a leſs perfect and more inequal Form than that of his *Oceana*, wherein, he thinks, better proviſion is made againſt external Violence or internal Diſeaſes. Nor does it at all import by what names either Perſons, or Places, or Things are call'd, ſince the Common-wealthſman finds he enjoys Liberty under the ſecurity of equal Laws, and that the reſt of the Subjects are fully ſatisfy'd they live under a Government which is a Monarchy in effect as well as in name. There's not a man alive that exceeds my affection to a mix'd Form of Government, by the Antients counted the moſt perfect; yet I am not ſo blinded with admiring the good Conſtitution of our own, but that every day I can diſcern in it many things deficient, ſome things redundant, and others that require emendation or change. And of this the ſupreme Legiſlative Powers are ſo ſenſible, that we ſee nothing more frequent with them than the enacting, abrogating, explaining, and altering of Laws, with regard to the very Form of the Adminiſtration. Nevertheleſs I hope the King and both Houſes of Parliament will not be counted Republicans; or, if they be, I am the readieſt in the world to run the ſame good or bad Fortune with them in this as well as in all other reſpects.

BUT, what HARRINGTON was oblig'd to ſay on the like occaſion, I muſt now produce for my ſelf. It was in the time of ALEXANDER, the greateſt Prince and Commander of his Age, that ARISTOTLE (with ſcarce inferior Applauſe, and equal Fame) wrote that excellent piece of Prudence in his Cloſet which is call'd his *Politicks*, going upon far other Principles than ALEXANDER's Government which it has long outliv'd. The like did LIVY without diſturbance in the time of AUGUSTUS, Sir THOMAS MORE in that of HENRY the Eighth, and MACHIAVEL when *Italy* was under Princes that afforded him not the ear. If theſe and many other celebrated Men wrote not only with honour and ſafety, but even of Common-wealths under Deſpotic or Tyrannical Princes, who can be ſo notoriouſly ſtupid as to wonder that in a free Government, and under a King that is both the reſtorer and ſupporter of the Liberty of *Europe*, I ſhou'd do juſtice to an Author who far outdoes all that went before him in his exquiſite knowledge of the Politicks?

THIS

THIS Liberty of writing freely, fully, and impartially, is a part of thoſe Rights which in the laſt Reigns were ſo barbarouſly invaded by ſuch as had no inclination to hear of their own enormous violations of the Laws of God and Man; nor is it undeſerving Obſervation, that ſuch as raiſe the loudeſt Clamours againſt it now, are the known Enemies of King WILLIAM's Title and Perſon, being ſure that the Abdicated King JAMES can never be reinthron'd ſo long as the Preſs is open for brave and free Spirits to diſplay the Miſchiefs of Tyranny in their true Colours, and to ſhew the infinite Advantages of Liberty. But not to diſmiſs even ſuch unreaſonable People without perfect ſatisfaction, let 'em know that I don't recommend a Common-wealth, but write the Hiſtory of a Common-wealthſman, fairly divulging the Principles and Pretences of that Party, and leaving every body to approve or diſlike what he pleaſes, without impoſing on his Judgment by the deluding Arts of Sophiſtry, Eloquence, or any other ſpecious but unfair methods of perſuaſion. Men, to the beſt of their ability, ought to be ignorant of nothing; and while they talk ſo much for and againſt a Common-wealth, 'tis fit they ſhou'd at leaſt underſtand the Subject of their Diſcourſe, which is not every body's caſe. Now as HARRINGTON's *Oceana* is, in my Opinion, the moſt perfect Form of Popular Government that ever was: ſo this, with his other Writings, contain the Hiſtory, Reaſons, Nature, and Effects of all ſorts of Government, with ſo much Learning and Perſpicuity, that nothing can be more preferably read on ſuch occaſions.

LET not thoſe therefore, who make no oppoſition to the reprinting or reading of PLATO's Heathen Common-wealth, ridiculouſly declaim againſt the better and Chriſtian Model of HARRINGTON; but peruſe both of 'em with as little prejudice, paſſion, or concern, as they would a Book of Travels into the *Indies* for their improvement and diverſion. Yet ſo contrary are the Tempers of many to this equitable diſpoſition, that DIONYSIUS the *Sicilian* Tyrant, and ſuch Beaſts of Prey, are the worthy Examples they wou'd recommend to the imitation of our Governors, tho', if they cou'd be able to perſuade 'em, they wou'd ſtill miſs of their fooliſh aim: for it is ever with all Books, as formerly with thoſe of CREMUTIUS CORDUS, who was condemn'd by that Monſter TIBERIUS for ſpeaking honourably of the immortal Tyrannicides BRUTUS and CASSIUS. TACITUS records the laſt words of this Hiſtorian, and ſubjoins this judicious Remark: *The Senate*, ſays he, *order'd his Books to be burnt by the Ediles; but ſome Copies were conceal'd, and afterwards publiſh'd; whence we may take occaſion to laugh at the Sottiſhneſs of thoſe who imagine that their preſent Power can alſo aboliſh the Memory of ſucceeding Time: for on the contrary, Authors acquire additional Reputation by their Puniſhment; nor have foreign Kings, and ſuch others as have us'd the like ſeverity, got any thing by it, except to themſelves Diſgrace, and Glory to the Writers.* But the Works of HARRINGTON were neither ſuppreſt at their firſt publication under the Uſurper, nor ever ſince call'd in by lawful Authority, but as ineſtimable Treaſures preſerv'd by all that had the happineſs to poſſeſs 'em intire; ſo that what was a precious rarity before, is now become a publick Good, with extraordinary advantages of Correctneſs, Paper, and Print. What I have perform'd in the Hiſtory of his Life, I leave the Readers to judge for themſelves; but in that and all my other Studies, I conſtantly aim'd as much at leaſt at the benefit

of

of Mankind, and eſpecially of my fellow Citizens, as at my own particular Entertainment or Reputation.

THE Politicks, no leſs than Arms, are the proper ſtudy of a Gentleman, tho' he ſhou'd confine himſelf to nothing, but carefully adorn his Mind and Body with all uſeful and becoming Accompliſhments; and not imitate the ſervile drudgery of thoſe mean Spirits, who, for the ſake of ſome one Science, neglect the knowledge of all other matters, and in the end are many times neither maſters of what they profeſs, nor vers'd enough in any thing elſe to ſpeak of it agreeably or pertinently: which renders 'em untractable in Converſation, as in Diſpute they are opinionative and paſſionate, envious of their Fame who eclipſe their littleneſs, and the ſworn Enemies of what they do not underſtand.

BUT Heaven be duly prais'd, Learning begins to flouriſh again in its proper Soil among our Gentlemen, in imitation of the *Roman* Patricians, who did not love to walk in Leading-ſtrings, and to be guided blindfold, nor lazily to abandon the care of their proper Buſineſs to the management of Men having a diſtinct Profeſſion and Intereſt: for the greateſt part of their beſt Authors were Perſons of Conſular Dignity, the ableſt Stateſmen, and the moſt gallant Commanders. Wherefore the ampleſt ſatisfaction I can enjoy of this ſort will be, to find thoſe delighted with reading this Work, for whoſe ſervice it was intended by the Author; and which with the ſtudy of other good Books, but eſpecially a careful peruſal of the *Greek* and *Roman* Hiſtorians, will make 'em in reality deſerve the Title and Reſpect of Gentlemen, help 'em to make an advantageous Figure in their own time, perpetuate their illuſtrious Names and ſolid Worth to be admir'd by future Generations.

AS for my ſelf, tho' no imployment or condition of Life ſhall make me diſreliſh the laſting entertainment which Books afford; yet I have reſolv'd not to write the Life of any modern Perſon again, except that only of one man ſtill alive, and whom in the ordinary courſe of nature I am like to ſurvive a long while, he being already far advanc'd in his declining time, and I but this preſent day beginning the thirtieth year of my Age.

Canon near *Banſted*, *Novemb.* 30. 1699.

THE

THE

LIFE

OF

James Harrington.

1. *JAMES HARRINGTON* (who was born in *January*, 1611) was deſcended of an Antient and Noble Family in *Rutlandſhire*, being Great Grandſon to Sir JAMES HARRINGTON; of whom it is obſerv'd by the * Hiſtorian of that County, that there were ſprung in his time eight Dukes, three Marquiſſes, ſeventy Earls, twenty ſeven Viſcounts, and thirty ſix Barons; of which number ſixteen were Knights of the Garter: to confirm which Account, we ſhall annex a Copy of the Inſcription on his Monument and that of his three Sons at *Exton*, with Notes on the ſame by an uncertain hand. As for our Author, he was the eldeſt Son of Sir SAPCOTES HARRINGTON, and JANE the Daughter of Sir WILLIAM SAMUEL of *Upton* in *Northamptonſhire*. His Father had Children beſides him, WILLIAM a Merchant in *London*; ELIZABETH marry'd to Sir RALPH ASHTON in *Lancaſhire*, Baronet; ANN marry'd to ARTHUR EVELYN, Eſq. And by a ſecond Wife he had JOHN kill'd at Sea; EDWARD a Captain in the Army, yet living; FRANCES marry'd to JOHN BAGSHAW of *Culworth* in *Northamptonſhire*, Eſq; and DOROTHY marry'd to ALLAN BELLINGHAM of *Levens* in *Weſtmorland* Eſq. This Lady is ſtill alive, and, when ſhe underſtood my Deſign, was pleas'd to put me in poſſeſſion of all the remaining Letters, and other Manuſcript Papers of her Brother, with the Collections and Obſervations relating to him, made by his other Siſter the Lady ASHTON, a Woman of very extraordinary Parts and Accompliſhments. Theſe, with the Account given of him by ANTHONY WOOD in the ſecond Volum of his *Athenæ Oxonienſes*, and what I cou'd learn from the Mouths of his ſurviving Acquaintance, are the Materials whereof I compos'd this inſuing Hiſtory of his Life.

* Wright's *Antiquity of the County of* Rutland, *p.* 52.

2. IN his very Childhood he gave ſure hopes of his future Abilitys, as well by his Inclination and Capacity to learn whatever

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was propos'd to him, as by a kind of natural gravity; whence his Parents and Maſters were wont to ſay, That he rather kept them in aw, than needed their correction: yet when grown a Man, none could eaſily ſurpaſs him for quickneſs of Wit, and a moſt facetious Temper. He was enter'd a Gentleman Commoner of *Trinity College* in *Oxford* in the year 1629, and became a Pupil to that great Maſter of Reaſon Dr. CHILLINGWORTH, who diſcovering the Errors, Impoſtures, and Tyranny of the *Popiſh* Church (whereof he was for ſometime a Member) attackt it with more proper and ſucceſsful Arms than all before, or perhaps any ſince have don. After conſiderably improving his Knowlege in the Univerſity, he was more particularly fitting himſelf for his intended Travels, by learning ſeveral Foreign Languages, when his Father dy'd, leaving him under Age. Tho' the Court of Wards was ſtill in being, yet by the Soccage Tenure of his Eſtate he was at liberty to chuſe his own Guardian; and accordingly picht upon his Grandmother the Lady SAMUEL, a Woman eminent for her Wiſdom and Virtue. Of her and the reſt of his Governors, he ſoon obtain'd a permiſſion to ſatisfy his eager deſire of ſeeing ſome other parts of the World, where he cou'd make ſuch Obſervations on Men and Manners, as might beſt fit him in due time to ſerve and adorn his Native Country.

3. HIS firſt ſtep was into *Holland*, then the principal School of Martial Diſciplin, and (what toucht him more ſenſibly) a place wonderfully flouriſhing under the influence of their Liberty which they had ſo lately aſſerted, by breaking the Yoke of a ſevere Maſter, the *Spaniſh* Tyrant. And here, no doubt, it was that he begun to make Government the Subject of his Meditations: for he was often heard to ſay, that, before he left *England*, he knew no more of Monarchy, Anarchy, Ariſtocracy, Democracy, Oligarchy, or the like, than as hard words whereof he learnt the ſignification in his Dictionary. For ſom months he liſted himſelf in my Lord CRAVEN's Regiment and Sir ROBERT STONE's; during which time being much at the *Hague*, he had the opportunity of further accompliſhing himſelf in two Courts, namely thoſe of the Prince of *Orange*, and the Queen of *Bohemia*, the Daughter of our K. JAMES I. then a Fugitive in *Holland*, her Husband having been abandon'd by his Father in Law, betray'd by the King of *Spain*, and ſtript of all his Territorys by the Emperor. This excellent Princeſs entertain'd him with extraordinary favour and civility on the account of his Uncle the Lord HARRINGTON, who had been her Governor; but particularly for the ſake of his own Merit. The Prince Elector alſo courted him into his Service, ingag'd him to attend him in a Journy he made to the Court of *Denmark*, and, after his return from travelling, committed the chief management of all his Affairs in *England* to his care. Nor were the young Princeſſes leſs delighted with his Company, his Converſation being always extremely pleaſant, as well as learn'd and polite; to which good qualitys thoſe unfortunat Ladys were far from being ſtrangers, as appears by the Letters of the great Philoſopher CARTESIUS, and by the other Writers of thoſe times.

4. THO he found many Charms inviting his longer ſtay in this place, yet none were ſtrong enough to keep him from purſuing his main deſign of travelling; and therefore he went next thro *Flanders* into *France*, where having perfected himſelf in the Language, ſeen what

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deſerv'd his curioſity, and made ſuch Remarks on their Government as will beſt appear in his Works, he remov'd thence into *Italy*. It happen'd to be then (as it is now) the Year of *Jubilee*. He always us'd to admire the great dexterity, wherwith the *Popiſh* Clergy could maintain their ſevere Government over ſo great a part of the World, and that Men otherwiſe reaſonable enough ſhould be inchanted out of their Senſes, as well as cheated out of their Mony, by theſe ridiculous Tricks of Religious Pageantry. Except the ſmall reſpect he ſhew'd to the Miracles they daily told him were perform'd in their Churches, he did in all other things behave himſelf very prudently and inoffenſively. But going on a *Candlemaſs* day with ſeveral other Proteſtants, to ſee the Pope perform the Ceremony of conſecrating Wax Lights; and perceiving that none could obtain any of thoſe Torches, except ſuch as kiſt the Pope's To, (which he expos'd to 'em for that purpoſe) tho he had a great mind to one of the Lights, yet he would not accept it on ſo hard a condition. The reſt of his Companions were not ſo ſcrupulous, and after their return complain'd of his ſqueamiſhneſs to the King; who telling him he might have done it only as a reſpect to a temporal Prince, he preſently reply'd, that ſince he had the honor to kiſs his Majeſty's hand, he thought it beneath him to kiſs any other Prince's foot. The King was pleas'd with his anſwer, and did afterwards admit him to be one of his Privy Chamber extraordinary, in which quality he attended him in his firſt Expedition againſt the *Scots*.

5. HE prefer'd *Venice* to all other places in *Italy*, as he did its Government to all thoſe of the whole World, it being in his Opinion immutable by any external or internal Cauſes, and to finiſh only with Mankind; of which Aſſertion you may find various proofs alleg'd in his Works. Here he furniſhed himſelf with a Collection of all the valuable Books in the *Italian* Language, eſpecially treating of Politics, and contracted acquaintance with every one of whom he might receive any benefit by inſtruction or otherwiſe.

6. AFTER having thus ſeen *Italy*, *France*, the *Low Countrys*, *Denmark*, and ſome parts of *Germany*, he returned home into *England*, to the great joy of all his Friends and Acquaintance. But he was in a ſpecial manner the Darling of his Relations, of whom he acknowleg'd to receive reciprocal ſatisfaction. His Brothers and Siſters were now pretty well grown, which made it his next care ſo to provide for each of 'em as might render 'em independent of others, and eaſy to themſelves. His Brother WILLIAM he bred to be a Merchant, in which calling he became a conſiderable Man; he was a good Architect, and was ſo much notic'd for his ingenious Contrivances, that he was receiv'd a Fellow of the Royal Society. How his other Brothers were diſpos'd, we mentioned in the beginning of this Diſcourſe. He took all the care of a Parent in the education of his Siſters, and wou'd himſelf make large Diſcourſes to 'em concerning the Reverence that was due to Almighty God; the benevolence they were obliged to ſhew all mankind; how they ought to furniſh their minds with knowlege by reading of uſeful Books, and to ſhew the goodneſs of their diſpoſition by a conſtant practice of Virtue: In a word, he taught 'em the true Rules of humanity and decency, always inculcating to 'em that good Manners did not ſo much conſiſt in a faſhionable carriage (which ought not to be neglected) as in becoming words and actions, an obliging addreſs, and a modeſt behavior. He treated his Mother in Law

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as if ſhe were his own, and made no diſtinction between her Children and the reſt of his Brothers and Siſters; which good Example had ſuch effects on 'em all, that no Family has bin more remarkable for their mutual friendſhip.

7. HE was of a very liberal and compaſſionate nature, nor could he indure to ſee a Friend want any thing he might ſpare; and when the Relief that was neceſſary exceded the bounds of his Eſtate, he perſuaded his Siſters not only to contribute themſelves, but likewiſe to go about to the reſt of their Relations to complete what was wanting. And if at any time they alleg'd that this Bounty had been thrown away on ungrateful Perſons, he would anſwer with a ſmile that he ſaw they were mercenary, and that they plainly ſold their Gifts ſince they expected ſo great a return as Gratitude.

8. HIS natural inclinations to ſtudy kept him from ſeeking after any publick Imployments. But in the year 1646, attending out of curioſity the Commiſſioners appointed by Parlament to bring King CHARLES the Firſt from *Newcaſtle* nearer to *London*, he was by ſom of 'em nam'd to wait on his Majeſty, as a Perſon known to him before, and ingag'd to no Party or Faction. The King approv'd the Propoſal, yet our Author would never preſume to com into his preſence except in public, till he was particularly commanded by the King; and that he, with THOMAS HERBERT (created a Baronet after the Reſtoration of the Monarchy) were made Grooms of the Bedchamber at *Holmby*, together with JAMES MAXWELL and PATRICK MAULE (afterwards Earl of *Penmoore* in *Scotland*) which two only remain'd of his old Servants in that Station.

9. HE had the good luck to grow very acceptable to the King, who much convers'd with him about Books and Foren Countrys. In his Siſters Papers I find it expreſt, that at the King's command he tranſlated into *Engliſh* Dr. SANDERSONS Book concerning the Obligation of Oaths: but ANTHONY WOOD ſays it was the King's own doing, and that he ſhew'd it at different times to HARRINGTON, HERBERT, Dr. JUXON, Dr. HAMMOND, and Dr. SHELDON for their approbation. However that be, 'tis certain he ſerv'd his Maſter with untainted fidelity, without doing any thing inconſiſtent with the Liberty of his Country; and that he made uſe of his Intereſt with his Friends in Parlament to have Matters accommodated for the ſatisfaction of all Partys. During the Treaty in the *Ile of Wight*, he frequently warn'd the Divines of his acquaintance to take heed how far they preſt theKing to inſiſt upon any thing, which, however it concern'd their Dignity, was no eſſential point of Religion; and that ſuch matters driven too far wou'd infallibly ruin all the indeavors us'd for a Peace, which Prophecy was prov'd too true by the Event. *His Majeſty lov'd his company*, ſays ANTHONY WOOD, *and, finding him to be an ingenious Man, choſe rather to converſe with him than with others of his Chamber: They had often diſcourſes concerning Government; but when they happen'd to talk of a Commonwealth, the King ſeem'd not to indure it.* Here I know not which moſt to commend, the King for truſting a Man of Republican Principles, or HARRINGTON for owning his Principles while he ſerv'd a King.

10. AFTER the King was remov'd out of the *Ile of Wight* to *Hurſtcaſtle* in *Hampſhire*, HARRINGTON was forcibly turn'd out of ſervice, becauſe he vindicated ſom of his Majeſty's Arguments againſt

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againſt the Parlament Commiſſioners at *Newport*, and thought his Conceſſions not ſo unſatisfactory as did ſom others. As they were taking the King to *Windſor*, he beg'd admittance to the Boot of the Coach that he might bid his Maſter farewel; which being granted, and he praparing to kneel, the King took him by the hand, and pull'd him in to him. He was for three or four days permitted to ſtay; but becauſe he would not take an Oath againſt aſſiſting or concealing the King's Eſcape, he was not only diſcharged from his Office, but alſo for ſom time detain'd in cuſtody, till Major General IRETON obtain'd his Liberty. He afterwards found means to ſee the King at St. *James*'s, and accompany'd him on the Scaffold, where, or a little before, he receiv'd a Token of his Majeſty's Affection.

11. AFTER the King's Death he was obſerv'd to keep much in his Library, and more retir'd than uſually, which was by his Friends a long time attributed to Melancholy or Diſcontent. At length when they weary'd him with their importunitys to change this ſort of Life, he thought fit to ſhew 'em at the ſame time their miſtake and a Copy of his *Oceana*, which he was privatly writing all that while: telling 'em withal, that ever ſince he began to examin things ſeriouſly, he had principally addicted himſelf to the ſtudy of Civil Government, as being of the higheſt importance to the Peace and Felicity of mankind; and that he ſucceded at leaſt to his own ſatisfaction, being now convinc'd that no Government is of ſo accidental or arbitrary an Inſtitution as people are wont to imagin, there being in Societys natural cauſes producing their neceſſary effects, as well as in the Earth or the Air. Hence he frequently argu'd that the Troubles of his time were not to be wholly attributed to wilfulneſs or faction, neither to the miſgovernment of the Prince, nor the ſtubborneſs of the People; but to a change in the Balance of Property, which ever ſince HENRY the Seventh's time was daily falling into the Scale of the Commons from that of the King and the Lords, as in his Book he evidently demonſtrats and explains. Not that hereby he approv'd either the Breaches which the King had made on the Laws, or excus'd the Severity which ſom of the Subjects exercis'd on the King; but to ſhew that as long as the Cauſes of theſe Diſorders remain'd, ſo long would the like Effects unavoidably follow: while on the one hand a King would be always indeavoring to govern according to the example of his Predeceſſors when the beſt part of the National Property was in their own hands, and conſequently the greateſt command of Mony and Men, as one of a thouſand pounds a Year can entertain more Servants, or influence more Tenants, than another that has but one hundred, out of which he cannot allow one Valet; and on the other hand he ſaid, the People would be ſure to ſtruggle for preſerving the Property whereof they were in poſſeſſion, never failing to obtain more Privileges, and to enlarge the Baſis of their Liberty, as often as they met with any ſucceſs (which they generally did) in quarrels of this kind. His chief aim therfore was to find out a method of preventing ſuch Diſtempers, or to apply the beſt Remedys when they happen'd to break out. But as long as the Balance remain'd in this unequal ſtate, he affirm'd that no King whatſoever could keep himſelf eaſy, let him never ſo much indeavor to pleaſe his People; and that tho a good King might manage Affairs tolerably well during his life, yet this did not prove the Government to be good, ſince under a leſs prudent Prince it would fall to

pieces again, while the Orders of a well conſtituted State make wicked men virtuous, and fools to act wiſely.

12. THAT *Empire follows the Balance of Property*, whether lodg'd in one, in a few, or in many hands, he was the firſt that ever made out; and is a noble Diſcovery, wherof the Honor ſolely belongs to him, as much as thoſe of the Circulation of the Blood, of Printing, of Guns, of the Compaſs, or of Optic Glaſſes, to their ſeveral Authors. 'Tis incredible to think what groſs and numberleſs Errors were committed by all the Writers before him, even by the beſt of them, for want of underſtanding this plain Truth, which is the foundation of all Politics. He no ſooner diſcours'd publicly of this new Doctrin, being a man of univerſal acquaintance, but it ingag'd all ſorts of people to buſy themſelves about it as they were variouſly affected. Som, becauſe they underſtood him, deſpis'd it, alleging it was plain to every man's capacity, as if his higheſt merit did not conſiſt in making it ſo. Others, and thoſe in number the feweſt, diſputed with him about it, merely to be better inform'd; with which he was well pleas'd, as reckoning a pertinent Objection of greater advantage to the diſcovery of Truth (which was his aim) than a complaiſant applauſe or approbation. But a third ſort, of which there never wants in all places a numerous company, did out of pure envy ſtrive all they could to leſſen or defame him; and one of 'em (ſince they could not find any precedent Writer out of whoſe Works they might make him a Plagiary) did indeavor, after a very ſingular manner, to rob him of the Glory of this invention: for our Author having friendly lent him a part of his Papers, he publiſh'd a ſmall piece to the ſame purpoſe intitl'd, *A letter from an Officer of the Army in* Ireland, *&c.* Major WILDMAN was then reputed the Author by ſom, and HENRY NEVIL by others; which latter, by reaſon of this thing, and his great intimacy with HARRINGTON, was by his detractors reported to be the Author of his Works, or that at leaſt he had a principal hand in the compoſing of them. Notwithſtanding which provocations, ſo true was he to the Friendſhip he profeſt to NEVIL and WILDMAN, that he avoided all harſh Expreſſions or public Cenſures on this occaſion, contenting himſelf with the Juſtice which the World was ſoon oblig'd to yield to him by reaſon of his other Writings, where no ſuch clubbing of Brains could be reaſonably ſuſpected.

13. BUT the publication of his Book met with greater difficultys from the oppoſition of the ſeveral Partys then ſet againſt one another, and all againſt him; but none more than ſom of thoſe who pretended to be for a Commonwealth, which was the ſpecious name under which they cover'd the rankeſt Tyranny of OLIVER CROMWEL, while HARRINGTON, like PAUL at *Athens*, indeavor'd to make known to the People what they ignorantly ador'd. By ſhewing that a Commonwealth was a Government of Laws, and not of the Sword, he could not but detect the violent adminiſtration of the Protector by his Baſhaws, Intendants, or Majors General, which created him no ſmall danger: while the Cavaliers on the other ſide tax'd him with Ingratitude to the memory of the late King, and prefer'd the Monarchy even of a Uſurper to the beſt order'd Commonwealth. To theſe he anſwer'd, that it was enough for him to forbear publiſhing his Sentiments during

during that King's life; but the Monarchy being now quite diſſolv'd, and the Nation in a ſtate of Anarchy, or (what was worſe) groaning under a horrid Uſurpation, he was not only at liberty, but even oblig'd as a good Citizen to offer a helping hand to his Countrymen, and to ſhew 'em ſuch a Model of Government as he thought moſt conducing to their Tranquillity, Wealth, and Power: That the Cavaliers ought of all People to be beſt pleas'd with him, ſince if his Model ſucceded, they were ſure to injoy equal Privileges with others, and ſo be deliver'd from their preſent Oppreſſion; for in a well conſtituted Commonwealth there can be no diſtinction of Partys, the paſſage to Preferment is open to Merit in all perſons, and no honeſt man can be uneaſy: but that if the Prince ſhould happen to be reſtor'd, his Doctrin of the Balance would be a light to ſhew him what and with whom he had to do, and ſo either to mend or avoid the Miſcarriages of his Father; ſince all that is ſaid of this doctrin may as well be accommodated to a Monarchy regulated by Laws, as to a Democracy or more popular form of a Commonwealth. He us'd to add on ſuch occaſions another reaſon of writing this Model, which was, That if it ſhould ever be the fate of this Nation to be, like *Italy* of old, overrun by any barbarous People, or to have its Government and Records deſtroyed by the rage of ſom mercileſs Conqueror, they might not be then left to their own Invention in framing a new Government; for few People can be expected to ſuccede ſo happily as the *Venetians* have don in ſuch a caſe.

14. IN the mean time it was known to ſom of the Courtiers, that the Book was a printing; wherupon, after hunting it from one Preſs to another, they ſeiz'd their Prey at laſt, and convey'd it to *Whitehall*. All the ſollicitations he could make were not able to retrieve his Papers, till he remember'd that OLIVER's favorit Daughter, the Lady CLAYPOLE, acted the part of a Princeſs very naturally, obliging all perſons with her civility, and frequently interceding for the unhappy. To this Lady, tho an abſolute ſtranger to him, he thought fit to make his application; and being led into her Antichamber, he ſent in his Name, with his humble requeſt that ſhe would admit him to her preſence. While he attended, ſom of her Women coming into the room were follow'd by her little Daughter about three years old, who ſtaid behind them. He entertained the Child ſo divertingly, that ſhe ſuffer'd him to take her up in his arms till her Mother came; wherupon he ſtepping towards her, and ſetting the Child down at her feet, ſaid, Madam, 'tis well you are com at this nick of time, or I had certainly ſtollen this pretty little Lady: Stollen her, reply'd the Mother! pray, what to do with her? for ſhe is yet too young to becom your Miſtreſs. Madam, ſaid he, tho her Charms aſſure her of a more conſiderable Conqueſt, yet I muſt confeſs it is not love but revenge that promted me to commit this theft. Lord, anſwer'd the Lady again, what injury have I don you that you ſhould ſteal my Child? None at all, reply'd he, but that you might be induc'd to prevail with your Father to do me juſtice, by reſtoring my Child that he has ſtollen. But ſhe urging it was impoſſible, becauſe her Father had Children enough of his own; he told her at laſt it was the iſſue of his brain which was miſrepreſented to the Protector, and taken out of the Preſs by his order. She immediatly promis'd to procure it for him, if it contain'd nothing prejudicial to her Father's Government; and he aſſur'd her it was only a kind of a Political Romance, ſo far from any

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Treaſon againſt her Father, that he hop'd ſhe would acquaint him that he deſign'd to dedicat it to him, and promis'd that ſhe her ſelf ſhould be preſented with one of the firſt Copys. The Lady was ſo well pleas'd with his manner of Addreſs, that he had his Book ſpeedily reſtor'd to him; and he did accordingly inſcribe it to OLIVER CROMWEL, who, after the peruſal of it, ſaid, the Gentleman had like to trapan him out of his Power, but that what he got by the Sword he would not quit for a little paper Shot: adding in his uſual cant, that he approv'd the Government of a ſingle Perſon as little as any of 'em, but that he was forc'd to take upon him the Office of a High Conſtable, to preſerve the Peace among the ſeveral Partys in the Nation, ſince he ſaw that being left to themſelves, they would never agree to any certain form of Government, and would only ſpend their whole Power in defeating the Deſigns, or deſtroying the Perſons of one another.

15. BUT nothing in the world could better diſcover CROMWEL's Diſſimulation than this Speech, ſince HARRINGTON had demonſtrated in his Book, that no Commonwealth could be ſo eaſily or perfectly eſtabliſh'd as one by a ſole Legiſlator, it being in his power (if he were a man of good Invention himſelf, or had a good Model propos'd to him by others) to ſet up a Government in the whole piece at once, and in perfection; but an Aſſembly, being of better Judgment than Invention, generally make patching work in forming a Government, and are whole Ages about that which is ſeldom or never brought by 'em to any perfection: but is commonly ruin'd by the way, leaving the nobleſt Attemts under reproach, and the Authors of 'em expos'd to the greateſt dangers while they live, and to a certain infamy when dead. Wherfore the wiſeſt Aſſemblys, in mending or making a Government, have pitch'd upon a ſole Legiſlator, whoſe Model they could rightly approve, tho not ſo well digeſt; as Muſicians can play in conſort, and judg of an Air that is laid before them, tho to invent a part of Muſic they could never agree, nor ſuccede ſo happily as one Perſon. If CROMWEL therfore had meant as he ſpoke, no man had ever ſuch an opportunity of reforming what was amiſs in the old Government, or ſetting up one wholly new, either according to the Plan of *Oceana*, or any other. This would have made him indeed a *Hero* ſuperior in laſting fame to SOLON, LYCURGUS, ZALEUCUS, and CHARONDAS; and render his Glory far more reſplendent, his Security greater, and his Renoun more durable than all the Pomp of his ill acquir'd Greatneſs could afford: wheras on the contrary he liv'd in continual fears of thoſe he had inſlav'd, dy'd abhor'd as a monſtrous betrayer of thoſe Libertys with which he was intruſted by his Country, and his Poſterity not poſſeſſing a foot of what for their only ſakes he was generally thought to uſurp. But this laſt is a miſtaken Notion, for ſom of the moſt notorious Tyrants liv'd and dy'd without any hopes of Children; which is a good reaſon why no mortal ought to be truſted with too much Power on that ſcore. LYCURGUS and ANDREW DORIA, who, when it was in their power to continue Princes, choſe rather to be the founders of their Countrys Liberty, will be celebrated for their Virtue thro the courſe of all Ages, and their very Names convey the higheſt Ideas of Godlike Generoſity; while JULIUS CÆSAR, OLIVER CROMWEL, and ſuch others as at any time inſlav'd

their

their fellow Citizens, will be for ever remember'd with deteſtation, and cited as the moſt execrable Examples of the vileſt Treachery and Ingratitude. It is only a refin'd and excellent Genius, a noble Soul ambitious of ſolid Praiſe, a ſincere lover of Virtue and the good of all Mankind, that is capable of executing ſo glorious an Undertaking as making a People free. 'Tis my fix'd opinion, that if the Protector's mind had the leaſt tincture of true greatneſs, he could not be Proof againſt the incomparable Rewards propos'd by HARRINGTON in the *Corollary* of his *Oceana*; as no Prince truly generous, whether with or without Heirs, is able to reſiſt their Charms, provided he has an opportunity to advance the happineſs of his People. 'Twas this Diſpoſition that brought the Prince of ORANGE to head us when we lately contended for our Liberty; to this we ow thoſe ineſtimable Laws we have obtain'd, ſince out of a grateful confidence we made him our King; and how great things, or after what manner, we may expect from him in time to com, is as hard to be truly conceiv'd as worthily expreſs'd.

16. I SHALL now give ſom account of the Book it ſelf, intitl'd by the Author, *The Commonwealth of Oceana*, a name by which he deſign'd *England*, as being the nobleſt Iland of the *Northern* Ocean. But before I procede further, I muſt explain ſom other words occurring in this Book, which is written after the manner of a Romance, in imitation of PLATO's *Atlantic Story*, and is a method ordinarily follow'd by Lawgivers.

Adoxus	*King* JOHN.
Convallium	*Hamton Court.*
Coraunus	HENRY VIII.
Dicotome	RIHARD II.
Emporium	*London.*
Halcionia	*The Thames.*
Halo	*Whitehall.*
Hiera	*Weſtminſter.*
Leviathan	HOBBES.
Marpeſia	*Scotland.*
Morpheus	JAMES I.
Mount Celia	*Windſor.*
Neuſtrians	*Normans.*
Olphaus Megaletor	OLIVER CROMWEL.
Panopæa	*Ireland.*
Pantheon	*Weſtminſter Hall.*
Panurgus	HENRY VII.
Parthenia	*Queen* ELIZABETH.
Scandians	*Danes.*
Teutons	*Saxons.*
Turbo	WILLIAM *the Conquerer.*
Verulamius	*Lord Chancellor* BACON.

17. THE Book conſiſts of *Preliminarys* divided into two parts, and a third Section call'd the *Council of Legiſlators*; then follows the *Model* of the Commonwealth, or the body of the Book; and laſtly coms the *Corollary* or Concluſion. The Preliminary Diſcourſes contain the Principles, Generation, and Effects of all Governments, whether Monarchical, Ariſtocratical, or Popular, and their ſeveral Corruptions, as

Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Anarchy, with all the good or bad mixtures that naturally reſult from them. But the firſt part dos in a more particular manner treat of antient Prudence, or that genius of Government which moſt prevail'd in the world till the time of JULIUS CÆSAR. None can conſult a more certain Oracle that would conceive the nature of Foren or Domeſtic Empire; the Balance of Land or Mony; Arms or Contracts; Magiſtracy and Judicatures; Agrarian Laws; Elections by the Ballot; Rotation of Officers, with a great many ſuch heads, eſpecially the inconveniencys and preeminences of each kind of Government, or the true compariſon of 'em all together. Theſe ſubjects have bin generally treated diſtinctly, and every one of them ſeems to require a Volum; yet I am of opinion that in this ſhort Diſcourſe there is a more full and clearer account of them, than can be eaſily found elſwhere; at leaſt I muſt own to have receiv'd greater ſatisfaction here than all my reading before, and the ſame thing has bin frankly own'd to me by others.

18. THE ſecond part of the Preliminarys treats of modern Prudence, or that genius of Government which has moſt obtain'd in the world ſince the expiration of the *Roman* Liberty, particularly the *Gothic* Conſtitution, beginning with the inundation of the barbarous Northern Nations over the *Roman* Empire. In this Diſcourſe there is a very clear account of the *Engliſh* Government under the *Romans*, *Saxons*, *Danes*, and *Normans*, till the foundations of it were cunningly undermin'd by HENRY VII. terribly ſhaken by HENRY VIII. and utterly ruin'd under CHARLES I. Here he muſt read who in a little compaſs would completely underſtand the antient Feuds and Tenures, the original and degrees of our Nobility, with the inferior Orders of the reſt of the People: under the *Saxons*, what was meant by Ealdorman, or Earls; King's Thane; middle Thane or Vavaſors; their Shiremoots, Sheriſs, and Viſcounts; their Halymoots, Weidenagemoots, and ſuch others. Here likewiſe one may learn to underſtand the Baronage of the *Normans*, as the Barons by their Poſſeſſions, by Writ, or by Letters Patent; with many other particulars which give an inſight into the ſprings and management of the Barons Wars, ſo frequent and famous in our Annals. The reſt of this Diſcourſe is ſpent in ſhewing the natural Cauſes of the diſſolution of the *Norman* Monarchy under CHARLES the Firſt, and the generation of the Commonwealth, or rather the Anarchy that ſucceded.

19. NEXT follows the Council of Legiſlators: for HARRINGTON being about to give the moſt perfect Model of Government, he made himſelf maſter of all the Antient and Modern Politicians, that he might as well imitat whatever was excellent or practicably in them, as his care was to avoid all things which were impracticable or inconvenient. Theſe were the juſteſt meaſures that could poſſibly be taken by any body, whether he deſign'd to be rightly inform'd, and ſufficiently furniſh'd with the beſt materials; or whether he would have his Model meet with an eaſy reception; for ſince his own Sentiments (tho never ſo true) were ſure to be rejected as privat Speculations or impracticable Chimeras, this was the readieſt way to make 'em paſs currently, as both authoriz'd by the wiſeſt men in all Nations, and as what in all times and places had bin practis'd with ſucceſs. To this end therfore he introduces, under feign'd names, nine Legiſlators, who perfectly underſtood the ſeveral Governments they were appointed

appointed to represent. The Province of the first was the Commonwealth of *Israel*; that of the second, *Athens*; of the third, *Sparta*; of the fourth, *Carthage*; of the fifth, the *Achæans*, *Ætolians*, and *Lycians*; of the sixth, *Rome*; of the seventh, *Venice*; of the eighth, *Switzerland*; and of the ninth, *Holland*. Out of the Excellencys of all these, supply'd with the Fruits of his own invention, he fram'd the Model of his *Oceana*; and indeed he shews himself in that work so throly vers'd in their several Historys and Constitutions, that to any man who would rightly understand them, I could not easily recommend a more proper Teacher: for here they are dissected and laid open to all Capacitys, their Perfections applauded, their Inconveniencys expos'd, and parallels frequently made between 'em no less entertaining than useful. Nor are the Antient and Modern *Eastern* or *European* Monarchys forgot, but exhibited with all their Advantages and Corruptions, without the least dissimulation or partiality.

20. AS for the *Model*, I shall say nothing of it in particular, as well because I would not forestal the pleasure of the Reader, as by reason an Abridgment of it is once or twice made by himself, and inserted among his Works. The method he observes is to lay down his Orders or Laws in so many positive Propositions, to each of which he subjoins an explanatory Discourse; and if there be occasion, adds a Speech supposd to be deliver'd by the Lord ARCHON, or som of the Legislators. These Speeches are extraordinary fine, contain a world of good Learning and Observation, and are perpetual Commentarys on his Laws. In the *Corollary*, which is the conclusion of the whole Work, he shews how the last hand was put to his Commonwealth; which we must not imagin to treat only of the Form of the Senat and Assemblys of the People, or the manner of waging War and governing in Peace. It contains besides, the Disciplin of a National Religion, and the security of a Liberty of Conscience; a Form of Government for *Scotland*, for *Ireland*, and the other Provinces of the Commonwealth; Governments for *London* and *Westminster*, proportionably to which the other Corporations of the Nation are to be model'd; Directions for the incouraging of Trade; Laws for regulating Academys; and most excellent Rules for the Education of our Youth, as well to the Wars or the Sea, to Manufactures or Husbandry, as to Law, Physic, or Divinity, and chiefly to the breeding and true figure of accomplish'd Gentlemen: There are admirable Orders for reforming the Stage; the number, choice, and business of the Officers of State and the Revenue, with all sorts of Officers; and an exact account both of their Salarys, and the ordinary yearly charge of the whole Commonwealth, which for two rarely consistent things, the grandeur of its State, and the frugal management of its Revenues, excedes all the Governments that ever were. I ought not to omit telling here, that this Model gives a full answer to those who imagin that there can be no Distinctions or Degrees, neither Nobility nor Gentry in a Democracy, being led into this mistake, because they ignorantly think all Commonwealths to be constituted alike; when, if they were but never so little vers'd in History, they might know that no Order of men now in the world can com near the Figure that was made by the Noblemen and Gentlemen of the *Roman* State: nor in this respect dos the Commonwealth of *Oceana* com any thing behind them; for, as HARRINGTON says very truly, *an Army may as well consist of Soldiers without Officers, or of Officers*

Officers without Soldiers, as a Commonwealth (especially such a one as is capable of Greatness) consist of a People without a Gentry, or of a Gentry without a People. So much may suffice for understanding the scope of this Book: I shall only add, that none ought to be offended with a few od terms in it, such as the Prime Magnitude, the Pillar of *Nilus*, the Galaxy, and the Tropic of Magistrats, since the Author explains what he means by 'em, and that any other may call 'em by what more significative names he pleases; for the things themselves are absolutely necessary.

21. NO sooner did this Treatise appear in public, but it was greedily bought up, and becom the subject of all mens discourse. The first that made exceptions to it was Dr. HENRY FERNE, afterwards Bishop of *Chester*. The Lady ASHTON presented him with one of the Books, and desir'd his opinion of it, which he quickly sent in such a manner as shew'd he did not approve of the Doctrin, tho he treated the Person and his Learning with due respect. To this Letter a reply was made, and some Querys sent along with it by HARRINGTON, to every one of which a distinct Answer was return'd by the Doctor; which being again confuted by HARRINGTON, he publish'd the whole in the year 1656, under the title of *Pian Piano, or an Intercourse between* H. FERNE *Doctor in Divinity, and* JAMES HARRINGTON *Esq; upon occasion of the Doctor's Censure of the Commonwealth of* Oceana. 'Tis a Treatise of little importance, and contains nothing but what he has much better discours'd in his answers to other Antagonists, which is the reason that I give the Reader no more trouble about it.

22. THE next that wrote against *Oceana* was MATTHEW WREN, eldest Son to the Bishop of *Ely*. His Book was intitl'd *Considerations*, and restrain'd only to the first part of the Preliminarys. To this our Author publish'd an answer in the first Book of his *Prerogative of Popular Government*, where he inlarges, explains, and vindicats his Assertions. How inequal this Combat was, and after what manner he treated his Adversary, I leave the Reader to judg; only minding him that as WREN was one of the *Virtuosi* who met at Dr. WILKINS's (the Seminary of the now Royal Society) HARRINGTON jokingly said, That *they had an excellent faculty of magnifying a Louse, and diminishing a Commonwealth.* But the Subjects he handles on this occasion are very curious, and reduc'd to the twelve following Questions.

(1.) WHETHER Prudence (or the Politics) be well distinguish'd into Antient and Modern?

(2.) WHETHER a Commonwealth be rightly defin'd to be a Government of Laws and not of men; and Monarchy to be a Government of som men or a few men, and not of Laws?

(3.) WHETHER the Balance of Dominion in Land be the natural cause of Empire?

(4.) WHETHER the Balance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial? and whether these two, or any Nations that are of a distinct Balance, coming to depend on one and the same head, such a mixture creates a new Balance?

(5.) WHETHER there be any common Right or Interest of Mankind distinct from the Interest of the parts taken severally? and how by the orders of a Commonwealth this may best be distinguish'd from privat Interest?

(6.) WHE-

(6.) WHETHER the *Senatuſconſulta*, or Decrees of the *Roman* Senat, had the power of Laws?

(7.) WHETHER the Ten Commandments, propos'd by God or MOSES, were voted and paſt into Laws by the People of *Iſrael*?

(8.) WHETHER a Commonwealth, coming up to the perfection of the Kind, coms not up to the perfection of Government, and has no flaw in it? that is, whether the beſt Commonwealth be not the beſt Government?

(9.) WHETHER Monarchy, coming up to the perfection of the Kind, coms not ſhort of the perfection of Government, and has not ſom flaw in it? that is, whether the beſt Monarchy be not the worſt Government? Under this head are alſo explain'd the Balance of *France*, the Original of a Landed Clergy, Arms, and their ſeveral kinds.

(10.) WHETHER any Commonwealth, that was not firſt broken or divided by it ſelf, was ever conquer'd by any Monarch? where he ſhews that none ever were, and that the greateſt Monarchys have bin broken by very ſmall Commonwealths.

(11.) WHETHER there be not an *Agrarian*, or ſom Law or Laws to ſupply the defects of it, in every Commonwealth? Whether the *Agrarian*, as it is ſtated in *Oceana*, be not equal and ſatisfactory to all Intereſts or Partys?

(12.) WHETHER a Rotation, or Courſes and Turns, be neceſſary to a welorder'd Commonwealth? in which is contain'd the *Parembole* or Courſes of *Iſrael* before the Captivity, together with an Epitome of the Commonwealth of *Athens*, as alſo another of the Commonwealth of *Venice*.

23. THE ſecond Book of the *Prerogative of Popular Government* chiefly concerns Ordination in the Chriſtian Church, and the Orders of the Commonwealth of *Iſrael*, againſt the opinions of Dr. HAMMOND, Dr. SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow. His Diſpute with theſe learned Perſons (the one of the Epiſcopal, and the other of the Preſbyterian Communion) is comprehended in five Chapters.

(1.) THE firſt, explaining the words *Chirotonia* and *Chirotheſia* paraphraſtically relates the Story of the Perambulation made by the Apoſtles PAUL and BARNABAS thro the Citys of *Lycaonia*, *Piſidia*, &c.

(2.) THE ſecond ſhews that thoſe Citys, or moſt of 'em were at the time of this Perambulation under Popular Government; in which is alſo contain'd the whole Adminiſtration of a *Roman* Province.

(3.) THE third ſhews the deduction of the *Chirotonia*, or holding up of hands, from Popular Government, and that the original of Ordination is from this cuſtom: in which is alſo contain'd the Inſtitution of the *Sanhedrim* or Senat of *Iſrael* by MOSES, and of that of *Rome* by ROMULUS.

(4.) THE fourth ſhews the deduction of the *Chirotheſia*, or the laying on of hands, from Monarchical or Ariſtocratical Government, and ſo the ſecond way of Ordination procedes from this cuſtom: here is alſo declar'd how the Commonwealth of the *Jews* ſtood after the Captivity.

(5.) THE fifth debates whether the *Chirotonia* us'd in the Citys mention'd was (as is pretended by Dr. HAMMOND, Dr. SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow) the ſame with the *Chirotheſia*, or a far

different thing. In which are contain'd the divers kinds of Church Government introduc'd and exercis'd in the age of the Apoſtles. By theſe heads we may perceive that a great deal of uſeful Learning is contain'd in this Book; and queſtionleſs he makes thoſe Subjects more plain and intelligible than any Writer I ever yet conſulted.

24. AGAINST *Oceana* chiefly did RICHARD BAXTER write his *Holy Commonwealth*, of which our Author made ſo ſlight that he vouchſaf'd no other anſwer to it but half a ſheet of Cant and Ridicule. It does not appear that *he rail'd at all the Miniſters as a parcel of Fools and Knaves.* But the reſt of BAXTER's complaint ſeems better grounded, as that HARRINGTON maintain'd *neither he nor any Miniſters underſtood at all what Polity was, but prated againſt they knew not what*, &c *This made him publiſh his Holy Commonwealth in anſwer to* HARRINGTON's *Heatheniſh Commonwealth*; *in which*, adds he, *I plead the Cauſe of Monarchy as better than Democracy or Ariſtocracy*; an odd way of modelling a Commonwealth. And yet the Royaliſts were ſo far from thinking his Book for their ſervice, that in the year 1683 it was by a Decree of the Univerſity of *Oxford* condemn'd to be publickly burnt, which Sentence was accordingly executed upon it, in company with ſom of the Books of HOBBES, MILTON, and others; wheras no cenſure paſt on HARRINGTON's *Oceana*, or the reſt of his Works. As for Divines meddling with Politics, he has in the former part of the Preliminarys to *Oceana* deliver'd his Opinion, That *there is ſomthing firſt in the making of a Commonwealth, then in the governing of it, and laſt of all in the leading of its Armys, which (tho there be great Divines, great Lawyers, great Men in all Profeſſions) ſeems to be peculiar only to the genius of a Gentleman: for it is plain in the univerſal ſeries of ſtory, that if any man founded a Commonwealth, he was firſt a Gentleman*; the truth of which Aſſertion he proves from MOSES downwards.

25. BEING much importun'd from all hands to publiſh an Abridgment of his *Oceana*, he conſented at length; and ſo, in the year 1659, was printed his *Art of Lawgiving* (or of Legiſlation) in three Books. The firſt, which treats *of the Foundations and Superſtructures of all kinds of Government*, is an abſtract of his Preliminarys to the *Oceana*: and the third Book, ſhewing *a Model of Popular Government fitted to the preſent State or Balance of this Nation*, is an exact Epitome of his *Oceana*, with ſhort Diſcourſes explaining the Propoſitions. By the way, the Pamphlet called the *Rota* is nothing elſe but theſe Propoſitions without the Diſcourſes, and therfore to avoid a needleſs repetition not printed among his Works. The ſecond Book between theſe two, is a full *Account of the Commonwealth of* Iſrael, *with all the variations it underwent.* Without this Book it is plainly impoſſible to underſtand that admirable Government concerning which no Author wrote common ſenſe before HARRINGTON, who was perſuaded to complete this Treatiſe by ſuch as obſerv'd his judicious Remarks on the ſame Subject in his other Writings. To *the Art of Lawgiving* is annex'd a ſmall Diſſertation, or *a Word concerning a Houſe of Peers*, which to abridg were to tranſcribe.

26. IN the ſame year, 1659, WREN coms out with another Book call'd *Monarchy aſſerted*, in vindication of his *Conſiderations.* If he could not preſs hard on our Author's Reaſonings, he was reſolv'd to overbear him with impertinence and calumny, treating him neither with the reſpect due to a Gentleman, nor the fair dealing becoming an inge-

ingenuous Adverſary, but on the contrary with the utmoſt Chicanery and Inſolence. The leaſt thing to be admir'd is, that he would needs make the Univerſity a Party againſt him, and bring the heavy weight of the Church's diſpleaſure on his ſholders: for as corrupt Miniſters ſtile themſelves the Government, by which Artifice they oblige better men to ſuppreſs their Complaints, for fear of having their Loyalty ſuſpected; ſo every ignorant Pedant that affronts a Gentleman, is preſently a Learned Univerſity; or if he is but in Deacons Orders, he's forthwith transform'd into the Catholic Church, and it becoms Sacrilege to touch him. But as great Bodys no leſs than privat Perſons, grow wiſer by Experience, and com to a clearer diſcernment of their true Intereſt: ſo I believe that neither the Church nor Univerſitys will be now ſo ready to eſpouſe the Quarrels of thoſe, who, under pretence of ſerving them, ingage in Diſputes they no ways underſtand, wherby all the diſcredit redounds to their Patrons, themſelves being too mean to ſuffer any diminution of Honor. HARRINGTON was not likewiſe leſs blamable in being provok'd to ſuch a degree by this pitiful Libel, as made him forget his natural character of gravity and greatneſs of mind. Were not the beſt of men ſubject to their peculiar weakneſſes, he had never written ſuch a Farce as his *Politicaſter, or Comical Diſcourſe in anſwer to Mr.* WREN. It relates little or nothing to the Argument, which was not ſo much amiſs, conſidering the ignorance of his Antagoniſt: but it is of ſo very ſmall merit, that I would not inſert it among his other Works, as a piece not capable to inſtruct or pleaſe any man now alive. I have not omitted his *Anſwer to Dr.* STUBBE *concerning a ſelect Senat*, as being ſo little worth; but as being only a repetition of what he has much better and more amply treated in ſom of his other pieces. Now we muſt note that upon the firſt appearance of his *Oceana* this STUBBE was ſo great an admirer of him, that, in his Preface to the *Good Old Cauſe*, he ſays *he would inlarge in his praiſe, did he not think himſelf too inconſiderable to add any thing to thoſe Applauſes which the underſtanding part of the World muſt beſtow upon him, and which, tho Eloquence ſhould turn Panegyriſt, he not only merits but tranſcends.*

27. OTHER Treatiſes of his, which are omitted for the ſame reaſon, are, 1. *A Diſcourſe upon this Saying: the Spirit of the Nation is not yet to be truſted with Liberty, leſt it introduce Monarchy, or invade the Liberty of Conſcience*; which Propoſition he diſapprov'd. 2. *A Diſcourſe ſhewing that the Spirit of Parlaments, with a Council in the intervals, is not to be truſted for a Settlement, leſt it introduce Monarchy, and Perſecution for Conſcience.* 3. *A Parallel of the ſpirit of the People with the ſpirit of Mr.* ROGERS, *with an Appeal to the Reader whether the ſpirit of the People, or the ſpirit of men like Mr.* ROGERS *be the fitter to be truſted with the Government.* This ROGERS was an Anabaptiſt, a ſeditious Enthuſiaſt, or fifthmonarchy man. 4. *Pour enclouer le canon, or the nailing of the Enemys Artillery.* 5 *The ſtumbling block of Diſobedience and Rebellion, cunningly imputed by* PETER HEYLIN *to* CALVEN, *remov'd in a Letter to the ſaid* P. H. who wrote a long Anſwer to it in the third part of his Letter combat. 'Tis obvious by the bare peruſal of the Titles, that theſe are but Pamphlets ſolely calculated for that time; and it certainly argues a mighty want of Judgment in thoſe Editors who make no diſtinction between the elaborat Works which an Author intended for univerſal benefit, and his more

ſlight

ſlight or temporary Compoſitions, which were written to ſerve a preſent turn, and becom afterwards not only uſeleſs, but many times not intelligible. Of this nature are the Pieces I now mention'd: all their good things are much better treated in his other Books, and the perſonal Reflections are (as I ſaid before) neither inſtructive nor diverting. On this occaſion I muſt ſignify, that tho the Hiſtory I wrote of MILTON's Life be prefixed to his Works, yet I had no hand in the Edition of thoſe Volumes; or otherwiſe his Logic, his Grammar, and the like, had not increas'd the bulk or price of his other uſeful Pieces. Our Author tranſlated into *Engliſh* Verſe ſom of *Virgil's Eclogs*, and about ſix Books of his *Æneids*; which, with his Epigrams, and other Poetical Conceits, are neither worthy of him nor the light.

28. SOM other ſmall Books he wrote which are more deſerving, and therfore tranſmitted to Poſterity with his greater Works; namely, 1. *Valerius* and *Publicola, or, the true form of a Popular Commonwealth*, a Dialog. 2. *Political Aphoriſms*, in number 120. 3. *Seven Models of a Commonwealth, Antient and Modern; or brief Directions ſhewing how a fit and perfect Model of Popular Government may be made, found, or underſtood.* Theſe are all the Commonwealths in the World for their kinds, tho not for their number. 4. *The Ways and means wherby an equal and laſting Commonwealth may be ſuddenly introduc'd, and perfectly founded, with the free conſent and actual confirmation of the whole People of* England. 5. There is added, *The Petition of divers well affected Perſons*, drawn up by HARRINGTON, and containing the Abſtract of his *Oceana*; but preſented to the Houſe of Commons by HENRY NEVIL the *6th* of *July* 1659, to which a ſatisfactory anſwer was return'd, but nothing don. 6. Beſides all theſe, finding his Doctrin of Elections by Balloting not ſo well underſtood as could be deſir'd, he publiſh'd on one ſide of a large ſheet of Paper, his *uſe and manner of the Ballot*, with a copper Cut in the middle repreſenting ſuch an Election in the great Aſſembly of the Commonwealth: but 'tis now inſerted in its proper place in the body of *Oceana*. Moſt of theſe contain Abridgments of his Model, adapted to the various Circumſtances and Occurrences of thoſe times; but containing likewiſe ſom Materials peculiar to themſelves, and for that reaſon thought fit to be printed a ſecond time. He did not write *the Grounds and Reaſons of Monarchy exemplify'd in the* Scotiſh *Line* (which Book is prefix'd to his Works) but one JOHN HALL, born in the City of *Durham*, educated at *Cambridg*, and a Student of *Grays Inn*. Being commanded by the Council of State (of whom he had a yearly Penſion) to attend OLIVER into *Scotland*, it occaſion'd him to publiſh that Piece. He wrote ſeveral other things in Proſe and Verſe, and dy'd before he was full thirty, lamented as a Prodigy of his Age.

29. HARRINGTON having thus exhauſted all that could be written on this Subject, he likewiſe indeavor'd to promote his Cauſe by public diſcourſes at a nightly meeting of ſeveral curious Gentlemen in the *New Palace Yard* at *Weſtminſter*. This Club was call'd the *Rota*, of which I ſhall give a ſhort account from ANTHONY WOOD, who mortally hated all Republicans, and was as much prejudic'd in favor of the Royaliſts, tho, to his honor be it ſpoken, he never deny'd juſtice to either ſide. " Their Diſcourſes about Government, *ſays he*, and of or-
" dering a Commonwealth, were the moſt ingenious and ſmart that
" ever

"ever were heard; for the Arguments in the Parlament houſe were "but flat to thoſe. This Gang had a balloting Box, and balloted how "things ſhould be carry'd by way of Eſſay; which not being us'd or "known in *England* before on this account, the room was every even- "ing very full. Beſides our Author and H. NEVIL, who were the "prime men of this Club, were CYRIAC SKINNER, Major "WILDMAN, Major VENNER, CHARLES WOLSLEY afterwards "knighted, ROGER COKE the Author of the *Detection of the four "laſt Reigns*, WILLIAM POULTNEY afterwards made a "Knight, JOHN AUBRY, MAXIMILIAN PETTY, and Dr. PET- "TY who was afterwards Sir WILLIAM, Sir JOHN HOSKYNS, "and a great many others, ſom wherof are ſtill living.——— "The Doctrin was very taking, and the more becauſe, as to human "foreſight, there was no poſſibility of the King's return. The great- "eſt of the Parlamentmen hated this Rotation and Balloting, as being "againſt their Power. Eight or ten were for it, of which number "H. NEVIL was one, who propos'd it to the Houſe, and made it "out to the Members, that, except they imbrac'd that ſort of Govern- "ment, they muſt be ruin'd. The Model of it was, that the third "part of the Senat or Houſe ſhould rote out by Ballot every year "(not capable of being elected again for three years to com) ſo that "every ninth year the Senat would be wholly alter'd. No Magi- "ſtrat was to continue above three years, and all to be choſen by the "Ballot, than which nothing could be invented more fair and impar- "tial, as 'twas then thought, tho oppos'd by many for ſeveral rea- "ſons. This Club of Commonwealthſmen laſted till about the 21*ſt* "of *Feb.* 1659, at which time the ſecluded Members being reſtor'd "by General GEORGE MONK, all their Models vaniſh'd.

30. WHEN the whole matter is duly conſider'd, it's impoſſible a Commonwealth ſhould have ſucceded in *England* at that time, ſince CROMWEL, who alone had the Power, yet wanted the Will to ſet it up. They were comparatively but very few that entertain'd ſuch a Deſign from the beginning of the Troubles; and, as it uſually happens, a great part of theſe did afterwards deſert their Principles, being ſeduc'd by the Honors and Preferments wherby they were retain'd in the Service of the reigning Powers. The body of the People were either exaſperated on a religious account, only to obtain that Liberty which they afterwards mutually deny'd each other, or by the change of the Balance they grew weary of Monarchy, and did not know it. The Republicans indeed made an advantage of their Diſcontents to deſtroy the eſtabliſh'd Government, without acquainting 'em with their real Deſigns; and when this was effectually don, the People (who had no ſettl'd Form in their view, and thought all things ſafe by the victory they had gain'd over the King and the Church) fell in with what was firſt offer'd by thoſe in whom they confided, and would as well have accepted a better Government if they had bin manag'd by men of honeſt and public Deſigns. But the Multitude can feel, tho they cannot ſee. Inſtead of injoying their deſir'd Liberty, they ſoon found themſelves under a moſt heavy Yoke, which they naturally labor'd to ſhake off; and yet in all the changes then made, two things were remarkable, that every one of 'em would be ſtil'd a Commonwealth, and yet none of 'em would mend or take warning by the Errors of thoſe that preceded, but ſtill continu'd to abuſe the

Nation, and unnaturally to ingroſs the Government into a few hands. The People being all this while told they were under a Commonwealth, and not being able to ſee thro the deceit, begun to think themſelves miſtaken in the choice they had made, ſince their ſufferings under theſe pretended Commonwealths were infinitly greater than what induc'd 'em to diſſolve the former Monarchy. In this condition the ſeveral Partys might (as HARRINGTON us'd to ſay) be fitly compar'd to a company of Puppydogs in a bag, where finding themſelves uneaſy for want of room, every one of 'em bites the tail or foot of the next, ſuppoſing that to be the cauſe of his miſery. By this means whatever was ſaid againſt a Commonwealth obtain'd ready belief, as, that it is the moſt ſeditious ſort of Government, and that inſtead of one Tyrant there are a great many who inrich themſelves by laying intolerable Taxes on others. All this and much more the People in *England* then experienc'd, and therfore deteſting their new Commonwealth, they reſtor'd the old Monarchy. But to do all Governments the Juſtice due from an impartial Hiſtorian, they never had a Commonwealth, but were interchangeably under Anarchy, Tyranny, and Oligarchy, to which Commonwealths have ever bin the greateſt enemys, and have frequently lent their voluntary aſſiſtance to deliver other Nations from the like oppreſſions. Thus the People of *England* came to hate the name of a Commonwealth, without loving their Liberty the leſs.

31. BUT to return whence we digreſs'd: Our Author, not concern'd in the exceſſive fears and hopes of thoſe that favor'd or oppos'd the Reſtoration of CHARLES the Second, continu'd to live in a peaceable manner at his one houſe, demeaning himſelf as became a perſon blindly ingag'd to no Party or Factions. But tho his Life was retir'd, it was not ſolitary, being frequented with people of all ſorts, ſom with a malicious deſign to fiſh ſomthing to his prejudice, and others to gain advantage to themſelves by his learned Converſation, or to put him upon ſomthing towards the better ſettlement of the Kingdom. Among theſe there was an eminent Royaliſt who prevail'd with him to draw up ſom Inſtructions for the King's ſervice, wherby he might be inabl'd to govern with ſatisfaction to the People and ſafety to himſelf: which being perform'd and ſign'd with his one hand, his Friend after ſhewing it to ſeveral of the Courtiers, found they did not approve a Scheme that was not likely to further their ſelfiſh Deſigns. At laſt he put his Paper into the hands of a great Miniſter about the King; and how well our Author was rewarded for his good Intentions, we are now going to relate. About this time he was buſy in reducing his Politics into ſhort and eaſy *Aphoriſms*, yet methodically digeſted in their natural order, and ſuted to the moſt vulgar capacitys. Of this he made no ſecret, and freely communicated his Papers to all that vifited him. While he was putting the laſt hand to this Syſtem, and as an innocent man apprehenſive of no danger, he was by an Order from the King, on the 28*th* of *December* 1661, ſeiz'd by Sir WILLIAM POULTNEY and others, and committed to the Tower of *London* for treaſonable Deſigns and Practices. He had the written ſheets of his Aphoriſms then lying looſe on the table before him, and underſtanding they intended to carry 'em to the Council, he beg'd the favor that he might ſtich 'em together; which was granted, and ſo remov'd with ſom other Papers to *Whitehall*. I have that Manuſcript now in my hands, and another Copy

of

of the ſame which was given me by one of his acquaintance, from both which I have printed it among the reſt of his Works. It is a complete *Syſtem of Politics*, and diſcovers the true Springs of the riſe, temper, and diſſolution of all ſorts of Governments, in a very brief and perſpicuous manner.

32. HE had no time given him to take leave of any body, but was ſtraight convey'd to the Tower, where none were allow'd to com to his ſight or ſpeech. His Siſters were inconſolable, and the more ſo, the leſs they knew what was laid to their Brother's charge. One of them, who on another occaſion had experienc'd the King's favor, threw herſelf now at his feet, and petition'd him to have compaſſion on her Brother, who thro a great miſtake was fallen under his Majeſty's diſpleaſure: for as ſhe was ſure that none of his Subjects exceded his Loyalty, ſo his Majeſty might ſee he was not the man they deſign'd, ſince the Warrant was for Sir JAMES HARRINGTON, wheras her Brother was never honor'd with ſuch a Title by his Majeſty's Anceſtors, and he would not have accepted it from OLIVER. To this the King made anſwer, that tho they might be miſtaken in his Title, he doubted he might be found more guilty of the Crimes alleg'd againſt him, than he wiſh'd any Brother of hers to be. Then ſhe preſs'd he might be examin'd before his Majeſty, or be brought to a ſpeedy trial. Shortly after my Lord LAUDERDALE, Sir GEORGE CARTERET, and Sir EDWARD WALKER were ſent to the Tower to queſtion him about a Plot which, they ſaid, he had contriv'd againſt his Majeſty's Perſon and Government. At this he was extraordinarily reviv'd, not being able to divine before the cauſe of his Confinement, and knowing himſelf wholly innocent of this Charge. He found means to tranſmit a Copy of his Examination to his Siſters, giving 'em leave to publiſh it, which was never hitherto don, and is as follows.

33. *THE Examination of* JAMES HARRINGTON, *taken in the Tower of* London *by the Earl of* LAUDERDALE, *Sir* GEORGE CARTERET, *and Sir* EDWARD WALKER.

LORD LAUDERDALE. Sir, I have heretofore accounted it an honor to be your Kinſman, but am now ſorry to ſee you upon this occaſion; very ſorry I aſſure you.

HARRINGTON. My Lord, ſeeing this is an occaſion, I am glad to ſee you upon this occaſion. Which ſaid, the Commiſſioners ſat down; and Mr. HARRINGTON ſtanding before my Lord, he began in this manner:

Lord. SIR, the King thinks it ſtrange that you, who have ſo eminently appear'd in Principles contrary to his Majeſty's Government, and the Laws of this Nation, ſhould ever ſince he came over live ſo quiet and unmoleſted, and yet ſhould be ſo ungrateful. Were you diſturb'd? were you ſo much as affronted, that you ſhould enter into ſuch deſperat practices?

Har. MY Lord, when I know why this is ſaid, I ſhall know what to ſay.

Lord.

Lord. WELL then, without any longer preamble, will you anſwer me ingenuouſly, and as you are a Gentleman, to what I have to propoſe?

Har. MY Lord, I value the aſſeveration *(as I am a Gentleman)* as high as any man, but think it an aſſeveration too low upon this occaſion; wherfore, with your leave, I ſhall make uſe of ſom greater aſſeveration.

Lord. FOR that do as you ſee good: do you know Mr. WILDMAN?

Har. MY Lord, I have ſom acquaintance with him.

Lord. WHEN did you ſee him?

Har. MY Lord, he and I have not bin in one houſe together theſe two years.

Lord. WILL you ſay ſo?

Har. YES, my Lord.

Lord. WHERE did you ſee him laſt?

Har. ABOUT a year ago I met him in a ſtreet that gos to *Drury-lane.*

Lord. DID you go into no houſe?

Har. NO, my Lord.

Sir *G. Carteret.* THAT's ſtrange!

Lord. COM, this will do you no good: Had not you, in *March* laſt, meetings with him in *Bowſtreet* in *Coventgarden?* where there were about twenty more of you; where you made a Speech about half an hour long, that they ſhould lay by diſtinguiſhing Names, and betake themſelves together into one Work, which was to diſſolve this Parlament, and bring in a new one, or the old one again. Was not this meeting adjourn'd from thence to the *Mill Bank?* were not you there alſo?

Har. MY Lord, you may think, if theſe things be true, I have no refuge but to the mercy of God and of the King.

Lord. TRUE.

Har. WELL then, my Lord, ſolemnly and deliberatly, with my eys to Heaven, I renounce the mercy of God and the King, if any of this be true, or if ever I thought or heard of this till now that you tell it me.

Sir *G. C.* THIS is ſtrange!

Lord. DO you know BAREBONES?

Har. YES, my Lord.

Lord. WHEN did you ſee him?

Har. I THINK that I have call'd at his houſe or ſhop thrice in my life.

Lord. HAD you never any meetings with him ſince the King came over?

Har. NO, my Lord.

Sir *G. C.* THIS is ſtrange!

Lord. DO you know Mr. NEVIL?

Har. VERY well, my Lord.

Lord. WHEN did you ſee him?

Har. MY Lord, I ſeldom us'd to viſit him; but when he was in Town, he us'd to ſee me at my houſe every evening, as duly almoſt as the day went over his head.

Lord.

Lord. WERE you not with him at ſom public meeting?

Har. MY Lord, the publickeſt meeting I have bin with him at, was at dinner at his own lodging, where I met Sir BERNARD GASCOIN, and I think Col. LEG.

Sir *Edw. Walker.* THEY were good ſafe company.

Lord. WHAT time was it?

Har. IN Veniſon time I am ſure, for we had a good Veniſon paſty.

Lord. DO you know one PORTMAN?

Har. NO, my Lord, I never heard of his name before.

Sir *G. C.* THIS is ſtrange!

Lord. COM, deal ingenuouſly, you had better confeſs the things.

Har. MY Lord, you do not look upon me (for I ſaw he did not firmly) I pray look upon me. Do you not know an innocent face from a guilty one? com, you do, my Lord, every one dos: My Lord, you are great Men, you com from the King, you are the Meſſengers of Death.

Lord. IS that a ſmall matter? (at which my Lord gave a ſhrug.)

Har. IF I be a Malefactor, I am no old Malefactor: why am not I pale? why do not I tremble? why dos not my tongue falter? why have you not taken me tripping? My Lord, theſe are unavoidable ſymtoms of guilt. Do you find any ſuch thing in me?

Lord. NO (which he ſpoke with a kind of amazement) and then added, I have ſaid all that I think I have to ſay.

Har. MY Lord, but I have not.

Lord. COM then.

Har. THIS plainly is a practice, a wicked practice, a practice for innocent Blood; and as weak a one as it is wicked. Ah, my Lord, if you had taken half the pains to examin the Guilty that you have don to examin the Innocent, you had found it; it could not have eſcap'd you. Now, my Lord, conſider if this be a practice, what kind of perſons you are that are thus far made inſtrumental in the hands of wicked men. Nay, whither will wickedneſs go? Is not the King's Authority (which ſhould be ſacred) made inſtrumental? My Lord, for your own ſake, the King's ſake, for the Lord's ſake, let ſuch Villanys be found out and puniſh'd. At this my Lord LAUDERDALE, as was thought ſomwhat out of countenance, roſe up; and fumbling with his hand upon the Table, ſaid:

Lord. WHY if it be as you ſay, they deſerve puniſhment enough, but otherwiſe look it will com ſeverely upon you.

Har. MY Lord, I accepted of that condition before.

Lord. COM, Mr. Vice-Chamberlain, it is late.

Har. MY Lord, now if I might I could anſwer the Preamble.

Lord. COM, ſay; and ſo he ſat down again.

Har. MY Lord, in the Preamble you charge me with being eminent in Principles contrary to the King's Government, and the Laws of this Nation. Som, my Lord, have aggravated this, ſaying, that *I being a privat man have bin ſo mad as to meddle with Politics: what had a privat man to do with Government?* My Lord, there is not any public Perſon, not any Magiſtrat, that has written in the Politics worth a button. All they that have bin excellent in this way, have bin privat men, as privat men, my Lord, as my ſelf. There is PLATO, there is ARISTOTLE, there is LIVY, there is MACCHIAVEL. My Lord, I can ſum up ARISTOTLE's *Politics* in a very few words;

he ſays there is the barbarous Monarchy (ſuch a one where the People have no Votes in making the Laws) he ſays there is the Heroic Monarchy (ſuch a one where the People have their Votes in making the Laws) and then he ſays there is Democracy; and affirms that a man cannot be ſaid to have Liberty, but in a Democracy only.

MY Lord LAUDERDALE, who thus far had bin very attentive at this ſhew'd ſom impatience.

Har. I SAY, ARISTOTLE ſays ſo; I have not ſaid ſo much. And under what Prince was it? Was it not under ALEXANDER, the greateſt Prince then in the World? I beſeech you, my Lord, did ALEXANDER hang up ARISTOTLE, did he moleſt him? LIVY for a Commonwealth is one of the fulleſt Authors; did not he write under AUGUSTUS CÆSAR? did CÆSAR hang up LIVY, did he moleſt him? MACCHIAVEL, what a Commonwealthſman was he? but he wrote under the *Medici* when they were Princes in *Florence*; did they hang up MACCHIAVEL, or did they moleſt him? I have don no otherwiſe than as the greateſt Politicians, the King will do no otherwiſe than as the greateſt Princes. But, my Lord, theſe Authors had not that to ſay for themſelves that I have; I did not write under a Prince, I wrote under a Uſurper, OLIVER. He having ſtarted up into the Throne, his Officers (as pretending to be for a Commonwealth) kept a murmuring, at which he told them that he knew not what they meant, nor themſelves; but let any of them ſhew him what they meant by a Commonwealth (or that there was any ſuch thing) they ſhould ſee that he ſought not himſelf: the Lord knew he ſought not himſelf, but to make good the Cauſe. Upon this ſom ſober men came to me and told me, if any man in *England* could ſhew what a Commonwealth was, it was my ſelf. Upon this perſuaſion I wrote; and after I had written, OLIVER never anſwer'd his Officers as he had don before, therfore I wrote not againſt the King's Government. And for the Law, if the Law could have puniſh'd me, OLIVER had don it; therfore my Writing was not obnoxious to the Law. After OLIVER the Parlament ſaid they were a Commonwealth; I ſaid they were not, and prov'd it: inſomuch that the Parlament accounted me a Cavalier, and one that had no other deſign in my writing, than to bring in the King; and now the King firſt of any man makes me a Roundhead.

Lord. THESE things are out of doors; if you be no Plotter, the King dos not reflect upon your writings.

AND ſo riſing up, they went out: my Lord being at the head of the ſtairs, I ſaid to him, My Lord, there is one thing more; you tax me with Ingratitude to the King, who had ſuffer'd me to live undiſturb'd: truly, my Lord, had I bin taken right by the King, it had (by this Example already given) bin no more than my due. But I know well enough I have bin miſtaken by the King; the King therfore taking me for no Friend, and yet uſing me not as an Enemy, is ſuch a thing as I have mention'd to all I have convers'd with, as a high Character of Ingenuity and Honor in the King's Nature.

Lord. I AM glad you have had a ſenſe of it; and ſo went down.

Har. MY Lord, it is my duty to wait on you no farther.

34. NOTWITHSTANDING the apparent Innocence of our Author, he was ſtill detain'd a cloſe Priſoner; and Chancellor HIDE,

HIDE, at a Conference of the Lords and Commons, charg'd him with being concern'd in a Plot, wherof one and thirty perſons were the chief managers after this manner: That they met in *Bowſtreet Coventgarden*, in St. *Martins le grand*, at the *Mill Bank*, and in other places; and that they were of ſeven different Partys or Intereſts, as three for the Commonwealth, three for the Long Parlament, three for the City, three for the Purchaſers, three for the Diſbanded Army, three for the Independents, and three for the Fifthmonarchy men. That their firſt Conſideration was how to agree on the choice of Parlamentmen againſt the inſuing Seſſion; and that a ſpecial care ought to be had about Members for the City of *London*, as a precedent for the reſt of the Kingdom to follow, wherupon they nominated the four Members after choſen, and now ſitting in Parlament: but three of theſe, being then preſent, ſtood up, and clear'd themſelves of this Aſperſion. Their next care was to frame a Petition to the Parlament for a preaching Miniſtry, and Liberty of Conſcience. Then they were to divide and ſubdivide themſelves into ſeveral Councils and Committees, for the better carrying on their buſineſs by themſelves or their Agents and Accomplices all over the Kingdom. In theſe Meetings HARRINGTON was ſaid to be often in the Chair; that they had taken an Oath of Secrecy, and concerted meaſures for levying Men and Mony.

35. THE Chancellor added, that tho he had certain Information of the times and places of their meetings, and particularly thoſe of HARRINGTON and WILDMAN, they were nevertheleſs ſo fixt in their nefarious deſign, that none of thoſe they had taken would confeſs any thing, not ſo much as that they had ſeen or ſpoken to one another at thoſe times or places; which obſtinacy, he thought, muſt needs procede from a faithfulneſs to their Oath. But a Committee of Lords and Commons, after ſeveral ſittings, could make nothing of this imaginary Plot, and did not ever name our Author in all their Reports.

36. HIS Sifters in the mean time being impatient to ſee him, and to know his Condition, after ſeveral fruitleſs Petitions, obtain'd an order of Council at laſt to be admitted into the Tower, where they found him barbarouſly treated by the Lieutenant, whom they ſoften'd into more humanity with a preſent of fifty pounds under the notion of Fees. By them he deliver'd a Petition to the King, importing that in the late times he was no public Perſon, nor acted to any man's detriment in his Life, Body, or Eſtate, but on the contrary had don his indeavors to help all perſons in diſtreſs; that he had oppos'd the Uſurper in ſuch a manner as was judg'd even by the Royaliſts themſelves to be very much to his diſadvantage; and that it was not probable that he, who had liv'd ſo peaceably before, would attemt any Novelty after his Majeſty's Reſtoration: wherfore he beg'd the favor of a public Trial, or a more eaſy confinement. But tho he had bin now a priſoner during the ſpace of five months, neither he nor any on his behalf could receive an Anſwer to their Petitions; which made him ſomwhat impatient, not ſo much to injoy his Liberty as to vindicat himſelf from the baſe Aſperſions of his Enemys. He therfore continually urg'd his ſiſter ASHTON to procure him a Trial, which ſhe not being able to effect, he petition'd the Parlament, ſhewing that he had lain a cloſe Priſoner in the Tower for five months upon a bare ſuſpicion of ſom diſaffection to the Government, which in all his Examinations did not in the leaſt appear; and that he hop'd e'er that time ſo to have clear'd his innocence by a public Trial,

Trial, as to deſerve his Liberty. But becauſe he underſtood theſe matters were in ſom meaſure repreſented to their Houſe, he would not preſume, without firſt making his application to them, to ſue for his freedom by other legal means. " May it therfore pleaſe this honorable " Houſe, ſays he, to take tender conſideration of the ſufferings of an " *Engliſhman* hitherto innocent; and that the long continuance of " him in priſon without trial may be hereafter the caſe of others, " and a precedent for the like caſe: and that this honorable Houſe " would pleaſe to move his Majeſty that your Petitioner may be " proceded againſt by a legal way of Trial, or that he may have his " freedom; that ſo he may no longer languiſh in Priſon to the ruin " of his Health and Eſtate. Theſe are not the words of a man conſcious of Guilt, or afraid of Power.

37. HIS Siſter could get no Member to deliver this Petition, or to give her any incouragement; ſom alleging that ſhe was more likely to deſtroy than ſerve her Brother, and others that by unſeaſonable preſſing ſhe might precipitat his danger; wheras if he would be patient under his ſufferings, he might be ſafe in his reſtraint. Then he advis'd her to move for his *habeas Corpus*; which at firſt was flatly deny'd, but afterwards when it was granted and duly ſerv'd, his Warder came one day to his Siſters at *Weſtminſter*, and acquainted them that between one and two a clock that morning their Brother was put on board a Ship to be tranſported he knew not whither, without any time given him either to ſee his Friends, or to make proviſion of Mony, Linen, or other neceſſarys. Nor could his Relations for a whole fortnight, either at the Tower or in the Secretarys Office, learn what was becom of him, till they received a note from himſelf on board one of the King's Ships then lying under *Hurſt* Caſtle, informing them that he believ'd he was bound for *Plymouth*. About a month after he ſent 'em word by another letter that he was landed on a kind of Rock oppoſit to *Plymouth*, call'd St. *Nicholas*'s *Iſland*, whence he afterwards had frequent opportunitys of writing to 'em many pious and moral Admonitions, as well as Letters of buſineſs and entertainment.

38. BUT his cloſe reſtraint to this ſmall ſpot of Earth, where there was no freſh Water, and ſcarce any room to move his Body, quickly chang'd the ſtate of his Health; this occaſion'd him to petition he might be removed to *Plymouth*, which was granted, his Brother WILLIAM, and his Uncle ANTHONY SAMUEL, obliging themſelves in a Bond of 5000 l. for his ſafe Impriſonment. Here he had not only the liberty of walking on the Hoe, but was alſo us'd with extraordinary Reſpect by the Deputy Governor of the Fort Sir JOHN SKELTON, who frequently invited him to his Table, and much lov'd his Converſation. Among the other Acquaintance he made at *Plymouth*, one was Dr. DUNSTAN, who advis'd him to take a preparation of *Guaiacum* in Coffee, as a certain cure for the Scurvy with which he was then troubl'd. He drank of this Liquor in great quantitys, every morning and evening. But after uſing it for ſom time, his Siſters, to their no ſmall amazement, receiv'd no more Anſwers to their Letters. At length Advice was brought 'em from his Landlady, that his Fancy was much diſorder'd, and deſiring ſom body might com to look after him. Immediatly one of them addreſs'd her ſelf to the Earl of *Bath*, then chief Governor of *Plymouth*, and inform'd him of his Priſoner's ſad condition. This noble Lord, who laid

laid many Obligations on him before, and gave frequent orders for his good Uſage, went hereupon to intercede for him with the King, repreſenting the danger of his Life if he were not remov'd from that unwholſom place to *London*, where he might have the advice of able Phyſicians: and the King was accordingly pleas'd to grant a Warrant for his Releaſe, ſince nothing appear'd againſt him ſupported by good Proof or probable Preſumtions.

39. THE next day the Lady ASHTON, with another of his Siſters, took their Journy towards *Plymouth*, where they found their poor Brother ſo transform'd in Body and Mind, that they ſcarce could perſuade themſelves it was the ſame perſon. He was reduc'd to a Skeleton, not able to walk alone, ſlept very little, his imagination diſturb'd, often fainted when he took his drink, and yet ſo fond of it that he would by no means be advis'd to forbear it. Dr. PRUJEAN, and other eminent Phyſicians, greatly blam'd Dr. DUNSTAN's preſcriptions, giving their Opinion under their hands that *Guiacum* and the other drying things, which he adminiſter'd to his Patient in Coffee, were enough of themſelves to beget Melancholy or Phrenzy, where there was no previous diſpoſition to it. A rumor at *Plymouth*, that HARRINGTON had taken ſom drink which would make any man mad in a month; the ſurlineſs of his Doctor, and ſomthing blab'd by a Maid that was put againſt his will to attend him, made his Siſter ſuſpect he had foul play leſt he ſhould write any more *Oceanas*. 'Tis certain, that (tho his Recovery was never perfect) he mended finely as ſoon as he was perſuaded to abſtain from this Liquor. In leſs than a month he was able to bear the Journy to *London* in a Coach, where he was no ſooner arriv'd but Sir JOHN SKELTON, who was then in Town, paid him a viſit. My Lady ASHTON complaining to him that ſhe had not timely notice of her Brother's Diſtemper, he proteſted he would have ſent her word of it, had not his Doctor aſſur'd him that he only counterfeited; and yet at the ſame time he made him take ſtrong Doſes of *Hellebor*, and God knows what beſides.

40. HE paſt ſom time at *Aſhted* in *Surrey* to drink the *Epſom*-waters, by which he found no benefit. At *London* he was put wholly under the care of Doctor PRUJEAN, who with all his Art could afford little help to the weakneſs of his Body, and none at all to the diſorder of his Mind, to his dying day. He was allow'd to diſcourſe of moſt other things as rationally as any man, except his own Diſtemper, fancying ſtrange things in the operation of his animal Spirits, which he thought to tranſpire from him in the ſhape of Birds, of Flys, of Bees, or the like. And thoſe about him reported that he talk'd much of good and evil Spirits, which made them have frightful apprehenſions. But he us'd, they ſaid, ſomtimes to argue ſo ſtrenuouſly that this was no deprav'd imagination, that his Doctor was often put to his ſhifts for an Anſwer. He would on ſuch occaſions compare himſelf to DEMOCRITUS, who for his admirable diſcoverys in Anatomy was reckon'd diſtracted by his fellow Citizens, till HIPPOCRATES cur'd 'em of their miſtake. I confeſs I did not know at firſt what to make of theſe things from the informations of his Acquaintance, till I met with a Letter of Dr. BURTHOGGE to his Siſter, wherin are contain'd certain Querys propos'd to him by HARRINGTON, with a ſtate of his Caſe written by the Doctor, who was his intimat Friend,

and a very good judg, whether conſider'd as a Phyſician or a Philoſopher, as appears by his late Treatiſe *of the Soul of the World*, &c. and as I have particular reaſon to affirm from his Letters to my Lady ASHTON, which are all now before me. Among other things the Doctor ſays, that he ever expreſt the higheſt ſatisfaction in thinking of what he had at any time written, as the beſt Service he was capable to do his Country, and ſincerely intended by him to the glory of God, which he thought in ſom meaſure to be the good of mankind: ſo far was he from being under any remorſe of Conſcience on that ſcore, as his ill wiſhers maliciouſly reported. Now, tho I was ſomwhat ſtagger'd concerning the nature of his Diſtemper by Dr. BURTHOGGE's Letter, I grew perfectly amaz'd when I found among his Papers the beginning of a little Treatiſe written by himſelf, wherin (without raillery) he proves 'em to be all mad that thought him ſo with reſpect to what he diſcours'd of Nature, which he maintain'd to work mechanically or mathematically, as BELLINI, BORELLI, Dr. PITCAIRNS, and other eminent men have ſince evidently ſhewn. It appears there that his pretended Viſions of Angels and Devils were nothing elſe but good or bad animal Spirits, and that his Flys and Bees were only Similitudes wherby he us'd to expreſs the various figures and forms of thoſe Particles. I own that he might probably enough be much decay'd in his underſtanding, by reaſon of his great and long weakneſs of body; but I ſhall never be convinc'd that he was delirious in that only inſtance which they allege: and to ſatisfy the Learned in this point (which, in my opinion, is a memorable Story that concerns 'em all) I ſhall ſubjoin his own diſcourſe to this Hiſtory.

41. WERE he really out of order, it had bin his misfortune, not his fault, and was the caſe of ſom of the beſt men that ever liv'd. An action that will better perſuade the world he was not truly himſelf, was his marrying in this condition. The Lady was a very agreable woman, whoſe Perſon and Converſation he always admir'd; ſhe was the Daughter of Sir MARMADUKE DORREL of *Buckinghamſhire*, fam'd for wit more than became her pretenſions to good ſenſe, had long liv'd among his Relations with the reſpect of a Friend and a Siſter; but now would needs change the office of a voluntary Attendant for the name of a Wife. It ſoon appear'd that this match was not ſo much diſintereſted as ſhe would pretend, which occaſion'd ſom difference between 'em; but they were quickly reconcil'd, and ſhe was always treated by him afterwards with the higheſt Generoſity, tho ſhe did not uſe him ſo handſomly when they were both young and healthy, and might have made a more ſeaſonable match than at this time. Towards his latter end he was ſubject to the Gout, and injoy'd little eaſe, but languiſhing and drooping a good while, he fell at laſt into a Palſy, and departed this Life at *Weſtminſter*, the 11*th* of *September*, in the Year 1677 (leaving his Eſtate to his Brother's Children) and lys bury'd there in S. *Margaret*'s Church, on the South ſide of the Altar, next to the Grave of Sir WALTER RALEIGH, with this Inſcription over him: *Hic jacet* JACOBUS HARRINGTON *Armiger (filius maximus natu* SAPCOTIS HARRINGTON *de Rand, in Com. Linc. Equitis aurati, &* JANÆ *uxoris ejus, filiæ* GULIELMI SAMUEL *de Upton in Com. Northamton. Militis) qui obiit ſeptimo die Septembris, ætatis ſuæ ſexageſimo ſexto, anno Dom.* 1677. *Nec virtus, nec animi dotes (arrha licet æterni in animam amoris Dei) corruptione eximere queant corpus.*

42. THUS

42. THUS dy'd JAMES HARRINGTON, whoſe Name is ſure to live ſo long as Learning and Liberty bear any Reputation in *England*. But tho he did not think ſo highly of himſelf, yet he was ſtrongly perſuaded that his *Oceana* was the Model of an equal Commonwealth, or a Government wherin no Party can be at variance with or gaining ground upon another, and never to be conquer'd by any foren Power; whence he concluded it muſt needs be likewiſe immortal: for as the People, who are the materials, never dy; ſo the Form, which is the Motion, muſt (without ſom oppoſition) be endleſs. The *Immortality of a Commonwealth* is ſuch a new and curious Problem, that I could not aſſure my ſelf of the Reader's pardon, without giving him ſom brief account of the Arguments for it, and they run much after this manner. The perfection of Government is ſuch a Libration in the frame of it, that no Man or Men under it can have the intereſt, or (having the intereſt) can have the power to diſturb it with Sedition. This will be granted at firſt ſight, and HARRINGTON appeals to all Mankind, whether his *Oceana* (examin'd by this principle) be not ſuch an equal Government, completely and intirely fram'd in all its neceſſary Orders or fundamental Laws, without any contradiction to it ſelf, to Reaſon, or Truth. If this be ſo (as the contrary dos not yet appear) then it has no internal cauſe of Diſſolution, and conſequently ſuch a Government can never be ruin'd any way; for he further ſhews (what all Hiſtory cannot contradict) that a Commonwealth, if not firſt broken or divided by Factions at home, was never conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch from the beginning of the World to this day: but the Commonwealth of *Oceana* having no Factions within, and ſo not to be conquer'd from without, is therfore an equal, perfect, and immortal Government. For want of this equality in the frame he clearly demonſtrats how the Commonwealths of *Rome*, *Athens*, and others, came to be deſtroy'd by their contending and overtopping partys; wheras that of *Venice* can never change or finiſh. He proves that this Equality is yet more wanting in Monarchys; for in abſolute Monarchy (as that of the *Turk*, for example) the *Janizarys* have frequent intereſt, and perpetual power to raiſe Sedition to the ruin of the Emperor, and, when they pleaſe, of the Empire: This cannot be ſaid of the Armys of *Oceana*, and therfore an abſolute Monarchy is no perfect Government. In what they improperly call a *mix'd Monarchy the Nobility are ſomtimes putting Chains on the* King, at other times domineering over the People; the King is either oppreſſing the People without control, or contending with the Nobility as their Protectors; and the People are frequently in arms againſt both King and Nobility, till at laſt one of the three Eſtates becoms maſter of the other two, or till they ſo mutually weaken one another that either they fall a prey to ſom more potent Government, or naturally grow into a Commonwealth: therfore mixt Monarchy is not a perfect Government; and if no ſuch Partys or Contentions can poſſibly exiſt in *Oceana*, then on the contrary is it a moſt equal, perfect, and immortal Commonwealth, *Quod erat demonſtrandum.*

43. IT will not be objected to the diſparagement of this Model, that it was no better receiv'd by OLIVER CROMWEL; nor is it fair to judg of things at any time by their Succeſs. If it ſhould be ſaid, that, after the expiration of his Tyranny, the People did not think fit to eſtabliſh it; I ſhall only anſwer, that all the Attemts which have bin us'd for introducing Arbitrary Power have prov'd as unfortunat, wher-

by

by it appears at leſt that the character which TACITUS gave the *Romans* of his time, may as well agree to the People of *England:* and it is, that *They are able to bear neither abſolute Liberty, nor abſolute Slavery.*

CONCLUSION.

I AM diſpos'd to believe that my Lady ASHTON's memory fail'd her, when ſhe ſaid that her Brother was at *Rome* during the Jubilee; for as Chronology ſeems to contradict it, ſo ſhe might eaſily miſtake the Jubilee for the Ceremony of conſecrating Candles, or any other ſolemnity; his remarks being equally applicable to all thoſe of the Popiſh Church. But as to the whole of this Hiſtory, tho it be manag'd with due moderation, and contains nothing but bare matters of fact, or ſuch obſervations as they naturally ſuggeſt; yet I was ſenſible before I wrote it, that I could not eſcape the diſpleaſure of three ſorts of perſons: ſuch as have reſolv'd to be angry at whatever I do; ſuch as neither rightly underſtand what is written by me nor any body elſe; and thoſe who, without any particular ſpite againſt an Author, yet to get a penny will pretend to anſwer any book that makes a conſiderable figure. Therfore I find my ſelf oblig'd beforehand to diſclaim all explanations made of my meaning, beyond what is warranted by the expreſs words of my Book; having conſtantly indeavor'd not only to write intelligibly, but ſo as that none can poſſibly miſunderſtand me. I renounce all the deſigns that may be imputed to me by ſuch as are ſo far from being admitted into my ſecret, that they were never in my company; but I ſpecially diſown whatever is ſaid by thoſe who firſt preſume to divine my thoughts, and then to vent their own raſh conjectures as my undoubted opinions. I ſlight their artifice who, when unable to object againſt the point in queſtion, labor to ingage their Adverſary in matters wholly beſides the purpoſe; and when their Evaſions have no better fortune than their Attacks, fall to railing againſt his Perſon, becauſe they cannot confute his Arguments. I am as much above the malice of ſom, as they are below my reſentments; and I wou'd at any time chuſe to be rather the object of their Envy than of their Favor: but as I am far from thinking my ſelf exemt from all the indiſcretions of Youth, or the frailtys of human Nature; ſo I am not conſcious of entertaining higher thoughts of my own performances than are becoming, or meaner of other mens than they deſerve. I know that to enterprize any thing out of the common road is to undergo undoubted envy or peril; and that he, who is not beforehand reſolv'd to bear oppoſition, will never do any great or beneficial exploit: yet 'tis no ſmall incouragement to me, that from the beginning of the world to this time not a ſingle inſtance can be produc'd of one who either was or would be eminent, but he met with Enemys to his perſon and fame. Notwithſtanding this conſideration be juſt, yet if I write any thing hereafter (either as oblig'd by Duty, or to amuze idle time) I have determin'd it ſhall not concern perſonal diſputes, or the narrow intereſts of jarring Factions, but ſomthing of univerſal benefit, and which all ſides may indifferently read. Without ſuch provocations as no man ought to indure, this is my fix'd reſolution; and I particularly deſire that none may blame me for acting otherwiſe, who force me to do ſo themſelves. I ſhall never be wanting to my own defence, when either the Cauſe or the Aggreſſor deſerves it: for as to thoſe Authors who conceal their names, if they write matters of fact 'tis a ſign they cannot make them good; and all men are agreed to reject their Teſtimony, except ſuch as reſolve to deny others common juſtice; but the ill opinion of theſe prejudic'd perſons can no more injure any man,

man, than their good opinion will do him honor. Beſides other reaſons of mentioning my ſuppos'd deſigns, one is to diſabuſe ſeveral people who (as I am told) are made to believe that in the Hiſtory of SOCRATES I draw a Parallel between that Philoſopher and JESUS CHRIST. This is a moſt ſcandalous and unchriſtian calumny, as will more fully appear to the world whenever the Book it ſelf is publiſh'd; for that I have bin ſom time about it, I freely avow; yet not in the manner thoſe officious Informers report, but as becoms a diſintereſted Hiſtorian, and a friend to all mankind.

The Inſcription on the Monument *of Sir* JAMES HARRINGTON *and his three Sons, at* Exton *in* Rutlandſhire.

HERE lieth Sir *James Harrington* of *Exton* Kt. with (a) *Lucy* his Wife, Daughter to Sir *William Sidney* Kt. by whom he had 18 Children, wherof three Sons and 8 Daughters marry'd as follows.

THE eldeſt Son, Sir (b) *John*, marry'd the Heireſs of *Robert Keylwoy* Surveyor of the Court of Wards and Liverys. The 2*d* Son, Sir (c) *Henry*, took to Wife one of the Coheirs of *Francis Agar*, one of his Majeſty's Privy Council in *Ireland*. The 3*d* Son, *James* (d) *Harrington* Eſq; had to Wife one of the Coheirs of *Robert Sapcotes* Eſq. The eldeſt Daughter, *Elizabeth*, was married to Sir *Edward* (e) *Montague* Kt. The 2*d*, *Frances*, to Sir *William* (f) *Lee* Kt. The 3*d*, *Margaret*, to *Don* (g) *Bonitto de Siſnores* of *Spain*, of the Family of the Dukes of *Frantaſquo*. The 4*th*, *Katherine*, to Sir *Edward* (h) *Dimmock* Kt. The 5*th*, *Mary*, to Sir *Edward* (i) *Wingfield* Kt. The 6*th*, *Mabell*, to Sir *Andrew* (k) *Noell* Kt. The 7*th*, *Sarah*, was marry'd to the Lord *Haſtings*, Heir to the Earl of *Huntingdon*. The 8*th*, *Theodoſia*, (l) to the Lord *Dudley* of *Dudley* Caſtle.

THE ſame Sir *James* and *Lucy* were marry'd fifty years: She died firſt, in the 72*d* year of her Age; he ſhortly after yielded to Nature, being 80 years old, in the year of our Lord 1591, and of Queen *Elizabeth*'s Reign 34. their Son *James* being made ſole Executor to them both; who, that he might as well perform to his Parents their Rites, as leave a Teſtimony of his own Piety to Poſterity, hath erected and dedicated this Monument to their eternal Memory.

(a) And Siſter to Sir *Philip Sidney* Kt.

(b) Who was afterwards created Ld *Harrington*, and his Lady was Governeſs to the Queen of *Bohemia*. His Family is extinct as to Heirs Male: One of his Daughters was marry'd to the Earl of *Bedford*, and was Groom of the Stole to Q. *Ann*. The other was marry'd to a *Scotch* Lord whoſe name was Lord *Bruce* Earl of *Elgin*; his Grandſon now Lord *Aliſbury*.

(c) Who happen'd to be Preſident of *Ireland*; and from him deſcended my Lady *Fretchavil*'s Father, my Lady *Moriſon*, and my Lord *Falkland*'s Lady.

(d) Afterwards Baronet: To him were born Sir *Edward Harrington*, Sir *Sapcotes Harrington*, and Mr. *John Harrington*; who had Iſſue both Sons and Daughters.

(e) Who was Father to the Lord *Montague*, the Earl of *Manchester*, and Lord Privy Seal; and Sir *Sidney Montague*, who was afterwards created Earl of *Sandwich*; and to the Earl of *Rutland*'s Lady, and Judg *Montague*.

(f) Who was afterwards created Lord *Chicheſter* and Earl of *Dunſmore*; and marry'd one of his Daughters to the Earl of *Southampton*, by whom he had the preſent Lady *Northumberland*. And his other Daughter marry'd her ſelf to Col. *Villers*, and is now Governeſs to the Lady *Mary* the Duke of *York*'s eldeſt Daughter.

(g) Which Dukedom afterwards fell to him; and by this Lady he had one ſole Daughter and Heir, who is ſaid to have marry'd the Duke of *Feria*, and by him to have had one Daughter, who is marry'd to a King of *Portugal*.

(h) Of *Lincolnſhire*, the King's Standard-bearer.

(i) An Antient noble Family in *Kent*.

(k) Now Lord *Cambden*, Owner of the place where this Monument is.

(l) One of whoſe Daughters marry'd the Earl of *Hume* in *Scotland*, and had by him two Daughters; one married my Lord *Morrice*, and the other my Lord *Maitland* now Duke of *Lauderdale*. The other Daughter of my Lady *Dudley* was Heir to the Honour of *Dudley* Caſtle; of whoſe Iſſue by the Mother's ſide is the preſent Lord *Dudley*.

The Mechanics of Nature:

OR,

An Imperfect Treatiſe written by JAMES HARRINGTON during his ſickneſs, to prove againſt his Doctors that the Notions he had of his own Diſtemper were not, as they alleg'd, Hypocondriac Whimſys or Delirious Fancys.

The PREFACE.

HAVING bin about nine months, ſom ſay in a Diſeaſe, I in a Cure, I have bin the wonder of Phyſicians, and they mine; not but that we might have bin reconcil'd, for Books (I grant) if they keep cloſe to Nature muſt be good ones, but I deny that Nature is bound to Books. I am no ſtudy'd Naturaliſt, having long ſince given over that Philoſophy as inſcrutable and incertain: for thus I thought with my ſelf; "Nature, to "whom it is given to work as it were under her Veil or behind the Curtain "is the Art of God: now if there be Arts of Men who have wrought open-"ly enough to the underſtanding (for example that of TITIAN*) never-"theleſs whoſe excellency I ſhall never reach; How ſhall I thus, ſticking "in the Bark at the Arts of Men, be able to look thence to the Roots, or "dive into the Abyſs of things in the Art of God? And nevertheleſs,* Si placidum caput undis extulerit, *ſhould Nature afford me a ſight of her, I do not think ſo meanly of myſelf but that I would know her as ſoon as ano-ther, tho more learn'd man. Laying therfore Arts wholly, and Books almoſt all aſide, I ſhall truly deliver to the world how I felt and ſaw Nature; that is, how ſhe came firſt into my ſenſes, and by the ſenſes into my under-ſtanding. Yet for the ſake of my Readers, and alſo for my own, I muſt invert the order of my Diſcourſe; For theirs, becauſe, till I can ſpeak to men that have had the ſame Senſations with my ſelf, I muſt ſpeak to ſuch as have a like underſtanding with others: For my own, becauſe, being like in this Diſcourſe to be the Monky that play'd at Cheſs with his Ma-ſter, I have need of ſom Cuſhion on my head, that being in all I have ſpoken hitherto more laid at than my Reaſon. My Diſcourſe then is to conſiſt of two parts: the firſt, in which I appeal to his underſtanding who will uſe his Reaſon, is a Platform of Nature drawn out in certain Apho-riſms; and the ſecond, in which I ſhall appeal to his ſenſes who in a Diſ-ſeaſe very common will make further trial is a Narrative of my Caſe.*

A Platform or Scheme of Nature.

1. NATURE is the *Fiat*, the Breath, and in the whole Sphere of her activity the very Word of God.

2. SHE is a Spirit, that ſame Spirit of God which in the beginning mov'd upon the Waters, his plaſtic Virtue, the Δύναμις ἡ διαπλαστικὴ, Ἐνεργεία ἐντικὴ

3. SHE is the Providence of God in his Government of the things of this world, even that Providence of which it is ſaid, that without it a Sparrow cannot fall to the ground, *Mat.* 10. 29.

3. SHE

4. SHE is the *Anima Mundi*, or Soul of the World;

Principio Cœlum, ac Terras, campoſque liquentes,
Lucentemque globum Lunæ, Titaniaque aſtra
SPIRITUS *intus alit, totamque effuſa per artus*
Mens agitat molem, & magno ſe corpore miſcet.
Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,
Et quæ marmoreo fert monſtra ſub æquore pontus.
Igneus eſt ollis vigor, & cæleſtis Origo
Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.
Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudentque, neque auras
Diſpiciunt clauſæ tenebris & carcere cæco. Virgil. Æn. l. 6.

5. SHE is infallible: for the Law of an infallible Lawgiver muſt needs be infallible, and Nature is the Law as well as the Art of God.

6. THO Nature be not fallible, yet ſhe is limited, and can do nothing above her matter; therfore no Miracles are to be expected from her.

7. AS Defects, Redundancys, or ſuch other rude qualitys of matter, ought not to be attributed to the Artificer or his Art; ſo neither is Nature, or the Art of God, to be charg'd with Monſters or imperfections, the things ſo reputed being the regular Effects both of the Matter and the Art that forms it.

8. NATURE is not only a Spirit, but is furniſh'd, or rather furniſhes her ſelf with innumerable miniſterial Spirits, by which ſhe operats on her whole matter, as the Univerſe; or on the ſeparat parts, as man's Body.

9. THESE miniſterial Spirits are certain Æthereal Particles inviſibly mix'd with elementary Matter; they work ordinarily unſeen or unfelt, and may be call'd Animal Spirits.

10. AS in ſound Bodys there muſt needs be GOOD SPIRITS managing the Oeconomy of Health; ſo in unſound Bodies, as in chronical Diſeaſes, there muſt needs be EVIL SPIRITS managing the Oeconomy of Diſtempers.

11. ANIMAL Spirits, whether in the Univerſe, or in man's Body, are good or evil Spirits, according to the Matter wherin and wherof they are generated.

12. WHAT is a good Spirit to one Creature, is evil to another, as the food of ſom Beaſts is poiſon to man; whence the gentleneſs of the Dove, and the fierceneſs of the Hauk.

13. BETWEEN the Animal Spirits of the whole or Univerſe, and of the parts, as of man's Body, there is an intercourſe or cooperation which preſerves the common order of Nature unſeen; and in ſom things often foretels or diſcovers it, which is what we call *Preſages*, *Signs* and *Prodigys*.

14. THE work of good Spirits, as Health for example, is felicitous, and as it were Angelical; and that of evil Spirits, as in Diſeaſes, is noxious, and as it were diabolical, a ſort of faſcination or witchcraft.

15. ALL Fermentation is caus'd by unlocking, unbinding, or letting looſe of Spirits; as all Attenuation is occaſion'd by ſtirring, working, or provoking of Spirits; and all Tranſpiration by the emiſſion or ſending abroad of Spirits.

16. NOTHING in Nature is annihilated or loſt, and therfore whatever is tranſpir'd, is receiv'd and put to ſom uſe by the Spirits of the Univerſe.

17. SCARCE

17. SCARCE any man but at ſom time or other has felt ſuch a motion as Country people call the *Lifeblood*; if in his Ey, perhaps there has flown out ſomthing like a dusky cloud, which is a tranſpiration or emiſſion of ſpirits; perhaps as it were a flaſh of Fire, which alſo was an emiſſion of ſpirits, but differenc'd according to the matter wherin and wherof they were wrought, as Choler, *&c.*

18. ANIMAL Spirits are ordinarily emitted ſtreaking themſelves into various figures, anſwerable to little arms or hands, by which they work out the matter by tranſpiration, no otherwiſe than they unlock'd it, and wrought it up in the body by attenuation, that is, by manufacture: for theſe operations are perfectly mechanical, and downright handywork as in our ſhops or workhouſes.

19. IF we find Nature in her operations not only uſing hands, but likewiſe ſomthing analogous to any Art, Tool, Engin, or Inſtrument which we have or uſe, it cannot be ſaid that Nature had theſe things of men, becauſe we know that men muſt have theſe things of Nature.

20. In Attenuation and Tranſpiration, where the matter of the Diſeaſe is not only copious but inveterat, the Work will not as I may ſay be inarticulat, as in the trembling call'd the Lifeblood; but articulat, and obviouſly ſo to the ſenſe of the Patient by immediat ſtrokes of the Humor upon his Organs, which ſomtimes may be ſtrong enough (tho not ordinarily) to reach anothers.

21. NATURE can work no otherwiſe than as God taught her, nor any man than as ſhe taught him.

22. WHEN I ſee a curious piece from the hands of an Apprentice, I cannot imagin that his Maſter was a bungler, or that he wrought not after the ſame manner as his Servant learn'd of him; which I apply to God and Nature.

23. PHYSICIANS ſomtimes take the PRUDENCE of Nature for the PHRENSY of the Patient.

24. IF any man can ſhew why theſe things are not thus, or that they may be otherwiſe, then I have don, and there is ſaid in this part already more than enough; but if they can neither ſhew that theſe things are not thus, nor know how they ſhould be otherwiſe, then ſo far I ſtand my ground, and am now arm'd for my Narrative *Cap a pè.*

'TIS a thouſand pitys that we have not this Narrative, to which no doubt he apply'd theſe Principles, and thence form'd the ſtate of his Diſtemper. But the Manuſcript containing no more, we may however evidently conclude that the Writer of it was not ſo greatly diſorder'd in his thoughts, which are for the moſt part very juſt, and all as cloſe and coherent as any man's.

Life. P. 21. To the other words there explain'd add *Hemiſua* the River *Trent*, and *Alma* the Palace of St. *James.*

THE

Grounds and Reaſons

OF

MONARCHY

CONSIDER'D:

And Exemplify'd in the *Scotiſh* Line, out of their own beſt Authors and Records.

THE

PREFACE.

THERE is nothing that has more confounded Knowledge among men, than the reciprocal violences of the Understanding and the Will; or, to ſpeak plainly, the Paſſion of the one and Blindneſs of the other: Since ſome by chance or intereſt take up Principles which they force the Underſtanding by ſtrain'd Arguments to maintain; others by the habit of ſome Opinion ſo bewitch the Will into confederacy, that they never can quit it, even after confutation. To remedy this Diſorder, ſince I had reſolv'd with my ſelf to ſay ſomething to this Point (which though it be but as a ſmall Wyre, yet the great weight of civil Felicity lies upon it) I knew no better Method than to take the Scales from the Eyes of the Underſtanding, and to ſhew the Will how better to bring about her great Deſign of Good. And in the proſecution of this, I would not skirmiſh with every Argument, which had been a thing of immenſe ſlavery, and not for every Eye; but I choſe rather to ſtrike at the Foundations, that the Underſtanding might loſe its Paſſion, and more freely conſider upon what Quickſands they lay. And in this I needed not to be poſitive, becauſe I undertake a Task in which moſt Men are commonly ſucceſsful, that is, to ſupport Error rather than to aſſert Truth. Hence I conſider Kingſhip ſimply, not troubling my ſelf to maintain any other Form, or to conſider Oaths, Ends, Changes of Government, or the particular Neceſſity or Reaſons of Safety: they being diſtinct Conſiderations and Subjects by themſelves. Now if this negative Method ſatisfys not, I ſee no ſuch great cauſe to be diſcourag'd; for, I confeſs, I do not perceive it ſo eaſy a thing to diſcover an Error; and I had rather tell a Man he was out of the way, than by endeavouring to bring him to the end of his Journey, lead him further about. And it is my opinion, that as Scepticiſm is not only uſeleſs, but dangerous; if in ſetting our Thoughts in a poſture of Defence, it makes us abſolutely wavering and incredulous: yet had I rather be ſceptical in my Opinion, than maintain it upon grounds taken upon truſt, and not demonſtrated.

THE Second Part is merely an inſtance accommodated to the Arguments of the Firſt, wherein I would not be underſtood to be a Writer of an Epitome (for I have other Employments for my Time and Thoughts, and thoſe nobler too) but to ſet down a true Series by way of Example; and therefore I was only to note Acceſſes to Government, and Receſſes from it, with the Effects proceeding from the Perſons of Governors. And here as I needed not much trouble Chronology: So leſt it might be a bare *Sceleton*, I ſprinkled ſome Obſervations that came to hand, and ſeem to afford either Pleaſure or Uſe. Thus much, leſt I might be miſunderſtood, I thought neceſſary to premiſe.

THE

THE
Grounds and Reaſons
OF
MONARCHY.

The First Part.

I HAVE often thought it ſtrange, that among all the Governments, either paſt or preſent, the *Monarchical* ſhould ſo far in Extent and Number exceed the *Popular*, as that they could never yet come into compariſon. I could never be perſuaded but it was more happy for a People to be diſpos'd of by a number of Perſons jointly intereſted and concern'd with them, than to be number'd as the Herd and Inheritance of One, to whoſe Luſt and Madneſs they were abſolutely ſubject; and that any Man of the weakeſt Reaſon and Generoſity would not rather choſe for his Habitation that ſpot of Earth where there was acceſs to Honour by Virtue, and no Worth could be excluded, rather than that where all Advancement ſhould proceed from the Will of one ſcarcely hearing and ſeeing with his own Organs, and gain'd for the moſt part by means lewd and indirect: and all this in the end to amount to nothing elſe but a more ſplendid and dangerous Slavery. To clear this Point, I conſider'd how inſcrutably Providence carrys on the turns and ſtops of all Governments, ſo that moſt People rather found than made them. The Conſtitutions of Men, ſome not fit to be Maſters of their Liberty, ſome not capable, ſome not willing; the Ambition of ſettled Tyrants, who breaking their own Bonds have brought in violent Alterations; and laſtly, civil Diſcord, have either corrupted or alter'd better Settlements.

BUT theſe are Obſervations rather than Arguments, and relate to Fact rather than Reaſon. That which aſtoniſh'd me moſt was to ſee thoſe of this Heroic and Learn'd Age, not only not riſing to Thoughts of Liberty, but inſtead thereof fooliſhly turning their Wits and Swords againſt themſelves in the maintenance of them whoſe Slaves they are: and indeed they can be no weak Cauſes that produce ſo long and ſettled a Diſtemper; tho ſome of thoſe I mention'd, if not moſt of them, are the true ones.

HE knows nothing that knows not how ſuperſtitiouſly the generality of Mankind is given to retain Traditions, and how pertinacious they are in the maintenance of their firſt Prejudices, inſomuch that a Diſcovery or more refin'd Reaſon is as inſupportable to them, as the Sun is to an Eye newly brought out of Darkneſs. Hence Opinionativeneſs (which is commonly proportion'd to their Ignorance) and a generous Obſtinacy ſometimes to Death andRuin. So that it is no wonder if we ſee many Gentlemen, whoſe Education enabled them only

to

to uſe their Senſes and firſt Thoughts, ſo dazzled with the Splendor of a Court, prepoſſeſt with the Affection of a Prince, or bewitch'd with ſome ſubdolous Fever, that they chooſe rather any hazard than the Enchantment ſhould be diſſolv'd. Others, perhaps a degree above theſe, yet in reſpect of ſome Title ſtuck upon the Family (which has been as fortunate a Miſtery of Kingcraft as any other) or in reverence to ſome glorious former Atchievements (minding not that in all theſe caſes the People are the only effective means, and the King only imaginary) think they ſhould degenerate from Bravery in bringing on a Change. Others are witheld by Sloth and Timorouſneſs, either not daring, or unwilling to be happy; ſome looking no further than their private Welfare, indifferent at the multiplication of public Evils; others (and theſe the worſt of all) out of a pravity of Nature ſacrificing to their Ambition and Avarice, and in order to that, following any Power, concurring with any Machinations, and ſupporting their Authors: while Princes themſelves (train'd up in theſe Arts, or receiving them by Tradition) know how to wind all their humours to their own advantage, now foiſting the Divinity of their Titles into Pulpits, now amuſing the People with Pomp and Shews, now diverting their hot Spirits to ſome unprofitable foreign War (making way to their accurs'd ends of Revenge or Glory, with the effuſion of that Blood which ſhould be as dear to them as their own) now ſtroaking the People with ſome feeble but enforc'd Law, for which notwithſtanding they will be paid (and 'tis obſerv'd, the moſt notorious Tyrants have taken this Courſe) now giving up the eminenteſt of their Miniſters (which they part with as indifferently as their Robes) to the Rage and Fury of the People; ſo that they are commanded and condemn'd by the ſame Mouth, and the credulous and ignorant, believing their King divinely ſet over them, ſit ſtill, and by degrees grow into Quiet and Admiration, eſpecially if lull'd aſleep with ſome ſmall continuance of Peace (be it never ſo unjuſt, unſound or dangerous) as if the Body Politic could not languiſh of an internal Diſeaſe, tho' its Complexion be freſh and chearful.

THOSE are the Reaſons which (if I conceive aright) have ſtupify'd the leſs knowing part of Mankind. Now, how the more ſearching part have ſo oddly miſcarry'd, will fall under conſideration.

FIRST then, we need not take the pains to demonſtrate how eaſy a thing it is for men of Acuteneſs, not converſant in Civil Affairs, not only to miſcarry in the Apprehenſion, but even in their Judgment of them: for they, inſtead of bringing the Series and Reaſon of things into Rule and Method, uſe on the contrary to meaſure them by their own preſuppos'd Speculation; and by that means become incapable of weighing rightly the various Incidences and Circumſtances of Buſineſs. For it is to be obſerv'd, that the Theorems of no Art or Profeſſion are either more eaſily found, or of more difficult practice than thoſe of Policy; ſo that it is no wonder if Men merely contemplative, fail ſo oft in the very laying of Grounds, as we ſhall anon inſtance. Now how fruitful Dainties Error and Abſurdity are, we all know. But more eſpecially the Contentions of contemplative Men are moſt numerous, various, and endleſs; for wrangling is with them an Art, and they are endu'd with that ungenerous Shame, never to acknowledge their Miſtakes. Moreover, their Principles are moſt times ill-grounded, and it is to be fear'd that in their Superſtructures they as often call in their

their Imaginations as their Judgment to frame Arguments. Beſides, theſe men fighting only with Pen, Ink and Paper, ſeldom arrive at a means to decide the Quarrel, by which he that gains the laſt word is ſuppos'd Conqueror; or the other leaves almoſt as inglorious a Conqueſt to the Victor, as if he had been overthrown.

THAT which I would infer from all this, is, that the Generality of ſpeculative Men, for the moſt part guiding their Underſtandings by thoſe Notions which they find in Books, fall not ſeldom by this means into conſiderable Errors. For all Books, thoſe I mean that are human, and fall directly under our Conſideration, either lay down practical Things and Obſervations of Kingſhip, or ſome general and univerſal Notions, or elſe controverſially aſſert *Monarchy* againſt ſome Oppoſers. Now in the two latter there are generally found two grand and inſupportable Fallacies, the firſt whereof is, that they fraudulently converſe in Generals, and (to borrow the School-terms) ſpeak of that in the *Abſtract* which they ſhould do in the *Concrete:* As for example, where they ſhould aſſert the particular Right of this or that Prince, they cunningly or ignorantly lay out moſt of their Diſcourſe about *Monarchy* in general, and often weary and amaze the Diſpute before they come to the true ground and ſtating of the Quarrel, whereby the Readers (diverted by ſuch Prepoſſeſſion, and intangled by general Notions of Authority, Power and government) ſeldom deſcend into the conſideration of Particulars, where the great Scruple and Difficulty for the moſt part lies. So that any King (be his Acceſs to the Government never ſo fraudulent and unjuſtifiable) comes to be look'd on as ſacred, authoritative, and by degrees begins not to bluſh at the Attributes of Sacred Majeſty, Grace, and Highneſs, or any other Terms that the ſervil Flattery and witty Barbarity of Courtiers can give to them: nay, ſome even of the wickedeſt of the Roman Emperors could be content to be ſaluted with *Perennitys* and *Divinitys*; whereas if Men would call their Reaſon into counſel, they might find that theſe blazing Stars were opac Bodies, and did ſhine only by Reflection: Theſe Men having no more Luſtre than either the Cabal of their own ſtate and diſtance, or the wretched Impoſition upon the People, caſts on them. For did Men deveſt the Authority from the Perſon, they would then commonly find it inconſiderable, if not poſitively evil. And again conſider Authority in itſelf as a thing fixt, real, immutable, and (when juſtly adminiſter'd) ſacred, they might find, that granting a Prince to be the moſt regular, juſt Perſon in all the world, yet many Men as good join'd with him, intruſted, and concurring to the ſame end, might do much more good; and that to deny this, were to be as irrational as to deny that one Perſon could do any good at all. But however, this I take to be certain and demonſtrable out of their own Principles, that Kings being only to be conſider'd in reſpect of the Truſt and Power lodg'd in them, a number of Men by as juſt means (not to ſay better) inveſted with the ſame Truſt and Power, are every jot as ſacred, and of as much Divine Right as any Monarch is, the Power being eſſentially the ſame, united or divided, as if a Commiſſion be to one or three. It will follow then, that Republics may be as juſt and authoritative as Kingſhips; and then their radical Argument of the *Jure Divino* of Kingſhip is wholly enervated, and the other render'd equally as Sovereign. And I am to note (but this is only tranſiently) the Poorneſs, or, to ſay better, the Blaſphemy of that Argument which flouriſhes out

Kings as the Types of Divinity, and vainly laviſhes ſome Metaphyſics, to prove that all things have a natural tendency to Oneneſs; nay, the itch of ſome merry Wits has carry'd them to run over moſt of the Divine Attributes (as ſome Engliſh Lawyers have talk'd of the legal, I muſt ſay phantaſtical Ubiquity and Omniſcience of our Kings, tho' we ſee the contrary; and ſome Civilians have ſaid as much about the Emperor before them) whereas they ſhould conſider, that the immenſe Simplicity of God flows out in its ſeveral Operations with ineffable variety, God being every where and the ſame, or, as the *Platoniſts* ſay, a Center in every part of its Circle, a Spirit without Quantity, Diſtance, and Comprehenſion; whereas Man is a determinate narrow Being, who doing one thing, ceaſes to do another, and thinking one of thing is forc'd to quit his former thought. Now how fit he is to be a Shadow of this Archetype, let any judge, unleſs he could be refin'd from his Corporeity, and inlarg'd into a proportionable Immenſity. Beſides, I know not whether it be ſafe to think or no, That as God, who, for the moſt part, indues Men with Gifts ſuitable to the places to which he calls them, would in ſome meaſure pour out his Spirit proportionate to theſe Men, whereas moſt commonly we find them, notwithſtanding their extraordinary advantages of Society, Education, and Buſineſs, as weak Men as any other: and good Princes being ſway'd by the Advice of Men good and wiſe, and the bad ſeduc'd by Men of their own Inclinations, what are all Monarchies but in reality Optimacies? for a few only eſſentially govern under the name of one, who is utterly as unable as the meaneſt of thoſe over whom he claims Superiority.

THE ſecond Falacy is this, That Men, while they labour thus to ſupport Monarchy, tell us not what kind of Monarchy it is, and conſequently gain nothing, tho' we ſhould grant them the former Propoſition to be true. For what does it avail to tell me of the Title of ſuch a Prince, if I know not by what Title he holds? Grant it were viſible to me that ſuch a Man was mark'd out by Providence to be my Governor, yet if I cannot tell what kind of one, whether abſolute, mixt, limited, merely executive, or only firſt in order, how ſhall I know to direct my Obedience? If he be abſolute, my very natural Liberty is taken away from me; nor do I know any Power that can make any Man ſuch, the Scripture ſetting juſt limitations and reſtrictions to all Governors. If mixt and limited, I muſt know the due Temper and Bounds whereby he is to rule, or elſe he may uſurp or be miſtaken, and I oppreſt or injur'd. If executive, the Power fundamentally reſides not in him, but in the Great Council, or them intruſted by the People; then I adore only a Shadow. Now if any Prince of *Europe* can really clear up theſe Miſts, and ſhew the Lines of his Government drawn fairly, and his Charter whole and authentic, like that of *Venice* and antient *Rome*, for my Part, I'll be the firſt Man ſhall ſwear him Allegiance, and the laſt that will preſerve him. But you will find that they will tell you in general about their Office, and in particular of their Claims of Succeſſion, Inheritance, and Anceſtors; when look but three or four Stories back, and you will meet either ſome ſavage unnatural Intruſion, diſguis'd under ſome forc'd Title or chimerical Cognation, or elſe ſome violent Alteration, or poſſibly ſome ſlender Oath or Articles, hardly extorted and imperfectly kept. Now if any Man that will but run over theſe Rules, and apply them to any Hiſtory whatever (as we ſhall exemplify in that of *Scotland*, upon which for the preſent we have pitcht) and

and not find moſt Titles ambiguous, the Effects of former Monarchies (for where, in a Catalogue of forty Kings, can you almoſt ſhew me three good ones, but things merely ſtruggling to maintain their Titles and domeſtic Intereſt?) ruinous to the People, who for the moſt part conſider them no otherwiſe than as to be reſcu'd from violent Confuſion, not as they conduce to the poſitive Happineſs of a civil Life; I ſay, all this will be found to be true, or my ſmall Converſation in Books is extremely falſe. And truly I conceive reading of Hiſtory to be the moſt rational Courſe to ſet any Judgment right, becauſe it inſtructs by Experience and Effects, and grounds the Judgment upon material Obſervations, and not blindly gropes after Notions and Cauſes, which to him are *tantum non inſcrutabile*; but of that anon. A main Miſtake under this Topic has been an erroneous compariſon and application of matters Civil and Military; for Men obſerving that mixt Councils about Generals, Plurality, Equality of Commands, frequent and ſudden Military Alterations, have brought no ſmall Diſtempers and Dangers to ſeveral Governments and Attempts; therefore they preſently conclude, that in Civils alſo it is the ſafeſt to continue a Command in one hand for preventing the like Diſturbances. But here they are deceiv'd; Civil matters conſiſt in long debate, great conſideration, patient expectation, and wary foreſight, which is better to be found in a number of choice experienc'd Heads, than in one ſingle Perſon, whoſe Youth and Vigour of Spirit enables him rather to Action, and fills him with that noble Temerity which is commonly ſo happy in Martial Affairs; that muſt be guided always to improve Occaſions, which are ſeldom to be found again, and, which miſtaken, are to be ſcarcely amended. Beſides, the Ferocity of daring Spirits can hardly be bounded while they ſtand level; ſo that it is no wonder if they extinguiſh all Emulations by putting the Power into the hands of one, whereas in a Commonwealth it is quite otherwiſe: and Factions (unleſs they be cruelly exorbitant) do but poiſe and balance one another; and many times like the diſcord of Humores upon the natural Body, produce real good to the Government. That ſlender conceit, that Nature ſeems to dreſs out a Principality in moſt of her works, as among Birds, Bees, *&c.* is ſo ſlender indeed (in regard they are no more Chiefs than what they fancy them, but all their Prepotency is merely predatory or oppreſſive; and even Lions, Elephants, Crocodiles and Eagles, have ſmall inconſiderable Enemies, of which they ſtand in fear, and by which they are often ruin'd) that the Recital confutes it; and if it were ſo, yet unleſs they could prove their one Man to be as much more excellent than the reſt as thoſe are, and that ſolely too, I ſee not what it would advantage them, ſince to comply with the deſign of Nature in one, they would contradict it in others, where ſhe is equally concern'd. But theſe Philological and Rhetorical Arguments have not a little hinder'd the ſeverer Diſquiſition of Reaſon, and prepoſſeſs'd the more eaſy Minds with Notions ſo much harder to be laid aſide, as they are more erroneous and pleaſing.

THESE are the fundamental Errors that have miſled the Judgment; now thoſe which have miſguided the Conſcience, have principally proceeded from the Miſinterpretation of Scripture; and therefore ſeeming Sacred, have been leſs examin'd and doubted, as carrying the moſt Authority. Thus in the old Teſtament, there being ſuch frequent mention of Kings, which notwithſtanding were given in Wrath,

they

they ſuperſtitiouſly maintain not only the neceſſity, but even the impunity of Kings; whereas we know not their Powers and Limitations, and it is inconſequent to argue, That becauſe *Judea* was ſo govern'd, we ſhould follow the ſame Pattern, when we find neither Precept, Conſequence, nor Neceſſity convincing us. And it is madneſs to think that while the Divine Spirit ſo freely and vehemently exclaims againſt the Iniquity of men, God would authorize it ſo far as to leave it in them only unpuniſhable who ſhould exterminate and reform it. As for the Antiquity from ADAM, it is true, before his Fall his Dominion was large and wide, but it was over the Beaſts that after his Fall learn'd to rebel againſt him; and œconomically, not deſpotically, over his Wife and Children. But what is this to Civil Government? In the New Teſtament (for I the brieflier paſs over this head, in regard it has been ſo copiouſly treated upon by thoſe under whoſe Profeſſion it falls, and that it does not immediately conduce to my Deſign) the principal Argument has been the meekneſs of CHRIST and his compliance with Civil Powers, which certainly, if he had been diſpos'd to have reſiſted, ſay they, he could as eaſily have overthrown, as with a few Cords whip the Buyers and Sellers out of the Temple. But he, that was the Wiſdom of his Father, rather thought fit to build up his Kingdom (which is not earthly, nor known of earthly men) in Meekneſs and Obedience to Civil Powers, which are perpetually chang'd and hurry'd at the Will of the firſt Mover, otherwiſe he would never have concerned himſelf ſo much in giving Dues to CÆSAR, and to God what is Gods; intimating the diſtinct Obedience owing by all men, as Chriſtians, and Citizens. When, granting Monarchy the moſt and only lawful Government, yet every one knows, that knows any thing of the *Roman* Story, that AUGUSTUS had no more Title to that Government, than to any of thoſe over whom he uſurp'd, and that his Acceſs to the Government was as fraudulent and violent as could be. Another Error is the miſtaking of the word * *Powers*, when it's clear the Scripture ſpeaks of it in a Latitude, as extending it to all ſorts of eſtabliſh'd Governments. Now men have falſly pretended, that thoſe Powers were only meant of Kings; and what by an indiſcreet collation of the places of the old, and violent wreſtings of others of the New Teſtament, they perfected the other grand Miſtake; which ſince it has been already clear'd up, and as we ſaid is but collateral with us for the preſent, we ſhall no further mention it.

* Δυνάμεις. Rom. 13.

AS for the alledg'd Examples and Speeches of the Primitive Times, I ſee not much in them conſiderable: for tho' Inſurrections againſt Princes cannot be produc'd, or rather much is ſaid againſt them, yet we are to conſider, that the Goſpel of CHRIST (which was at that time not much defil'd by the World) engages not to any Domination, but (wholly taken up with its own Extaſies, ſpiritual Delights and Expectations) neglects all other Affairs as ſtrange and dangerous. And moreover (tho' I know what has been ſaid to the contrary) I cannot find, after well conſidering thoſe Ages, any probable ground how, if they would have rebel'd, they could have made any Head. They were indeed numerous, but then they had Legionaries among them; and who knows not what an ineffectual thing a People is (be it never ſo deſirous) when overaw'd by the Soldiery? And they were a People (as Greatneſs to God and Man is different) not conſiderable for their worldly Power (for how few eminent Commanders were converted

converted in the firſt Ages?) but out of his own mere choice, ſo that it was not ſtrange if they could not do much. For God, as he choſe the weakeſt means in planting the Goſpel, even Fiſhermen; ſo, in the primitive Propagation he call'd the weaker Men, tho' Chriſtianity afterwards grew ample and auguſt, and Kings were proud to give their Names to it.

AS for the Fathers (ſuppoſing them free of their many Adulterations, Interpolations, and all thoſe Errors and Incertainties which the proceſs of time and fraud of Men has foiſted into them) they are to be accepted only as Witneſſes, not as Judges: that is to ſay, they may prove matter of Fact, but none of their words matter of Right; eſpecially if we conſider their Writings, either Homilies, Commentaries, or Controverſies, which are ever directed to another end than this is, and they themſelves (Men ſecluded from Buſineſs) are ſo much more unable to judge and reſolve civil Controverſies, in regard the unhappineſs of the latter times has produc'd many Controverſies not known or thought of in their days, which not falling directly under their Profeſſion, cannot receive any Light or Authority from them.

HAVING thus conſider'd Kingſhip, and how evil it has appear'd thro' the falſe Lights of the Underſtanding, we ſhall now conſider, whether, taking it by itſelf, its Foundations be laid upon a Cylinder or upon a Cube: and this, I think, we are the likelieſt to do, if we conſider them in their Rights and Uſes, or, to ſpeak plainer, in their Legality and Policy; ſo that if we find that none of the ways of retaining their Crowns can be authentic except one, and that one makes againſt them, we ſhall ſee we have no juſt cauſes of blind Adoration or implicit Obligation to truckle under any of their Commands. And if again we diſcover that ſort of Government it ſelf is not ſo profitable to the end of Civil Happineſs, but rather diametrically oppoſite to it; we may ſuppoſe that Men are either ſtrangely obſtinate, or elſe they might eradicate an Error which not only offers ſo many Prejudices to their Underſtanding, but that has ſuch an evil Influence upon their external Welbeing.

WE have then to conſider, that for one Man to rule over Many, there muſt neceſſarily be pretended ſome Right, tho' it be but colourable; for either he muſt be choſen by the People as their Arbitrator and Supreme Judge, or elſe he muſt by force of Arms invade them, and bring them to Obedience, which he by Force preſerving for his Sons, or Succeſſors, makes way for a third Claim, which is Inheritance. A fourth ſome have invented, tho' were it real, it is but a difference of the laſt, and I therefore ſhall mention it under that Head. But to the Conſideration.

FIRST therefore Election, ſuppoſing the People, either finding themſelves unable to weild their own Happineſs, or for preventing of Diſorder, make choice of one Man to be ſet over them, it here inſtantly follows, that the Authority is in the People, and flowing from them; for Choice argues a Power, and being elected a Subordination to it; in the End, I mean, tho' not in every Act. Now there is none choſen but for ſome End, or for ſome Intentions reciprocal betwixt both Parties; for otherwiſe ſuch a choice were but Dotage, and conſequently invalid: Wherefore thus it will follow, that thoſe who pretend to King it upon this Topic, muſt either ſhew a formal Election (which I think many Kings are not able to do) or if he can ſhew one, pro-

duce alſo the Conditions and Ends for which he was choſen. Now all parts being either implicit or explain'd, let him exhibit the Covenant, that it may be known whether he governs according to it or not; for if he tranſgreſſes, he forfeits, and the others are abſolv'd from their promis'd Obedience. If the Agreement be unwritten or intentional, either Party is relatively ty'd; and then if he does any thing againſt the welfare of the People (that Soveraign Law and end of all Governments) the People may not only juſtly ſuppoſe the former Capitulation broken, but even endeavour, by what poſſible means they can, to reſtore themſelves to their former Rights: For why ſhould the making of a Compact prejudice any when it is once broken? And here comes in another Fallacy, with which the Aſſertors of Royalty have ſo flouriſh'd, that an Agreement between a People and one Man ſhould deſcend to his Poſterity; whereas it is to be conſider'd, that the People chooſing one Man is commonly in conſideration of his Perſon and perſonal Merit; which not being the ſame in his Son (as commonly Families in the Horizon are in the Meridian, the Founders being braver than any that follow after them) that every intent is fruſtrated and ceaſes; and the People providing for the Happineſs of a few years, which are determinable with incertainty of the latter part of the Life of one Man, run themſelves and their Poſterity into an eternal Inconvenience (for any thing they know) of bad Governors. And if the People would never ſo formally agree with him, that in regard of his Merits or felicity of Actions, his Son ſhould be receiv'd in that place, yet would they not ſtand to it, that very Pact expiring with the Life of either. For my Father may leave me notionally a Slave in a Tenure (a thing frequent with our Anceſtors) or as Civilians term it, a Feodary, with which I am content, in reſpect of the Advantage it brings me, or becauſe my own Eſtate is too little to be independant, and therefore I think it good prudence to be ſhelter'd under the protection of the greater; but my natural Liberty, that is to ſay, to make my Life as juſtly happy and advantageous to me as I may, he can no more give away from me than my underſtanding or Eye-ſight: for theſe are Priviledges with which God and Nature have indu'd me, and theſe I cannot be deny'd but by him that will alſo deny me a Being. But to go on, Suppoſe a ſecond Generation ſhould accept the Son, and a third a Grandſon, yet this confirms not a fourth; and the People very impoliticly ſtrengthen and confirm the Power by continuance, and in a manner with their own hands lay the Foundation of Abſoluteneſs; their Governors themſelves growing in Intereſts, increaſing in Alliances and Forces; ſo it is very improbable but that within a little they grow too big and formidable, and leave nothing of Liberty except the Name, and (if they be leſs cunning) not that. A pertinent Example of this, and ſo near us that I cannot paſs it, we ſee in young ORANGE and the *Low Countries* at this day, who continuing his Progenitors for their ſignal Services, and him for theirs, are now puniſh'd for their generous and indiſcreet rewarding of Virtue, that their Liberty was lately almoſt blown up before they well perceiv'd it to be undermin'd, and they are now at charge to maintain their own Oppreſſion. As for that formal Election and Stipulation, who ſees not what a vain and ridiculous cheat it is, they coming with Swords in their hands to demand the Scepter of a weak and ſtupid multitude that appears only to gaze upon the Ceremonies, and whoſe refuſal were ineffectual? but it is a gracious piece of the Cabal of *Tyranny* to deceive the People with Shadows, Fantaſms, and names of Liberty.

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AS for thoſe that intrude by Force, they cannot certainly have the Forehead to infer any Right, they being but, as the Pirate ſaid to ALEXANDER, public and more magnificent Robbers. Certainly theſe are the NIMRODS, the great Hunters, God's Scourges, and the Burdens of the Earth; and whether they be Founders of Empires, or great Captains (as BOCCALIN diſtinguiſhes them) they ought rather to be remember'd with horror and deteſtation, than have that undue Reverence with which they commonly meet.

YET theſe are they that lay the Foundations of Succeſſion, and from theſe do the Succeſſors claim, and enjoy with the leſs reluctance, becauſe the regret of the Violences, and heat of the firſt daily wears out; whether it be by the continuance of Peace that charms Men into a love of eaſe, or that the continuance of Slavery enfeebles their Minds, that they rather chooſe to look at their preſent Enjoyment than real Happineſs; ſo that it is not ſtrange if the Perſon of their Oppreſſor becomes in time adorable, and he himſelf thinks that confirm'd and juſtify'd to him in proceſs of time, to which in the beginning he had no right. But if we conſider the buſineſs a little higher, we might find that ſince neither the People (as we have prov'd before) have power to make themſelves Vaſſals, and the Intruders themſelves cannot pretend any juſt Title; their Domination is merely illegal, and apt to be ſhaken off with the firſt conveniency, it being every whit as equitable, that theſe Men ſhould be judg'd Enemies of Mankind, and condemn'd to die the death of Parricides for uſurping a Power, as NERO for abuſing it. But I would fain aſk the *Regious Defenders*, by what Law they can maintain Governments to be inherent in one, and to be tranſmitted to his Offspring? If they ſay by the Law of God, I would demand again how they can make this Law appear to me? If they ſay that the Scripture contains the Right and Sacredneſs of Kings, I aſk them again, How they know that God extends that Priviledge and Authority to this King? If they ſay, that he is involv'd in the general Right, they do but run into a Circle; unleſs they can ſhew me, that all his Approaches to the Government were regular, and ſuch as God was pleas'd with, or elſe God had by ſome Sign and Wonder declar'd his approbation of him; for without theſe two, they muſt make God the Author of Evil, which is impious, and pretend his Commiſſion for an unlawful Act; and by the ſame right, any other (as a Tyrant, for example) may pretend it to an Action never ſo unjuſt, it being no unuſual thing to borrow the face of Divinity, even upon ſome foul Impoſtures, as (to forbear further Inſtances) NUMA's Conference with ÆGERIA, SCIPIO's Retirement into the Capitol, and SERTORIUS's white Hart.

Now if they pretend the Law of Nature, they muſt demonſtrate to us, both that ſhe endow'd Men with unequal Freedom, and that ſhe ſhap'd out ſuch a Man to rule; whereas it appears on the contrary, that all Men naturally are equal: for tho' Nature with a noble Variety has made different the Features and Lineaments of Men, yet as to Freedom, till it be loſt by ſome external means, ſhe has made every one alike, and given them the ſame Deſires. But ſuppoſe ſhe had intended ſuch a Family for Government, and had given them ſome illuſtrious Marks, as we read of ſome that had, whether by the imagination of their Mothers, or by Deceit; yet then would Nature fall into a double Irregularity, firſt in deſerting her Method of making all free, and ſecondly

condly in making her general Work merely ſubſervient, and ſecondary to her particular; which how contrary it is to that beautiful Harmony of hers, I need not much inſiſt. Now if they ſay, they are Fathers of the People, and for that reaſon they call themſelves the Heads, inferring the People to be no more than a Trunk, it's only metaphorical, and proves nothing: for they muſt remember, that ſince *Father* has a relation upon which it depends, and upon whoſe removal it vaniſhes, they themſelves cannot bring any ſuch; for by phyſical procreation they will not offer it; and for metaphorical Dependance, it will come to nothing, we ſeeing People languiſh when their Princes are fulleſt, and, like Leeches, rather willing to burſt than to fall off; and on the contrary, the People upon the removal of a Prince chearful and reliev'd. Now if there were ſo ſtrict a Union between theſe two, ſuch a Contrariety and Antipathy could never appear; for certainly when any two Perſons endeavour to gain Ground one upon another, there is an Enmity, whatever is pretended. Beſides, if theſe men would be Fathers, it were then their duty to do like Fathers, which is to provide for, defend and cheriſh; whereas on the contrary, it is they themſelves that eat the Bread out of the Mouths of their Children, and thro' the Groans of the Poor. And whereas Flattery has ſaid, that what they draw up in Vapours they ſend down in Showers, yet are we ſure that ſuch Rains are for the moſt part unfruitful, if not ominous and infectious. If they pretend the Law of Nations, it were well they would declare to us firſt what this Law is, and whether generally agreed on or no by Nations. If they ſay, yes, they muſt reſolve whether explicitly or implicitly: if they ſay the former, let them produce them; if the latter, they muſt demonſtrate, that all Nations are agreed in ſuch and ſuch Notions, and all Men of theſe nations, ſince every one muſt be of equal capacity: When on the contrary, tho' the Underſtandings of moſt Men, whom we know or have convers'd with, ſeem to agree in ſome general Maxims, but unpoliſh'd, unnumbred, and unmethodized, yet we ſee many Nations differing from us in many things, which we think clearly, fundamentally, and naturally true; neither do Climates and Education only ſo diverſify the Minds of men, but even their Underſtandings, and the different ways of thinking ſo diſtinguiſh even thoſe of one Country, that tho' we may pleaſe our ſelves in thinking that all Men's thoughts follow the fantaſtical method of ours, yet we might find, if we were perfectly converſant with all Men of the World, and well read in their Authors (as we are not with half of them, no, nor any one man with the twentieth part) that there are ſcarce four or five Axioms, excepting as they make a part of the Law of nature, would be univerſally receiv'd. Now (for I have been the longer by reaſon that this imaginary Law has been ſo held up by the Civilians, and made the ſubterfuge of ſo many conſiderable Diſputes) if it be ſo weak as that we can ſcarce tell whether it has a being or no, for even that which we account the moſt ſacred piece of it, the violation of public Meſſengers, the *Tartar* and *Muſcovite*, unleſs reſtrain'd by fear, break it every day. What then are the Arguments deduc'd from it? or if there were ſuch a Law, what would it avail ſuch a particular Man? for why ſhould other Nations impoſe a Governor where they are not concern'd? And if they pretend this Law as to the preſervation and impunity of their Perſons, the ſame Anſwer will ſerve again, with this Addition, That they make an Offender incapable of Puniſh-

ment,

ment, which is but to give them a Commiſſion to offend. Now if they run upon that diſtinction of ſuſpending only, and not puniſhing (as if forſooth this kind of People muſt be preſerv'd, tho' by the ruin of Mankind, to immediate Vengeance) then I ſay, That Suſpenſion is really a Puniſhment; and if his Demerits can deſerve that, I ſee not but that upon a proportionable Increaſe, they may deſerve Dethronization or Death, as clearly as two and two make four, and four more make eight. If they alledge poſitive or municipal Laws, and number *Homages*, they are not much the nearer, ſince that all ſuch Laws are but Rivulets and Branches of them we before examin'd; and ſince we found that thoſe ſpeak ſo little in their favour, that which theſe do cannot ſignify much, eſpecially ſince Princes, who are ever watchful to improve all occaſions of this Nature, can either by Terror or Artifice draw Aſſemblies, or the major part of them, to their own Lure; nay, even the worſt of them have not forgot to be ſolicitous in this Caſe. But it muſt be remark'd, That whatever poſitive Laws are repugnant to thoſe general ones, they are Injurious, and ought to be repeal'd. And truly it is a ſad Obſervation, that as Monarchs grow, either out of the Weakneſs of Government, and (as I may ſay) its Pupilage, as ROMULUS and THESEUS did at *Rome* and *Athens*, or elſe out of the diſeaſe or depravation of it, as CÆSAR again invaded *Rome:* ſo have the People been never more fond of them, than when Manners were at the higheſt Corruption, which ever gave Acceſs of Strength to them; nor have they more diſtaſted them, than when their Spirits and Diſcipline were the moſt brave and healthful: So fatally diſagreeing are true Liberty, which is the very Source of Virtue and Generoſity, and the impotent Domination of a ſingle Tyrant, who commonly reigns by no other means than the Diſcords of braver Citizens, who can neither indure Equality or Superiority among themſelves, and rather admit a general Vaſſalage, than juſt Equality; or by the Vices of the baſer ſort, which naturally reconcile them and Kings, and concern them both in a bad Example. But ſuppoſe Succeſſion a thing ſacred and inviolable, yet once break and interrupt it, it is little worth, either the Uſurper being to be acknowledg'd regular, or the whole Series daſh'd out of order. Nay, we ſee Aſpirers themſelves either ſo blinded with their Pretences, or with Animoſity, and ſo crying up their own Titles, that it is almoſt impoſſible for any private Judgment to do right in this caſe, themſelves thwarting one another; and it cannot be in the power of Nature that both ſhould be right. But who can inſtance one Monarch whoſe Crown is come to him by untainted Succeſſion? and what Hiſtory will not confirm the Example I ſhall anon bring? Certainly tho' Succeſſion were a Thing that had not ſo little reaſon or reality, yet I ſee not why Men ſhould with ſuch a ſtrange pertinacy defend it. Matters of Government ought to be manag'd by Prudence; but Succeſſion puts them into the hands of Fortune, when a Child incapable or infirm, under the regiment of a Nurſe, muſt (poſſibly) be Supreme Governor, and thoſe whom either their Abilities or Virtues fit for it, Subordinate or laid aſide. But what if the Perſon whom Neceſſity has ſet at the ſtern be incapable, lunatic, weak, or vitious, is not this a good way to prevent Controverſies? yet this plainly enervates all good Council, when a King ſhould have need of Tutors, and that a Multitude of People ſhould be commanded by one who commands not himſelf; and, when we ſcarce obey even excellent Princes, to adore Shadows and weak ones.

AS for BOXHORNIUS's diſtinction of Succeſſion, wherein the next Heir muſt neceſſarily ſucceed by the Original Right of the former, I would ask him, whether the Predeceſſor were a Poſſeſſor or Uſufructuary? If the firſt, all our former Arguments fall on him; if the latter, it makes not for his Succeſſor, the People being Owners: and beſides, the diſtinction is one of his own coining, never pretended before; upon the firſt Controverſy it is invalid, altho' the firſt Founder had a Right, as we have prov'd the contrary.

HAVING, with what brevity I could, brought to an end my firſt Intention, I ſhall now fall upon the ſecond, which is the intrinſic value and expediency of this Government, and ſome little compariſon with others; but herein we ſhall be ſhort, and only ſo far as concerns this. And indeed it is a buſineſs ſo tickliſh, that even Mr. HOBS in his Piece *de Cive*, tho' he aſſur'd himſelf that the reſt of his Book (which is principally calculated for the aſſertion of Monarchy) is demonſtrated, yet he doubts whether the Arguments which he brings to this buſineſs be ſo firm or not; and MALVEZZI contrarily remonſtrates (in his Diſcourſes upon TACITUS) that Optimacies are clearly better than Monarchies, as to all advantages. And indeed if we look on the Arguments for Monarchy, they are either Flouriſhes, or merely Notions; ſuch are the reference and perfection of Unity, which, ſay they, muſt needs work better and more naturally, as one ſimple Cauſe (beſides that it ſtills and reſtrains all other claims) than many co-ordinate: whereas they never conſider that tho' among many joint Cauſes there may be ſome jarring, yet like croſs Wheels in an Engine, they tend to the regulation of the whole. What violent Miſchiefs are brought [illegible] by the Contentions of Pretenders in Monarchies, the Ambiguities of Titles, and lawleſs Ambition of Aſpirers? whereas in a ſettled Republic all this is clear and unperplex'd; and in caſe any particular Man aſpires, they know againſt whom to join, and puniſh as a common Enemy. As for that reaſon which alledges the advantage of Secreſy in buſineſs, it carries not much with it, in regard that under that even moſt pernicious deſigns may be carried on; and for wholeſome Councils (bateing ſome more nice Tranſactions) it matters not how much they be toſt among thoſe who are ſo much intruſted and concern'd in them, all bad deſigns being never in probability ſo feeble and ineffectual, as when there are many Eyes to overlook them, and voices to decry them. As for that expedition in which they ſay Monarchs are ſo happy, it may as well further a bad intention, as give effect to a juſt Council, it depending on the Judgment of a ſingle man, to whoſe will and ends all muſt refer; whereas a ſelect number of intruſted Perſons may haſten every opportunity with a juſt ſlowneſs as well as they, tho' indeed (unleſs it be in ſome Military critical Minutes) I ſee not ſuch an Excellency in the ſwiftneſs of heady Diſpatch, Precipitation in Councils being ſo dangerous and ominous. As for what concerns private ſuitors, they may as ſpeedily and effectually (if not more) be anſwer'd in ſtaid Republics, as in the Court of a King, where Bribery and unworthy Favourites do not what is juſt, but what is deſir'd.

WITH theſe and many others as conſiderable (which partly willingly, and partly in this penury of Books, forgettingly I paſs) do they intend to ſtrengthen this fantaſtical and airy Building; but as ſly Controverters many times leave out the principal Text or Argument, becauſe ſhould it be produc'd, it could not be ſo eaſily anſwer'd: ſo

theſe

theſe Men tell us all the Advantages of Monarchy, ſuppoſing them ſtill well ſettled, and under virtuous Men; but you ſhall never hear them talk of it in its corrupt ſtate under lewd Kings and unſettled Laws; they never let fall a word of the dangers of Inter-reigns, the Minorities and Vices of Princes, Miſgovernments, evil Councils, Ambitions, Ambiguities of Titles, and the Animoſities and Calamities that follow them, the neceſſary Injuſtices and Oppreſſions by which Monarchs (uſing the People's Wealth and Blood againſt themſelves) hold them faſt in their Seats, and, by ſome ſuſpenſion of Divine Juſtice, die not violently.

WHEREAS other Governments, eſtabliſh'd againſt all theſe Evils, being ever of Vigour and juſt Age, ſettled in their own Right, freed from pretences, ſerv'd by experienc'd and engag'd Councils, and (as nothing under the Moon is perfect) ſometimes gaining and advantag'd in their Controverſies, which have not ſeldom (as we may ſee in Old *Rome)* brought forth good Laws and Augmentations of Freedom; whereas once declining from their Purity and Vigour, and (which is the effect of that) raviſh'd by an Invader, they languiſh in a brutiſh Servitude, (Monarchy being truly a Diſeaſe of Government) and like Slaves, ſtupid with harſhneſs and continuance of the laſh, wax old under it, till they either arrive at that Period which God preſcribes to all People and Governments, or elſe better Stars and Poſterity awaken them out of that Lethargy, and reſtore them to their priſtine Liberty, and its Daughter Happineſs.

BUT this is but to converſe in Notions, wandring, and ill abſtracted from things; let us now deſcend to practical Obſervation, and clearly manifeſt out the whole Series of Time and Actions, what Circumſtances and Events have either uſher'd or follow'd one Race of Kings, That if there were all the Juſtice in the World that the Government of a Nation ſhould be entail'd upon one Family, yet certainly we could not grant it to ſuch a one whoſe criminal Lives and formidable Deaths have been Evidences of God's Wrath upon it for ſo many Generations.

AND ſince no Country that I know yields ſuch an illuſtrious Example of this as *Scotland* does, and it may be charity to bring into the way ſuch as are miſled, I have pitch'd upon the *Scotiſh* Hiſtory, wherein as I have only conſulted their own Authors, as my fitteſt Witneſſes in this caſe; ſo have I (not as a juſt Hiſtory, but as far as concerns this purpoſe) faithfully, and as much as the thing would permit, without gloſſes repreſented it: ſo that any calm Underſtanding may conclude that the Vengeance which now is level'd againſt that Nation, is but an attendant of this new introduc'd Perſon; and that he himſelf, tho' for the preſent he ſeems a *Log* among his Frogs, and ſuffers them to play about him, yet God will ſuffer him (if the *Engliſh* Army prevents not) to turn *Stork* and devour them, while their Cries ſhall not be heard, as thoſe that (in ſpite of the warning of Providence, and the light of their own Reaſons, for their own corrupt Intereſt and greedy Ambition) brought theſe Miſeries upon themſelves.

An Inſtance of the preceding REASONS *out of the* SCOTISH HISTORY.

The Second Part.

AND now we come to our main Buſineſs, which is the review of Story, wherein we may find ſuch a direct and uninterrupted Series, ſuch mutual Endearments between Prince and People, and ſo many of them crown'd with happy Reigns and quiet Deaths (two ſucceſſively ſcarce dying naturally) that we may conclude, they have not only the moſt reaſon, but a great deal of excellent Intereſt who eſpouſe the Perſon and Quarrel of the hopeful Deſcendant of ſuch a Family: nor ſhall we be ſo injurious to the Glory of a Nation, proud with a Catalogue of Names and Kings, as to expunge a great part of their number; tho' ſome, who have done it, affirm there can be no probability that they had any other being than what HECTOR BOYES, and the black book of *Paſley* (out of which BUCHANAN had moſt of his Materials) are pleas'd to beſtow on them, there being no mention of the name of *Scot* in any Authentic Writer till four hundred years after CHRIST. No, we ſhall no more envy theſe old Heroes to them, than their placing the Red Lion in the dexter Point of their Eſcutcheon. But tho' we might in juſtice reject them as fabulous and monkiſh, yet ſince they themſelves acknowledge them, and they equally make againſt them, we ſhall run them over like genuine Hiſtory. The firſt of this bleſſed Race was FERGUS;
1. firſt General, and afterward got himſelf made King: but no ſooner caſt away on the Coaſt of *Ireland* but a Contention ariſes about the validity of their Oath to him, and Uncles are appointed to ſucceed,
2. which argues it Elective: ſo FERITHARIS Brother to FERGUS is King, but his Nephew forms a Conſpiracy againſt him, forces him to reſign and fly to the Iſles, where he dy'd. FERITHARIS dying ſoon after, was ſuſpected to be poiſon'd. After him comes in MAIN
3. (FERGUS's ſecond Son) who with his Son DORNADILLA, reign'd
4. quietly fifty ſeven years. But REUTHER his Son not being of Age,
5. the People make his Uncle NOTHAT take the Government; but he
6. miſruling, REUTHER, by the help of one DOUAL, rais'd a Party againſt him, and beheads him, makes himſelf King with the Indignation of the People that he was not elected: ſo that by the Kindred of NOTHAT he is fought, taken, and diſplac'd; but afterwards makes a Party, and regains. His Son THEREUS was too young, ſo that his
7. Brother RHEUTHA ſucceeded, but after ſeventeen years was glad to
8. reſign. Well, THEREUS reigns, but after ſix years declines to ſuch Lewdneſs that they force him to fly, and govern by a *Prorex*. After
9. 10. his Death JOSINA his Brother, and his Son FINAN are Kings, and quietly die ſo.

11. BUT then comes DURST, one who ſlays all the Nobility at a Banquet, and is by the People ſlain. After his Death the validity of the Oath to FERGUS is call'd in queſtion, and the elective Power vindicated; but at length EVEN his Brother is admitted, who tho' he
12. rul'd

rul'd valiantly and well, yet he had GILLUS a Baſtard Son, *Vaſer & Regni cupidus.* The next of the Line are Twins, DOCHAM and DORGAL, Sons of DURST: the while they diſputed about priority of Age, are, by the Artifice of GILLUS, ſlain in a Tumult; who makes a ſtrong Party, and ſeizing of a Hold, ſays he was made Superviſor by his Father, and ſo becomes King, cuts off all the Race of DURST: but is after forc'd out of the Kingdom, and taken by EVEN the Second his Succeſſor (who was choſen by the People) and by him put to Death in *Ireland.* After EVEN comes EDER: after EDER his Son EVEN the Third, who for making a Law, that the Nobility ſhould have the Enjoyment of all new marry'd Women before they were touch'd by their Husbands, was doom'd to Priſon during his Life, and there ſtrangl'd. His Succeſſor was his Kinſman METELLAN: after whom was elected CARATAC, whom his Brother CORBRET ſucceeded. But then came DARDAN (whom the Lords made to take on him the Government, by reaſon of the Nonage of CORBRET's Son) who for his Lewdneſs was taken by the People, and beheaded. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

AFTER him CORBRET the Second, whoſe Son LUCTAC for his Lewdneſs was by the People put to death; then was elected MOGALD, who following his vitious Predeceſſors ſteps, found his Death like theirs violent. 21. 22. 23.

HIS Son CONAR, one of the Conſpirators againſt him, ſucceeded, but miſgoverning, was clapt in Priſon, and there dy'd. 24.

ETHODIUS his Siſter's Son ſucceeded, who was ſlain in the night in his Chamber by his Piper. 25.

HIS Son being a Minor, SATRAEL his Brother was accepted, who ſeeking to place the Succeſſion in his own Line, grew ſo hateful to the People, that, not daring to come abroad, he was ſtrangl'd in the night by his own Servants, which made way for the youngeſt Brother. 26.

DONALD, who outdid the others Vices by contrary Virtues, and had a happy Reign of one and twenty years. 27.

ETHODIUS the Second, Son of the firſt of that Name, was next, a dull inactive Prince, *Familiarium tumultu occiſus.* 28.

HIS Son ATHIRCO promis'd fair, but deceiv'd their expectations with moſt horrid Lewdneſs, and at length vitiated the Daughters of NATHALOCK a Nobleman, and caus'd them to be whipt before his Eyes; but ſeeing himſelf ſurrounded by Conſpirators, eluded their Fury with his own Sword; his Brother and Children being forc'd to fly to the *Picts.* NATHALOCK, turning his Injury into Ambition, made himſelf King, and govern'd anſwerably; for he made moſt of the Nobility to be ſtrangl'd, under pretence of calling them to Council, and was after ſlain by his own Servants. 29. 30.

AFTER his Death ATHIRCO's Children were call'd back, and FINDOC his Son, being of excellent hopes, accepted, who made good what his Youth promis'd: he beat in ſundry Battels DONALD the Ilander; who ſeeing he could not prevail by force, ſent two as Renegados to the King, who (being not accepted) conſpire with his Brother, by whoſe means one of them ſlew him with a Spear when he was hunting. 31.

HIS Brother DONALD ſucceeds (the youngeſt of the three) who, about to revenge his Brother's Death, hears the Ilander is enter'd *Murray;* 32.

ray; whom he encountring with unequal Forces, is taken Priſoner with thirty of the Nobility, and whether of Grief, or his Wounds, dies in Priſon.

33. THE Ilander that had before uſurp'd the Name, now aſſum'd the Power (the Nobles, by reaſon of their kindred Priſoners, being over-aw'd) This man wanting nothing of an exquiſite Tyrant, was, after twelve years Butcheries, ſlain by CRATHLINTH Son of FINDOC, who under a diſguiſe found Addreſs and Opportunity. The brave
34. Tyrannicide was univerſally accepted, and gave no cauſe of Repentance; his Reign is famous for a War begun between the *Scots* and *Picts* about a Dog (as between the *Trojans* and *Italians* for a white Hart) and the defection of CARAUSIUS from DIOCLESIAN which happen'd in his time.

35. HIS Kinſman FINCORMAC ſucceeded worthy of memory for little but the Piety of the *Culdys* (an Order of religious Men of that time overborn by others ſucceeding) He being dead, three Sons of
36. his three Brothers contended for the Crown: ROMACH as the eldeſt, ſtrengthen'd by his Alliance with the *Picts*, with their aſſiſtance ſeiz'd on it, forcing others to fly; but proving cruel, the Nobility conſpir'd and ſlew him.

37. ANGUSIAN, another pretender, ſucceeds, who being aſſail'd by NECTHAM King of the *Picts*, who came to revenge ROMACH, routed his Army in a pitcht Battle; but NECTHAM coming again, he was routed, and both he and NECTHAM ſlain.

38. FETHELMAC, the third Pretender, came next, who beating the *Picts*, and waſting their Fields, HERGUST, when he ſaw there could be no advantage by the Sword, ſuborn'd two *Picts* to murder him, who drawing to conſpiracy the Piper that lay in his Chamber (as the manner was then) he at the appointed time admitted them, and there ſlew him.

39. THE next was EVGEN Son of FINCORMAC, who was ſlain in a Battle with the *Picts*, to the almoſt extirpation and baniſhment of the *Scots*; but at laſt the *Picts*, taking diſtaſte at the *Romans*, en-
40. ter'd into a ſecret League with the *Scots*, and agreed that FERGUS (whoſe Uncle the laſt King was) being then in baniſhment, and of a military breeding and inclination, ſhould be choſen King. With him the *Danes* maintain'd a long War againſt the *Romans*, and pull'd down the *Picts* wall: at laſt he and the King of *Picts* were in one day ſlain in a Battle againſt them. This Man's acceſs to Government was ſtrange, *ignotus Rex ab ignoto populo accerſitus*, and may be thought temerarious; he having no Land for his People, and the *Roman* Name inimical; yet founded he a Monarchy, there having been Kings ever ſince; and we are to note, this is the firſt man that the ſounder Writers will allow to be real and not fabulous. Him ſucceeded his Son
41. EUGENIUS (whoſe Grandfather GRAHAM had all the power) a warlike Prince, whom ſome ſay ſlain, ſome dead of a diſeaſe. After
42. him his Brother DONGARD, who after the ſpending of five ſuperſtitious years, left the Crown (as they call it) to his youngeſt Bro-
43. ther CONSTANTIN; who from a good private Man turn'd a lewd Prince, and was ſlain by a Nobleman, whoſe Daughter he had raviſh'd.
44. He was ſucceeded by CONGAL, CONSTANTIN's Son, who came a tolerable good Prince to a looſe People; and having ſpent ſome two and twenty years in ſlight excurſions againſt the *Saxons*, left the rule

to

to his Brother GORAN, who notwithſtanding he made a good League againſt the *Britains*, which much conduc'd to his and the People's Settlement, yet in requital, after thirty four Years, they made away with him; which brought in EUGENIUS, the third of that Name, the Son of CONGAL, who was ſtrongly ſuſpected to have a hand in his Death, inſomuch that GORAN's Widow was forc'd to fly into *Ireland* with her Children. This Man in thirty three Years time did nothing but reign, and make ſhort Incurſions upon the Borders; he left the Rule to his Brother CONGAL, a monaſtical, ſuperſtitious, and inactive Prince, who reign'd ten years. KINNATEL his Brother was deſign'd for Succeſſor; yet AIDAN the Son of GORAN laid his claim, but was content to ſuſpend, in reſpect of the Age and Diſeaſes of KINNATEL, which after fourteen Months took him out of the World, and clear'd the controverſy, and AIDAN by the Conſent of COLUMBA (a Prieſt that govern'd all in thoſe Days) came to be King; a Man that, after thirty four Years turbulently ſpent, being beaten by the *Saxons*, and ſtruck with the Death of COLUMBA, dy'd of Grief. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

AFTER him was choſen KENNETH, who has left nothing behind him but his Name. Then came EUGENIUS the Fourth, the Son of AIDAN (ſo irregular is the *Scots* Succeſſion, that we ſee it inverted by Uſurpation or croſs Elections in every two or three Generations) This Man left an ambiguous Fame; for HECTOR BOETIUS ſays he was peaceable; the Manuſcript, implacably ſevere: He reign'd ſixteen years, and left his Son FERCHARD Succeſſor, who, endeavouring to heighten the Prerogative by the Diſſenſions of the Nobility, was on the contrary impeach'd by them, and call'd to an account, which he denying, was clapt in Priſon, where he himſelf ſav'd the Executioner a Labour. So that his Brother DONALD ſucceeded, who being taken up with the Piety of thoſe Days, left nothing memorable, except that he in perſon interpreted *Scots* Sermons to the *Saxons*. He was follow'd by his Nephew FERCHARD, Son to the firſt of that Name, a Thing like a King in nothing but his Exorbitancies, who in hunting was wounded by a Wolf, which caſt him into a Fever, wherein he not obſerving the impos'd Temperance, brought on himſelf the louſy Diſeaſe; upon which diſcomforted, he was by the Perſuaſion of COLMAN (a religious Man) brought out in his Bed cover'd with Hair-cloth, where he made a public Acknowledgment to the People, and ſoon after dy'd. MALDWIN, DONALD's Son, follow'd, who after twenty Years ignoble Reign was ſtrangled by his Wife. EUGENIUS the Fifth ſucceeded, Son (they ſay) of King DONGARD, tho' Chronology ſeems to refute it. This Man ſpent five Years in ſlight Incurſions, and was ſucceeded by EUGENIUS the Sixth, Son of FERCHARD. This Man is famous for a little Learning, as the Times went, and the Prodigy of raining Blood ſeven Days, all Milkmeats turning into Blood. AMBERKELLETH, Nephew to EUGENIUS the Fifth, who ſucceeded this rude Prince, while he was diſcharging the Burden of Nature, was ſlain by an Arrow from an unknown Hand. EUGENIUS the Seventh follow'd, who being attempted by Conſpirators, had his new marry'd Wife ſlain in Bed beſide him; for which he being accus'd, produc'd the Murderers before his Trial, and was acquitted, and ſo ended the reſt of his 17 Years in Peace, recommending to the People MORDAC, Son of AMBER- 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

KELLETH,

KELLETH, who continuing a blank Reign, or it may be a happy
61. one, in regard it was peaceable, left it to ETFYN Son of EUGENIUS the Seventh: the firſt part of his Reign was peaceable; but Age obliging him to put the Government into the Hands of four of his Servants, it happen'd to him, as it does to other Princes, whoſe Fortunes decay commonly with their Strength, that it was very unhappy
62. and turbulent: Which Miſeries EUGENIUS the Eighth, Son of MORDAC, reſtrain'd. But he, it ſeems, having a Nature fitter to appeaſe Tumults than to enjoy Reſt, at the firſt Enjoyment of Peace broke into ſuch Lewdneſs, that the Nobility at a meeting ſtab'd him,
63. and made way for FERGUS the Son of ETFYN, one like his Predeceſſor in manner, death, and continuance of Reign, which was three Years; the only diſſimilitude was, that the latter's Wife brought his Death; for which others being impeach'd, ſhe ſtep'd in and confeſt it;
64. and to avoid Puniſhment, puniſh'd her ſelf with a Knife. SOLUATH, Son of EUGENIUS the Eighth, follow'd him, who tho' his Gout made him of leſs Action, yet it made his Prudence more viſible, and
65. himſelf not illaudable: His Death brought in ACHAIUS the Son of ETFYN, whoſe Reign was ennobled with an *Iriſh* War, and many learned Men; beſides the Aſſiſtance lent HUNGUS to fight againſt the *Northumbrians*, whom he beat in a famous Battle, which (if I may mention the matter) was preſignified to HUNGUS in a Dream, St. *Andrew* appearing to him, and aſſuring him of it; and in the time of Battle a white Croſs (that which the Heralds call a Saltier, and we ſee commonly in the *Scots* Banners) appear'd in the Sky; and this I think to have been the Occaſion of that bearing, and an Order of Knights of St. *Andrew*, ſometimes in Reputation in *Scotland*, but extinguiſh'd, for ought I can perceive, before the time of JAMES the Sixth, tho' the Collar and Pendant of it are at this day worn about the *Scots* Arms. To this Man CONGAL his Couſin ſucceeded, who left no-
66. thing behind him but five years to ſtretch out the account of time.
67. DONGAL the Son of SOLUATH came next, who being of a Nature fierce and inſupportable, there was an endeavour to ſet up ALPIN Son of ACHAIUS, which Deſign by ALPIN himſelf was fruſtrated, which made the King willinger to aſſiſt ALPIN in his Pretenſion to the Kingdom of *Picts*; in which Attempt he was drown'd, and
68. left to ALPIN that which he before had ſo nobly refus'd, who making uſe of the former, rais'd an Army, beat the *Picts* in many ſignal Victories; but at laſt was ſlain by them, leaving his name to the place
69. of his Death, and the Kingdom to his Son KENNETH. This Man ſeeing the People broken with the late War, and unwilling to fight, drew them on by this Subtility; he invites the Nobility to dinner, and after plying them with Drink till Midnight, leaves them ſleeping on the floor (as the manner was) and then hanging Fiſhskins about the Walls of the Chamber, and making one ſpeak thro' a Tube, and call them to War; they waking, and half aſleep, ſuppos'd ſomething of Divinity to be in it, and the next morning not only conſented to War, but (ſo ſtrange is deluded Imagination) with unſpeakable Courage fell upon the Enemy and put them to the Rout; which being confirm'd by other great Victories, utterly ruin'd the *Pictiſh* Name. This Man may be added to the two FERGUSES, and truly may be ſaid to be the Founder of the *Scots* Empire, not only in making that the middle of his Dominion, which was once the Bounds, but in confirming his

Acqui-

Acquiſitions with good Laws, having the opportunity of a long Peace, which was ſixteen years, his whole time of Government being twenty. This was he that plac'd that Stone, famous for that illuſory Prophecy, *Ni fallat fatum*, &c. (which firſt was brought out of *Spain* into *Ireland*, and from thence into *Argyle*) at *Scoon*; where he put it in a Chair, in which all his Succeſſors (till EDWARD the Firſt brought it away) were crown'd, and ſince that all the Kings of *England*, till the happineſs of our Commonwealth made it uſeleſs. His Brother DONALD was his Succeſſor, a man made up of extremities of Virtues and Vices; no man had more bravery in the Field, nor more 70.
Vice at home, which increaſing with his years, the Nobility put him in priſon, where either for fear or ſcorn he put an end to his days, leaving behind him his Brother CONSTANTIN, a Man wanting 71.
nothing of him but his Vices, who ſtruggling with a potent Enemy (for the *Picts* had call'd in the *Danes*) and driving them much into deſpair (a Bravery that has not ſeldom ruin'd many excellent Captains) was taken by them, put into a little Cave, and there ſlain. He was ſucceeded by ETHUS his Brother, who had all his eldeſt Brother's Vices, 72.
and none of his ſecond's Virtues; Nature, it ſeems, making two extremes and a middle in the three Brethren. This man voluptuous and cowardly, was forc'd to reſign; or, as others ſay, dy'd of Wounds receiv'd in a Duel from his Succeſſor, who was GREGORY Son of 73.
DONGAL, who was not only an excellent Man, but an excellent Prince, that both recover'd what the others had loſt, and victoriouſly travers'd the Northern Counties of *England*, and a great part of *Ireland*; of whoſe King a Minor, and in his power, he generouſly made no advantage, but ſettled his Country, and provided faithful and able Guardians for him. Theſe things juſtly yield him the name of *Great*. DONALD Son of CONSTANTIN the Second, by his 74.
recommendation, ſucceeded in his Power and Virtues, notwithſtanding ſome ſay he was remov'd by Poiſon. Next was CONSTANTIN 75.
the Third, Son of ETHUS, an unſtable perſon, who aſſiſted the *Danes*, which none of his Predeceſſors would do; and after they had deſerted him baſely, yet yielded them Succours, conſiſting of the chief of the *Scots* Nobility, which with the whole *Daniſh* Army were routed by the *Saxons*. This ſtruck him ſo, that he retir'd among the *Culdys* (which were as the Greek Caloyers, or Romiſh Monks at this day) and there bury'd himſelf alive. After him was MILCOM, Son of 76.
DONALD the Third, who tho' a good Prince, and well skill'd in the Arts of Peace, was ſlain by a Conſpiracy of thoſe to whom his Virtue was burdenſome. His Succeſſor was INDULF (by what Title I find 77.
not) who fighting with the *Danes*, that with a Navy unexpectedly came into the *Frith*, was ſlain. DUF his Son ſucceeds, famous for an Accident, 78.
which if it be true, ſeems nearly diſtant from a Fable. He was ſuddenly afflicted by a ſweating Diſeaſe, by which he painfully languiſh'd, yet no body could find the cauſe, till at laſt a Girl, that had ſcatter'd ſome words, after torments, confeſt that her Mother and ſome other women had made an Image of Wax, which, as it waſted, the King ſhould waſte, by ſweating much; the place being diligently ſearch'd, it was found accordingly: ſo the Image being broke, he inſtantly recover'd. That which diſturb'd his five Years Reign was the turbulency of the Northern People, whom, when he had reduc'd and taken, with intent to make exemplary Puniſhment, DONALD the

Commander of the Caſtle of *Forres*, where he then lay, interceded for ſome of them; but being repuls'd, and exaſperated by his Wife, after he had made all his Servants drunk, ſlew him in his Bed, and bury'd him under a little Bridge (leſt the cutting of Turfs might diſcover a Grave) near *Kilros* Abbey; tho' others ſay, he turn'd aſide a River, and after he had bury'd him, ſuffer'd it to take its former
79. Channel. CULEN the Son of INDULF, by the Election of Parliament, or Convention of the People, ſucceeded, good only in this one Action, of inquiring and puniſhing his Predeceſſor's Death; but after, by the neglect of Diſcipline, and the exquiſiteneſs of his Vices, became a Monſter, and ſo continued three years, till being weakned and exhauſted in his Body, and vext with perpetual Diſeaſes, he was ſummon'd by the Parliament, and in the way was ſlain by a *Thane* (ſo they then call'd Lieutenants of Counties) whoſe Daughter he had raviſh'd.

80. THEN came KENETH, brother to DUF (tho' the forepart of his Reign was totally unlike his) who being invaded by the *Danes*, beat them in that famous Battle, which was won by the three HAYS, Husbandmen (from whom all the HAYS now give three Shields Gules) who with their Scythes reinforc'd the loſt Battle; but in his latter time he loſt this reputation, by poiſoning MILCOLM Son of DUF, to preſerve the Crown for a Son of his Name, tho' of leſs merit (for ſays BUCHANAN, *They uſe to chooſe the fitteſt, not the neareſt)* which being done, he got ordain'd in a Parliament, that the Succeſſion ſhould be lineal, the Son ſhould inherit, and be call'd Prince of *Scots*; and if he were a Minor, be govern'd by ſome wiſe Man (here comes the pretence of Succeſſion, whereas before it was clearly Elective) and at fifteen he ſhould chooſe his Guardian himſelf. But the Divine Vengeance, which ſeldom, even this life, paſſes by Murder, overtook him; for he was enſnar'd by a Lady, whoſe Son he had caus'd to be executed, and ſlain by an Arrow out of an Ambuſh ſhe had laid.

81. CONSTANTIN the Son of CULEN, notwithſtanding all the Artifice of KENNETH, by his reaſoning againſt the Act, perſuaded moſt of the Nobility to make him King, ſo that MILCOLM the Son of KENNETH and he made up two Factions, which tore the Kingdom; till at length MILCOLM's Baſtard Brother (himſelf being in *England* aſſiſting the *Danes*) fought him, routed his Army, and with the loſs of his own Life took away his, they dying of mutual
82. Wounds. GRIME, of whoſe Birth they do not certainly agree, was choſen by the *Conſtantinians*, who made a good Party; but at the Interceſſion of FORARD (an accounted Rabbi of the times) they at laſt agreed, GRIME being to enjoy the Kingdom for his Life, after which MILCOLUMB ſhould ſucceed, his Father's Law ſtanding in force. But he, after declining into Lewdneſs, Cruelty and Spoil (as Princes drunk with Greatneſs and Proſperity uſe to do) the People call'd back MILCOLUMB, who rather receiving Battle than giving it (for it was upon Aſcenſion-day, his principal Holy-day) routed his Forces, wounded himſelf, took him, pull'd out his Eyes, which altogether made an end of his Life, all Factions and Humours being reconcil'd.

83. MILCOLUMB, who with various Fortune fought many ſignal Battles with the *Danes*, that under their King SUENO had invaded *Scotland*, in his latter time grew to ſuch Covetouſneſs and Oppreſſion, that all

all Authors agree he was murder'd, tho' they diſagree about the Manner; ſome ſay by Confederacy with his Servants; ſome by his Kinſmen and Competitors; ſome by the Friends of a Maid whom he had raviſh'd. DONALD his Grandchild ſucceeded, a good-natur'd and 84.
inactive Prince, who with a Stratagem of ſleepy Drink deſtroy'd a *Daniſh* Army, that had invaded and diſtreſs'd him; but at laſt being inſnar'd by his Kinſman MACKBETH (who was prick'd forward by Ambition, and a former Viſion of three Women of a ſour human ſhape, whereof one ſaluted him *Thane* of *Angus*, another Earl of *Murray*, the third King) he was beheaded.

THE Severity and Cruelty of MACKBETH was ſo known, 85.
that both the Sons of the murder'd King were forc'd to retire, and yield to the Times, while he courted the Nobility with Largeſſes. The firſt ten Years he ſpent virtuouſly, but the Remainder was ſo ſavage and tyrannical, that MACDUF Thane of *Fife* fled into *England* to MILCOLM Son of DONALD, who by his Perſuaſions, and the Aſſiſtance of the King of *England*, enter'd *Scotland*, where he found ſuch great Acceſſions to his Party, that MACKBETH was forc'd to fly; his Death is hid in ſuch a Miſt of Fables, that it is not certainly known.

MILCOLUMB, the third of that Name, now being quietly 86.
ſeated, was the firſt that brought in thoſe gay Inventions and Diſtinctions of Honours, as Dukes, Marqueſſes, (that now are become ſo airy, that ſome carry them from Places to which they have as little Relation as to any Iſland in *America*, and others from Cottages and Dovecotes) his firſt trouble was FORFAR, MACKBETH's Son, who claim'd the Crown, but was ſoon after cut off. Some War he had with that WILLIAM whom we call falſly the Conqueror, ſome with his own People, which by the Interceſſion of the Biſhops were ended. At length quarrelling with our WILLIAM the ſecond, he laid ſiege to *Alnwick* Caſtle, which being forc'd to Extremity, a Knight came out with the Keys on a Spear, as if it were to preſent them to him, and to yield the Caſtle; but he, not with due heed receiving them, was run through the Eye and ſlain. Some from hence derive the Name of PIERCY (how truly I know not) his Son and Succeſſor EDWARD following his Revenge too hotly, receiv'd ſome Wounds, of which within a few days he dy'd.

DONALD BANE (that is in Iriſh, *White*) who had fled in- 87.
to the Iſles for fear of MACKBETH, promis'd them to the King of *Norway*, if he would procure him to be King, which was done with eaſe, as the Times then ſtood; but this Uſurper being hated by the People, who generally lov'd the Memory of MILCOLM, they ſet DUNCAN, MILCOLM's Baſtard, againſt him, who forc'd him to 88.
retire to his Iſles. DUNCAN a military Man ſhew'd himſelf unfit for Civil Government; ſo that DONALD, waiting all Advantages, caus'd him to be beheaded, and reſtor'd himſelf: But his Reign was ſo turbulent, the Iſlanders and *Engliſh* invading on both ſides, that they call'd in EDGAR Son of MILCOLM; then in *England*, who with ſmall Aſſiſtances poſſeſt himſelf, all Men deſerting DONALD, 89.
who being taken and brought to the King, dy'd in Priſon. EDGAR ſecure by his good Qualities, and ſtrengthen'd by the *Engliſh* Alliance, ſpent nine Years virtuouſly and peaceably; and gave the People leave to breath and reſt, after ſo much Trouble and Bloodſhed. His Brother

ALEX-

90. ALEXANDER, ſirnam'd ACER, or the *Fierce*, ſucceeded; the beginning of whoſe Reign being diſturb'd by a Rebellion, he ſpeedily met them at the *Spey*, which being a ſwift River, and the Enemy on the other ſide, he offer'd himſelf to ford it on Horſeback: but ALEXANDER CAR taking the Employment from him, forded the River with ſuch Courage, that the Enemy fled, and were quiet the reſt of his Reign. Some ſay he had the Name of ACER, becauſe ſome Conſpirators being by the Fraud of the Chamberlain admitted into his Chamber, he caſually waking, firſt ſlew the Chamberlain, and after him ſix of the Conſpirators, not ceaſing to purſue the reſt, till he had ſlain moſt of them with his own Hands: this with the building of ſome Abbies, and ſeventeen Year's Reign, is all we know of him.

91. HIS Brother DAVID ſucceeded, one whoſe profuſe Prodigality upon the Abbies brought the Revenue of the Crown (ſo prevalent was the Superſtition of thoſe Days) almoſt to nothing. He had many Battles with our STEPHEN about the Title of MAUD the Empreſs; and having loſt his excellent Wife and hopeful Son in the flower of
92. their Days, he left the Kingdom to his Grandchildren, the eldeſt whereof was MILCOLUMB a ſimple King, bafflʼd and led up and down into *France* by our HENRY the Second; which brought him to ſuch contempt, that he was vex'd by frequent Inſurrections, eſpecially them of *Murray*, whom he almoſt extirpated. The latter part of his Reign was ſpent in building Monaſteries; he himſelf ty'd by a Vow of Chaſtity, would never marry, but left for his Succeſſor his Brother
93. WILLIAM, who expoſtulating for the Earldom of *Northumberland*, gave occaſion for a War, in which he was ſurpriz'd and taken, but afterwards releas'd upon his doing Homage for the Kingdom of *Scotland* to King HENRY, of whom he acknowledg'd to hold it, and putting in caution the Caſtles of *Roxboro* (once ſtrong, now nothing but Ruins) *Barwic*, *Edinburg*, *Sterling*, all which notwithſtanding was after releas'd by RICHARD *Cœur de Lyon*, who was then upon an Expedition to the Holy War; from whence returning, both he and DAVID Earl of *Huntingdon*, Brother to the King of *Scots*, were taken Priſoners. The reſt of his Reign (except the rebuilding of St. *Johnſton*, which had been deſtroy'd by Waters, whereby he loſt his eldeſt Son, and ſome Treaties with our King JOHN) was little worth Memory; only you will wonder that a *Scotiſh* King could reign forty nine Years, and yet die in peace.

94. ALEXANDER his Son ſucceeded, famous for little, except ſome Expeditions againſt our King JOHN, ſome Inſurrections, and a
95. Reign two Years longer than his Father's. His Son was the third of that Name, a Boy of eight Years old, whoſe Minority was infeſted with the turbulent CUMMINS; who when he was of age, being call'd to account, not only refus'd to appear, but ſurpriz'd him at *Sterling*, governing him at their pleaſure. But ſoon after he was awak'd by a furious Invaſion of ACHO King of *Norway* (under the pretence of ſome Iſlands given him by MACKBETH) whom he forc'd to accept a Peace, and ſpent the latter part amidſt the Turbulencies of the Prieſts (drunk at that time with their Wealth and Eaſe) and at laſt having ſeen the continu'd Funerals of his Sons DAVID, ALEXANDER, his Wife, and his Daughter, he himſelf with a fall from a Horſe broke his Neck, leaving of all his Race only a Grandchild by his Daughter, which dy'd ſoon after.

THIS

THIS Man's Family being extinguiſh'd, they were forc'd to run to another Line, which, that we may ſee how happy an expedient immediate Succeſſion is for the Peace of the Kingdom, and what Miſeries it prevents, I ſhall, as briefly and as pertinently as I can, ſet down.

DAVID, Brother to K. WILLIAM, had three Daughters; MARGARET marry'd to ALLAN Lord of *Galloway*, ISABEL marry'd to ROBERT BRUCE Lord of *Annandale* and *Cleveland*, ADA marry'd to HENRY HASTINGS Earl of *Huntingdon*. Now ALLAN begot on his Wife DORNADILLA, marry'd to JOHN BALIOL afterwards King of *Scotland*, and two other Daughters. BRUCE on his Wife got ROBERT BRUCE Earl of *Carick*, having marry'd the Heretrix thereof. As for HUNTINGDON he deſiſted his claim. The queſtion is, whether BALIOL in right of the eldeſt Daughter, or BRUCE being come of the ſecond (but a Man) ſhould have the Crown, he being in the ſame degree, and of the more worthy Sex. The Controverſy being toſt up and down, at laſt was refer'd to EDWARD, the firſt of that name, King of *England*. He thinking to fiſh in theſe troubled Waters, ſtirs up eight other Competitors, the more to entangle the Buſineſs, and with twenty four Counſellors, half *Engliſh*, half *Scots*, and abundance of Lawyers fit enough to perplex the Matter, ſo handled the Buſineſs, after cunning delays, that at length he ſecretly tampers with BRUCE (who was then conceiv'd to have the better right of the Buſineſs) that if he would acknowledge the Crown of him, he would adjudge it for him; but he generouſly anſwering, that he valu'd a Crown at a leſs rate, than for it to put his Country under a foreign Yoke: He made the ſame Motion to BALIOL, who accepted it; and ſo we have a King again, by what Right we all ſee; but it is good reaſon to think that Kings, come they by their Power never ſo unjuſtly, may juſtly keep it.

BALIOL having thus got a Crown, as unhappily kept it; for no ſooner was he crown'd, and had done Homage to EDWARD, but the ABERNETHYS having ſlain MACDUF Earl of *Fife*, he not only pardon'd them, but gave them a piece of Land in controverſy: whereupon MACDUF's Brother complains againſt him to EDWARD, who makes him riſe from his Seat in Parliament, and go to the Bar: He hereupon enrag'd, denies EDWARD aſſiſtance againſt the *French*, and renounces his Homage. EDWARD immediately comes to *Berwic*, takes and kills ſeven thouſand, moſt of the Nobility of *Fife* and *Lowthian*, and afterwards gave them a great Defeat at *Dunbar*, whoſe Caſtle inſtantly ſurrender'd. After this he march'd to *Montroſe*, where BALIOL reſign'd himſelf and Crown, all the Nobility giving Homage to EDWARD. BALIOL is ſent Priſoner to *London*, and from thence, after a Year's detention, into *France*. While EDWARD was poſſeſt of all *Scotland*, one WILLIAM WALLACE aroſe, who being a private Man beſtir'd himſelf in the Calamity of his Country, and gave the *Engliſh* ſeveral notable foils. EDWARD coming again with an Army, beat him that was already overcome with Envy and Emulation as well as Power; upon which he laid by his Command, and never acted more, but only in ſlight Incurſions. But the *Engliſh* being beaten at *Roſlin*, EDWARD comes in again, takes *Sterling*, and makes them all render Homage; but at length BRUCE ſeeing all his Promiſes nothing but Smoke, enters into League with CUMMIN to get the Kingdom: but being betray'd by him to EDWARD, he ſtab'd CUMMIN 96.

97. at *Drumfreis*, and made himſelf King. This Man, tho' he came with diſadvantage, yet wanted neither Patience, Courage, nor Conduct; ſo that after he had miſerably lurk'd in the Mountains, he came down, and gathering together ſome Force, gave our EDWARD the Second ſuch a Defeat near *Sterling*, as *Scotland* never gave the like to our Nation: and continu'd the War with various fortune with the Third, till at laſt Age
98. and Leproſy brought him to his Grave. His Son DAVID, a Boy of eight Years, inherited that which he with ſo much danger obtain'd, and wiſdom kept. In his Minority he was govern'd by THOMAS RANDOLF Earl of *Murray*, whoſe ſeverity in puniſhing was no leſs dreaded than his Valour had been honoured. But he ſoon after dying of Poiſon; and EDWARD BALIOL, Son of JOHN, coming with a Fleet, and ſtrengthen'd with the Aſſiſtance of the *Engliſh*, and ſome
99. Robbers, the Governor the Earl of *Mar* was routed, ſo that BALIOL makes himſelf King, and DAVID was glad to retire into *France*. Amidſt theſe Parties (EDWARD the Third backing BALIOL) was *Scotland* miſerably torn, and the BRUCES in a manner extinguiſh'd, till ROBERT (after King) with them of *Argyle* and his own Family and Friends, began to renew the claim, and bring it into a War again; which was carried on by ANDREW MURRAY the Governor, and afterwards by himſelf: So that DAVID, after nine Years Baniſhment, durſt return, where making frequent Incurſions, he at length in the fourth Year of his return march'd into *England*, and in the Biſhoprick of *Durham* was routed, and fled to an obſcure Bridge, ſhew'd to this Day by the Inhabitants. There he was by JOHN COPLAND taken Priſoner, where he continu'd nine Years, and in the thirty ninth Year of his Reign he dy'd.

100. ROBERT his Siſter's Son, whom he had intended to put by, ſucceeds, and firſt brought the STUARTS (which at this Day are a Plague to the Nation) into play. This Man after he was King, whether it were Age or Sloth, did little; but his Lieutenants and the *Engliſh* were perpetually in action. He left his Kingdom to JOHN his Baſtard Son by the Lady MORE his Concubine, whom he marry'd, either to legitimate the three Children (as the manner was then) he had by her, or elſe for old Acquaintance, his Wife and her Huſband dying much about
101. a time. This JOHN would be crown'd by the name of ROBERT (his own, they ſay, being unhappy for Kings) a wretched inactive Prince, lame, and only govern'd by his Brother WALTER, who having DAVID the Prince upon complaint of ſome Exorbitancies deliver'd to his care, caus'd him to be ſtarv'd; upon which the King intending to ſend his Son JAMES into *France*, the Boy was taken at *Flamburg*, and kept by our HENRY the Fourth: upon the hearing of which his Father ſwounded, and ſoon after dy'd. His Reign was memorable for nothing but his breaking with GEORGE Earl of *March* (to whoſe Daughter, upon the payment of a great part of her Portion which he never would repay, he had promis'd his Son DAVID for a Huſband) to take the Daughter of DOUGLAS who had a greater; which occaſion'd the Earl of *March* to make many inrodes with our HENRY HOTSPUR; and a famous Duel of three hundred Men apiece, whereof on the one ſide ten remain'd, and on the other one, which was the only way to appeaſe the deadly Feuds of theſe two Families. The Interreign was govern'd by ROBERT, who enjoying the Power he had too much coveted, little minded the

Liberty

Liberty of his Nephew, only he ſent ſome Auxiliaries into *France*, who, they ſay, behav'd themſelves worthily; and his ſlothful Son MORDAC, who making his Sons ſo bold with Indulgence, that one of them kill'd a Falcon on his fiſt, which he deny'd to give him: he in revenge procur'd the Parliament to ranſom the King, who had been eighteen years a Priſoner. This JAMES was the firſt of that name, 102.
and tho' he was an excellent Prince, yet had a troubleſome Reign; firſt, in regard of a great Penſion rais'd for his Ranſom; next, for domeſtic Commotions; and laſtly, for raiſing of Money; which, tho' the Revenue was exhauſted, was call'd Covetouſneſs. This having offended ROBERT GRAHAM, he conſpir'd with the Earl of *Athol*, ſlew him in his Chamber, his Wife receiving two wounds, endeavouring to defend him.

THIS JAMES left the Second, a Boy of ſix years, whoſe Infan- 103.
cy, by the miſguidance of the Governor, made a miſerable People, and betray'd the Earl DOUGLAS to death, and almoſt all that great Family to ruin; but being ſupplanted by another Earl of DOUGLAS, the King in his juſt age ſuffer'd Minority under him, who upon diſpleaſure rebel'd, and was kill'd by the King's own hand. Afterwards having his middle years perpetually moleſted with civil Broils, yet going to aſſiſt the Duke of *York* againſt HENRY the Sixth, he was diverted by an *Engliſh* Gentleman that counterfeited himſelf a *Nuncio* (which I mention out of a Manuſcript, becauſe I do not remember it in our Stories) and broke up his Army. Soon after beſieging *Roxburg*, he was ſlain by the burſting of a Cannon in the twenty ninth year of his Age.

JAMES the Second left a Boy of ſeven Years, govern'd by his Mo- 104.
ther, and afterwards by the BOYDS; thro' the perſuaſions of Aſtrologers and Witches, to whom he was ſtrongly addicted, he declin'd to Cruelty; which ſo inrag'd the Nobility, that, headed by his Son, they conſpired againſt him, routing his Forces near *Sterling*, where he flying to a Mill, and asking for a Confeſſor, a Prieſt came, who told him, that *tho' he was no good Prieſt, yet he was a good Leech*, and with that ſtab'd him to the heart. A Parliament approv'd his death, and order'd Indemnities to all that had fought againſt him.

JAMES the Fourth, a Boy of fifteen Years, is made King, go- 105.
vern'd by the Murderers of his Father; a prodigal, vainglorious Prince, ſlain at *Floddon* Field, or, as ſome ſuppoſe, at *Kelſy* by the HUMES, which (as the Manuſcript alledges) ſeems more probable, in regard that the Iron Belt (to which he added a Ring every Year) which he wore in repentance for the death of his Father, was never found, and there were many, the day of Battle, habited like him. His Succeſſor was his Son JAMES, the Fifth of that name, a Boy of not above two years of age; under whoſe Minority, what by the miſgovernment of 106.
Tutors, and what by the Factions of the Nobility, *Scotland* was waſted almoſt into Famine and Solitude: however in his juſt Age he prov'd an induſtrious Prince, yet could not ſo ſatisfy the Nobility, but that he and they continued in a mutual heat, till that barbarous execution of young HAMILTON ſo fill'd him with Remorſe, that he dream'd he came and cut off his two Arms and threaten'd after to cut off his Head. And he diſpleas'd the People ſo much, that he could not make his Army fight with the *Engliſh* then in *Scotland*; whereupon he dy'd of grief, having firſt heard the death of his two Sons, who dy'd at the inſtant

inſtant of his Dream, and leaving a Daughter of five days old, whom he never ſaw.

107. THIS was that MARY under whoſe Minority (by the weakneſs of the Governor, and ambition of the Cardinal) the Kingdom felt all thoſe Woes that are threaten'd to them whoſe King is a Child; till at length the prevalency of the *Engliſh* Arms (awak'd for her cauſe) brought the great deſign of ſending her into *France* to perfection: So at five Years old ſhe was tranſported, and at fifteen marry'd to the *Dolphin* FRANCIS, after King; while her Mother, a Daughter of the GUISE, in her Regency, exercis'd all Rage againſt the Profeſſors of the pure Religion then in the dawn. FRANCIS after two Years left her a childleſs Widow, ſo that at eighteen ſhe return'd into *Scotland* to ſucceed her Mother (then newly dead) in her Exorbitancies.

I HAD almoſt forgot to tell, that this young Couple in the tranſport of their nuptial Solemnities took the Arms and Title of *England*; which indiſcreet Ambition we may ſuppoſe firſt quicken'd the jealouſy of ELIZABETH againſt her, which after kindl'd ſo great a flame.

IN *Scotland* ſhe ſhew'd what a ſtrange influence looſe Education has upon Youth, and the weaker Sex. All the *French* Effeminacies came over with her, and the Court loſt that little Severity which was left. DAVID RIZIO, an *Italian* Fidler, was the only Favourite, and it is too much fear'd, had thoſe enjoyments which no Woman can give but ſhe that gives away her Honour and Chaſtity.

BUT a little after, HENRY Lord *Darnly* coming with MATTHEW Earl of *Lenox*, his Father, into *Scotland*, ſhe caſt an Eye upon him, and marry'd him. Whether it were to ſtrengthen her pretenſion to *England*, he being come of HENRY the Seventh's Daughter, as we ſhall tell anon, or to colour her Adulteries, and hide the ſhame of an Impregnation (tho' ſome have whiſper'd, that ſhe never conceiv'd, and that the Son was ſuppoſitious) or ſome Phrenzy of Affection drew her that way; certain it is ſhe ſoon declin'd her Affection to her Huſband, and increas'd it to DAVID (he being her perpetual Companion at board, and managing all Affairs, while the King with a contemptible Train was ſent away) inſomuch that ſome of the Nobility that could not digeſt this, enter'd a Conſpiracy, which the King headed, and ſlew him in her Chamber.

THIS turn'd all her neglect of the King into rage, ſo that her chiefeſt buſineſs was to appeaſe her Favourite's Ghoſt with the ſlaughter of her Husband; poiſon was firſt attempted, but it being (it ſeems) too weak, or his Youth overcoming it, that expectation fail'd. But the Devil and BOTHWEL furniſh'd her with another that ſucceeded; ſhe ſo entices him, being ſo ſick that they were forc'd to bring him in a Horſe-litter to *Edinburg*, where ſhe cheriſh'd him extremely, till the credulous young Man began to lay a ſide ſuſpicion, and to hope better: So ſhe puts him into a ruinous houſe near the Palace, from whence no news can be had, brings in her own bed, and lies in the houſe with him; and at length when the deſign was ripe, cauſes him one Sunday night, with his Servant, to be ſtrangl'd, thrown out of the Window, and the houſe to be blown up with Gunpowder, her own rich Bed having been before ſecretly convey'd away. This and other performances made her favour upon BOTHWEL, ſo hot, that ſhe muſt marry him;

him; the only obſtacle was, he had a Wife already; but ſhe was compel'd to ſue for a Divorce, which (ſo great Perſons being concern'd) it was a wonder it ſhould be granted ſo long as ten days. Well, ſhe marries; but the more honeſt Nobility amaz'd at thoſe Exorbitancies, aſſemble together, and with Arms in their Hands begin to expoſtulate. The new married Couple are forc'd to make back Southwards; where finding but ſlender Aſſiſtance, and the Queen fooliſhly coming from *Dunbar* to *Leith*, was glad at laſt to delay a Parly till her dear was eſcap'd; and then (clad in an old tatter'd coat) to yield herſelf a Priſoner.

BEING brought to *Edinburg*, and us'd rather with hate of her former Enormities, than Pity of her preſent Fortune, ſhe received a Meſſage, that ſhe muſt either reſign the Crown to her Son JAMES (that was born in the time of her Marriage with DARNLY) or elſe they would proceed to another Election, and was forc'd to obey. So the Child then in his Cradle was acknowledg'd JAMES the Sixth, better known afterwards by the Title of *Great Britain.* 108.

THE wretched Mother flying after into *England*, was entertain'd (tho' with a Guard) by Queen ELIZABETH; but after that being ſuborn'd by the Papiſts, and exaſperated by the GUIZES, ſhe enter'd into Plots and Machinations, ſo inconſiſtent with the Safety of *England*, that by an Act of Parliament ſhe was condemned to death, which ſhe receiv'd by a Hatchet at *Fotheringay* Caſtle.

THE Infancy of her Son was attended with thoſe domeſtic Evils that accompany the Minority of Kings. In his Youth he took to Wife the Daughter of *Denmark* (a Woman I hear little of, ſaving the Character SALUST gives SEMPRONIA, that ſhe could dance better than became a virtuous Woman) with whom he ſuppoſing the Earl GOWRY too much in League, caus'd him and his Brother to be ſlain at their own Houſe whither he was invited; he giving out, that they had an intent to murder him; and that by Miracle and the Aſſiſtance of ſome Men (whom he had inſtructed for that purpoſe, and taught their tale) he eſcap'd. For this Deliverance (or to ſay better, Aſſaſſination) he blaſphem'd God with a ſolemn Thankſgiving once a Year all the Remainder of his Life.

WELL had it been for us, if our Forefathers had laid hold of that happy opportunity of ELIZABETH's Death (in which the TEUTHORS took a period) to have perform'd that which, perhaps in due puniſhment, has coſt us ſo much Blood and Sweat; and not have bow'd under the Sway of a Stranger, diſdain'd by the moſt generous and wiſe at that time, and only ſupported by the Faction of ſome, and the Sloth of others; who brought but a ſlender Title, and (however the flattery of the times cry'd him up for a SOLOMON) weak Commendations for ſuch an Advancement.

HIS Title ſtood thus, MARGARET, eldeſt Daughter to HENRY the Seventh, was marry'd to JAMES the Fourth, whoſe Son JAMES the Fifth had MARY the Mother of JAMES the Sixth. MARGARET after her firſt Huſband's death, marries ARCHIBALD DOUGLAS Earl of *Angus*, who upon her begot MARGARET Wife of MATTHEW Earl of *Lenox*, and Mother of that HENRY DARNLY, whoſe tragical End we juſt now mention'd. Now upon this ſlender Title, and our internal Diſſenſions (for the *Cecilians* and *Eſſexians*, for ſeveral ends, made perpetual Applications) got

JAMMY from a Revenue of 30000 *l.* to one of almoſt two Millions, tho' there were others that had as fair pretences (and what elſe can any of them make?) the Statute of 25. *Edw.* 3. expreſly excluding Foreigners from the Crown: and ſo the Children of CHARLES BRANDON by MARY the ſecond Daughter, Dowager of *France*, being next to come in. And the Lady ARABELLA being ſprung from a third Huſband (the Lord STUART) of the ſaid MARGARET, and by a Male Line, carry'd ſurely ſo formidable a pretenſion (it ſhould ſeem) that even that Iniquity which was perſonally inherent to her, made her days very unhappy, and for moſt part captive, and her death ('tis thought) ſomewhat too early; ſo cruel are the Perſecutions of cowardly Minds, even againſt the weakeſt and moſt unprotected Innocence.

AND indeed his Right to the Crown was ſo unſatisfactory even to the moſt judicious of thoſe days, that TOBY MATTHEWS having ſuit about ſome Privileges which he claim'd to his Biſhoprick (which was then *Durham*) wherein the King oppos'd him; and having one day ſtated the Caſe before ſome of his Friends, who ſeem'd to approve of it; yes, ſays he, I could wiſh he had but half ſo good a Title to the Crown. And 'tis known that ſome Speeches of Sir WALTER RAWLEY, too generous and Engliſh for the times, was that which brought him to Trial and Condemnation for a feign'd Crime; and afterwards ſo facilitated that barbarous Deſign of GUNDAMAR, to cut off his Head for a Crime, for which he was condemn'd fourteen Years before, and which by the Commiſſions he after receiv'd (according to the opinion of the then Lord Chancellor, and the greateſt Lawyers) was in Law pardon'd.

THIS may appear beſides our purpoſe; but we could not ſever this Conſideration, unleſs we would draw him with a half face, and leave as much in umbrage as we expreſt. That which moſt ſolemniz'd his Perſon was, firſt the Conſideration of his adhering to the Proteſtant Religion; whereas we are to conſider that thoſe ſlight Velitations he had with BELLARMIN and the *Romaniſts*, tended rather to make his own Authority more intrinſically intenſe and venerable, than to confute any thing they ſaid: for he had before ſhak'd them off as to foreign Juriſdiction; and for matter of Popery, it appear'd in his latter time that he was no ſuch enemy to it, both by his own compliances with the *Spaniſh* Ambaſſadors, the deſign of the *Spaniſh* Match (in which his Son was perſonally embark'd) and the ſlow Aſſiſtances ſent to his Daughter, in whoſe ſafety and protection Proteſtantiſm was at that time ſo much concern'd.

FOR his Knowledge, he had ſome glancings and niblings, which the Severity of the excellent BUCHANAN forc'd into him in his younger time, and after Converſation ſomewhat poliſh'd. But tho' I bear not ſo great a contempt to his other Works, as BEN JOHNSON did to his Poetry, yet if they among many others were going to the fire, they would not be one of the firſt I ſhould reſcue, as poſſibly expecting a more ſevere and refin'd Judgment in many others; and knowing that he that had ſo many able Wits at command, might eaſily give their Oracles thro' his Mouth. But ſuppoſe the things generous and fit to live (as I am not yet convinc'd) yet what commendation is this to a King, who ſhould have other buſineſs than ſpinning and weaving fine Theories, and engaging in School Chiquaneries? which was well underſtood

derſtood by HENRY the Fourth, who hearing ſome Men celebrate him with theſe Attributes; yes (anſwer'd he, very tartly) *He is a fine King, and writes little Books.*

'TIS true, he was a good Drol, and poſſibly after Greece Wine ſomewhat factious: But of his ſubſtantial and heroic Wiſdom I have not heard any great Inſtances. He himſelf us'd to brag of his *King-craft*, which was not to render his People happy, and to proſecute the ends of a good King, but to ſcrue up the Prerogative, divert Parliaments from the due diſquiſition and proſecution of their Freedoms, and to break them up at pleaſure; and indeed his parting with the Cautionary Towns of the *Low Countries*, and that for ſo ſmall a Sum, ſhew'd him a Perſon not ſo quickſighted, or unfit to be over-reach'd.

FOR his peaceable Reign, honourable and juſt Quarrels he wanted not; but ſloth and cowardice witheld him: and indeed the eaſe and luxury of thoſe times fomented and nouriſh'd thoſe lurking and peſtilent humours, which afterwards ſo dangerouſly broke out in his Son's Reign.

WE ſhall not trouble his Aſhes with the mention of his perſonal Faults; only, if we may compare God's Judgments with apparent Sins, we may find the latter end of his Life neither fortunate nor comfortable to him. His Wife diſtaſted by him, and ſome ſay, languiſhing of a foul Diſeaſe; his eldeſt Son dying with too violent ſymptoms of Poiſon, and that, as is fear'd, by a hand too much ally'd; his ſecond (againſt whom he ever had a ſecret antipathy) ſcarce return'd from a mad and dangerous Voyage; his Daughter (all that was left of that Sex) baniſh'd, with her numerous Iſſue, out of her Huſband's Dominion, and living in miſerable Exile; and laſtly, himſelf dying of a violent death by Poiſon, in which his Son was more than ſuſpected to have a hand, as may be infer'd from BUCKINGHAM's Plea, that he did it by the Command of the Prince, and CHARLES's diſſolution of the Parliament that took in hand to examine it; and laſtly, his indifferency at *Buckingham*'s death (tho' he pretended all love to him alive) as glad to be rid of ſo dangerous and ſo conſiderable a Partner of his Guilt. Yet the miter'd Paraſites of thoſe times could ſay, that one went to Heaven in *Noah*'s Ark, the other in *Eliſha*'s Chariot, he dying of a pretended Fever, ſhe (as they ſaid) of a Dropſy.

CHARLES having now obtain'd his Brother's Inheritance, carry'd himſelf in managing of it like one that gain'd it as he did. The firſt of his Acts was that glorious attempt upon the Iſle of *Rhee*. The next, that Noble and Chriſtian betraying of *Rochel*, and conſequently in a manner the whole Proteſtant Intereſt in *France*. The middle of the Reign was heightening of Prerogative and Prelacy, and conforming our Churches to the pattern of *Rome*; till at laſt juſt Indignation brought his Subjects of *Scotland* into *England*, and ſo forc'd him to call a Parliament: which tho' he ſhameleſsly ſays in the firſt line of the Book, call'd his, was out of his *own inclination to Parliaments*, yet how well he lik'd them, may appear by his firſt tampering with his own Army in the North, to ſurprize and diſſolve them; then with the *Scots*, who at that time were Court proof; then raiſing up the *Iriſh* Rebellion, which has waſted millions of Lives; and laſtly, his open ſeceſſion from *Weſtminſter*, and hoſtility againſt the two Houſes, which maintain'd a firſt and ſecond ſharp War, that had almoſt ruin'd the Nation, had not Providence in a manner immediately interpos'd and reſcu'd

109.

reſcu'd us to Liberty, and made us ſuch ſignal Inſtruments of his Vengeance, that all wicked Kings may tremble at the example.

IN a word, never was man ſo reſolute and obſtinate in a Tyranny; never People more ſtrangely beſotted with it. To paint the Image of DAVID with his face, and blaſphemouſly to parallel him with CHRIST, would make one at firſt thought think him a Saint: But to compare his Proteſtations and Actions; his Actions of the Day, his Actions of the Night; his Proteſtant Religion, and his courting of the Pope; and obedience to his Wife; we may juſtly ſay, he was one of the the moſt conſummate in the Arts of Tyranny that ever was. And it could be no other than God's hand that arreſted him in the height of his Deſigns and Greatneſs, and cut off him and his Family, making good his own Imprecations on his own Head.

OUR Scene is again in *Scotland*, which has accepted his Son, whom for diſtinction ſake we will be content to call CHARLES the Second. Certainly theſe People were ſtrangely blind as to God's Judgment perpetually pour'd out upon a Family; or elſe wonderfully addicted to their own Intereſt, to admit the ſpray of ſuch a ſtock; one that has ſo little to commend him, and ſo great improbability to further their Deſigns and Happineſs; a Popiſh Education, if not Religion too, however for the preſent he may ſeem to diſſemble it; *France*, the Jeſuits, and his Mother, good means of ſuch an improvement; the dangerous Maxims of his Father, beſides the Revenge he owes his Death, of which he will never totally acquit the *Scots*; his Hate to the whole Nation; his Senſe of MONTROSE's Death; his backwardneſs to come to them till all other means fail'd (both his foreign beg'd Aſſiſtances, his Propoſitions to the Pope, and Commiſſions to MONTROSE) and laſtly, his late running away to his old Friends in the North: ſo that any man may ſee his preſent compliance to be but hiſtrionical and forc'd, and that as ſoon as he has led them into the Snare, and got power into his own hands, ſo as that he may appear once more bare-fac'd, he will be a ſcourge upon them for their groſs Hypocriſy, and leave them a ſad inſtance to all Nations, how dangerous it is to eſpouſe ſuch an Intereſt, againſt which God with ſo viſible and ſevere a hand does fight, carry'd on by and for the ſupport of a tyrannizing Nobility and Clergy, and wherein the poor People are blindly led on by thoſe afrighting (but falſe and ungrounded) pretenſions of Perfidy and Perjury, and made inſtrumental with their own Eſtates and Blood towards inſlaving and ruining themſelves.

THE

COMMON-WEALTH

OF

OCEANA.

To his HIGHNESS

The Lord Protector of the Common-wealth of *England*, *Scotland*, and *Ireland*.

——*Quid rides? mutato nomine, de te*
Fabula narratur.—— Horat.

The Introduction, or Order of the Work.

Pliny's *Deſcription of* Oceana.

OCEANA is ſaluted by the Panegyriſt after this manner; *O the moſt bleſt and fortunate of all Countries,* OCEANA! *How deſervedly has Nature with the Bounties of Heaven and Earth indu'd thee? Thy ever-fruitful Womb not clos'd with Ice, nor diſſolv'd by the raging Star: where* CERES *and* BACCHUS *are perpetual Twins. Thy Woods are not the Harbour of devouring Beaſts, nor thy continual Verdure the ambuſh of Serpents, but the food of innumerable Herds and Flocks preſenting thee their Shepherdeſs with diſtended Dugs, or golden Fleeces. The Wings of thy Night involve thee not in the horror of Darkneſs, but have ſtill ſome white feather; and thy Day is (that for which we eſteem Life) the longeſt.* But this Extaſy of PLINY (as is obſerv'd by BERTIUS) ſeems to allude as well to *Marpeſia* and *Panopea*, now Provinces of this Common-wealth, as to *Oceana* it ſelf.

The Nature of the People.

TO ſpeak of the People in each of theſe Countries, this of *Oceana*, for ſo ſoft a one, is the moſt martial in the whole World. *Let States that aim at Greatneſs* (ſays VERULAMIUS) *take heed how their Nobility and Gentlemen multiply too faſt, for that makes the common Subject grow to be a Peaſant and baſe Swain driven out of heart, and in effect but a Gentleman's Labourer; juſt as you may ſee in Coppice Woods, if you leave the Staddels too thick, you ſhall never have clean Underwood, but Shrubs and Buſhes: So in Countries, if the Gentlemen be too many, the Commons will be baſe; and you will bring it to that at laſt, that not the hundredth Poll will be fit for a Helmet, ſpecially as to the Infantry, which is the Nerve of an Army, and ſo there will be great Population and little Strength. This of which I ſpeak has been no where better ſeen than by comparing of* Oceana *and* France, *whereof* Oceana, *tho' far leſs in Territory and Population, has been nevertheleſs an overmatch, in regard the middle People of* Oceana *make good Soldiers, which the Peaſants in* France *do not.* In which Words VERULAMIUS (as MACHIAVEL has done before him) harps much upon a ſtring which he has not perfectly tun'd, and that is the *balance of Dominion or Property:* as it follows more plainly in his praiſe *of the profound and admirable device of* PANURGUS *King of* Oceana, *in making Farms and Houſes of Huſbandry of a Standard; that is, maintain'd with ſuch a Proportion of Land to them, as may breed a ſubject to live in convenient plenty, and no ſervile condition, and to keep the Plow in the Hand of the owners, and not mere hirelings. And thus indeed* (ſays he) *you ſhall attain to* VIRGIL's *Character* * *which he gives of antient* Italy.

BUT the Tillage bringing up a good Soldiery, brings up a good Common-wealth; which the Author in the praiſe of PANURGUS did not mind, nor PANURGUS in deſerving that praiſe: for where the owner of the Plow comes to have the Sword too, he will uſe it in defence of his own; whence it has happen'd that the People of *Oceana* in proportion to their property have been always free. And the Genius of

* Terra potens armis atque ubere gleba.

this

this Nation has ever had ſome reſemblance with that of antient *Italy*; which was wholly addicted to Common-wealths, and where *Rome* came to make the greateſt account of her ruſtic Tribes, and to call her Conſuls from the Plow; for in the way of Parliaments, which was the Government of this Realm, Men of Country-lives have been ſtill intruſted with the greateſt Affairs, and the People have conſtantly had an averſion to the ways of the Court. Ambition loving to be gay and to fawn, has been a Gallantry look'd upon as having ſomething in it of the Livery; and Huſbandry, or the Country way of Life, tho' of a groſſer ſpinning, as the beſt Stuff of a Common-wealth, according to ARISTOTLE, ſuch a one being the moſt obſtinate Aſſertreſs of her Liberty, and the leaſt ſubject to Innovation or Turbulency. Wherefore till the Foundations (as will be hereafter ſhew'd) were remov'd, this People was obſerv'd to be the leaſt ſubject to Shakings and Turbulency of any: Whereas Common-wealths, upon which the City Life has had the ſtronger influence, as *Athens*, have ſeldom or never been quiet; but at the beſt are found to have injur'd their own Buſineſs by over-doing it. Whence the Urban Tribes of *Rome*, conſiſting of the *Turba forenſis*, and *Libertins* that had received their Freedom by manumiſſion, were of no Reputation in compariſon of the Ruſtics. It is true, that with *Venice* it may ſeem to be otherwiſe, in regard the Gentlemen (for ſo are all ſuch call'd as have a Right to that Government) are wholly addicted to the City Life: but then the *Turba forenſis*, the Secretaries, *Cittadini*, with the reſt of the Populace, are wholly excluded. Otherwiſe a Common-wealth, conſiſting but of one City, would doubtleſs be ſtormy, in regard that Ambition would be every Man's Trade: but where it conſiſts of a Country, the Plow in the Hands of the owner finds him a better Calling, and produces the moſt innocent and ſteddy Genius of a Common-wealth, ſuch as is that of *Oceana*.

The Nature of the Marpeſians.

MARPESIA, being the Northern part of the ſame Iſland, is the dry Nurſe of a populous and hardy Nation, but where the Stadels have been formerly too thick: whence their Courage anſwer'd not their Hardineſs, except in the Nobility, who govern'd that Country much after the manner of *Poland*; but that the King was not elective till the People receiv'd their Liberty, the Yoke of the Nobility being broke by the Common-wealth of *Oceana*, which in grateful return is thereby provided with an inexhauſtible Magazine of Auxiliaries.

The Nature of the Panopeans.

PANOPEA, the ſoft Mother of a ſlothful and puſillanimous People, is a neighbour Iſland, antiently ſubjected by the Arms of *Oceana*; ſince almoſt depopulated for ſhaking the Yoke, and at length replanted with a new Race. But (thro' what virtues of the Soil, or vice of the Air ſoever it be) they come ſtill to degenerate. Wherefore ſeeing it is neither likely to yield Men fit for Arms, nor neceſſary it ſhould; it had been the Intereſt of *Oceana* ſo to have diſpos'd of this Province, being both rich in the nature of the Soil, and full of commodious Ports for Trade, that it might have been order'd for the beſt in relation to her Purſe: which in my opinion (if it had been thought upon in time) might have been beſt done by planting it with *Jews*, allowing them their own Rites and Laws; for that would have brought them ſuddenly from all parts of the World, and in ſufficient numbers. And tho' the *Jews* be now altogether for Merchandize, yet in the Land of *Canaan* (except ſince their exile from whence they have not been

Land-

Landlords) they were altogether for Agriculture; and there is no cauſe why a Man ſhould doubt, but having a fruitful Country, and excellent Ports too, they would be good at both. *Panopea* well peopled, would be worth a matter of four millions dry Rents; that is, beſides the advantage of the Agriculture and Trade, which, with a Nation of that Induſtry, comes at leaſt to as much more. Wherefore *Panopea* being farm'd out to the *Jews* and their Heirs for ever, for the pay of a provincial Army to protect them during the term of ſeven Years, and for two Millions annual Revenue from that time forward, beſides the Cuſtoms which would pay the provincial Army, would have been a Bargain of ſuch advantage both to them and this Common-wealth, as is not to be found otherwiſe by either. To receive the *Jews* after any other manner into a Common-wealth, were to maim it: for they of all Nations never incorporate, but taking up the room of a Limb, are of no uſe or office to the Body, while they ſuck the Nouriſhment which would ſuſtain a natural and uſeful Member.

The Situation of the Common-wealth of Oceana.

IF *Panopea* had been ſo diſpos'd of, that Knapſack, with the *Marpeſian* Auxiliary, had been an ineſtimable Treaſure; the Situation of theſe Countries being Iſlands (as appears by *Venice* how advantageous ſuch a one is to the like Government) ſeems to have been deſign'd by God for a Common-wealth. And yet that, thro' the ſtreightneſs of the place and defect of proper Arms, can be no more than a Common-wealth for Preſervation: whereas this, reduc'd to the like Government, is a Common-wealth for increaſe, and upon the mightieſt foundation that any has been laid from the beginning of the World to this Day.

Illam arctâ capiens Neptunus compede ſtringit:
Hanc autem glaucis captus complectitur ulnis.

THE Sea gives law to the growth of *Venice*, but the growth of *Oceana* gives law to the Sea.

THESE Countries having been antiently diſtinct and hoſtile Kingdoms, came by MORPHEUS the *Marpeſian* (who ſucceeded by hereditary right to the Crown of *Oceana)* not only to be join'd under one head; but to be caſt, as it were by a Charm, into that profound ſleep, which, broken at length by the Trumpet of Civil War, has produc'd thoſe effects, that have given occaſion to the inſuing Diſcourſe, divided into four parts.

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1. *The Preliminaries, ſhewing the Principles of Government.*

2. *The Council of* Legiſlators, *ſhewing the Art of making a Common-wealth.*

3. *The Model of the Common-wealth of* Oceana, *ſhewing the effect of ſuch an Art.*

4. *The Corollary, ſhewing ſome Conſequences of ſuch a Government.*

The Preliminaries, ſhewing the Principles of Government.

FANOTTI, the moſt excellent Deſcriber of the Common-wealth of *Venice*, divides the whole Series of Government into two Times or Periods. The one ending with the Liberty of *Rome*, which was the Courſe or Empire, as I may call it, of Antient Prudence, firſt diſcover'd to mankind by GOD himſelf in the Fabric of the Commonwealth of *Iſrael*, and afterwards pick'd out of his Footſteps in Nature, and unanimouſly follow'd by the *Greeks* and *Romans*. The other beginning with the Arms of CÆSAR, which, extinguiſhing Liberty, were the Tranſition of Antient into Modern Prudence, introduc'd by thoſe Inundations of *Huns*, *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Lombards*, *Saxons*, which, breaking the *Roman* Empire, deform'd the whole face of the World with thoſe ill features of Government, which at this time are become far worſe in theſe weſtern parts, except *Venice*, which eſcaping the hands of the *Barbarians*, by virtue of its impregnable Situation, has had its Eye fix'd upon antient Prudence, and is attain'd to a perfection even beyond the Copy.

Definitions of Government.

RELATION being had to theſe two times, Government (to define it *de jure*, or according to antient Prudence) is an Art whereby a Civil Society of Men is inſtituted and preſerv'd upon the Foundation of common Right or Intereſt; or (to follow ARISTOTLE and LIVY) It is the Empire of Laws, and not of Men.

AND Government (to define it *de facto*, or according to modern Prudence) is an Art whereby ſome man, or ſome few men, ſubject a City or a Nation, and rule it according to his or their private Intereſt: which, becauſe the Laws in ſuch caſes are made according to the intereſt of a man, or of ſome few Families, may be ſaid to be the Empire of Men, and not of Laws.

THE former kind is that which MACHIAVEL (whoſe Books are neglected) is the only Politician that has gone about to retrieve; and
Pag. 180. that LEVIATHAN (who would have his Book impos'd upon the
Pag. 377. Univerſities) goes about to deſtroy. For, *It is* (ſays he) *another Error of* ARISTOTLE's *Politics, that in a well-order'd Common-wealth not Men ſhould govern, but the Laws. What man that has his natural ſenſes, tho' he can neither write nor read, does not find himſelf govern'd by them he fears and believes can kill or hurt him when he obeys not? Or, who believes that the Law can hurt him, which is but Words and Paper, without the Hands and Swords of men?* I confeſs, that * the Magiſtrate upon his Bench is that to the Law, which a Gunner upon his Platform is to his Cannon. Nevertheleſs, I ſhould not dare to argue with a man of any Ingenuity after this manner. A whole Army, tho' they can neither write nor read, are not afraid of a Platform, which they know is but Earth or Stone; nor of a Cannon, which without a hand to give fire to it, is but cold Iron; therefore a whole Army is afraid of one Man. But of this kind is the Ratiocination of LEVIATHAN (as I ſhall ſhew in divers places that come in my way) throughout his whole Politics,
Pag. 111. or worſe; as where he ſays *of* ARISTOTLE *and of* CICERO, *of the* Greeks, *and of the* Romans, *who liv'd under popular States, that they deriv'd thoſe Rights not from the Principles of Nature, but tranſcrib'd them into their Books, out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, as Grammarians deſcribe the Rules of Language out of Poets.* Which is as if a man ſhould tell famous HERVY, that he tranſcrib'd his Circulation of the Blood not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that Body.

TO go on therefore with this Preliminary Diſcourſe, I ſhall divide it (according to the two definitions of Government relating to JANOTTI's two times) into two parts. The firſt treating of the Principles of Government in general, and according to the Antients: The Second treating of the late Governments of *Oceana* in particular, and in that of modern Prudence.

Diviſion of Government. GOVERNMENT, according to the Antients, and their learn'd Diſciple MACHIAVEL, the only Politician of later Ages, is of three kinds; The Government of One Man, or of the better ſort, or of the whole People: which by their more learn'd names are call'd *Monarchy*, *Ariſtocracy*, and *Democracy*. theſe they hold, thro' their proneneſs to degenerate, to be all evil. For whereas they that govern ſhould govern according to Reaſon, if they govern according to Paſſion, they do that which they ſhould not do. Wherefore as Reaſon and Paſſion are two things, ſo Government by Reaſon is one thing, and the corruption of Government by Paſſion is another thing, but not always another Government: as a Body that is a alive is one thing, and a Body that is dead is another thing, but not always another Creature, tho' the Corruption of one comes at length to be the Generation of another. The Corruption then of *Monarchy* is call'd *Tyranny*; that of *Ariſtocracy*, *Oligarchy*; and that of *Democracy*, *Anarchy*. But Legiſlators having found theſe three Governments at the beſt to be naught, have invented another conſiſting of a mixture of them all, which only is good. This is the Doctrine of the Antients.

* Magiſtratus eſt lex armata.

BUT

BUT LEVIATHAN is positive, that they are all deceiv'd, and that there is no other Government in Nature than one of the three; as also that the Flesh of them cannot stink, the names of their Corruptions being but the names of Men's Phansies, which will be understood when we are shewn which of them was *Senatus Populusque Romanus*.

TO go my own way, and yet to follow the Antients, the Principles of Government are twofold; Internal, or the goods of the Mind; and External, or the goods of Fortune. The goods of the Mind are natural or acquir'd Virtues, as Wisdom, Prudence, and Courage, *&c.* The goods of Fortune are Riches. There be goods also of the Body, as Health, Beauty, Strength; but these are not to be brought into account, upon this score, because if a Man or an Army acquires Victory or Empire, it is more from their Discipline, Arms, and Courage, than from their natural Health, Beauty, or Strength, in regard that a People conquer'd may have more of natural Strength, Beauty and Health, and yet find little remedy. The Principles of Government then are in the goods of the Mind, or in the goods of Fortune. To the goods of the Mind answers Authority; to the goods of Fortune, Power or Empire. Wherefore LEVIATHAN, tho' he be right where he says that *Riches are Power*, is mistaken where he says that *Prudence, or the reputation of Prudence, is Power:* for the Learning or Prudence of a Man is no more Power than the Learning or Prudence of a Book or Author, which is properly Authority. A learned Writer may have Authority tho' he has no Power; and a foolish Magistrate may have Power, tho' he has otherwise no Esteem or Authority. The difference of these two is observ'd by LIVY in EVANDER, of whom he says, * that he govern'd rather by the Authority of others, than by his own Power.

Goods of the Mind and of Fortune.

Empire and Authority.

TO begin with Riches, in regard that Men are hung upon these, not of choice as upon the other, but of necessity and by the Teeth: for as much as he who wants Bread is his Servant that will feed him; if a Man thus feeds a whole People, they are under his Empire.

Empire.

EMPIRE is of two kinds, Domestic and National, or Foreign and Provincial.

Division of Empire.

DOMESTIC Empire is founded upon Dominion.

Domestic Empire.

DOMINION is Property real or personal, that is to say, in Lands, or in Money and Goods.

Dominion.

LANDS, or the parts and parcels of a Territory, are held by the Proprietor or Proprietors, Lord or Lords of it, in some proportion; and such (except it be in a City that has little or no Land, and whose Revenue is in Trade) as is the proportion or balance of Dominion or Property in Land, such is the nature of the Empire.

Balance in Lands.

IF one Man be sole Landlord of a Territory, or over-balance the People, for example three parts in four, he is Grand Signior: for so the *Turk* is call'd from his Property; and his Empire is absolute Monarchy.

Absolute Monarchy.

IF the Few or a Nobility, or a Nobility with the Clergy be Landlords, or over-balance the People to the like proportion, it makes the *Gothic* balance (to be shewn at large in the second part of this Discourse) and the Empire is mix'd Monarchy, as that of *Spain, Poland*, and late of *Oceana*.

Mix'd Monarchy.

* Regebat magis Autoritate quam Imperio.

AND

Popular Government.

AND if the whole People be Landlords, or hold the Lands ſo divided among them, that no one Man, or number of Men, within the compaſs of the *Few* or *Ariſtocracy*, over-balance them, the Empire (without the interpoſition of Force) is a Common-wealth.

Tyranny. Oligarchy. Anarchy.

IF Force be interpos'd in any of theſe three caſes, it muſt either frame the Government to the Foundation, or the Foundation to the Government; or holding the Government not according to the balance, it is not natural, but violent: and therefore if it be at the devotion of a Prince, it is *Tyranny*; if at the devotion of the Few, *Oligarchy*; or if in the power of the People, *Anarchy*. Each of which Confuſions, the balance ſtanding otherwiſe, is but of ſhort continuance, becauſe againſt the nature of the balance, which, not deſtroy'd, deſtroys that which oppoſes it.

BUT there be certain other Confuſions, which, being rooted in the balance, are of longer continuance, and of worſe conſequence; as firſt, where a Nobility holds half the Property, or about that proportion, and the People the other half; in which caſe, without altering the balance, there is no remedy but the one muſt eat out the other: as the People did the Nobility in *Athens*, and the Nobility the People in *Rome*. Secondly, when a Prince holds about half the Dominion, and the People the other half (which was the caſe of the *Roman* Emperors, planted partly upon their military Colonies, and partly upon the Senate and the People) the Government becomes a very ſhambles both of the Princes and the People. Somewhat of this nature are certain Governments at this day, which are ſaid to ſubſiſt by confuſion. In this caſe, to fix the balance, is to entail miſery: but in the three former, not to fix it, is to loſe the Government. Wherefore it being unlawful in *Turky*, that any ſhould poſſeſs Land but the Grand Signior, the balance is fix'd by the Law, and that Empire firm. Nor, tho' the Kings often fell, was the Throne of *Oceana* known to ſhake, until the Statute of *Alienations* broke the Pillars, by giving way to the Nobility to ſell their Eſtates. * While *Lacedemon* held to the diviſion of Land made by LYCURGUS, it was immoveable, but, breaking that, could ſtand no longer. This kind of Law fixing the balance in Lands is call'd *Agrarian*, and was firſt introduc'd by God himſelf, who divided the Land of *Canaan* to his People by Lots, and is of ſuch virtue, that wherever it has held, that Government has not alter'd, except by conſent; as in that unparallel'd example of the People of *Iſrael*, when being in liberty they would needs chooſe a King. But without an *Agrarian*, Government, whether Monarchical, Ariſtocratical, or Popular, has no long Leaſe.

AS for Dominion perſonal or in Money, it may now and then ſtir up a MELIUS or a MANLIUS, which, if the Common-wealth be not provided with ſome kind of *Dictatorian* Power, may be dangerous, tho' it has been ſeldom or never ſucceſsful: becauſe to Property producing Empire, it is requir'd that it ſhould have ſome certain root or foothold, which, except in Land, it cannot have, being otherwiſe as it were upon the Wing.

Balance in Money.

NEVERTHELESS, in ſuch Cities as ſubſiſt moſtly by Trade, and have little or no Land, as *Holland* and *Genoa*, the balance of Treaſure may be equal to that of Land in the caſes mention'd.

* Si terra recedat, Ionium Ægæo frangat mare.

BUT

BUT LEVIATHAN, tho' he ſeems to ſcew at Antiquity, following his furious Maſter CARNEADES, has caught hold of the public Sword, to which he reduces all manner and matter of Government; as, where he affirms this opinion [*that any Monarch receives his Power by Covenant, that is to ſay, upon conditions*] *to proceed from the not underſtanding this eaſy truth, That Covenants being but Words and Breath, have no power to oblige, contain, conſtrain, or protect any Man, but what they have from the public Sword.* But as he ſaid of the Law, that without this Sword it is but Paper; ſo he might have thought of this Sword, that without a Hand it is but cold Iron. The Hand which holds this Sword is the Militia of a Nation; and the Militia of a Nation is either an Army in the field, or ready for the field upon occaſion. But an Army is a Beaſt that has a great Belly, and muſt be fed; wherefore this will come to what Paſtures you have, and what Paſtures you have will come to the balance of Property, without which the public Sword is but a name or mere ſpit-frog. Wherefore to ſet that which LEVIATHAN ſays of Arms and of Contracts a little ſtreighter; he that can graze this Beaſt with the great belly, as the *Turk* does his *Timariots*, may well deride him that imagines he receiv'd his Power by Covenant, or is oblig'd to any ſuch toy: it being in this caſe only that Covenants are but Words and Breath. But if the Property of the Nobility, ſtock'd with their Tenants and Retainers, be the paſture of that Beaſt, the Ox knows his Maſter's Crib; and it is impoſſible for a King in ſuch a Conſtitution to reign otherwiſe than by Covenant; or if he breaks it, it is words that come to blows.

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Arms and Contracts.

BUT ſays he, *when an Aſſembly of Men is made Sovereign, then no Man imagines any ſuch Covenant to have paſt in the Inſtitution.* But what was that by PUBLICOLA of appeal to the People, or that whereby the People had their Tribunes? *Fy*, ſays he, *no body is ſo dull as to ſay, that the People of* Rome *made a Covenant with the* Romans, *to hold the Sovereignty on ſuch or ſuch conditions; which not perform'd, the* Romans *might depoſe the* Roman *People.* In which there be ſeveral remarkable thinks; for he holds the Common-wealth of *Rome* to have conſiſted of one Aſſembly, whereas it conſiſted of the Senate and the People; that they were not upon Covenant, whereas every Law enacted by them was a Covenant between them; That the one Aſſembly was made Sovereign, whereas the People who only were Sovereign, were ſuch from the beginning, as appears by the antient ſtile of their Covenants or Laws, * *The Senate has reſolv'd, the People have decreed*; That a Council being made Sovereign, cannot be made ſuch upon conditions, whereas the *Decemvirs* being a Council that was made Sovereign, was made ſuch upon conditions; That all Conditions or Covenants making a Sovereign, the Sovereign being made, are void; whence it muſt follow that, the *Decemviri* being made, were ever after the lawful Government of *Rome*, and that it was unlawful for the Common-wealth of *Rome* to depoſe the *Decemvirs*; as alſo that CICERO, if he wrote otherwiſe out of his Common-wealth, did not write out of Nature. But to come to others that ſee more of this balance.

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Pag. 89.

YOU have ARISTOTLE full of it in divers places, eſpecially where he ſays, that *immoderate Wealth, as where one Man or the few have greater Poſſeſſions than the Equality or the Frame of the Commonwealth*

B. 5. 3. 3. 9.

* Cenſuere patres, juſſit populus.

will bear, is an occaſion of Sedition, which ends for the greater part in Monarchy; and that for this cauſe the Oſtraciſm has been receiv'd in divers places, as in Argos *and* Athens. *But that it were better to prevent the growth in the beginning, than, when it has got head, to ſeek the remedy of ſuch an evil.*

D. B. 1. c. 55. MACHIAVEL has miſs'd it very narrowly and more dangerouſly; for not fully perceiving that if a Common-wealth be gall'd by the Gentry, it is by their over-balance, he ſpeaks of the Gentry as hoſtile to popular Governments, and of popular Governments as hoſtile to the Gentry; and makes us believe that the People in ſuch are ſo enrag'd againſt them, that where they meet a Gentleman they kill him: which can never be prov'd by any one example, unleſs in civil War; ſeeing that even in *Switzerland* the Gentry are not only ſafe, but in honour. But the Balance, as I have laid it down, tho' unſeen by MACHIAVEL, is that which interprets him, and that which he confirms by his Judgment in many others as well as in this place, where he concludes, *That he who will go about to make a Common-wealth where there be many Gentlemen, unleſs he firſt deſtroys them, undertakes an Impoſſibility. And that he who goes about to introduce Monarchy where the condition of the People is equal, ſhall never bring it to paſs, unleſs he cull out ſuch of them as are the moſt turbulent and ambitious, and make them Gentlemen or Noblemen, not in name but in effect; that is, by inriching them with Lands, Caſtles, and Treaſures, that may gain them Power among the reſt, and bring in the reſt to dependance upon themſelves, to the end that they maintaining their Ambition by the Prince, the Prince may maintain his Power by them.*

WHEREFORE as in this place I agree with MACHIAVEL, that a Nobility or Gentry, over-balancing a popular Government, is the utter bane and deſtruction of it; ſo I ſhall ſhew in another, that a Nobility or Gentry, in a popular Government not over-balancing it, is the very life and ſoul of it.

The right of the Militia ſtated. BY what has been ſaid, it ſhould ſeem that we may lay aſide further diſputes of the public Sword, or of the right of the Militia; which, be the Government what it will, or let it change how it can, is inſeparable from the over-balance in Dominion: nor, if otherwiſe ſtated by the Law or Cuſtom (as in the Common-wealth of *Rome*, * where the People having the Sword, the Nobility came to have the over-balance) avails it to any other end than deſtruction. For as a Building ſwaying from the Foundation muſt fall, ſo it fares with the Law ſwaying from Reaſon, and the Militia from the balance of Dominion. And thus much for the balance of National or Domeſtic Empire, which is in Dominion.

The Balance of foreign Empire. THE balance of Foreign or Provincial Empire is of a contrary nature. A man may as well ſay, that it is unlawful for him who has made a fair and honeſt purchaſe to have Tenants, as for a Government that has made a juſt progreſs, and inlargement of itſelf, to have Provinces. But how a Province may be juſtly acquir'd, appertains to another place. In this I am to ſhew no more than how or upon what kind of balance it is to be held; in order whereto I ſhall firſt ſhew upon what kind of balance it is not to be held. It has been ſaid, that national or independant Empire, of what kind ſoever, is to be exercis'd

* Conſules ſine lege Curiata rem militarem attingere non potuerunt

by

by them that have the proper balance of Dominion in the Nation; wherefore provincial or dependant Empire is not to be exercis'd by them that have the balance of Dominion in the Province, becauſe that would bring the Government from Provincial and Dependant, to National and Independant. Abſolute Monarchy, as that of the *Turks*, neither plants its People at home nor abroad, otherwiſe than as Tenants for life or at will; wherefore its National and Provincial Government is all one. But in Governments that admit the Citizen or Subject to Dominion in Lands, the richeſt are they that ſhare moſt of the Power at home; whereas the richeſt among the Provincials, tho' native Subjects, or Citizens that have been tranſplanted, are leaſt admitted to the Government abroad: for Men, like Flowers or Roots being tranſplanted, take after the Soil wherein they grow. Wherefore the Common-wealth of *Rome*, by planting Colonies of its Citizens within the bounds of *Italy*, took the beſt way of propagating it ſelf, and naturalizing the Country; whereas if it had planted ſuch Colonies without the bounds of *Italy*, it would have alienated the Citizens, and given a root to Liberty abroad that might have ſprung up foreign, or ſavage, and hoſtile to her: wherefore it never made any ſuch diſperſion of it ſelf and its ſtrength, till it was under the yoke of the Emperors, who diſburdening themſelves of the People, as having leſs apprehenſion of what they could do abroad than at home, took a contrary courſe.

THE *Mamalucs* (which till any Man ſhew me the contrary, I ſhall preſume to have been a Common-wealth conſiſting of an Army, whereof the common Soldier was the People, the Commiſſion Officer the Senate and the General the Prince) were Foreigners, and by Nation *Circaſſians*, that govern'd *Ægypt*; wherefore theſe never durſt plant themſelves upon Dominion, which growing naturally up into the National Intereſt, muſt have diſſolv'd the foreign yoke in that Province.

THE like in ſome ſort may be ſaid of *Venice*, the Government whereof is uſually miſtaken: for *Venice*, tho' it does not take in the People, never excluded them. This Common-wealth, the Orders whereof are the moſt Democratical or Popular of all others, in regard of the exquiſite Rotation of the Senate, at the firſt inſtitution took in the whole People; they that now live under the Government without participation of it, are ſuch as have ſince either voluntarily choſen ſo to do, or were ſubdu'd by Arms. Wherefore the Subject of *Venice* is govern'd by Provinces; and the balance of Dominion not ſtanding, as has been ſaid, with Provincial Government: As the *Mamalucs* durſt not caſt their Government upon this balance in their Provinces, leſt the National Intereſt ſhould have rooted out the Foreign; ſo neither dare the *Venetians* take in their Subjects upon this balance, leſt the foreign Intereſt ſhould root out the National (which is that of the 3000 now governing) and by diffuſing the Common-wealth throughout her Territories, loſe the advantage of her Situation, by which in great part it ſubſiſts. And ſuch alſo is the Government of the *Spaniard* in the *Indies*, to which he deputes Natives of his own Country, not admitting the *Creolios* to the Government of thoſe Provinces, tho' deſcended from *Spaniards*.

BUT if a Prince or a Common-wealth may hold a Territory that is foreign in this, it may be aſk'd, why he may not hold one that is native in the like manner? To which I anſwer, becauſe he can hold a foreign by a native Territory, but not a native by a foreign: and as hitherto I have ſhewn what is not the provincial Balance, ſo by this anſwer it

may

may appear what it is, namely the over-balance of a native Territory to a foreign; for as one Country balances it ſelf by the diſtribution of Property according to the proportion of the ſame, ſo one Country over-balances another by advantage of divers kinds. For example, the Common-wealth of *Rome* over-balanc'd her Provinces by the vigour of a more excellent Government oppos'd to a crazier, or by a more exquiſite Militia oppos'd to one inferior in Courage or Diſcipline. The like was that of the *Mamalucs*, being a hardy People, to the *Ægyptians* that were a ſoft one. And the balance of Situation is in this kind of wonderful effect; ſeeing the King of *Denmark*, being none of the moſt potent Princes, is able at the *Sound* to take Toll of the greateſt: and as this King by the advantage of the Land can make the Sea tributary; ſo *Venice*, by the advantage of the Sea, in whoſe arms ſhe is impregnable, can make the Land to feed her *Gulf*. For the Colonies in the *Indies*, they are yet Babes that cannot live without ſucking the Breaſts of their Mother Cities, but ſuch as I miſtake if when they come of age they do not wean themſelves: which cauſes me to wonder at Princes that delight to be exhauſted in that way. And ſo much for the principles of Power, whether National or Provincial, Domeſtic or Foreign; being ſuch as are external, and founded in the goods of Fortune.

Authority. I COME to the principles of Authority, which are internal, and founded upon the goods of the Mind. Theſe the Legiſlator that can unite in his Government with thoſe of Fortune, comes neareſt to the work of God, whoſe Government conſiſts of Heaven and Earth: which was ſaid by PLATO, tho' in different words, as, when Princes ſhould be Philoſophers, or Philoſophers Princes, the World would be happy. And ſays SOLOMON, *There is an evil which I have ſeen under the Sun, which proceeds from the Ruler (enimvero neque nobilem, neque ingenuum, nec libertinum quidem armis præponere, regia utilitas eſt) Folly is ſet in great dignity, and the Rich* (either in Virtue and Wiſdom, in the goods of the Mind, or thoſe of Fortune upon that balance which gives them a ſenſe of the National Intereſt) *ſit in low places. I have ſeen Servants upon horſes, and Princes walking as Servants upon the earth.* Sad complaints, that the principles of Power and of Authority, the goods of the Mind and of Fortune, do not meet and twine in the Wreath or Crown of Empire! Wherefore, if we have any thing of Piety or of Prudence, let us raiſe our ſelves out of the mire of private Intereſt to the contemplation of Virtue, and put a hand to the removal of *this evil from under the Sun*; this evil againſt which no Government that is not ſecur'd, can be good; this evil from which the Government that is ſecure muſt be perfect. SOLOMON tells us, that the cauſe of it is from the Ruler, from thoſe principles of power, which balanc'd upon earthly traſh, exclude the heavenly treaſures of Virtue, and that influence of it upon Government, which is Authority. We have wander'd the Earth to find out the balance of power: but to find out that of Authority, we muſt aſcend, as I ſaid, nearer Heaven, or to the Image of God, which is the Soul of Man.

Eccleſ. 10. 15. Tacit. Grot.

THE *Soul of Man* (whoſe life or motion is perpetual Contemplation or Thought) is the Miſtreſs of two potent Rivals, the one Reaſon, the other Paſſion, that are in continual ſuit; and, according as ſhe gives up her will to theſe or either of them, is the felicity or miſery which Man partakes in this mortal life.

FOR

FOR as whatever was Paſſion in the contemplation of a man, being brought forth by his will into action, is Vice and the bondage of Sin; ſo whatever was Reaſon in the contemplation of a man, being brought forth by his will into action, is virtue and the freedom of Soul.

AGAIN, as thoſe actions of a man that were Sin acquire to himſelf Repentance or Shame, and affect others with Scorn or Pity; ſo thoſe actions of a man that are Virtue acquire to himſelf Honour, and upon others Authority.

NOW Government is no other than the Soul of a Nation or City: wherefore that which was Reaſon in the debate of a Common-wealth being brought forth by the reſult, muſt be Virtue; and for as much as the Soul of a City or Nation is the Sovereign Power, her Virtue muſt be Law. But the Government whoſe Law is Virtue, and whoſe Virtue is Law, is the ſame whoſe Empire is Authority, and whoſe Authority is Empire.

AGAIN, If the Liberty of a man conſiſts in the Empire of his Reaſon, the abſence whereof would betray him to the bondage of his Paſſions; then the Liberty of a Common-wealth conſiſts in the Empire of her Laws, the abſence whereof would betray her to the Luſt of Tyrants. And theſe I conceive to be the Principles upon which ARISTOTLE and LIVY (injuriouſly accus'd by LEVIATHAN for not writing out of nature) have grounded their Aſſertion, *That a Common-wealth is an Empire of Laws, and not of Men.* But they muſt not carry it ſo. *For*, ſays he, *the Liberty, whereof there is ſo frequent and honourable mention in the Hiſtory and Philoſophy of the antient Greeks and Romans, and the Writings and Diſcourſes of thoſe that from them have receiv'd all their learning in the Politics, is not the Liberty of particular Men, but the Liberty of the Common-wealth.* He might as well have ſaid, that the Eſtates of particular Men in a Common-wealth are not the Riches of particular Men, but the Riches of the Common-wealth; for equality of Eſtates cauſes equality of Power, and equality of Power is the Liberty not only of the Common-wealth, but of every Man. But ſure a Man would never be thus irreverent with the greateſt Authors, and poſitive againſt all Antiquity, without ſome certain demonſtration of Truth: and, what is it? Why, *there is written on the Turrets of the City of* Lucca *in great Characters at this day the word* LIBERTAS; *yet no Man can thence infer, that a particular Man has more Liberty or Immunity from the Service of the Common-wealth there than in* Conſtantinople. *Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchical or Popular, the Freedom is the ſame.* The Mountain has brought forth, and we have a little Equivocation! For to ſay, that a *Luccheſe* has no more Liberty or Immunity from the Laws of *Lucca*, than a *Turk* has from thoſe of *Conſtantinople*, and to ſay that a *Luccheſe* has no more Liberty or Immunity by the Laws of *Lucca*, than a *Turk* has by thoſe of *Conſtantinople*, are pretty different Speeches. The firſt may be ſaid of all Governments alike; the ſecond ſcarce of any two; much leſs of theſe, ſeeing it is known, that whereas the greateſt *Baſha* is a Tenant, as well of his Head as of his Eſtate, at the Will of his Lord, the meaneſt *Luccheſe* that has Land, is a Freeholder of both, and not to be control'd but by the Law, and that fram'd by every private Man to no other end (or they may thank themſelves) than to protect the Liberty of every private Man, which by that means comes to be the Liberty of the Common-wealth.

Pag. 110.

BUT ſeeing they that make the Laws in Common-wealths are but Men, the main Queſtion ſeems to be, how a Common-wealth comes to be an Empire of Laws, and not of Men? or how the Debate or Reſult of a Common-wealth is ſo ſure to be according to Reaſon; ſeeing they who debate, and they who reſolve, be but Men? *And as often as Reaſon is againſt a Man, ſo often will a Man be againſt Reaſon.*

Hobs. THIS is thought to be a ſhrewd ſaying, but will do no harm; for be it ſo that Reaſon is nothing but Intereſt, there be divers Intereſts, and ſo divers Reaſons.

AS firſt, there is private Reaſon, which is the Intereſt of a private Man.

SECONDLY, There is Reaſon of State, which is the Intereſt (or Error, as was ſaid by SOLOMON) of the Ruler or Rulers, that is to ſay, of the Prince, of the Nobility, or of the People.

THIRDLY, There is that Reaſon, which is the Intereſt of Man-
Hooker. *B.* 1. kind, or of the whole. *Now if we ſee even in thoſe natural Agents that want ſenſe, that as in themſelves they have a Law which directs them in the means whereby they tend to their own perfection, ſo likewiſe that another Law there is, which touches them as they are ſociable parts united into one Body, a Law which binds them each to ſerve to others good, and all to prefer the good of the whole, before whatſoever their own particular; as when ſtones, or heavy things forſake their ordinary want or center, and fly upwards, as if they heard themſelves commanded to let go the good they privately wiſh, and to relieve the preſent diſtreſs of Nature in common.* There is a common Right, Law of Nature, or Intereſt of the whole; which is more excellent, and ſo acknowledg'd to be by the Agents
Grot. themſelves, than the Right or Intereſt of the Parts only. *Wherefore tho' it may be truly ſaid that the Creatures are naturally carry'd forth to their proper utility or profit, that ought not to be taken in too general a ſenſe; ſeeing divers of them abſtain from their own profit, either in regard of thoſe of the ſame kind, or at leaſt of their young.*

MANKIND then muſt either be leſs juſt than the Creature, or acknowledge alſo his common Intereſt to be common Right. And if Reaſon be nothing elſe but Intereſt, and the Intereſt of Mankind be the right Intereſt, then the Reaſon of Mankind muſt be right Reaſon. Now compute well; for if the Intereſt of popular Government come the neareſt to the Intereſt of Mankind, then the Reaſon of popular Government muſt come the neareſt to right Reaſon.

BUT it may be ſaid, that the difficulty remains yet; for be the Intereſt of popular Government right Reaſon, a Man does not look upon Reaſon as it is right or wrong in it ſelf, but as it makes for him or againſt him. Wherefore unleſs you can ſhew ſuch Orders of a Government, as, like thoſe of God in Nature, ſhall be able to conſtrain this or that Creature to ſhake off that Inclination which is more peculiar to it, and take up that which regards the common Good or Intereſt; all this is to no more end, than to perſuade every man in a popular Government not to carve himſelf of that which he deſires moſt, but to be mannerly at the public Table, and give the beſt from himſelf to Decency and the common Intereſt. But that ſuch orders may be eſtabliſh'd, as may, nay muſt give the upper hand in all caſes to common Right or Intereſt, notwithſtanding the nearneſs of that which ſticks to every man in private, and this in a way of equal certainty and facility, is known even to Girls, being no other than thoſe that are of common practice with them in

divers

divers caſes. For example, two of them have a Cake yet undivided, which was given between them: that each of them therefore may have that which is due, Divide, ſays one to the other, and I will chooſe; or let me divide, and you ſhall chooſe. If this be but once agreed upon, it is enough: for the divident, dividing unequally, loſes, in regard that the other takes the better half; wherefore ſhe divides equally, and ſo both have right. *O the depth of the Wiſdom of God!* and yet *by the mouths of Babes and Sucklings has he ſet forth his ſtrength*; that which great Philoſophers are diſputing upon in vain, is brought to light by two harmleſs Girls, even the whole Myſtery of a Common-wealth, which lies only in dividing and chooſing. Nor has God (if his Works in Nature be underſtood) left ſo much to Mankind to diſpute upon, as who ſhall divide, and who chooſe, but diſtributed them for ever into two Orders, whereof the one has the natural right of dividing, and the other of chooſing. For Example:

The Orders of popular Government in Nature.

A COMMON-WEALTH is but a civil Society of Men: let us take any number of Men (as twenty) and immediately make a Common-wealth. Twenty Men (if they be not all Idiots, perhaps if they be) can never come ſo together, but there will be ſuch a difference in them, that about a third will be wiſer, or at leaſt leſs fooliſh than all the reſt; theſe upon acquaintance, tho' it be but ſmall, will be diſcover'd, and (as Stags that have the largeſt Heads) lead the Herd: for while the ſix diſcourſing and arguing one with another, ſhew the eminence of their parts, the fourteen diſcover things that they never thought on; or are clear'd in divers Truths which had formerly perplex'd them. Wherefore in matter of common concernment, difficulty, or danger, they hang upon their lips as Children upon their Fathers; and the influence thus acquir'd by the ſix, the eminence of whoſe parts is found to be a ſtay and comfort to the fourteen, is * the *Authority of the Fathers.* Wherefore this can be no other than a natural Ariſtocracy diffus'd by God throughout the whole Body of Mankind to this end and purpoſe; and therefore ſuch as the People have not only a natural, but a poſitive Obligation to make uſe of as their Guides; as where the People of *Iſrael* are commanded to *take wiſe Men, and underſtanding, and known among their Tribes, to be made Rulers over them.* The ſix then approv'd of, as in the preſent caſe, are the Senate, not by hereditary Right, or in regard of the greatneſs of their Eſtates only (which would tend to ſuch Power as might force or draw the People) but by election for their excellent Parts, which tends to the advancement of the influence of their Virtue or Authority that leads the People. Wherefore the Office of the Senate is not to be Commanders, but Counſellors of the People; and that which is proper to Counſellors is firſt to debate, and afterward to give advice in the buſineſs whereupon they have debated; whence the Decrees of the Senate are never Laws, nor ſo † call'd: and theſe being maturely fram'd, it is their Duty ‖ to propoſe in the caſe to the People. Wherefore the Senate is no more than the debate of the Common-wealth. But to debate, is to diſcern or put a difference between things that, being alike, are not the ſame; or it is ſeparating and weighing this reaſon againſt that, and that reaſon againſt this, which is dividing.

Deut. 1. 13.

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* Authoritas Patrum. † Senatuſconſulta. ‖ Ferre ad Populum.

The People. THE Senate then having divided, who ſhall chooſe? Aſk the Girls: for if ſhe that divided muſt have choſen alſo, it had been little worſe for the other in caſe ſhe had not divided at all, but kept the whole Cake to her ſelf, in regard that being to chooſe too, ſhe divided accordingly. Wherefore if the Senate have any farther power than to divide, the Common-wealth can never be equal. But in a Common-wealth conſiſting of a ſingle Council, there is no other to chooſe than that which divided; whence it is, that ſuch a Council fails not to ſcramble, that is, to be factious, there being no other dividing of the Cake in that caſe but among themſelves.

NOR is there any remedy but to have another Council to chooſe. The Wiſdom of the Few may be the Light of Mankind; but the Intereſt of the Few is not the Profit of Mankind, nor of a Common-wealth. Wherefore ſeeing we have granted Intereſt to be Reaſon, they muſt not chooſe, leſt it put out their Light. But as the Council dividing conſiſts of the Wiſdom of the Common-wealth, ſo the Aſſembly or Council chooſing ſhould conſiſt of the Intereſt of the Common-wealth: as the Wiſdom of the Common-wealth is in the Ariſtocracy, ſo the Intereſt of the Common-wealth is in the whole body of the People. And whereas this, in caſe the Common-wealth conſiſt of a whole Nation, is too unweildy a body to be aſſembled, this Council is to conſiſt of ſuch a Repreſentative as may be equal, and ſo conſtituted, as can never contract any other Intereſt than that of the whole People; the manner whereof, being ſuch as is beſt ſhewn by Exemplification, I remit to the Model. But in the preſent caſe, the ſix dividing, and the fourteen chooſing, muſt of neceſſity take in the whole intereſt of the twenty.

DIVIDING and chooſing in the language of a Common-wealth is debating and reſolving; and whatſoever upon debate of the Senate is propos'd to the People, and reſolv'd by them, is enacted * by the authority of the Fathers, and by the power of the People, which concurring, make a Law.

The Magiſtracy. BUT the Law being made, ſays LEVIATHAN, *is but Words and Paper without the Hands and Swords of Men*; wherefore as thoſe two Orders of a Common-wealth, namely the Senate and the People, are Legiſlative, ſo of neceſſity there muſt be a third to be executive of the Laws made, and this is the Magiſtracy; in which order, with the reſt being wrought up by art, the Common-wealth conſiſts of *the Senate propoſing, the People reſolving, and the Magiſtracy executing:* whereby partaking of the *Ariſtocracy* as in the Senate, of the *Democracy* as in the People, and of *Monarchy* as in the Magiſtracy, it is complete. Now there being no other Common-wealth but this in Art or Nature, it is no wonder if MACHIAVEL has ſhew'd us that the Antients held this only to be good; but it ſeems ſtrange to me, that they ſhould hold that there could be any other: for if there be ſuch a thing as pure *Monarchy*, yet that there ſhould be ſuch a one as pure *Ariſtocracy*, or pure *Democracy*, is not in my underſtanding. But the Magiſtracy both in number and function is different in different Common-wealths. Nevertheleſs there is one condition of it that muſt be the ſame in every one, or it diſſolves the Common-wealth where it is wanting. And this is no leſs than that as the hand of the Magiſtrate is the executive

* Authoritate Patrum & juſſu Populi.

Power of the Law, ſo the head of the Magiſtrate is anſwerable to the People that his execution be according to the Law; by which LEVIATHAN may ſee that the hand or ſword that executes the Law is in it, and not above it.

NOW whether I have rightly tranſcrib'd theſe Principles of a Common-wealth out of Nature, I ſhall appeal to God and to the World. To God in the Fabric of the Common-wealth of *Iſrael:* and to the World in the univerſal Series of antient Prudence. But in regard the ſame Common-wealths will be open'd at large in the Council of Legiſlators, I ſhall touch them for the preſent but ſlightly, beginning with that of *Iſrael.* *The Orders of a Common-wealth in experience, as that of* Iſrael.

THE Common-wealth of *Iſrael* conſiſted of the Senate, the People, and the Magiſtracy.

THE People by their firſt diviſion, which was genealogical, were contain'd under their thirteen Tribes, Houſes, or Families; whereof the firſt-born in each was Prince of his Tribe, and had the leading of it: the Tribe of LEVI only being ſet apart to ſerve at the Altar, had no other Prince but the High Prieſt. In their ſecond diviſion they were divided locally by their Agrarian, or the diſtribution of the Land of *Canaan* to them by lot, the Tithe of all remaining to LEVI; whence according to their local diviſion, the Tribes are reckon'd but Twelve. Numb. 1. Joſh. *ch.* 13, *to ch.* 42.

THE Aſſemblies of the People thus divided were methodically gather'd by Trumpets to the Congregation; which was, it ſhould ſeem, of two ſorts. For if it were call'd by one Trumpet only, the Princes of the Tribes and the Elders only aſſembl'd; but if it were call'd with two, the whole People gather'd themſelves to the Congregation, for ſo it is render'd by the *Engliſh:* but in the *Greek* it is call'd *Eccleſia*, or the Church of God, and by the *Talmudiſt*, the great Synagogue. The word *Eccleſia* was alſo antiently and properly us'd for the Civil Congregations or Aſſemblies of the People in *Athens*, *Lacedemon*, and *Epheſus*, where it is ſo call'd in Scripture, tho' it be otherwiſe render'd by the Tranſlators, not much as I conceive to their commendation, ſeeing by that means they have loſt us a good leſſon, the Apoſtles borrowing that name for their Spiritual Congregations, to the end that we might ſee they intended the Government of the Church to be Democratical or Popular, as is alſo plain in the reſt of their Conſtitutions. *The People.* Numb. 10. 7. Numb. 10. 4. Numb. 10. 3. Judg. 20. 2. Acts 19. 23.

THE Church or Congregation of the People of *Iſrael* aſſembl'd in a military manner, and had the reſult of the Common-wealth, or the power of confirming all their Laws, tho' propos'd even by God himſelf; as where they make him King; and where they reject or depoſe him as Civil Magiſtrate, and elect *Saul.* It is manifeſt that he gave no ſuch example to a Legiſlator in a popular Government as to deny or evade the power of the People, which were a contradiction: but tho' he deſervedly blames the ingratitude of the People in that action, he commands SAMUEL, being next under himſelf Supreme Magiſtrate, *to hearken to their Voice* (for where the ſuffrage of the People goes for nothing, it is no Common-wealth) and comforts him, ſaying, *They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me that I ſhould not reign over them.* But to reject him that he ſhould not reign over them, was as Civil Magiſtrate to depoſe him. The Power therefore which the People had to depoſe even God himſelf as he was Civil Magiſtrate, leaves little doubt but that they had Power to have rejected any of thoſe Laws confirm'd by them throughout the Judg. 20. 2. Exod. 19. 1 Sam. 8. 7.

Deut. 29. Scripture, which (to omit the ſeveral parcels) are generally contain'd under two heads, thoſe that were made by Covenant with the People in the Land of *Moab*, and thoſe which were made by Covenant with the People in *Horeb:* which two, I think, amount to the whole body of the *Iſraelitiſh* Laws. But if all and every one of the Laws of *Iſrael* being propos'd by God, were no otherwiſe enacted than by Covenant with the People, then that only which was reſolv'd by the People of *Iſrael* was their Law; and ſo the reſult of that Common-wealth was in the People. Nor had the People the reſult only in matter of Law, but the Power in ſome caſes of Judicature; as alſo the right of levying War; cognizance in matter of Religion; and the Election of their Magiſtrates, as the Judge or Dictator, the King, the Prince: which functions were exercis'd by the *Synagoga magna* or Congregation of *Iſrael*, not always in one manner; for ſometimes they were perform'd by the ſuffrage of the People, *vivâ voce*; ſometimes by the Lot only; and at others by the Ballot, or by a mixture of the Lot with the Suffrage, as in the caſe of ELDAD and MEDAD, which I ſhall open with the Senate.

Joſh. 7. 16. Judg. 20. 8, 9, 10. 1 Sam. 7. 6. 7. 8. 1 Chron. 13. 2. 2 Chron. 30. 4. Judg. 11. 11. 1 Sam. 10. 17. 1 Mac. 14. Exod. 9. 3, 4, 5. Joſh. 7. 1 Sam. 10.

The Senate.

THE Senate of *Iſrael*, call'd in the Old Teſtament the *ſeventy Elders*, and in the New the *Sanhedrim* (which word is uſually tranſlated the *Council*) was appointed by God, and conſiſted of Seventy Elders beſides MOSES, which were at firſt elected by the People; but in what manner is rather intimated than ſhewn. Nevertheleſs, becauſe I cannot otherwiſe underſtand the paſſage concerning ELDAD and MEDAD, of whom it is ſaid, *that they were of them that were written, but went not up to the Tabernacle*, then with the *Talmudiſts*, I conceive that ELDAD and MEDAD had the Sufferage of the Tribes, and ſo were written as Competitors for Magiſtracy; but coming afterwards to the lot, fail'd of it, and therefore went not up to the Tabernacle, or place of Confirmation by God, or to the Seſſion-houſe of the Senate with the Seventy upon whom the lot fell to be Senators: for the Seſſion-houſe of the *Sanhedrim* was firſt in the Court of the Tabernacle, and afterwards in that of the Temple, where it came to be call'd the ſtone Chamber or Pavement. If this were the *Ballot* of *Iſrael*, that of *Venice* is the ſame tranſpos'd; for in *Venice* the Competitor is choſen as it were by the lot, in regard that the Electors are ſo made, and the Magiſtrate is choſen by the *Suffrage of the great Council or Aſſembly of the People*. But the *Sanhedrim* of *Iſrael* being thus conſtituted, MOSES for his time, and after him his Succeſſor, ſat in the midſt of it as *Prince* or *Archon*, and at his left hand the Orator or Father of the Senate; the reſt of the bench coming round with either horn like a Creſcent, had a Scribe attending upon the tip of it.

Numb. 11. Deut. 1. Numb. 11. John.

THIS Senate, in regard the Legiſlator of *Iſrael* was infallible, and the Laws given by God ſuch as were not fit to be alter'd by men, is much different in the exerciſe of their Power from all other Senates, except that of the *Areopagits* in *Athens*, which alſo was little more than a Supreme Judicatory; for it will hardly, as I conceive, be found that the *Sanhedrim* propos'd to the People till the return of the Children of *Iſrael* out of Captivity under *Eſdras*, at which time there was a new Law made, namely, for a kind of Excommunication, or rather Baniſhment, which had never been before in *Iſrael*. Nevertheleſs it is not to be thought that the *Sanhedrim* had not always that right, which from the time of *Eſdras* it more frequently exercis'd, of propoſing to the

the People, but that they forbore it in regard of the fulneſs and infallibility of the Law already made, whereby it was needleſs. Wherefore the function of this Council, which is very rare in a Senate, was executive, and conſiſted in the adminiſtration of the Law made; and whereas the Council it ſelf is often underſtood in Scripture by the Prieſt and the Levite, there is no more in that ſave only that the Prieſts and the Levites, who otherwiſe had no Power at all, being in the younger Years of this Common-wealth, thoſe that were beſt ſtudy'd in the Laws were the moſt frequently elected into the *Sanhedrim*. For the Courts conſiſting of three and twenty Elders ſitting in the Gates of every City, and the *Triumvirates* of Judges conſtituted almoſt in every Village, which were parts of the executive Magiſtracy ſubordinate to the *Sanhedrim*, I ſhall take them at better leiſure, and in the larger Diſcourſe; but theſe being that part of this Common-wealth, which was inſtituted by MOSES upon the advice of JETHRO the Prieſt of *Midian*, (as I conceive a Heathen) are to me a ſufficient warrant even from God himſelf, who confirm'd them, to make farther uſe of human Prudence, wherever I find it bearing a Teſtimony to it ſelf, whether in Heathen Common-wealths or others: And the rather, becauſe ſo it is, that we who have the holy Scriptures, and in them the Original of a Common-wealth, made by the ſame hand that made the World, are either altogether blind or negligent of it; while the Heathens have all written theirs, as if they had had no other Copy: As, to be more brief in the preſent account of that which you ſhall have more at large hereafter.

The Magiſtracy. Deut. 17. 9. 10, 11. Exod. 18.

ATHENS conſiſted of the Senate of the *Bean* propoſing; of the Church or Aſſembly of the People reſolving, and too often debating, which was the ruin of it; as alſo of the Senate of the *Areopagites*, the nine *Archons*, with divers other Magiſtrates executing.

Of Athens.

LACEDEMON conſiſted of the Senate propoſing; of the Church or Congregation of the People reſolving only and never debating, which was the long life of it; and of the two Kings, the Court of the *Ephors*, with divers other Magiſtrates executing.

Of Lacedemon.

CARTHAGE conſiſted of the Senate propoſing and ſometimes reſolving too; of the People reſolving and ſometimes debating too, for which fault ſhe was reprehended by ARISTOTLE; and ſhe had her *Suffetes*, and her hundred Men, with other Magiſtrates executing.

Of Carthage.

ROME conſiſted of the Senate propoſing, the *Concio* or People reſolving, and too often debating, which caus'd her ſtorms; as alſo of the Conſuls, Cenſors, Ædils, Tribunes, Pretors, Queſtors, and other Magiſtrates executing.

Of Rome.

VENICE conſiſts of the Senate or *Pregati* propoſing, and ſometimes reſolving too; of the great Council or Aſſembly of the People, in whom the reſult is conſtitutively; as alſo of the *Doge*, the *Signory*, the *Cenſors*, the *Dieci*, the *Quazancies*, and other Magiſtrates executing.

Of Venice.

THE proceeding of the Common-wealths of *Switzerland* and *Holland* is of a like nature, tho' after a more obſcure manner: for the Sovereignties, whether Cantons, Provinces, or Cities, which are the People, ſend their Deputies commiſſion'd and inſtructed by themſelves (wherein they reſerve the Reſult in their own power) to the Provincial or general Convention, or Senate, where the Deputies debate, but have no other power of Reſult than what was confer'd upon them by the People, or is farther confer'd by the ſame upon farther occaſion. And

Of Switzerland *and* Holland.

for

for the executive part they have Magiſtrates or Judges in every Canton, Province or City, beſides thoſe which are more public, and relate to the League, as for adjuſting Controverſies between one Canton, Province or City, and another; or the like between ſuch perſons as are not of the ſame Canton, Province or City.

BUT that we may obſerve a little farther how the Heathen Politicians have written, not only out of Nature, but as it were out of Scripture: As in the Common-wealth of *Iſrael* God is ſaid to have been King; ſo the Common-wealth where the Law is King, is ſaid by ARISTOTLE to be *the Kingdom of God.* And where by the Luſts or Paſſions of Men a Power is ſet above that of the Law deriving from Reaſon, which is the dictate of God, God in that ſenſe is rejected or depos'd that he ſhould not reign over them, as he was in *Iſrael.* Page 170. And yet LEVIATHAN will have it, that *by reading of theſe Greek and Latin* (he might as well in this ſenſe have ſaid *Hebrew*) *Authors, young Men, and all others that are unprovided of the antidote of ſolid Reaſon, receiving a ſtrong and delightful impreſſion of the great Exploits of War, atchiev'd by the Conductors of their Armies, receive withal a pleaſing Idea of all they have done beſides; and imagine their great proſperity not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular Men, but from the virtue of their popular form of Government, not conſidering the frequent Seditions and Civil Wars produc'd by the imperfection of their Polity.* Where, firſt, the blame he lays to the Heathen Authors is in his ſenſe laid to the Scripture; and whereas he holds them to be young Men, or Men of no antidote that are of like opinions, it ſhould ſeem that MACHIAVEL, the ſole retriever of this antient Prudence, is to his ſolid Reaſon a beardleſs Boy that has newly read LIVY. And how ſolid his Reaſon is, may appear, where he grants the great proſperity of antient Common-wealths, which is to give up the Controverſy. For ſuch an effect muſt have ſome adequate cauſe; which to evade he inſinuates that it was nothing elſe but the emulation of particular Men: as if ſo great an Emulation could have been generated without as great Virtue; ſo great Virtue without the beſt Education; the beſt Education without the beſt Laws; or the beſt Laws any otherwiſe than by the excellency of their Polity.

BUT if ſome of theſe Common-wealths, as being leſs perfect in their Polity than others, have been more ſeditious, it is not more an argument of the infirmity of this or that Common-wealth in particular, than of the excellency of that kind of Polity in general; which if they, that have not altogether reach'd, have nevertheleſs had greater proſperity, what would befal them that ſhould reach?

IN anſwer to which Queſtion let me invite LEVIATHAN, who of all other Governments gives the advantage to Monarchy for perfection, to a better diſquiſition of it by theſe three aſſertions.

THE firſt, That the perfection of Government lies upon ſuch a libration in the frame of it, that no Man or Men in or under it can have the intereſt; or having the intereſt, can have the power to diſturb it with Sedition.

THE ſecond, That Monarchy, reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches not to the perfection of Government; but muſt have ſome dangerous flaw in it.

THE third, That popular Government, reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches the perfection of Government, and has no flaw in it.

THE firſt aſſertion requires no proof. FOR

FOR the proof of the ſecond; Monarchy, as has been ſhewn, is of two kinds, the one by Arms, the other by a Nobility, and there is no other kind in Art or Nature; for if there have been antiently ſome Governments call'd Kingdoms as one of the *Goths* in *Spain*, and another of the *Vandals* in *Africa*, where the King rul'd without a Nobility, and by a Council of the People only: it is expreſly ſaid by the Authors that mention them, that the Kings were but the Captains, and that the People not only gave them Laws, but depos'd them as often as they pleas'd. Nor is it poſſible in reaſon that it ſhould be otherwiſe in like caſes; wherefore theſe were either no Monarchies, or had greater flaws in them than any other.

BUT for a Monarchy by arms, as that of the *Turk* (which of all models that ever were comes up to the perfection of the kind) it is not in the wit or power of Man to cure it of this dangerous flaw; That the *Janizarys* have frequent intereſt and perpetual power to raiſe Sedition, and to tear the Magiſtrate, even the Prince himſelf, in pieces. Therefore the Monarchy of *Turky* is no perfect Government.

AND for a Monarchy by a Nobility, as of late in *Oceana* (which of all other models before the declination of it came up to the perfection in that kind) it was not in the power or wit of Man to cure it of that dangerous flaw, That the Nobility had frequent intereſt and perpetual power by their Retainers and Tenants to raiſe Sedition; and (whereas the *Janizarys* occaſion this kind of Calamity no ſooner than they make an end of it) to levy a laſting War, to the vaſt effuſion of Blood, and that even upon occaſions wherein the People, but for their dependance upon their Lords, had no concernment, as in the feud of the *Red* and *White*. The like has been frequent in *Spain*, *France*, *Germany*, and other Monarchies of this kind; wherefore Monarchy by a Nobility is no perfect Government.

FOR the proof of the third aſſertion; LEVIATHAN yeilds it to me, that there is no other Common-wealth but Monarchical or Popular: wherefore if no Monarchy be a perfect Government, then either there is no perfect Government, or it muſt be popular; for which kind of Conſtitution I have ſomething more to ſay, than LEVIATHAN has ſaid or ever will be able to ſay for Monarchy. As,

FIRST, That it is the Government that was never conquer'd by any Monarch, from the beginning of the World to this day; for if the Common-wealths of *Greece* came under the yoke of the Kings of *Macedon*, they were firſt broken by themſelves.

SECONDLY, That it is the Government that has frequently led mighty Monarchs in Triumph.

THIRDLY, That it is the Government, which, if it has been ſeditious, it has not been ſo from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular Conſtitution; which, wherever the like has happen'd, muſt have been inequal.

FOURTHLY, That it is the Government, which, if it has been any thing near equal, was never ſeditious; or let him ſhew me what Sedition has happen'd in *Lacedemon* or *Venice*.

FIFTHLY, That it is the Government, which, attaining to perfect equality, has ſuch a libration in the frame of it, that no Man living can ſhew which way any Man or Men, in or under it, can contract any ſuch Intereſt or Power as ſhould be able to diſturb the Common-wealth with Sedition; wherefore an equal Common-wealth is that

only which is without flaw, and contains in it the full perfection of Government. But to return.

BY what has been ſhewn in Reaſon and Experience it may appear, that tho' Common-wealths in general be Governments of the Senate propoſing, the People reſolving, and the Magiſtracy executing; yet ſome are not ſo good at theſe Orders, as others, thro' ſome impediment or defect in the frame, balance, or capacity of them, according to which they are of divers kinds.

Diviſion of Common-wealths.

THE firſt diviſion of them is into ſuch as are ſingle, as *Iſrael*, *Athens*, *Lacedemon*, &c. and ſuch as are by Leagues, as thoſe of the *Acheans*, *Etolians*, *Lycians*, *Switz*, and *Hollanders*.

THE ſecond (being MACHIAVEL's) is into ſuch as are for preſervation, as *Lacedemon* and *Venice*, and ſuch as are for increaſe, as *Athens* and *Rome*; in which I can ſee no more than that the former takes in no more Citizens than are neceſſary for defence, and the latter ſo many as are capable of increaſe.

THE third diviſion (unſeen hitherto) is into equal and inequal, and this is the main point, eſpecially as to domeſtic Peace and Tranquillity; for to make a Common-wealth inequal, is to divide it into parties, which ſets them at perpetual variance, the one party endeavouring to preſerve their Eminence and inequality, and the other to attain to Equality: whence the People of *Rome* deriv'd their perpetual ſtrife with the Nobility or Senate. But in an equal Common-wealth there can be no more ſtrife than there can be over-balance in equal weights; wherefore the Common-wealth of *Venice*, being that which of all others is the moſt equal in the Conſtitution, is that wherein there never happen'd any ſtrife between the Senate and the People.

AN equal Common-wealth is ſuch a one as is equal both in the balance or foundation, and in the ſuperſtructure; that is to ſay, in her Agrarian Law, and in her Rotation.

Equal Agrarian.

AN equal *Agrarian* is a perpetual Law eſtabliſhing and preſerving the balance of Dominion by ſuch a diſtribution, that no one Man or number of Men, within the compaſs of the Few or *Ariſtocracy*, can come to overpower the whole People by their poſſeſſions in Lands.

AS the *Agrarian* anſwers to the Foundation, ſo does *Rotation* to the Superſtructures.

Rotation.

EQUAL *Rotation* is equal viciſſitude in Government, or ſucceſſion to Magiſtracy confer'd for ſuch convenient terms, enjoying equal vacations, as take in the whole body by parts, ſucceeding others, thro' the free election or ſuffrage of the People.

Prolongation of Magiſtracy.

THE contrary whereunto is prolongation of Magiſtracy, which, traſhing the wheel of Rotation, deſtroys the life or natural motion of a Common-wealth.

Ballot.

THE election or ſuffrage of the People is moſt free, where it is made or given in ſuch a manner, that it can neither oblige * nor diſoblige another; nor thro' fear of an Enemy, or baſhfulneſs towards a Friend, impair a Man's liberty.

WHEREFORE, ſays CICERO, † the Tablet or Ballot of the People of *Rome* (who gave their Votes by throwing Tablets or little pieces of wood ſecretly into Urns mark'd for the negative or affirma-

* Qui beneficium accepit libertatem vendidit. † Grata populo eſt tabella quæ frontes aperit hominum, mentes tegit, datque eam libertatem ut quod velint faciant.

tive)

tive) was a welcome Conſtitution to the People, as that which, not impairing the aſſurance of their brows, increas'd the freedom of their Judgment. I have not ſtood upon a more particular deſcription of this Ballot, becauſe that of *Venice* exemplify'd in the Model is of all others the moſt perfect.

A N *equal Common-wealth* (by that which has been ſaid) *is a Government eſtabliſh'd upon an equal Agrarian, ariſing into the Superſtructures or three Orders, the Senate debating and propoſing, the People reſolving, and the Magiſtracy executing by an equal Rotation thro' the ſuffrage of the People given by the Ballot.* For tho' Rotation may be without the Ballot, and the Ballot without Rotation, yet the Ballot not only as to the inſuing Model includes both, but is by far the moſt equal way; for which cauſe under the name of the Ballot I ſhall hereafter underſtand both that and Rotation too. *Definition of an equal Common-wealth.*

N O W having reaſon'd the Principles of an equal Common-wealth; I ſhould come to give an inſtance of ſuch a one in experience, if I could find it; but if this work be of any value, it lies in that it is the firſt example of a Common-wealth that is perfectly equal. For *Venice*, tho' it comes the neareſt, yet is a Common-wealth for preſervation; and ſuch a one, conſidering the paucity of Citizens taken in, and the number not taken in, is externally unequal: and tho' every Common-wealth that holds Provinces muſt in that regard be ſuch, yet not to that degree. Nevertheleſs *Venice* internally, and for her capacity, is by far the moſt equal, tho' it has not in my judgment arriv'd at the full perfection of equality; both becauſe her Laws ſupplying the defect of an Agrarian, are not ſo clear nor effectual at the Foundation, nor her Superſtructures by the virtue of her Ballot or Rotation exactly libbrated; in regard that thro' the paucity of her Citizens, her greater Magiſtracies are continually wheel'd thro' a few hands, as is confeſs'd by JANOTTI where he ſays, that if a Gentleman comes once to be *Savio di terra ferma*, it ſeldom happens that he fails from thenceforward to be adorn'd with ſome one of the greater Magiſtracies, as *Savi di mare*, *Savi di terra ferma*, *Savi Grandi*, Counſellors, thoſe of the Decemvirate or Dictatorian Council, the *Aurogatori* or Cenſors which require no vacation or interval. Wherefore if this in *Venice*, or that in *Lacedemon*, where the Kings were hereditary, and the Senators (tho' elected by the People) for life, cauſe no inequality (which is hard to be conceiv'd) in a Common-wealth for preſervation, or ſuch a one as conſiſts of a few Citizens; yet is it manifeſt, that it would cauſe a very great one in a Common-wealth for increaſe, or conſiſting of the Many, which by ingroſſing the Magiſtracies in a few hands, would be obſtructed in their Rotation.

B U T there be who ſay (and think it a ſtrong Objection) that let a Common-wealth be as equal as you can imagine, two or three Men when all is done will govern it; and there is that in it, which, notwithſtanding the pretended ſufficiency of a popular State, amounts to a plain confeſſion of the imbecillity of that Policy, and of the Prerogative of Monarchy: for as much as popular Governments in difficult caſes have had recourſe to Dictatorian Power, as in *Rome*.

T O which I anſwer, That as Truth is a ſpark to which Objections are like bellows, ſo in this reſpect our Common-wealth ſhines; for the Eminence acquir'd by ſuffrage of the People in a Common-wealth, eſpecially if it be popular and equal, can be aſcended by no other ſteps than

than the universal acknowledgement of Virtue: and where men excel in Virtue, the Common-wealth is stupid and unjust, if accordingly they do not excel in Authority. Wherefore this is both the advantage of Virtue, which has her due encouragement, and of the Common-wealth which has her due services. These are the Philosophers which PLATO would have to be Princes, the Princes which SOLOMON would have to be mounted, and their Steeds are those of Authority, not Empire; or, if they be buckl'd to the Chariot of Empire, as that of the Dictatorian Power, like the Chariot of the Sun, it is glorious for terms and vacations, or intervals. And as a Common-wealth is a Government of Laws and not of Men, so is this the Principality of Virtue, and not of Man; if that fail or set in one, it rises in another * who is created his immediate Successor. And this takes away that vanity from under the Sun, which is an Error proceeding more or less from all other Rulers under Heaven but an equal Common-wealth.

THESE things consider'd, it will be convenient in this place to speak a word to such, as go about to insinuate to the Nobility or Gentry a fear of the People, or to the People a fear of the Nobility or Gentry, as if their interests were destructive to each other; when indeed an Army may as well consist of Soldiers without Officers, or of Officers without Soldiers, as a Common-wealth (especially such a one as is capable of Greatness) of a People without a Gentry, or of a Gentry without a People. Wherefore this (tho' not always so intended, as may appear by MACHIAVEL, who else would be guilty) is a pernicious error. There is something first in the making of a Common-wealth, then in the governing of it, and last of all in the leading of its Armies; which (tho' there be great Divines, great Lawyers, great Men in all Professions) seems to be peculiar only to the Genius of a Gentleman. For so it is in the universal series of Story, that if any Man has founded a Common-wealth, he was first a Gentleman. MOSES had his Education by the Daughter of PHARAOH; THESEUS and SOLON, of noble Birth, were held by the *Athenians* worthy to be Kings; LYCURGUS was of the Royal Blood; ROMULUS and NUMA Princes; BRUTUS and PUBLICOLA *Patricians*; the GRACCHI, that lost their lives for the People of *Rome* and the restitution of that Common-wealth, were the Sons of a Father adorn'd with two Triumphs, and of CORNELIA the Daughter of SCIPIO, who being demanded in marriage by King PTOLOMY, disdain'd to become the Queen of *Egypt*. And the most renown'd OLPHAUS MEGALETOR, sole Legislator (as you will see anon) of the Common-wealth of *Oceana*, was deriv'd from a noble Family: nor will it be any occasion of scruple in this case, that LEVIATHAN affirms the Politics to be no antienter than his Book *de Cive*. Such also as have got any fame in the Civil Government of a Common-wealth, or by the leading of its Armies, have been Gentlemen; for so in all other respects were those plebeian Magistrates elected by the People of *Rome*, being of known Descents, and of equal Virtues, except only that they were excluded from the name by the Usurpation of the *Patricians*. *Holland*, thro' this defect at home, has borrow'd Princes for Generals, and Gentlemen of divers Nations for Commanders: And the *Switzers*, if they have any defect in this

* Uno avulso, non deficit alter
Aureus, & simili frondescit virga metallo.

kind,

kind, rather lend their People to the Colours of other Princes, than make that noble uſe of them at home, which ſhould aſſert the Liberty of Mankind. For where there is not a Nobility to hearten the People, they are ſlothful, regardleſs of the World, and of the public intereſt of Liberty, as even thoſe of *Rome* had been without their Gentry: wherefore let the People embrace the Gentry in peace, as the light of their Eyes; and in war, as the trophy of their Arms. And if CORNELIA diſdain'd to be Queen of *Egypt*, if a Roman Conſul look'd down from his Tribunal upon the greateſt King; let the Nobility love and cheriſh the People that afford them a Throne ſo much higher in a Common-wealth, in the acknowledgment of their Virtue, than the Crowns of Monarchs.

BUT if the equality of a Common-wealth conſiſt in the equality firſt of the Agrarian, and next of the Rotation, then the inequality of a Common-wealth muſt conſiſt in the abſence or inequality of the Agrarian, or of the Rotation, or of both. *An inequal Common-wealth.*

ISRAEL and *Lacedemon*, which Common-wealths (as the People of this, in JOSEPHUS, claims kindred of that) have great reſemblance, were each of them equal in their Agrarian, and inequal in their Rotation; eſpecially *Iſrael*, where the *Sanhedrim* or Senate, firſt elected by the People, as appears by the words of MOSES, took upon them ever after, without any precept of God, to ſubſtitute their Succeſſors by Ordination; which having been there of civil uſe, as Excommunication, Community of Goods, and other Cuſtoms of the *Eſſeans*, who were many of them converted, came afterward to be introduc'd into the Chriſtian Church. And the election of the Judge, *Suffes* or Dictator, was irregular, both for the occaſion, the term, and the vacation of that Magiſtracy; as you find in the Book of *Judges*, where it is often repeated, That in thoſe days there was no King in *Iſrael*, that is, no Judge: and in the firſt of SAMUEL, where ELY judg'd *Iſrael* forty Years, and SAMUEL all his life. In *Lacedemon* the election of the Senate being by ſuffrage of the People, tho' for life, was not altogether ſo inequal; yet the hereditary Right of Kings, were it not for the Agrarian, had ruin'd her. Deut. 1.

ATHENS and *Rome* were inequal as to their Agrarian, that of *Athens* being infirm, and this of *Rome* none at all; for if it were more antiently carry'd, it was never obſerv'd. Whence by the time of TIBERIUS GRACCHUS the Nobility had almoſt eaten the People quite out of their Lands, which they held in the occupation of Tenants and Servants: Whereupon, the remedy being too late, and too vehemently apply'd, that Common-wealth was ruin'd.

THESE alſo were inequal in their Rotation, but in a contrary manner. *Athens*, in regard that the Senate (choſen at once by lot, not by ſuffrage, and chang'd every Year, not in part, but in the whole) conſiſted not of the natural Ariſtocracy; nor ſitting long enough to underſtand, or to be perfect in their office, had no ſufficient Authority to reſtrain the People from that perpetual Turbulence in the end, which was their ruin, notwithſtanding the efforts of NICIAS, who did all a Man could do to help it. But as *Athens* by the headineſs of the People, ſo *Rome* fell by the Ambition of the Nobility, thro' the want of an equal Rotation; which, if the People had got into the Senate, and timely into the Magiſtracies (whereof the former was always uſurp'd

by the *Patricians*, and the latter for the moſt part) they had both carried and held their Agrarian, and that had render'd that Common-wealth immoveable.

BUT let a Common-wealth be equal or inequal, it muſt conſiſt, as has been ſhewn by Reaſon and all Experience, of the three general Orders; that is to ſay, of the Senate debating and propoſing, of the People reſolving, and of the Magiſtracy executing. Wherefore I can never wonder enough at LEVIATHAN, who, without any reaſon or example, will have it, that a Common-wealth conſiſts of a ſingle Perſon, or of a ſingle Aſſembly; nor can I ſufficiently pity thoſe *thouſand Gentlemen, whoſe Minds, which otherwiſe would have waver'd, he has fram'd* (as is affirm'd by himſelf) *into a conſcientious obedience* (for ſo he is pleas'd to call it) *of ſuch a Government.*

BUT to finiſh this part of the Diſcourſe, which I intend for as complete an Epitome of antient Prudence, and in that of the whole Art of Politics, as I am able to frame in ſo ſhort a time;

THE two firſt Orders, that is to ſay, the Senate and the People, are Legiſlative, whereunto anſwers that part of this Science which by Politicians is intitled * *of Laws*; and the third Order is executive, to which anſwers that part of the ſame Science which is ſtil'd † *of the Frame and Courſe of Courts or Judicatories.* A word to each of theſe will be neceſſary.

Of Laws. AND firſt for Laws, they are either Eccleſiaſtical or Civil, ſuch as concern Religion or Government.

LAWS Eccleſiaſtical, or ſuch as concern Religion, according to the univerſal courſe of antient Prudence, are in the power of the Magiſtrate; but according to the common practice of modern Prudence, ſince the Papacy, torn out of his hands.

BUT, as a Government pretending to liberty, and yet ſuppreſſing Liberty of Conſcience (which, becauſe Religion not according to a Man's Conſcience can to him be none at all, is the main) muſt be a contradiction; ſo, a Man that, pleading for the Liberty of private Conſcience, refuſes Liberty to the National Conſcience, muſt be abſurd.

A COMMON-WEALTH is nothing elſe but the National Conſcience. And if the conviction of a Man's private Conſcience produces his private Religion, the conviction of the national Conſcience muſt produce a national Religion. Whether this be well reaſon'd, as alſo whether theſe two may ſtand together, will beſt be ſhewn by the examples of the antient Common-wealths taken in their order.

IN that of *Iſrael* the Government of the National Religion appertain'd not to the Prieſts and Levites, otherwiſe than as they happen'd to be of the *Sanhedrim* or Senate, to which they had no right at all but by election. It is in this capacity therefore that the People are commanded
Deut. 17. under pain of death *to hearken to them, and to do according to the ſentence of the Law which they ſhould teach*; but in *Iſrael* the Law Eccleſiaſtical and Civil was the ſame, therefore the *Sanhedrim* having the power of one, had the power of both. But as the National Religion appertain'd to the Juriſdiction of the *Sanhedrim*, ſo the Liberty of Conſcience appertain'd, from the ſame date, and by the ſame right, to the
Deut. 18. 10. Prophets and their Diſciples; as where it is ſaid, *I will raiſe up a Pro-*

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* De Legibus. † De Judiciis.

phet

phet——and whoever will not hearken to my words which he ſhall ſpeak in my name, I will require it of him. The words relate to prophetic Right, which was above all the Orders of this Common-wealth; whence ELIJAH not only refus'd to obey the King, but deſtroy'd his Meſſengers with fire. 2 Kings 1. And whereas it was not lawful by the National Religion to ſacrifice in any other place than the Temple, a Prophet was his own Temple, and might ſacrifice where he would, as ELIJAH did in *Mount Carmel.* By this right JOHN *the Baptiſt* and our Saviour, to whom it more particularly related, had their Diſciples, and taught the People; whence is deriv'd our preſent right of GATHER'D CONGREGATIONS: wherefore the Chriſtian Religion grew up according to the Orders of the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*, and not againſt them. Nor was Liberty of Conſcience infring'd by this Government, till the Civil Liberty of the ſame was loſt, as under HEROD, PILATE, and TIBERIUS, a three-pil'd Tyranny. 1 Kings 18. 19.

TO proceed, *Athens* preſerv'd her Religion, by the teſtimony of PAUL, with great Superſtition: If ALCIBIADES, that Atheiſtical fellow, had not ſhew'd them a pair of heels, they had ſhaven off his head for ſhaving their MERCURYS, and making their Gods look ridiculouſly upon them without beards. Nevertheleſs if PAUL reaſon'd with them, they lov'd news, for which he was the more welcome; and if he converted DIONYSIUS the *Areopagit*, that is, one of the Senators, there follow'd neither any hurt to him, nor leſs of honour to DIONYSIUS. And for *Rome*, if CICERO, in his moſt excellent Book *de natura Deorum*, overthrew the National Religion of that Common-wealth, he was never the farther from being Conſul. But there is a meanneſs and poorneſs in modern Prudence, not only to the damage of Civil Government, but of Religion itſelf: for to make a man in matter of Religion, which admits not of ſenſible demonſtration *(jurare in verba Magiſtri)* engage to believe no otherwiſe than is believ'd by my Lord Biſhop, or Goodman Presbyter, is a Pedantiſm, that has made the Sword to be a Rod in the hands of School-maſters; by which means, whereas the Chriſtian Religion is the fartheſt of any from countenancing War, there never was a War of Religion but ſince Chriſtianity: For which we are beholden to the Pope; for the Pope not giving liberty of Conſcience to Princes and Common-wealths, they cannot give that to their Subjects which they have not themſelves: whence both Princes and Subjects either thro' his inſtigation, or their own diſputes (have introduc'd that execrable cuſtom, never known in the world before, of fighting for Religion, and denying the Magiſtrate to have any juriſdiction concerning it; whereas the Magiſtrates loſing the power of Religion loſes the Liberty of Conſcience, which in that caſe has nothing to protect it. But if the People be otherwiſe taught, it concerns them to look about them, and to diſtinguiſh betwen the ſhrieking of the Lapwing, and the voice of the Turtle.

TO come to Civil Laws, if they ſtand one way and the balance another, it is the caſe of a Government which of neceſſity muſt be new model'd; wherefore your Lawyer adviſing you upon the like occaſions to fit your Government to their Laws, are no more to be regarded, than your Taylor if he ſhould deſire you to fit your body to his doublet. There is alſo danger in the plauſible pretence of reforming the Law, except the Government be firſt good, in which caſe it is a good

Tree,

Tree, and (trouble not yourſelves overmuch) brings not forth evil fruit; otherwiſe, if the Tree be evil, you can never reform the fruit: or if a Root that is naught bring forth fruit of this kind that ſeems to be good, take the more heed, for it is the ranker poiſon. It was nowiſe probable, if AUGUSTUS had not made excellent Laws, that the bowels of *Rome* could have come to be ſo miſerably eaten out by the Tyranny of TIBERIUS and his Succeſſors. The beſt Rule as to your Laws in general is, that they be few. *Rome* by the teſtimony of CICERO was beſt govern'd under thoſe of the twelve Tables; and by that of TACITUS, *Plurimæ leges, corruptiſſima reſpublica.* You will be told, That where the Laws be few, they leave much to Arbitrary Power; but where they be many, they leave more: The Laws in this caſe, according to JUSTINIAN and the beſt Lawyers, being as litigious as the Suitors. SOLON made few; LYCURGUS fewer Laws: and Common-wealths have the feweſt at this day of all other Governments.

Of Courts. NOW to conclude this part with a word *de Judiciis*, or of the *Conſtitution or Courſe of Courts*; it is a Diſcourſe not otherwiſe capable of being well manag'd but by particular examples, both the Conſtitution and Courſe of Courts being divers in different Governments, but beſt beyond compare in *Venice*, where they regard not ſo much the Arbitrary Power of their Courts, as the Conſtitution of them; whereby that Arbitrary Power being altogether unable to retard or do hurt to buſineſs, produces and muſt produce the quickeſt diſpatch, and the moſt righteous dictates of Juſtice that are perhaps in human nature. The manner I ſhall not ſtand in this place to deſcribe, becauſe it is exemplify'd at large in the Judicature of the People of *Oceana*. And thus much of antient Prudence, and the firſt branch of this preliminary Diſcourſe.

The Second Part of the Preliminaries.

IN the ſecond Part I ſhall endeavour to ſhew the riſe, Progreſs, and Declination of modern Prudence.

THE date of this kind of Policy is to be computed, as was ſhewn, from thoſe Inundations of *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Huns*, and *Lombards*, that overwhelm'd the *Roman* Empire. But as there is no appearance in the Bulk or Conſtitution of modern Prudence, that it ſhould ever have been able to come up and grapple with the Antient, ſo ſomething of neceſſity muſt have interpos'd whereby this came to be enervated, and that to receive ſtrength and encouragement. And this was the execrable Reign of the *Roman* Emperors taking riſe from (that *fælix ſcelus*) the Arms of CÆSAR, in which ſtorm the Ship of the *Roman* Common-wealth was forc'd to diſburden itſelf of that precious Freight, which never ſince could emerge or raiſe its head but in the *Gulf of Venice*.

The Tranſition of Antient into Modern Prudence.

IT ſaid in Scripture, *Thy evil is of thy ſelf, O Iſrael!* To which anſwers that of the Moraliſts, * *None is hurt but by himſelf*, as alſo the whole matter of the Politics; at preſent this Example of the *Romans*, who, thro' a negligence committed in their Agrarian Laws, let in the ſink of Luxury, and forfeited the ineſtimable Treaſure of Liberty for themſelves and their Poſterity.

The Agrarian Laws of the Romans.

THEIR Agrarian Laws were ſuch, whereby their Lands ought to have been divided among the People, either without mention of a Colony, in which caſe they were not oblig'd to change their abode; or with mention and upon condition of a Colony, in which caſe they were to change their abode; and leaving the City, to plant themſelves upon the Lands ſo aſſign'd. The Lands aſſign'd, or that ought to have been aſſign'd in either of theſe ways, were of three kinds: Such as were taken from the Enemy and diſtributed to the People; or ſuch as were taken from the Enemy, and under colour of being reſerv'd to the Public uſe, were thro' ſtealth poſſeſt by the Nobility; or ſuch as were bought with the Public Money to be diſtributed. Of the Laws offer'd in theſe caſes, thoſe which divided the Lands taken from the Enemy, or purchas'd with the Public Money, never occaſion'd any diſpute; but ſuch as drove at diſpoſſeſſing the Nobility of their Uſurpations, and dividing the *common purchaſe of the Sword among the People*, were never touch'd but they caus'd Earthquakes, nor could they ever be obtain'd by the People; or being obtain'd, be obſerv'd by the Nobility, who not only preſerv'd their prey, but growing vaſtly rich upon it, bought the People by degrees quite out of thoſe Shares that had been confer'd upon them. This the GRACCHI coming too late to perceive, found the Balance of the Commonwealth to be loſt; but putting the People (when they had leaſt force) by forcible means upon the recovery of it, did ill, ſeeing it neither could nor did tend to any more than to ſhew them by worſe effects, that what the Wiſdom of their Leaders, had diſcever'd was true. For (quite contrary to what has happen'd in *Oceana*, where, *the Balance falling to the Peo-*

Sigonius de Ant. Ro.

* Nemo nocetur niſi ex ſe.

ple, they have overthrown the Nobility) that Nobility of *Rome*, under the conduct of SYLLA, overthrew the People and the Commonwealth: ſeeing SYLLA firſt introduc'd that new Balance, which was the Foundation of the ſucceeding Monarchy, in the plantation of Military Colonies, inſtituted by his diſtribution of the conquer'd Lands, not now of Enemies, but of Citizens, to forty ſeven Legions of his Soldiers; ſo that how he came to be PERPETUAL DICTATOR, or other Magiſtrates to ſucceed him in like Power, is no Miracle.

Military Colonies.

The Balance of the Roman Empire.

THESE Military Colonies (in which manner ſucceeding Emperors continu'd, as AUGUSTUS by the diſtribution of the *Veterans*, whereby he had overcome BRUTUS and CASSIUS, to plant their Soldiery) conſiſted of ſuch as I conceive were they that are call'd *Milites beneficiarii*; in regard that the Tenure of their Lands was by way of Benefices, that is for Life, and upon condition of Duty or Service in the War upon their own Charge. Theſe Benefices ALEXANDER SEVERUS granted to the Heirs of the Incumbents, but upon the ſame conditions. And ſuch was the Dominion by which the *Roman* Emperors gave their Balance. But to the Beneficiaries, as was no leſs than neceſſary for the ſafety of the Prince, a matter of eight thouſand by the Example of AUGUSTUS were added, which departed not from his ſides, but were his perpetual Guard, call'd *Pretorian Bands*; tho' theſe, according to the incurable flaw already obſerv'd in this kind of Government, became the moſt frequent Butchers of their Lords that are to be found in Story. Thus far the *Roman* Monarchy is much the ſame with that at this day in *Turky*, conſiſting of a Camp, and a Horſe-quarter; a Camp in regard of the *Spahys and Janizarys*, the perpetual Guard of the Prince, except they alſo chance to be liquoriſh after his Blood; and a Horſe-quarter in regard of the diſtribution of his whole Land to Tenants for Life, upon condition of continual Service, or as often as they ſhall be commanded at their own charge by *Timars*, being a word which they ſay ſignifies *Benefices*, that it ſhall ſave me a labour of opening the Government.

BUT the Fame of MAHOMET and his Prudence, is eſpecially founded in this, That whereas the *Roman* Monarchy, except that of *Iſrael*, was the moſt imperfect, the *Turkiſh* is the moſt perfect that ever was. Which happen'd in that the *Roman* (as the *Iſraelitiſh* of the *Sanhedrim* and the Congregation) had a mixture of the Senate and the People; and the *Turkiſh* is pure. And that this was pure, and the other mix'd, happen'd not thro' the Wiſdom of the Legiſlators, but the different Genius of the Nations; the People of the Eaſtern Parts, except the *Iſraelites*, which is to be attributed to their Agrarian, having been ſuch as ſcarce ever knew any other Condition than that of Slavery; and theſe of the Weſtern having ever had ſuch a reliſh of Liberty, as thro' what deſpair ſoever could never be brought to ſtand ſtill while the Yoke was putting on their Necks, but by being fed with ſome hopes of reſerving to themſelves ſome part of their Freedom.

Dion.

WHEREFORE JULIUS CÆSAR (ſaith * SUETONIUS) contented himſelf in naming half the Magiſtrates, to leave the reſt to the ſuffrage of the People. And MÆCENAS, tho' he would not have AUGUSTUS to give the People their Liberty, would not have him

* Comitia cum populo fortitus eſt.

take

take it quite away *. Whence this Empire being neither *Hawk* nor *Buzzard*, made a flight accordingly; and the Prince being perpetually toſt (having the Avarice of the Soldiery on this hand to ſatisfy upon the People, and the Senate and the People on the other to be defended from the Soldiery) ſeldom dy'd any other death than by one Horn of this *Dilemma*, as is noted more at large by MACHIAVEL. But P. cap. 19.
the *Pretorian Bands*, thoſe beſtial executioners of their Captain's Tyranny upon others, and of their own upon him, having continued from the time of AUGUSTUS, were by CONSANTINE the Great (incens'd againſt them for taking part with his Adverſary MAXENTIUS) remov'd from their ſtrong Garriſon which they held in *Rome*, and diſtributed into divers Provinces. The Benefices of the Soldiers that were hitherto held for Life and upon Duty, were by this Prince made hereditary: ſo that the whole Foundation whereupon this Empire was firſt built being now remov'd, ſhews plainly, that the Emperors muſt long before this have found out ſome other way of ſupport; and this was by ſtipendiating the *Goths*, a People that, deriving their Roots from the Northern parts of *Germany*, or out of *Sweden*, had (thro' their Victories obtain'd againſt DOMITIAN) long ſince ſpread their Branches to ſo near a Neighbourhood with the [illegible]*man* Territories, that they began to overſhadow them. For the Empe-rors making uſe of them in their Armies (as the *French* do at this day of the *Switz*) gave them that under the notion of a Stipend, which they receiv'd as Tribute, coming (if there were any default in the payment) ſo often to diſtrein for it, that in the time of HONORIUS they ſack'd *Rome*, and poſſeſt themſelves of *Italy*. And ſuch was the tranſition of antient into modern Prudence; or that breach which being follow'd in every part of the *Roman* Empire with Inundations of *Vandals*, *Huns*, *Lombards*, *Franks*, *Saxons*, overwhelm'd antient Languages, Learning, Prudence, Manners, Cities, changing the names of Rivers, Countries, Seas, Mountains, and Men; CAMILLUS, CÆSAR and POMPEY, being come to EDMUND, RICHARD, and GEOFFREY. Machiavel.

The Gothic Balance.

TO open the Groundwork or Balance of theſe new Politicians: *Feudum*, ſays CALVIN the Lawyer, is a *Gothic* word of divers ſignifications; for it is taken either for *War*, or for a *poſſeſſion of conquer'd Lands, diſtributed by the Victor to ſuch of his Captains and Soldiers as had merited in his Wars, upon condition to acknowledge him to be their perpetual Lord, and themſelves to be his Subjects.*

Inſtitution of Feudatory Principalities.

OF theſe there were three Kinds or Orders: The firſt of Nobility, diſtinguiſh'd by the Titles of Dukes, Marquiſſes, Earls; and theſe being gratified with the Cities, Caſtles, and Villages of the conquer'd *Italians*, their Feuds participated of Royal Dignity, and were call'd *Regalia*, by which they had right to coin Money, create Magiſtrates, take Toll, Cuſtoms, Confiſcations, and the like.

FEUDS of the ſecond Order were ſuch as, with the conſent of the King, were beſtow'd by theſe Feudatory Princes upon Men of inferior Quality, call'd their *Barons*, on condition that next to the King they ſhould defend the Dignities and Fortunes of their Lords in Arms.

* Neque id exiſtimare debes autorem me tibi eſſe, ut tyrannidem in S. P. Q. R. in ſervitutem redactum teneas: quod neque dicere meum, neque facere tuum eſt.

THE

THE loweſt Order of *Feuds* were ſuch as being confer'd by thoſe of the ſecond Order upon private men, whether Noble or not Noble, oblig'd them in the like Duty to their Superiors; theſe were call'd *Vaſors*. And this is the *Gothic* Balance, by which all the Kingdoms this day in Chriſtendom were at firſt erected; for which cauſe, if I had time, I ſhould open in this place the Empire of *Germany*, and the Kingdoms of *France*, *Spain*, and *Poland*: But ſo much as has been ſaid being ſufficient for the diſcovery of the Principles of modern Prudence in general, I ſhall divide the remainder of my Diſcourſe, which is more particular, into three parts.

THE firſt ſhewing the Conſtitution of the late Monarchy of *Oceana*.
THE ſecond, the Diſſolution of the ſame. And
THE third, the Generation of the preſent Commonwealth.

THE Conſtitution of the late Monarchy of *Oceana* is to be conſider'd in relation to the different Nations by whom it has been ſucceſſively ſubdu'd and govern'd. The firſt of theſe were the *Romans*, the ſecond the *Teutons*, the third the *Scandians*, and the fourth the *Neuſtrians*.

THE Government of the *Romans*, who held it as a Province, I ſhall omit, becauſe I am to ſpeak of their Provincial Government in another place; only it is to be remember'd here, that if we have given over running up and down naked, and with dappl'd hides, learn'd to write and read, and to be inſtructed with good Arts, for all theſe we are beholden to the *Romans*, either immediately, or mediately by the *Teutons*: for that the *Teutons* had the Arts from no other hand, is plain enough by their Language, which has yet no word to ſignify either writing or reading, but what is deriv'd from the *Latin*. Furthermore, by the help of theſe Arts ſo learn'd, we have been capable of that Religion which we have long ſince receiv'd; wherefore it ſeems to me, that we ought not to detract from the memory of the *Romans*, by whoſe means we are, as it were, of Beaſts become Men, and by whoſe means we might yet of obſcure and ignorant Men (if we thought not too well of our ſelves) become a wiſe and a great People.

For the proof of the inſuing Diſcourſe out of Records and Antiquities, ſee Selden's *Titles of Honour from* pag. 593, *to* pag. 837.

THE *Romans* having govern'd *Oceana* provincially, the *Teutons* were the firſt that introduc'd the Form of the late Monarchy. To theſe ſucceeded the *Scandians*, of whom (becauſe their Reign was ſhort, as alſo becauſe they made little alteration in the Goverment as to the Form) I ſhall take no notice. But the *Teutons*, going to work upon the *Gothic* Balance, divided the whole Nation into three ſorts of *Feuds*, that of *Ealdorman*, that of *Kings Thane*, and that of *Middle Thane*.

The Teuton Monarchy.

WHEN the Kingdom was firſt divided into Precincts will be as hard to ſhew, as when it began firſt to be govern'd; it being impoſſible that there ſhould be any Government without ſome Diviſion. The Diviſion that was in uſe with the *Teutons*, was by Counties, and every County had either its *Ealdorman*, or *High Reeve*. The title of *Ealdorman* came in time to *Eorl*, or *Erl*, and that of *High Reeve* to *High Sheriff*.

EARL

EARL of the Shire or County denoted the *Kings Thane*, or Tenant by Grand Sejeantry or Knights Service, in chief or *in capite*, his Poſſeſſions were ſometimes the whole Territory from whence he had his denomination, that is, the whole County, ſometimes more than one County, and ſometimes leſs, the remaining part being in the Crown. He had alſo ſometimes a third, or ſome other cuſtomary part of the profits of certain Cities, Boroughs, or other places within his Earldom. For an example of the poſſeſſions of Earls in antient times, ETHELRED had to him and his Heirs the whole Kingdom of *Mercia*, containing three or four Counties; and there were others that had little leſs. *Earls.*

KINGS *Thane* was alſo an honorary Title, to which he was qualify'd that had five Hides of Land held immediately of the King by ſervice of perſonal attendance; inſomuch that if a Churl or Countryman had thriven to this proportion, having a Church, a Kitchen, a Belhouſe (that is, a Hall with a Bell in it to call his Family to dinner) a Borough-gate with a ſeat (that is a Porch) of his own, and any diſtinct Office in the King's Court, then was he the *Kings Thane*. But the proportion of a Hide Land, otherwiſe call'd *Caruca*, or a Plow Land, is difficult to be underſtood, becauſe it was not certain; nevertheleſs it is generally conceiv'd to be ſo many Acres may be manag'd with one Plow, and would yeild the maintenance of the ſame, with the appurtenances in all kinds. *Kings Thane.*

THE *Middle Thane* was feudal, but not honorary; he was alſo call'd a *Vavaſor*, and his Lands a *Vavaſory*, which held of ſome Meſn Lord, and not immediately of the King. *Middle Thane.*

POSSESSIONS and their Tenures, being of this nature, ſhew the Balance of the *Teuton* Monarchy; wherein the Riches of Earls were ſo vaſt, that to ariſe from the Balance of their Dominion to their Power, they were not only call'd *Reguli* or little Kings, but were ſuch indeed; their Juriſdiction being of two ſorts, either that which was exercis'd by them in the Court of their Counties, or in the High Court of the Kingdom.

IN the Territory denominating an Earl, if it were all his own, the Courts held, and the Profits of that Juriſdiction were to his own uſe and benefit. But if he had but ſome part of his County, then his Juriſdiction and Courts (ſaving perhaps in thoſe poſſeſſions that were his own) were held by him to the King's uſe and benefit; that is, he commonly ſupply'd the Office which the Sheriffs regularly executed in Counties that had no Earls, and whence they came to be call'd *Viſcounts*. The Court of the County that had an Earl was held by the Earl and the Biſhop of the Dioceſs, after the manner of the Sheriffs Turns to this day; by which means both the Eccleſiaſtical and Temporal Laws were given in charge together to the Country. The Cauſes of *Vavaſors* or *Vavaſorys* appertain'd to the cognizance of this Court, where Wills were prov'd, Judgment and Execution given, Caſes criminal and civil determin'd. *Shiremot.* *Viſcounts.*

THE *Kings Thanes* had the like Juriſdiction in their *Thane Lands*, as Lords in their Manors, where they alſo kept Courts. *Halymot.*

BESIDES theſe in particular, both the Earls and *Kings Thanes*, together with the Biſhops, Abbats, and *Vavaſors*, or *Middle Thanes*, had in the High Court or Parliament of the Kingdom, a more public Juriſdiction, conſiſting Firſt of deliberative Power for adviſing upon, *Weidenagemoots.*

and assenting to new Laws: Secondly, of giving council in matters of State: and Thirdly, of Judicature upon Suits and Complaints. I shall not omit to enlighten the obscurity of these times (in whichth ere is little to be found of a methodical Constitution of this High Court) by the addition of an Argument, which I conceive to bear a strong testimony to it self, tho' taken out of a late Writing that conceals the Author. "It is well known, says he, that in every quarter of the Realm "a great many Boroughs do yet send Burgesses to the Parliament, "which nevertheless be so antiently and so long since decay'd and gone "to nought, that they cannot be shew'd to have been of any Reputa- "tion since the Conquest, much less to have obtain'd any such Privi- "lege by the grant of any succeeding King: wherefore these must have "had this right by more antient usage, and before the Conquest, they "being unable now to shew whence they deriv'd it.

THIS Argument (tho' there be more) I shall pitch upon as sufficient to prove; First, that the lower sort of the People had right to Session in Parliament during the time of the *Teutons*. Secondly, that they were qualify'd to the same by election in their Boroughs, and, if Knights of the Shire (as no doubt they are) be as antient in the Countries. Thirdly, If it be a good Argument to say, that the Commons during the reign of the *Teutons* were elected into Parliament, because they are so now, and no man can shew when this custom began; I see not which way it should be an ill one to say, that the Commons during the reign of the *Teutons* constituted also a distinct House, because they do so now; unless any man can shew that they did ever sit in the same House with the Lords. Wherefore to conclude this part, I conceive for these, and other reasons to be mention'd hereafter, that the Parliament of the *Teutons* consisted of the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons of the Nation, notwithstanding the stile of divers acts of Parliament, which runs as that of *Magna Charta* in the King's name only, seeing the same was nevertheless enacted by the King, Peers, and Commons of the Land, as is testify'd in those words by a subsequent Act.

25 Edw. 3. c. 1.

Monarchy of the Neustrians.

THE Monarchy of the *Teutons* had stood in this posture about two hundred and twenty years; when TURBO Duke of *Neustria* making his claim to the Crown of one of their Kings that dy'd childless, follow'd it with successful Arms; and being possest of the Kingdom, us'd it as conquer'd, distributing the Earldoms, Thane Lands, Bishopricks and Prelacies of the whole Realm among his *Neustrians*. From this time the Earl came to be call'd *Comes*, *Consul*, and *Dux* (tho' *Consul* and *Dux* grew afterward out of use) the *Kings Thanes* came to be call'd *Barons*, and their Lands Baronies; the *Middle Thane* holding still of a mean Lord, retain'd the name of *Vavasor*.

Their Earls.

THE *Earl* or *Comes* continu'd to have the third part of the Pleas of the County paid to him by the Sheriff or *Vice-comes*, now a distinct Officer in every County depending upon the King; saving that such Earls as had their Counties to their own use, were now *Counts Palatine*, and had under the King Regal Jurisdiction: insomuch that they constituted their own Sheriffs, granted Pardons, and issu'd Writs in their own names; nor did the King's Writ of ordinary Justice run in their Dominions till a late Statute, whereby much of this privilege was taken away.

27. H. 8.

FOR

FOR *Barons*, they came from henceforth to be in different times of three kinds; Barons by their Eſtates and Tenures, Barons by Writ, and Barons created by Letters Patents. From TURBO the firſt to ADOXUS the ſeventh King from the Conqueſt, Barons had their denomination from their Poſſeſſions and Tenures. And theſe were either Spiritual or Temporal; for not only the Thane Lands, but the poſſeſſions of Biſhops, as alſo of ſome twenty ſix Abbats, and two Priors, were now erected into Baronies, whence the Lords Spiritual that had ſuffrage in the *Teuton* Parliament as Spiritual Lords, came to have it in the *Neuſtrian* Parliament as Barons, and were made ſubject (which they had not formerly been) to Knights ſervice in chief. *Baronny* coming henceforth to ſignify all honorary poſſeſſions as well of Earls as Barons, and Baronage to denote all kinds of Lords as well Spiritual as Temporal having right to ſit in Parliament, the Baronies in this ſenſe were ſometimes more, and ſometimes fewer, but commonly about 200 or 250, containing in them a matter of ſixty thouſand *feuda militum*, or Knights Fees, whereof ſome twenty eight thouſand were in the Clergy. It is ill luck that no man can tell what the Land of a Knights Fee (reckon'd in ſome Writs at 40 *l.* a year, and in others at 10 *l.*) was certainly worth; for by ſuch a help we might have exactly demonſtrated the Balance of this Government. But ſays COOK, it contain'd twelve Plow Lands, and that was thought to be the moſt certain account. But this again is extremely uncertain; for one Plow out of ſome Land that was fruitful, might work more than ten out of ſome other that was barren. Nevertheleſs, ſeeing it appears by BRACTON, that of Earldoms and Baronies it was wont to be ſaid, that the whole Kingdom was compos'd; as alſo, that theſe conſiſting of 60000 Knights Fees, furniſh'd 60000 men for the King's ſervice, being the whole Militia of this Monarchy, it cannot be imagin'd, that the *Vavaſorys* or Freeholds in the People amounted to any conſiderable proportion. Wherefore the Balance and Foundation of this Government was in the 60000 Knights Fees, and theſe being poſſeſt by the 250 Lords, it was a Government of the Few, or of the Nobility; wherein the People might alſo aſſemble, but could have no more than a mere name. And the Clergy holding a third to the whole Nation, as is plain by the Parliament Roll; it is an abſurdity (ſeeing the Clergy of *France* came firſt thro' their Riches to be a State of that Kingdom) to acknowledge the People that have been a State of this Realm, and not to allow it to the Clergy, who were ſo much more weighty in the Balance, which is that of all other whence a State or Order in a Government is denominated. Wherefore this Monarchy conſiſted of the King, and of the three (*ordines Regni*, or) Eſtates, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons: It conſiſted of theſe I ſay as to the balance, tho' during the Reign of ſome of theſe Kings, not as to the adminiſtration.

Their Barons.

Barons by their Poſſeſſions.

Cook 11 Inſt. pag. 596.

Balance of the Neuſtrian Monarchy.

4 Rich. 2. Numb. 13.

FOR the ambition of TURBO, and ſome of thoſe that more immediately ſucceeded him, to be abſolute Princes, ſtrove againſt the nature of their Foundation, and, inaſmuch as he had divided almoſt the whole Realm among his *Neuſtrians*, with ſome encouragement for a while. But the *Neuſtrians* while they were but foreign Plants, having no ſecurity againſt the Natives, but in growing up by their Princes ſides, were no ſooner well rooted in their vaſt Dominions, than they came up according to the infallible conſequence of the Balance domeſtic,

Adminiſtration of the Neuſtrian Monarchy during the reign of the firſt Kings.

and,

and, contracting the National intereſt of the Baronage, grew as fierce in the vindication of the antient Rights and Liberties of the ſame, as if they had been always Natives: Whence, the Kings being as obſtinate on the one ſide for their abſolute Power, as theſe on the other for their Immunities, grew certain Wars which took their denomination from the Barons.

THIS fire about the middle of the Reign of ADOXUS began to break out. And whereas the Predeceſſors of this King had divers times been forc'd to ſummon Councils reſembling thoſe of the *Teutons*, to which the Lords only that were Barons by Dominion and Tenure had hitherto repair'd, ADOXUS ſeeing the effects of ſuch Dominion, began firſt not to call ſuch as were Barons by Writ (for that was according to the practice of antient times) but to call ſuch by Writs as were otherwiſe no Barons; by which means ſtriving to avoid the conſequence of the Balance, in coming unwillingly to ſet the Government ſtreight, he was the firſt that ſet it awry. For the Barons in his Reign, and his Succeſſors, having vindicated their antient Authority, reſtor'd the Parliament with all the Rights and Privileges of the ſame, ſaving that from thenceforth the Kings had found out a way whereby to help themſelves againſt the mighty, by Creatures of their own, and ſuch as had no other ſupport but by their favour. By which means this Government, being indeed the Maſter-piece of modern Prudence, has been cry'd up to the Skys, as the only invention whereby at once to maintain the Sovereignty of a Prince, and the Liberty of the People. Whereas indeed it has been no other than a wreſtling match, wherein the Nobility, as they have been ſtronger, have thrown the King; or the King, if he has been ſtronger, has thrown the Nobility; or the King, where he has had a Nobility, and could bring them to his party, has thrown the People, as in *France* and *Spain*; or the People where they have had no Nobility, or could get them to be of their party, have thrown the King, as in *Holland*, and of later times in *Oceana*. But they came not to this ſtrength but by ſuch approaches and degrees, as remain to be further open'd. For whereas the Barons by Writ (as the ſixty four Abbats, and thirty ſix Priors that were ſo call'd) were but *pro tempore*, DICOTOME being the twelfth King from the Conqueſt, began to make Barons by Letters Patents, with the addition of honorary Penſions for the maintainance of their Dignities to them and their Heirs; ſo that they were hands in the King's Purſe, and had no ſhoulders for his Throne. Of theſe when the Houſe of Peers came once to be full, as will be ſeen hereafter, there was nothing more empty. But for the preſent, the Throne having other ſupports, they did not hurt that ſo much as they did the King: For the old Barons taking DICTOME's Prodigality to ſuch Creatures ſo ill, that they depos'd him, got the trick of it, and never gave over ſetting up and pulling down their Kings according to their various intereſts, and that faction of the *White* and *Red*, into which they had been thenceforth divided, till PANURGUS the eighteenth King from the Conqueſt, was more by their Favour than his Right advanc'd to the Crown. This King thro' his natural ſubtility reflecting at once upon the greatneſs of their Power, and the inconſtancy of their favour, began to find another Flaw in this kind of Government, which is alſo noted by MACHIAVEL, namely that a Throne ſupported by a Nobility, is not ſo hard to be aſcended, as kept warm. Wherefore his ſecret Jealouſy, leſt the diſſenſion of the Nobility, as it brought

Barons by Writ.

49 H 3.

Barons by Letters Patents.

Diſſolution of the late Monarchy of Oceana.

brought him in, might throw him out, made him travel in ways undiſcover'd by them, to ends as little foreſeen by himſelf: while to eſtabliſh his own ſafety, he by mixing water with their Wine, firſt began to open thoſe Sluces that have ſince overwhelm'd not the King only, but the Throne. For whereas a Nobility ſtrikes not at the Throne without which they cannot ſubſiſt, but at ſome King that they do not like; popular Power ſtrikes thro' the King at the Throne, as that which is incompatible with it. Now that PANURGUS in abateing the Power of the Nobility, was the cauſe whence it came to fall into the hands of the People, appears by thoſe ſeveral Statutes that were made in his Reign, as that for *Population*, thoſe againſt *Retainers*, and that for *Alienations*.

BY the Statute of Population, all houſes of Husbandry that were us'd with twenty Acres of Ground and upwards, were to be maintain'd, and kept up for ever with a competent proportion of Land laid to them, and in no wiſe, as appears by a ſubſequent Statute, to be ſever'd. By which means the houſes being kept up, did of neceſſity inforce Dwellers; and the proportion of Land to be till'd being kept up, did of neceſſity inforce the Dweller not to be a Begger or Cottager, but a Man of ſome ſubſtance, that might keep Hinds and Servants, and ſet the Plow a going. This did mightly concern (ſays the Hiſtorian of that Prince) the might and manhood of the Kingdom, and in effect amortize a great part of the Lands to the hold and poſſeſſion of the Yeomanry or middle People, who living not in a ſervile or indigent faſhion, were much unlink'd from dependance upon their Lords, and living in a free and plentiful manner, became a more excellent Infantry; but ſuch a one upon which the Lords had ſo little Power, that from henceforth they may be computed to have been diſarm'd.

AND as they loſt their Infantry after this manner, ſo their Cavalry and Commanders were cut off by the Statute of Retainers; for whereas it was the cuſtom of the Nobility to have younger Brothers of good houſes, metal'd fellows, and ſuch as were knowing in the feats of Arms about them; they who were longer follow'd with ſo dangerous a train, eſcap'd not ſuch Puniſhments, as made them take up.

HENCEFORTH the Country-lives, and great Tables of the Nobility, which no longer nouriſh'd veins that would bleed for them, were fruitleſs and loathſome till they chang'd the Air, and of Princes became Courtiers; where their Revenues, never to have been exhauſted by Beef and Mutton, were found narrow, whence follow'd racking of Rents, and at length ſale of Lands: the riddance thro' the Statute of Alienations being render'd far more quick and facil than formerly it had been thro' the new invention of Intails.

TO this it happen'd, that CORAUNUS the Succeſſor of that King diſſolving the Abbies, brought with the declining ſtate of the Nobility ſo vaſt a prey to the Induſtry of the People, that the Balance of the Common-wealth was too apparently in the popular Party, to be unſeen by the wiſe Council of Queen PARTHENIA, who converting her reign thro' the perpetual Love-tricks that paſt between her and her People into a kind of Romance, wholly neglected the Nobility. And by theſe degrees came the Houſe of Commons to raiſe that head, which ſince has been ſo high and formidable to their Princes, that they have look'd pale upon thoſe Aſſemblies. Nor was there any thing now wanting to the deſtruction of the Throne, but that the

People, not apt to ſee their own ſtrength, ſhould be put to feel it; when a Prince, as ſtiff in diſputes as the nerve of Monarchy was grown ſlack, receiv'd that unhappy encouragement from his Clergy which became his utter ruin, while truſting more to their Logic than the rough Philoſophy of his Parliament, it came to an irreparable breach; for the Houſe of Peers, which alone had ſtood in this gap, now ſinking down between the King and the Commons, ſhew'd that CRASSUS was dead, and the *Iſthmus* broken. But a Monarchy deveſted of its Nobility, has no refuge under Heaven but an Army. Wherefore the diſſolution of this Government caus'd the War, not the War the diſſolution of this Government.

OF the King's ſucceſs with his Arms it is not neceſſary to give any further account, than that they prov'd as ineffectual as his Nobility; but without a Nobility or an Army (as has been ſhew'd) there can be no Monarchy. Wherefore what is there in nature that can ariſe out of theſe Aſhes, but a popular Government, or a new Monarchy to be erected by the victorious Army?

TO erect a Monarchy, be it never ſo new, unleſs like LEVIATHAN you can hang it, as the Country-fellow ſpeaks, by Geometry (for what elſe is it to ſay, that every other Man muſt give up his will to the will of this one Man without any other foundation?) it muſt ſtand upon old Principles, that is, upon a Nobility or an Army planted on a due balance of Dominion. *Aut viam inveniam aut faciam*, was an Adage of CÆSAR; and there is no ſtanding for a Monarchy unleſs it finds this Balance, or makes it. If it finds it, the work's done to its hand: for, where there is inequality of Eſtates, there muſt be inequality of Power; and where there is inequality of Power, there can be no Common-wealth. To make it, the Sword muſt extirpate out of Dominion all other roots of Power, and plant an Army upon that ground. An Army may be planted Nationally or Provincially. To plant it Nationally, it muſt be in one of the four ways mention'd, that is, either Monarchically in part, as the *Roman Beneficiarii*; or Monarchically in the whole, as the *Turkiſh Timariots*; Ariſtocratically, that is, by Earls and Barons, as the *Neuſtrians* were planted by TURBO; or Democratically, that is, by equal lots, as the Iſraelitiſh Army in the Land of *Canaan* by JOSHUA. In every one of theſe ways there muſt not only be Confiſcations, but Confiſcations to ſuch a proportion as may anſwer to the work intended.

CONFISCATION of a People that never fought againſt you, but whoſe Arms you have born, and in which you have been victorious, and this upon premeditation, and in cold blood, I ſhould have thought to be againſt any example in human Nature, but for thoſe alledg'd by MACHIAVEL of AGATHOCLES, and OLIVERETTO *di Fermo:* the former whereof being Captain General of the *Syracuſans*, upon a day aſſembl'd the Senate and the People, as if he had ſomething to communicate with them, when at a ſign given he cut the Senators in pieces to a man, and all the richeſt of the People, by which means he came to be King. The proceedings of OLIVERETTO in making himſelf Prince of *Fermo*, were ſomewhat different in circumſtances, but of the ſame nature. Nevertheleſs CATILIN, who had a ſpirit equal to any of theſe in his intended miſchief, could never bring the like to paſs in *Rome*. The head of a ſmall Common-wealth, ſuch a one as was that of *Syracuſa* or *Fermo*, is eaſily brought to the block;

block; but that a populous Nation, ſuch as *Rome*, had not ſuch a one, was the grief of NERO. If SYLLA or CÆSAR attain'd to be Princes, it was by Civil War, and ſuch Civil War as yielded rich ſpoils, there being a vaſt Nobility to be confiſcated; which alſo was the caſe in *Oceana*, when it yielded earth by Earldoms and Baronies to the *Neuſtrian*, for the plantation of his new Potentates. Where a Conqueror finds the Riches of a Land in the hands of the Few, the Forfeitures are eaſy, and amount to vaſt advantage; but where the People have equal ſhares, the Confiſcation of many comes to little, and is not only dangerous, but fruitleſs.

THE *Romans* in one of their defeats of the *Volſci* found among the Captives certain *Tuſculans*, who, upon examination, confeſt that the Arms they bore were by command of their State; whereupon information being given to the Senate by the General CAMILLUS, he was forthwith commanded to march againſt *Tuſculum*; which doing accordingly, he found the *Tuſculan* Fields full of Husbandmen, that ſtir'd not otherwiſe from the Plow, than to furniſh his Army with all kind of Accomodations and Victuals: drawing near to the City, he ſaw the Gates wide open, the Magiſtrates coming out in their Gowns to ſalute and bid him welcome: entring, the Shops were all at work, and open; the Streets ſounded with the noiſe of School-boys at their Books; there was no face of War. Whereupon CAMILLUS cauſing the Senate to aſſemble, told them, That tho' the Art was underſtood, yet had they at length found out the true Arms whereby the *Romans* were moſt undoubtedly to be conquer'd, for which cauſe he would not anticipate the Senate, to which he deſir'd them forthwith to ſend, which they did accordingly: and their Dictator with the reſt of their Embaſſadors being found by the *Roman* Senators as they went into the houſe ſtanding ſadly at the door, were ſent for in as Friends, and not as Enemies: Where the Dictator having ſaid, If we have offended, the fault was not ſo great as is our Penitence and your Virtue; the Senate gave them peace forthwith, and ſoon after made the *Tuſculans* Citizens of *Rome*.

BUT putting the caſe, of which the World is not able to ſhew an example, That the forfeiture of a populous Nation, not conquer'd, but Friends, and in cool blood, might be taken; your Army muſt be planted in one of the ways mention'd. To plant it in the way of abſolute Monarchy, that is upon feuds for life, ſuch as the *Timars*, a Country as large and fruitful as that of *Greece*, would afford you but ſixteen thouſand *Timariots*, for that is the moſt the *Turk* (being the beſt husband that ever was of this kind) makes of it at this day: and if *Oceana*, which is leſs in fruitfulneſs by one half, and in extent by three parts, ſhould have no greater a force, whoever breaks her in one battle, may be ſure ſhe ſhall never riſe; for ſuch (as was noted by MACHIAVEL) is the nature of the *Turkiſh* Monarchy, if you break it in two battles, you have deſtroy'd its whole Militia; and the reſt being all ſlaves, you hold it without any further reſiſtance. Wherefore the erection of an abſolute Monarchy in *Oceana*, or in any other Country that is no larger, without making it a certain prey to the firſt Invader, is altogether impoſſible.

TO plant by halves, as the *Roman* Emperors did their Beneficiaries, or military Colonies, it muſt be either for life; and this an Army of *Oceaners* in their own Country (eſpecially having Eſtates of Inheritance)

tance) will never bear; becauſe ſuch an Army ſo planted is as well confiſcated as the People; nor had the *Mamalucs* been contented with ſuch uſage in *Egypt*, but that they were Foreigners, and daring not to mix with the Natives, it was of abſolute neceſſity to their being.

OR planting them upon Inheritance, whether Ariſtocratically as the *Neuſtrians*, or Democratically as the *Iſraelites*, they grow up by certain conſequence into the national Intereſt: and this, if they be planted popularly, comes to a Common-wealth; if by way of Nobility, to a mix'd Monarchy, which of all other will be found to be the only kind of Monarchy, whereof this Nation, or any other that is of no greater extent, has been or can be capable: for if the *Iſraelites* (tho' their Democratical Balance, being fix'd by their Agrarian, ſtood firm) be yet found to have elected Kings, it was becauſe, their Territory lying open, they were perpetually invaded, and being perpetually invaded, turn'd themſelves to any thing, which thro' the want of experience they thought might be a remedy; whence their miſtake in election of their Kings (under whom they gain'd nothing, but on the contrary loſt all they had acquir'd by their Common-wealth, both Eſtates and Liberties) is not only apparent, but without parallel. And if there have been (as was ſhewn) a Kingdom of the *Goths* in *Spain*, and of the *Vandals* in *Aſia*, conſiſting of a ſingle Perſon and a Parliament (taking a Parliament to be a Council of the People only, without a Nobility) it is expreſly ſaid of thoſe Councils, that they depos'd their Kings as often as they pleas'd: Nor can there be any other conſequence of ſuch a Government, ſeeing where there is a Council of the People, they do never receive Laws, but give them: and a Council giving Laws to a ſingle Perſon, he has no means in the World whereby to be any more than a ſubordinate Magiſtrate, but force: in which caſe he is not a ſingle Perſon, and a Parliament, but a ſingle Perſon and an Army, which Army again muſt be planted as has been ſhewn, or can be of no long continuance.

IT is true, that the Provincial Balance being in nature quite contrary to the National, you are no way to plant a Provincial Army upon Dominion. But then you muſt have a native Territory in Strength, Situation, or Government, able to over-balance the foreign, or you can never hold it. That an Army ſhould in any other caſe be long ſupported by a mere Tax, is a mere phanſy as void of all reaſon and experience, as if a Man ſhould think to maintain ſuch a one by robbing of Orchards: for *a mere Tax is but pulling of Plumtrees, the roots whereof are in other Men's grounds*, who ſuffering perpetual Violence, come to hate the Author of it: And it is a Maxim, that *no Prince that is hated by his People can be ſafe.* Arms planted upon Dominion extirpate Enemies, and make Friends; but maintain'd by a mere Tax, have Enemies that have roots, and Friends that have none.

TO conclude, *Oceana*, or any other Nation of no greater extent, muſt have a competent Nobility, or is altogether incapable of Monarchy: for where there is equality of Eſtates, there muſt be equality of Power; and where there is equality of Power, there can be no Monarchy.

The generation of the Common-wealth.

TO come then to the generation of the Common-wealth; it has been ſhewn how thro' the ways and means us'd by PANURGUS to abaſe the Nobility, and ſo to mend that flaw which we have aſſerted to be incurable in this kind of Conſtitution, he ſuffer'd the Balance to fall into

into the power of the People, and ſo broke the Government: but the Balance being in the People, the Common-wealth (tho' they do not ſee it) is already in the nature of * them. There wants nothing elſe but Time (which is ſlow and dangerous) or Art (which would be more quick and ſecure) for the bringing thoſe native Arms (wherewithal they are found already) to reſiſt they know not how every thing that oppoſes them, to ſuch maturity as may fix them upon their own ſtrength and bottom.

BUT whereas this Art is Prudence; and that part of Prudence which regards the preſent Work, is nothing elſe but the skill of raiſing ſuch Superſtructures of Government, as are natural to the known Foundations: they never mind the Foundation, but thro' certain animoſities (wherewith by ſtriving one againſt another they are infected) or thro' freaks, by which, not regarding the courſe of things, nor how they conduce to their purpoſe, they are given to building in the Air, come to be divided and ſubdivided into endleſs Parties and Factions, both Civil and Eccleſiaſtical: which briefly to open, I ſhall firſt ſpeak of the People in general, and then of their Diviſions. *What Prudence is.*

A PEOPLE (ſays MACHIAVEL) that is corrupt, is not capable of a Common-wealth. But in ſhewing what a corrupt People is, he has either involv'd himſelf or me; nor can I otherwiſe come out of the Labyrinth, than by ſaying, that the Balance altering a People, as to the foregoing Government, muſt of neceſſity be corrupt: but Corruption in this ſenſe ſignifies no more than that the Corruption of one Government (as in natural Bodies) is the Generation of another. Wherefore if the Balance alters from Monarchy, the Corruption of the People in this caſe is that which makes them capable of a Common-wealth. But whereas I am not Ignorant, that the Corruption which he means is in Manners, this alſo is from the Balance. For the Balance leading from Monarchical into Popular, abates the Luxury of the Nobility, and, inriching the People, brings the Government from a more private to a more public Intereſt; which coming nearer, as has been ſhewn, to Juſtice and right Reaſon, the People upon a like alteration is ſo far from ſuch a Corruption of Manners, as ſhould render them incapable of a Common-wealth, that of neceſſity they muſt thereby contract ſuch a Reformation of Manners as will bear no other kind of Government. On the other ſide, where the Balance changes from Popular to Oligarchical or Monarchical, the public Intereſt, with the Reaſon and Juſtice included in the ſame, becomes more private; Luxury is introduc'd in the room of Temperance, and Servitude in that of Freedom; which cauſes ſuch a corruption of Manners both in the Nobility and People, as, by the Example of *Rome* in the time of the *Triumvirs*, is more at large diſcover'd by the Author to have been altogether incapable of a Common-wealth.

BUT the Balance of *Oceana* changing quite contrary to that of *Rome*, the Manners of the People were not thereby corrupted, but on the contrary adapted to a Common-wealth. For differences of Opinion in a People not rightly inform'd of their Balance, or a diviſion into Parties (while there is not any common Ligament of Power ſuffi-

* Cornua nota prius vitulo, quàm frontibus extant.

cient to reconcile or hold them) is no ſufficient proof of Corruption. Nevertheleſs, ſeeing this muſt needs be matter of ſcandal and danger, it will not be amiſs, in ſhewing what were the Parties, to ſhew what were their Errors.

THE Parties into which this Nation was divided, were Temporal, or Spiritual: and the Temporal Parties were eſpecially two, the one *Royaliſts*, the other *Republicans*: each of which aſſerted their different Cauſes, either out of Prudence or Ignorance, out of Intereſt or Conſcience.

The Royaliſt.

FOR Prudence, either that of the Antients is inferior to the Modern (which we have hitherto been ſetting face to face, that any one may judge) or that of the Royaliſt muſt be inferior to that of the Common-wealthſman. And for Intereſt, taking the Common-wealthſman to have really intended the Public (for otherwiſe he is a Hypocrite and the worſt of Men) that of the Royaliſt muſt of neceſſity have been more private. Wherefore the whole diſpute will come upon matter of Conſcience; and this, whether it be urg'd by the Right of Kings, the Obligation of former Laws, or of the Oath of Allegiance, is abſolv'd by the Balance.

FOR if the Right of Kings were as immediately deriv'd from the Breath of God as the life of Man, yet this excludes not Death and Diſſolution. But, that the diſſolution of the late Monarchy was as natural as the Death of a Man, has been already ſhewn. Wherefore it remains with the Royaliſts to diſcover by what Reaſon or Experience it is poſſible for a Monarchy to ſtand upon a popular Balance; or, the Balance being popular, as well the Oath of Allegiance, as all other Monarchical Laws imply an impoſſibility, and are therefore void.

The Common-wealthſman.

TO the Common-wealthſman I have no more to ſay, but that if he excludes any Party, he is not truly ſuch; nor ſhall ever found a Common-wealth upon the natural Principle of the ſame, which is Juſtice. And the Royaliſt for having oppos'd a Common-wealth in *Oceana* (where the Laws were ſo ambiguous that they might be eternally diſputed, and never reconcil'd) can neither be juſtly for that cauſe excluded from his full and equal ſhare in the Government; nor prudently, for this reaſon, that a Common-wealth conſiſting of a Party will be in perpetual labour of her own deſtruction: Whence it was that the *Romans* having conquer'd the *Albans*, incorporated them with equal Right into the Common-wealth. And if the Royaliſts be *fleſh of your fleſh*, and nearer of Blood than were the *Albans* to the *Romans*, you being alſo both Chriſtians, the Argument's the ſtronger. Nevertheleſs there is no reaſon that a Common-wealth ſhould any more favour a Party remaining in fix'd oppoſition againſt it, than BRUTUS did his own Sons. But if it fixes them upon that oppoſition, it is its own fault, not theirs; and this is done by excluding them. Men that have equal Poſſeſſions, and the ſame ſecurity for their Eſtates and their Liberties that you have, have the ſame cauſe with you to defend both: But if you will be trampling, they fight for Liberty, tho' for Monarchy; and you for Tyranny, tho' under the name of a Common-wealth: The nature of Orders in a Government rightly inſtituted being void of all jealouſy, becauſe, let the Parties which it imbraces be what they will, its Orders are ſuch as they neither would reſiſt if they could,

could, nor could if they would, as has been partly already ſhewn; and will appear more at large by the following Model.

THE Parties that are Spiritual are of more kinds than I need mention; ſome for a National Religion, and others for Liberty of Conſcience, with ſuch animoſity on both ſides, as if theſe two could not conſiſt together, and of which I have already ſufficiently ſpoken, to ſhew, that indeed the one cannot well ſubſiſt without the other. But they of all the reſt are the moſt dangerous, who, holding that the Saints muſt govern, go about to reduce the Common-wealth to a Party, as well for the Reaſons already ſhewn, as that their Pretences are againſt Scripture, where the Saints are commanded to ſubmit to the Higher Powers, and to be ſubject to the Ordinance of Man. And that Men, pretending under the notion of Saints or Religion to Civil Power, have hitherto never fail'd to diſhonour that Profeſſion, the World is full of Examples, whereof I ſhall confine my ſelf at preſent only to a couple, the one of Old, the other of New *Rome*. *Religious Parties.*

IN Old *Rome* the Patricians or Nobility pretending to be the godly Party, were queſtion'd by the People for ingroſſing all the Magiſtracies of that Common-wealth, and had nothing to ſay why they did ſo, but * that Magiſtracy requir'd a kind of Holineſs which was not in the People: † at which the People were fill'd with ſuch Indignation as had come to cutting of Throats, if the Nobility had not immediately laid by the Inſolency of that Plea; which nevertheleſs when they had done, the People for a long time after continu'd to elect no other but Patrician Magiſtrates. *Saints.*

THE Example of New *Rome* in the riſe and practice of the Hierarchy (too well known to require any further illuſtration) is far more immodeſt.

THIS has been the courſe of Nature: And when it has pleas'd, or ſhall pleaſe God to introduce any thing that is above the courſe of Nature, he will, as he has always done, confirm it by Miracle; for ſo in his Prophecy of the Reign of CHRIST upon Earth, he expreſly promiſes: ſeeing that *the Souls of them that were beheaded for* JESUS, *ſhall be ſeen to live and reign with him*; which will be an object of Senſe, the rather, becauſe the reſt of the Dead are not to live again till the thouſand Years be finiſh'd. And it is not lawful for Men to perſuade us that a thing already is, tho' there be no ſuch object of our Senſe, which God has told us ſhall not be till it be an object of our Senſe.

THE Saintſhip of a People as to Government, conſiſts in the election of Magiſtrates fearing God, and hating Covetouſneſs, and not in their confining themſelves, or being confin'd to Men of this or that Party or Profeſſion. It conſiſts in making the moſt prudent and religious choice they can; yet not in truſting to Men, but, next God, to their own Orders. *Give us good Men, and they will make us good Laws*, is the Maxim of a Demagog, and is (thro' the alteration which is commonly perceivable in Men, when they have power to work their own Wills) exceeding fallible. But *give us good Orders, and they*

* Quod nemo plebeius auſpicia haberet. † Plebs ad id maxima indignatione exarſit, quod auſpicari, tanquam inviſi Diis immortalibus, negarentur poſſe. *T. Liv.* 4. 8.

will

will make us good Men, is the Maxim of a Legiſlator, and the moſt infallible in the Politicks.

BUT theſe Diviſions (however there be ſome good Men that look ſadly on them) are trivial things; firſt as to the Civil concern, becauſe the Government, whereof this Nation is capable, being once ſeen, takes in all Intereſts. And, ſecondly, as to the Spiritual; becauſe as the pretence of Religion has always been turbulent in broken Governments, ſo where the Government has been ſound and ſteady, Religion has never ſhew'd itſelf with any other face than that of the natural Sweetneſs, and Tranquillity: Nor is there any reaſon why it ſhould; wherefore the Errors of the People are occaſion'd by their Governors. If they be doubtful of the way, or wander from it, it is becauſe their Guides miſlead them; and the Guides of the People are never ſo well qualified for leading by any Virtue of their own, as by that of the Government.

The Errors of the People are from their Governors.

THE Government of *Oceana*, (as it ſtood at the time whereof we diſcourſe, conſiſting of one ſingle Council of the People, excluſively of the King and the Lords) was call'd a Parliament: Nevertheleſs the Parliaments of the *Teutons* and of the *Neuſtrians* conſiſted, as has been ſhewn, of the King, Lords and Commons; wherefore this under an old Name was a new thing: A Parliament conſiſting of a ſingle Aſſembly elected by the People, and inveſted with the whole Power of the Government, without any Covenants, Conditions, or Orders whatſoever. So new a thing, that neither antient nor modern Prudence can ſhew any avow'd Example of the like. And there is ſcarce any thing that ſeems to me ſo ſtrange as that (whereas there was nothing more familiar with theſe Counſellors, than to bring the Scripture to the Houſe) there ſhould not be a Man of them that ſo much as offer'd to bring the Houſe to the Scripture, wherein, as has been ſhewn, is contain'd that Original, whereof all the reſt of the Common-wealths ſeem to be Copies. Certainly if LEVIATHAN (who is ſurer of nothing than that a popular Common-wealth conſiſts but of one Council) tranſcrib'd his Doctrine out of this Aſſembly, for him to except againſt ARISTOTLE and CICERO for writing out of their own Common-wealths, was not ſo fair play; or if the Parliament tranſcrib'd out of him, it had been an honour better due to MOSES. But where one of them ſhould have an Example but from the other, I cannot imagine, there being nothing of this kind that I can find in ſtory, but the Oligarchy of *Athens*, the thirty Tyrants of the ſame, and the *Roman Decemvirs*.

Lib. 8. FOR the *Oligarchy*, THUCYDIDES tells us, that it was a Senate or Council of Four hundred, pretending to a Balancing Council of the People conſiſting of Five thouſand, but not producing them; wherein you have the definition of an *Oligarchy*, which is a ſingle Council both debating and reſolving, dividing and chooſing; and what that muſt come to, was ſhewn by the Example of the Girls, and is apparent by the experience of all times: Wherefore the Thirty ſet up by the *Lacedemonians* (when they had conquer'd *Athens*) are call'd Tyrants by all Authors, LEVIATHAN only excepted, who will have them againſt all the World to have been an *Ariſtocracy*; but for what reaſon I cannot imagine, theſe alſo, as void of any Balance, having been void of that which is eſſential to every Common-wealth, whether Ariſtocratical or Popular;

Popular; except he be pleas'd with them, becauſe that, according to the Teſtimony of XENOPHON, they kill'd more men in eight months, than the *Lacedemonians* had done in ten years; *oppreſſing the People* (to uſe Sir WALTER RALEIGH's words) *with all baſe and intolerable Slavery.*

THE uſurp'd Government of the *Decemvirs* in *Rome* was of the ſame kind. Wherefore in the fear of God let Chriſtian Legiſlators (ſetting the Pattern given in the Mount on the one ſide, and theſe execrable Examples on the other) know the right hand from the left; and ſo much the rather, becauſe thoſe things which do not conduce to the good of the Govern'd, are fallacious, if they appear to be good for the Governors. God in chaſtiſing a People, is accuſtom'd to burn his Rod. The Empire of thoſe Oligarchies was not ſo violent as ſhort, nor did they fall upon the People, but in their own immediate ruin. A Council without a Balance is not a Common-wealth, but an Oligarchy; and every Oligarchy, except it be put to the defence of its Wickedneſs or Power againſt ſome outward danger, is factious. Wherefore the Errors of the People being from their Governors (which Maxim in the Politics bearing a ſufficient teſtimony to it ſelf, is alſo prov'd by MACHIAVEL) if the People of *Oceana* have been factious, the Cauſe is apparent: But what Remedy?

The General.

IN anſwer to this Queſtion, I come now to the Army; of which the moſt victorious Captain, and incomparable Patriot OLPHAUS MEGALETOR was now General: who being a much greater maſter of that Art, whereof I have made a rough draught in theſe Preliminaries, had ſuch ſad reflections opon the ways and proceedings of the Parliament, as caſt him upon Books, and all other means of diverſion, among which he happen'd on this place of MACHIAVEL: "Thrice "happy is that People which chances to have a Man able to give "them ſuch a Government at once, as without alteration may ſe- "cure them of their Liberties; ſeeing it is certain that *Lacedemon*, in "obſerving the Laws of LYCURGUS, continu'd about eight hundred "years without any dangerous Tumult or Corruption. My Lord General (as it is ſaid of THEMISTOCLES, that he could not ſleep for the Glory obtain'd by MILTIADES at the Battle of *Maratho*) took ſo new and deep an Impreſſion at theſe words of the much greater Glory of LYCURGUS, that, being on this ſide aſſaulted with the emulation of his illuſtrious Object, and on the other with the Miſery of the Nation, which ſeem'd (as it were ruin'd by his Victory) to caſt it ſelf at his feet, he was almoſt wholly depriv'd of his natural reſt, till the debate he had within himſelf came to a firm reſolution, that the greateſt Advantages of a Common-wealth are, firſt, that the Legiſlator ſhould be one Man: And, ſecondly, that the Government ſhould be made altogether, or at once. For the firſt, It is certain, ſays MACHIAVEL, that a Common-wealth is ſeldom or never well turn'd cor conſtituted, except it has been the Work of one Man; for which cauſe a wiſe Legiſlator, and one whoſe mind is firmly ſet, not upon private but the public Intereſt, not upon his Poſterity but upon his Country, may juſtly endeavour to get the ſovereign Power into his own hands: nor ſhall any man that is Maſter of Reaſon blame ſuch extraordinary means as in that caſe will be neceſſary, the end proving no other than the Conſtitution of a well-order'd Common-wealth. The

Def. B. 1. c. 9.

That a Legiſlator is to be one.

reaſon of this demonſtrable: for the ordinary means not failing, the Common-wealth has no need of a Legiſlator; but the ordinary means failing, there is no recourſe to be had but to ſuch as are extraordinary. And, whereas a Book or a Building has not been known to attain to its perfection, if it has not had a ſole Author or Architect; a Common-wealth, as to the Fabric of it, is of the like nature. And thus it may be made at once; in which there be great advantages: for a Common-wealth made at once, takes Security at the ſame time it lends its Money; and truſts not it ſelf to the Faith of Men, but launces immediately forth into the Empire of Laws: and being ſet ſtreight, brings the Manners of its Citizens to its rule; whence follow'd that uprightneſs which was in *Lacedemon*. But Manners that are rooted in men, bow the tenderneſs of a Common-wealth coming up by twigs to their bent; whence follow'd the obliquity that was in *Rome*, and thoſe perpetual Repairs by the Conſuls Axes, and Tribunes Hammers, which could never finiſh that Common-wealth but in deſtruction.

That a Common-wealth is to be made at once.

MY Lord General being clear in theſe Points, and of the neceſſity of ſome other courſe than would be thought upon by the Parliament, appointed a meeting of the Army, where he ſpoke his ſenſe agreeable to theſe Preliminaries with ſuch ſucceſs to the Soldiery, that the Parliament was ſoon after depos'd; and he himſelf (in the great Hall of the *Pantheon* or Palace of Juſtice, ſituated in *Emporium* the capital City) was created by the univerſal Suffrage of the Army, Lord ARCHON, or ſole Legiſlator of *Oceana:* upon which Theatre you have, to conclude this piece, a Perſon introduc'd, whoſe fame ſhall never draw its curtain.

THE Lord ARCHON being created, fifty ſelect Perſons to aſſiſt him (by labouring in the Mines of antient Prudence, and bringing its hidden Treaſures to new light) were added, with the ſtile alſo of *Legiſlators*, and ſat as a Council, whereof he was the ſole Director and Preſident.

The

The Council of Legiſlators.

OF this piece, being the greater half of the whole work, I ſhall be able at this time to give no farther account, than very briefly to ſhew at what it aims.

MY Lord ARCHON in opening the Council of Legiſlators, made it appear how unſafe a thing it is to follow Phanſy in the Fabric of a Common-wealth; and how neceſſary that the Archives of antient Prudence ſhould be ranſack'd before any Counſellor ſhould preſume to offer any other matter in order to the work in hand, or towards the conſideration to be had by the Council upon a Model of Government. Wherefore he caus'd an Urn to be brought, and every one of the Counſellors to draw a Lot. By the Lots as they were drawn,

The Common-wealth of	fell to
ISRAEL	PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE.
ATHENS	NAVARCHUS DE PARALO.
LACEDEMON	LACO DE SCYTALE.
CARTHAGE	MAGO DE SYRTIBUS.
the *ACHEANS*, *ÆTOLIANS*, and *LYCIANS*	ARATUS DE ISTHMO.
the *SWITZ*	ALPESTER DE FULMINE.
HOLLAND, and the *UNITED PROVINCES*	GLAUCUS DE ULNA.
ROME	DOLABEDLA DE ENYO.
VENICE	LYNCEUS DE STELLA.

THESE contain'd in them all thoſe Excellences whereof a Common-wealth is capable; ſo that to have added more, had been to no purpoſe. Upon time given to the Counſellors, by their own Studies and thoſe of their Friends, to prepare themſelves, they were open'd in the Order, and by the Perſons mention'd at the Council of Legiſlators; and afterwards by order of the ſame were repeated at the Council of the *Prytans* to the People: for in drawing of the Lots, there were about a dozen of them inſcrib'd with the letter P. whereby the Counſellors that drew them became *Prytans*.

THE *Prytans* were a Committee or Council ſitting in the great Hall of *Pantheon*, to whom it was lawful for any man to offer any thing in order to the Fabrick of the Common-wealth: for which cauſe, that they might not be oppreſt by the throng, there was a Rail about the Table where they ſat, and on each ſide of the ſame a Pulpit; that on the right hand for any man that would propoſe any thing, and that on the left for any other that would oppoſe him. And all Parties (being indemnify'd by Proclamation of the ARCHON) were invited to diſpute their own Intereſts, or propoſe whatever they thought fit (in order to the future Government) to the Council of the *Prytans*, who (having a Guard of about two or three hundred men, leſt the heat of diſpute might break the peace) had the Right of Moderators, and were to

report

report from time to time ſuch Propoſitions or Occurrences as they thought fit, to the Council of Legiſlators ſitting more privately in the Palace call'd *Alma*.

THIS was that which made the People (who were neither ſafely to be admitted, nor conveniently to be excluded in the framing of the Common-wealth) verily believe when it came forth, that it was no other than that whereof they themſelves had been the makers.

MOREOVER, this Council ſat divers months after the publiſhing, and during the promulgation of the Model to the People; by which means there is ſcarce any thing was ſaid or written for or againſt the ſaid Model, but you ſhall have it with the next impreſſion of this work by way of Oration addreſt to, and moderated by the *Prytans*.

BY this means the Council of Legiſlators had their neceſſary Solitude and due aim in their greater work, as being acquainted from time to time with the pulſe of the People, and yet without any manner of interruption or diſturbance.

WHEREFORE every Common-wealth in its place having been open'd by due Method; that is, Firſt, by the People; Secondly, by the Senate; And, Thirdly, by the Magiſtracy: The Council upon mature debate took ſuch reſults or orders out of each, and out of every part of each of them, as upon opening the ſame they thought fit; which being put from time to time in writing by the Clerk or Secretary, there remain'd no more in the Concluſion, than putting the Orders ſo taken together, to view and examine them with a diligent Eye, that it might be clearly diſcover'd whether they did interfere, or could any wiſe come to interfere or joſtle one with the other. For as ſuch Orders joſtling, or coming to joſtle one another, are the certain diſſolution of the Common-wealth; ſo taken upon the proof of like experience, and neither joſtling, nor ſhewing which way they can poſſibly come to joſtle one another, they make a perfect, and (for ought that in human Prudence can be foreſeen) an immortal Common-wealth.

AND ſuch was the Art whereby my Lord ARCHON (taking Counſel of the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*, as of MOSES; and of the reſt of the Common-wealths, as of JETHRO) fram'd the Model of the Common-wealth of *Oceana*.

THE

MODEL

OF THE

Common-wealth of *OCEANA.*

WHEREAS my Lord ARCHON being from MOSES and LYCURGUS the first Legislator, that hitherto is found in History to have introduc'd, or erected an entire Common-wealth at once, happen'd, like them also, to be more intent upon puting the same into execution or action, than into writing; by which means the Model came to be promulgated or publish'd with more brevity and less illustration than is necessary for their understanding, who have not been acquainted with the whole Proceedings of the Council of Legislators, and of the *Prytans*, where it was asserted and clear'd from all objections and doubts: To the end that I may supply what was wanting in the promulgated Epitome to a more full and perfect Narative of the whole, I shall rather take the Common-wealth practically, and as it has now given an account of it self in some years Revolutions (as DICEARCHUS is said to have done that of *Lacedemon*, first transcrib'd by his hand some three or four hundred years after the Institution) yet not omiting to add for proof to every Order such Debates and Speeches of the Legislators in their Council, or at least such parts of them as may best discover the reason of the Government; nor such ways and means as were us'd in the institution or rise of the Building, not to be so well conceiv'd, without some knowledge given of the Engins wherewithal the mighty Weight was mov'd. But thro' the entire omission of the Council of Legislators or Workmen, that squar'd every stone to this Structure in the Quarries of antient Prudence, the proof of the first part of this Discourse will be lame, except I insert, as well for illustration, as to avoid frequent repetition, three remarkable Testimonies in this place. Suidas.

THE first is taken out of the Common-wealth of *Israel: So* MOSES *hearken'd to the voice of* (JETHRO) *his Father in law, and did all that he had said. And* MOSES *chose able men out of all* Israel, *and made them heads over the People*; Tribunes, as it is in the vulgar Latin; or *Phylarchs*, that is, *Princes of the Tribes*, sitting upon twelve * Thrones and judging the twelve Tribes of *Israel:* and next to these he chose Rulers of Thousands, Rulers of Hundreds, Rulers of Fifties, and Rulers of Tens, which were the steps or rise of this Common-wealth from its foundation or root to its proper elevation or accomplishment in the *Sanhedrim*, and the Congregation, already open'd in the Preliminaries. Exod. 18.24. Numb. 1. 16. Matth.

* Sellis Curulibus. *Grot.*

THE Second is taken out of *Lacedemon*, as LYCURGUS (for the greater impreſſion of his Inſtitutions upon the minds of his Citizens) pretended to have receiv'd the Model of that Common-wealth from the Oracle of APOLLO at *Delphos*, the words whereof are thus recorded by PLUTARCH in the Life of that famous Legiſlator: ‘ When thou
Crag. de Rep. Lac. lib. 1. c. 6. ‘ ſhalt have divided the People into Tribes (which were ſix) and *Obas* ‘ (which were five in every Tribe) thou ſhalt conſtitute the Senate, conſiſting, with the two Kings, of thirty Counſellors, who, according as ‘ occaſion requires, ſhall cauſe the Congregation to be aſſembled between the Bridge and the River *Gnacion*, where the Senate ſhall propoſe ‘ to the People, and diſmiſs them without ſuffering them to debate. The *Obæ* were Linages into which every Tribe was divided, and in each Tribe there was another Diviſion containing all thoſe of the ſame that were of military Age; which being call the *Mora*, was ſubdivided into Troops and Companies that were held in perpetual Diſcipline under the Command of a Magiſtrate call'd the *Polemarch*.

THE Third is taken out of the Common-wealth of *Rome*, or thoſe parts of it which are compriz'd in the firſt and ſecond Books of LIVY where the People, according to the inſtitution by ROMULUS, are firſt divided into thirty *Curias* or Pariſhes, whereof he elected (by three out of each *Curia*) the Senate, which from his Reign to that of SERVIUS
Halicar. TULLUS propos'd to the Pariſhes or Parochial Congregations; and theſe being call'd the *Comitia Curiata*, had the election of the * Kings the Confirmation of their † Laws, and the laſt appeal in matters of Judicature, as appears in the caſe of HORATIUS that kill'd his Siſter; till in the Reign of SERVIUS (for the other Kings kept not to the inſtitution of ROMULUS) the People being grown ſomewhat, the Power of the *Curiata* was for the greater part tranſlated to the *Centuriata Comitia* inſtituted by this King, which diſtributed the People according to the cenſe or valuation of their Eſtates into ſix Claſſes, every one containing about forty Centuries, divided into Youth and Elders; the Youth for field-ſervice, the Elders for the defence of their Territory, all arm'd and under continual Diſcipline, in which they aſſembl'd both upon military and civil occaſions. But when the Senate propos'd to the People, the Horſe only, whereof there were twelve Centuries conſiſting of the richeſt ſort over and above thoſe of the Foot enumerated, were call'd with the firſt Claſſis of the Foot to the ſuffrage; or if theſe accorded not, then the ſecond Claſſis was call'd to them, but ſeldom or never any of the reſt. Wherefore the People after the expulſion of the Kings, growing impatient of this inequality, reſted not till they had reduc'd the ſuffrage as it had been in the *Comitia Curiata* to the whole People again: But in another way, that is to ſay, by the *Comitia Tributa*, which thereupon were inſtituted, being a Council where the People in exigencies made Laws without the Senate; which Laws were call'd *Plebiſcita*. This Council is that in regard whereof CICERO and other great Wits ſo frequently inveigh againſt the People, and ſometimes even LIVY, as at the firſt ‖ inſtitution of it. To ſay the truth, it was a kind of Anarchy, whereof the People could not

* Quirites, Regem create; ita patribus viſum eſt: Tullum Hoſtilium Regem Populus juſſit, Patres authores facti. † Ut ab Romulo traditum, ſuffragium viritim eadem vi, eodemque jure omnibus datum eſt. ‖ Hunc annum inſignem maximè Comitia Tributa efficiunt; res major victoriâ ſuſcepti certaminis quam uſu, plus enim dignitatis Comitiis ipſis detractum eſt, patribus ex Concilio ſubmovendis, quam virium aut plebi additum aut demtum patribus.

be

be excuſable, if there had not, thro' the Courſes taken by the Senate, been otherwiſe a neceſſity that they muſt have ſeen the Common-wealth run into Oligarchy.

THE manner how the *Comitia Curiata*, *Centuriata*, or *Tributa* were call'd, during the time of the Common-wealth, to the ſuffrage, was by lot: the *Curia*, Century, or Tribe, whereon the firſt lot fell, being ſtil'd *Principium*, or the Prerogative; and the other *Curiæ*, Centuries, or Tribes, whereon the ſecond, third, and fourth Lots, *&c.* fell, the *Jure vocatæ:* From henceforth not the firſt Claſſis, as in the times of SERVIUS, but the Prerogative, whether *Curia*, Century, or Tribe, came firſt to the Suffrage, whoſe Vote was call'd *Omen Prærogativum*, and ſeldom fail'd to be leading to the reſt of the Tribes. The *Jure vocatæ* in the order of their Lots came next: The manner of giving ſuffrage was, by caſting wooden Tablets, mark'd for the Affirmative or the Negative, into certain Urns ſtanding upon a Scaffold, as they march'd over it in files; which for the reſemblance it bore, was call'd the Bridge. The Candidate or Competitor, who had moſt Suffrages in a *Curia*, Century, or Tribe, was ſaid to have that *Curia*, Century, or Tribe; and he who had moſt of the *Curiæ*, Centuries, or Tribes, carry'd the Magiſtracy. Sigonius.

THESE three places being premis'd, as ſuch upon which there will be frequent reflection, I come to the Narrative, divided into two parts, the firſt containing the Inſtitution, the ſecond the Conſtitution of the Common-wealth; in each whereof I ſhall diſtinguiſh the Orders, as thoſe which contain the whole Model, from the reſt of the Diſcourſe, which tends only to the explanation or proof of them.

IN the inſtitution or building of a Common-wealth, the firſt work (as that of Builders) can be no other than fitting and diſtributing the Materials. *Inſtitution of the Common-wealth.*

THE Materials of a Common-wealth are the People; and the People of *Oceana* were diſtributed by caſting them into certain Diviſions, regarding their Quality, their Age, their Wealth, and the places of their reſidence or habitation, which was done by the inſuing Orders. *Diviſions of the People.*

THE firſt ORDER diſtributes the People into Freemen or Citizens, and Servants, while ſuch; for if they attain to Liberty, that is, to live of themſelves, they are Freemen or Citizens. 1. Order. *Into Freemen and Servants.*

THIS Order needs no proof, in regard of the nature of Servitude, which is inconſiſtent with Freedom or participation of Government in a Common-wealth.

THE ſecond ORDER diſtributes Citizens into Youth and Elders (ſuch as are from 18 years of age to 30, being accounted Youth; and ſuch as are of 30 and upwards, Elders) and eſtabliſhes that the Youth ſhall be the marching Armies, and the Elders the ſtanding Garriſons of this Nation. 2. Order. *Into Youth and Elders.*

A COMMON-WEALTH whoſe Arms are in the hands of her Servants, had need be ſituated (as is elegantly ſaid of *Venice* by * CONTARINI) out of the reach of their clutches; witneſs the

* Lontana della fede degli huomini.

danger

danger run by that of *Carthage* in the Rebellion of SPENDIUS and MATHO. But tho' a City (if one Swallow makes a Summer) may thus chance to be ſafe, yet ſhall it never be great; for if *Carthage* or *Venice* acquir'd any Fame in their Arms, it is known to have happen'd thro' the meer virtue of their Captains, and not of their Orders: wherefore *Iſrael*, *Lacedemon*, and *Rome* intail'd their Arms upon the prime of their Citizens, divided (at leaſt in *Lacedemon* and *Rome*) into Youth and Elders; the Youth for the Field, and the Elders for defence of their Territory,

3. Order. *into Horſe and Foot.*

THE third ORDER diſtributes the Citizens into Horſe and Foot by the cenſe or valuation of their Eſtates; they who have above one hunded Pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Moneys, being oblig'd to be of the Horſe; and they who have under that Sum, to be of the Foot. But if a man has prodigally waſted and ſpent his Patrimony, he is neither capable of Magiſtracy, Office, or Suffrage in the Commonwealth.

CITIZENS are not only to defend the Common-wealth, but according to their abilities, as the *Romans* under SERVIUS TULLUS (regard had to their Eſtates) were ſome enrol'd in the Horſe Centuries, and others of the Foot, with Arms injoin'd accordingly; nor could it be otherwiſe in the reſt of the Common-wealths, tho' out of Hiſtorical Remains, that are ſo much darker, it be not ſo clearly proveable. And the neceſſary Prerogative to be given by a Common-wealth to Eſtates, is in ſome meaſure in the nature of Induſtry, and the uſe of it to the Public. * *Roman People*, ſays JULIUS EXUPERANTIUS, *were divided into Claſſes, and tax'd according to the value of their Eſtates. All that were worth the Sums appointed were employ'd in the Wars; for they moſt eagerly contend for the Victory, who fight for Liberty in defence of their Country and Poſſeſſions. But the poorer ſort were pol'd only for their Heads (which was all they had) and kept in Garriſon at home in time of War: For theſe might betray the Armies for Bread, by reaſon of their Poverty; which is the reaſon that* MARIUS, *to whom the care of the Government ought not to have been committed, was the firſt that led 'em into the field*; and his Succeſs was accordingly. There is a mean in things; as exorbitant Riches overthrow the Balance of a Common-wealth, ſo extreme Poverty cannot hold it, nor is by any means to be truſted with it. The Clauſe in the Order concerning the Prodigal is *Athenian*, and a very laudable one; for he that could not live upon his Patrimony, if he comes to touch the publick Money, makes a Common-wealth Bankrupt.

4. Order. *Into Pariſhes, Hundreds, and Tribes.*

THE fourth ORDER diſtributes the People according to the places of their Habitation, into Pariſhes, Hundreds, and Tribes.

For except the People be methodically diſtributed, they cannot be methodically collected; but the being of a Common-wealth conſiſts in the methodical Collection of the People: wherefore you have the

* Populus Romanus per Claſſes diviſus erat, & pro Patrimonii facultate cenſebantur; ex iis, omnes quibus res erat, ad militiam ducebantur; diligenter enim pro victoria laborabant, qui ex libertate bona patriam defendebant: Illi autem quibus nullæ opes erant, caput ſuum, quod ſolum poſſidebant, cenſebantur, & belli tempore in mœnibus reſidebant; facile enim poterant exiſtere proditores, quia egeſtas haud facile habetur ſine damno. Hos igitur Marius, quibus non fuerat Reſp. committenda, duxit ad bellum.

Iſra-

Iſraelitiſh Diviſions into Rulers of Thouſands, of Hundreds, of Fifties, and of Tens; and of the whole Common-wealth into Tribes: The *Laconic* into *Obas*, *Moras*, and Tribes: the *Roman* into Tribes, Centuries and Claſſes: and ſomething there muſt of neceſſity be in every Government of the like nature; as that in the late Monarchy, by Counties. But this being the only inſtitution in *Oceana* (except that of the Agrarian) which requir'd any charge, or included any difficulty, engages me to a more particular Deſcription of the manner how it was perform'd, as follows.

The uſe and method of the Surveyors.

A THOUSAND Surveyors commiſſionated and inſtructed by the Lord ARCHON and the Council, being divided into two equal numbers, each under the inſpection of two Surveyors General, were diſtributed into the Northern and Southern parts of the Territory, divided by the River *Hemiſua*, the whole whereof contains about ten thouſand Pariſhes, ſome ten of thoſe being aſſign'd to each Surveyor: For as to this matter there needed no great exactneſs, it tending only (by ſhewing whither every one was to repair, and whereabout to begin) to the more orderly carrying on of the work; the nature of their Inſtructions otherwiſe regarding rather the number of the Inhabitants than of the Pariſhes. The Surveyors therefore being every one furniſh'd with a convenient proportion of Urns, Balls and balloting Boxes (in the uſe whereof they had been formerly exercis'd) and now arriving each at his reſpective Pariſhes, began with the People, by teaching them their firſt leſſon, which was the Ballot; and tho' they found them in the beginning ſomething froward as at toys, with which (while they were in expectation of greater matters from a Council of Legiſlators) they conceiv'd themſelves to be abus'd, they came within a little while to think them pretty ſport, and at length ſuch as might very ſoberly be us'd in good earneſt: whereupon the Surveyors began the Inſtitution included in

5. Order. *Inſtitution of the Pariſhes, of the Ballot, and of the Deputies.*

THE fifth ORDER, requiring, That upon the firſt Monday next enſuing the laſt of *December*, the bigger Bell in every Pariſh throughout the Nation be rung at eight of the Clock in the morning, and continue ringing for the ſpace of one hour; and that all the Elders of the Pariſh reſpectively repair to the Church, before the Bell has done ringing; where dividing themſelves into two equal Numbers, or as near equal as may be, they ſhall take their places according to their Dignities (if they be of divers qualities) and according to their Seniority (if they be of the ſame) the one half on the one ſide, and the other half on the other, in the body of the Church: which done, they ſhall make Oath to the Overſeers of the Pariſh for the time being *(inſtead of theſe the Surveyors were to officiate at the inſtitution or firſt Aſſembly)* by holding up their hands, to make a fair Election according to the Laws of the Ballot, as they are hereafter explain'd, of ſuch Perſons, amounting to a fifth part of their whole number, to be their Deputies, and to exerciſe their Power in manner hereafter explain'd, as they ſhall think in their Conſciences to be fitteſt for that truſt, and will acquit themſelves of it to the beſt advantage of the Common-wealth. And Oath being thus made, they ſhall proceed to Election, if the Elders of the Pariſh amount to one thouſand by the Ballot of the Tribe *(as it is in due place explain'd)* and if the Elders of the Pariſh amount to fifty or upwards, but within the number of one thouſand, by the Ballot of the hundred *(as it is in due place explain'd)*. But if the Elders amount not to fifty, then they

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ſhall proceed to the Ballot of the Pariſh, as it is in this place and after this manner explain'd. The two overſeers for the time being ſhall ſeat themſelves at the upper end of the middle Ally, with a Table before them, their faces being towards the Congregation: And the Conſtable for the time being ſhall ſet an Urn before the Table, into which he ſhall put ſo many Balls as there be Elders preſent, whereof there ſhall be one that is gilded, the reſt being white; and when the Conſtable has ſhaken the Urn ſufficiently to mix the Balls, the Overſeers ſhall call the Elders to the Urn, who from each ſide of the Church ſhall come up the middle Ally in two files, every man paſſing by the Urn, and drawing out one Ball; which if it be Silver, he ſhall caſt into a Bowl ſtanding at the foot of the Urn, and return by the outward Ally on his ſide to his place. But he who draws the golden Ball is the Propoſer, and ſhall be ſeated between the Overſeers, where he ſhall begin in what order he pleaſes, and name ſuch as (upon his Oath already taken) he conceives fitteſt to be choſen, one by one, to the Elders; and the Party nam'd ſhall withdraw, while the Congregation is balloting his name by the double Box or Boxes appointed and mark'd on the the outward part, to ſhew which ſide is Affirmative and which Negative, being carry'd by a Boy or Boys appointed by the Overſeers, to every one of the Elders, who ſhall hold up a pellet made of linen Rags, between his Finger and his Thumb, and put it after ſuch a manner into the Box, as tho' no man can ſee into which ſide he puts it, yet any man may ſee that he puts in but one pellet or ſuffrage. And the ſuffrage of the Congregation being thus given, ſhall be return'd with the Box or Boxes to the Overſeers, who opening the ſame, ſhall pour the affirmative Balls into a white Bowl ſtanding upon the Table on the right hand, to be number'd by the firſt Overſeer; and the Negative into a green Bowl ſtanding on the left hand, to be number'd by the ſecond Overſeer: and the ſuffrages being number'd, he who has the major part in the Affirmative is one of the Deputies of the Pariſh: and when ſo many Deputies are choſen as amount to a full fifth part of the whole number of the Elders, the Ballot for that time ſhall ceaſe. The Deputies being choſen are to be liſted by the Overſeers in order as they were choſen, except only that ſuch as are Horſe muſt be liſted in the firſt place with the reſt, proportionable to the number of the Congregation, after this manner.

Anno Dom.

The Liſt of the firſt Mover.

A. A. Ord. Eq.	1 Dep.	*of the Pariſh of——in the Hundred*
B. B.	2 Dep.	*of——and the Tribe of——which*
C. C.	3 Dep.	*Pariſh at the preſent Election contains*
D. D.	4 Dep.	*20 Elders, whereof one is of the Horſe*
E. E.	5 Dep.	*or Equeſtrian Order.*

The firſt and ſecond in the Liſt are Overſeers by conſequence: the third is the Conſtable, and the fourth and fifth are Church-wardens; the Perſons ſo choſen are Deputies of the Pariſh for the ſpace of one year from their Election, and no longer; nor may they be elected two years together. This Liſt being the *Primum Mobile*, or firſt Mover of the Common-wealth, is to be regiſter'd in a Book diligently kept and preſerv'd by the Overſeers, who are reſponſible in their places for theſe and other Duties to be hereafter mention'd, to the Cenſors of the Tribe:

and

and the Congregation is to obſerve the preſent Order, as they will anſwer the contrary to the *Phylarch*, or Prerogative Troop of the Tribe; which, in caſe of failure in the whole or any part of it, have power to fine them or any of them at diſcretion, but under an Appeal to the Parliament.

FOR proof of this Order; Firſt, in Reaſon: It is with all Politicians paſt diſpute, that paternal Power is in the right of Nature; and this is no other than the derivation of Power from Fathers of Families, as the natural root of a Common-wealth. And for Experience, if it be otherwiſe in that of *Holland*, I know no other example of the like kind. In *Iſrael*, the ſovereign Power came clearly from the natural Root, the Elders of the whole People; and *Rome* was born (*Comitiis Curiatis*) in her Parochial Congregations, out of which ROMULUS firſt rais'd her Senate, then all the reſt of the Orders of that Common-wealth, which roſe ſo high: for the depth of a Common-wealth is the juſt height of it. Joſ. 24. 1.

* *She raiſes up her Head unto the Skies,*
Near as her Root unto the Center lies.

AND if the Common-wealth of *Rome* was born of thirty Pariſhes, this of *Oceana* was born of ten thouſand. But whereas mention in the birth of this is made of an Equeſtrian Order, it may ſtartle ſuch as know that the diviſion of the People of *Rome*, at the inſtitution of that Common-wealth into Orders, was the occaſion of its ruin. The diſtinction of the Patrician as a hereditary Order from the very Inſtitution, ingroſſing all the Magiſtracies, was indeed the deſtruction of *Rome*; but to a Knight or one of the Equeſtrian Order, ſays HORACE,

Si quadringentis ſex ſeptem millia deſunt,
Plebs eris.

By which it ſhould ſeem that this Order was not otherwiſe hereditary than a man's Eſtate, nor did it give any claim to Magiſtracy; wherefore you ſhall never find that it diſquieted the Common-wealth; nor does the name denote any more in *Oceana*, than the Duty of ſuch a man's Eſtate to the Public.

BUT the Surveyors both in this place and in others, foraſmuch as they could not obſerve all the Circumſtances of this Order, eſpecially that of the time of Election, did for the firſt as well as they could; and, the Elections being made and regiſter'd, took each of them Copies of thoſe Liſts which were within their Allotments; which done, they produc'd

THE ſixth ORDER, directing, in caſe a Parſon or Vicar of a Pariſh comes to be remov'd by Death or by the Cenſors, that the Congregation of the Pariſh aſſemble and depute one or two Elders by the Ballot, who upon the charge of the Pariſh ſhall repair to one of the Univerſities of this Nation with a certificate ſign'd by the Overſeers, and addreſt to the Vice-Chancellor: which Certificate giving notice of the Death or Removal of the Parſon or Vicar, of the value of the Parſonage or Vicarage, and of the deſire of the Congregation to receive a

4. Order. *Of Ordination, a National Religion, and Liberty of Conſcience.*

* Ipſa hæret Scopulis, & tantum vertice ad Auras Æthereas, quantum radice ad Tartara, tendit.

Probationer

Probationer from that Univerſity; the Vice-Chancellor upon the receipt thereof ſhall call a Convocation, and having made choice of a fit Perſon, ſhall return him in due time to the Pariſh, where the Perſon ſo return'd ſhall receive the full fruits of the Benefice or Vicarage, and do the duty of the Parſon or Vicar, for the ſpace of one year, as Probationer: and that being expir'd, the Congregation of the Elders ſhall put their Probationer to the Ballot: and if he attains not to two parts in three of the Suffrage Affirmative, he ſhall take his leave of the Pariſh, and they ſhall ſend in like manner as before for another Probationer; but if their Probationer obtains two parts in three of the Suffrage Affirmative, he is then Paſtor of that Pariſh. And the Paſtor of the Pariſh ſhall pray with the Congregation, preach the Word, and adminiſter the Sacraments to the ſame, according to the Directory to be hereafter appointed by the Parliament. Nevertheleſs ſuch as are of gather'd Congregations, or from time to time ſhall join with any of them, are in no wiſe oblig'd to this way of electing their Teachers, or to give their Votes in this caſe, but wholly left to the Liberty of their own Conſciences, and to that way of worſhip which they ſhall chooſe, being not Popiſh, Jewiſh, or Idolatrous. And to the end they may be the better protected by the State in the free exerciſe of the ſame, they are deſir'd to make choice, in ſuch manner as they beſt like, of certain Magiſtrates in every one of their Congregations, which we could wiſh might be four in each of them, to be Auditors in caſes of differences or diſtaſte, if any thro' variety of opinions, that may be grievous or injurious to them, ſhould fall out. And ſuch Auditors or Magiſtrates ſhall have power to examine the matter, and inform themſelves, to the end that if they think it of ſufficient weight, they may acquaint the *Phylarch* with it, or introduce it into the Council of Religion; where all ſuch Cauſes as thoſe Magiſtrates introduce, ſhall from time to time be heard and determin'd according to ſuch Laws, as are, or ſhall hereafter be provided by the Parliament, for the juſt defence of the Liberty of Conſcience.

THIS Order conſiſts of three parts, the firſt reſtoring the power of Ordination to the People, which, that it originally belongs to them, is clear, tho' not in Engliſh yet in Scripture, where the Apoſtles *ordain'd Elders by the holding up of hands in every Congregation*, that is, by the ſuffrage of the People, which was alſo given in ſome of thoſe Cities by the Ballot. And tho' it may be ſhewn that the Apoſtles ordain'd ſome by the laying on of hands, it will not be ſhewn that they did ſo in every Congregation.

Acts 14. 23.

EXCOMMUNICATION, as not clearly proveable out of the Scripture, being omitted, the ſecond part of the Order implies and eſtabliſhes a National Religion; for there be degrees of Knowledge in divine things; true Religion is not to be learnt without ſearching the Scriptures; the Scriptures cannot be ſearch'd by us unleſs we have them to ſearch; and if we have nothing elſe, or (which is all one) underſtand nothing elſe but a Tranſlation, we may be (as in the place alledg'd we have been) beguil'd or miſled by the Tranſlation, while we ſhould be ſearching the true ſenſe of the Scripture, which cannot be attain'd in a natural way (and a Common-wealth is not to preſume upon that which is ſupernatural) but by the knowledge of the Original and of Antiquity, acquir'd by our own ſtudies, or thoſe of ſome others, for even *Faith comes by hearing*. Wherefore a Common-wealth not making proviſion of men from time to time, knowing in the original Languages

Languages wherein the Scriptures were written, and vers'd in thoſe Antiquities to which they ſo frequently relate, that the true ſenſe of them depends in great part upon that Knowledge, can never be ſecure that ſhe ſhall not loſe the Scripture, and by conſequence her Religion; which to preſerve ſhe muſt inſtitute ſome method of this Knowledge, and ſome uſe of ſuch as have acquir'd it, which amounts to a National Religion.

THE Common-wealth having thus perform'd her duty towards God, as a rational Creature, by the beſt application of her Reaſon to Scripture, and for the preſervation of Religion in the purity of the ſame, yet pretends not to Infallibility, but comes in the third part of the Order, eſtabliſhing Liberty of Conſcience according to the Inſtructions given to her Council of Religion, to raiſe up her hands to Heaven for further light; in which proceeding ſhe follows that (as was ſhewn in the Preliminaries) of *Iſrael*, who tho' her National Religion was always a part of her Civil Law, gave to her Prophets the upper hand of all her Orders.

BUT the Surveyors having now done with the Pariſhes, took their leaves; ſo a Pariſh is the firſt diviſion of Land occaſion'd by the firſt Collection of the People of *Oceana*, whoſe Function proper to that place is compriz'd in the ſix preceding Orders. *Definition of a Pariſh.*

THE next ſtep in the progreſs of the Surveyors was to a meeting of the neareſt of them, as their work lay, by twenties; where conferring their Liſts, and computing the Deputies contain'd therein, as the number of them in Pariſhes, being neareſt Neighbours, amounted to one hundred, or as even as might conveniently be brought with that account, they caſt them and thoſe Pariſhes into the Precinct which (be the Deputies ever ſince more or fewer) is ſtill call'd the *Hundred:* and to every one of theſe Precincts they appointed a certain place, being the moſt convenient Town within the ſame, for the annual Rendevouz; which done, each Surveyor returning to his Hundred, and ſummoning the Deputies contain'd in his Liſts to the Rendevouz, they appear'd and receiv'd. *Inſtitution of the Hundred.*

THE ſeventh ORDER, requiring, That upon the firſt Monday next enſuing the laſt of *January*, the Deputies of every Pariſh annually aſſemble in Arms at the Rendevouz of the Hundred, and there elect out of their number one Juſtice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Captain, one Enſign of their Troop or Century, each of theſe out of the Horſe; and one Juryman, one Crowner, one High Conſtable, out of the Foot; the Election to be made by the Ballot in this manner. The Jurymen for the time being are to be Overſeers of the Ballot (*inſtead of theſe, the Surveyors are to officiate at the firſt Aſſembly*) and to look to the performance of the ſame according to what was directed in the Ballot of the Pariſhes, ſaving that the High Conſtable ſetting forth the Urn, ſhall have five ſeveral ſutes of Gold Balls, and one dozen of every ſute; whereof the firſt ſhall be mark'd with the Letter *A*, the ſecond with the letter *B*, the third with *C*, the fourth with *D*, and the fifth with *E*: and of each of theſe ſutes he ſhall caſt one Ball into his Hat, or into a little Urn, and ſhaking the Balls together preſent them to the firſt Overſeer, who ſhall draw one, and the ſute which is ſo drawn by the Overſeer ſhall be of uſe for that Day, and no other: for example, if the Overſeer draw an *A*, the High Conſtable ſhall put ſeven Gold Balls mark'd with the letter *A* into the Urn, with ſo many Silver ones as ſhall bring them even with the number of the Deputies, who 7. Order.

being ſworn, as before, at the Ballot of the Pariſh to make a fair Election, ſhall be call'd to the Urn; and every man coming in manner as was there ſhew'd, ſhall draw one Ball, which if it be Silver, he ſhall caſt it into a Bowl ſtanding at the foot of the Urn, and return to his place; but the firſt that draws a Gold Ball (ſhewing it to the Overſeers, who if it has not the letter of the preſent Ballot, have power to apprehend and puniſh him) is the firſt Elector, the ſecond the ſecond Elector, and ſo to the ſeventh; which Order they are to obſerve in their function. The Electors as they are drawn ſhall be plac'd upon the Bench by the Overſeers, till the whole number be complete, and then be conducted, with the Liſt of the Officers to be choſen, into a place apart, where being private, the firſt Elector ſhall name a Perſon to the firſt Office in the Liſt; and if the Perſon ſo nam'd, being balloted by the reſt of the Electors, attains not to the better half of the Suffrages in the Affirmative, the firſt Elector ſhall continue nominating others, till one of them ſo nominated by him attains to the plurality of the Suffrages in the Affirmative, and be written firſt Competitor to the firſt Office. This done, the ſecond Elector ſhall obſerve in his turn the like Order; and ſo the reſt of the Electors, naming Competitors each to his reſpective Office in the Liſt, till one Competitor be choſen to every Office: And when one Competitor is choſen to every Office, the firſt Elector ſhall begin again to name a ſecond Competitor to the firſt Office, and the reſt ſucceſſively ſhall name to the reſt of the Offices till two Competitors be choſen to every Office; the like ſhall be repeated till three Competitors be choſen to every Office. And when three Competitors are choſen to every Office, the Liſt ſhall be return'd to the Overſeers, or ſuch as the Overſeers, in caſe they or either of them happen'd to be Electors, have ſubſtituted in his or their place or places: and the Overſeers or Subſtitutes having caus'd the Liſt to be read to the Congregation, ſhall put the Competitors, in order as they are written, to the Ballot of the Congregation; and the reſt of the Proceedings being carried on in the manner directed in the Fifth Order, that Competitor, of the three written to each Office, who has moſt of the Suffrages above half in the Affirmative, is the Officer. The Liſt being after this manner compleated, ſhall be entered into a Regiſter, to be kept at the Rendevouz of the Hundred, under inſpection of the Magiſtrates of the ſame, after the manner following:

Anno Domini

The Liſt of the Nebuloſa.

A. A. Ord. Eq.	Juſtice of the Peace	*of the Hundred of—in the Tribe of—which Hundred conſiſts at this Election of 105 Deputies.*
B. B. Ord. Eq.	Firſt Juryman	
C. C. Ord. Eq.	Captain of the Hundred	
D. D. Ord. Eq.	Enſign	
E. E.	Second Juryman	
F. F.	High Conſtable	
G. G.	Crowner	

THE Liſt being entered, the High Conſtable ſhall take three Copies of the ſame, whereof he ſhall preſently return one to the Lord High Sheriff of the Tribe, a ſecond to the Lord *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, and a third to the Cenſors; or theſe, thro' the want of ſuch Magiſtrates at the firſt muſter, may be returned to the Orator, to be appointed for that Tribe. To the obſervations of all and every part of this Order, the

the Officers and Deputies of the Hundred are all and every of them oblig'd, as they will anſwer it to the *Phylarch*, who has power in caſe of failure in the whole or any part, to fine all or any of them ſo failing at diſcretion, or according to ſuch Laws as ſhall hereafter be provided in that caſe; but under an Appeal to the Parliament.

THERE is little in this Order worthy of any further account, but that it anſwers to the Rulers of Hundreds in *Iſrael*, to the *Mora* or Military part of the Tribe in *Lacedemon*, and to the Century in *Rome*. The Jurymen, being two in a Hundred, and ſo forty in a Tribe, give the Latitude allow'd by the Law for exceptions. And whereas the Golden Balls at this Ballot begin to be mark'd with Letters, whereof one is to be drawn immediately before it begins; this is to the end that the Letter being unknown, Men may be fruſtrated of tricks or foul play, whereas otherwiſe a Man might bring a Golden Ball with him, and make as if he had drawn it out of the Urn. The Surveyors, when they had taken Copies of theſe Liſts, had accompliſh'd their work in the Hundreds.

SO a Hundred is the ſecond Diviſion of Land occaſion'd by the ſecond Collection of the People, whoſe Civil and Military Functions proper to this place are compriz'd in the foregoing Order. *Definition of the Hundred*

HAVING ſtated the Hundreds, they met once again by Twenties, where there was nothing more eaſy than to caſt every twenty Hundreds, as they lay moſt conveniently together, into one Tribe; ſo the whole Territory of *Oceana*, conſiſting of about ten thouſand Pariſhes, came to be caſt into one thouſand Hundreds, and into fifty Tribes. In every Tribe at the place appointed for the annual Rendevouz of the ſame, were then, or ſoon after, begun thoſe Buildings which are now called *Pavilions*; each of them ſtanding with one open ſide upon fair Columns, like the porch of ſome antient Temple, and looking into a Field, capable of the muſter of ſome four thouſand Men: Before each Pavilion ſtand three Pillars ſuſtaining Urns for the Ballot, that on the right-hand equal in height to the brow of a Horſeman, being call'd the *Horſe Urn*; that on the left-hand, with Bridges on either ſide to bring it equal in height with the brow of a Footman, being called the *Foot Urn*; and the *middle Urn* with a Bridge on the ſide towards the Foot Urn, the other ſide, as left for the Horſe, being without one: and here ended the whole work of the Surveyors, who returned to the Lord ARCHON with this. *Inſtitution of the Tribe.* *Of the Pavilion.*

Account of the Charge.

	l.	*s.*	
IMPRIMIS, Urns, Balls, and Balloting Boxes for ten thouſand Pariſhes, the ſame being wooden Ware,	20000	00	*The whole Charge of the Inſtitution.*
ITEM, Proviſions of the like kind for a thouſand Hundreds,	3000	00	
ITEM, Urns and Balls of Metal, with Balloting Boxes for fifty Tribes,	2000	00	
ITEM, For erecting of fifty Pavilions,	60000	00	
ITEM, Wages for four Surveyors General at 1000 *l.* a Man,	4000	00	
ITEM, Wages for the reſt of the Surveyors, being 1000, at 250 *l.* a Man,	250000	00	
Sum Total,	339000	00	

THIS

THIS is no great matter of charge for the building of a Common-wealth, in regard that it has coſt (which was pleaded by the Surveyors) as much to rig a few Ships. Nevertheleſs that proves not them to be honeſt, nor their account to be juſt; but they had their Money for once, tho' their reckoning be plainly guilty of a Crime, to coſt him his Neck that commits it another time, it being impoſſible for a Common-wealth (without an exact proviſion that it be not abus'd in this kind) to ſubſiſt: for if no regard ſhould be had of the Charge (tho' that may go deep) yet the Debauchery and Corruption, whereto, by negligence in Accounts, it infallibly expoſes its Citizens, and thereby leſſens the public Faith, which is the Nerve and Ligament of Government, ought to be prevented. But the Surveyors being diſpatch'd, the Lord ARCHON was very curious in giving names to his Tribes, which having caus'd to be written in Scrols caſt into an Urn, and preſented to the Counſellors, each of them drew one, and was accordingly ſent to the Tribe in his lot, as Orators of the ſame, a Magiſtracy no otherwiſe inſtituted, than for once and *pro tempore*, to the end that the Council upon ſo great an occaſion might both congratulate with the Tribes, and aſſiſt at the firſt muſter in ſome things of neceſſity to be differently carry'd from the eſtabliſhed Adminiſtration, and future Courſe of the Common-wealth.

THE Orators being arrived, every one as ſoon as might be, at the Rendevouz of his Tribe, gave notice to the Hundreds, and ſummon'd, the Muſter, which appeared for the moſt part upon good Horſes, and already indifferently well arm'd; as to inſtance in one for all, the Tribe of *Nubia*, where HERMES DE CADUCEO, Lord Orator of the ſame, after a ſhort ſalutation and a hearty welcome, apply'd himſelf to his buſineſs, which began with

8. Order. *THE eighth ORDER, requiring*, That the Lord High Sheriff as Commander in Chief, and the Lord *Cuſtos Rotulorum* as Muſtermaſter of the Tribe (or the Orator for the firſt Muſter) upon reception of the Liſts of their Hundreds, return'd to them by the High Conſtables of the ſame, preſently cauſe them to be caſt up, dividing the Horſe from the Foot, and liſting the Horſe by their names in Troops, each Troop containing about a hundred in number, to be inſcrib'd, firſt, ſecond, or third Troop, *&c.* according to the Order agreed upon by the ſaid Magiſtrates: Which done, they ſhall liſt the Foot in like manner, and inſcribe the Companies in like order. Theſe Liſts upon the Eve of the Muſter ſhall be deliver'd to certain Trumpeters and Drummers, whereof there ſhall be fifteen of each ſort (as well for the preſent as other uſes to be hereafter mentioned) ſtipendiated by the Tribe. And the Trumpeters and Drummers ſhall be in the Field before the Pavilion, upon the day of the Muſter, ſo ſoon as it is light, where they ſhall ſtand every one with his Liſt in his hand, at a due diſtance, plac'd according to the Order of the Liſt; the Trumpeters with the Liſts of the Horſe on the right-hand, and the Drummers with the Liſts of the Foot on the left-hand: where having ſounded a while, each of them ſhall begin to call, and continue calling the names of the Deputies, as they come into the field, till both the Horſe and Foot be gather'd by that means into their due Order. The Horſe and Foot being in order, the Lord Lieutenant of the Tribe ſhall caſt ſo many Gold Balls mark'd with the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, *&c.* as there be Troops of Horſe in the Field, together with ſo many Silver Balls as there be Companies, mark'd in the ſame manner, into a little Urn, to which

which he ſhall call the Captains; and the Captains drawing the Gold Balls ſhall command the Horſe, and thoſe that draw the Silver the Foot, each in the order of his Lot. The like ſhall be done by the Conductor at the ſame time for the Enſigns at another Urn; and they that draw the Gold Balls ſhall be Cornets, the reſt Enſigns.

THIS Order may puzzle the Reader, but tends to a wonderful ſpeed of the Muſter, to which it would be a great matter to loſe a day in ranging and martialling, whereas by virtue of this the Tribe is no ſooner in the field than in Battalia, nor ſooner in Battalia than call'd to the Urns or the Ballot by virtue of

THE ninth ORDER, whereby the Cenſors (or the Orator for the firſt Muſter) upon reception of the Liſts of the Hundreds from the High Conſtables, according as is directed by the ſeventh Order, are to make their Notes for the Urns beforehand, with regard had to the Liſts of the Magiſtrates, to be elected by the enſuing Orders; that is to ſay, by the firſt Liſt call'd the *prime Magnitude*, ſix; and by the ſecond call'd the *Galaxy*, nine. Wherefore the Cenſors are to put into the middle Urn for the Election of the firſt Liſt twenty four Gold Balls, with twenty ſix Blanks or Silver Balls, in all ſixty; and into the ſide Urns ſixty Gold Balls divided into each according to the different number of the Horſe and the Foot: that is to ſay, if the Horſe and the Foot be equal, equally; and if the Horſe and the Foot be inequal, inequally, by an Arithmetical Proportion. The like ſhall be done the ſecond day of the Muſter, for the ſecond Liſt, except that the Cenſors ſhall put into the middle Urn 36 Gold Balls with 24 Blanks, in all ſixty; and ſixty Gold Balls into the ſide Urns, divided reſpectively into the number of the Horſe and the Foot: and the Gold Balls in the ſide Urns at either Ballot are by the addition of Blanks to be brought even with the number of the Ballotans at either Urn reſpectively. The Cenſors having prepar'd their Notes, as has been ſhewn, and being come at the day appointed into the Field, ſhall preſent a little Urn to the Lord High Sheriff, who is to draw twice for the Letters to be us'd that day, the one at the ſide Urns, and the other at the middle. And the Cenſors having fitted the Urns accordingly, ſhall place themſelves in certain moveable Seats or Pulpits (to be kept for that uſe in the Pavilion) the firſt Cenſor before the Horſe Urn, the ſecond before the Foot Urn, the Lord Lieutenant doing the Office of Cenſor *pro tempore* at the middle Urn; where all and every one of them ſhall cauſe the Laws of the Ballot to be diligently obſerv'd, taking a ſpecial care that no man be ſuffer'd to come above once to the Urn (whereof it more particularly concerns the Subcenſors, that is to ſay, the Overſeers of every Pariſh, to be careful; they being each in this regard reſponſible for their reſpective Pariſhes) or to draw above one Ball, which if it be Gold, he is to preſent to the Cenſor, who ſhall look upon the Letter; and if it be not that of the day, and of the reſpective Urn, apprehend the Party, who for this or any other like diſorder, is obnoxious to the *Phylarch*. 9. Order.

THIS Order being obſerv'd by the Cenſors, it is not poſſible for the People, if they can but draw the Balls, tho' they underſtand nothing at all of the Ballot, to be out. To philoſophize further upon this Art, tho' there be nothing more rational, were not worth the while; becauſe in writing it will be perplex'd, and the firſt practice of it gives the demonſtration: whence it came to paſs, that the Orator after ſome

needleſs pains in the explanation of the two foregoing Orders, betaking himſelf to exemplify the ſame, found the work done to his hand; for the Tribe, as eager upon a buſineſs of this nature, had retain'd one of the Surveyors, out of whom (before the Orator arriv'd) they had got the whole Myſtery by a ſtolen Muſter, at which in order to the Ballot they had made certain Magiſtrates *pro tempore*. Wherefore he found not only the Pavilion (for this time a Tent) erected with three Poſts ſupplying the place of Pillars to the Urns; but the Urns being prepar'd with a juſt number of Balls for the firſt Ballot, to become the Field, and the occaſion very gallantly, with their Covers made in the manner of Helmets, open at either ear to give paſſage to the hands of the Ballotants, and flanting with noble Plumes to direct the March of the People. Wherefore he proceeded to

10. Order. *THE tenth ORDER*, requiring of the Deputies of the Pariſhes, That upon every Monday next enſuing the laſt of *February*, they make their perſonal appearance, Horſe and Foot in Arms accordingly, at the Rendevouz of the Tribe; where being in Diſcipline, the Horſe upon the right, and the Foot upon the left, before the Pavilion, and having made Oath by holding up their hands upon the tender of it by the Lord High Sheriff, to make Election without favour, and of ſuch only as they ſhall judge fitteſt for the Common-wealth: The Conductor ſhall take three Balls, the one inſcrib'd with theſe words [*outward Files*] another with theſe words [*inward Files*] and the third with theſe [*middle Files*] which Balls he ſhall caſt into a litle Urn, and preſent it to the Lord High Sheriff, who, drawing one, ſhall give the words of Command, as they are thereupon inſcrib'd, and the Ballot ſhall begin accordingly. For example, if the Ball be inſcrib'd *middle Files*, the Ballot ſhall begin by the middle; that is, the two Files that are middle to the Horſe, ſhall draw out firſt to the Horſe Urn, and the two Files that are middle to the Foot, ſhall draw out firſt to the Foot Urn, and be follow'd by all the reſt of the Files as they are next to them in order. The like ſhall be done by the inward, or by the outward Files, in caſe they be firſt call'd. And the Files, as every Man has drawn his Ball, if it be Silver, ſhall begin at the Urn to countermarch to their places; but he that has drawn a Gold Ball at a ſide Urn, ſhall proceed to the middle Urn, where if the Ball he draws be Silver, he alſo ſhall countermarch: But if it be Gold, he ſhall take his place upon a form ſet croſs the Pavilion, with his face toward the Lord High Sheriff, who ſhall be ſeated in the middle of the Pavilion, with certain Clerks by him, one of which ſhall write down the names of every Elector, that is, of every one that drew a Gold Ball at the middle Urn, and in the Order his Ball was drawn, till the Electors amount to ſix in number. And the firſt ſix Electors; Horſe and Foot promiſcuouſly, are the firſt Order of Electors; the ſecond ſix (ſtill accounting them as they are drawn) the ſecond Order; the third ſix, the third Order; and the fourth ſix, the fourth Order of Electors: every Elector having place in his order, according to the order wherein he was drawn. But ſo ſoon as the firſt Order of Electors is compleat, the Lord High Sheriff ſhall ſend them with a Copy of the following Liſt, and a Clerk that underſtands the Ballot, immediately to a little Tent ſtanding before the Pavilion in his Eye, to which no other Perſon but themſelves, during the Election, ſhall approach. The Liſt ſhall be written in this manner:

Anno

Anno Domini

The Liſt of the Prime Magnitude or firſt days Election of Magiſtrates.

1. The Lord High Sheriff, *Commander in Chief*
2. Lord Lieutenant
3. Lord Cuſtos Rotulorum, *Muſtermaſter General*
4. The Conductor, *being Quartermaſter General*
5. The firſt Cenſor
6. The ſecond Cenſor

of the Tribe of Nubia *containing at this preſent Muſter* 700 *Horſe, and* 1500 *Foot, in all* 2200 *Deputies.*

Inſtitution of the Prime Magnitude.

AND the Electors of the firſt hand or order, being ſix, ſhall each of them name to his reſpective Magiſtracy in the left ſuch as are not already elected in the Hundreds, till one Competitor be choſen to every Magiſtracy in the Liſt by the Ballot of the Electors of the firſt Order; which done, the Liſt with the Competitors thereunto annex'd ſhall be return'd to the Lord High Sheriff by the Clerk attending that Order, but the Electors ſhall keep their places: for they have already given their Suffrage, and may not enter into the Ballot of the Tribe. If there ariſes any Diſpute in an Order of Electors, one of the Cenſors or Subcenſors appointed by them in caſe they be Electors, ſhall enter into the Tent of that Order; and that Order ſhall ſtand to his Judgment in the deciſion of the Controverſy. The like ſhall be done exactly by each other Order of Electors, being ſent as they are drawn, each with another Copy of the ſame Liſt, into a diſtinct Tent, till there be return'd to the Lord High Sheriff four Competitors to every Magiſtracy in the Liſt; that is to ſay, one Competitor elected to every Office in every one of the four Orders: which Competitors the Lord High Sheriff ſhall cauſe to be pronounced or read by a Crier to the Congregation; and the Congregation having heard the whole Liſts repeated, the Names ſhall be put by the Lord High Sheriff to the Tribe, one by one, beginning with the firſt Competitor in the firſt order, thence proceeding to the firſt Competitor in the ſecond Order, and ſo to the firſt in the third and fourth Orders. And the Suffrages being taken in boxes by Boys *(as has been already ſhewn)* ſhall be power'd into the Bowls ſtanding before the Cenſors, who ſhall be ſeated at each end of the Table in the Pavilion, the one numbring the Affirmatives, and the other the Negatives; and he, of the four Competitors to the firſt Magiſtracy, that has moſt above half the Suffrages of the Tribe in the Affirmative, is the firſt Magiſtrate. The like is to be done ſucceſſively by the reſt of the Competitors in their order. But becauſe ſoon after the Boxes are ſent out for the firſt name, there be others ſent out for the ſecond, and ſo for the third, *&c.* by which means divers names are ſucceſſively at one and the ſame time in balloting; the Boy that carries a Box ſhall ſing or repeat continually the name of the Competitor for whom that Box is carrying, with that alſo of the Magiſtracy to which he is propos'd. A Magiſtrate of the Tribe happening to be an Elector, may ſubſtitute any one of his own Order to execute his other Function. The Magiſtrates of the Prime Magnitude being thus elected, ſhall receive the preſent Charge of the Tribe.

IF it be objected againſt this Order, that the Magiſtrates to be elected by it, will be Men of more inferior rank than thoſe of the Hundreds, in regard that thoſe are choſen firſt; it may be remember'd,

ber'd, that ſo were the Burgeſſes in the former Government, nevertheleſs the Knights of the Shire were Men of greater quality: And the Election at the Hundred is made by a Council of Electors, of whom leſs cannot be expected than the diſcretion of naming Perſons fitteſt for thoſe Capacities, with an Eye upon theſe to be elected at the Tribe. As for what may be objected in point of Difficulty, it is demonſtrable by the foregoing Orders, that a Man might bring ten thouſand Men (if there were occaſion) with as much eaſe, and as ſuddenly to perform the Ballot, as he can make five thouſand Men (drawing them out by double Files) to march a quarter of a mile. But becauſe at this Ballot, to go up and down the Field, diſtributing the linen Pellets to every Man, with which he is to ballot or give ſuffrage, would loſe a great deal of time, therefore a Man's Wife, his Daughters, or others, make him his proviſion of Pellets before the Ballot; and he comes into the field with a matter of a ſcore of them in his pocket. And now I have as good as done with the ſport. The next is

11. Order. *Functions of the Magiſtrates of the Prime Magnitude.*

THE Eleventh ORDER, explaining the Duties and Functions of the Magiſtrates contain'd in the Liſt of the Prime Magnitude: And thoſe of the Hundreds, beginning with the Lord High Sheriff, who, over and above his more antient Offices, and thoſe added by the former Order, is the firſt Magiſtrate of the *Phylarch*, or Prerogative Troop. The Lord Lieutenant, over and above his Duty mention'd, is Commander in Chief of the Muſters of the Youth, and ſecond Magiſtrate of the *Phylarch*. The *Cuſtos Rotulorum* is to return the yearly Muſter-rolls of the Tribe, as well that of the Youth as of the Elders, to the Rolls in *Emporium*, and is the third Magiſtrate of the *Phylarch*. The Cenſors by themſelves, add their Subcenſors, that is, the Overſeers of the Pariſhes, are to ſee that the reſpective Laws of the Ballot be obſerv'd in all the popular Aſſemblies of the Tribe. They have power alſo to put ſuch National Miniſters, as in Preaching ſhall intermeddle with matters of Government, out of their Livings; except the Party appeals to the *Phylarch*, or to the Council of Religion, where in that caſe the Cenſors ſhall proſecute. All and every one of theſe Magiſtrates, together with the Juſtices of Peace, and the Jurymen of the Hundreds, amounting in the whole number to threeſcore and ſix, are the Prerogative Troop or *Phylarch* of the Tribe.

THE Function of the *Phylarch* or Prerogative Troop is fivefold.

Functions of the Phylarch.

FIRST, They are the Council of the Tribe, and as ſuch to govern the Muſters of the ſame according to the foregoing Orders, having cognizance of what has paſt in the Congregation or Elections made in the Pariſhes or the Hundreds, with power to puniſh any undue practices, or variation from their reſpective Rules and Orders, under an Appeal to the Parliament. A Marriage legitimatly is to be pronounc'd by the Parochial Congregation, the Muſter of the Hundred, or the *Phylarch*. And if a Tribe have a deſire (which they are to expreſs at the Muſter by their Captains, every Troop by his own) to petition the Parliament, the *Phylarch*, as the Council, ſhall frame the Petition in the Pavilion, and propoſe it by Clauſes to the Ballot of the whole Tribe; and the Clauſes that ſhall be affirm'd by the Ballot of the Tribe, and ſign'd by the hands of the ſix Magiſtrates of the Prime Magnitude, ſhall be received and eſteemed by the Parliament as the Petition of the Tribe, and no other.

SECONDLY,

SECONDLY, The *Phylarch* has power to call to their aſſiſtance what other Troops of the Tribe they pleaſe (be they Elders or Youth, whoſe Diſcipline will be hereafter directed) and with theſe to receive the Judges *Itinerant* in their Circuits, whom the Magiſtrates of the *Phylarch* ſhall aſſiſt upon the Bench, and the Juries elſewhere in their proper functions according to the more antient Laws and Cuſtoms of this Nation.

THIRDLY, The *Phylarch* ſhall hold the Court call'd the *Quarter Seſſions* according to the antient Cuſtom, and therein ſhall alſo hear Cauſes in order to the protection of Liberty of Conſcience, by ſuch Rules as are or ſhall hereafter be appointed by the Parliament.

FOURTHLY, All Commiſſions, iſſu'd into the Tribes by the Parliament, or by the Chancery, are to be directed to the *Phylarch*, or ſome of that Troop, and executed by the ſame reſpectively.

FIFTHLY, In the caſe of Levies of Money the Parliament ſhall tax the Phylarchs, the Phylarchs ſhall tax the Hundreds, the Hundreds the Pariſhes, and the Pariſhes ſhall levy it upon themſelves. The Pariſhes having levy'd the Tax Money, accordingly ſhall return it to the Officers of the Hundreds, the Hundreds to the Phylarchs, and the Phylarchs to the *Exchequer*. But if a man has ten Children living, he ſhall pay no Taxes; if he has five living, he ſhall pay but half Taxes; if he has been marry'd three years, or be above twenty five years of Age, and has no Child or Children lawfully begotten, he ſhall pay double Taxes. And if there happen to grow any diſpute upon theſe or ſuch other Orders, as ſhall or may hereto be added hereafter, the Phylarchs ſhall judge the Tribes, and the Parliament ſhall judge the Phylarchs. For the reſt, if any man ſhall go about to introduce the right or power of Debate into any popular Council or Congregation of this Nation, the Phylarch or any Magiſtrate of the Hundred, or of the Tribe, ſhall cauſe him preſently to be ſent in cuſtody to the Council of War.

Inſtitution of the Roll call'd the Pillar of Nilus.

THE part of the Order relating to the Rolls in *Emporium* being of ſingular uſe, is not unworthy to be ſomewhat better open'd. In what manner the Liſts of the Pariſhes, Hundreds, and Tribes are made, has been ſhewn in their reſpective Orders, where after the Parties are elected, they give an account of the whole number of the Elders or Deputies in their reſpective Aſſemblies or Muſters; the like for this part exactly is done by the Youth in their Diſcipline (to be hereafter ſhewn) wherefore the Liſts of the Pariſhes, Youth and Elders, being ſum'd up, give the whole number of the People able to bear Arms; and the Liſts of the Tribes, Youth and Elders, being ſum'd up, give the whole number of the People bearing Arms. This account, being annually recorded by the Maſter of the Rolls, is call'd the *Pillar of Nilus*, becauſe the People being the Riches of the Common-wealth, as they are found to riſe or fall by the degrees of this Pillar, like that River, give an account of the Public Harveſt,

THUS much for the Deſcription of the firſt days work at the Muſter, which happen'd, as has been ſhewn, to be done as ſoon as ſaid: for as in practice it is of ſmall difficulty, ſo requires it not much time, ſeeing the great Council of *Venice*, conſiſting of a like number, begins at twelve of the Clock, and elects nine Magiſtrates in one Afternoon. But the Tribe being diſmiſt for this night, repair'd to their Quarters, under the conduct of their new Magiſtrates. The next morning returning into the field very early, the Orator proceeded to

THE twelfth ORDER, directing the Muſter of the Tribe in the ſecond days Election, being that of the Liſt call'd the *Galaxy*; in which the Cenſors ſhall prepare the Urns according to the Directions given in the ninth Order for the ſecond Ballot; this is to ſay, with 36 Gold Balls in the middle Urn, making four Orders, and nine Electors in every Order, according to the number of the Magiſtrates in the Liſt of the *Galaxy*, which is as follows:

1. Knight
2. Knight } to be choſen out of the Horſe.

3. Deputy
4. Deputy } to be choſen out of the Horſe.
5. Deputy

6. Deputy
7. Deputy
8. Deputy } to be choſen out of the Foot.
9. Deputy

THE reſt of the Ballot ſhall proceed exactly according to that of the firſt day. But foraſmuch as the Common-wealth demands as well the fruits of a man's body as of his mind, he that has not been marry'd ſhall not be capable of theſe Magiſtracies till he be marry'd. If a Deputy, already choſen to be an Officer in the Pariſh, in the Hundred, or in the Tribe, be afterwards choſen of the *Galaxy*, it ſhall be lawful for him to deligate his Office in the Pariſh, in the Hundred, or in the Tribe, to any one of his own Order, being not already choſen into Office. The Knights and Deputies being choſen, ſhall be brought to the head of the Tribe by the Lord High Sheriff, who ſhall adminiſter to them this Oath; *Ye ſhall well and truly obſerve and keep the Orders and Cuſtoms of this Common-wealth which the People have choſen.* And if any of them ſhall refuſe the Oath, he ſhall be rejected, and that Competitor which had the moſt voices next ſhall be call'd in his place; who if he takes the Oath ſhall be enter'd in the Liſt; but if he alſo refuſes the Oath, he who had moſt voices next ſhall be call'd, and ſo till the number of nine out of thoſe Competitors which had moſt voices be ſworn Knights and Deputies of the *Galaxy*. [*This Clauſe, in regard of the late Diviſions, and to the end that no violence be offer'd to any man's Conſcience, to be of force but for the firſt three years only.*] The Knights of the *Galaxy* being elected and ſworn, are to repair, by the Monday next enſuing the laſt of *March*, to the *Pantheon* or Palace of Juſtice, ſituated in the Metropolis of this Common-wealth (except the Parliament, by reaſon of a contagious Sickneſs, or ſome other occaſion, has adjourn'd to another part of the Nation) where they are to take their places in the Senate, and continue in full Power and Commiſſion, as Senators, for the full term of three years next enſuing the date of their Election. The Deputies of the *Galaxy* are to repair by the ſame day (except as before excepted) to the *Halo* ſituated in *Emporium*, where they are to be liſted of the Prerogative Tribe, or equal Repreſentative of the People; and to continue in full Power and Commiſſion as their Deputies for the full term of three years next enſuing their Election. But foraſmuch as the term of every Magiſtracy or Office in this Common-wealth requires an equal vaca-

tion,

tion, a Knight or Deputy of the *Galaxy*, having fulfil'd his term of three years, ſhall not be re-elected into the ſame *Galaxy*, or any other, till he has alſo fulfil'd his three years vacation.

WHOEVER ſhall rightly conſider the foregoing Orders will be as little able to find how it is poſſible, that a worſhipful Knight ſhould declare himſelf in Ale and Beef worthy to ſerve his Country, as how my Lord High Sheriff's Honour, in caſe he were protected from the Law, could play the knave. But tho' the foregoing Orders, ſo far as they regard the Conſtitution of the Senate and the People, requiring no more as to an ordinary Election than is therein explain'd, that is but one third part of their Knights and Deputies, are perfect; yet muſt we in this place, and as to the Inſtitution, of neceſſity erect a Scaffold. For the Common-wealth to the firſt creation of her Councils in full number, requir'd thrice as many as are eligible by the foregoing Orders. Wherefore the Orator, whoſe aid in this place was moſt neceſſary, rightly informing the People of the reaſon, ſtaid them two days longer at the Muſter, and took this courſe. One Liſt containing two Knights and ſeven Deputies, he caus'd to be choſen upon the ſecond day; which Liſt being call'd the *firſt Galaxy*, qualify'd the Parties elected of it with power for the term of one year and no longer: another Liſt containing two Knights and ſeven Deputies more, he caus'd to be choſen the third day, which Liſt being call'd the *ſecond Galaxy*, qualify'd the Parties elected of it with Power for the term of two years and no longer. And upon the fourth day he choſe the *third Galaxy*, according as it is directed by the Order, impower'd for three years; which Liſts ſucceſſively falling (like the Signs or Conſtellations of one Hemiſphere, which ſetting, cauſe thoſe of the other to riſe) caſt the great Orbs of this Common-wealth into an annual, triennial, and perpetual Revolution.

THE buſineſs of the Muſter being thus happily finiſh'd, HERMES DE CADUCEO, Lord Orator of the Tribe of *Nubia*, being now put into her firſt Rapture, caus'd one of the Cenſors Pulpits to be planted in front of the Squadron, and aſcending into the ſame, ſpeak after this manner.

My Lords, the Magiſtrates and the People of the Tribe of Nubia.

" WE have this day ſolemniz'd the happy Nuptials of the two
" greateſt Princes that are upon the Earth or in Nature, ARMS
" and COUNCILS: in the mutual Embraces whereof conſiſts your
" whole COMMON-WEALTH; whoſe Councils upon their perpe-
" tual Wheelings, Marches, and Countermarches, create her Armies;
" and whoſe Armies with the golden Vollies of the BALLOT at once
" create and ſalute her Councils. There be thoſe (ſuch is the World
" at preſent) that think it ridiculous to ſee a Nation exerciſing its Ci-
" vil Functions in Military Diſcipline; while they, committing their
" Buff to their Servants, come themſelves to hold Trenchards. For
" what avails it ſuch as are unarm'd, or (which is all one) whoſe
" Education acquaints them not with the proper uſe of their Swords,
" to be called Citizens? What were two or three thouſand of you, tho'
" never ſo well affected to your Country, but naked, to one Troop of

" Merce-

" Mercenary Soldiers? If they ſhould come upon the Field and ſay, " Gentlemen, It is thought fit that ſuch and ſuch Men ſhould be choſen " by you; where were your Liberty? Or, Gentlemen, Parliaments " are exceeding good, but you are to have a little patience, theſe times " are not ſo fit for them; where were your Common-wealth? What " cauſes the Monarchy of the *Turks* but Servants in Arms? What was " it that begot the glorious Common-wealth of *Rome*, but the Sword " in the hands of her Citizens? Wherefore my glad Eyes ſalute the Se- " renity and Brightneſs of this day with a ſhower that ſhall not cloud " it. Behold the Army of *Iſrael* become a Common-wealth, and the " Common-wealth of *Iſrael* remaining an Army, with her Rulers of Tens " and of Fifties, her Rulers of Hundreds and Thouſands, drawing near " (as this day throughout our happy Fields) to the Lot by her Tribes, " increas'd above threefold, and led up by her *Phylarchs* or Princes, to " ſit upon * fifty Thrones, judging the fifty Tribes of *Oceana!* Or, Is " it *Athens*, breaking from her Iron Sepulcher, where ſhe has been ſo " long trampled by Hoſts of *Janizaries*? For certainly that is the voice " of THESEUS, having gathered his ſcatter'd *Athenians* into one City. " † This freeborn Nation lives not upon the Dole or Bounty of one " man, but diſtributing her annual Magiſtracies and Honours with her " own hand, is her ſelf King PEOPLE—*(at which the Orator was a " while interrupted with ſhouts, but at length proceeded)*—Is it grave " *Lacedemon* in her arm'd Tribe divided by her *Obæ* and her *Mora*, " which appears to chide me that I teach the People to talk, or con- " ceive ſuch Language as is dreſt like a Woman, to be a fit Uſher of the " Joys of Liberty into the hearts of men? Is it *Rome* in her victorious " Arms (for ſo ſhe held her *Concio* or Congregation) that congratu- " lates with us, for finding out that which ſhe could not hit on, and " binding up her *Comitia Curiata*, *Centuriata*, and *Tributa*, in one in- " violable League of Union? Or is it the Great Council of incompa- " rable *Venice*, bowling forth by the ſelf ſame Ballot her immortal " Common-wealth? For, neither by Reaſon nor by Experience is it " impoſſible that a Common-wealth ſhould be immortal; ſeeing the " People being the Materials, never die; and the Form, which is " Motion, muſt, without oppoſition, be endleſs. The Bowl which " is thrown from your hand, if there be no rub, no impediment, " ſhall never ceaſe: for which cauſe the glorious Luminaries that are " the Bowls of God, were once thrown for ever; and next theſe, " thoſe of *Venice*. But certainly, my Lords, whatever theſe great " Examples may have ſhewn us, we are the firſt that have ſhewn to " the World a Common-wealth eſtabliſh'd in her riſe upon fifty ſuch " Towers, and ſo garnizon'd as are the Tribes of *Oceana*, containing " a hundred thouſand Elders upon the annual Liſt, and yet but an " Out-guard; beſides her marching Armies to be equal in the Diſci- " pline, and in the number of her Youth.

" AND foraſmuch as Sovereign Power is a neceſſary but a for- " midable Creature, not unlike the Powder which (as you are Soldiers) " is at once your Safety and your Danger, being ſubject to take fire

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* Sellis Curulibus.

†——————Hæc juris ſui
Parere Domino Civitas uni negat:
Rex ipſe Populus annuas mandat vices
Honoris huic illive.——————

" againſt

" againſt you as well as for you; how well and ſecurly is ſhe by your
" *Galaxys* ſo collected as to be in full force and vigour, and yet ſo diſtri-
" buted that it is impoſſible you ſhould be blown up by your own Ma-
" gazine? Let them who will have it, that Power if it be confin'd
" connot be Sovereign, tell us, whether our Rivers do not enjoy a more
" ſecure and fruitful Reign within their proper banks, than if it were
" lawful for them, in ravaging our Harveſts, to ſpill themſelves?
" Whether Souls, not confin'd to their peculiar Bodies, do govern them
" any more than thoſe of Witches in their Trances? Whether Power,
" not confin'd to the bounds of Reaſon and Virtue, has any other
" bounds than thoſe of Vice and Paſſion? Or if Vice and Paſſion be
" boundleſs, and Reaſon and Virtue have certain Limits, on which of
" theſe Thrones holy men ſhould anoint their Sovereign? But to blow
" away this duſt, The Sovereign Power of a Common-wealth is no more
" bounded, that is to ſay ſtraitened, than that of a Monarch; but is
" balanc'd. The Eagle mounts not to her proper pitch, if ſhe be
" bounded; nor is free, if ſhe be not balanc'd. And leſt a Monarch
" ſhould think he can reach further with his Scepter, the Roman Eagle
" upon ſuch a Balance ſpread her Wings from the Ocean to *Euphrates*.
" Receive the Sovereign Power; you have receiv'd it, hold it faſt, im-
" brace it for ever in your ſhining Arms. The virtue of the Loadſtone
" is not impair'd or limited, but receives ſtrength and nouriſhment by
" being bound in Iron. And ſo giving your Lordſhips much Joy, I
" take my leave of this Tribe.

THE Orator deſcending, had the period of his Speech made with a vaſt applauſe and exultation of the whole tribe, attending him for that night to his quarter, as the *Phylarch* with ſome commanded Troops did the next day to the Frontiers of the Tribe, where leave was taken on both ſides with more Tears than Grief.

SO, a Tribe is the third Diviſion of Land occaſion'd by the third Collection of the People, whoſe Functions proper to that place are contain'd in the five foregoing Orders. *Definition of the Tribe.*

THE Inſtitution of the Common-wealth was ſuch as needed thoſe Props and Scaffolds which may have troubled the Reader; but I ſhall here take them away, and come to the Conſtitution which ſtands by it ſelf, and yields a clearer proſpect.

THE motions, by what has been already ſhewn, are Spherical; and Spherical Motions have their proper Center: for which cauſe (e're I proceed further) it will be neceſſary, for the better underſtanding of the whole, that I diſcover the Center whereupon the Motions of this Common-wealth are form'd. *Conſtitution of the Common-wealth.*

THE Center, or Baſis of every Government, is no other than the Fundamental Laws of the ſame.

FUNDAMENTAL Laws are ſuch as ſtate what it is that a Man may call his own, that is to ſay, Property; and what the Means be whereby a Man may enjoy his own, that is to ſay, Protection. The firſt is alſo call'd Dominion, and the ſecond Empire or Sovereign Power, whereof this (as has been ſhewn) is the natural product of the former; for ſuch as is the Balance of Dominion in a Nation, ſuch is the nature of its Empire.

WHEREFORE the Fundamental Laws of *Oceana*, or the Center of this Common-wealth, are the Agrarian and the Ballot: The Agra-

rian by the Balance of Dominion preſerving Equality in the Root; and the Ballot by an equal Rotation conveying it into the Branch, or Exerciſe of Sovereign Power: As, to begin with the former, appears by

13. Order. *THE thirteenth ORDER*, conſtituting the Agrarian Laws of *Oceana*, *Marpeſia* and *Panopea*, whereby it is ordain'd, *Firſt*, for all ſuch Lands as are lying and being within the proper Territories of *Oceana*, that every Man who is at preſent poſſeſt, or ſhall hereafter be poſſeſt of an Eſtate in Land exceeding the Revenue of two thouſand Pounds a year, and having more than one Son, ſhall leave his Lands either equally divided among them, in caſe the Lands amount to above 2000 l. a year to each; or ſo near equally in caſe they come under, that the greater part or portion of the ſame remaining to the eldeſt, exceed not the value of two thouſand Pounds Revenue. And no man, not in preſent poſſeſſion of Lands above the value of two thouſand Pounds by the year, ſhall receive, enjoy, (except by lawful Inheritance) acquire, or purchaſe to himſelf lands within the ſaid Territories, amounting, with thoſe already in his poſſeſſion, above the ſaid Revenue. And if a man has a Daughter, or Daughters, except ſhe be an Heireſs, or they be Heireſſes, he ſhall not leave or give to any one of them in Marriage or otherwiſe, for her Portion, above the value of one thouſand five hundred Pounds in Lands, Goods, and Monies. Nor ſhall any Friend, Kinſman, or Kinſwomen, add to her or their Portion or Portions that are ſo provided for, to make any one of them greater. Nor ſhall any man demand, or have more in marriage with any Woman. Nevertheleſs an Heireſs ſhall enjoy her lawful inheritance, and a Widow whatſoever the Bounty or Affection of her Huſband ſhall bequeath to her, to be divided in the firſt Generation, wherein it is diviſible according as has been ſhewn.

SECONDLY, For Lands lying and being within the Territories of *Marpeſia*, the Agrarian ſhall hold in all parts as it is eſtabliſh'd in *Oceana*, except only in the Standard or Proportion of Eſtates in Land, which ſhall be ſet for *Marpeſia* at five hundred Pounds. And,

THIRDLY, For *Panopea*, the Agrarian ſhall hold in all parts, as in *Oceana*. And whoſoever poſſeſſing above the proportion allow'd by theſe Laws, ſhall be lawfully convicted of the ſame, ſhall forfeit the Overplus to the uſe of the State.

AGRARIAN Laws of all others have ever been the greateſt Bugbears, and ſo in the Inſtitution were theſe, at which time it was ridiculous to ſee how ſtrange a fear appear'd in every body of that which, being good for all, could hurt no body. But inſtead of the proof of this Order, I ſhall out of thoſe many Debates that happen'd e're it could be paſt, inſert two Speeches that were made at the Council of Legiſlators, the firſt by the Right Honourable PHILAUTUS DE GARBO, a young Man, being Heir apparent to a very Noble Family, and one of the Counſellors, who expreſt himſelf as follows.

May

May it pleaſe your Highneſs, my Lord ARCHON *of* Oceana.

" IF I did not, to my capacity, know from how profound a " Counſellor I diſſent, it would certainly be no hard taſk to make " it as light as the day: Firſt, That an Agrarian is altogether un- " neceſſary. Secondly, That it is dangerous to a Common-wealth. " Thirdly, That it is inſufficient to keep out Monarchy. Fourthly, " That it ruins Families. Fifthly, That it deſtroys Induſtry. And " laſt of all, that tho' it were indeed of any good uſe, it will be a " matter of ſuch difficulty to introduce in this Nation, and ſo to ſettle " that it may be laſting, as is altogether invincible.

" FIRST, That an Agrarian is unneceſſary to a Common-wealth, " what clearer Teſtimony can there be, than that the Common-wealths " which are our Co-temporaries (*Venice*, to which your Highneſs " gives the upper hand of all Antiquity, being one) have no ſuch " thing? And there can be no reaſon why they have it not, ſeeing it " is in the Sovereign Power at any time to eſtabliſh ſuch an Order, " but that they need it not; wherefore no wonder if ARISTOTLE, " who pretends to be a good Common-wealthſman, has long ſince de- " rided PHALEAS, to whom it was attributed by the *Greeks*, for his " invention.

" SECONDLY, That an Agrarian is dangerous to a Common- " wealth is affirm'd upon no ſlight Authority, ſeeing MACHIAVEL " is poſitive, that it was the Diſſenſion which happen'd about the Agra- " rian that caus'd the Deſtruction of *Rome*; nor do I think that it " did much better in *Lacedemon*, as I ſhall ſhew anon.

" THIRDLY, That it is inſufficient to keep out Monarchy can- " not without impiety be deny'd, the holy Scriptures bearing witneſs, " that the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*, notwithſtanding her Agrarian, " ſubmitted her neck to the arbitrary Yoke of her Princes.

" FOURTHLY, Therefore to come to my next Aſſertion, " That it is deſtructive to Families; this alſo is ſo apparent, that it " needs pity rather than proof. Why, alas, do you bind a Nobility " (which no Generation ſhall deny to have been the firſt that freely " ſacrific'd their Blood to the antient Liberties of this People) on an " unholy Altar? Why are the People taught, That their Liberty, " which, except our noble Anceſtors had been born, muſt have long " ſince been bury'd, cannot now be born except we be bury'd? A " Common-wealth ſhould have the innocence of the Dove. Let us " leave this purchaſe of her Birth to the Serpent, which eats it ſelf " out of the womb of its Mother.

" FIFTHLY, But it may be ſaid, perhaps, that we are fallen " from our firſt Love, become proud and idle. It is certain, my " Lords that the hand of God is not upon us for nothing. But take " heed how you admit of ſuch aſſaults and ſallies upon Men's Eſtates, " as may ſlacken the Nerve of Labour, and give others alſo reaſon to " believe that their Sweat is vain; or elſe, whatſoever be pretended, " your Agrarian (which is my Fifth Aſſertion) muſt indeed deſtroy " Induſtry. For, that ſo it did in *Lacedemon* is moſt apparent, as alſo " that it could do no otherwiſe, where every Man having his 40 " Quarters of Barley, with Wine proportionable, ſupply'd him out of

" his

" his own Lot by his Labourer or Helot; and being confin'd in that " to the ſcantling above which he might not live, there was not any " ſuch thing as a Trade, or other Art, except that of War, in ex- " erciſe. Wherefore a *Spartan*, if he were not in Arms, muſt ſit and " play with his fingers, whence inſu'd perpetual War, and, the Eſtate " of the City being as little capable of increaſe as that of the Citizens, " her inevitable Ruin. Now what better ends you can propoſe to " your ſelves in the like ways, I do not ſo well ſee as I perceive that " there may be worſe: For *Lacedemon* yet was free from Civil War: " But if you employ your Citizens no better than ſhe did, I cannot " promiſe you that you ſhall fare ſo well, becauſe they are ſtill deſi- " rous of War that hope it may be profitable to them; and the ſtrong- " eſt Security you can give of Peace, is to make it gainful. Otherwiſe " Men will rather chooſe that whereby they may break your Laws, " than that whereby your Laws may break them. Which I ſpeak not " ſo much in relation to the Nobility or ſuch as would be holding, as " to the People or them that would be getting; the paſſion in theſe " being ſo much the ſtronger, as a Man's felicity is weaker in the " fruition of things, than in their proſecution and increaſe.

" TRULY, my Lords, it is my fear, that by taking of more " hands, and the beſt from Induſtry, you will further indamage it, " than can be repair'd by laying on a few, and the worſt; while the " Nobility muſt be forc'd to ſend their Sons to the Plow, and, as if " this were not enough, to marry their Daughters alſo to Farmers.

" SIXTHLY, But I do not ſee (to come to the laſt point) how " it is poſſible that this thing ſhould be brought about, to your good " I mean, tho' it may to the deſtruction of many. For that the Agra- " rian of *Iſrael*, or that of *Lacedemon* might ſtand, is no ſuch mi- " racle; the Lands, without any conſideration of the former Pro- " prietor, being ſurvey'd and caſt into equal Lots, which could nei- " ther be bought, nor ſold, nor multiply'd: ſo that they knew where- " about to have a Man. But in this Nation no ſuch Diviſion can be " introduc'd, the Lands being already in the hands of Proprietors, " and ſuch whoſe Eſtates lie very rarely together, but mix'd one with " another; being alſo of Tenures in nature ſo different, that as there " is no experience that an Agrarian was ever introduc'd in ſuch a caſe, " ſo there is no appearance how, or reaſon why it ſhould: but that " which is againſt Reaſon and Experience is impoſſible.

THE caſe of my Lord PHILAUTUS was the moſt concern'd in the whole Nation; for he had four younger Brothers, his Father being yet living to whom he was Heir of ten thouſand Pounds a year. Wherefore being a Man both of good Parts and Eſteem, his Words wrought both upon Men's Reaſon and Paſſions, and had born a ſtroke at the head of the buſineſs, if my Lord ARCHON had not interpos'd the Buckler in this Oration.

My Lords, the Legiſlators of Oceana.

" MY Lord PHILAUTUS has made a thing which is eaſy to " ſeem hard; if the Thanks were due to his Eloquence, it " would be worthy of leſs praiſe, than that he owes it to his Merit

" and

" and the Love he has moſt deſervedly purchas'd of all Men: nor is
" it rationally to be fear'd, that he who is much beforehand in his
" private, ſhould be in arrear in his public Capacity. Wherefore my
" Lord's tenderneſs throughout his Speech ariſing from no other Prin-
" ciple than his Solicitude leſt the Agrarian ſhould be hurtful to his
" Country; it is no leſs than my duty to give the beſt ſatisfaction I am
" able to ſo good a Patriot, taking every one of his Doubts in the Or-
" der propos'd. And,

" FIRST, Whereas my Lord, upon obſervation of the modern
" Common-wealths, is of opinion, that an Agrarian is not neceſſary:
" It muſt be confeſt, that at the firſt ſight of them there is ſome
" appearance favouring his Aſſertion, but upon Accidents of no prece-
" dent to us. For the Common-wealths of *Switzerland* and *Holland*, I
" mean of thoſe Leagues, being ſituated in Countries not alluring the In-
" habitants to Wantonneſs, but obliging them to univerſal Induſtry,
" have an implicit Agrarian in the nature of them: and being not ob-
" noxious to a growing Nobility (which, as long as their former
" Monarchies had ſpread the wing over them, could either not at all
" be hatch'd, or was ſoon broken) are of no example to us, whoſe
" Experience in this point has been to the contrary. But what if even
" in theſe Governments there be indeed an explicit Agrarian? For
" when the Law commands an equal or near equal diſtribution of a
" Man's Eſtate in Land among his Children, as it is done in thoſe
" Countries, a Nobility cannot grow; and ſo there needs no Agra-
" rian, or rather there is one. And for the growth of the Nobility
" in *Venice* (if ſo it be, for MACHIAVEL obſerves in that Re-
" public, as a cauſe of it, a great mediocrity of Eſtates) it is not a
" point that ſhe is to fear, but might ſtudy, ſeeing ſhe conſiſts of no-
" thing elſe but Nobility; by which, whatever their Eſtates ſuck from
" the People, eſpecially if it comes equally, is digeſted into the better
" Blood of that Common-wealth, which is all, or the greateſt benefit
" they can have by accumulation. For how inequal ſoever you will
" have them to be in their Incomes, they have Officers of the Pomp,
" to bring them equal in expences, or at leaſt in the oſtentation or ſhew
" of them. And ſo unleſs the advantage of an Eſtate conſiſts more
" in the meaſure than in the uſe of it, the Authority of *Venice* does
" but enforce our Agrarian; nor ſhall a Man evade or elude the Pru-
" dence of it, by the Authority of any other Common-wealth. For
" if a Common-wealth has been introduc'd at once, as thoſe of *Iſrael*
" and *Lacedemon*, you are certain to find her underlaid with this as the
" main Foundation; nor, if ſhe is oblig'd more to Fortune than Pru-
" dence, as ſhe rais'd her head without muſing upon this matter, as
" appears by that of *Athens*, which thro' her defect in this point, ſays
" ARISTOTLE, introduc'd her *Oſtraciſm*, as moſt of the Demo- Polit. 13. c. 9.
" cracies of *Greece*. But, not to reſtrain a Fundamental of ſuch la-
" titude to any one kind of Government, do we not yet ſee, that if
" there be a ſole Landlord of a vaſt Territory, he is the *Turk*? That
" if a few Landlords over-balance a populous Country, they have ſtore
" of Servants? That if a People be in an equal balance, they can have
" no Lords? That no Government can otherwiſe be erected, than
" upon ſome one of theſe Foundations? That no one of theſe Foun-
" dations (each being elſe apt to change into ſome other) can give
" any ſecurity to the Government, unleſs it be fix'd? That thro' the

" want of this fixation, potent Monarchies and Common-wealths have
" fallen upon the heads of the People, and accompanied their own ſad
" Ruins with vaſt effuſions of innocent Blood? Let the Fame, as was
" the merit of the antient Nobility of this Nation, be equal to, or
" above what has been already ſaid, or can be ſpoken; yet have we
" ſeen not only their Glory, but that of a Throne, the moſt indulgent
" to, and leaſt invaſive for ſo many Ages upon the Liberty of a People
" that the World has known, thro' the mere want of fixing her foot
" by a proportionable Agrarian upon her proper Foundation, to have
" fallen with ſuch horror, as has been a Spectacle of Aſtoniſhment to the
" whole Earth. And were it well argu'd from one Calamity, that
" we ought not to prevent another? Nor is ARISTOTLE ſo good
" a Common-wealthſman for deriding the Invention of PHALEAS, as
Polit. l. 5. c. 3. " in recollecting himſelf, where he ſays, that Democracies, when a
" leſs part of their Citizens over-top the reſt in Wealth, degenerate
" into Oligarchies and Principalities: and, which comes nearer to the
" preſent purpoſe, that the greater part of the Nobility of *Tarentum*
" coming accidentally to be ruin'd, the Government of the Few came
" by conſequence to be chang'd into that of the Many.

" THESE things conſider'd, I cannot ſee how an Agrarian, as
" to the fixation or ſecurity of a Government, can be leſs than neceſſa-
" ry. And if a Cure be neceſſary, it excuſes not the Patient, his
" Diſeaſe being otherwiſe deſperate, that it is dangerous; which was
" the caſe of *Rome*, not ſo ſtated by MACHIAVEL, where he
" ſays, *That the ſtriſe about the Agrarian caus'd the Deſtruction of that*
" *Common-wealth.* As if when a Senator was not rich (as CRASSUS
" held) except he could pay an Army, that Common-wealth could
" expect nothing but Ruin, whether in ſtrife about the Agrarian, or
" without it. * *Of late*, ſays LIVY, *Riches have introduc'd Ava-*
" *rice; and voluptuous Pleaſures abounding have thro' Luſt and Luxury*
" *begot a deſire of blaſting and deſtroying all good Orders.* If the greateſt
" Security of a Common-wealth conſiſts in being provided with the
" proper Antidote againſt this Poiſon, her greateſt danger muſt be
" from the abſence of an Agrarian, which is the whole truth of the
" *Roman* example. For the *Laconic*, I ſhall reſerve the farther expli-
" cation of it, as my Lord alſo did, to another place: and firſt ſee
" whether an Agrarian proportion'd to a popular Government be
" ſufficient to keep out Monarchy. My Lord is for the Negative,
" and fortify'd by the People of *Iſrael* electing a King. To which I
" ſay, That the Action of the People therein expreſt is a full Anſwer to
" the Objection of that example: For the Monarchy neither grew
" upon them, nor could, by reaſon of the Agrarian, poſſibly have
" invaded them, if they had not pull'd it upon themſelves by the
" election of a King. Which being an accident, the like whereof is
" not to be found in any other People ſo planted, nor in this, till, as it
" is manifeſt, they were given up by God to infatuation (for ſays he
" to SAMUEL, *They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected Me,*
" *that I ſhould not reign over them*) has ſomething in it which is appa-
" rent, by what went before, to have been beſides the courſe of Na-
" ture, and by what follow'd. For the King having no other Foun-

* Nuper divitiæ avaritiam, & abundantes voluptates deſiderium, per luxum atque libidinem, pereundi perdendique omnia invexere. *Liv. in Præf.*

" dation

" dation than the Calamities of the People, ſo often beaten by their
" Enemies, that deſpairing of themſelves, they were contented with
" any change; if he had Peace as in the days of SOLOMON, left but
" a ſlippery Throne to his Succeſſor, as appear'd by REHOBOAM.
" And the Agrarian, notwithſtanding the Monarchy thus introduc'd,
" ſo faithfully preſerv'd the Root of that Common-wealth, that it
" ſhot forth oftner, and by intervals continu'd longer than any other
" Government, as may be computed from the Inſtitution of the ſame
" by JOSHUA, 1465 years before CHRIST, to the total diſſolution
" of it, which happened in the Reign of the Emperor ADRIAN,
" 135 years after the Incarnation. A People planted upon an equal
" Agrarian, and holding to it, if they part with their Liberty, muſt
" do it upon good will, and make but a bad title of their Bounty.
" As to inſtance yet further in that which is propos'd by the preſent
" Order to this Nation, the Standard whereof is at 2000 *l.* a year:
" The whole Territory of *Oceana* being divided by this proportion,
" amounts to 5000 Lots. So the Lands of *Oceana* being thus diſtri-
" buted, and bound to this Diſtribution, can never fall to fewer than
" five thouſand Proprietors. But five thouſand Proprietors ſo ſeiz'd
" will not agree to break the Agrarian, for that were to agree to rob
" one another; nor to bring in a King, becauſe they muſt maintain
" him, and can have no benefit by him; nor to exclude the People,
" becauſe they can have as little by that, and muſt ſpoil their Militia.
" So the Common-wealth continuing upon the balance propos'd, tho'
" it ſhould come into five thouſand hands, can never alter; and that
" it ſhould ever come into five thouſand hands, is as improbable as any
" thing in the World that is not altogether impoſſible.

" MY Lord's other Conſiderations are more private: As that this
" Order deſtroys Families; which is as if one ſhould lay the ruins of
" ſome antient Caſtle to the Herbs which uſually grow out of them;
" the deſtruction of thoſe Families being that indeed which naturally
" produc'd this Order. For we do not now argue for that which
" we would have, but for that which we are already poſſeſt of;
" as would appear, if a note were but taken of all ſuch as have at
" this day above two thouſand Pounds a year in *Oceana*. If my Lord
" ſhould grant (and I will put it with the moſt) that they who are
" Proprietors in Land, exceeding this proportion, exceed not three
" hundred; with what brow can the Intereſt of ſo few be balanc'd
" with that of the whole Nation? or rather, what Intereſt have
" they to put in ſuch a Balance? They would live as they have been
" accuſtom'd to do; Who hinders them? They would enjoy their
" Eſtates; who touches them? They would diſpoſe of what they have
" according to the Intereſt of their Families: It is that which we de-
" ſire. A Man has one Son; let him be call'd: Would he enjoy his
" Father's Eſtate? It is his, his Son's, and his Son's Son's after him.
" A Man has five Sons; let them be call'd: Would they enjoy their
" Father's Eſtate? It is divided among them: for we have four Votes
" for one in the ſame Family, and therefore this muſt be the Intereſt of
" the Family, or the Family knows not its own Intereſt. If a Man
" ſhall diſpute otherwiſe, he muſt draw his Arguments from Cuſtom,
" and from Greatneſs, which was the Intereſt of the Monarchy, not
" of the Family: and we are now a Common-wealth. If the Mo-
" narchy could not bear with ſuch Diviſions becauſe they tended to a

" Com-

" Common-wealth; neither can a Common-wealth connive at ſuch " Accumulations, becauſe they tend to a Monarchy. If the Monarchy " might make bold with ſo many for the good of one, we may make " bold with one for the good of ſo many; nay, for the good of all. " My Lords, it comes into my mind, that which upon occaſion of the " variety of Parties enumerated in our late Civil Wars, was ſaid by a " Friend of mine coming home from his Travels, about the latter " end of theſe Troubles; That he admir'd how it came to paſs, that " younger Brothers, eſpecially being ſo many more in number than " their Elder, did not unite as one man againſt a Tyranny, the like " whereof has not been exercis'd in any other Nation. And truly, " when I conſider that our Countrymen are none of the worſt natur'd, " I muſt confeſs I marvel much how it comes to paſs, that we ſhould " uſe our Children as we do our Puppies; take one, lay it in the lap, " feed it with every good bit, and drown five: nay yet worſe; for- " aſmuch as the Puppies are once drown'd, whereas the Children are " left perpetually drowning. Really, my Lords, it is a flinty Cu- " ſtom! And all this for his cruel Ambition, that would raiſe himſelf " a Pillar, a golden Pillar for his Monument, tho' he has Children, " his own reviving Fleſh, and a kind of Immortality. And this is " that Intereſt of a Family, for which we are to think ill of a Govern- " ment that will not indure it. But quiet your ſelves: The Land " thro' which the River *Nilus* wanders in one ſtream, is barren; but " where it parts into ſeven, it multiplies its fertile ſhores by diſtribut- " ing, yet keeping and improving ſuch a Propriety and Nutrition, as " is a prudent Agrarian, to a well order'd Common-wealth.

" NOR (to come to the fifth Aſſertion) is a political Body render'd " any fitter for Induſtry, by having one gouty and another wither'd " Leg, than a natural. It tends not to the improvement of Mer- " chandize that there be ſome who have no need of their Trading, and " others that are not able to follow it. If Confinement diſcourages " Induſtry, an Eſtate in Money is not confin'd; and leſt Induſtry " ſhould want whereupon to work, Land is not ingroſt or entail'd " upon any man, but remains at its devotion. I wonder whence the " computation can ariſe, that this ſhould diſcourage Induſtry. Two " thouſand Pounds a year a man may enjoy in *Oceana*, as much in " *Panopea*, five hundred in *Marpeſia*: There be other Plantations, and " the Common-wealth will have more. Who knows how far the " Arms of our Agrarian may extend themſelves? and whether he " that might have left a Pillar, may not leave a Temple of many " Pillars to his more pious Memory? Where there is ſome meaſure in " Riches, a man may be rich; but if you will have them to be in- " finite, there will be no end of ſtarving himſelf, and wanting what he " has: and what pains does ſuch a one take to be poor! Furthermore, " if a man ſhall think that there may be an Induſtry leſs greaſy, or " more noble, and ſo caſt his thoughts upon the Common-wealth, " he will have leiſure for her, and ſhe Riches and Honours for him; " his Sweat ſhall ſmell like ALEXANDER's. My Lord PHILAU- " TUS is a young Man, who enjoying his ten thouſand Pounds a " year, may keep a noble Houſe in the old way, and have homely " Gueſts; and having but two, by the means propos'd, may take the " upper hand of his great Anceſtors: with reverence to whom, I " may ſay, there has not been one of them would have diſputed his

" place

" place with a *Roman* Conſul. My Lord, do not break my heart;
" the Nobility ſhall go to no other Plows than thoſe from which we
" call our Conſuls. But, ſays he, it having been ſo with *Lacedemon*,
" that neither the City nor the Citizens were capable of increaſe, a
" blow was given by that Agrarian, which ruin'd both. And what
" are we concern'd with that Agrarian, or that blow, while our Citi-
" zens and our City (and that by our Agrarian) are both capable of
" increaſe? The *Spartan*, if he made a Conqueſt, had not Citizens to
" hold it; the *Oceaner* will have enow: the *Spartan* could have no
" Trade, the *Oceaner* may have all. The Agrarian in *Laconia*, that
" it might bind on Knapſaks, forbidding all other Arts but that of
" War, could not make an Army of above 30000 Citizens. The Agra-
" rian in *Oceana* without interruption of Traffic, provides us in the
" fifth part of the Youth an annual ſource or freſh ſpring of 100,000,
" beſides our Provincial Auxiliaries, out of which to draw marching
" Armies; and as many Elders, not feeble, but men moſt of them in
" the flower of their Age, and in Arms for the defence of our Ter-
" ritories. The Agrarian in *Laconia* baniſh'd Money, this multiplies it:
" That allow'd a matter of twenty or thirty Acres to a man; this
" two or three thouſand: There is no compariſon between them.
" And yet I differ ſo much from my Lord, or his Opinion that the
" Agrarian was the ruin of *Lacedemon*, that I hold it no leſs than de-
" monſtrable to have been her main ſupport. For if, baniſhing all other
" diverſions, it could not make an Army of above 30000; then
" letting in all other diverſions, it muſt have broken that Army.
" Wherefore LYSANDER bringing in the golden ſpoils of *Athens*,
" irrecoverably ruin'd that Common-wealth; and is a warning to us,
" than in giving encouragement to Induſtry, we alſo remember, that
" Covetouſneſs is the root of all Evil. And our Agrarian can never be
" the cauſe of thoſe Seditions threaten'd by my Lord, but is the pro-
" per cure of them, as * LUCAN notes well in the State of *Rome* be-
" fore the Civil Wars, which happen'd thro' the want of ſuch an An-
" tidote

" Why then are we miſtaken, as if we intended not equal advan-
" tages in our Common-wealth to either Sex, becauſe we would not
" have Women's Fortunes conſiſt in that mettal, which expoſes them
" to Cutpurſes? If a man cuts my Purſe, I may have him by the heels,
" or by the neck for it; whereas a man may cut a woman's purſe,
" and have her for his pains in fetters. How brutiſh, and much more
" than brutiſh, is that Common-wealth, which prefers the Earth be-
" fore the fruits of her Womb? If the People be her Treaſure, the
" ſtaff by which ſhe is ſuſtain'd and comforted; with what Juſtice can
" ſhe ſuffer them, by whom ſhe is moſt enrich'd, to be for that cauſe
" the moſt empoveriſh'd? And yet we ſee the Gifts of God, and the
" Bounties of Heaven in fruitful Families, thro' this wretched cuſtom
" of marrying for Money, become their inſupportable grief and pover-
" ty. Nor falls this ſo heavy upon the lower ſort, being better able
" to ſhift for themſelves, as upon the Nobility or Gentry. For what
" avails it in this caſe, from whence their Veins have deriv'd their

* Hunc uſura vorax, rapidumque in tempore Fœnus;
Hinc concuſſa fides, & multis utile bellum.

" Blood; while they ſhall ſee the Tallow of a Chandler ſooner convert-
" ed into that Beauty which is requir'd in a Bride? I appeal, whether
" my Lord PHILAUTUS or my ſelf be the Advocate of Nobility;
" againſt which in the caſe propos'd by me, there would be nothing
" to hold the balance. And why is a Woman, if ſhe may have but
" fifteen hundred pounds, undone? If ſhe be unmarry'd, what Noble-
" man allows his Daughter in that caſe a greater Revenue, than ſo
" much Money may command? And if ſhe marry, no Nobleman can
" give his Daughter a greater portion than ſhe has. Who is hurt in
" this caſe? nay, who is not benefited? If the Agrarian gives us the
" ſweat of our brows without diminution; if it prepares our Ta-
" ble, if it makes our Cup to overflow; and above all this, in pro-
" viding for our Children, anoints our Heads with that Oil which
" takes away the greateſt of wordly cares; what man, that is not be-
" ſotted with a Covetouſneſs as vain as endleſs, can imagine ſuch a
" Conſtitution to be his Poverty? ſeeing where no woman can be con-
" ſiderable for her portion, no portion will be conſiderable with a wo-
" man; and ſo his Children will not only find better preferments with-
" out his Brokage, but more freedom of their own Affections. We
" are wonderful ſevere in Laws, that they ſhall not marry without our
" conſent; as if it were care and tenderneſs over them: But is it not,
" leſt we ſhould not have the other thouſand Pounds with this Son, or
" the other hundred Pounds a year more in Jointure for that Daugh-
" ter? Theſe, when we are croſt in them, are the Sins for which we
" water our couch with tears, but not of Penitence; ſeeing whereas it
" is a miſchief beyond any that we can do to our Enemies, we perſiſt
" to make nothing of breaking the Affection of our Children. But
" there is in this Agrarian a Homage to pure and ſpotleſs Love, the con-
" ſequence whereof I will not give for all your Romances. An Alder-
" man makes not his Daughter a Counteſs till he has given her 20000 *l.*
" nor a Romance a conſiderable Miſtreſs till ſhe be a Princeſs; theſe are
" Characters of baſtard Love. But if our Agrarian excludes Ambi-
" tion and Covetouſneſs, we ſhall at length have the care of our own
" breed, in which we have been curious as to our Dogs and Hor-
" ſes. The Marriage-Bed will be truly legitimate, and the Race of
" the Common-wealth not ſpurious.

" BUT *(impar magnanimis auſis, imparque dolori)* I am hurl'd from
" all my hopes by my Lords laſt aſſertion of Impoſſibility, that the
" Root from whence we imagine theſe Fruits, ſhould be planted or
" thrive in this Soil. And why? becauſe of the mixture of Eſtates, and
" variety of Tenures. Nevertheleſs, there is yet extant in the *Exche-*
" *quer* an old Survey of the whole Nation; wherefore ſuch a thing is
" not impoſſible. Now if a new Survey were taken at the preſent
" rates, and the Law made, that no man ſhould hold hereafter above
" ſo much Land as is valu'd therein at 2000 *l.* a year, it would amount
" to a good and ſufficient Agrarian. It is true, that there would remain
" ſome difficulty in the different kind of Rents, and that it is a matter
" requiring not only more leiſure than we have, but an Authority
" which may be better able to bow men to a more general Conſent,
" than is to be wrought out of them by ſuch as are in our capacity.
" Wherefore, as to the manner, it is neceſſary that we refer it to the
" Parliament; but as to the matter, they cannot otherwiſe fix their
" Government upon the right Balance.

" I

" I SHALL conclude with a few words to ſome parts of the " Order, which my Lord has omitted. As firſt to the Conſequences " of the Agrarian to be ſettled in *Martſia*, which irreparably breaks " the Ariſtocracy of that Nation; being of ſuch a nature, as ſtanding, " it is not poſſible that you ſhould govern. For while the People of that " Country are little better than the Cattle of the Nobility, you muſt " not wonder if according as theſe can make their Markets with fo- " reign Princes, you find thoſe to be driven upon your Grounds. And " if you be ſo tender, now you have it in your Power, as not to hold " a hand upon them that may prevent the ſlaughter which muſt other- " wiſe enſue in like caſes, the Blood will lie at your door. But in hold- " ing ſuch a hand upon them, you may ſettle the Agrarian; and in " ſettling the Agrarian, you give that People not only Liberty, but " Lands; which makes your Protection neceſſary to their Security; " and their Contribution due to your Protection, as to their own Safety.

" FOR the Agrarian of *Panopea*, it allowing ſuch proportions of " ſo good Land, men that conceive themſelves ſtraitned by this in " *Oceana*, will begin there to let themſelves forth, where every Citi- " zen will in time have his *Villa*. And there is no queſtion, but the " improvement of that Country by this means muſt be far greater than " it has been in the beſt of former times.

" I HAVE no more to ſay, but that in thoſe antient and heroic " Ages (when men thought that to be neceſſary which was virtuous) " the Nobility of *Athens* having the People ſo much engag'd in their " debt, that there remain'd no other queſtion among theſe, than " which of thoſe ſhould be King, no ſooner heard SOLON ſpeak " than they quitted their Debts, and reſtor'd the Common-wealth; " which ever after held a ſolemn and annual Feaſt call'd the *Siſacthia* " or *Reciſion*, in memory of that Action. Nor is this example the " *Phœnix*; for at the inſtitution by LYCURGUS, the Nobility having " Eſtates (as ours here) in the Lands of *Laconia*, upon no other va- " luable conſideration than the Common-wealth propos'd by him, " threw them up to be parcel'd by his Agrarian. But now when no " man is deſir'd to throw up a farthing of his Money, or a ſhovel full " of his Earth, and that all we can do is but to make a virtue of ne- " ceſſity; we are diſputing whether we ſhould have Peace or War: " For Peace you cannot have without ſome Government, nor any " Government without the proper Balance. Wherefore if you will " not fix this which you have, the reſt is Blood, for without Blood " you can bring in no other.

BY theſe Speeches made at the Inſtitution of the Agrarian, you may perceive what were the Grounds of it. The next is

THE fourteenth ORDER, conſtituting the Ballot of *Venice*, as it is fitted by ſeveral Alterations, and appointed to every Aſſembly, to be the conſtant and only way of giving ſuffrage in this Common-wealth, according to the following Scheme. 14. Order.


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I SHALL endeavour by the preceding Figure to demonſtrate the Manner of the *VENETIAN BALLOT* (a thing as difficult in diſcourſe or writing, as facile in practice) according to the uſe of it in *Oceana*. The whole Figure repreſents the Senate, containing, as to the Houſe or form of ſitting, a ſquare and a half; the Tribunal at the upper end being aſcended by four ſteps. On the uppermoſt of theſe ſit the Magiſtrates that conſtitute the Signory of the Common-wealth, that is to ſay, A the Strategus; B the Orator; C the three Commiſſioners of the Great Seal; D the three Commiſſioners of the Treaſury, whereof one, E, exerciſes for the preſent the Office of a Cenſor at the middle Urn F.

TO the two upper ſteps of the Tribunal anſwer G G. G G. the two long Benches next the Wall on each ſide of the Houſe; the outwardmoſt of which are equal in height to the uppermoſt ſtep, and the innermoſt equal in height to the next. Of theſe four Benches conſiſts the firſt Seat; as the ſecond Seat conſiſts inlike manner of thoſe four Benches H H. H H. which being next the Floor, are equal in height to the two nethermoſt ſteps of the Throne. *So the whole Houſe is diſtributed into two Seats, each conſiſting of four Benches.*

THIS diſtribution cauſes not only the greater conveniency, as will be ſhewn, to the Senators in the exerciſe of their Function at the Ballot, but a greater grace to the aſpect of the Senate. In the middle of the outward Benches ſtand I. I. the chairs of the Cenſors, thoſe being their ordinary places, tho' upon occaſion of the Ballot they deſcend, and ſit where they are ſhewn by K. K. at each of the outward Urns L. L. Thoſe M. M. that ſit with their Tables, and the Bowls N. N. before them, upon the half ſpace or ſecond ſtep of the Tribunal from the floor, are the Clerks or Secretaries of the Houſe. Upon the ſhort Seats O. O. on the floor (which ſhould have been repreſented by Woolſacks) ſit P the two Tribunes of the Horſe; Q the two Tribunes of the Foot; and R R. R R. the Judges: all which Magiſtrates are Aſſiſtants, but have no ſuffrage. This poſture of the Senate conſider'd the Ballot is perform'd as follows.

FIRST, whereas the gold Balls are of ſeveral ſutes, and accordingly mark'd with ſeveral Letters of the Alphabet, a Secretary preſents a little Urn (wherein there is one Ball of every ſute or mark) to the Strategus and the Orator; and look what Letter the Strategus draws, the ſame and no other is to be us'd for that time in the middle Urn F; the like for the Letter drawn by the Orator is to be obſerv'd for the ſide Urns L. L. that is to ſay, if the Strategus drew a Ball with an *A*, all the gold Balls in the middle Urn for that day are mark'd with the Letter *A*; and if the Orator drew a *B*, all the gold Balls in the ſide Urn for that day are mark'd with the Letter *B*: which done immediately before the Ballot, and ſo the Letter unknown to the Ballotants, they can uſe no fraud or jugling; otherwiſe a man might carry a gold Ball in his hand, and ſeem to have drawn it out of an Urn. He that draws a gold Ball at any Urn, delivers it to the Cenſor or Aſſeſſor of that Urn, who views the Character, and allows accordingly of his Lot.

THE Strategus and the Orator having drawn for the Letters, the Urns are prepar'd accordingly by one of the Commiſſioners and the

two Cenſors. The preparation of the Urns is after this manner. If the Senate be to elect, for example, the Liſt call'd the *Tropic of Magiſtrates*, which is this;

1. *The Lord* STRATEGUS;
2. *The Lord* ORATOR;
3. *The third* COMMISSIONER *of the Great Seal*;
4. *The third* COMMISSIONER *of the Treaſury*;
5. *The firſt* CENSOR;
6. *The ſecond* CENSOR;

This Liſt or Schedule conſiſts of ſix Magiſtracies, and to every Magiſtracy there are to be four Competitors, that is, in all four and twenty Competitors propos'd to the Houſe. They that are to propoſe the Competitors are call'd Electors, and no Elector can propoſe above one Competitor: wherefore for the propoſing of four and twenty Competitors you muſt have four and twenty Electors; and whereas the Ballot conſiſts of a *Lot* and of a *Suffrage*, the Lot is for no other uſe than for the deſignation of Electors; and he that draws a gold Ball at the middle Urn is an Elector. Now, as to have four and twenty Competitors propos'd, you muſt have four and twenty Electors made; ſo to have four and twenty Electors made by lot, you muſt have four and twenty gold Balls in the middle Urn; and theſe (becauſe otherwiſe it would be no Lot) mix'd with a competent number of Blanks, or ſilver Balls. Wherefore to the four and twenty gold Balls caſt ſix and twenty ſilver ones, and thoſe (reckoning the Blanks with the Prizes) make fifty Balls in the middle Urn. This done (becauſe no man can come to the middle Urn that has not firſt drawn a gold Ball at one of the ſide Urns) and to be ſure that the Prizes or gold Balls in this Urn be all drawn, there muſt come to it fifty perſons: therefore there muſt be in each of the ſide Urns five and twenty gold Balls, which in both come to fifty; and to the end that every Senator may have his Lot, the gold Balls in the ſide Urns are to be made up with Blanks equal to the number of the Ballotans at either Urn: for example, the Houſe conſiſting of 300 Senators, there muſt be in each of the ſide Urns 125 Blanks and 25 Prizes, which come in both the ſide Urns to 300 Balls. This is the whole Myſtery of preparing the Urns, which the Cenſors having skill to do accordingly, the reſt of the Ballot, whether the parties balloting underſtand it or no, muſt of neceſſary conſequence come right; and they can neither be out nor fall into any confuſion in the exerciſe of this Art.

BUT the Ballot, as I ſaid, is of two parts, *Lot* and *Suffrage*, or the *Propoſition* and *Reſult*. The Lot determines who ſhall propoſe the Competitors; and the Reſult of the Senate, which of the Competitors ſhall be the Magiſtrates. The whole, to begin with the Lot, proceeds in this manner.

The firſt Secretary with an audible Voice reads firſt the Liſt of the Magiſtrates to be choſen for the day; then the Oath for fair Election, at which the Senators hold up their hands; which done another Secretary preſents a little Urn to the Strategus, in which are four Balls, each of them having one of theſe four Inſcriptions: *FIRST SEAT AT THE UPPER END. FIRST SEAT AT THE LOWER END. SECOND SEAT AT THE UPPER END.*

END. SECOND SEAT AT THE LOWER END. and look which of them the Strategus draws, the Secretary pronouncing the Inſcription with a loud Voice, the Seat ſo call'd comes accordingly to the Urns: this in the Figure is the *SECOND SEAT AT THE UPPER END.* The manner of their coming to the ſide Urns is in double Files, there being two holes in the cover of each ſide Urn, by which means two may draw at once. The Senators therefore SS. SS are coming from the upper end of their Seats HH. HH to the ſide Urns L. L. The Senators TT. T. are drawing. The Senator V has drawn a gold Ball at his ſide Urn, and is going to the middle Urn F, where the Senator W having done the like at the other ſide Urn, is already drawing. But the Senators XX. XX having drawn Blanks at their ſide Urns, and thrown them into the Bowls Y. Y. ſtanding at the feet of the Urns, are marching by the lower end into their Seats again; the Senator *a* having done the like at the middle Urn, is alſo throwing his blank into the Bowl *b*, and marching to his Seat again: for a man by a prize at a ſide Urn gains no more than right to come to the middle Urn, where if he draws a blank, his Fortune at the ſide Urn comes to nothing at all; wherefore he alſo returns to his place. But the Senator *c* has had a Prize at the middle Urn, where the Commiſſioner having viewed his Ball, and found the mark to be right, he marches up the ſteps to the Seat of the Electors, which is the form *d* ſet croſs the Tribunal, where he places himſelf according as he was drawn with the other Electors *e e e* drawn before him. Theſe are not to look back, but ſit with their Faces towards the Signory or State, till their number amount to that of the Magiſtrates to be that day choſen, which for the preſent, as was ſhewn, are ſix; wherefore ſix Electors being made, they are reckon'd according as they were drawn: Firſt, ſecond, third, fourth, fifth, ſixth, in their Order; and the firſt ſix that are choſen are the *FIRST ORDER OF ELECTORS.*

THE firſt Order of Electors being made, are conducted by a Secretary, with a copy of the Liſt to be choſen, out of the Senate, and into a Committee or Council-Chamber, being neither ſuffer'd by the way, nor in their room (till the Ballot be ended) to have conference with any but themſelves; wherefore the Secretary, having given them their Oath that they ſhall make Election according to the Law and their Conſcience, delivers them the Liſt, and ſeats himſelf, at the lower end of the Table with his Pen and Paper, while another Secretary keeps the Door.

BY ſuch time as the firſt Order of Electors are thus ſeated, the ſecond Order of Electors is drawn, who with a ſecond Copy of the ſame Liſt are conducted into another Committee-chamber, by other Secretaries performing the ſame Office with the former.

THE like exactly is done by the third and by the fourth Orders (or *Hands*, as the *Venetians* call them) of Electors; by which means you have the four and twenty Electors divided according to the four Copies of the ſame Liſt, by ſix, into four Hands or Orders; and every one of theſe Orders names one Competitor to every Magiſtracy in the Liſt; that is to ſay, the firſt Elector names to the firſt Magiſtracy, the ſecond Elector to the ſecond Magiſtracy, and ſo forth. But tho' the Electors, as has been ſhewn, are choſen by mere lot, yet the Competitors by them nam'd are not choſen

ſen by any Lot, but by the Suffrage of the whole Order: For example; The firſt Elector in the firſt Order propoſes a Name to be Strategus, which Name is balloted by himſelf and the other five Electors; and if the Name ſo balloted attain not to above half the Suffrages, it is laid aſide, and the firſt Elector names another to the ſame Magiſtracy; and ſo in caſe this alſo fails, another, till one he has nam'd, whether it be himſelf, or ſome other, has attain'd to above half the Suffrages in the affirmative; and the name ſo attaining to above half the Suffrages in the Affirmative is written to the firſt Magiſtracy in the Liſt by the Secretary; which being done, the ſecond Elector of the firſt Order names to the ſecond Magiſtracy till one of his nomination be choſen to the ſame. The like is done by the reſt of the Electors of the firſt Order, till one Competitor be choſen, and written to every Magiſtracy in their Liſt. Now the ſecond, third, and fourth Orders of Electors doing exactly after the ſame manner, it comes to paſs that one Competitor to every Magiſtracy being choſen in each Order, there be in all four Competitors choſen to every Magiſtracy.

IF any Controverſy ariſes in an Order of Electors, one of the Cenſors (theſe being at this game the Groomporters) is advertis'd by the Secretary, who brings him in, and the Electors diſputing are bound to acquieſce in his Sentence. For which cauſe it is that the Cenſors do not ballot at the Urns; the Signory alſo abſtains, leſt it ſhould deform the Houſe: wherefore the Blanks in the ſide Urns are by ſo many the fewer. And ſo much for the Lot, which is of the greater Art but leſs Conſequence, becauſe it concerns *Propoſition* only: But all (except the Tribunes and the Judges, which being but Aſſiſtants have no Suffrage) are to ballot at the *Reſult*, to which I now come.

THE four Orders of Electors having perfected their Liſts, the face of the Houſe is chang'd: for the Urns are taken away, and every Senator and Magiſtrate is ſeated in his proper place, ſaving the Electors, who, having given their Suffrages already, may not ſtir out of their chambers, till the Houſe have given theirs, and the reſt of the Ballot be perform'd; which follows in this manner.

THE four Liſts being preſented by the Secretaries of each Council of Electors to the Signory, are firſt read, according to their Order, to the Houſe with an audible Voice; and then the Competitors are put to the Ballot or Suffrage of the whole Senate in this manner: *A. A.* nam'd to be Strategus in the firſt Order; whereupon eight Ballotins or Pages, ſuch as are expreſs'd by the Figures *f. f.* take eight of the Boxes repreſented, tho' rudely, by the Figures *g. g.* and go four on the one, and four on the other ſide of the Houſe, that is, one to every Bench, ſinging *A. A. nam'd to be the Strategus in the firſt Order*: and every Magiſtrate and Senator (beginning by the Strategus and the Orator firſt) holds up a little Pellet of Linen, as the Box paſſes, between his Finger and his Thumb, that men may ſee he has but one, and then puts it into the ſame. The Box conſiſting in the inner part of two Boxes, being painted on the outſide white and green, to diſtinguiſh the Affirmative from the Negative ſide, is ſo made, that when your Hand is in it, no man can ſee to which of the ſides you put the Suffrage, nor hear to which it falls, becauſe the Pellet being Linen, makes no noiſe. The Strategus and the Orator having begun, all the reſt do the like.

THE

THE Ballotins having thus gather'd the Suffrages, bring them before the Signory, in whoſe preſence the outward Boxes being open'd, they take out the inner Boxes, whereof the Affirmative is white, and the Negative green, and pour the white into the Bowl N on the right hand, which is white alſo, and the green into the Bowl N on the left, which is alſo green. Theſe Bowls or Baſons (better repreſented at the lower end of the Figure by *b. i.*) being upon this occaſion ſet before the Tables of the Secretaries at the upper end N. N. the white on the right hand, and the green on the left, the Secretaries on each ſide number the Balls: by which if they find that the Affirmatives amount not to above one half, they write not the Name that was balloted; but if they amount to above one half, they write it, adding the number of above half the Suffrages to which it attain'd. The firſt name being written, or laid aſide, the next that is put is B. B. nam'd to be Strategus in the ſecond Order; the third C C. nam'd to be Strategus in the third Order; the fourth D. D. nam'd to be Strategus in the fourth Order: and he of theſe four Competitors that has moſt above half in the Affirmative, is the Magiſtrate; or if none of them attain to above half, the nomination for that Magiſtracy is to be repeated by ſuch new Electors as ſhall be choſen at the next Ballot. And ſo, as is exemplify'd in the firſt Magiſtracy, proceeds the Ballot of the reſt; firſt in the firſt, then in the ſecond, and ſo in the third and fourth Orders.

NOW whereas it may happen that A. A. (for example) being nam'd Strategus in the firſt Order, may alſo be nam'd to the ſame or ſome one or more other Magiſtracies in one or more of the other Orders; his name is firſt balloted where it is firſt written, that is, to the more worthy Magiſtracy, whereof if he miſſes, he is balloted as it comes in courſe for the next, and ſo for the reſt, if he miſſes of that, as often as he is nam'd.

AND becauſe to be nam'd twice, or oftner, whether to the ſame or ſome other Magiſtracy, is the ſtronger recommendation; the note muſt not fail to be given upon the name, at the propoſition, in this manner; A. A. *nam'd to be Strategus in the firſt, and in the ſecond Order:* or A. A *nam'd to be Strategus in the firſt and the third; in the firſt and the fourth*, &c. But if he be nam'd to the ſame Magiſtracy in the firſt, ſecond, third, and fourth Orders, he can have no Competitor; wherefore attaining to above half the Suffrages, he is the Magiſtrate. Or thus: A. A. *nam'd to be Strategus in the firſt, to be Cenſor in the ſecond, to be Orator in the third, and to be Commiſſioner of the Seal in the fourth Order*, or the like in more or fewer Orders: In which caſes if he miſſes of the firſt Magiſtracy, he is ballotted to the ſecond; if he miſſes of the ſecond, to the third; and if he miſſes of the third, to the fourth.

THE Ballot not finiſh'd before Sunſet, tho' the Election of the Magiſtrates already choſen be good, voids the Election of ſuch Competitors as being choſen are not yet furniſh'd with Magiſtracies, as if they had never been nam'd (for this is no Jugling Box, but an Art that muſt ſee the Sun) and the Ballot for the remaining Magiſtracies is to be repeated the next day by new Orders of Electors, and ſuch Competitors as by them ſhall be elected. And ſo in the like manner, if of all the names propos'd to the ſame Magiſtracy, no one of them attains to above half the Suffrages in the Affirmative.

THE Senatorian Ballot of *Oceana* being thus deſcrib'd, thoſe of the Pariſh, of the Hundred, and of the Tribe, being ſo little different, that in this they are all contain'd, and by this may be eaſily underſtood,

are yet fully deſcrib'd, and made plain enough before in the *5th*, *6th*, *7th*, *8th*, *9th*, and *10th* Orders.

THIS therefore is the general Order, whence thoſe branches of the Ballot, ſome whereof you have already ſeen, are deriv'd; which, with thoſe that follow, were all read and debated in this place at the Inſtitution. When my Lord EPIMONUS DE GARRULA, being one of the Counſellors, and having no farther patience (tho' the Rules were compos'd by the Agent of this Common-wealth, reſiding for that purpoſe at *Venice)* than to hear the direction for the Pariſhes, ſtood up and made way for himſelf in this manner.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs, my Lord ARCHON.

" UNDER correction of MR. PEREGRIN SPY, our very learn-
" ed Agent and Intelligencer, I have ſeen the World a little,
" *Venice*, and (as Gentlemen are permitted to do) the Great Coun-
" cil balloting. And truly I muſt needs ſay, that it is for a dumb ſhew
" the goodlieſt that I ever beheld with my eyes. You ſhould have ſome
" would take it ill, as if the noble *Venetians* thought themſelves too
" good to ſpeak to ſtrangers, but they obſerv'd them not ſo narrowly.
" The truth is, they have nothing to ſay to their Acquaintance; or
" Men that are in Council ſure would have Tongues: For a Council,
" and not a word ſpoken in it, is a contradiction. But there is ſuch a
" pudder with their marching and countermarching, as, tho' never a
" one of them draw a Sword, you would think they were training;
" which till I found that they did it only to entertain ſtrangers, I came
" from among them as wiſe as I went thither. But in the Parliament
" of *Oceana* you had no Balls, nor Dancing, but ſober Converſation;
" a man might know and be known, ſhew his parts, and improve
" 'em. And now if you take the advice of this ſame fellow, you will
" ſpoil all with his whimſies. *Mr. Speaker*,—Cry you mercy, my
" Lord ARCHON, I mean; Set the wiſeſt man of your Houſe in
" the Great Council of *Venice*, and you will not know him from a
" fool. Whereas nothing is more certain, than that flat and dull fel-
" lows in the judgment of all ſuch as us'd to keep company with them
" before, upon election into our Houſe, have immediately chitted like
" Barley in the fat, where it acquires a new Spirit, and flow'd forth in-
" to Language, that I am as confident as I am here, if there were not
" ſuch as delight to abuſe us, is far better than TULLY'S; Or, let any
" body but tranſlate one of his Orations, and ſpeak it in the Houſe,
" and ſee if every body do not laugh at him. This is a great matter,
" *Mr. Speaker*; they do not cant it with your Book learning, your Orbs,
" your Centers, your prime Magnitudes, and your Nebulones, things
" I profeſs that would make a ſober man run ſtark mad to hear 'em;
" while we, who ſhould be conſidering the Honour of our Country,
" and that it goes now or never upon our hand, whether it ſhall be ri-
" diculous to all the World, are going to Nineholes, or trow Madam
" for our buſineſs, like your dumb *Venetian*, whom this ſame Sir
" POLITIC your Reſident, that never ſaw him do any thing but
" make faces, would inſinuate into you, at this diſtance, to have the
" only knack of State. Whereas if you ſhould take the pains, as I have
" done, to look a little nearer, you would find theſe ſame wonderful
" things

" things to be nothing elſe but mere natural Fopperies, or *Capricios*, as " they call them in *Italian*, even of the meaneſt of that Nation. For, " put the caſe you be travelling in *Italy*, ask your *Contadino*, that is, " the next Country fellow you meet, ſome queſtion, and preſently he " ballots you an anſwer with a nod, which is affirmative; or a ſhake " with his head, which is the negative box; or a ſhrug with his " ſhoulder, which is the *Boſſolo di non finceri*——Good! You will " admire SANDS for telling you, that *Grotta di Cane* is a Miracle: " and I ſhall be laugh'd at for aſſuring you, that it is nothing elſe but " ſuch a damp (continu'd by the neighbourhood of certain Sulphur " Mines) as thro' accidental heat does ſometimes happen in our Coalpits. " But Ingratitude muſt not diſcourage an honeſt man from doing good. " There is not, I ſay, ſuch a tongue-ty'd Generation under Heaven as " your *Italian*; that you ſhould not wonder if he makes ſigns. But " our People muſt have ſomething in their Diurnals, we muſt ever " and anon be telling 'em our minds; or if we be at it when we raiſe " Taxes, like thoſe Gentlemen with the finger and the thumb, they " will ſwear that we are Cutpurſes.—Come, I know what I have heard " 'em ſay, when ſome men had money that wrought hard enough for " it; and do you conceive they will be better pleas'd when they ſhall " be told, that upon like occaſions you are at mumchance or ſtoolball? " I do not ſpeak for my ſelf; for tho' I ſhall always acknowledge, that " I got more by one years ſitting in the Houſe than by my three years " Travels, it was not of that kind. But I hate that this ſame SPY, " for pretending to have play'd at Billiards with the moſt Serene Com- " mon-wealth of *Venice*, ſhould make ſuch fools of us here, when I " know that he muſt have had his intelligence from ſome Corncutter " upon the *Rialta*; for a noble *Venetian* would be hang'd if he ſhould " keep ſuch a fellow-company. And yet if I do not think he has made " you all dote, never truſt me, my Lord ARCHON is ſometimes in " ſuch ſtrange Raptures. Why, good my Lord, let me be heard as " well as your Apple Squire; *Venice* has freſh blood in her Cheeks, I " muſt confeſs, yet ſhe is but an old Lady. Nor has he pick'd her Ca- " binet; theſe he ſends you are none of her Receits I can aſſure you, " he bought them for a *Julio* at St. *Marks* of a Mountebank. She has " no other waſh, upon my knowledge, for that ſame envy'd Complexion " of hers but her *Marſhes*, being a little better ſcented, ſaving your " preſence, than a Chamberpot. My Lords, I know what I ſay, but " you will never have done with it, That neither the Great *Turk*, nor " any of thoſe little *Turks* her Neighbours, have been able to ſpoil her! " Why you may as well wonder that Weeſels do not ſuck eggs in " Swans neſt. Do you think that it has lain in the Devotion of her " Beads; which you that have puk'd ſo much at Popery, are now " at length reſolv'd ſhall conſecrate *M. Parſon*, and he drop'd by every " one of his Congregation, while thoſe ſame whimſical Intelligen- " ces your Surveyors (you will break my heart) give the turn to " your *primum mobile*? and ſo I think they will; for you will find, " that Money is the *primum mobile*, and they will turn you this out of " ſome three or four hundred thouſand Pounds: a pretty Sum for " Urns and Balls, for Boxes and Pills, which theſe ſame Quackſalvers " are to adminiſter to the Pariſhes; and for what Diſeaſe I marvel! " Or how does it work? Out comes a Conſtable, an Overſeer, and a " Churchwarden! *Mr. Speaker*, I am amaz'd!

NEVER

NEVER was there Gooſe ſo ſtuck with Lard as my Lord EPIMONUS's Speech with Laughter; the ARCHON having much ado to recover himſelf, in ſuch manner as might enable him to return theſe thanks.

" IN your whole lives, my Lords, where you never entertain'd
" with ſo much Ingenuity; my Lord EPIMONUS having at
" once mended all the faults of Travellers. For, firſt, whereas
" they are abominable liars, he has not told you (except ſome mali-
" tious body has miſinform'd him concerning poor SPY) one ſyllable
" of falſhood. And, ſecondly, whereas they never fail to give the
" upper hand in all their Diſcourſes to foreign Nations, ſtill juſtling
" their own into the kennel; he bears an Honour to his Country
" that will not diſſolve in *Cephalonia*, nor be corrupted with Figs
" and Melons, which I can aſſure you is no ordinary obligation:
" And therefore hold it a matter of public concern, that we be no
" occaſion of quenching my Lord's Affections; nor is there any
" ſuch great matter between us, but in my opinion might be eaſily
" reconcil'd: for tho' that which my Lord gain'd by ſitting in the
" Houſe, I ſtedfaſtly believe, as he can affirm, was got fairly;
" yet dare I not, nor do I think, that upon conſideration he will
" promiſe ſo much for other Gameſters, eſpecially when they were
" at it ſo high, as he intimates not only to have been in uſe, but to
" be like enough to come about again. Wherefore, ſay I, let them
" throw with boxes; for unleſs we will be below the Politics of
" an ordinary, there is no ſuch bar to cogging. It is known to
" his Lordſhip, that our Game is *moſt at a throw*, and that every
" caſt of our Dice is in our Suffrages; nor will he deny, that partia-
" lity in a Suffrage is downright cogging. Now if the *Venetian* Boxes
" be the moſt ſovereign of all Remedies againſt this ſame cogging, is
" it not a ſtrange thing that they ſhould be thrown firſt into the fire
" by a fair Gameſter? Men are naturally ſubject to all kinds of Paſ-
" ſions: Some you have that are not able to withſtand the brow
" of an Enemy; and others that make nothing of this, are leſs
" proof againſt that of a Friend. So that if your Suffrage be bare-
" fac'd, I dare ſay you ſhall not have one fair caſt in twenty. But
" whatever a man's fortune be at the box, he neither knows whom
" to thank, nor whom to challenge. Wherefore (that my Lord may
" have a charitable opinion of the choice Affection wich I confeſs
" to have, above all other Beauties, for that of incompareable *Venice*)
" there is in this way of Suffrage no leſs than a demonſtration that
" it is the moſt pure: and the purity of the ſuffrage in a popular Go-
" vernment is the Health, if not the Life of it; ſeeing the Soul is no
" otherwiſe breath'd into the Sovereign Power, than by the Suffrage
" of the People. Wherefore no wonder if POSTELLUS be of
" opinion, that this uſe of the Ball is the very ſame with that
" of the Bean in *Athens*; or, that others, by the Text concerning
" ELDAD and MEDAD, derive it from the Common-wealth of *If-*
" *rael*. There is another thing, tho' not ſo material to us, that my
" Lord will excuſe me if I be not willing to yield, which is, that *Ve-*
" *nice* ſubſiſts only by her Situation. It is true, that a man in time of
" War may be more ſecure from his Enemies by being in a Citadel,
" but not from his Diſeaſes: wherefore the firſt cauſe, if he lives long,

" is

" is his good Conſtitution, without which his Citadel were to little " purpoſe; and it is not otherwiſe with *Venice.*

WITH this Speech of the ARCHON I conclude the proof of the Agrarian, and the Ballot, being the Fundamental Laws of this Common-wealth; and come now from the Center to the Circumferences or Orbs, whereof ſome have been already ſhewn: As how the Pariſhes annually pour themſelves into the Hundreds, the Hundreds into the Tribes, and the Tribes into the Galaxies; the Annual Galaxy of every Tribe conſiſting of two Knights and ſeven Deputies, whereof the Knights conſtitute the Senate; the Deputies, the Prerogative Tribe, commonly call'd the *People*; and the Senate and People conſtitute the Sovereign Power, or Parliament of *Oceana.* Wherefore to ſhew what the Parliament is, I muſt firſt open the Senate, and then the Prerogative Tribe.

TO begin with the Senate, of which (as a Man is differently repreſented by a Picture-drawer, and by an Anatomiſt) I ſhall firſt diſcover the Face or Aſpect, and then the Parts, with the uſe of them. Every Monday morning in the Summer at ſeven, and in the Winter at eight, the great Bell in the Clock-houſe at the *Pantheon* begins, and continues ringing for the ſpace of one hour: in which time the Magiſtrates of the Senate, being attended according to their Quality, with a reſpective number of the Ballotins, Door-keepers, and Meſſengers; and having the Enſigns of their Magiſtracies born before them, as the Sword before the Strategus, the Mace before the Orator, a Mace with the Seal before the Commiſſioners of the Chancery, the like with the Purſe before the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury; and a Silver Wand, like thoſe in uſe with the Univerſities, before each of the Cenſors, being Chancellors of the ſame. Theſe with the Knights, in all three hundred, aſſemble in the Houſe or Hall of the Senate. *The Face of the Senate.*

THE Houſe or Hall of the Senate, being ſituated in the *Pantheon* or Palace of Juſtice, is a Room conſiſting of a Square and a half. In the middle of the lower end is the Door; at the upper end hangs a rich State over-ſhadowing the greater part of a large Throne, or half pace of two Stages; the firſt aſcended by two ſteps from the floor, and the ſecond about the middle riſing two ſteps higher. Upon this ſtand two Chairs, in that on the right hand ſits the Strategus, in the other the Orator, adorn'd with Scarlet Robes, after the faſhion that was us'd by the Dukes in the Ariſtocracy. At the right end of the upper Stage ſtand three Chairs, in which the three Commiſſioners of the Seal are plac'd; and at the other end ſit the three Commiſſioners of the Treaſury, every one in a Robe or Habit like that of the Earls. Of theſe Magiſtrates of this upper Stage conſiſts the Signory. At either end of the lower Stage ſtands a little Table, to which the Secretaries of the Senate are ſet with their tufted Sleeves in the habit of civil Lawyers. To the four ſteps, whereby the two Stages of the Throne are aſcended, anſwer four long Benches, which ſucceſſively deriving from every one of the ſteps, continue their reſpective height, and extend themſelves by the ſide Walls towards the lower end of the Houſe, every Bench being divided by numeral Characters into the thirty ſeven parts or places. Upon the upper benches ſit the Cenſors in the Robes of Barons; the firſt in the middle of the right hand bench, and the ſecond directly oppoſite to him on the other ſide. Upon the reſt of the Benches ſit the Knights, who if they be call'd to the Urns, diſtributing

themſelves by the Figures, come in equal files, either by the firſt Seat, which conſiſts of the two upper Benches on either ſide; or by the ſecond Seat, conſiſting of the two lower Benches on either ſide: beginning alſo at the upper, or at the lower ends of the ſame, according to the Lot whereby they are call'd; for which end the Benches are open, and aſcended at either end with eaſy ſtairs and large paſſages. The reſt of the Ballot is conformable to that of the Tribe; the Cenſors of the Houſe ſitting at the ſide Urns, and the youngeſt Magiſtrate of the Signory at the middle: the Urns being placed before the Throne, and prepar'd according to the number of the Magiſtrates to be at that time choſen by the Rulers already given to the Cenſors of the Tribes. But before the Benches of the Knights on either ſide ſtands one being ſhorter; and at the upper end of this ſit the two Tribunes of the Horſe. At the upper end of the other, the two Tribunes of the Foot in their Arms; the reſt of the Benches being cover'd by the Judges of the Land in their Robes. But theſe Magiſtrates have no Suffrage, nor the Tribunes, tho' they derive their preſence in the Senate from the *Romans*; nor the Judges, tho' they derive theirs from the antient Senate of *Oceana*. Every Monday this Aſſembly ſits of courſe; at other times, if there be occaſion, any Magiſtrate of the Houſe by giving order for the Bell, or by his Lictor or Enſign-bearer, calls a Senate. And every Magiſtrate or Knight during his Seſſion has the Title, Place, and Honour of a Duke, Earl, Baron, or Knight, reſpectively. And every one that has born the ſame Magiſtracy by his third Seſſion, has his reſpective Place and Title during the Term of his Life, which is all the Honour confer'd by this Common-wealth, except upon the Maſter of the Ceremonies, the Maſter of the Horſe, and the King of the Heralds, who are Knights by their places. And thus you have the face of the Senate, in which there is ſcarce any Feature that is not *Roman* or *Venetian*; nor do the Horns of the Creſcent extend themſelves much unlike thoſe of the *Sanhedrim*, on either hand of the Prince, and of the Father of that Senate. But upon Beauty, in which every Man has his phanſy, we will not otherwiſe philoſophize than to remember that there is ſomething more than decency in the Robe of a Judge, that would not be well ſpar'd from the Bench; and that the graveſt Magiſtrate, to whom you can commit the Sword of Juſtice, will find a quickneſs in the Spurs of Honour, which if they be not laid to Virtue, will lay themſelves to that which may rout a Common-wealth.

Conſtitution of the Senate.

TO come from the Face of the Senate, to the Conſtitution and uſe of the Parts: It is contain'd in the peculiar Orders. And the Orders which are peculiar to the Senate, are either of Election or Inſtruction.

ELECTIONS in the Senate are of three ſorts, Annual, Biennial, and Extraordinary.

ANNUAL Elections are perform'd by the Schedule call'd the *Tropic:* And the Tropic conſiſts of two parts; the one containing the Magiſtrates, and the other the Councils to be yearly elected. The Schedule or Tropic of the Magiſtrates is as follows in

15. Order. *Tropic of the Magiſtrates.*

THE fifteenth ORDER, requiring, That upon every Monday next enſuing the laſt of *March*, the Knights of the Annual Galaxies taking their places in the Senate, be call'd the third Region of the ſame; and that the Houſe having diſmiſt the firſt Region, and receiv'd the third, proceed to election of the Magiſtrates contain'd in the firſt part of the Tropic, by the enſuing Schedule:

The

The Lord Strategus,
The Lord Orator,
The firſt Cenſor,
The ſecond Cenſor,
} *Annual Magiſtrates.*

The third Commiſſioner of the Seal,
The third Commiſſioner of the Treaſury,
} *Triennial Magiſtrates.*

THE Annual Magiſtrates (provided that no one Man bears above one of thoſe Honours during the term of one Seſſion) may be elected out of any Region. But the Triennial Magiſtrates may not be elected out of any other than the third Region only, leſt the term of their Seſſion expire before that of their Honour; and (it being unlawful for a Man to bear Magiſtracy any longer than he is thereto qualify'd by the Election of the People) cauſe a Fraction in the Rotation of this Common-wealth.

Of the Strategus.

THE *Strategus* is firſt Preſident of the Senate, and General of the Army, if it be commanded to march; in which caſe there ſhall be a ſecond *Strategus* elected to be firſt Preſident of the Senate, and General of the ſecond Army: and if this alſo be commanded to march, a third *Strategus* ſhall be choſen; and ſo on, as long as the Common-wealth ſends forth Armies.

Of the Orator

THE Lord *Orator* is the ſecond and more peculiar Preſident of the Senate, to whom it appertains to keep the Houſe to Orders.

Of the Cenſors.

THE *Cenſors*, whereof the firſt by conſequence of his Election is Chancellor of the Univerſity of *Clio*, and the ſecond of that of *Calliope*, are Preſidents of the Council for Religion and Magiſtrates, to whom it belongs to keep the Houſe to the order of the Ballot. They are alſo Inquiſitors into the ways and means of acquiring Magiſtracy; and have power to puniſh indirect proceedings in the ſame, by removing a Knight or Magiſtrate out of the Houſe, under appeal to the Senate.

Of the Commiſſioners of the Seal.

THE Commiſſioners of the Seal being three, whereof the third is annually choſen out of the third Region, are Judges in Chancery.

Of the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury.

THE Commiſſioners of the Treaſury being three, whereof the third is annually choſen out of the third Region, are Judges in the Exchequer; and every Magiſtrate of this Schedule has right to propoſe to the Senate.

Of the Signory.

BUT the *Strategus* with the ſix Commiſſioners, are the *Signory* of this Common-wealth, having right of Seſſion and Suffrage in every Council of the Senate, and Power either jointly or ſeverally to propoſe in all or any of them.

I HAVE little in this Order to obſerve or prove, but that the *Strategus* is the ſame Honour both in name and thing that was born, among others, by PHILOPEMEN and ARATUS in the Common-wealth of the *Acheans*; the like having been in uſe alſo with the *Ætolians*. The *Orator*, call'd otherwiſe the *Speaker*, is with ſmall alteration the ſame that had been of former uſe in this Nation. Theſe two, if you will, may be compar'd to the Conſuls in *Rome*, or the Sufferes in *Carthage*; for their Magiſtracy is ſcarce different.

THE Cenſors derive their power of removing a Senator from thoſe of *Rome*; the Government of the ballot, from thoſe of *Venice*; and

that

that of Animadverſion upon the *Ambitus*, or canvaſs for Magiſtracy from both.

THE *Signory*, with the whole Right and Uſe of that Magiſtracy, to be hereafter more fully explain'd, is almoſt purely *Venetian*.

THE ſecond part of the Tropic is directed by

16. Order. Conſtitution of the Councils.

THE ſixteenth ORDER, whereby the Conſtitution of the Councils, being four, that is to ſay, the Council of State, the Council of War, the Council of Religion, and the Council of Trade, is render'd conformable in their Revolutions to that of the Senate. As, firſt, by the annual Election of five Knights out of the third Region of the Senate, into the Council of State, conſiſting of fifteen Knights, five in every Region. Secondly, By the annual Election of three Knights out of the third Region of the Council of State, to be propos'd by the Provoſts, and elected by that Council, into the Council of War, conſiſting of nine Knights, three in every Region, not excluded by this Election from remaining Members alſo of the Council of State. The four Tribunes of the People have right of Seſſion and Suffrage in the Council of War. Thirdly, By the annual Election of four Knights out of the third Region of the Senate into the Council of Religion, conſiſting of twelve Knights, four in every Region: Of this Council the Cenſors are Preſidents. Fourthly, By the annual Election of four Knights out of the third Region of the Senate into the Council of Trade, conſiſting of twelve Knights, four in every Region. And each Region, in every one of theſe Councils thus conſtituted, ſhall weekly and interchangeably elect one Provoſt, whoſe Magiſtracy ſhall continue for one Week; nor ſhall he be re-elected in the ſame, till every Knight of that Region in the ſame Council has once born the ſame Magiſtracy. And the Provoſts being one in every Region, three in every Council, and twelve in all, beſides their other Capacities, ſhall aſſemble and be a Council, or rather an Academy apart, to certain ends and purpoſes to be hereafter further explain'd, with thoſe of the reſt of the Councils.

Of the Council of State.

Of the Council of War.

Of the Council of Religion.

Of the Council of Trade.

Of the Provoſts.

Of the Council of the Provoſts.

THIS Order is of no other uſe than for the frame and turn of the Councils, and yet of no ſmall one: for in Motion conſiſts Life; and the Motion of a Common-wealth will never be current, unleſs it be circular. Men that, like my Lord EPIMONUS, not enduring the reſemblance of this kind of Government to Orbs and Spheres, fall on phyſicing and purging it, do no more than is neceſſary; for if it be not in Rotation both as to Perſons and Things, it will be very ſick. The People of *Rome*, as to Perſons, if they had not been taken up by the Wheel of Magiſtracy, had overturn'd the Chariot of the Senate. And thoſe of *Lacedemon*, as to Things, had not been ſo quiet when the Senate traſh'd their Buſineſs, by encroaching upon the Reſult, if by the Inſtitution of the *Ephors* they had not brought it about again. So that if you allow not a Common-wealth her Rotation, in which conſiſts her Equality, you reduce her to a Party, and then it is neceſſary that you be Phyſicians indeed, or rather Farriers; for you will have ſtrong Patients, and ſuch as muſt be halter'd and caſt, or your ſelves may need Boneſetters. Wherefore the Councils of this Common-wealth, both in regard of their Elections, and, as will be ſhewn, of their Affairs, are uniform with the Senate in their Revolutions; not as Whirlpits to ſwallow, but to bite, and with the Scrues of their Rotation to hold and turn a Buſineſs (like the Vice of a Smith) to the Hand

Hand of the Workman. Without Engines of which nature it is not poſſible for the Senate, much leſs for the People, to be perfect Artificers in a political Capacity. But I ſhall not hold you longer from

THE ſeventeenth ORDER, directing biennial Elections, or the Conſtitution of the Orb of Ambaſſadors in ordinary, conſiſting of four Reſidences, the Revolution whereof is perform'd in eight years, and preſerv'd thro' the Election of one Embaſſador in two years by the Ballot of the Senate to repair to the Court of *France*, and reſide there for the term of two years; and the term of two years being expir'd, to remove from thence to the Court of *Spain*, there to continue for the ſpace of two years, and thence to remove to the State of *Venice*; and after two years reſidence in that City, to conclude with his reſidence at *Conſtantinople* for a like term of time, and ſo to return. A Knight of the Senate, or a Deputy of the Prerogative, may not be elected Embaſſador in Ordinary, becauſe a Knight or Deputy ſo choſen, muſt either loſe his Seſſion, which would cauſe an unevenneſs in the motion of this Common-wealth, or accumulate Magiſtracy, which agrees not with the equality of the ſame. Nor may any Man be elected into this Capacity, that is above five and thirty years of Age, leſt the Common-wealth loſe the charge of his Education, by being depriv'd at his return of the Fruit of it, or elſe enjoy it not long thro' the defects of Nature.

17. Order. *Conſtitution of the biennial Election or Orb of Embaſſadors in ordinary.*

THIS Order is the Perſpective of the Common-wealth, whereby ſhe foreſees Danger, or the Traffic; whereby ſhe receives every two years thereturn of a Stateſman enrich'd with eight years experience, from the prime Marts of Negotiation in *Europe*. And ſo much for the Elections in the Senate that are ordinary; ſuch as are extraordinary follow in

THE eighteenth ORDER, appointing all Elections upon emergent occaſions, except that of the Dictator, to be made by the Scrutiny, or that kind of Election, whereby a Council comes to be a fifth Order of Electors. For Example, if there be occaſion of an Embaſſador Extraordinary, the Provoſts of the Council of State, or any two of them ſhall propoſe to the ſame, till one Competitor be choſen by that Council: and the Council having choſen a Competitor, ſhall bring his name into the Senate, which in the uſual way ſhall chooſe four more Competitors to the ſame Magiſtracy; and put them, with the Competitor of the Council, to the Ballot of the Houſe, by which he of the five that is choſen is ſaid to be elected by the Scrutiny of the Council of State. A Vice-Admiral, a Polemarch, or Field Officer, ſhall be elected after the ſame manner, by the Srutiny of the Council of War. A Judge or Serjeant at Law, by the Scrutiny of the Commiſſioners of the Seal. A Baron or conſiderable Officer of the Exchequer, by the Scrutiny of the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury. Men in Magiſtracy, or out of it, are equally capable of Election by the Scrutiny; but a Magiſtrate or Officer elected by the Scrutiny to a military Employment, if he be neither a Knight of the Senate, nor a Deputy of the Prerogative, ought to have his Office confirm'd by the Prerogative, becauſe the Militia in a Common-wealth, where the People are Sovereign, is not lawful to be touch'd *injuſſu Populi*.

18. Order. *Conſtitution of Election Extraordinary, or by the Scrutiny.*

THE

THE *Romans* were ſo curious, that tho' their Conſuls were elected in the * *Centuriate Aſſemblies*, they might not touch the Militia, except they were confirm'd in the † *Parochial Aſſemblies:* for a Magiſtrate not receiving his Power from the People, takes it from them; and to take away their Power, is to take away their Liberty. As to the Election by the Scrutiny, it is eaſily perceiv'd to be *Venetian*, there being no ſuch way to take in the Knowledge, which in all reaſon muſt be beſt in every Council of ſuch men as are moſt fit for their turns, and yet to keep them from the biaſs of particular Affection or Intereſt under that pretence: for the cauſe why the Great Council in *Venice* ſcarce ever elects any other than the Name that is brought in by the Scrutiny, is very probable to be, that they may....This Election is the laſt of thoſe appertaining to the Senate. The Councils being choſen by the Orders already ſhewn, it remains that we come to thoſe whereby they are inſtructed: and the Orders of Inſtruction to the Councils are two, the firſt for the Matter whereupon they are to proceed; and the ſecond for the Manner of their proceeding. The Matter of the Councils is diſtributed to them by

19. Order. *Inſtructions for the Councils as to their Matter.*

THE nineteenth ORDER, diſtributing to every Council ſuch Buſineſſes as are properly to belong to their Cognizance, whereof ſome they ſhall receive and determine; and others they ſhall receive, prepare and introduce into the Houſe: As, firſt,

For the Council of State.

THE Council of State is to receive all Addreſſes, Intelligences, and Letters of Negotiation; to give audience to Embaſſadors ſent to, and to draw up Inſtructions for ſuch as ſhall be ſent by, this Common-wealth; to receive Propoſitions from, and hold Intelligence with the Provincial Councils; to conſider upon all Laws to be enacted, amended, or repeal'd; and upon all Levies of Men or Money, War or Peace, Leagues or Aſſociations to be made by this Common-wealth, ſo far forth as is conducible to the orderly preparation of the ſame to be introduc'd by them into the Senate. Provided that all ſuch Affairs, as other wiſe appertaining to the Council of State are, for the good of the Common-wealth, to be carry'd with greater ſecrecy, be manag'd by the Council of War, with Power to receive and ſend forth Agents, Spies, Emiſſaries, Intelligencers, Frigots; and to manage Affairs of that nature, if it be neceſſary, without communication to the Senate, till ſuch time as it may be had without detriment to the Buſineſs. But they ſhall have no Power to engage the Common-wealth in a War, without the conſent of the Senate and the People. It appertains alſo to this Council to take charge of the Fleet as Admiral; and of all Store-houſes, Armories, Arſenals, and Magazines appertaining to this Common-wealth. They ſhall keep a diligent Record of the military Expeditions from time to time reported by him that was Strategus or General, or one of the Polemarchs in that Action; or at leaſt ſo far as the Experience of ſuch Commanders may tend to the improvement of the military diſcipline, which they ſhall digeſt and introduce into the Senate: and if the Senate ſhall thereupon frame any Article, they ſhall ſee that it be obſerved in the Muſters or Education of the Youth. And whereas the Council of War is the Sentinal or Scout of this Common-wealth, if any Perſon or Perſons ſhall go about to introduce Debate into any popular Aſſembly of the ſame, or otherwiſe

For the Council of War.

* Centuriatis. † Curiatis Comitiis.

to

to alter the preſent Government, or ſtrike at the root of it, they ſhall apprehend, or cauſe to be apprehended, ſeiz'd, impriſon'd; and examine, arraign, acquit, or condemn, and cauſe to be executed any ſuch Perſon or Perſons, by their proper Power and Authority, and without appeal.

THE Council of Religion, as the Arbiter of this Common-wealth in caſes of Conſcience more peculiarly appertaining to Religion, Chriſtian Charity, and a pious Life, ſhall have the care of the National Religion, and the protection of the Liberty of Conſcience, with the cognizance of all Cauſes relating to either of them. And firſt as to the National Religion; They ſhall cauſe all Places or Preferments of the beſt Revenue in either of the Univerſities to be confer'd upon no other than ſuch of the moſt learn'd and pious Men, as have dedicated themſelves to the ſtudy of Theology. They ſhall alſo take a ſpecial care that by ſuch Augmentations as be or ſhall hereafter be appointed by the Senate, every Benefice in this Nation be improv'd at leaſt to the value of one hundred pounds a year. And to the end that there be no intereſt at all, whereby the Divines or Teachers of the National Religion may be corrupted, or corrupt Religion, they ſhall be capable of no other kind of Employment or Preferment in this Common-wealth. And whereas a Directory for the Adminiſtration of the National Religion is to be prepar'd by this Council, they ſhall in this and other Debates of this nature proceed in manner following: A Queſtion ariſing in matter of Religion ſhall be put and ſtated by the Council in writing; which Writing the Cenſors ſhall ſend by their Beadles (being Proctors choſen to attend them) each to the Univerſity whereof he is Chancellor; and the Vice-Chancellor of the ſame receiving the Writing, ſhall call a Convocation of all the Divines of that Univerſity, being above forty years of Age. And the Univerſities upon a point ſo propos'd, ſhall have no manner of Intelligence or Correſpondence one with another, till their Debates be ended, and they have made return of their Anſwers to the Council of Religion by two or three of their own Members, that may clear their ſenſe, if any doubt ſhould ariſe to the Council; which done, they ſhall return, and the Council having receiv'd ſuch information, ſhall proceed according to their own Judgments, in the preparation of the whole matter for the Senate: That ſo the Intereſt of the Learned being remov'd, there may be a right application of Reaſon to Scripture, which is the Foundation of the National Religion. *For the Council of Religion.*

SECONDLY, This Council, as to the protection of the Liberty of Conſcience, ſhall ſuffer no coercive Power in the matter of Religion to be exercis'd in this Nation: The Teachers of the National Religion being no other than ſuch as voluntarily undertake that calling; and their Auditors or Hearers, no other than are alſo voluntary. Nor ſhall any gather'd Congregation be moleſted or interrupted in their way of Worſhip (being neither Jewiſh nor Idolatrous) but vigilantly and vigorouſly protected and defended in the Enjoyment, Practice, and Profeſſion of the ſame. And if there be Officers or Auditors appointed by any ſuch Congregation for the introduction of Cauſes into the Council of Religion, all ſuch Cauſes ſo introduc'd ſhall be receiv'd, heard, and determin'd by the ſame, with recourſe had, if need be, to the Senate.

THIRDLY, Every Petition addreſt to the Senate, except that of a Tribe, ſhall be receiv'd, examin'd, and debated by this Council; and ſuch only as they, upon ſuch examination and debate had, ſhall think fit, may be introduc'd into the Senate.

THE Council of Trade being the *Vena Porta* of this Nation, ſhall hereafter receive Inſtructions more at large. For the preſent, their Experience *For the Council of Trade.*

perience attaining to a right underſtanding of thoſe Trades and Myſteries that feed the Veins of this Common-wealth, and a true diſtinction of them from thoſe that ſuck or exhauſt the ſame, they ſhall acquaint the Senate with the Conveniencies and Inconveniencies, to the end that Encouragement may be apply'd to the one, and Remedy to the other.

For the Academy of the Provoſts.

THE Academy of the Provoſts, being the Affability of the Common-wealth, ſhall aſſemble every day towards the Evening in a fair Room, having certain withdrawing Rooms thereto belonging. And all ſorts of Company that will repair thither for Converſation or Diſcourſe, ſo it be upon matters of Government, News, or Intelligence, or to propoſe any thing to the Councils, ſhall be freely and affably receiv'd in the outer Chamber, and heard in the way of civil Converſation, which is to be manag'd without any other Awe or Ceremony than is thereto uſually appertaining; to the end that every Man may be free, and that what is propos'd by one, may be argu'd or diſcours'd by the reſt, except the matter be of ſecrecy; in which caſe the Provoſts, or ſome of them, ſhall take ſuch as deſire Audience into one of the withdrawing Rooms. And the Provoſts are to give their minds, that this Academy be ſo govern'd, adorn'd, and preſerv'd, as may be moſt attractive to Men of Parts and good Affections to the Common-wealth, for the excellency of the Converſation.

FURTHERMORE, If any Man, not being able or willing to come in perſon, has any advice to give which he judges may be for the good of the Common-wealth, he may write his mind to the Academy of the Provoſts, in a Letter ſign'd or not ſign'd; which Letter ſhall be left with the Door-keeper of the Academy. Nor ſhall any Perſon delivering ſuch a Letter be ſeiz'd, moleſted, or detain'd, tho' it ſhould prove to be a Libel. But the Letters ſo deliver'd ſhall be preſented to the Provoſts; and in caſe they be ſo many that they cannot well be perus'd by the Provoſts themſelves, they ſhall diſtribute them as they pleaſe to be read by the Gentlemen of the Academy, who finding any thing in them material, will find matter of Diſcourſe: Or if they happen upon a buſineſs that requires privacy, return it with a Note upon it to a Provoſt. And the Provoſts by the Secretaries attending ſhall cauſe ſuch Notes out of Diſcourſes or Letters to be taken as they pleaſe, to the end that they may propoſe, as occaſion ſerves, what any two of them ſhall think fit out of their Notes ſo taken to their reſpective Councils: to the end that not only the Ear of the Common-wealth be open to all, but that Men of ſuch Education being in her eye, ſhe may upon emergent Elections or Occaſions be always provided of her choice of fit Perſons.

For the Attendance of the Councils.

EVERY Council being adorn'd with a State for the Signory, ſhall be attended by two Secretaries, two Door-keepers, and two Meſſengers in ordinary, and have power to command more upon Emergencies, as occaſion requires. And the Academy ſhall be attended with two Secretaries, two Meſſengers, and two Door-keepers; this with the other Councils being provided with their farther Conveniencies at the charge of the State.

For the Dictator.

BUT whereas it is incident to Common-wealths, upon Emergencies requiring extraordinary ſpeed or ſecrecy, either thro' their natural delays or unnatural haſt, to incur equal danger, while holding to the ſlow pace of their Orders, they come not in time to defend themſelves from ſome ſudden blow; or breaking them for the greater ſpeed, they but haſte to their own deſtruction: If the Senate ſhall at any time make Election of nine Knights extraordinary, to be added to the Council of War, as a *Juncta* for the term of three Months, the Council of War, with the *Juncta* ſo added, is for the term of the ſame Dictator of *Oceana*, having power to levy Men and Money,

Money, to make War and Peace, as alſo to enact Laws, which ſhall be good for the ſpace of one year (if they be not ſooner repeal'd by the Senate and the People) and for no longer time, except they be confirm'd by the Senate and the People And the whole Adminiſtration of the Common-wealth for the term of the ſaid three Months ſhall be in the Dictator; provided, that the Dictator ſhall have no Power to do any thing that tends not to his proper end and inſtitution, but all to the preſervation of the Common-wealth as it is eſtabliſh'd, and for the ſudden reſtitution of the ſame to the natural Channel and common courſe of Government. And all Acts, Orders, Decrees, or Laws of the Council of War with the *Juncta*, being thus created, ſhall be ſign'd,

DICTATOR OCEANÆ.

THIS Order of Inſtructions to the Councils being (as in a matter of that nature is requiſite) very large, I have us'd my beſt skill to abbreviate it in ſuch manner, as might ſhew no more of it than is neceſſary to the underſtanding of the whole; tho' as to the parts, or further duties of the Councils, I have omitted many things of ſingular uſe in a Common-wealth. But it was diſcours'd at the Council by the ARCHON in this manner.

My Lords, the Legiſlators;

" YOUR Councils, except the Dictator only, are proper and " native Springs and Sources, you ſee, which (hanging a few " ſticks and ſtraws, that, as leſs conſiderable, would otherwiſe be " more troubleſome, upon the banks of their peculiar Channels) de- " rive the full ſtream of buſineſs into the Senate, ſo pure, and ſo far " from the poſſibility of being troubl'd or ſtain'd (as will undenia- " bly appear by the Courſe contain'd in the enſuing Order) with " any kind of private Intereſt or Partiality, that it ſhall never be poſſi- " ble for any Aſſembly hearkning to the advice or Information of this " or that worthy Member (either inſtructed upon his Pillow, or " while he was making himſelf ready, or by the Petition or Ticket " which he receiv'd at the door) to have half the Security in his " Faith, or advantage by his Wiſdom; ſuch a Senate or Council being " thro' the incertainty of the Winds, like a wave of the Sea. Nor " ſhall it otherwiſe mend the matter by flowing up into dry ditches, " or referring buſineſs to be better examin'd by Committees, than to " go further about with it to leſs purpoſe; if it does not ebb back again " with the more mud in it. For in a caſe refer'd to an occaſional " Committee, of which any Member that is deſirous may get himſelf " nam'd, and to which no body will come, but either for the ſake of " his Friend or his own Intereſt; it fares little better as to the Infor- " mation of the Senate, than if it had been refer'd to the Parties. Where- " fore the *Athenians* being diſtributed into four Tribes, out of which " by equal numbers they annually choſe four hundred Men, call'd " *the Senate of the Bean* (becauſe the Ballot at their Election was per- " form'd by the uſe of Beans) divided them by Fifties into eight " parts. And every Fifty in their turn, for one eighth part of the " year, was a Council apart call'd the *Prytans*. The *Prytans* in " their diſtinct Council receiving all Comers, and giving ear to every " Man that had any thing to propoſe concerning the Common-wealth,

" had power to debate and prepare all the buſineſſes that were to be
" introduc'd into the Senate. The *Achæans* had ten ſelected Magiſtrates
" call'd the *Demiurgs*, conſtituting a Council apart call'd the *Synarchy*,
" which with the *Strategus* prepar'd all the buſineſs that was intro-
" duc'd into their Senate. But both the Senate of the *Athenians*, and
" that of the *Achæans*, would have wonder'd if a Man had told them,
" that they were to receive all Comers and Diſcourſes, to the end that
" they might refer them afterwards to the *Prytans* or the *Synarchy*;
" much leſs to an occaſional Committee, expos'd to the catch that
" catch may of the Parties intereſted. And yet *Venice* in this, as in
" moſt of her Orders, excels them all by the Conſtitution of her
" Councils, that of the College, and the other of the *Dieci*, or Coun-
" cil of Ten. The courſe of the College is exactly deſcrib'd in the
" enſuing Order: And for that of the *Dieci*, it ſo little differs from
" what it has beſtow'd upon our *Dictator*, that I need not make any
" particular deſcription of it. But to *Dictatorian* Power in general,
" and the the uſe of it, becauſe it muſt needs be of difficult digeſtion to
" ſuch as, puking ſtill at antient Prudence, ſhew themſelves to be in
" the Nurſery of Mother-wit; it is no leſs than neceſſary to ſay ſome-
" thing. And, Firſt, in a Common-wealth that is not wrought up,
" or perfected, this Power will be of very frequent, if not continual
" uſe; wherefore it is ſaid more than once, upon defects of the Govern-
" ment, in the Book of *Judges*, *That in thoſe days there was no King in*
" Iſrael. Nor has the Tranſlator, tho for *no King* he ſhould have
" ſaid *no Judge*, abus'd you ſo much; ſeeing that the Dictator (and
" ſuch was the *Judge of Iſrael*) or the Dictatorian Power being in a
" ſingle Perſon, ſo little differs from Monarchy, which follow'd in
" that, that from the ſame cauſe there has been no other effect in any
" Common-wealth; as in *Rome* was manifeſt by SYLLA and CÆSAR,
" who to make themſelves Abſolute or Sovereign, had no more to do
" than to prolong their Magiſtracy; for * the Dictatorian Power was
" reputed Divine, and therefore irreſiſtable. Nevertheleſs ſo it is,
" that without this Power, which is ſo dangerous, and ſubject to in-
" troduce Monarchy, a Common-wealth cannot be ſafe from falling
" into the like diſſolution; unleſs you have an Expedient in this caſe
" of your own, and bound up by your Providence from recoiling.
" Expedients in ſome caſes you muſt not only have, but be beholden
" for them to ſuch whom you muſt truſt at a pinch, when you have
" not leiſure to ſtand with them for Security; which will be a thou-
" ſand times more dangerous. And there can never be a Common-
" wealth otherwiſe than by the Order in debate wrought up to that
" perfection; but this neceſſity muſt ſometimes happen in regard of
" her natural ſlowneſs and openneſs, and the ſuddenneſs of Aſſaults
" that may be made upon her, as alſo the Secrecy which in ſome caſes
" may be of abſolute neceſſity to her Affairs. Whence MACHIA-
" VEL concludes it poſitively, that a Common-wealth unprovided of
" ſuch a Refuge, muſt fall to ruin: for her courſe is either broken
" by the blow in one of thoſe caſes, or by her ſelf, while it ſtartles
" her out of her Orders. And indeed a Common-wealth is like a
" Greyhound, which having once coaſted, will never after run fair,
" but grow ſlothful; and when it comes to make a common practice

* Dictatoris imperium quaſi Numen. *Liv.*

" of

" of taking nearer ways than its Orders, it is diſſolv'd: for the being " of a Common-wealth conſiſts in its Orders. Wherefore at this lift " you will be expos'd to danger, if you have not provided before- " hand for the ſafety of your Reſort in the like caſes: nor is it ſuffi- " cient that your Reſort be ſafe, unleſs it be as ſecret and quick; for if " it be ſlow or open, your former Inconveniencies are not remedy'd. " Now for our imitation in this part, there is nothing in experience " like that of the Council of Ten in *Venice*; the benefit whereof would " be too long to be ſhewn in the whole piece, and therefore I ſhall " take but a pattern out of JANOTTI. In the War, ſays he, which " the *Venetians* had with *Florence* in *Caſentin*, the *Florentins* finding a ne- " ceſſity in their affairs far from any other inclination in themſelves to " aſk their Peace, ſent Ambaſſadors about it to *Venice*, where they were " no ſooner heard, than the bargain was ſtruck up by the Council of " Ten: and every body admiring (ſeeing this Common-wealth ſtood " upon the higher ground) what ſhould be the reaſon of ſuch haſte; " the Council upon the return of the Ambaſſadors imparted Letters to " the Senate, whereby it appear'd, that the *Turk* had newly lanch'd a " formidable Fleet againſt their State; which had it been underſtood " by the *Florentins*, it was well enough known they would have made " no Peace. Wherefore the ſervice of the Ten was highly applauded by " the Senate, and celebrated by the *Venetians*. Whereby may appear, " not only in part what uſe there is of Dictatorian Power in that Go- " vernment, but that it is aſſum'd at the diſcretion of that Council; " whereas in this of *Oceana* it is not otherwiſe entruſted than when " the Senate, in the Election of nine Knights extraordinary, gives at " once the Commiſſion, and takes ſecurity in a balance, added to the " Council of War, tho' ſecurer before by the Tribunes of the People " than that of *Venice*, which yet never incur'd Jealouſy: For if the " younger Nobility have been often girding at it, that happen'd not " ſo much thro' the apprehenſion of danger in it to the Common- " wealth, as thro' the awe of it upon themſelves. Wherefore the " Graver have doubtleſly ſhewn their Prudence in the Law; whereby, " the Magiſtracy of theſe Counſellors being to laſt till their Succeſſors " be created, the Council is eſtabliſh'd.

THE Inſtructions of the Councils for their matter being ſhewn, it remains that I ſhew the Inſtructions for the manner of their proceeding, as they follow in

THE twentieth ORDER, containing the Method of Debates to be obſerv'd by the Magiſtrates and the Councils ſucceſſively, in order to a Decree of the Senate.

20. Order. *Inſtructions for the Councils as to their manner of Proceeding.*

THE Magiſtrates of the Signory, as Counſellors of this Common-wealth, ſhall take into their conſideration all matters of State, or of Government; and, having right to propoſe in any Council, may any one or more of them propoſe what buſineſs he or they pleaſe in that Council to which it moſt properly belongs. And, that the Councils may be held to their duty, the ſaid Magiſtrates are ſuperintendents and inſpectors of the ſame, with right to propoſe to the Senate.

THE Cenſors have equal Power with theſe Magiſtrates, but in relation to the Council of Religion only.

ANY two of the three Provoſts in every Council may propoſe to, and are the more peculiar Propoſers of, the ſame Council; to the end that

that there be not only an inſpection and ſuperintendency of buſineſs in general, but that every work be alſo committed to a peculiar hand.

ANY one or more of the Magiſtrates, or any two of the Provoſts reſpectfully having propos'd, the Council ſhall debate the buſineſs ſo propos'd, to which they of the third Region that are willing ſhall ſpeak firſt in their order; they of the ſecond, next; and they of the firſt, laſt: and the opinions of thoſe that propos'd or ſpoke, as they ſhall be thought the moſt conſiderable by the Council, ſhall be taken by the Secretary of the ſame in writing, and each of them ſign'd with the name of the Author.

THE Opinions being thus prepar'd, any Magiſtrate of the Signory, the Cenſor, or any two of the Provoſts of that Council, upon this occaſion may aſſemble the Senate.

THE Senate being aſſembled, the Opinions (for example, if they be four) ſhall be read in their Order, that is, according to the Order or Dignity of the Magiſtrates or Counſellors by which they were ſign'd. And being read, if any of the Council introducing them will ſpeak, they, as beſt acquainted with the buſineſs, ſhall have precedence; and after them the Senators ſhall ſpeak according to their Regions, beginning by the third firſt, and ſo continuing till every man that will has ſpoken: and when the Opinions have been ſufficiently debated, they ſhall be put all together to the Ballot after this manner.

FOUR Secretaries carrying each of them one of the Opinions in one hand, with a white Box in the other, and each following the other, according to the order of the Opinions, ſhall preſent his Box, naming the Author of his Opinion to every Senator; and one Secretary or Ballotin with a green Box ſhall follow the four white ones; and one Secretary or Ballotin with a red Box ſhall follow the green one: and every Senator ſhall put one Ball into ſome of theſe ſix boxes. The Suffrage being gather'd and open'd before the Signory, if the red Box or *Nonſincere* had above half the Suffrages, the Opinions ſhall be all caſt out, for the major part of the Houſe is not clear in the buſineſs. If no one of the four Opinions had above half the Suffrages in the Affirmative, that which had feweſt ſhall be caſt out, and the other three ſhall be balloted again. If no one of the three had above half, that which had feweſt ſhall be caſt out, and the other two ſhall ballot again. If neither of the two had above half, that which had feweſt ſhall be caſt out, and the remaining Opinion ſhall be balloted again. And if the remaining Opinion has not above half, it ſhall alſo be caſt out. But the firſt of the Opinions that arrives at moſt above half in the Affirmative, is the Decree of the Senate. The Opinions being all of them caſt out by the *Nonſincere*, may be reviewed, if occaſion permits, by the Council, and brought in again. If they be caſt out by the Negative, the caſe being of advice only, the Houſe approves not, and there is an end of it: the caſe being neceſſary, and admitting delay, the Council is to think again upon the buſineſs, and to bring in new Opinions; but the Caſe being neceſſary, and not admitting delay, the Senate immediately electing the *Juncta*, ſhall create the Dictator. * *And let the Dictator*, as the Roman ſaying is, *take care that the Common-wealth receives no harm.*

THIS in caſe the Debate concludes not in a Decree. But if a Decree be paſt, it is either in matter of State or Government according to Law enacted already, and then it is good without going any further: or it is in

* Et videat Dictator ne quid Reſpub. detrimenti capiat.

matter

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matter of Law to be enacted, repeal'd, or amended; and then the Decree of the Senate, eſpecially if it be for a war, or for a Levy of Men or Money, is invalid, without the reſult of the Common-wealth, which is in the Prerogative Tribe, or Repreſentative of the People.

THE Senate having prepar'd a Decree to be propos'd to the People, ſhall appoint their Propoſers; and no other may propoſe for the Senate to the People but the Magiſtrates of the Houſe: that is to ſay, the three Commiſſioners of the Seal, or any two of them; the three of the Treaſury, or any two of them; or the two Cenſors.

THE Senate having appointed their Propoſers, ſhall require of the Tribunes a muſter of the People at a ſet time and place: and the Tribunes or any two of them having muſter'd the People accordingly, the Propoſers ſhall propoſe the Senſe or Decree of the Senate by clauſes to the People. And that which is propos'd by the Authority of the Senate, and reſolv'd by the Command of the People, is the Law of *Oceana*.

TO this Order, implicitly containing the ſum very near of the whole Civil part of the Common-wealth, my Lord ARCHON ſpoke thus in Council.

My Dear Lords;

" THERE is a Saying, That a man muſt cut his Coat accord-
" ing to his Cloth. When I conſider what God has allow'd or
" furniſh'd to our preſent work, I am amaz'd. You would have a
" popular Government, he has weigh'd it to you in the preſent ba-
" lance, as I may ſay, to a dram; you have no more to do, but to fix
" it. For the Superſtructures of ſuch a Government, they require a
" good Ariſtocracy: and you have, or have had a Nobility or Gentry
" the beſt ſtudy'd, and the beſt Writers, at leaſt next that of *Italy*,
" in the whole World; nor have they been inferior, when ſo exercis'd,
" in the leading of Armies. But the People are the main body of a
" Common-wealth; ſhew me from the Treaſuries of the Snow (as it
" is in JOB) to the burning Zone, a People whoſe ſhoulders ſo uni-
" verſally and ſo exactly fit the Corſlet. Nevertheleſs it were conve-
" nient to be well provided with Auxiliaries. There is *Marpeſia* thro'
" her fruitfulneſs inexhauſtible of men, and men thro' her barrenneſs
" not only inur'd to hardſhip, but in your Arms. It may be ſaid,
" that *Venice*, excepting only that ſhe takes not in the People, is the
" moſt incompareable Situation of a Common-wealth. You are *Venice*
" taking in your People and your Auxiliaries too. My Lords, the
" Children of *Iſrael* were makers of Brick, before they were builders
" of a Common-wealth: But our brick is made, our Morter temper'd,
" the Cedars of *Lebanon* are hew'd and ſquar'd to our hands. Has
" this been the work of man? or is it in man to withſtand this work?
" *Shall he that contends with the Almighty, inſtruct him? He that re-*
" *proves God, let him anſwer it.* For our parts, every thing is ſo laid,
" that when we come to have uſe of it, it is the next at hand; and un-
" leſs we can conceive that God and nature do any thing in vain,
" there is no more for us to do but to diſpatch. The Piece, which we
" have reach'd to us in the foregoing Orders, is the Ariſtocracy. *A-*
" *thens*, as has been ſhewn, was plainly loſt thro' the want of a good
" Ariſtocracy. But the ſufficiency of an Ariſtocracy goes demonſtra-
" bly upon the hand of the Nobility or Gentry: for that the Politicks

" can be maſter'd without ſtudy, or that the People can have leiſure to " ſtudy, is a vain imagination; and what kind of Ariſtocracy Divines " and Lawyers would make, let their incurable running upon their " own narrow biaſs, and their perpetual invectives againſt MACHI- " AVEL (tho' in ſome places juſtly reproveable, yet the only Politician " and incompareable Patron of the People) ſerve for inſtruction. I " will ſtand no more to the Judgment of Lawyers and Divines in this " work, than to that of ſo many other Tradeſmen; but if this Mo- " del chances to wander abroad, I recommend it to the *Roman Specu-* " *lativi* (the moſt complete Gentlemen of this age) for their cenſure: " or, with my Lord EPIMONUS his leave, ſend three or four hun- " dred Copies to your Agent at *Venice*, to be preſented to the Magi- " ſtrates there; and when they have conſider'd them, to be propos'd to " the debate of the Senate, the moſt competent Judges under Heaven, " who, tho' they have great affairs, will not refuſe to return you the O- " racle of their Ballot. The Councillors of Princes I will not truſt; they " are but Journeymen. *The Wiſdom of theſe latter times in Princes* " *Affairs* (ſays VERULAMIUS) *is rather fine deliveries and ſhiftings of* " *dangers when they be near, than ſolid and grounded courſes to keep them* " *off*. Their Councillors do not derive their proceedings from any " ſound root of Government that may contain the demonſtration, and " aſſure the ſucceſs of them, but are expedient-mongers, givers of them- " ſelves to help a lame dog over a ſtile; elſe how comes it to paſs, that " the fame of Cardinal RICHLIEU has been like Thunder, whereof we " hear the noiſe, but can make no demonſtration of the reaſon? But " to return, if neither the People, nor Divines, and Lawyers, can be " the Ariſtocracy of a Nation, there remains only the Nobility; in " which ſtile, to avoid farther repetition, I ſhall underſtand the " Gentry alſo, as the *French* do by the word *Nobleſſe*.

" Now to treat of the Nobility in ſuch ſort as may be leſs obnoxi- " ous to miſtake, it will be convenient, and anſwerable to the preſent " occaſion, that I divide my Diſcourſe into four parts.

" THE Firſt treating of Nobility, and the kinds of it.
" THE Second, of their capacity of the Senate.
" THE Third, of the divers kinds of Senates.
" THE Fourth, of the Senate, according to the foregoing Orders.

" NOBILITY may be defin'd divers ways; for it is either an- " tient Riches, or antient Virtue, or a Title confer'd by a Prince or a " Common-wealth.

" NOBILITY of the firſt kind may be ſubdivided into two o- " thers, ſuch as hold an over-balance in Dominion or Property to the " whole People, or ſuch as hold not an over-balance. In the former " caſe, a Nobility (ſuch was the *Gothic*, of which ſufficient has been " ſpoken) is incompatible with popular Government; for to popular " Government it is eſſential that Power ſhould be in the People, but " the over-ballance of a Nobility in dominion draws the Power to " themſelves. Wherefore in this ſenſe it is that MACHIAVEL is " to be underſtood, where he ſays, * That theſe are pernicious in a " Common-wealth; and of *France*, *Spain*, and *Italy*, that they are

* Queſti tali ſono pernitioſi in ogni Republica, & in ogni Provincia.

" Nations

" Nations * which for this cauſe are the corruption of the World: for
" otherwiſe Nobility may according to his definition (which is, *That*
" *they are ſuch as live upon their own Revenues in plenty, without en-*
" *gagement either to the tilling of their Lands, or other work for their*
" *livelihood)* hold an under-balance to the People; in which caſe they
" are not only ſafe, but neceſſary to the natural mixture of a well-or-
" der'd Common-wealth. For how elſe can you have a Common-
" wealth that is not altogether mechanic? or what compariſon is there
" of ſuch Common-wealths as are, or come neareſt to mechanic, for
" example, *Athens*, *Switzerland*, *Holland*, to *Lacedemon*, *Rome*, and *Ve-*
" *nice*, plum'd with their Ariſtocracies? Your Mechanics, till they
" have firſt feather'd their neſts, like the Fowls of the Air, whoſe
" whole Employment is to ſeek their food, are ſo buſy'd in their pri-
" vate concernments, that they have neither leiſure to ſtudy the pub-
" lic, nor are ſafely to be truſted with it, † becauſe a Man is not
" faithfully embark'd in this kind of ſhip, if he has no ſhare in the
" freight. But if his ſhare be ſuch as gives him leiſure by his private
" advantage to reflect upon that of the public, what other name is there
" for this ſort of Men, being *a leur aiſe*, but (as MACHIAVEL you
" ſee calls them) NOBILITY? eſpecially when their Families come to
" be ſuch as are noted for their Services done to the Common-wealth,
" and ſo take into their antient Riches antient Virtue, which is the ſe-
" cond definition of Nobility, but ſuch a one as is ſcarce poſſible in
" nature without the former. *For as the Baggage*, ſays VERULAMIUS,
" *is to an Army, ſo are Riches to Virtue; they cannot be ſpar'd nor left*
" *behind, tho' they be impediments, ſuch as not only hinder the march,*
" *but ſometimes thro' the care of them loſe or diſturb the Victory.* Of this
" latter ſort is the Nobility of *Oceana*; the beſt of all others, becauſe
" they, having no ſtamp whence to derive their price, can have it no
" otherwiſe than by their intrinſic value. The third definition of No-
" bility, is a Title, Honour, or diſtinction from the People, confer'd
" or allow'd by the Prince or the Common-wealth. And this may be
" two ways, either without any ſtamp or privilege, as in *Oceana*; or
" with ſuch privileges as are inconſiderable, as in *Athens* after the bat-
" tle of *Plateæ*, whence the Nobility had no right, as ſuch, but to
" religious Offices, or inſpection of the public Games, to which they
" were alſo to be elected by the People: or with Privileges, and
" thoſe conſiderable ones, as the Nobility in *Athens* before the battle
" of *Plateæ*, and the *Patricians* in *Rome*, each of which had right,
" or claim'd it, to the Senate and all the Magiſtracies; wherein for
" ſome time they only by their ſtamp were current.

" BUT to begin higher, and to ſpeak more at large of Nobility
" in their ſeveral capacities of the Senate. The Phylarchs or Princes of
" the Tribes of *Iſrael* were the moſt renown'd, or, as the *Latin*, the Numb. 1. 16.
" moſt noble of the Congregation, whereof by hereditary right they
" had the leading and judging. The Patriarchs, or Princes of Families, Ver. 18.
" according as they declar'd their Pedigrees, had the like right as to their
" Families; but neither in theſe nor the former, was there any hereditary
" right to the *Sanhedrim*: tho' there be little queſtion but the wiſe men,
" and underſtanding, and known among their Tribes, which the Peo-

* Lequali tutte inſieme ſono la corruttela del mondo. † Egeſtas haud facile habetur ſine damno.

" ple

" ple took or elected into thoſe or other Magiſtracies, and whom " MOSES made Rulers over them, muſt have been of theſe; ſeeing " they could not chooſe but be the moſt known among the Tribes, " and were likelieſt by the advantages of Education to be the moſt " wiſe and underſtanding.

" SOLON having found the *Athenians* neither locally nor genea- " logically, but by their different ways of Life, divided into four Tribes, " that is, into the Soldiery, the Tradeſmen, the Huſbandmen, and " the Goat-herds, inſtituted a new diſtribution of them, according to " the cenſe or valuation of their Eſtates, into four Claſſes: the firſt, " ſecond, and third, conſiſting of ſuch as were Proprietors in Land, " diſtinguiſh'd by the rate of their Freeholds, with that ſtamp upon " them, which making them capable of adding Honour to their " Riches, that is to ſay, of the Senate and all the Magiſtracies, exclud- " ed the fourth, being the Body of the People, and far greater in num- " ber than the former three, from all other right, as to thoſe Capaci- " ties, except the election of theſe, who by this means became a here- " ditary Ariſtocracy or Senatorian Order of Nobility. This was that " courſe which came afterwards to be the deſtruction of *Rome*, and " had now ruin'd *Athens*. The Nobility, according to the inevitable " Nature of ſuch a one, having laid the Plot how to diveſt the Peo- " ple of the Reſult, and ſo to draw the whole Power of the Com- " mon-wealth to themſelves; which in all likelihood they had done, " if the People coming by mere chance to be victorious in the Battle of " *Plateæ*, and famous for defending *Greece* againſt the *Perſians*, had " not return'd with ſuch Courage as irreſiſtibly broke the Claſſes, to " which of old they had born a white Tooth, brought the Nobility " to equal Terms, and the Senate with the Magiſtracies to be common " to both; the Magiſtracies by Suffrage, and the Senate (which was the " miſchief of it, as I ſhall ſhew anon in that Conſtitution) by Lot only.

" THE *Lacedemonians* were in the manner, and for the ſame cauſe " with the *Venetians* at this day, no other than a Nobility, even ac- " cording to the definition given of Nobility by MACHIAVEL; for " they neither exercis'd any Trade, nor labour'd their Lands or Lots, " which was done by their *Helots:* wherefore ſome Nobility may be " far from pernicious in a Common-wealth by MACHIAVEL's own " Teſtimony, who is an admirer of this, tho' the Servants thereof " were more in number than the Citizens. To theſe Servants I hold " the anſwer of LYCURGUS, when he bad him who aſk'd why he " did not admit the People to the Government of his Common-wealth, " to go home and admit his Servants to the Government of his Fami- " ly, to relate: for neither were the *Lacedemonians* Servants, nor far- " ther capable of the Government, unleſs, whereas the Congregation " had the Reſult, he ſhould have given them the Debate alſo; every " one of theſe that attain'd to ſixty years of Age, and the major Vote " of the Congregation, being equally capable of the Senate.

" THE Nobility of *Rome*, and their capacity of the Senate, I have " already deſcrib'd by that of *Athens* before the battle of *Plateæ*; ſa- " ving only that the *Athenian* was never eligible into the Senate with- " out the ſuffrage of the People, till the introduction of the Lot, but " the *Roman* Nobility ever: for the *Patricians* were elected into the " Senate by the Kings, by the Conſuls, or the Cenſors; or if a Ple- " beian happen'd to be conſcrib'd, he and his Poſterity became Patri-

" cians.

" cians. Nor, tho' the People had many diſputes with the Nobili-
" ty, did this ever come in controverſy, which, if there had been no-
" thing elſe, might in my judgment have been enough to overturn that
" Common-wealth.

" THE *Venetian* Nobility, but that they are richer, and not mi-
" litary, reſemble at all other points the *Lacedemonian*, as I have al-
" ready ſhewn. Theſe MACHIAVEL excepts from his rule, by
" ſaying, that their Eſtates are rather perſonal than real, or of any
" great Revenue in Land; which comes to our account, and ſhews, that
" a Nobility or party of the Nobility, not over-balancing in Domini-
" on, is not dangerous, but of neceſſary uſe in every Common-wealth
" provided it be rightly order'd: for if it be ſo order'd as was that
" of *Rome*, tho' they do not over-balance in the beginning, as they
" did not there, it will not be long ere they do, as is clear both in
" reaſon and experience towards the latter end. That the Nobility
" only be capable of the Senate, is there only not dangerous, where
" there be no other Citizens, as in this Government and that of *La-*
" *cedemon.*

" THE Nobility of *Holland* and *Switzerland*, tho' but few, have
" Privileges not only diſtinct from the People, but ſo great, that in ſome
" Sovereignties they have a negative voice; an example which I am far
" from commending, being ſuch as (if thoſe Governments were not
" cantoniz'd, divided, and ſubdivided into many petty Sovereignties
" that balance one another, and in which the Nobility, except they
" had a Prince at the head of them, can never join to make work)
" would be the moſt dangerous that ever was but the *Gothic*, of which
" it favors. For in antient Common-wealths you ſhall never find a
" Nobility to have had a negative but by the Poll, which, the People
" being far more in number, came to nothing; whereas theſe have it,
" be they never ſo few, by their ſtamp or order.

" OURS of *Oceana* have nothing elſe but their education and their
" leiſure for the public, furniſh'd by their eaſe and competent Riches;
" and their intrinſic value, which, according as it comes to hold weight
" in the judgment or ſuffrage of the People, is their only way to honour
" and preferment. Wherefore I would have your Lordſhips to look
" upon your Children as ſuch, who if they come to ſhake off ſome part
" of their baggage, ſhall make the more quick and glorious march:
" for it was nothing elſe but the baggage ſordidly plunder'd by the
" Nobility of *Rome*, that loſt the victory of the whole World in the
" midſt of her Triumph.

" HAVING follow'd the Nobility thus cloſe, they bring us, ac-
" cording to their natural courſe and divers kinds, to the divers Con-
" ſtitutions of the Senate.

" THAT of *Iſrael* (as was ſhew'd by my Right Noble Lord
" PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE, in the opening of the Common-wealth)
" conſiſted of ſeventy Elders, elected at firſt by the People. But
" whereas they were for life, they ever after (tho' without any divine
" precept for it) ſubſtituted their Succeſſors by Ordination, which Ce-
" remony was moſt uſually perform'd by impoſition of hands; and
" by this means a Common-wealth of as popular inſtitution as can be
" found, became, as it is accounted by JOSEPHUS, Ariſtocratical.
" From this Ordination derives that which was introduc'd by the A-
" poſtles into the Chriſtian Church; for which cauſe I think it is, that

" the Presbyterians would have the Government of the Church to be " Ariſtocratical: Tho' the Apoſtles, to the end, as I conceive, that " they might give no occaſion to ſuch a miſtake, but ſhew that they " intended the Government of the Church to be popular, *ordain'd El-* " *ders*, as has been ſhewn, *by the holding up of hands* (or free Suffrage of " the People) *in every Congregation*, or *Eccleſia:* for that is the word in " the Original, being borrow'd from the civil Congregations of the " People in *Athens* and *Lacedemon*, which were ſo call'd; and the " word for *holding up of hands* in the Text, is alſo the very ſame, which " ſignify'd the Suffrage of the People in *Athens*, χειροτονήσαντες; for " the Suffrage of the *Athenians* was given *per Chirotonian*, ſays EM- " MIUS.

" THE Council of the Bean (as was ſhewn by my Lord NA- " VARCHUS DE PARALO in his full Diſcourſe) being the propo- " ſing Senate of *Athens* (for that of the *Areopagits* was a Judicatory) " conſiſted of four, ſome ſay five hundred Senators, elected annually, " all at once, and by a mere lot without ſuffrage. Wherefore tho' the " Senate, to correct the temerity of the Lot, had power to caſt out " ſuch as they ſhould judge unworthy of that honour; this related to " manners only, and was not ſufficient to repair the Common-wealth, " which by ſuch means became impotent: and foraſmuch as her Senate " conſiſted not of the natural Ariſtocracy, which in a Common-wealth " is the only ſpur and rein of the People, it was caſt headlong by the " raſhneſs of her Demagogs or Grandees into ruin; while her Senate, " like the *Roman* Tribunes (* *who almoſt always, inſtead of governing,* " *were rather govern'd by the multitude*) propos'd not to the Reſult only, " but to the debate alſo of the People, who were therefore call'd to the " Pulpits, where ſome vomited, and others drank poiſon.

" THE Senate of *Lacedemon*, moſt truly diſcover'd by my Lord " LACO DE SCYTALE, conſiſted but of 30 for life, whereof the " two Kings having but ſingle Votes, were hereditary, the reſt elect- " ed by the free Suffrage of the People, but out of ſuch as were ſixty " years of age. Theſe had the whole debate of the Common-wealth " in themſelves, and propos'd to the Reſult only of the People. And " now the riddle which I have heretofore found troubleſome to unfold " is out; that is to ſay, why *Athens* and *Lacedemon*, conſiſting each of " the Senate and the People, the one ſhould be held a Democracy, and " the other an Ariſtocracy, or laudable Oligarchy, as it is term'd by " ISOCRATES; for that word is not, wherever you meet it, to be " branded, ſeeing it is us'd alſo by ARISTOTLE, PLUTARCH, " and others, ſometimes in a good ſenſe. The main difference was, " that the People in this had the Reſult only, and in that the Debate " and Reſult too. But for my part, where the People have the electi- " on of the Senate, not bound to a diſtinct order, and the Reſult, which " is the Sovereign Power, I hold them to have that ſhare in the Govern- " ment (the Senate being not for life) whereof, with the ſafety of the " Common-wealth, they are capable in nature; and ſuch a Govern- " ment, for that cauſe, to be Democracy: tho' I do not deny, but in " *Lacedemon*, the paucity of the Senators conſider'd, it might be call'd " *Oligarchy*, in compariſon of *Athens*; or, if we look on their conti- " nuance for life, tho' they had been more, *Ariſtocracy*.

* Qui fere ſemper regebantur a multitudine magis quam regebant.

" THE

" THE Senate of *Rome* (whoſe Fame has been heard to thunder in " the Eloquence of my Lord DOLABELLA D' ENYO) conſiſting of " 300, was, in regard of the number, leſs Oligarchical than that of " *Lacedemon*; but more in regard of the *Patrician*, who, having a " hereditary Capacity of the ſame, were not elected to that Honour " by the People; but, being conſcrib'd by the Cenſors, enjoy'd it for " life. Wherefore theſe, if they had their wills, would have reſolv'd " as well as debated; which ſet the People at ſuch variance with them, " as diſſolv'd the Common-wealth: whereas if the People had en- " joy'd the Reſult, that about the Agrarian, as well as all other ſtrife, " muſt of neceſſity have ceas'd.

" THE Senates of *Switzerland* and *Holland* (as I have learnt of " my Lords ALPESTER and GLAUCUS) being bound up (like " the ſheaf of Arrows which the latter gives) by Leagues, lie like " thoſe in their Quivers: But Arrows, when they come to be drawn, " fly ſome this way, and ſome that; and I am contented that theſe " concern us not.

" THAT of *Venice* (by the faithful Teſtimony of my moſt ex- " cellent Lord LINCEUS DE STELLA) has oblig'd a World, ſufficient- " ly puniſh'd by its own blindneſs and ingratitude, to repent and be " wiſer: for whereas a Common-wealth in which there is no Senate, " or where the Senate is corrupt, cannot ſtand; the Great Council of " *Venice*, like the Statue of *Nilus*, leans upon an Urn or Waterpot, " which pours forth the Senate in ſo pure and perpetual a ſtream, " as being unable to ſtagnate, is for ever incapable of Corruption. " The fuller Deſcription of this Senate is contain'd in that of *Oceana*; " and that of *Oceana* in the foregoing Orders. To every one of " which, becauſe ſomething has been already ſaid, I ſhall not ſpeak " in particular. But in general, your Senate, and the other Aſſembly, " or the Prerogative, as I ſhall ſhew in due place, are perpetual, not " as Lakes or Puddles, but as the Rivers of *Eden*; and are beds made, " as you have ſeen, to receive the whole People, by a due and faithful " viciſſitude, into their current. They are not, as in the late way, al- " ternate. Alternate Life in Government is the alternate * Death of it.

" THIS was the *Gothic* work, whereby the former Government " (which was not only a ſhip, but a guſt too) could never open her " ſails, but in danger to overſet her ſelf; neither could make any voy- " age nor lie ſafe in her own harbour. The Wars of later ages, ſays " VERULAMIUS, ſeem to be made in the dark, in reſpect of the glory " and honour which reflected on men from the Wars in antient times. " Their ſhipping of this ſort was for Voyages, ours dare not launch; " nor lies it ſafe at home. Your *Gothic* Politicians ſeem to me rather " to have invented ſome new Ammunition or Gunpowder, in their " King and Parliament, than Government. For what is become of " the Princes (a kind of People) in *Germany?* blown up. Where are " the Eſtates, or the Power of the People in *France?* blown up. " Where is that of the People in *Arragon*, and the reſt of the *Spaniſh* " Kingdoms? blown up. On the other ſide, where is the King of " *Spain*'s Power in *Holland?* blown up. Where is that of the *Au-* " *ſtrian* Princes in *Switzerland?* blown up. This perpetual peeviſhneſs " and jealouſy, under the alternate Empire of the Prince, and of the

* Ut fratrem pollux alternâ morte redemit.

" People,

" People, is obnoxious to every Spark. Nor ſhall any man ſhew a " reaſon that will be holding in prudence, why the People of " *Oceana* have blown up their King, but that their Kings did not " firſt blow up them. The reſt is diſcourſe for Ladies. Wherefore " your Parliaments are not henceforth to come out of the Bag of " ÆOLUS, but by your Galaxies, to be the perpetual food of the " Fire of VESTA.

" YOUR Galaxies, which divide the Houſe into ſo many Re- " gions, are three; one of which conſtituting the third Region is an- " nually choſen, but for the term of three years; which cauſes the " Houſe (having at once Bloſſoms, Fruit half ripe, and others drop- " ping off in full maturity) to reſemble an Orange-tree, ſuch as is at " the ſame time an Education or Spring, and a Harveſt too: for the " People have made a very ill choice in the Man, who is not eaſily " capable of the perfect knowledge in one year of the Senatorian Or- " ders; which Knowledge, allowing him for the firſt to have been a " Novice, brings him the ſecond year to practice, and time enough. " For at this rate you muſt always have two hundred knowing Men " in the Government. And thus the Viciſſitude of your Senators is " not perceivable in the ſteadineſs and perpetuity of your Senate; " which, like that of *Venice*, being always changing, is for ever the " ſame. And tho' other Politicians have not ſo well imitated their " Pattern, there is nothing more obvious in Nature, ſeeing a Man who " wears the ſame Fleſh but a ſhort time, is nevertheleſs the ſame Man, " and of the ſame genius; and whence is this but from the conſtancy " of Nature, in holding a Man to her Orders? Wherefore keep alſo " to your Orders. But this is a mean Requeſt, your Orders will be " worth little, if they do not hold you to them; wherefore embark. " They are like a Ship, if you be once aboard, you do not carry them, " but they you; and ſee how *Venice* ſtands to her tackling: you will " no more forſake them, than you will leap into the Sea.

" BUT they are very many, and difficult. O, my Lords, what " Seaman caſts away his Card, becauſe it has four and twenty Points " of the Compaſs? and yet thoſe are very near as many, and as dif- " ficult as the Orders in the whole circumference of your Common- " wealth. Conſider, how have we been toſt with every wind of Doc- " trine, loſt by the glib Tongues of your Demagogs and Grandees in " our own Havens? A company of Fidlers that have diſturb'd your " reſt for your Groat; two to one, three thouſand pounds a year to " another, has been nothing. And for what? Is there one of them " that yet knows what a Common-wealth is? And are you yet afraid " of ſuch a Government in which theſe ſhall not dare to ſcrape, for " fear of the Statute? THEMISTOCLES could not fiddle, but could " make of a ſmall City a great Common-wealth: theſe have fiddel'd, " and for your Money, till they have brought a great Common-wealth " to a ſmall City.

" IT grieves me, while I conſider how, and from what cauſes ima- " ginary Difficulties will be aggravated, that the foregoing Orders " are not capable of any greater clearneſs in diſcourſe or writing: " But if a Man ſhould make a Book, deſcribing every trick or paſ- " ſage, it would fare no otherwiſe with a game at Cards; and this is " no more, if a Man plays upon the ſquare. *There is a great diffe-* " *rence*, ſays VERULAMIUS, *between a cunning Man and a wiſe* " *Man*

" *Man* (between a Demagog and a Legiſlator) *not only in point of* " *honeſty, but in point of ability: As there be that can pack the Cards,* " *and yet cannot play well; ſo there be ſome that are good in Canvaſſes* " *and Factions, that are otherwiſe weak men.* Allow me but theſe Or- " ders, and let them come with their Cards in their ſleeves, or pack " if they can. *Again*, ſays he, *it is one thing to underſtand Perſons,* " *and another to underſtand Matters; for many are perfect in Men's hu-* " *mors, that are not greatly capable of the real part of Buſineſs: which* " *is the conſtitution of one that has ſtudy'd Men more than Books. But* " *there is nothing more hurtful in a State, than that cunning men ſhould* " *paſs for wiſe.* His words are an Oracle. As DIONYSIUS, when " he could no longer exerciſe his Tyranny among Men, turn'd School- " maſter, that he might exerciſe it among Boys. Allow me but theſe " Orders, and your Grandees ſo well skill'd in the Baits and Palates of " Men, ſhall turn Rat-catchers.

" AND whereas *Councils* (as is diſcreetly obſerv'd by the ſame " Author in his time) *are at this day, in moſt places, but familiar meet-* " *ings* (ſomewhat like the Academy of our Provoſts) *where matters* " *are rather talk'd on than debated, and run too ſwift to order an Act of* " *Council*; give me my Orders, and ſee if I have not puzzle'd your " Demagogs.

" IT is not ſo much my deſire to return upon hants, as theirs that " will not be ſatisfy'd; wherefore if, notwithſtanding what was ſaid " of dividing and chooſing in our preliminary Diſcourſes, men will yet " be returning to the Queſtion, Why the Senate muſt be a Council a- " part (tho' even in *Athens*, where it was of no other Conſtitution " than the popular Aſſembly, the diſtinction of it from the other was " never held leſs than neceſſary) this may be added to the former " Reaſons, that if the Ariſtocracy be not for the Debate, it is for no- " thing; but if it be for debate, it muſt have convenience for it: And " what convenience is there for debate in a crowd, where there is no- " thing but joſtling, treading upon one another, and ſtirring of " Blood, than which in this caſe there is nothing more dangerous? " Truly, it was not ill ſaid of my Lord EPIMONUS, That *Ve-* " *nice* plays her game, as it were, at Billiards or Nine-holes; and ſo " may your Lordſhips, unleſs your Ribs be ſo ſtrong, that you think " better of Football: for ſuch ſport is Debate in a popular Aſſembly, " as, notwithſtanding the diſtinction of the Senate, was the deſtructi- " on of *Athens*.

THIS Spech concluded the Debate which happen'd at the Inſtitution of the Senate. The next Aſſembly is that of the People or Prerogative Tribe.

THE face, or mein of the Prerogative Tribe for the Arms, the Horſes, and the Diſcipline, but more eſpecially for the ſelect men, is that of a very noble Regiment, or rather of two; the one of Horſe, divided into three Troops (beſides that of the Provinces, which will be ſhewn hereafter) with their Captains, Cornets, and two Tribunes of the Horſe at the head of them; the other of Foot in three Companies (beſides that of the Provinces) with their Captains, Enſigns, and two Tribunes of the Foot at the head of them. The firſt Troop is call'd the *Phœnix*; the ſecond the *Pelican*; and the third the *Swallow*. The firſt Company the *Cypreſs*; the ſecond the *Myrtle*; and the third

The Face of the Prerogative Tribe.

the *Spray*. Of theſe again (not without a near reſemblance of the *Roman* diviſion of a Tribe) the *Phœnix* and the *Cypreſs* conſtitute the firſt Claſs; the *Pelican* and the *Myrtle* the ſecond; and the *Swallow* with the *Spray* the third, renew'd every Spring by

21. Order. *The Change or Election of the Triennial Officers of the Prerogative.*

THE one and twentieth ORDER, directing, that upon every Monday next enſuing the laſt of *March*, the Deputies of the annual Galaxy arriving at the Pavilion in the *Halo*, and electing one Captain and one Cornet of the *Swallow* (triennial Officers) by and out of the Cavalry at the Horſe Urn, according to the Rules contain'd in the Ballot of the Hundred; and one Captain with one Enſign of the *Spray* (triennial Officers) by and out of the Infantry at the Foot Urn, after the ſame way of balloting; conſtitute and become the third Claſſes of the Prerogative Tribe.

SEVEN Deputies are annually return'd by every Tribe, whereof three are Horſe, and four are Foot; and there be fifty Tribes: ſo the *Swallow* muſt conſiſt of 150 Horſe, the *Spray* of 200 Foot. And the reſt of the Claſſes being two, each of them in number equal; the whole Prerogative (beſides the Provinces, that is, the Knights and Deputies of *Marpeſia* and *Panopea*) muſt conſiſt of 1050 Deputies. And theſe Troops and Companies may as well be call'd Centuries as thoſe of the *Romans*; for the *Romans* related not, in ſo naming theirs, to the number. And whereas they were diſtributed according to the valuation of their Eſtates, ſo are theſe; which by virtue of the laſt Order, are now accommodated with their triennial Officers. But there be others appertaining to this Tribe, whoſe Election, being of far greater importance, is annual, as follows in

22. Order. *The Change or Election of the Annual Magiſtrates of the Prerogative.*

THE twenty ſecond ORDER; whereby the firſt Claſs having elected their triennial Officers, and made Oath to the Old Tribunes, that they will neither introduce, cauſe, nor to their power ſuffer Debate to be introduc'd into any popular Aſſembly of this Government, but to their utmoſt be aiding and aſſiſting to ſeize and deliver any Perſon or Perſons in that way offending, and ſtriking at the Root of this Common-wealth, to the Council of War; are to proceed with the other two Claſſes of the Prerogative Tribe to election of the new Tribunes, being four annual Magiſtrates, whereof two are to be elected out of the Cavalry at the Horſe Urn, and two out of the Infantry at the Foot Urn, according to the common Ballot of the Tribes. And they may be promiſcuouſly choſen out of any Claſſis, provided that the ſame Perſon ſhall not be capable of bearing the Tribunitian Honour twice in the term of one Galaxy. The Tribunes thus choſen ſhall receive the Tribe (in reference to the Power of muſtering and diſciplining the ſame) as Commanders in chief; and for the reſt as Magiſtrates, whoſe proper Function is preſcrib'd by the next Order. The Tribunes may give leave to any number of the Prerogative, not exceeding one hundred at a time, to be abſent, ſo they be not Magiſtrates, nor Officers, and return within three months. If a Magiſtrate or Officer has a neceſſary occaſion, he may alſo be abſent for the ſpace of one month; provided, that there be not above three Cornets or Enſigns, two Captains, or one Tribune ſo abſent at one time.

TO this the ARCHON ſpoke at the Inſtitution after this manner.

My

My Lords,

" IT is affirm'd by CICERO in his Oration for FLACCUS, that " the Common-wealths of *Greece* were all ſhaken or ruin'd by the " intemperance of their *Comitia*, or Aſſemblies of the People. " The truth is, if good heed in this point be not taken, a Common-" wealth will have bad legs. But all the world knows he ſhould have " excepted *Lacedemon*, where the People, as has been ſhewn by the " Oracle, had no power at all of Debate, nor (till after LYSANDER, " whoſe Avarice open'd a gulf, that was not long ere it ſwallow'd " up his Country) came it ever to be exercis'd by them. Whence " that Common-wealth ſtood longeſt and firmeſt of any other, but " this, in our days, of *Venice*: which having underlaid her ſelf " with the like Inſtitution, owes a great, if not the greateſt part of " her ſteaddineſs to the ſame principle; the great Council, which is " with her the People, by the Authority of my Lord EPIMONUS, " never ſpeaking a word. Nor ſhall any Common-wealth, where " the People in their political capacity is talkative, ever ſee half the " days of one of theſe: But being carried away by vain-glorious Men " (that, as OVERBURY ſays, piſs more than they drink) ſwim down " the ſtream; as did *Athens*, the moſt prating of theſe Dames, " when that ſame ranting fellow ALCIBIADES fell a demagoging " for the *Sicilian* War. But whereas Debate by the authority and " experience of *Lacedemon* and *Venice*, is not to be committed to " the People in a well-order'd Government, it may be ſaid, That " the Order ſpecify'd is but a ſlight bar in a matter of like danger; " for ſo much as an Oath, if their be no recourſe upon the breach " of it, is a weak tie for ſuch hands as have the Sword in them: " wherefore what ſhould hinder the People of *Oceana*, if they hap-" pen not to regard an Oath, from aſſuming Debate, and making " themſelves as much an Anarchy as thoſe of *Athens*? To which I " anſwer, Take the common ſort in a private capacity, and, except " they be injur'd, you ſhall find them to have a baſhfulneſs in the " preſence of the better ſort, or wiſer Men; acknowledging their " Abilities by attention, and accounting it no mean honour to receive " reſpect from them: But if they be injur'd by them, they hate them, " and the more for being wiſe or great, becauſe that makes it the " greater injury. Nor refrain they in this caſe from any kind of in-" temperance of Speech, if of Action. It is no otherwiſe with a " People in their political capacity; you ſhall never find that they have " aſſum'd Debate for it ſelf, but for ſomething elſe. Wherefore in *La-*" *cedemon* where there was, and in *Venice* where there is nothing " elſe for which they ſhould aſſume it, they have never ſhewn ſo " much as an inclination to it. Nor was there any appearance of ſuch " a deſire in the People of *Rome* (who from the time of ROMULUS " had been very well contented with the power of Reſult either in " the * Parochial Aſſemblies, as it was ſettled upon them by him; or " in the meetings of the † Hundreds, as it was alter'd in their regard " for the worſe by SERVIUS TULLIUS) till news was brought ſome " fifteen years after the exile of TARQUIN their late King (during

* Comitiis Curiatis. † Centuriatis.

" which

" which time the Senate had govern'd pretty well) that he was dead " at the Court of ARISTODEMUS the Tyrant of *Cumæ*. * Where- " upon the *Patricians*, or Nobility, began to let out the hitherto " diſſembl'd Venom, which is inherent in the root of Oligarchy, " and fell immediately upon injuring the People beyond all modera- " tion. For whereas the People had ſerv'd both gallantly and con- " tentedly in Arms upon their own charges, and, tho' joint Purchaſers " by their Swords of the conquer'd Lands, had not participated in " the ſame to above two Acres a man (the reſt being ſecretly " uſurp'd by the *Patricians)* they thro' the meanneſs of their ſupport, " and the greatneſs of their expence, being generally indebted, no " ſooner return'd home with Victory to lay down their Arms, than " they were ſnatch'd up by their Creditors, the Nobility, to cram " Goals. Whereupon, but with the greateſt modeſty that was ever " known in the like caſe, they firſt fell upon debate, affirming, † *that* " *they were oppreſt and captivated at home, while abroad they fought for* " *Liberty and Empire; and that the Freedom of the common People was* " *ſafer in time of War than Peace, among their Enemies than their Fel-* " *low citizens.* It is true, that when they could not get the Senate, thro' " fear, as was pretended by the *Patricians*, to aſſemble and take their " grievances into conſideration, they grew ſo much the warmer, that " it was glad to meet; where APPIUS CLAUDIUS, a fierce Spirit, " was of opinion, that recourſe ſhould be had to Conſular power, " whereby ſome of the brands of Sedition being taken off, the flame " might be extinguiſh'd. SERVILIUS being of another temper, thought " it better and ſafer to try if the People might be bow'd than broken. " But this debate was interrupted by tumultuous news of the near " approach of the *Volſci*, a caſe in which the Senate had no recourſe " but to the People, who contrary to their former cuſtom upon the " like occaſions would not ſtir a foot, but fell a laughing, and ſaying, " ‖ Let them fight that have ſomething to fight for. The Senate that " had purſes, and could not ſing ſo well before the Thief, being " in a great perplexity, found no poſſible way out of it, but to be- " ſeech SERVILIUS, one of a Genius well known to be popular, " That he would accept of the Conſulſhip, and make ſome ſuch uſe of " it as might be helpful to the *Patrician* Intereſt. SERVILIUS ac- " cepting of the Offer, and making uſe of his Intereſt with the Peo- " ple, perſuaded them to hope well of the good intention of the Fa- " thers, whom it would little beſeem to be forc'd to thoſe things which " would loſe their Grace, and that in view of the Enemy, if they " came not freely; and withal publiſh'd an Edict, that no Man " ſhould with-hold a Citizen of *Rome* by impriſonment from giving " his name (for that was the way, as I ſhall have opportunity here- " after to ſhew more at large, whereby they drew out their Armies) " nor to ſeize or ſell any man's Goods or Children that was in the " Camp. Whereupon the People with a mighty concourſe immediate- " ly took Arms, march'd forth, and (which to them was as eaſy as " to be put into the humour, and that, as appears in this place, was not

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* Eo nuncio erecti patres, erecta plebs. Sed patribus nimis luxurioſa ea fuit lætitia; plebi, cui ad eam diem ſummâ ope inſervitum erat, injuriæ à primoribus fieri cœpêre. *Liv. l.* 2. † Se foris pro libertate & imperio dimicantes, domi à civibus captos & oppreſſos eſſe: tutioremque in bello quam in pace, inter hoſtes quam inter cives, libertatem plebis eſſe. ‖ Patres militarent, patres arma caperent, ut penes eoſdem pericula belli, penes quos præmia, eſſent.

" hard)

" hard) totally defeated the *Volſci* firſt, then the *Sabins* (for the " neighbour Nations, hoping to have had a good bargain of the Diſ- " cord in *Rome*, were up in arms on all ſides) and after the *Sabins*, " the *Aurunci*. Whence returning victorious in three Battles, they " expected no leſs than that the Senate would have made good their " words; when APPIUS CLAUDIUS, the other Conſul, of his " innate Pride, and that he might fruſtrate the Faith of his Colleague, " caus'd the Soldiers (who being ſet at liberty, had behav'd them- " ſelves with ſuch valour) to be reſtor'd at their return to their Credi- " tors and their Goals. Great reſort upon this was made by the Peo- " ple to SERVILIUS, ſhewing him their Wounds, calling him " to witneſs how they had behav'd themſelves, and minding him of " his promiſe. Poor SERVILIUS was ſorry, but ſo over-aw'd with " the headineſs of his Colleague, and the obſtinacy of the whole " faction of the Nobility, that not daring to do any thing either " way, he loſt both Parties: the Fathers conceiving that he was am- " bitious, and the People that he was falſe; while the Conſul CLAU- " DIUS continuing to countenance ſuch as daily ſeiz'd and impriſon'd " ſome of the indebted People, had ſtill new and dangerous Contro- " verſies with them, inſomuch that the Common-wealth was torn " with horrid Diviſion, and the People (becauſe they found it not ſo " ſafe, or ſo effectual in public) minded nothing but laying their " heads together in private Conventicles. For this AULUS VIRGI- " NIUS, and TITUS VETUSIUS, the new Conſuls, were reprov'd by " the Senate as ſlothful, and upbraided with the Virtue of APPIUS " CLAUDIUS. Whereupon the Conſuls having deſir'd the Senate, " that they might know their pleaſure, ſhew'd afterwards their readi- " neſs to obey it, by ſummoning the People according to command; " and requiring names whereby to draw forth an Army for diver- " ſion, but no man would anſwer. Report hereof being made to " the Senate, the younger ſort of the Fathers grew ſo hot with the " Conſuls, that they deſir'd them to abdicate the Magiſtracy, which " they had not the courage to defend.

" THE Conſuls, tho' they conceiv'd themſelves to be roughly " handled, made this ſoft Anſwer: *Fathers Conſcript*, that you may " pleaſe to take notice it was foretold ſome horrid Sedition is at hand, " we ſhall only deſire, that they whoſe valour in this place is ſo great, " may ſtand by us to ſee how we behave our ſelves, and then be as " reſolute in your Commands as you will: your Fatherhoods may " know if we be wanting in the performance.

" AT this ſome of the hot young Noblemen return'd with the " Conſuls to the Tribunal, before which the People were yet ſtand- " ing; and the Conſuls having generally requir'd names in vain, to " put it to ſomething, requir'd the name of one that was in their eye " particularly; on whom, when he mov'd not, they commanded a " Lictor to lay hands: but the People thronging about the Party " ſummon'd, forbad the Lictor, who durſt not touch him; at which " the Hotſpurs that came with the Conſuls, enrag'd by the affront, " deſcended from the Throne to the aid of the Lictor; from whom " in ſo doing they turn'd the indignation of the People upon them- " ſelves with ſuch heat, that the Conſuls interpoſing, thought fit, by " remitting the Aſſembly, to appeaſe the Tumult; in which never- " theleſs there had been nothing but noiſe. Nor was there leſs in the

" Senate, being ſuddenly rally'd upon this occaſion, where they that " receiv'd the repulſe, with others whoſe head were as addle as their " own, fell upon the buſineſs as if it had been to be determin'd by cla- " mour, till the Conſuls, upbraiding the Senate that it differ'd not from " the Market-place, reduc'd the Houſe to Orders. And the Fathers " having been conſulted accordingly, there were three Opinions; PUB- " LIUS VIRGINIUS conceiv'd, that the conſideration to be had " upon the matter in queſtion, or aid of the indebted and impriſon'd " People, was not to be further extended than to ſuch as had en- " gag'd upon the promiſe made by SERVILIUS: TITUS LAR- " GIUS, that it was no time to think it enough, if men's Merits were " acknowledg'd, while the whole People, ſunk under the weight of " their debts, could not emerge without ſome common aid; which to " reſtrain, by putting ſome into a better condition than others, would " rather more inflame the Diſcord than extinguiſh it. APPIUS " CLAUDIUS (ſtill upon the old hant) would have it, that the " People were rather wanton than fierce: It was not oppreſſion that " neceſſitated, but their Power that invited them to theſe freaks; the " Empire of the Conſuls ſince the appeal to the People (whereby a " Plebeian might ask his fellows if he were a Thief) being but a " mere ſcare-crow. Go to, ſays he, let us create the Dictator, from " whom there is no appeal, and then let me ſee more of this work, " or him that ſhall forbid my Lictor. The advice of APPIUS was " abhor'd by many; and to introduce a general reciſion of Debts with " LARGIUS, was to violate all Faith: That of VIRGINIUS, as " the moſt moderate, would have paſt beſt, but that there were private " Intereſts, that conſtant bane of the Public, which withſtood it. " So they concluded with APPIUS, who alſo had been Dictator, if " the Conſuls and ſome of the graver ſort had not thought it altoge- " ther unſeaſonable, at a time when the *Volſci* and the *Sabins* were up " again, to venture ſo far upon alienation of the People: for which " cauſe VALERIUS, being deſcended from the PUBLICOLAS, the " moſt popular Family, as alſo in his own perſon of a mild nature, " was rather truſted with ſo rigid a Magiſtracy. Whence it hap- " pen'd, that the People, tho' they knew well enough againſt whom " the Dictator was created, fear'd nothing from VALERIUS; but " upon a new promiſe made to the ſame effect with that of SERVI- " LIUS, hop'd better another time, and throwing away all diſputes, " gave their names roundly, went out, and, to be brief, came home " again as victorious as in the former Action, the Dictator entring the " City in Triumph. Nevertheleſs when he came to preſs the Senate " to make good his promiſe, and do ſomething for the eaſe of the Peo- " ple, they regarded him no more as to that point than they had done " SERVILIUS. Whereupon the Dictator, in diſdain to be made a " ſtale, abdicated his Magiſtracy, and went home. Here then was " a victorious Army without a Captain, and a Senate pulling it by the " beard in their Gowns. What is it (if you have read the Story, for " there is not ſuch another) that muſt follow? Can any man imagine, " that ſuch only ſhould be the opportunity upon which this People " could run away? Alas, poor men, the *Æqui* and the *Volſci*, and the " *Sabins* were nothing, but the Fathers invincible! There they ſat " ſome three hundred of them arm'd all in Robes, and thundering with " their Tongues, without any hopes in the earth to reduce them to

" any

" any tolerable conditions. Wherefore, not thinking it convenient to " abide long ſo near them, away marches the Army, and encamps in " the fields. This Retreat of the People is call'd the *Seceſſion of Mount* " *Aventin*, where they lodg'd very ſad at their condition; but not let- " ting fall ſo much as a word of murmur againſt the Fathers. The " Senate by this time were great Lords, had the whole City to them- " ſelves; but certain Neighbours were upon the way that might come " to ſpeak with them, not aſking leave of the Porter. Wherefore " their minds became troubl'd, and an Orator was poſted to the Peo- " ple to make as good conditions with them as he could; but, what- " ever the terms were, to bring them home, and with all ſpeed. " And here it was covenanted between the Senate and the People, " that theſe ſhould have Magiſtrates of their own Election, call'd the " *Tribunes*; upon which they return'd.

" TO hold you no longer, the Senate having done this upon ne- " ceſſity, made frequent attempts to retract it again; while the Tri- " bunes on the other ſide, to defend what they had got, inſtituted their " *Tributa Comitia*, or Council of the People; where they came in time, " and, as Diſputes increas'd, to make Laws without the Authority of " the Senate, call'd *Plebiſcita*. Now to conclude in the point at which " I drive; ſuch were the ſteps whereby the People of *Rome* came to " aſſume Debate: nor is it in Art or Nature to debar a People of the " like effect, where there is the like cauſe. For ROMULUS having " in the Election of his Senate ſquar'd out a Nobility for the ſupport " of a Throne, by making that of the *Patricians* a diſtinct and here- " ditary Order, planted the Common-wealth upon two contrary In- " tereſts or Roots, which ſhooting forth in time produc'd two Com- " mon-wealths, the one Oligarchical in the Nobility, the other a mere " Anarchy of the People, and ever after caus'd a perpetual feud and " enmity between the Senate and the People, even to death.

" THERE is not a more noble or uſeful queſtion in the Politics " than that which is ſtarted by MACHIAVEL, Whether means were " to be found whereby the Enmity that was between the Senate and " the People of *Rome* could have been remov'd. Nor is there any " other in which we, or the preſent occaſion, are ſo much concern'd, " particularly in relation to this Author; foraſmuch as his judgment " in the determination of the queſtion ſtanding, our Common-wealth " falls. And he that will erect a Common-wealth againſt the Judg- " ment of MACHIAVEL, is oblig'd to give ſuch reaſons for his en- " terprize as muſt not go a begging. Wherefore to repeat the Poli- " tician very honeſtly, but ſomewhat more briefly, he diſputes thus.

" THERE be two ſorts of Common-wealths, the one for preſer- " vation, as *Lacedemon* and *Venice*; the other for increaſe, as *Rome*. Macch. Diſc. B. 1. c. 6.

" *LACEDEMON* being governed by a King and a ſmall Senate, " could maintain it ſelf a long time in that condition, becauſe the Inhabi- " tants, being few, having put a bar upon the reception of Strangers, and " living in a ſtrict obſervation of the Laws of LYCURGUS, which now " had got reputation, and taken away all occaſion of Tumults, might " well continue long in Tranquillity. For the Laws of LYCURGUS in- " troduc'd a greater equality in Eſtates, and a leſs equality in Honours, " whence there was equal Poverty; and the *Plebeians* were leſs ambitious, " becauſe the Honours or Magiſtracies of the City could extend but to a " few, and were not communicable to the People: nor did the Nobility " by uſing them ill, ever give them a deſire to participate of the ſame.

" This

" This proceeded from the Kings, whoſe Principality being plac'd in the " midſt of the Nobility, had no greater means whereby to ſupport it ſelf, " than to ſhield the People from all injury; whence the People not fear- " ing Empire, deſir'd it not: And ſo all occaſion of enmity between the " Senate and the People was taken away. But this Union happen'd eſpe- " cially from two cauſes; the one, that the Inhabitants of *Lacedemon* be- " ing few could be governed by the Few: the other, that, not receiving " Strangers into their Common-wealth, they did not corrupt it, nor " increaſe it to ſuch a proportion as was not governable by the Few.

" *VENICE* has not divided with her Plebeians, but all are call'd " Gentlemen that be in adminiſtration of the Government; for which " Government ſhe is more beholden to Chance than the Wiſdom of her " Law-makers: For many retiring to thoſe Iſlands, where that City is " now built, from the inundations of *Barbarians* that over-whelm'd the " *Roman* Empire, when they were encreas'd to ſuch a number, that to " live together it was neceſſary to have Laws; they ordain'd a form of " Government whereby aſſembling often in Council upon Affairs, and " finding their number ſufficient for Government, they put a bar upon all " ſuch as repairing afterwards to their City ſhould become Inhabitants, " excluding them from participation of Power. Whence they that were " included in the Adminiſtration had right; and they that were excluded, " coming afterwards, and being receiv'd upon no other conditions to be " Inhabitants, had no wrong; and therefore had no occaſion, nor (being ne- " ver truſted with Arms) any means to be tumultuous. Wherefore this " Common-wealth might very well maintain it ſelf in Tranquillity.

" THESE things conſider'd, it is plain that the *Roman* Legiſlators, " to have introduc'd a quiet State, muſt have done one of theſe two things; " either ſhut out Strangers, as the *Lacedemonians*; or, as the *Venetians*, " not allow'd the People to bear Arms. But they did neither. By which " means the People having power and encreaſe, were in perpetual tu- " mult. Nor is this to be help'd in a Common-wealth for encreaſe, ſee- " ing if *Rome* had cut off the occaſion of her Tumults, ſhe muſt have cut " off the means of her Increaſe, and by conſequence of her Greatneſs.

" Wherefore let a Legiſlator conſider with himſelf, whether he would " make his Common-wealth for preſervation, in which caſe ſhe may be " free from Tumults; or for encreaſe, in which caſe ſhe muſt be in- " feſted with them.

" IF he makes her for preſervation, ſhe may be quiet at home; but " will be in danger abroad. *Firſt*, Becauſe her Foundation muſt be " narrow, and therefore weak, as that of *Lacedemon*, which lay but up- " on 30000 Citizens; or that of *Venice*, which lies but upon 3000. *Se- " condly*, Such a Common-wealth muſt either be in Peace, or in War: " If ſhe be in Peace, the Few are ſooneſt effeminated and corrupted, " and ſo obnoxious alſo to Faction. If in War, ſucceeding ill, ſhe is " an eaſy prey; or ſucceeding well, ruin'd by encreaſe: a weight which " her Foundation is not able to bear. For *Lacedemon*, when ſhe had " made herſelf Miſtreſs, upon the matter, of all *Greece*, thro' a ſlight " accident, the Rebellion of *Thebes*, occaſion'd by the Conſpiracy of " PELOPIDAS diſcovering this infirmity of her nature, the reſt of her " conquer'd Cities immediately fell off, and in the turn as it were of " a hand reduc'd her from the fulleſt tide to the loweſt ebb of her " fortune. And *Venice* having poſſeſt her ſelf of a great part of *Italy* " by her purſe, was no ſooner in defence of it put to the trial of " Arms, than ſhe loſt all in one Battle.

" WHENCE

" WHENCE I conclude, That in the Ordination of a Common-
" wealth a Legiſlator is to think upon that which is moſt honourable;
" and laying aſide Models for Preſervation, to follow the example of
" *Rome* conniving at, and temporizing with the enmity between the
" Senate and the People, as a neceſſary ſtep to the *Roman* Greatneſs.
" For that any Man ſhould find out a balance that may take in the con-
" veniences, and ſhut out the Inconveniences of both, I do not think it
" poſſible. *Theſe are the words of the Author, tho' the method be ſome-*
" *what alter'd, to the end that I may the better turn them to my purpoſe.*

" MY LORDS, I do not know how you hearken to this ſound;
" but to hear the greateſt Artiſt in the modern World, giving ſentence
" againſt our Common-wealth, is that with which I am nearly con-
" cern'd. Wherefore, with all honour due to the Prince of Politicians,
" let us examine his reaſoning with the ſame liberty which he has aſſert-
" ed to be the right of a free People. But we ſhall never come up to
" him, except by taking the buſineſs a little lower, we deſcend from
" effects to their cauſes. The cauſes of Commotion in a Common-
" wealth are either external or internal. External are from Enemies,
" from Subjects or from Servants. To diſpute then what was the cauſe
" why *Rome* was infeſted by the *Italian*, or by the Servile Wars; why
" the Slaves took the Capitol; why the *Lacedemonians* were near as
" frequently troubl'd with their Helots, as *Rome* with all thoſe; or
" why *Venice*, whoſe Situation is not truſted to the faith of Men, has
" as good or better quarter with them whom ſhe governs, than *Rome*
" had with the *Latins*; were to diſpute upon external cauſes. The
" queſtion put by MACHIAVEL is of internal cauſes; Whether
" the enmity that was between the Senate and the People of *Rome*
" might have been remov'd. And to determine otherwiſe of this queſti-
" on than he does, I muſt lay down other Principles than he has done.
" To which end I affirm, that a Common-wealth internally con-
" ſider'd, is either equal or inequal. A Common-wealth that is inter-
" nally equal, has no internal cauſe of Commotion, and therefore can
" have no ſuch effect but from without. A Common-wealth inter-
" nally inequal has no internal cauſe of quiet, and therefore can have
" no ſuch effect but by diverſion.

" TO prove my Aſſertions, I ſhall at this time make uſe of no
" other than his examples. *Lacedemon* was externally unquiet, be-
" cauſe ſhe was externally inequal, that is as to her *Helots*; and ſhe
" was internally at reſt, becauſe ſhe was equal in her ſelf, both in
" root and branch: In the root by her Agrarian, and in branch by
" the Senate, inaſmuch as no Man was thereto qualify'd, but by election
" of the People. Which Inſtitution of LYCURGUS is mention'd Ariſt. Polit.
" by ARISTOTLE, where he ſays, that rendering his Citizens B. 2.
" emulous (not careleſs) of that honour, he aſſign'd to the People
" the election of the Senate. Wherefore MACHIAVEL in this, as
" in other places, having his eye upon the diviſion of *Patrician* and
" *Plebeian* Families as they were in *Rome*, has quite miſtaken the Or-
" ders of this Common-wealth, where there was no ſuch thing. Nor
" did the quiet of it derive from the Power of the Kings, who were
" ſo far from ſhielding the People from the injury of the Nobility, of
" which there was none in his ſenſe but the Senate, that one declar'd
" end of the Senate at the inſtitution was to ſhield the People from the
" Kings, who from that time had but ſingle Votes. Neither did it

" proceed from the ſtraitneſs of the Senate, or their keeping the People " excluded from the Government, that they were quiet, but from " the equality of their adminiſtration, ſeeing the Senate (as is plain " by the Oracle, their fundamental Law) had no more than the De- " bate, and the Reſult of the Common-wealth belong'd to the People. " Wherefore when THEOPOMPUS and POLYDORUS Kings of *La-* " *cedemon*, would have kept the People excluded from the Govern- " ment, by adding to the antient Law this Clauſe, *If the determina-* " *tion of the People be faulty, it ſhall be lawful for the Senate to reſume* " *the Debate*, the People immediately became unquiet, and reſum'd " that Debate, which ended not till they had ſet up their *Ephors*, and " caus'd that Magiſtracy to be confirm'd by their Kings. * *For when* " THEOPOMPUS *firſt ordain'd that the* Ephori *or Overſeers ſhould be* " *created at* Lacedemon, *to be ſuch a reſtraint upon the Kings there as the* " *Tribunes were upon the Conſuls at* Rome, *the Queen complain'd to him,* " *that by this means he tranſmitted the Royal Authority greatly dimi-* " *niſh'd to his Children: I leave indeed leſs*, anſwer'd he, *but more laſt-* " *ing. And this was excellently ſaid; for that Power only is ſafe which is* " *limitted from doing hurt.* THEOPOMPUS *therefore, by confining the* " *Kingly Power within the bounds of the Laws, did recommend it by ſo* " *much to the People's Affection, as he remov'd it from being Arbitrary.* " By which it may appear, that a Common-wealth for preſervation, " if ſhe comes to be inequal, is as obnoxious to enmity between " the Senate and the People, as a Common-wealth for increaſe; and " that the Tranquillity of *Lacedemon* was deriv'd from no other cauſe " than her Equality.

" FOR *Venice*, to ſay that ſhe is quiet becauſe ſhe diſarms her " Subjects, is to forget that *Lacedemon* diſarm'd her *Helots*, and yet " could not in their regard be quiet; wherefore if *Venice* be defended " from external cauſes of Commotion, it is firſt thro' her Situation, in " which reſpect her Subjects have no hope (and this indeed may be " attributed to her fortune) and, ſecondly, thro' her exquiſite Juſtice, " whence they have no will to invade her. But this can be attributed " to no other cauſe than her Prudence; which will appear to be great- " er, as we look nearer; for the effects that proceed from Fortune, if " there be any ſuch thing, are like their cauſe, inconſtant. But " there never happen'd to any other Common-wealth ſo undiſturb'd " and conſtant a Tranquillity and Peace in her ſelf, as is that of " *Venice*; wherefore this muſt proceed from ſome other cauſe than " Chance. And we ſee that as ſhe is of all others the moſt quiet, " ſo the moſt equal Common-wealth. Her body conſiſts of one " Order, and her Senate is like a rolling ſtone, as was ſaid, which " never did, nor, while it continues upon that rotation, never ſhall " gather the moſs of a divided or ambitious Intereſt; much leſs ſuch a " one as that which graſp'd the People of *Rome* in the talons of their " own Eagles. And if MACHIAVEL, averſe from doing this " Common-wealth right, had conſider'd her Orders, as his Reader

* Nam cum primus inſtituiſſet Theopompus ut Ephori Lacedæmone crearentur, ita futuri regiæ poteſtati oppoſiti quemadmodum Romæ Tribuni plebis conſulari imperio ſunt objecti; atque illi uxor dixiſſet, id egiſſe illum ut filiis minorum poteſtatem relinqueret: Relinquam, inquit, ſed diuturniorem. Optimè quidem: Ea enim demum tuta eſt potentia, quæ viribus ſuis modum imponit. Theopompus igitur legitimis regnum vinculis conſtringendo, quo longius à licentia retraxit, hoc propius ad benevolentiam civium admovit. *Val. Max. l.* 4. *c.* 1. *de externis*, §. 8.

" ſhall

" ſhall eaſily perceive he never did, he muſt have been ſo far from at-
" tributing the Prudence of them to Chance, that he would have
" touch'd up his admirable work to that perfection, which, as to the
" civil part, has no pattern in the univerſal World but this of *Venice*.

" ROME, ſecure by her potent and victorious Arms from all ex-
" ternal cauſes of Commotion, was either beholden for her Peace at
" home to her Enemies abroad, or could never reſt her head. My
" LORDS, you that are Parents of a Common-wealth, and ſo freer
" Agents than ſuch as are merely natural, have a care. For, as no man
" ſhall ſhew me a Common-wealth born ſtreight, that ever became
" crooked; ſo, no man ſhall ſhew me a Common-wealth born crook-
" ed, that ever became ſtreight. *Rome* was crooked in her birth, or ra-
" ther prodigious. Her twins the *Patricians* and *Plebeian* Orders
" came, as was ſhewn by the foregoing ſtory, into the World, one
" body but two heads, or rather two bellies: for, notwithſtanding
" the Fable out of ÆSOP, whereby MENENIUS AGRIPPA the Orator
" that was ſent from the Senate to the People at Mount *Aventin*,
" ſhew'd the Fathers to be the Belly, and the People to be the Arms
" and the Legs (which except that, how ſlothful ſoever it might ſeem,
" they were nouriſh'd, not theſe only, but the whole Body muſt lan-
" guiſh and be diſſolv'd) it is plain, that the Fathers were a diſtinct
" Belly; ſuch a one as took the meat indeed out of the People's
" mouths, but abhorring the Agrarian, return'd it not in the due and
" neceſſary nutrition of a Common-wealth. Nevertheleſs, as the
" People that live about the Cataracts of *Nilus* are ſaid not to hear the
" noiſe, ſo neither the *Roman* Writers, nor MACHIAVEL the moſt
" converſant with them, ſeem among ſo many of the Tribunitian
" ſtorms, to hear their natural voice: for tho' they could not miſs
" of it ſo far as to attribute them to the ſtrife of the People for parti-
" cipation in Magiſtracy, or, in which MACHIAVEL more particu-
" larly joins, to that about the Agrarian; this was to take the buſineſs
" ſhort, and the remedy for the diſeaſe.

" A PEOPLE, when they are reduc'd to miſery and deſpair,
" become their own Politicians, as certain Beaſts when they are ſick
" become their own Phyſicians, and are carry'd by a natural inſtinct to
" the deſire of ſuch Herbs as are their proper cure; but the People,
" for the greater part, are beneath the Beaſts in the uſe of them.
" Thus the People of *Rome*, tho' in their miſery they had recourſe
" by inſtinct, as it were, to the two main Fundamentals of a Com-
" mon-wealth, participation of Magiſtracy, and the Agrarian, did
" but taſte and ſpit at them, not (which is neceſſary in Phyſic)
" drink down the potion, and in that their healths. For when they
" had obtain'd participation of Magiſtracy, it was but lamely, not to
" a full and equal Rotation in all Elections; nor did they greatly re-
" gard it in what they had got. And when they had attain'd to the
" Agrarian, they neglected it ſo far as to ſuffer the Law to grow ob-
" ſolete: but if you do not take the due doſe of your Medicines (as
" there be ſlight taſtes which a man may have of Philoſophy that in-
" cline to Atheiſm) it may chance to be poiſon, there being a like
" taſte of the Politics that inclines to Confuſion, as appears in the
" Inſtitution of the *Roman* Tribunes, by which Magiſtracy and no
" more, the People were ſo far from attaining to Peace, that they in
" getting but ſo much, got but heads for an eternal feud; whereas if

" they

" they had attain'd in perfection either to the Agrarian, they had " introduc'd the equality and calm of *Lacedemon*, or to Rotation, " and they had introduc'd that of *Venice:* And ſo there could have " been no more enmity between the Senate and the People of *Rome*, " than there was between thoſe Orders in *Lacedemon*, or is now in *Ve-* " *nice*. Wherefore MACHIAVEL ſeems to me, in attributing the Peace " of *Venice* more to her luck than her prudence, of the whole ſtable to " have ſaddled the wrong Horſe; for tho' *Rome* * in her military part " could beat it better, beyond all compariſon, upon the ſounding " hoof, *Venice* for the civil part has plainly had the wings of *Pegaſus*.

" THE whole Queſtion then will come upon this point, Whether " the People of *Rome* could have obtain'd theſe Orders? And firſt, to " ſay, that they could not have obtain'd them without altering the " Common-wealth, is no Argument; ſeeing neither could they, with- " out altering the Common-wealth, have obtain'd their Tribunes, which " nevertheleſs were obtain'd. And if a man conſiders the poſture " that the People were in when they obtain'd their Tribunes, they " might as well, and with as great eaſe (foraſmuch as the reaſon why " the Nobility yielded to the Tribunes was no other, than that there " was no remedy) have obtain'd any thing elſe. And for experience, " it was in the like caſe that the *Lacedemonians* did ſet up their *Ephors*, " and the *Athenians* after the battle of *Plateæ* bow'd the Senate (ſo " hard a thing it is for a Common-wealth that was born crooked to " become ſtreight) as much the other way. Nor, if it be objected, " that this muſt have ruin'd the Nobility (and in that depriv'd the " Common-wealth of the Greatneſs which ſhe acquir'd by them) is " this opinion holding; but confuted by the ſequel of the ſtory, ſhew- " ing plainly, that the Nobility thro' the defect of ſuch Orders, that " is to ſay, of Rotation and the Agrarian, came to eat up the Peo- " ple: and battening themſelves in Luxury, to be, as SALUST ſpeaks " of them, " † *a moſt ſluggiſh and lazy Nobility, in whom, beſides the* " *name, there was no more than in a ſtatue*; and to bring ſo mighty a " Common-wealth, and of ſo huge a Glory, to ſo deplorable an end. " Wherefore means might have been found to remove the enmity that " was between the Senate and the People of *Rome*.

" MY LORDS, If I have argu'd well, I have given you the " comfort and aſſurance, that notwithſtanding the judgment of MA- " CHIAVEL, your Common-wealth is both ſafe and ſound: but if I " have not argu'd well, then take the comfort and aſſurance which he " gives you while he is firm, That a Legiſlator is to lay aſide all other " examples, and follow that of *Rome* only, conniving and temporiz- " ing with the enmity between the Senate and the People, as a neceſ- " ſary ſtep to the *Roman* Greatneſs. Whence it follows, that your " Common-wealth, at the worſt, is that which he has given you his " word is the beſt.

" I HAVE held your Lordſhips long, but upon an account of no " ſmall importance, which I can now ſum up in theſe few words: " Where there is a liquoriſhneſs in a popular Aſſembly to debate, it " proceeds not from the Conſtitution of the People, but of the Com-

* ——— Qui nimbos & non imitabile fulmen
Ære, & cornipedum curſu ſimularat equorum.

† Inertiſſimi nobiles, in quibus, ſicut in ſtatua, præter nomen nihil erat additamenti.

" mon-wealth.

" mon-wealth. Now that your Common-wealth is of ſuch a Conſti-
" tution as is naturally free from this kind of intemperance, is that
" which to make good, I muſt divide the remainder of my Diſcourſe
" into two Parts.

" THE Firſt, ſhewing the ſeveral Conſtitutions of the Aſſem-
" blies of the People in other Common-wealths.
" THE Second, comparing our Aſſembly of the People with
" theirs; and ſhewing how it excludes the Inconveniences, and
" imbraces the Conveniences of them all.

" IN the beginning of the firſt Part I muſt take notice, that among
" the popular Errors of our days it is no ſmall one, that men imagine
" the antient Governments of this kind to have conſiſted for the moſt
" part of one City, that is, of one Town; whereas by what we have
" learnt of my Lords that open'd them, it appears that there was not
" any conſiderable one of ſuch a Conſtitution but *Carthage*, till this
" in our days of *Venice*.

" FOR to begin with *Iſrael*, it conſiſted of the twelve Tribes, lo-
" cally ſpread or quarter'd throughout the whole Territory; and theſe
" being call'd together by Trumpets, conſtituted the Church or Aſſem-
" bly of the People. The vaſtneſs of this weight, as alſo the ſlowneſs
" thence inavoidable, became a great cauſe (as has been ſhewn at large
" by my Lord PHOSPHORUS) of the breaking that Common-wealth;
" notwithſtanding that the Temple, and thoſe religious Ceremonies
" for which the People were at leaſt annually oblig'd to repair thither,
" were no ſmall Ligament of the Tribes, otherwiſe ſlightly tack'd
" together.

" ATHENS conſiſted of four Tribes, taking in the whole People
" both of the City and of the Territory; not ſo gather'd by THE-
" SEUS into one Town, as to exclude the Country, but to the end
" that there might be ſome Capital of the Common-wealth: tho' true it
" be, that the Congregation conſiſting of the Inhabitants within the
" Walls, was ſufficient to all intents and purpoſes, without thoſe of
" the Country. Theſe alſo being exceeding numerous, became bur-
" denſome to themſelves, and dangerous to the Commonwealth; the
" more for their ill education, as is obſerv'd by XENOPHON and
" POLYBIUS, who compare them to Mariners that in a calm are
" perpetually diſputing and ſwaggering one with another, and never
" lay their hands to the common tackling or ſafety, till they be all in-
" danger'd by ſome ſtorm. Which caus'd THUCYDIDES when he
" ſaw this People thro' the purchaſe of their Miſery become ſo much
" wiſer, as to reduce their *Comitia* or Aſſemblies to five thouſand, to
" ſay in his eighth Book; *And now, at leaſt in my time, the* Athenians
" *ſeem to have order'd their State aright, conſiſting of a moderate temper*
" *both of the Few* (by which he means the Senate of the Bean) *and of*
" *the Many*, or the five thouſand. And he does not only give you his
" judgment, but the beſt proof of it; for *this*, ſays he, *was the firſt*
" *thing that, after ſo many misfortunes paſt, made the City again to raiſe*
" *her head.* The place I would deſire your Lordſhips to note, as the
" firſt example that I find, or think is to be found, of a popular Aſ-
" ſembly by way of Repreſentative.

" LACEDEMON consisted of thirty thousand Citizens dispers'd " throughout *Laconia*, one of the greatest Provinces in all *Greece*, and di- " vided, as by some Authors is probable, into six Tribes. Of the " whole body of these, being gather'd, consisted the great Church or " Assembly, which had the Legislative Power; the little Church, ga- " ther'd sometimes for matters of concern within the City, consisted of " the *Spartans* only. These happen'd, like that of *Venice*, to be good " Constitutions of a Congregation, but from an ill cause the infirmity " of a Common-wealth, which thro' her paucity was Oligarchical.

" WHEREFORE, go which way you will, it should seem, " that without a Representative of the People, your Common-wealth " consisting of a whole Nation, can never avoid falling either into " Oligarchy or Confusion.

" THIS was seen by the *Romans*, whose rustic Tribes extending " themselves from the River *Arno* to the *Vulturnus*, that is, from *Fe-* " *sulæ* or *Florence* to *Capua*, invented a way of Representative by Lots: " the Tribe upon which the first fell, being the Prerogative; and some " two or three more that had the rest, the *Jure vocatæ*. These gave " the Suffrage of the Common-wealth in * two meetings; the Prero- " gative at the first Assembly, and the *Jure vocatæ* at a second.

" NOW to make the parallel, all the Inconveniences that you have " observ'd in these Assemblies are shut out, and all the Conveniences " taken into your Prerogative. For first it is that for which *Athens*, " shaking off the blame of XENOPHON and POLYBIUS, came " to deserve the praise of THUCYDIDES, a Representative. And, " secondly, not as I suspect in that of *Athens*, and is past suspicion in " this of *Rome*, by lot, but by suffrage, as was also the late House of " Commons, by which means in your Prerogatives all the Tribes of " *Oceana* are *Jure vocatæ*; and if a man shall except against the pau- " city of the standing number, it is a wheel, which in the revolution " of a few years turns every hand that is fit, or fits every hand that it " turns to the public work. Moreover, I am deceiv'd if upon due " consideration it does not fetch your Tribes, with greater equality and " ease to themselves and to the Government, from the Frontiers of *Mar-* " *pesia*, than *Rome* ever brought any one of hers out of her *Pomœria*, " or the nearest parts of her adjoining Territories. To this you may " add, That whereas a Common-wealth, which in regard of the Peo- " ple is not of facility in execution, were sure enough in this Nation to " be cast off thro' impatience; your Musters and Galaxies are given to " the People, as milk to Babes, whereby when they are brought up " thro' four days election in a whole year (one at the Parish, one at the " Hundred, and two at the Tribe) to their strongest meat, it is of no " harder digestion, than to give their Negative or Affirmative as they " see cause. There be gallant men among us that laugh at such an " Appeal or Umpire; but I refer it whether you be more inclining to " pardon them or me, who I confess have been this day laughing at a " sober man, but without meaning him any harm, and that is PE- " TRUS CUNÆUS, where speaking of the nature of the People, he " says, that *taking them apart, they are very simple, but yet in their As-* " *semblies they see and know something:* and so runs away without trou- " bling himself with what that something is. Whereas the People,

* Binis Comitiis.

" taken

" taken apart, are but ſo many private Intereſts; but if you take them " together, they are the public Intereſt. The public Intereſt of a " Common-wealth, as has been ſhewn, is neareſt that of mankind, " and that of mankind is right reaſon; but with Ariſtocracy (whoſe " Reaſon or Intereſt, when they are all together, as appear'd by the " *Patricians*, is but that of a Party) it is quite contrary: for as, ta- " ken apart, they are far wiſer than the People conſider'd in that man- " ner; ſo being put together, they are ſuch fools, who by depoſing " the People, as did thoſe of *Rome*, will ſaw off the branch where- " upon they ſit, or rather deſtroy the root of their own Greatneſs. " Wherefore MACHIAVEL following ARISTOTLE, and yet going " before him, may well aſſert, * *That the People are wiſer and more* " *conſtant in their Reſolutions than a Prince*; which is the Prerogative " of popular Government for Wiſdom. And hence it is that the Pre- " rogative of your Common-wealth, as for Wiſdom, ſo for Power, is " in the People: which (tho' I am not ignorant that the *Roman* Pre- " rogative was ſo call'd *à Prærogando*, becauſe their Suffrage was firſt " aſk'd) gives the denomination to your Prerogative Tribe.

THE Elections, whether Annual or Triennial, being ſhewn by the twenty ſecond, that which comes in the next place to be conſider'd is

THE twenty third ORDER, ſhewing the Power, Function, and manner of Proceeding of the Prerogative Tribe.

23. Order. *The Conſtitution, Functions and manner of Proceeding of the Prerogative.*

THE Power or Function of the Prerogative is of two parts, the one of Reſult, in which it is the Legiſlative Power; the other of Judicature, in which regard it is the higheſt Court, and the laſt appeal in this Common-wealth.

FOR the former part (the People by this Conſtitution being not oblig'd by any Law that is not of their own making or confirmation, by the reſult of the Prerogative, their equal Repreſentative) it ſhall not be lawful for the Senate to require obedience from the People, nor for the People to give obedience to the Senate in or by any Law that has not been promulgated, or printed and publiſh'd for the ſpace of ſix weeks; and afterwards propos'd by the Authority of the Senate to the Prerogative Tribe, and reſolved by the major Vote of the ſame in the Affirmative. Nor ſhall the Senate have any power to levy War, Men, or Money, otherwiſe than by the conſent of the People ſo given, or by a Law ſo enacted, except in caſes of Exigence, in which it is agreed, that the Power both of the Senate and the People ſhall be in the Dictator, ſo qualify'd, and for ſuch a term of time, as is according to that Conſtitution already preſcrib'd. While a Law is in promulgation, the Cenſors ſhall animadvert upon the Senate, and the Tribunes upon the People, that there be no laying of heads together, no Conventicles or canvaſſing to carry on or oppoſe any thing; but that all may be done in a free and open way.

FOR the latter part of the Power of the Prerogative, or that whereby they are the Supreme Judicatory of this Nation, and of the Provinces of the ſame, the cognizance of Crimes againſt the Majeſty of the People, ſuch as High Treaſon, as alſo of Peculat, that is, robbery of the Treaſury, or defraudation of the Common-wealth, appertains to this Tribe. And if any Perſon or Perſons, Provincials or Citizens, ſhall appeal to the People, it belongs to the Prerogative to judge and determine the caſe; provided that if the Appeal be from any Court of Juſtice in this Nation or the Provinces, the Appellant ſhall firſt depoſite a hundred Pounds in the Court from

* Che la multitudine è piu ſavia & piu conſtante che un Prencipe.

which

which he appeals, to be forfeited to the ſame, if he be caſt in his Suit by the People. But the Power of the Council of War being the expedition of this Common-wealth, and the martial Law of the *Strategus* in the Field, are thoſe only from which there ſhall lie no Appeal to the People.

THE Proceeding of the Prerogative in caſe of a Propoſition, is to be thus order'd. The Magiſtrates, propoſing by Authority of the Senate ſhall rehearſe the whole matter, and expound it to the People: which done, they ſhall put the whole together to the Suffrage, with three Boxes, the Negative, the Affirmative, and the Nonſincere: and the Suffrage being return'd to the Tribunes, and number'd in the preſence of the Propoſers, if the major Vote be in the Nonſincere, the Propoſers ſhall deſiſt, and the Senate ſhall reſume the Debate. If the major Vote be in the Negative, the Propoſers ſhall deſiſt, and the Senate too. But if the major Vote be in the Affirmative, then the Tribe is clear, and the Propoſers ſhall begin and put the whole matter, with the Negative and the Affirmative (leaving out the Nonſincere) by Clauſes; and the Suffrages being taken and number'd by the Tribunes in the preſence of the Propoſers, ſhall be written and reported by the Tribunes to the Senate. And that which is propos'd by the Authority of the Senate, and confirm'd by the Command of the People, is the Law of *Oceana*.

THE Proceeding of the Prerogative in a caſe of Judicature is to be thus order'd. The Tribunes being Auditors of all Cauſes appertaining to the cognizance of the People, ſhall have notice of the Suit or Trial, whether of Appeal or otherwiſe, that is to be commenc'd; and if any one of them ſhall accept of the ſame, it appertains to him to introduce it. A Cauſe being introduc'd, and the People muſter'd or aſſembl'd for the deciſion of the ſame, the Tribunes are Preſidents of the Court, having power to keep it to Orders, and ſhall be ſeated upon a Scaffold erected in the middle of the Tribe. Upon the right hand ſhall ſtand a Seat, or large Pulpit aſſign'd to the Plaintiff, or the Accuſer; and, upon the left, another for the Defendant, each if they pleaſe with his Council. And the Tribunes (being attended upon ſuch occaſions with ſo many Ballotins, Secretaries, Door-keepers, and Meſſengers of the Senate as ſhall be requiſite) one of them ſhall turn up a Glaſs of the nature of an Hour-glaſs, but ſuch a one as is to be of an hour and a half's running; which being turn'd up, the Party or Council on the right hand may begin to ſpeak to the People. If there be Papers to be read, or Witneſſes to be examin'd, the Officer ſhall lay the Glaſs ſideways till the Papers be read, and the Witneſſes examined, and then turn it up again; and ſo long as the Glaſs is running, the Party on the right hand has liberty to ſpeak, and no longer. The Party on the right hand having had his time, the like ſhall be done in every reſpect for the Party on the left. And the Cauſe being thus heard, the Tribunes ſhall put the queſtion to the Tribe with a white, a black, and a red Box (or Nonſincere) whether Guilty, or not Guilty. And if the Suffrage being taken, the major Vote be in the Nonſincere, the Cauſe ſhall be re-heard upon the next juridical day following, and put to the queſtion in the ſame manner. If the major Vote comes the ſecond time in the Nonſincere, the Cauſe ſhall be heard again upon the third day: but at the third hearing the queſtion ſhall be put without the Nonſincere. Upon the firſt of the three days in which the major Vote comes in the white Box, the Party accus'd is abſolv'd; and upon the firſt of them in which it comes in the black Box, the Party accus'd is condemn'd. The Party accus'd being condemned, the Tribunes (if the caſe be criminal) ſhall put with the white and

the

the black Box theſe Queſtions, or ſuch of them, as, regard had to the caſe, they ſhall conceive moſt proper.

1. *WHETHER he ſhall have a Writ of eaſe.*
2. *WHETHER he ſhall be fin'd ſo much, or ſo much.*
3. *WHETHER he ſhall be confiſcated.*
4. *WHETHER he ſhall be render'd incapable of Magiſtracy.*
5. *WHETHER he ſhall be baniſh'd.*
6. *WHETHER he ſhall be put to death.*

THESE, or any three of theſe Queſtions, whether ſimple or ſuch as ſhall be thought fitly mix'd, being put by the Tribunes, that which has moſt above half the Votes in the black Box is the Sentence of the People, which the Troop of the third Claſſis is to ſee executed accordingly.

BUT whereas by the Conſtitution of this Common-wealth it may appear that neither the propoſition of the Senate, nor the Judicature of the People, will be ſo frequent as to hold the Prerogative in continual Employment; the Senate, a main part of whoſe Office it is to teach and inſtruct the People, ſhall duly (if they have no greater Affairs to divert them) cauſe an Oration to be made to the Prerogative by ſome Knight or Magiſtrate of the Senate, to be choſen out of the ableſt men, and from time to time appointed by the Orator of the Houſe, in the great Hall of the *Pantheon*, while the Parliament reſides in the Town; or in ſome Grove or ſweet place in the field, while the Parliament for the heat of the year ſhall reſide in the Country; upon every Tueſday, morning or afternoon.

AND the Orator appointed for the time to this Office, ſhall firſt repeat the Orders of the Common-wealth with all poſſible brevity; and then making choice of one or ſome part of it, diſcourſe thereof to the People. An Oration or Diſcourſe of this nature, being afterward peruſ'd by the Council of State, may as they ſee cauſe be printed and publiſh'd.

THE ARCHON's Comment upon the Order I find to have been of this ſenſe.

My Lords,

" TO crave pardon for a word or two in farther explanation of what was read, I ſhall briefly ſhew how the Conſtitution of " this Tribe or Aſſembly anſwers to their Function; and how their " Function, which is of two parts, the former in the Reſult or Legi- " ſlative Power, the latter in the ſupreme Judicature of the Common- " wealth, anſwers to their Conſtitution. MACHIAVEL has a Diſ- " courſe, where he puts the queſtion, *Whether the guard of Liberty* " *may with more ſecurity be committed to the Nobility, or to the People.* " Which doubt of his ariſes thro' the want of explaining his terms; " for the guard of Liberty can ſignify nothing elſe but the Reſult of the " Common-wealth: ſo that to ſay, that the guard of Liberty may be " committed to the Nobility, is to ſay, that the Reſult may be com- " mitted to the Senate, in which caſe the People ſignify nothing. Now " to ſhew it was a miſtake to affirm it to have been thus in *Lacedemon*, " ſufficient has been ſpoken; and whereas he will have it to be ſo

" *Venice* alſo, * *They*, ſays CONTARINI, *in whom reſides the Su-*
" *preme Power of the whole Common-wealth, and of the Laws, and upon*
" *whoſe Orders depends the Authority as well of the Senate as of all the o-*
" *ther Magiſtrates, is the* GREAT COUNCIL. It is inſtitutively
" in the Great Council, by the judgment of all that know that Com-
" mon-wealth; tho' for the Reaſons ſhewn, it be ſometimes exercis'd
" by the Senate. Nor need I run over the Common-wealths in this
" place for the proof of a thing ſo doubtleſs, and ſuch as has
" been already made ſo apparent, as that the Reſult of each was in
" the popular part of it. The popular part of yours, or the Prero-
" gative Tribe, conſiſts of ſeven Deputies (whereof three are of the
" Horſe) annually elected out of every Tribe of *Oceana*; which be-
" ing fifty, amounts to one hundred and fifty Horſe, and two hundred
" Foot. And the Prerogative conſiſting of three of theſe Liſts, con-
" ſiſts of four hundred and fifty Horſe, and ſix hundred Foot, beſides
" thoſe of the Provinces to be hereafter mention'd; by which means
" the over-balance in the Suffrage remaining to the Foot by one hun-
" dred and fifty Votes, you have to the ſupport of a true and natural
" Ariſtocracy, the deepeſt root of a Democracy that has been ever
" planted. Wherefore there is nothing in Art or Nature better qua-
" lify'd for the Reſult than this Aſſembly. It is noted out of CICERO
" by MACHIAVEL, That the People, tho' they are not ſo prone
" to find out Truth of themſelves, as to follow Cuſtom, or run into
" Error; yet if they be ſhewn Truth, they not only acknowledge and
" embrace it very ſuddenly, but are the moſt conſtant and faithful
" Guardians and Conſervators of it. It is your Duty and Office,
" whereto you are alſo qualify'd by the Orders of this Common-wealth,
" to have the People as you have your Hawks and Greyhounds, in
" Leaſes and Slips, to range the Fields, and beat the Buſhes for them;
" for they are of a nature that is never good at this ſport, but when
" you ſpring or ſtart their proper quarry. Think not that they will
" ſtand to ask you what it is, or leſs know it than your Hawks and
" Greyhounds do theirs; but preſently make ſuch a flight or courſe,
" that a Huntſman may as well undertake to run with his Dogs, or a
" Falconer to fly with his Hawk, as an Ariſtocracy at this game to
" compare with the People. The People of *Rome* were poſſeſt of no
" leſs a prey than the Empire of the World, when the Nobility turn'd
" tails, and perch'd among Daws upon the Tower of Monarchy.
" For tho' they did not all of them intend the thing, they would none
" of them endure the Remedy, which was the Agrarian.

" BUT the Prerogative Tribe has not only the Reſult, but is the
" Supreme Judicature, and the ultimate Appeal in this Common-wealth.
" For the popular Government that makes account to be of any
" ſtanding, muſt make ſure in the firſt place of the † Appeal to the
" People. As an Eſtate in truſt becomes a man's own, if he be not
" anſwerable for it: ſo the Power of a Magiſtracy not accountable to
" the People, from whom it was receiv'd, becoming of private uſe,
" the Common-wealth loſes her Liberty. Wherefore the Right of Su-

* Quello appreſſo il quale e la ſomma autorita di tutta la città, e delle leggi & decreti, de i quali pende l' autorità coſi del Senato come ancora di tutti i Magiſtrati, e il Conſiglio Grande.

† Ante omnes de provocatione adverſus Magiſtratus ad Populum, ſacrandoque cum bonis capite ejus, qui regni occupandi conſilia iniiſſet.

" preme

" preme Judicature in the People (without which there can be no " ſuch thing as popular Government) is confirm'd by the conſtant " practice of all Common-wealths; as that of *Iſrael* in the caſes of " ACHAN, and of the Tribe of BENJAMIN, adjudg'd by the Congre- " gation. The *Dicaſterion* or Court call'd the *Heliaia* in *Athens*, " which (the *Comitia* of that Common-wealth conſiſting of the whole " People, and ſo being too numerous to be a Judicatory) was conſti- " tuted ſometimes of five hundred, at others of one thouſand, or, ac- " cording to the greatneſs of the cauſe, of fifteen hundred, elected by " the Lot out of the whole Body of the People, had with the nine " ARCHONS that were Preſidents, the cognizance of ſuch Cauſes " as were of higheſt importance in that State. The five Ephors in " *Lacedemon* which were popular Magiſtrates, might queſtion their " Kings, as appears by the caſes of PAUSANIAS, and of AGIS, " who being upon his Trial in this Court, was cry'd to by his Mo- " ther to appeal to the People, as PLUTARCH has it in his Life. The " Tribunes of the People of *Rome* (like, in the nature of their Magi- " ſtracy, and for ſome time in number, to the Ephors, as being, " according to HALICARNASSEUS and PLUTARCH, inſtituted in " imitation of them) had power * to ſummon any man, his Magi- " ſtracy at leaſt being expir'd (for from the Dictator there lay no Ap- " peal) to anſwer for himſelf to the People. As in the caſe of CORIO- " LANUS, who was going about to force the People, by withhold- " ing Corn from them in a Famine, to relinquiſh the Magiſtracy of " the Tribunes; in that of SPURIUS CASSIUS for affecting Tyranny; " of MARCUS SERGIUS for running away at *Veii*; of CAIUS LU- " CRETIUS for ſpoiling his Province; of JUNIUS SILANUS for mak- " ing War, without a command from the People, againſt the *Cimbri*; " with divers others. And the Crimes of this nature were call'd *Læſæ* " *Majeſtatis*, or High Treaſon. Examples of ſuch as were arraign'd " or try'd for Peculat, or Defraudation of the Common-wealth, were " MARCUS CURIUS, for intercepting the Money of the *Samnites*; " SALINATOR, for the unequal diviſion of Spoils to his Soldiers; " MARCUS POSTHUMIUS, for cheating the Common-wealth by a " feign'd Shipwreck. Cauſes of theſe two kinds were of a more " public nature; but the like Power upon Appeals was alſo exercis'd " by the People in private matters, even during the time of the " Kings; as in the caſe of HORATIUS. Nor is it otherwiſe with " *Venice*, where the Doge LOREDANO was ſentenc'd by the Great " Council; and ANTONIO GRIMANI, afterwards Doge, queſtion'd, " for that he being Admiral had ſuffer'd the *Turk* to take *Lepanto* in " view of his Fleet.

" NEVERTHELESS, there lay no Appeal from the *Ro-* " *man* Dictator to the People; which if there had, might have coſt " the Common-wealth dear, when SPURIUS MELIUS affecting Em- " pire, circumvented and debauch'd the Tribunes: whereupon TI- " TUS QUINTIUS CINCINNATUS was created Dictator; who hav- " ing choſen SERVILIUS AHALA to be his Lieutenant, or *Magi-* " *ſter Equitum*, ſent him to apprehend MELIUS, whom, while he " diſputed the Commands of the Dictator, and implor'd the aid of " the People, AHALA cut off upon the place. By which example

* Diem dicere.

you

" you may ſee in what caſes the Dictator may prevent the Blow, " which is ready ſometimes to fall e're the People be aware of the " Danger. Wherefore there lies no Appeal from the *Dieci*, or the " Council of Ten, in *Venice*, to the Great Council, nor from our " Council of War to the People. For the way of proceeding of this " Tribe, or the Ballot, it is, as was once ſaid for all, *Venetian*.

" THIS Diſcourſe of Judicatories whereupon we are fallen, " brings us rather naturally than of deſign from the two general Or- " ders of every Common-wealth, that is to ſay, from the debating " part or the Senate, and the reſolving part or the People, to the " third, which is the executive part or the Magiſtracy, whereupon I " ſhall have no need to dwell: For the executive Magiſtrates of this " Common-wealth are the Strategus in Arms; the Signory in their ſe- " veral Courts, as the Chancery, the Exchequer; as alſo the Coun- " cils in divers caſes within their Inſtructions; the Cenſors as well in " their proper Magiſtracy, as in the Council of Religion; the Tri- " bunes in the Government of the Prerogative, and that Judicatory; " and the Judges with their Courts: Of all which ſo much is already " ſaid or known as may ſuffice.

" THE Tueſday Lectures or Orations to the People will be of " great benefit to the Senate, the Prerogative, and the whole Nation. " To the Senate, becauſe they will not only teach your Senators Elo- " cution, but keep the Syſtem of the Government in their memories. " Elocution is of great uſe to your Senators; for if they do not un- " derſtand Rhetoric (giving it at this time for granted, that the Art " were not otherwiſe good) and come to treat with, or vindicate the " cauſe of the Common-wealth againſt ſome other Nation that is good " at it, the advantage will be ſubject to remain upon the merit of the " Art, and not upon the merit of the Cauſe. Furthermore, the Ge- " nius or Soul of this Government being in the whole and in every " part, they will never be of ability in determination upon any par- " ticular, unleſs at the ſame time they have an Idea of the whole. " That this therefore muſt be, in that regard, of equal benefit to the " Prerogative, is plain; tho' theſe have a greater concernment in it. " For this Common-wealth is the Eſtate of the People: and a Man, " you know, tho' he be virtuous, yet if he does not underſtand his " Eſtate, may run out or be cheated of it. Laſt of all, the Treaſures " of the Politics will by this means be ſo open'd, rifled, and diſpers'd, " that this Nation will as ſoon dote, like the *Indians*, upon glaſs " Beads, as diſturb your Government with Whimſies and Freaks of " Mother-wit; or ſuffer themſelves to be ſtutter'd out of their Liber- " ties. There is not any reaſon why your Grandees, your wiſe men " of this Age, that laugh out and openly at a Common-wealth as the " moſt ridiculous thing, do not appear to be, as in this regard they " are, mere Idiots, but that the People have not Eyes.

THERE remains no more relating to the Senate and the People than,

24. Order. *Conſtitution of the provincial part of the Senate and the People.*

THE twenty fourth ORDER, whereby it is lawful for the Province of *Marpeſia* to have 30 Knights of their own election continually preſent in the Senate of *Oceana*, together with 60 Deputies of Horſe, and 120 of Foot in the Prerogative Tribe, indu'd with equal Power (reſpect had

had to their quality and number) in the Debate and result of this Common-wealth: provided that they observe the Course or Rotation of the same by the annual Return of 10 Knights, 20 Deputies of the Horse, and 40 of the Foot. The like in all respects is lawful for *Panopea*; and the Horse of both the Provinces amounting to one Troop, and the Foot to one Company, one Captain and one Cornet of the Horse shall be annually chosen by *Marpesia*, and one Captain and one Ensign of the Foot shall be annually chosen by *Panopea*.

THE Orb of the Prerogative being thus compleat, is not unnaturally compar'd to that of the Moon, either in consideration of the Light borrow'd from the Senate, as from the Sun; or of the ebbs and floods of the People, which are mark'd by the Negative or Affirmative of this Tribe. And the Constitution of the Senate and the People being shewn, you have that of the Parliament of *Oceana*, consisting of the Senate proposing, and of the People resolving; which amounts to an Act of Parliament. So the Parliament is the Heart, which, consisting of two Ventricles, the one greater and repleniſh'd with a grosser matter, the other less and full of a purer, sucks in, and spouts forth the vital Blood of *Oceana* by a perpetual Circulation. Wherefore the life of this Government is no more unnatural or obnoxious upon this score to dissolution, than that of a Man; nor to giddiness than the World: seeing the Earth, whether it be it self or the Heavens that are in rotation, is so far from being giddy, that it could not subsist without motion. But why should not this Government be much rather capable of duration and steadiness by motion? than which God has ordain'd no other to the universal Common-wealth of Mankind: seeing one Generation comes, and another goes, but the Earth remains firm for ever; that is, in her proper Situation or Place, whether she be mov'd or not mov'd upon her prope Center. The Senate, the People, and the Magistracy, or the Parliament so constituted, as you have seen, is the Guardian of this Common-wealth, and the Husband of such a Wife as is elegantly describ'd by SOLOMON. *She is like the Merchant's Ship; she brings her Food from far. She considers a Field and buys it: With the fruit of her hands she plants a Vineyard. She perceives that her Merchandize is good. She stretches forth her hands to the Poor. She is not afraid of the Snow for her Houshold; for all her Houshold are cloath'd with Scarlet. She makes her self Coverings of Tapestry; her Clothing is Silk and Purple. Her Husband is known* (by his Robes) *in the Gates, when he sits among the Senators of the Land.* The Gates, or inferior Courts, were branches as it were of the Sanhedrim or Senate of *Israel*. Nor is our Common-wealth a worse Housewife, or has she less regard to her Magistrates; as may appear by

Constitution of the Parliament.

Prov. 31.

THE twenty fifth ORDER: That, whereas the public Revenue is thro' the late Civil Wars dilapidated, the Excise, being improv'd or improvable to the Revenue of one Million, be apply'd for the space of eleven years to come, to the reparation of the same, and for the present maintenance of the Magistrates, Knights, Deputies, and other Officers, who according to their several Dignities and Functions, shall annually receive towards the Support of the same, as follows.

25. Order.

THE Lord Strategus Marching, is, upon another account, to have Field Pay as General.

	lib. per ann.
THE *Lord Strategus ſitting*	2000
THE *Lord Orator*	2000
THE *three Commiſſioners of the Seal*	4500
THE *three Commiſſioners of the Treaſury*	4500
THE *two Cenſors*	3000
THE 290 *Knights, at* 500 *l. a man*	145000
THE 4 *Embaſſadors in Ordinary*	12000
THE *Council of War for Intelligence*	3000
THE *Maſter of the Ceremonies*	500
THE *Maſter of the Horſe*	500
HIS *Subſtitute*	150
THE 12 *Ballotins for their Winter Liveries*	240
FOR *their Summer Liveries*	120
FOR *their Board-wages*	480
FOR *the keeping of three Coaches of State,* 24 *Coach-horſes, with Coachmen and Poſtilions*	1500
FOR *the Grooms, and keeping of* 16 *great Horſes for the Maſter of the Horſe, and for the Ballotins whom he is to govern and inſtruct in the Art of Riding*	480
THE 20 *Secretaries of the Parliament*	2000
THE 20 *Door-keepers, who are to attend with Pole-axes; for their Coats*	200
FOR *their Board-wages*	1000
THE 20 *Meſſengers, which are Trumpeters, for their Coats*	200
FOR *their Board-wages*	1000
FOR *Ornament of the Muſters of the Youth*	5000
Sum	189370

OUT of the perſonal Eſtates of every man, who at his Death bequeaths not above forty ſhillings to the Muſter of that Hundred wherein it lies, ſhall be levy'd one *per cent.* till the ſolid Revenue of the Muſter of the Hundred amounts to 50 *l. per annum* for the Prizes of the Youth.

THE twelve Ballotins are to be divided into three Regions, according to the courſe of the Senate; the four of the firſt Region to be elected at the Tropic out of ſuch Children as the Knights of the ſame ſhall offer, not being under eleven years of age, nor above thirteen. And their Election ſhall be made by the Lot at an Urn ſet by the Serjeant of the Houſe for that purpoſe in the Hall of the *Pantheon.* The Livery of the Common-wealth for the faſhion or the colour may be chang'd at the Election of the Strategus according to his phanſy. But every Knight during his Seſſion ſhall be bound to give to his Footman, or ſome one of his Footmen, the Livery of the Common-wealth.

THE Prerogative Tribe ſhall receive as follows.

	lib. by the week.
THE 2 *Tribunes of the Horſe*	14
THE 2 *Tribunes of the Foot*	12
THE 3 *Captains of Horſe*	15

THE

THE 3 *Cornets*		
THE 3 *Captains of Foot*	9	
THE 3 *Enſigns*	12	
THE 442 *Horſe, at* 2l. *a man*	7	
THE 592 *Foot, at* 1l. 10s. *a man*	884	
THE 6 *Trumpeters*	888	
THE 3 *Drummers*	7	10s.
	2	5s.
SUM by the Week	1850	15s.
SUM by the Year	96239	
THE Total of the Senate, the People, and the Magiſtracy,	287459	15s.

THE Dignity of the Common-wealth, and Aids of the ſeveral Magiſtracies and Offices thereto belonging, being provided for as aforeſaid, the Overplus of the Exciſe, with the Product of the Sum riſing, ſhall be carefully manag'd by the Senate and the People thro' the diligence of the Officers of the Exchequer, till it amounts to eight Millions, or to the purchaſe of about four hundred thouſand Pounds ſolid Revenue. At which time, the term of eleven years being expir'd, the Exciſe, except it be otherwiſe order'd by the Senate and the People, ſhall be totally remitted and aboliſh'd for ever.

AT this Inſtitution the Taxes, as will better appear in the Corollary, were abated about one half, which made the Order when it came to be taſted, to be of good reliſh with the People in the very beginning; tho' the Advantages then were no ways comparable to the Conſequences to be hereafter ſhewn. Nevertheleſs, my Lord EPIMONUS, who with much ado had been held till now, found it midſummer Moon, and broke out of Bedlam in this manner.

My Lord ARCHON,

" I HAVE a ſinging in my head like that of a Cart-wheel, my
" Brains are upon a Rotation; and ſome are ſo merry, that a Man
" cannot ſpeak his griefs, but if your highſhod Prerogative, and thoſe
" ſame ſlouching Fellows your Tribunes, do not take my Lord Stra-
" tegus's, and my Lord Orator's heads, and jole them together under
" the Canopy, then let me be ridiculous to all Poſterity. For here is
" a Common-wealth, to which if a Man ſhould take that of the Pren-
" tices in their antient Adminiſtration of Juſtice at Shrovetide, it were
" an Ariſtocracy. You have ſet the very Rabble with Troncheons in
" their hands, and the Gentry of this Nation like Cocks with Scarlet
" Gills, and the Golden Combs of their Salaries to boot, leſt they
" ſhould not be thrown at.

" NOT a Night can I ſleep for ſome horrid Apparition or other;
" one while theſe Myrmidons are meaſuring Silks by their Quarter-
" ſtaves; another, ſtuffing their greaſy Pouches with my Lord High
" Treaſurers *Jacobuſſes*. For they are above a thouſand in Arms to
" three hundred, which, their Gowns being pull'd over their ears,
" are but in their Doublets and Hoſe. But what do I ſpeak of a thou-
" ſand? there be two thouſand in every Tribe, that is, a hundred
" thouſand in the whole Nation, not only in the poſture of an Army,

but

" but in a civil Capacity ſufficient to give us what Laws they pleaſe. " Now every body knows, that the lower ſort of People regard no- " thing but Money; and you ſay it is the Duty of a Legiſlator to pre- " ſume all Men to be wicked: wherefore they muſt fall upon the " richer, as they are an Army; or, leſt their minds ſhould miſgive " them in ſuch a villany, you have given them encouragement that " they have a nearer way, ſeeing it may be done every whit as well " as by the over-balancing Power which they have in Elections. There " is a Fair which is annually kept in the Center of theſe Territories at " *Kiberton*, a Town famous for Ale, and frequented by good Fel- " lows; where there is a Solemnity of the Pipers and Fidlers of this " Nation (I know not whether *Lacedemon*, where the Senate kept ac- " count of the ſtops of the Flutes and of the Fiddleſtrings of that " Common-wealth, had any ſuch Cuſtom) call'd the *Bulrunning*; " and he that catches and holds the Bull, is the annual and ſupreme " Magiſtrate of that *Comitia* or Congregation, call'd *King Piper*; " without whoſe Licence it is not lawful for any of thoſe Citizens to " enjoy the liberty of his Calling; nor is he otherwiſe legitimately " qualify'd (or *civitate donatus)* to lead Apes or Bears in any Peram- " bulation of the ſame. Mine Hoſt of the Bear, in *Kiberton*, the " Father of Ale, and Patron of good Foot-ball and Cudgel-players, " has any time ſince I can remember, been Grand Chancellor of this " Order. Now, ſay I, ſeeing great things ariſe from ſmall beginnings, " what ſhould hinder the People, prone to their own Advantage, and " loving Money, from having Intelligence convey'd to them by this " ſame *King Piper* and his Chancellor, with their Loyal Subjects the " Minſtrils and Bearwards, Maſters of Ceremonies, to which there is " great recourſe in their reſpective Perambulations, and which they " will commiſſion and inſtruct, with Directions to all the Tribes, " willing and commanding them, that as they wiſh their own good, " they chooſe no other into the next *primum Mobile*, but of the ableſt " Cudgel and Foot-ball-players? Which done as ſoon as ſaid, your " *primum Mobile* conſiſting of no other ſtuff, muſt of neceſſity be " drawn forth into your *Nebulones*, and your *Galimofries*; and ſo the " ſilken Purſes of your Senate and Prerogative being made of Sows " ears, moſt of them Black-ſmiths, they will ſtrike while the Iron is " hot, and beat your Eſtates into Hobnails; mine Hoſt of the Bear " being Strategus, and King Piper Lord Orator. Well, my Lords, it " might have been otherwiſe expreſt, but this is well enough a con- " ſcience. In your way, the Wit of Man ſhall not prevent this or the " like Inconvenience; but if this (for I have confer'd with Artiſts) " be a mathematical Demonſtration, I could kneel to you, that e're " it be too late we might return to ſome kind of Sobriety.

" IF we empty our Purſes with theſe Pomps, Salaries, Coaches, " Lacquies, and Pages, what can the People ſay leſs, than that we " have dreſt a Senate and a Prerogaive for nothing, but to go to the " Park with the Ladies?

MY Lord ARCHON, whoſe meekneſs reſembl'd that of MOSES, vouchſaf'd this Anſwer.

My

My Lords;

" FOR all this, I can ſee my Lord EPIMONUS every night in " the Park, and with Ladies; nor do I blame this in a young " Man, or the Reſpect which is and ought to be given to a Sex that is " one half of the Common-wealth of Mankind, and without which " the other would be none: But our Magiſtrates, I doubt, may be ſome- " what of the oldeſt to perform this part with much acceptation; " and, as the *Italian* Proverb ſays, * *Servire & non gradire è coſa da* " *far morire*. Wherefore we will lay no certain Obligation upon them " in this Point, but leave them, if it pleaſe you, to their own fate or " diſcretion. But this (for I know my Lord EPIMONUS loves me, " tho' I can never get his eſteem) I will ſay, if he had a Miſtreſs " ſhould uſe him ſo, he would find it a ſad Life; or I appeal to your " Lordſhips, how I can reſent it from ſuch a Friend, that he puts " King Piper's Politicks in the Balance with mine. King Piper, I deny " not, may teach his Bears to dance, but they have the worſt ear of " all Creatures. Now how he ſhould make them keep time in fifty " ſeveral Tribes, and that two years together, for elſe it will be to " no purpoſe, may be a ſmall matter with my Lord to promiſe; but " it ſeems to me of impoſſible performance. Firſt, Thro' the nature " of the Bean; and, ſecondly, thro' that of the Ballot; or how what " he has hitherto thought ſo hard, is now come to be eaſy: but he " may think, that for expedition they will eat up theſe Balls like Ap- " ples. However, there is ſo much more in their way by the Conſti- " tution of this, than is to be found in that of any other Common- " wealth, that I am reconcil'd; it now appearing plainly, that the " Points of my Lord's Arrows are directed at no other White, than " to ſhew the excellency of our Government above others; which, as " he proceeds further, is yet plainer; while he makes it appear, that " there can be no other elected by the People but Smiths,

" *Bronteſque Steropeſque & nudus membra Pyracmon:*

" OTHONIEL, AOD, GIDEON, JEPHTHA, SAMSON, as in *Iſrael:* MIL- " TIADES, ARISTIDES, THEMISTOCLES, CIMON, PERICLES, as in " *Athens:* PAPYRIUS, CINCINNATUS, CAMILLUS, FABIUS, SCIPIO, " as in *Rome:* Smiths of the fortune of the Common-wealth; not ſuch " as forg'd Hobnails, but Thunder-bolts. Popular Elections are of that " kind, that all the reſt of the World is not able, either in number " or glory, to equal thoſe of theſe three Common-wealths. Theſe " indeed were the ableſt Cudgel and Footbal-players; bright Arms " were their Cudgels, and the World was the Ball that lay at their " Feet. Wherefore we are not ſo to underſtand the Maxim of Legiſla- " tors, which holds *all men to be wicked*, as if it related to Mankind " or a Common-wealth, the Intereſts whereof are the only ſtrait lines " they have whereby to reform the crooked; but as it relates to every " Man or Party, under what colour ſoever he or they pretend to be

* To love and not enjoy, is the way to break ones heart.

" truſted apart, with or by the whole. Hence then it is deriv'd, which is
" made good in all experience, that the Ariſtocracy is ravenous, and
" not the People. Your Highwaymen are not ſuch as have Trades,
" or have been brought up to Induſtry; but ſuch commonly whoſe
" Education has pretended to that of Gentlemen. My Lord is ſo ho-
" neſt, he does not know the Maxims that are of abſolute neceſſity to
" the Arts of Wickedneſs; for it is moſt certain, if there be not more
" Purſes than Thieves, that the Thieves themſelves muſt be forc'd to
" turn honeſt, becauſe they cannot thrive by their Trade: But now
" if the People ſhould turn Thieves, who ſees not that there would
" be more Thieves than Purſes? Wherefore that a whole People
" ſhould turn Robbers or Levellers, is as impoſſible in the end as in
" the means. But that I do not think your Artiſt which you men-
" tion'd, whether Aſtronomer or Arithmetician, can tell me how
" many Barly-corns would reach to the Sun; I could be content he
" were call'd to the account, with which I ſhall conclude this Point:
" when by the way I have chid my Lords the Legiſlators, who, as
" if they doubted my tackling could not hold, would leave me to flag
" in a perpetual Calm, but for my Lord EPIMONUS, who breaths
" now and then into my Sails, and ſtirs the Waters. A Ship makes not
" her way ſo briskly, as when ſhe is handſomely bruſh'd by the Waves,
" and tumbles over thoſe that ſeem to tumble againſt her; in which
" caſe I have perceiv'd in the dark, that Light has been ſtruck even out
" of the Sea, as in this place, where my Lord EPIMONUS feigning
" to give us a demonſtration of one thing, has given it of another,
" and of a better. For the People of this Nation, if they amount
" in each Tribe to two thouſand Elders, and two thouſand Youths,
" upon the annual Roll, holding a fifth to the whole Tribe; then the
" whole of a Tribe, not accounting Women and Children, muſt a-
" mount to twenty thouſand; and ſo the whole of all the Tribes, be-
" ing fifty, to one Million. Now you have ten thouſand Pariſhes,
" and reckoning theſe one with another, each at one thouſand pounds
" a Year dry Rent, the Rent or Revenue of the Nation, as it is or
" might be let to Farm, amounts to ten Millions; and ten Millions
" in Revenue divided equally to one Million of Men, comes but to
" ten pounds a year to each wherewith to maintain himſelf, his Wife
" and Children. But he that has a Cow upon the common, and
" earns his Shilling by the day at his labour, has twice as much already
" as this would come to for his ſhare; becauſe if the Land were thus
" divided, there would be no body to ſet him on work. So my Lord
" EPIMONUS's Footman, who coſts him thrice as much as one of
" theſe could thus get, would certainly loſe by this bargain. What
" ſhould we ſpeak of thoſe innumerable Trades whereupon men live,
" not only better than others upon good ſhares of Lands, but become
" alſo purchaſers of greater Eſtates? Is not this the demonſtration
" which my Lord meant, that the Revenue of Induſtry in a Nation
" at leaſt in this, is three or fourfold greater than that of the mere
" Rent? If the People then obſtruct Induſtry, they obſtruct their
" own livelihood; but if they make a War, they obſtruct Induſtry.
" Take the Bread out of the Peoples mouths, as did the *Roman* Patri-
" cians, and you are ſure enough of a War, in which caſe they may
" be Levellers; but our Agrarian cauſes their Induſtry to flow with
" Milk and Honey. It will be own'd, that this is true, if the People

" were

" were given * to underſtand their own happineſs; But where is it " they do that? Let me reply with the like queſtion, Where do they " not? They do not know their happineſs it ſhould ſeem in *France*, " *Spain* and *Italy:* but teach them what it is, and try whoſe Senſe is " the truer. As to the late Wars in *Germany*, it has been affirm'd to " me there, that the Princes could never make the People to take " Arms while they had Bread, and have therefore ſuffer'd Countries " now and then to be waſted, that they might get Soldiers. This " you will find to be the certain pulſe and temper of the People; and " if they have been already prov'd to be the moſt wiſe and conſtant " Order of a Government, why ſhould we think (when no man can " produce one Example of the common Soldiery in an Army muti- " nying becauſe they had not Captains pay) that the Prerogative " ſhould jole the heads of the Senate together, becauſe theſe have the " better Salaries; when it muſt be as evident to the People in a Na- " tion, as to the Soldiery in an Army, that it is no more poſſible their " Emoluments of this kind ſhould be afforded by any Common- " wealth in the World to be made equal with thoſe of the Senate, " than that the common Soldiers ſhould be equal with the Captains? " It is enough for the common Soldier, that his Virtue may bring him " to be a Captain, and more to the Prerogative, that each of them is " nearer to be a Senator.

" IF my Lord thinks our Salaries too great, and that the Com- " mon-wealth is not Houſwife enough; whether is it better Houſ- " wifery that ſhe ſhould keep her Family from the Snow, or ſuffer " them to burn her Houſe that they may warm themſelves? for one " of theſe muſt be. Do you think that ſhe came off at a cheaper " rate, when men had their Rewards by a thouſand, two thouſand " pounds a Year in Land of Inheritance? If you ſay, that they will " be more godly than they have been, it may be ill taken; and if you " cannot promiſe that, it is time we find out ſome way of ſtinting at " leaſt, if not curing them of that ſame *ſacra Fames.* On the other " ſide, if a poor Man (as ſuch a one may ſave a City) gives his ſweat " to the Public, with what conſcience can you ſuffer his Family in " the mean time to ſtarve? But he that lays his hand to this Plow, " ſhall not loſe by taking it off from his own: and a Common-wealth " that will mend this, ſhall be penny wiſe. The *Sanhedrim* of *Iſrael* " being the Supreme, and a conſtant Court of Judicature, could not " chooſe but be exceeding gainful. The Senate of the Bean in *Athens*, " becauſe it was but annual, was moderately ſalariated; but that of " the *Areopagits* being for Life, bountifully: and what advantages " the Senators of *Lacedemon* had, where there was little Money or " uſe of it, were in Honours for life. The *Patricians* having no pro- " fit, took all. *Venice* being a Situation, where a man goes but to " the door for his Employment, the Honour is great, and the Reward " very little: but in *Holland* a Counſellor of State has fifteen hundred " *Flemiſh* Pounds a Year, beſides other Accommodations. The States " General have more. And that Common-wealth looks nearer her " Penny than ours needs to do.

* O fortunati nimium, bona ſi ſua norint,
Agricolæ!

" FOR

" FOR the Revenue of this Nation, beſides that of her Induſtry, " it amounts, as has been ſhewn, to ten Millions; and the Salaries in " the whole come not to three hundred thouſand Pounds a Year. The " Beauty they will add to the Common-wealth will be exceeding great, " and the People will delight in this Beauty of their Common-wealth; " the Encouragement they will give to the ſtudy of the Public being " very profitable, the Accommodation they will afford to your Ma- " giſtrates very honourable and eaſy. And the Sum, when it or twice " as much was ſpent in Hunting and Houſe-keeping, was never any " grievance to the People. I am aſham'd to ſtand huckling upon this " Point; it is ſordid. Your Magiſtrates are rather to be provided " with further Accommodations. For what if there ſhould be Sick- " neſs? whither will you have them to remove? And this City in the " founded Times, for the heat of the Year, is no wholſome abode: " have a care of their Healths to whom you commit your own. I " would have the Senate and the People, except they ſee cauſe to the " contrary, every firſt of *June* to remove into the Country Air for " the ſpace of three months. You are better fitted with Summer- " houſes for them, than if you had built them to that purpoſe. There " is ſome twelve miles diſtant the *Convallium* upon the River *Halcio-* " *nia*, for the Tribunes and the Prerogative, a Palace capable of a " thouſand Men: and twenty miles diſtant you have Mount *Celia*, " reverend as well for the Antiquity as State of a Caſtle completely " capable of the Senate: the Propoſers having Lodgings in the *Conval-* " *lium*, and the Tribunes in *Celia*, it holds the Correſpondency be- " tween the Senate and the People exactly. And it is a ſmall matter " for the Propoſers, being attended with the Coaches and Officers of " State, beſides other Conveniencies of their own, to go a matter of " five or ten miles (thoſe Seats are not much further diſtant) to meet " the People upon any Heath or Field that ſhall be appointed: " where, having diſpatch'd their buſineſs, they may hunt their own " Venizon (for I would have the great wall'd Park upon the *Halcionia* " to belong to the Signory, and thoſe about the *Convallium* to the " Tribunes) and ſo go to ſupper. Pray, my Lords, ſee that they " do not pull down theſe Houſes to ſell the Lead of them; for when " you have conſider'd on't, they cannot be ſpar'd. The Founders of " the School in *Hiera* provided that the Boys ſhould have a Summer " Seat. You ſhould have as much care of theſe Magiſtrates. But " there is ſuch a ſelling, ſuch a *Jewiſh* humour in our Republicans, that " I cannot tell what to ſay to it; only this, any man that knows what " belongs to a Common-wealth, or how diligent every Nation in that " caſe has been to preſerve her Ornaments, and ſhall ſee the waſte late- " ly made (the Woods adjoining to this City, which ſerv'd for the " delight and health of it, being cut down to be ſold for three pence) " will tell you, that they who did ſuch things would never have made " a Common-wealth. The like may be ſaid of the Ruin or Damage " done upon our Cathedrals, Ornaments in which this Nation excels " all others. Nor ſhall this ever be excus'd upon the ſcore of Reli- " gion; for tho' it be true, that God dwells not in Houſes made with " hands, yet you cannot hold your Aſſemblies but in ſuch Houſes, and " theſe are of the beſt that have been made with hands. Nor is it well " argu'd that they are pompous, and therefore profane, or leſs proper " for Divine Service; ſeeing the Chriſtians in the Primitive Church

" choſe

" choſe to meet with one accord in the Temple; ſo far were they from " any inclination to pull it down.

THE Orders of this Common-wealth, ſo far, or near ſo far as they concern the Elders, together with the ſeveral ſpeeches at the Inſtitution, which may ſerve for the better underſtanding of them as ſo many Commentaries, being ſhewn; I ſhould now come from the Elders to the Youth, or from the civil Conſtitution of this Government to the Military, but that I judge this the fitteſt place whereinto, by the way, to inſert the Government of the City, tho' for the preſent but perfunctorily.

The Government of Emporium.

THE Metropolis or Capital City of *Oceana* is commonly call'd *Emporium*, tho' it conſiſts of two Cities diſtinct, as well in Name as in Government, whereof the other is call'd *Hiera:* For which cauſe I ſhall treat of each apart, beginning with *Emporium.*

The City-Tribes and Wards.

EMPORIUM with the Liberties is under a twofold Diviſion, the one regarding the National, and the other the Urban or City Government. It is divided, in regard of the National Government, into three Tribes, and in reſpect of the Urban into twenty ſix, which for diſtinction ſake are call'd *Wards*, being contain'd under the three Tribes but inequally: Wherefore the firſt Tribe containing ten Wards is call'd *Scazon*, the ſecond containing eight *Metoche*, and the third containing as many, *Telicouta*; the bearing of which names in mind concerns the better underſtanding of the Government.

Wardmote.

EVERY Ward has her Wardmote, Court, or Inqueſt, conſiſting of all that are of the Cloathing or Liveries of Companies reſiding within the ſame.

The Liveries.

SUCH are of the Livery or Cloathing as have attain'd to the dignity to wear Gowns and parti-colour'd Hoods or Tippets, according to the Rules and antient Cuſtoms of their reſpective Companies.

The Companies.

A COMPANY is a Brotherhood of Tradeſmen profeſſing the ſame Art, govern'd according to their Charter by a Maſter and Wardens. Of theſe there be about ſixty, whereof twelve are of greater dignity than the reſt, that is to ſay, the Mercers, Grocers, Drapers, Fiſhmongers, Goldſmiths, Skinners, Merchant-Taylors, Haberdaſhers, Salters, Ironmongers, Vintners, Cloath-workers; which, with moſt of the reſt, have common Halls, divers of them being of antient and magnificent Structure, wherein they have frequent meetings at the Summons of their Maſters or Wardens, for the managing and regulation of their reſpective Trades and Myſteries. Theſe Companies, as I ſhall ſhew, are the Roots of the whole Government of the City. For the Liveries that reſide in the ſame Ward, meeting at the Wardmote Inqueſt (to which it belongs to take cognizance of all ſorts of Nuſances, and violations of the Cuſtoms and Orders of the City, and to preſent them to the Court of Aldermen) have alſo power to make election of two ſorts of Magiſtrates or Officers; the firſt of Elders or Aldermen of the Ward, the ſecond of Deputies of the ſame, otherwiſe call'd *Common Council men.*

Common-Halls.

Election of Aldermen, and of the Common-Council men.

THE Wards in theſe elections, becauſe they no not elect all at once, but ſome one year, and ſome another, obſerve the diſtinction of the three Tribes; for example, the *Scazon* conſiſting of ten Wards, makes election the firſt Year of ten Aldermen, one in each Ward, and of one hundred and fifty Deputies, fifteen in each Ward: all which are Triennial Magiſtrates or Officers, that is to ſay, are to bear their dignity for the ſpace of three years.

THE ſecond Year, the *Metoche*, conſiſting of eight Wards, elects eight Aldermen, one in each Ward, and a hundred and twenty Deputies, fifteen in each Ward; being alſo Triennial Magiſtrates.

THE third Year *Telicouta*, conſiſting of a like number of Wards, elects an equal number of like Magiſtrates for a like term. So that the whole number of the Aldermen, according to that of the Wards, amounts to twenty ſix; and the whole number of the Deputies, to three hundred and ninety.

The Court of Aldermen.

THE Aldermen thus elected have divers Capacities: for, firſt, they are Juſtices of the Peace for the term, and in conſequence of their Election. Secondly, They are Preſidents of the Wardmote, and Governors each of that Ward whereby he was elected. And laſt of all, theſe Magiſtrates being aſſembled together, conſtitute the Senate of the City, otherwiſe call'd the *Court of Aldermen:* but no man is capable of this Election that is not worth ten thouſand Pounds. This Court upon every new Election, makes choice of nine Cenſors out of their own number.

The Common Council.

THE Deputies in like manner being aſſembled together, conſtitute the Prerogative Tribe of the City, otherwiſe call'd the *Common Council:* by which means the Senate and the People of the City were comprehended, as it were, by the motion of the National Government, into the ſame Wheel of annual, triennial, and perpetual Revolution.

The Common Hall.

BUT the Liveries, over and above the right of theſe Elections by their Diviſions mention'd, being aſſembed all together at the *Guild* of the City, conſtitute another Aſſembly call'd the *Common-Hall.*

The Election of the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs.

THE Common-Hall has the right of two other Elections; the one of the Lord Mayor, and the other of the two Sheriffs, being annual Magiſtrates. The Lord Mayor can be elected out of no other than one of the Twelve Companies of the firſt Ranks; and the Common-Hall agrees by the plurality of Suffrages upon two Names: which being preſented to the Lord Mayor for the time being, and the Court of Aldermen, they elect one by their Scrutiny; for ſo they call it, tho' it differs from that of the Common-wealth. The Orator or Aſſiſtant to the Lord Mayor in holding of his Courts, is ſome able Lawyer elected by the Court of Aldermen, and call'd the Recorder of *Emporium.*

THE Lord Mayor being thus elected, has two Capacities; one regarding the Nation, and the other the City. In that which regards the City, he is Preſident of the Court of Aldermen, having Power to aſſemble the ſame, or any other Council of the City, as the Common Council or Common-Hall, at his will and pleaſure: and in that which regards the Nation, he is Commander in chief of the three Tribes whereinto the City is divided; one of which he is to bring up in Perſon at the National muſter to the Ballot, as his *Vicecomites*, or High Sheriffs, are to do by the other two, each at their diſtinſt Pavilion, where the nine Aldermen, elected Cenſors, are to officiate by three in each Tribe, according to the Rules and Orders already given to the Cenſors of the ruſtic Tribes. And the Tribes of the City have no other than one common Phylarch, which is the Court of Aldermen and the Common Council; for which cauſe they elect not at their Muſter the firſt Liſt call'd the *Prime Magnitude.*

Some Conveniences in this Alteration.

THE Conveniences of this Alteration of the City Government, beſides the bent of it to a conformity with that of the Nation, were many, whereof I ſhall mention but a few: As firſt, whereas men under the former adminiſtration,

niſtration, when the burden of ſome of theſe Magiſtracies lay for life, were oftentimes choſen not for their fitneſs, but rather unfitneſs, or at leaſt unwillingneſs to undergo ſuch a weight, whereby they were put at great Rates to fine for their eaſe; a man might now take his ſhare in Magiſtracy with that equity which is due to the Public, and without any inconvenience to his private Affairs. Secondly, Whereas the City (inaſmuch as the Acts of the Ariſtocracy, or Court of Aldermen, in their former way of proceeding, were rather Impoſitions than Propoſitions) was frequently diſquieted with the inevitable conſequence of diſorder in the power of Debate exercis'd by the popular Part, or Common Council; the right of Debate being henceforth eſtabliſh'd in the Court of Aldermen, and that of Reſult in the Common Council, kill'd the branches of Diviſion in the Root. Which for the preſent may ſuffice to have been ſaid of the City of *Emporium*.

The Government of Hiera.

THAT of HIERA conſiſts as to the National Government of two Tribes, the firſt call'd *Agoræa*, the ſecond *Propola*: But as to the peculiar Policy, of twelve *Manipuls*, or Wards divided into three Cohorts, each Cohort containing four Wards; whereof the Wards of the firſt Cohort elect for the firſt Year four Burgeſſes, one in each Ward; the Wards of the ſecond Cohort for the ſecond year four Burgeſſes, one in each Ward; and the Wards of the third Cohort for the third Year four Burgeſſes, one in each Ward; all triennial Magiſtrates: by which the twelve Burgeſſes, making one Court for the Government of this City, according to their Inſtructions by Act of Parliament, fall likewiſe into an Annual, Triennial, and perpetual Revolution.

The Court.

The High Steward.

THIS Court being thus conſtituted, makes election of divers Magiſtrates; As firſt of a High Steward, who is commonly ſome Perſon of Quality, and this Magiſtracy is elected in the Senate by the Scrutiny of this Court; with him they chooſe ſome able Lawyer to be his Deputy, and to hold the Court; and laſt of all they elect out of their own Number ſix Cenſors.

THE High Steward is Commander in Chief of the two Tribes, whereof he in Perſon brings up the one at the National Muſter to the Ballot, and his Deputy the other at a diſtinct Pavilion; the ſix Cenſors choſen by the Court, officiating by three in each Tribe at the Urns: and theſe Tribes have no other Phylarch but this Court.

AS for the manner of Elections and Suffrage, both in *Emporium* and *Hiera*, it may be ſaid once for all, that they are perform'd by the Ballot, and according to the reſpective Rules already given.

THERE be other Cities and Corporations throughout the Territory, whoſe Policy being much of this kind, would be tedious and not worth the labour to inſert, nor dare I ſtay. *Juvenum manus emicat ardens.*

I RETURN, according to the method of the Common-wealth, to the remaining part of her Orbs, which are Military and Provincial; the Military, except the Strategus, and the Polemarchs or Field Officers, conſiſting of the Youth only, and the Provincial conſiſting of a mixture both of the Elders and of the Youth.

TO begin with the Youth, or the military Orbs, they are Circles to which the Common-wealth muſt have a care to keep cloſe. A Man is a Spirit rais'd by the Magic of Nature; if ſhe does not ſtand ſafe, and ſo that ſhe may ſet him to ſome good and uſeful work, he ſpits fire, and blows up Caſtles: for where there is life, there muſt be motion or work; and the work of idleneſs is miſchief, but the work of induſtry is health. To ſet Men to this, the Common-wealth muſt begin betimes with them, or it will be too late: and the means whereby ſhe ſets them

to it, is EDUCATION, the plaſtic art of Government. But it is as frequent as ſad in experience (whether thro' negligence, or, which in the conſequence is all one or worſe, over-fondneſs in the domeſtic performance of this Duty) that innumerable Children come to owe their utter Perdition to their own Parents; in each of which the Common-wealth loſes a Citizen. Wherefore the Laws of a Government, how wholeſome ſoever in themſelves, are ſuch as, if Men by a congruity in their Education be not bred to find a reliſh in them, they will be ſure to loath and deteſt. The Education therefore of a Man's own Children is not wholly to be committed or truſted to himſelf. You find in * LIVY the Children of BRUTUS having been bred under Monarchy, and us'd to a Court life, making faces at the Common-wealth of *Rome*: *A King* (ſay they) *is a Man with whom you may prevail when you have need there ſhould be Law, or when you have need there ſhould be no Law; he has Favours in the right, and he frowns not in the wrong place; he knows his Friends from his Enemies. But Laws are deaf inexorable things, ſuch as make no difference between a Gentleman and an ordinary fellow; a Man can never be merry for them, for to truſt altogether to his own innocence is a ſad life.* Unhappy wantons! SCIPIO on the other ſide, when he was but a Boy (about two or three and twenty) being inform'd that certain *Patricians* or *Roman* Gentlemen, thro' a qualm upon the defeat which HANNIBAL had given them at *Cannæ*, were laying their heads together and contriving their Flight with the tranſportation of their Goods out of *Rome*, drew his Sword, and ſetting himſelf at the door of the Chamber where they were at Council, proteſted, *That who did not immediately ſwear not to deſert the Common-wealth, he would make his Soul to deſert his Body.* Let Men argue as they pleaſe for Monarchy, or againſt a Common-wealth, the World ſhall never ſee any Man ſo ſottiſh or wicked as in cool blood to prefer the Education of the Sons of BRUTUS before that of SCIPIO; and of this mould, except a MELIUS or a MANLIUS, was the whole youth of that Common-wealth, tho' not ordinarily ſo well caſt. Now the health of a Government, and the education of the Youth being of the ſame pulſe, no wonder if it has been the conſtant practice of well order'dCommon-wealths to commit the care and feeling of it to public Magiſtrates. A duty that was perform'd in ſuch a manner by the Areopagites, as is elegantly prais'd by ISOCRATES. *The Athenians*, ſays he, *write not their Laws upon dead Walls, nor content themſelves with having ordain'd Puniſhments for Crimes, but provide in ſuch a way by the Education of their Youth, that there be no Crimes for Puniſhment.* He ſpeaks of thoſe Laws which regarded Manners, not of thoſe Orders which concern'd the Adminiſtration of the Common-wealth, leſt you ſhould think he contradicts XENOPHON and POLYBIUS. The Children of *Lacedemon*, at the ſeventh year of their age were deliver'd to the *Pædonomi*, or School-maſters, not mercenary, but Magiſtrates of the Common-wealth, to which they were accountable for their charge: and by theſe at the age of fourteen they were preſented to other Magiſtrates call'd the *Beidiæi*, having the in-

* Aſſueti more regio vivere——inter ſe conquerebantur——Regem hominem eſſe à quo impetres ubi jus, ubi injuria opus ſit; eſſe gratiæ locum, eſſe beneficio; & iraſci & ignoſcere poſſe; inter amicum & inimicum diſcrimen noſſe. Leges rem ſurdam, inexorabilem eſſe; ſalubriorem, melioremque inopi quam potenti; nihil laxamenti nec veniæ habere, ſi modum exceſſeris; periculoſum eſſe in tot humanis erroribus ſola innocentia vivere. *Liv. l. 2.*

ſpection

ſpection of the Games and Exerciſes, among which that of the *Plataniſta* was famous, a kind of Fight in Squadrons, but ſomewhat too fierce. When they came to be of military age, they were liſted of the *Mora*, and ſo continu'd in readineſs for public Service under the Diſcipline of the *Polemarchs*. But the *Roman* Education and Diſcipline by the Centuries and Claſſes is that to which the Common-wealth of *Oceana* has had a more particular regard in her three Eſſays, being certain degrees by which the Youth commence as it were in Arms for Magiſtracy, as appears by

THE twenty ſixth ORDER, inſtituting, That if a Parent has but one Son, the Education of that one Son ſhall be wholly at the diſpoſition of that Parent. But whereas there be Free Schools erected and indow'd, or to be erected and indow'd in every Tribe of this Nation, to a ſufficient proportion for the Education of the Children of the ſame (which Schools, to the end there be no detriment or hindrance to the Scholars upon caſe of removing from one to another, are every of them to be govern'd by the ſtrict inſpection of the Cenſors of the Tribes, both upon the School-Maſters manner of Life and Teaching, and the proficiency of the Children, after the rules and method of that in *Hiera*) if a Parent has more Sons than one, the Cenſors of the Tribes ſhall animadvert upon and puniſh him that ſends not his Sons within the ninth year of their age to ſome one of the Schools of a Tribe, there to be kept and taught if he be able at his own charges; and if he be not able, *gratis*, till they arrive at the age of fifteen years. And a Parent may diſpoſe of his Sons at the fifteenth year of their age according to his choice or ability, whether it be to Service in the way of Apprentices to ſome Trade or otherwiſe, or to further ſtudy, as by ſending them to the Inns of Court, of Chancery, or to one of the Univerſities of this Nation. But he that takes not upon him one of the Profeſſions proper to ſome of thoſe places, ſhall not continue longer in any of them than till he has attain'd to the age of eighteen years; and every Man having not at the age of eighteen years taken upon him, or addicted himſelf to the profeſſion of the Law, Theology, or Phyſic, and being no Servant, ſhall be capable of the Eſſays of the youth, and no other perſon whatſoever: except a Man, having taken upon him ſuch a profeſſion, happens to lay it by, ere he arrives at three or four and twenty years of age, and be admitted to this Capacity by the reſpective *Phylarch*, being ſatisfy'd that he kept not out ſo long with any deſign to evade the Service of the Common-wealth; but, that being no ſooner at his own diſpoſal, it was no ſooner in his choice to come in. And if any Youth or other Perſon of this Nation have a deſire to travel into foreign Countries upon occaſion of buſineſs, delight, or further improvement of his Education; the ſame ſhall be lawful for him upon a Paſs obtain'd from the Cenſors in Parliament, putting a convenient limit to the time, and recommending him to the Embaſſadors by whom he ſhall be aſſiſted, and to whom he ſhall yield Honour and Obedience in their reſpective Reſidences. Every Youth at his return from his Travel is to preſent the Cenſors with a Paper of his own writing, containing the Intereſt of State or Form of Government of the Countries, or ſome one of the Countries where he has been; and if it be good, the Cenſors ſhall cauſe it to be printed and publiſh'd, prefixing a Line in commendation of the Author. 26. Order.

EVERY Wedneſday next enſuing the laſt of *December*, the whole Youth of every Pariſh, that is to ſay every Man (not excepted by the

foregoing part of the Order) being from eighteen years of age to thirty, ſhall repair at the ſound of the Bell to their reſpective Church, and being there aſſembl'd in preſence of the Overſeers, who are to govern the Ballot, and the Conſtable who is to officiate at the Urn, ſhall, after the manner of the Elders, elect every fifth Man of their whole number (provided that they chooſe not above one of two Brothers at one Election, nor above half if they be four or upward) to be a *Stratiot* or Deputy of the Youth; and the Liſt of the *Stratiots* ſo elected being taken by the Overſeers, ſhall be enter'd in the Pariſh Book, and diligently preſerv'd as a Record, call'd the firſt Eſſay. They whoſe Eſtates by the Law are able, or whoſe Friends are willing to mount them, ſhall be of the Horſe, the reſt are of the Foot. And he who has been one year of this Liſt, is not capable of being re-elected till after another year's interval.

EVERY Wedneſday next enſuing the laſt of *January*, the *Stratiots* being muſter'd at the Rendevouz of their reſpective Hundred, ſhall in the preſence of the Jurymen, who are Overſeers of that Ballot, and of the high Conſtable who is to officiate at the Urn, elect out of the Horſe of their Troop or Company one Captain, and one Enſign or Cornet, to the command of the ſame. And the Jurymen having enter'd the Liſt of the Hundred into a Record to be diligently kept at the Rendevouz of the ſame; the firſt public game of this Common-wealth ſhall begin and be perform'd in this manner. Whereas there is to be at every Rendevouz of a Hundred one Cannon, Culverin, or Saker; the prize Arms being forg'd by ſworn Armorers of this Common-wealth, and for their proof, beſides their Beauty, view'd and try'd at the Tower of *Emporium*, ſhall be expos'd by the Juſtice of Peace appertaining to that Hundred (the ſaid Juſtice with the Jurymen being Judges of the Game) and the Judges ſhall deliver to the Horſe-man that gains the Prize at the Career, one ſute of Arms being of the value of twenty Pounds; to the Pike-man that gains the Prize at throwing the Bullet, one ſute of Arms of the value of ten Pounds; to the Musketeer that gains the Prize at the mark with his Musket, one ſute of Arms of the value of ten Pounds; and to the Cannoneer that gains the Prize at the mark with the Cannon, Culverine, or Saker, a Chain of Silver being the value of ten Pounds; provided, that no one man at the ſame Muſter plays above one of the Prizes. Whoſoever gains a Prize is bound to wear it (if it be his lot) upon Service; and no man ſhall ſell or give away any Armour thus won, except he has lawfully attain'd to two or more of them at the Games.

THE Games being ended, and the Muſter diſmiſt, the Captain of the Troop or Company ſhall repair with a Copy of the Liſt to the Lord Lieutenant of the Tribe, and the high Conſtable with a Duplicate of the ſame to the *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, or Muſter-maſter General, to be alſo communicated to the Cenſors; in each of which the Jurymen giving a note upon every name of an only Son, ſhall certify that the Liſt is without ſubterfuge or evaſion: or, if it be not, an account of thoſe upon whom the Evaſion or Subterfuge lies, to the end that the *Phylarch* or the Cenſors may animadvert accordingly.

AND every Wedneſday next enſuing the laſt of *February*, the Lord Lieutenant, *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, the Cenſors, and the Conductor, ſhall receive the whole Muſter of the Youth of that Tribe at the Rendevouz of the ſame, diſtributing the Horſe and Foot with their Officers, according to the Directions given in the like caſe for the diſtribution of the Elders; and the whole Squadron being put by that means in Battalia, the ſecond Game of this Common-wealth ſhall begin by the exerciſe of the Youth in all the parts

parts of their military Diſcipline according to the Orders of Parliament, or direction of the Council of War in that caſe. And the hundred Pounds allow'd by the Parliament for the Ornament of the Muſter in every Tribe, ſhall be expended by the Phylarch upon ſuch artificial Caſtles, Citadels, or the like Devices, as may make the beſt and moſt profitable ſport for the Youth and their Spectators. Which being ended, the Cenſors having prepar'd the Urns by putting into the Horſe Urn 220 Gold Balls, whereof ten are to be mark'd with the letter *M*, and the other ten with the letter *P*; into the Foot Urn 700 Gold Balls, whereof 50 are to be mark'd with the letter *M*, and 50 with the letter *P*: and after they have made the Gold Balls in each Urn, by the addition of Silver Balls to the ſame, in number equal with the Horſe and Foot of the *Stratiots*, the Lord Lieutenant ſhall call the *Stratiots* to the Urns, where they that draw the Silver Balls ſhall return to their places, and they that draw the Gold Balls ſhall fall off to the Pavilion, where, for the ſpace of one hour, they may chop and change their Balls according as one can agree with another, whoſe Lot he likes better. But the hour being out, the Conductor ſeparating them whoſe Gold Balls have no letter, from thoſe whoſe Balls are mark'd, ſhall cauſe the Cryer to call the Alphabet, as firſt *A*; whereupon all they whoſe Gold Balls are not mark'd, and whoſe ſirnames begin with the letter *A*, ſhall repair to a Clerk appertaining to the *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, who ſhall firſt take the names of that letter; then thoſe of *B*, and ſo on, till all the names be alphabetically inrol'd. And the Youth of this Liſt being ſix hundred Foot in a Tribe, that is, 30000 Foot in all the Tribes; and two hundred Horſe in a Tribe, that is, 10000 Horſe in all the Tribes, are the ſecond Eſſay of the *Stratiots*, and the ſtanding Army of this Common-wealth to be always ready upon command to march. They whoſe Balls are mark'd with *M*, amounting, by 20 Horſe and 50 Foot in a Tribe, to 2500 Foot, and 500 Horſe in all the Tribes; and they whoſe Balls are mark'd with *P*, in every point correſpondent, are parts of the third Eſſay: they of *M* being ſtraight to march for *Marpeſſa*, and they of *P* for *Panopea*, to the ends, and according to the further directions following in the Order for the provincial Orbs.

IF the Polemarchs or Field Officers be elected by the ſcrutiny of the Council of War, and the Strategus commanded by the Parliament or the Dictator to march, the Lords Lieutenants (who have power to muſter and diſcipline the Youth ſo often as they receive Orders for the ſame from the Council of War) are to deliver the ſecond Eſſay, or ſo many of them as ſhall be commanded, to the Conductors, who ſhall preſent them to the Lord Strategus at the time and place appointed by his Excellency to be the general Rendevouz of *Oceana*, where the Council of War ſhall have the accommodation of Horſes and Arms for his men in readineſs: and the Lord Strategus having arm'd, mounted, and diſtributed them, whether according to the recommendation of their Prize Arms, or otherwiſe, ſhall lead them away to his Shipping, being alſo ready and provided with Victuals, Ammunition, Artillery, and all other neceſſaries; commanding them, and diſpoſing of the whole Conduct of the War by his ſole Power and Authority. And this is the third Eſſay of the *Stratiots*, which being ſhip'd, or march'd out of their Tribes, the Lord Lieutenants ſhall re-elect the ſecond Eſſay out of the remaining part of the firſt; and the Senate another Strategus.

IF any Veteran or Veterans of this Nation, the term of whoſe Youth or Militia is expir'd, having a deſire to be entertain'd in the further ſervice of the Common-wealth, ſhall preſent him or themſelves at the Rendevouz of *Oceana* to the Strategus, it is in his power to take

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on ſuch and ſo many of them as ſhall be agreed by the Polemarchs, and to ſend back an equal number of the Stratiots.

AND for the better managing of the proper Forces of this Nation, the Lord Strategus, by appointment of the Council of War, and out of ſuch Levies as they ſhall have made in either or both of the Provinces to that end, ſhall receive Auxiliaries by Sea or elſewhere at ſome certain place, not exceeding his proper Arms in number.

AND whoſoever ſhall refuſe any one of his three Eſſays, except upon cauſe ſhewn he be diſpens'd withal by the Phylarch; or, if the Phylarch be not aſſembled, by the Cenſors of his Tribe, ſhall be deem'd a *Helot* or public Servant, ſhall pay a fifth part of his yearly Revenue, beſides all other Taxes, to the Common-wealth for his Protection, and be incapable of bearing any Magiſtracy except ſuch as is proper to the Law. Nevertheleſs if a man has but two Sons, the Lord Lieutenant ſhall not ſuffer above one of them to come to the Urn at one Election of the ſecond Eſſay: and tho' he has above two Sons, there ſhall not come above half the Brothers at one Election: and if a man has but one Son, he ſhall not come to the Urn at all without the conſent of his Parents, or his Guardians; nor ſhall it be any reproach to him, or impediment to his bearing of Magiſtracy.

THIS Order, with relation to foreign Expeditions, will be prov'd and explain'd together with.

27. Order. *THE twenty ſeventh* ORDER, providing, in caſe of Invaſion apprehended, that the Lords High Sheriffs of the Tribes upon Commands receiv'd from the Parliament, or the Dictator, diſtribute the Bands of the Elders into diviſions after the nature of the Eſſays of the Youth; and that the ſecond Diviſion or Eſſay of the Elders, being made and conſiſting of 30000 Foot, and 10000 Horſe, be ready to march with the ſecond Eſſay of the Youth, and be brought alſo by the Conductors to the Strategus.

THE ſecond Eſſay of the Elders and Youth being march'd out of their Tribes, the Lords High Sheriffs and Lieutenants ſhall have the remaining part of the annual Bands both of Elders and Youth in readineſs, which, if the Beacons be fir'd, ſhall march to the Rendevouz to be in that caſe appointed by the Parliament, or the Dictator. And the Beacons being fir'd, the *Curiata Comitia*, or Parochial Congregations, ſhall elect a fourth both of Elders and Youth to be immediately upon the Guard of the Tribes, and dividing themſelves as aforeſaid, to march alſo in their Diviſions according to Orders: which method in caſe of extremity ſhall proceed to the election of a third, or the levy of a ſecond, or of the laſt man in the Nation, by the Power of the Lords High Sheriffs; to the end that the Common-wealth in her utmoſt preſſure may ſhew her truſt that God in his Juſtice will remember Mercy, by humbling her ſelf, and yet preſerving her Courage, Diſcipline and Conſtancy, even to the laſt drop of her blood, and the utmoſt farthing.

THE Services perform'd by the Youth, or by the Elders, in caſe of Invaſion, and according to this Order, ſhall be at their proper coſt and charges that are any ways able to endure it; but if there be ſuch as are known in their Pariſhes to be ſo indigent that they cannot march out of their Tribes, nor undergo the burden in this caſe incumbent, then the Congregations of their Pariſhes ſhall furniſh them with ſufficient ſums of Money to be repaid upon the Certificate of the ſame by the Parliament when the Action ſhall be over. And of that which is reſpectively enjoin'd by this Order, any Tribe, Pariſh, Magiſtrate, or Perſon that ſhall fail, is to anſwer for it at the Council of War, as a Deſerter of his Country.

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THE ARCHON, being the greateſt Captain of his own, if not of any age, added much to the Glory of this Common-wealth, by interwaving the Militia with more Art and Luſter than any Legiſlator from or before the time of SERVIUS TULLIUS, who conſtituted the *Roman* Militia. But as the Bones or Skeleton of a man, tho' the greateſt part of his Beauty be contain'd in their Proportion or Symmetry, yet ſhewn without Fleſh, are a ſpectacle that is rather horrid than entertaining; ſo without Diſcourſes are the Orders of a Common-wealth: which, if ſhe goes forth in that manner, may complain of her Friends that they ſtand mute, and ſtaring upon her. Wherefore this Order was thus fleſh'd by the Lord ARCHON.

My Lords;

" DIOGENES ſeeing a young Fellow drunk, told him that his " Father was drunk when he begot him. For this in natural " Generation I muſt confeſs I ſee no reaſon; but in the Political it is " right. The Vices of the People are from their Governors; thoſe of " their Governors from their Laws or Orders; and thoſe of their Laws " or Orders from their Legiſlators. * Whatever was in the Womb " imperfect, as to her proper work, comes very rarely, or never at all " to perfection afterwards: and the formation of a Citizen in the " Womb of the Common-wealth is his Education.

" EDUCATION by the firſt of the foregoing Orders is of ſix " kinds; At the School, in the Mechanicks, at the Univerſities, at the " Inns of Court or Chancery, in Travels, and in military Diſci- " pline: ſome of which I ſhall but touch, and ſome I ſhall handle " more at large.

" THAT which is propos'd for the erecting and endowing of *Schools.* " Schools throughout the Tribes, capable of all the Children of the " ſame, and able to give to the Poor the Education of theirs *gratis*, is " only matter of direction in caſe of very great Charity, as eaſing the " needy of the charge of their Children from the ninth to the fifteenth " year of their age, during which time their work cannot be profitable; " and reſtoring them when they may be of uſe, furniſh'd with tools " whereof there are advantages to be made in every work, ſeeing he " that can read and uſe his Pen has ſome convenience by it in the mean- " eſt Vocation. And it cannot be conceiv'd, but that which comes, " tho' in ſmall parcels, to the advantage of every man in his Vocati- " on, muſt amount to the advantage of every Vocation, and ſo to that " of the whole Common-wealth. Wherefore this is commended to " the Charity of every wiſe-hearted and wel-minded man, to be done " in time, and as God ſhall ſtir him up or enable him; there being " ſuch proviſion already in the caſe, as may give us leave to proceed " without obſtruction.

" PARENTS, under animadverſion of the Cenſors, are to diſ- *Mechanicks in general.* " poſe of their Children at the fifteenth year of their age to ſomething; " but what, is left, according to their abilities or inclination, at their " own choice. This, with the multitude, muſt be to the Mechanicks, " that is to ſay, to Agriculture or Husbandry; to Manufactures, or " to Merchandize.

* Ut male poſuimus initia, ſic cætera ſequuntur. *Cic.*

Husbandry. " AGRICULTURE is the Bread of the Nation; we are hung " upon it by the teeth; it is a mighty Nurſery of Strength, the beſt " Army, and the moſt aſſur'd Knapſack; it is manag'd with the leaſt " turbulent or ambitious, and the moſt innocent hands of all other " Arts. Wherefore I am of ARISTOTLE's opinion, that a Com- " mon-wealth of Husbandmen, and ſuch is ours, muſt be the beſt of " all others. Certainly, my Lords, you have no meaſure of what " ought to be, but what can be done for the encouragement of this " Profeſſion. I could wiſh I were Husband good enough to direct " ſomething to this end; but racking of Rents is a vile thing in the " richer ſort, an uncharitable one to the poorer, a perfect mark of " Slavery, and nips your Common-wealth in the faireſt Bloſſom. On " the other ſide, if there ſhould be too much eaſe given in this kind, " it would occaſion Sloth, and ſo deſtroy Induſtry, the principal " nerve of a Common-wealth. But if ought might be done to hold " the Balance even between theſe two, it would be a work in this Na- " tion equal to that for which FABIUS was ſirnam'd MAXIMUS by " the *Romans*.

Manufactures and Merchandize. " IN Manufactures and Merchandize the *Hollander* has gotten the " ſtart of us; but at the long run it would be found, that a People work- " ing upon a foreign Commodity does but farm the Manufacture, and " that it is really intail'd upon them only, where the growth of it is " native: as alſo that it is one thing to have the carriage of other men's " Goods, and another for a man to bring his own to the beſt market. " Wherefore (Nature having provided encouragement for theſe Arts in " this Nation above all others, where, the People growing, they of " neceſſity muſt alſo increaſe) it cannot but eſtabliſh them upon a far " more ſure and effectual Foundation than that of the *Hollanders*. But " theſe Educations are in order to the firſt things, or neceſſities of Na- " ture; as Husbandry to the Food, Manufacture to the Cloathing, and " Merchandize to the Purſe of the Commonwealth.

" THERE be other things in Nature, which being ſecond as to " their Order, for their dignity and Value are firſt, and ſuch to which " the other are but Accommodations; of this ſort are eſpecially theſe, " Religion, Juſtice, Courage, and Wiſdom.

Univerſities. " THE Education that anſwers to Religion in our Government is " that of the Univerſities. MOSES the Divine Legiſlator was not " only skilful in all the Learning of the *Egyptians*, but took alſo into " the Fabric of his Common-wealth the Learning of the *Midianites* in " the advice of JETHRO: and his Foundation of a Univerſity laid " in the Tabernacle, and finiſh'd in the Temple, became that Pinacle " from whence (according to many *Jewiſh* and *Chriſtian* Authors) " all the Learning in the world has taken wing; as the Philoſophy of " the *Stoicks* from the *Phariſees*; that of the *Epicureans* from the *Sad-* " *ducees*; and from the Learning of the *Jews* ſo often quoted by our " SAVIOUR, and fulfil'd in Him, the *Chriſtian* Religion. *Athens* " was the moſt famous Univerſity in her days; and her Senators, that " is to ſay, the *Areopagits*, were all Philoſophers. *Lacedemon*, to " ſpeak truth, tho' ſhe could write and read, was not very bookiſh. " But he that diſputes hence againſt Univerſities, diſputes by the ſame " Argument againſt Agriculture, Manufacture, and Merchandize; " every one of theſe having been equally forbid by LYCURGUS, not " for it ſelf (for if he had not been learn'd in all the Learning of *Crete*,

Acts 17. 18.

" and

" and well travel'd in the knowledge of other Governments, he had
" never made his Common-wealth) but for the diverſion which they
" muſt have given his Citizens from their Arms, who, being but few,
" if they had minded any thing elſe, muſt have deſerted the Com-
" mon-wealth. For *Rome*, ſhe had *ingenium par imperio*, was as learn-
" ed as great, and held her College of *Augurs* in much reverence. *Ve-*
" *nice* has taken her Religion upon truſt. *Holland* cannot attend it to
" be very ſtudious. Nor does *Switzerland* mind it much; yet are they
" all addicted to their Univerſities. We cut down Trees to build
" Houſes; but I would have ſome body ſhew me, by what reaſon or
" experience the cutting down of a Univerſity ſhould tend to the ſet-
" ting up of a Common-wealth. Of this I am ſure, that the perfec-
" tion of a Common-wealth is not to be attain'd without the know-
" ledge of antient Prudence; nor the knowledge of antient Prudence
" without Learning; nor Learning without Schools of good Litera-
" ture: and theſe are ſuch as we call Univerſities. Now tho' mere
" Univerſity learning of it ſelf be that which (to ſpeak the words of
" VERULAMIUS) *crafty men contemn, and ſimple men only admire, yet*
" *is it ſuch as wiſe men have uſe of; for Studies do not teach their own*
" *uſe, but that is a Wiſdom without and above them, won by obſerva-*
" *tion. Expert men may execute, and perhaps judge of Particulars one*
" *by one; but the general Councils and the Plots, and the marſhalling of*
" *Affairs, come beſt from thoſe that are learned.* Wherefore if you
" would have your Children to be Stateſmen, let them drink by all
" means of theſe Fountains, where perhaps there never were any.
" But what tho' the Water a Man drinks be not nouriſhment; it is
" the Vehicle without which he cannot be nouriſh'd. Nor is Religion
" leſs concern'd in this point than Government; for take away your
" Univerſities, and in a few years you loſe it.

" THE Holy Scriptures are written in *Hebrew* and *Greek:* they
" that have neither of theſe Languages may think light of both; but
" find me a man that has one in perfection, the ſtudy of whoſe whole
" Life it has not been. Again, this is apparent to us in daily Conver-
" ſation, that if four or five Perſons that have liv'd together be talk-
" ing, another ſpeaking the ſame Language may come in, and yet un-
" derſtand very little of their Diſcourſe, in that it relates to Circum-
" ſtances, Perſons, Things, Times and Places, which he knows not.
" It is no otherwiſe with a man, having no inſight of the times in
" which they were written, and the Circumſtances to which they re-
" late, in the reading of antient Books, whether they be divine or hu-
" man. For example, when we fall upon the Diſcourſe about Bap-
" tiſm and Regeneration that was between our SAVIOUR and NICO-
" DEMUS, where CHRIST reproaches him with his ignorance in this
" matter: *Art thou a Doctor in* Iſrael, *and underſtandeſt not theſe*
" *things?* What ſhall we think of it? or wherefore ſhould a Doctor in
" *Iſrael* have underſtood theſe things more than another, but that both
" Baptiſm and Regeneration, as was ſhew'd at large by my Lord
" PHOSPHORUS, were Doctrines held in *Iſrael?* I inſtance in one place
" of a hundred, which he, that has not maſter'd the Circumſtances to
" which they relate, cannot underſtand. Wherefore to the underſtand-
" ing of the Scripture, it is neceſſary to have antient Languages, and
" the knowledge of antient times, or the aid of them who have ſuch
" knowledge: and to have ſuch as may be always able and ready to

" give

" give ſuch aid (unleſs you would borrow it of another Nation;
" which would not only be baſe, but deceitful) it is neceſſary to a
" Common-wealth that ſhe have Schools of good Literature, or Uni-
" verſities of her own. We are commanded, as has been ſaid more
" than once, to ſearch the Scriptures; and which of 'em ſearch the
" Scriptures, they that take this pains in antient Languages and Learn-
" ing, or they that will not, but truſt to Tranſlations only, and to
" words as they ſound to preſent Circumſtances? than which nothing
" is more fallible, or certain to loſe the true ſenſe of Scriptures, pre-
" tended to be above human Underſtanding, for no other cauſe than
" that they are below it. But in ſearching the Scriptures by the pro-
" per uſe of our Univerſities, we have been heretofore bleſt with
" greater Victories and Trophies againſt the purple Hoſts and golden
" Standards of the *Romiſh* Hierarchy, than any Nation; and there-
" fore, why we ſhould relinquiſh this upon the preſumption of ſome,
" that becauſe there is a greater Light which they have, I do not know.
" There is a greater Light than the Sun, but it does not extinguiſh the
" Sun, nor does any Light of God's giving extinguiſh that of Nature,
" but encreaſe and ſanctify it. Wherefore, neither the Honour born by
" the *Iſraelitiſh*, *Roman*, or any other Common-wealth that I have
" ſhewn, to their Eccleſiaſtics, conſiſted in being govern'd by them,
" but in conſulting them in matters of Religion; upon whoſe Reſpon-
" ſes or Oracles they did afterwards as they thought fit. Nor would
" I be here miſtaken, as if, by affirming the Univerſities to be, in or-
" der both to Religion and Government, of abſolute neceſſity, I de-
" clar'd them or the Miniſtry in any wiſe fit to be truſted, ſo far as to
" exerciſe any power not deriv'd from the Civil Magiſtrate in the ad-
" miniſtration of either. If the *Jewiſh* Religion were directed
" and eſtabliſh'd by MOSES, it was directed and eſtabliſh'd by the
" Civil Magiſtrate; or if MOSES exercis'd this Adminiſtration as a
" Prophet, the ſame Prophet did inveſt with the ſame Adminiſtration
" the *Sanhedrim*, and not the Prieſts; and ſo does our Common-
" wealth the Senate, and not the Clergy. They who had the ſu-
" preme Adminiſtration or Government of the National Religion in
" *Athens*, were the firſt ARCHON, the *Rex Sacrificus*, or High Prieſt,
" and a *Polemarch*; which Magiſtrates were ordain'd or elected * by
" the holding up of hands in the Church, Congregation, or *Comitia*
" of the People. The Religion of *Lacedemon* was govern'd by the
" Kings, who were alſo High Prieſts, and officiated at the Sacrifice;
" theſe had power to ſubſtitute their *Pythii*, Embaſſadors, or Nun-
" cios, by which, not without concurrence of the Senate, they held
" intelligence with the Oracle of APOLLO at *Delphos*. And the Ec-
" cleſiaſtical part of the Common-wealth of *Rome* was govern'd by
" the *Pontifex Maximus*, the *Rex Sacrificulus*, and the *Flamins*, all or-
" dain'd or elected by the People, the *Pontifex* by the † Tribes, the
" King by the ‡ Centuries, and the *Flamins* by the ‖ Pariſhes. I do
" not mind you of theſe things, as if, for the matter, there were any
" parallel to be drawn out of their Superſtitions to our Religion; but
" to ſhew that for the manner, antient Prudence is as well a rule in di-
" vine as human things; nay, and ſuch a one as the Apoſtles them-
" ſelves, ordaining Elders by the holding up of hands in every Con-

* Per χειροτονιαν. † Tributis. ‡ Centuriatis. ‖ Curiatis Comitiis.

" gregation,

" gregation, have exactly follow'd: for ſome of the Congregations
" where they thus ordain'd Elders were thoſe of *Antioch*, *Iconium*,
" *Lyſtra*, *Derbe*, the Countries of *Lycaonia*, *Piſidia*, *Pamphylia*, *Perga*,
" with *Attalia*. Now that theſe Cities and Countries, when the *Ro-*
" *mans* propagated their Empire into *Aſia*, were found moſt of them
" Common-wealths, and that many of the reſt were indu'd with like
" power, ſo that the People living under the protection of the *Roman*
" Emperors, continu'd to elect their own Magiſtrates, is ſo known a
" thing, that I wonder whence it is that men, quite contrary to the
" univerſal proof of theſe examples, will have Eccleſiaſtical Govern-
" ment to be neceſſarily diſtinct from Civil Power, when the Right
" of the Elders ordain'd by the holding up of hands in every Congre-
" gation to teach the People, was plainly deriv'd from the ſame Civil
" Power by which they ordain'd the reſt of their Magiſtrates. And it
" is not otherwiſe in our Common-wealth, where the Parochial Con-
" gregation elects or ordains its Paſtor. To object the Common-
" wealth of *Venice* in this place, were to ſhew us that it has been no
" otherwiſe but where the civil Power has loſt the liberty of her
" Conſcience by imbracing Popery; as alſo that to take away the
" Liberty of Conſcience in this Adminiſtration from the civil Power,
" were a proceeding which has no other precedent than ſuch as is Po-
" piſh. Wherefore your Religion is ſettled after the following man-
" ner: the Univerſities are the Seminaries of that part which is natio-
" nal, by which means others with all ſafety may be permitted to follow
" the Liberty of their own Conſciences, in regard that, however
" they behave themſelves, the ignorance of the unlearn'd in this caſe
" cannot loſe your Religion nor diſturb your Government, which o-
" therwiſe it would moſt certainly do; and the Univerſities with their
" Emoluments, as alſo the Benefices of the whole Nation, are to be
" improv'd by ſuch Augmentations as may make a very decent and
" comfortable ſubſiſtence for the Miniſtry, which is neither to be al-
" low'd Synods nor Aſſemblies, except upon the occaſion ſhewn in
" the Univerſities, when they are conſulted by the Council of State,
" and ſuffer'd to meddle with Affairs of Religion, nor to be capable
" of any other public Preferment whatſoever; by which means the
" Intereſt of the Learned can never come to corrupt your Religion, nor
" diſturb your Government, which otherwiſe it would moſt certainly
" do. *Venice*, tho' ſhe does not ſee, or cannot help the corruption of
" her Religion, is yet ſo circumſpect to avoid diſturbance of her Go-
" vernment in this kind, that her Council proceeds not to election of
" Magiſtrates, till it be proclaim'd, *Fora Papolini*, by which words
" ſuch as have conſanguinity with red Hats, or relation to the Court
" of *Rome*, are warn'd to withdraw. If a Miniſter in *Holland* meddles
" with matter of State, the Magiſtrate ſends him *a pair of Shoes*;
" whereupon, if he does not go, he is driven away from his charge.
" I wonder why Miniſters, of all men, ſhould be perpetually tamper-
" ing with Government; firſt becauſe they, as well as others, have it
" in expreſs charge to ſubmit themſelves to the Ordinances of men;
" and ſecondly, becauſe theſe Ordinances of men muſt go upon ſuch
" political Principles, as they of all others, by any thing that can be
" found in their Writings or Actions, leaſt underſtand: whence you
" have the ſuffrage of all Nations to this ſenſe, that an ounce of Wiſ-
" dom is worth a pound of Clergy. Your greateſt Clerks are not

" your wiſeſt men: and when ſome foul Abſurdity in State is com-
" mitted, it is common with the *French*, and even the *Italians*, to call
" it *Pas de Clerck*, or, *Governo da Prete*. They may bear with men
" that will be preaching without ſtudy, while they will be govern-
" ing without Prudence. My Lords, if you know not how to rule
" your Clergy, you will moſt certainly, like a man that cannot rule
" his Wife, have neither quiet at home, nor honour abroad. Their
" honeſt Vocation is to teach your Children at the Schools and the
" Univerſities, and the People in the Pariſhes: and yours is concern'd
" to ſee that they do not play the ſhrews: of which parts does con-
" ſiſt the Education of your Common-wealth, ſo far as it regards Re-
" ligion.

The Inns of Court and Chancery.

" TO JUSTICE, or that part of it which is commonly executive,
" anſwers the Education of the Inns of Court and Chancery. Upon
" which to philoſophize requires a peculiar kind of Learning that I have
" not. But they who take upon them any Profeſſion proper to the E-
" ducations mention'd, that is, Theology, Phyſic, or Law, are not
" at leiſure for the Eſſays. Wherefore the Eſſays being Degrees where-
" by the Youth commence for all Magiſtracies, Offices, and Honours in
" the Pariſh, Hundred, Tribe, Senate or Prerogative; Divines, Phy-
" ſicians, and Lawyers, not taking theſe Degrees, exclude themſelves
" from all ſuch Magiſtracies, Offices, and Honours. And whereas
" Lawyers are likeſt to exact further reaſon for this, they (growing
" up from the moſt gainful Art at the Bar to thoſe Magiſtracies upon
" the Bench, which are continually appropriated to themſelves, and
" not only endow'd with the greateſt Revenues, but alſo held for
" life) have the leaſt reaſon of all the reſt to pretend to any other;
" eſpecially in an equal Common-wealth, where Accumulate on of Ma-
" giſtracy, or to take a Perſon engag'd by his Profit to the Laws, as
" they ſtand, into the Power which is Legiſlative, and which ſhould
" keep them to what they were, or ought to be, were a Solœciſm in
" Prudence. It is true, that the Legiſlative Power may have need of
" Advice and Aſſiſtance from the executive Magiſtracy, or ſuch as are
" learn'd in the Law; for which cauſe the Judges are, as they have
" heretofore been, Aſſiſtants in the Senate. Nor however it came a-
" bout, can I ſee any reaſon why a Judge, being but an Aſſiſtant or
" Lawyer, ſhould be Member of a Legiſlative Council.

" I DENY not, that the *Roman* Patricians were all Patrons, and
" that the whole People were Clients, ſome to one Family, and ſome to
" another, by which means they had their Cauſes pleaded and defend-
" ed in ſome appearance *gratis*; for the Patron took no Money, tho' if
" he had a Daughter to marry, his Clients were to pay her Portion:
" nor was this ſo great a grievance. But if the Client accus'd his
" Patron, gave teſtimony or ſuffrage againſt him, it was a crime of
" ſuch a nature, that any man might lawfully kill him as a Traitor;
" and this, as being the nerve of the Optimacy, was a great cauſe of
" ruin to that Common-wealth: for when the People would carry
" any thing that pleas'd not the Senate, the Senators were ill provided
" if they could not intercede, that is, oppoſe it by their Clients;
" with whom, to vote otherwiſe than they pleas'd, was the higheſt
" Crime. The obſervation of this Bond till the time of the GRAC-
" CHI, that is to ſay, till it was too late, or to no purpoſe to break it,
" was the cauſe, why in all the former heats and diſputes that had

" happen'd

" happen'd between the Senate and the People, it never came to blows,
" which indeed was good: but withal, the People could have no re-
" medy, which was certainly evil. Wherefore I am of opinion, that
" a Senator ought not to be a Patron or Advocate, nor a Patron or Ad-
" vocate to be a Senator: for if his Practice be *gratis*, it debauches
" the People; and if it be mercenary, it debauches himſelf: take it
" which way you will, when he ſhould be making of Laws, he will
" be knitting of Nets.

" LYCURGUS, as I ſaid, by being a Traveller became a Legi-
" ſlator, but in times when Prudence was another thing Neverthe-
" leſs we may not ſhut out this part of Education in a Common-
" wealth, which will be her ſelf a Traveller; for thoſe of this make
" have ſeen the World, eſpecially becauſe this is certain (tho' it be not
" regarded in our times, when things being left to take their chance, it
" fares with us accordingly) that no man can be a Politician, except he
" be firſt an Hiſtorian or a Traveller; for except he can ſee what muſt
" be, or what may be, he is no Politician. Now if he has no know-
" ledge in Story, he cannot tell what has been; and if he has not been
" a Traveller, he cannot tell what is: but he that neither knows what
" has been, nor what is, can never tell what muſt be, or what may
" be. Furthermore, the Embaſſies in ordinary by our Conſtitution
" are the Prizes of young men, more eſpecially ſuch as have been Tra-
" vellers. Wherefore they of theſe inclinations having leave of the
" Cenſors, owe them an account of their time, and cannot chooſe but
" lay it out with ſome ambition of Praiſe or Reward, where both are
" open: whence you will have eyes abroad, and better choice of pub-
" lic Miniſters; your Gallants ſhewing themſelves not more to the
" Ladies at their Balls, than to your Common-wealth at her Aca-
" demy, when they return from their Travels.

" BUT this Common-wealth being conſtituted more eſpecially of
" two Elements, Arms and Councils, drives by a natural inſtinct at
" Courage and Wiſdom; which he who has attain'd, is arriv'd at the
" perfection of human nature. It is true, that theſe Virtues muſt have
" ſome natural root in him that is capable of them; but this amounts
" not to ſo great a matter as ſome will have it. For if Poverty makes
" an induſtrious, a moderate Eſtate a temperate, and a laviſh Fortune
" a wanton man, and this be the common courſe of things; Wiſdom
" then is rather of neceſſity than inclination. And that an Army
" which was meditating upon flight, has been brought by deſpair to
" win the Field, is ſo far from being ſtrange, that like cauſes will
" evermore produce like effects. Wherefore this Common-wealth
" drives her Citizens like Wedges; there is no way with them but
" thorow, nor end but that Glory whereof Man is capable by Art or
" Nature. That the Genius of the *Roman* Families commonly preſerv-
" ed it ſelf throughout the line (as to inſtance in ſome, the MANLII
" were ſtill ſevere, the PUBLICOLÆ lovers, and the APPII haters of
" the People) is attributed by MACHIAVEL to their Education: nor,
" if Intereſt might add to the reaſon why the Genius of a *Patrician*
" was one thing, and that of a *Plebeian* another, is the like ſo appa-
" rent between different Nations, who, according to their different
" Educations, have yet as different manners. It was antiently noted,
" and long confirm'd by the actions of the *French*, that in their firſt aſ-
" faults their Courage was more than that of Men; and for the reſt leſs

" than

" than that of Women: which nevertheleſs, thro' the amendment of " their Diſcipline, we ſee now to be otherwiſe. I will not ſay, but " that ſome Man or Nation upon an equal improvement of this kind " may be lighter than ſome other; but certainly, Education is the " ſcale without which no Man or Nation can truly know his or her " own weight or value. By our Hiſtories we can tell when one *Marpeſian* would have beaten ten *Oceaners*, and when one *Oceaner* would " have beaten ten *Marpeſians*. MARC ANTHONY was a *Roman*, but " how did that appear in the imbraces of CLEOPATRA? You muſt " have ſome other Education for your Youth; or they, like that paſſage, will ſhew better in Romance than true Story.

" THE Cuſtom of the Common-wealth of *Rome* in diſtributing " her Magiſtracies without reſpect of age, happen'd to do well in " CORVINUS and SCIPIO; for which cauſe MACHIAVEL (with " whom that which was done by *Rome*, and that which is well " done, is for the moſt part all one) commends this courſe. Yet how " much it did worſe at other times, is obvious in POMPEY and CÆSAR; Examples by which BOCCALINI illuſtrates the Prudence of " *Venice* in her contrary practice, affirming it to have been no ſmall " ſtep to the ruin of the *Roman* Liberty, that theſe (having taſted in " their Youth of the ſupreme Honours) had no greater in their age to " hope for, but by perpetuating of the ſame in themſelves; which " came to Blood, and ended in Tyranny. The opinion of VERULAMIUS is ſafe: *The Errors*, ſays he, *of young men are the ruin of* " *buſineſs; whereas the Errors of old men amount but to this, that more* " *might have been done, or ſooner.* But tho' their Wiſdom be little, their " Courage is great: Wherefore (to come to the main Education of " this Common-wealth) the Militia of *Oceana* is the Province of " Youth.

" THE diſtribution of this Province by the Eſſays is ſo fully deſcrib'd in the Order, that I need repeat nothing: the Order it ſelf " being but a Repetition or Copy of that Original, which in antient " Prudence is of all others the faireſt; as that from whence the Common-wealth of *Rome* more particularly deriv'd the Empire of the " World. And there is much more reaſon in this age, when Governments are univerſally broken or ſwerv'd from their Foundations, and " the People groan under Tyranny, that the ſame cauſes (which could " not be withſtood when the World was full of popular Governments) " ſhould have the like effects.

" THE Cauſes in the Common-wealth of *Rome*, whereof the Empire of the World was not any miraculous, but a natural (nay I may " ſafely ſay a neceſſary) conſequence, are contain'd in that part of her " Diſcipline which was domeſtic, and in that which ſhe exercis'd in " her Provinces or Conqueſt. Of the latter I ſhall have better occaſion to ſpeak when we come to our provincial Orbs; the former " divided the whole People by Tribes, amounting, as LIVY and " CICERO ſhew, at their full growth to thirty five, and every " Tribe by the Cenſe or Valuation of Eſtates into five Claſſes: for the " ſixth being *Proletary*, that is the Nurſery, or ſuch as thro' their poverty contributed nothing to the Common-wealth but Children, was " not reckon'd, nor us'd in Arms. And this is the firſt point of the " Militia, in which modern Prudence is quite contrary to the antient; " for whereas we, excuſing the rich, and arming the poor, become the

" Vaſſals

" Vaſſals of our Servants, they, by excuſing the poor, and arming " ſuch as were rich enough to be Freemen, became Lords of the Earth. " The Nobility and Gentry of this Nation, who underſtand ſo little " what it is to be Lords of the Earth, that they have not been able to " keep their own Lands, will think it a ſtrange Education for their " Children to be common Soldiers, and oblig'd to all the Duties of " Arms: nevertheleſs it is not for 4 *s.* a week, but to be capable of " being the beſt man in the Field or in the City; the latter part of " which conſideration makes the common Soldier herein a better man " than the General of any monarchical Army. And whereas it may " be thought, that this would drink deep of noble Blood, I dare " boldly ſay, take the *Roman* Nobility in the heat of their fierceſt " Wars, and you ſhall not find ſuch a ſhambles of them as has been " made of ours by mere Luxury and Slothfulneſs; which, killing the " Body, kill the Soul alſo; *Animaſque in vulnere ponunt.* Whereas " common Right is that which who ſtands in the vindication of, has " us'd that Sword of Juſtice for which he receives the Purple of " Magiſtracy. The Glory of a man on Earth can go no higher, and " if he falls he riſes again, and comes ſooner to that reward which is " ſo much higher as Heaven is above the Earth. To return to the " *Roman* Example: Every Claſſis was divided, as has been more than " once ſhewn, into Centuries, and every Century was equally divid- " ed into Youth and Elders; the Youth for foreign Service, and the " Elders for the guard of the Territory. In the firſt Claſſis were a- " bout eighteen Centuries of Horſe, being thoſe which by the Inſti- " tution of SERVIUS were firſt call'd to the Suffrage in the * Cen- " turial Aſſemblies. But the *Delectus*, or Levy of an Army, which " is the preſent buſineſs, proceeded, according to POLYBIUS, in this " manner.

" Upon a War decreed, the Conſuls elected four and twenty mi- " litary Tribunes or Colonels; whereof ten, being ſuch as had merited " their tenth Stipend, were younger Officers. The Tribunes being " choſen, the Conſuls appointed a day to the Tribes, when thoſe in " them of military age were to appear at the Capitol; the day being " come, and the Youth aſſembl'd accordingly, the Conſuls aſcended " their Tribunal, and the younger Tribunes were ſtrait divided into " four parts after this manner: four were aſſign'd to the firſt Legion " (a Legion at the moſt conſiſted of 6000 Foot, and 300 Horſe) " three to the ſecond, four to the third, and three to the fourth. The " younger Tribunes being thus diſtributed, two of the elder were " aſſign'd to the firſt Legion, three to the ſecond, two to the third, " and three to the fourth. And the Officers of each Legion thus aſ- " ſign'd, having drawn the Tribes by Lots, and being ſeated accord- " ing to their diviſions at a convenient diſtance from each other, " the Tribe of the firſt Lot was call'd: whereupon they that were of " it knowing the buſineſs, and being prepar'd, preſently bolted out four " of their number, in the choice whereof ſuch care was taken, that " they offer'd none that was not a Citizen; no Citizen that was not " of the Youth; no Youth that was not of ſome one of the five " Claſſes; nor any one of the five Claſſes that was not expert at his " Exerciſes. Moreover, they us'd ſuch diligence in matching them

* Centuriatis.

" for age and Stature, that the Officers of the Legions, except they " happen'd to be acquainted with the Youth ſo bolted, were forc'd to " put themſelves upon fortune, while they of the firſt Legion choſe " one; they of the ſecond, the next; they of the third another; " and the fourth Youth fell to the laſt Legion: and thus was the " Election (the Legions and the Tribes varying according to their " Lots) carry'd on till the Foot were compleat. The like courſe with " little alteration was taken by the Horſe Officers till the Horſe alſo " were compleat. This was call'd giving of Names, which the
Judg. 20. 9. " Children of *Iſrael* did alſo by Lot; and if any man refus'd to give " his Name, he was ſold for a Slave, or his Eſtate confiſcated to the " Common-wealth. *When* * MARCUS CURIUS *the Conſul was* " *forc'd to make a ſudden Levy, and none of the Youth would give in their* " *Names, all the Tribes being put to the Lot, he commanded the firſt* " *Name drawn out of the Urn of the* Pollion *Tribe (which happen'd to* " *come firſt) to be call'd; but the Youth not anſwering, he order'd his Goods* " *to be ſold:* which was conformable to the Law in *Iſrael*, according " to which SAUL took a yoke of Oxen, and hew'd them in pieces,
1 Sam. 11. 7. " and ſent them throughout the Tribes, ſaying, *Whoſoever comes not* " *forth to battle after* SAUL *and* SAMUEL, *ſo ſhall it be done to his Oxen.* " By which you may obſerve alſo, that they who had no Cattle " were not of the Militia in *Iſrael*. But the age of the *Roman* Youth " by the *Tullian* Law determin'd at 30; and by the Law (tho' it " ſhould ſeem by MACHIAVEL and others, that this was not " well obſerv'd) a Man could not ſtand for Magiſtracy till he was " *Miles emeritus*, or had fulfil'd the full term of his Militia, which " was compleat in his tenth Stipend or Service: nor was he after- " wards oblig'd under any penalty to give his name, except the " Common-wealth were invaded, in which caſe the Elders were as " well oblig'd as the Youth. † The Conſul might alſo levy *Milites* " *evocatos*, or Soldiers, commanded men out of ſuch as had ſerv'd " their turn, and this at his diſcretion. The Legions being thus com- " pleat, were divided by two to each Conſul; and in theſe no Man " had right to ſerve but a *Roman* Citizen: now becauſe two Le- " gions made but a ſmall Army, the *Romans* added to every one of " their Armies an equal number of Foot, and a double number of " Horſe levy'd among their *Latin* or *Italian* Aſſociates; ſo a Conſular " Army, with the Legions and Auxiliaries, amounted to about thirty " thouſand: and whereas they commonly levy'd two ſuch Armies to- " gether, theſe being join'd made about ſixty thouſand.

" THE Steps whereby our Militia follows the greateſt Captain, " are the three Eſſays; the firſt, elected by a fifth man in the || Pa- " riſhes, and amounting in the whole to one hundred thouſand, chooſe " their Officers at the ** Hundreds, where they fall alſo to their " Games or Exerciſes, invited by handſome Prizes, ſuch as for them- " ſelves and the honour of them will be coveted; ſuch as will render " the Hundred a place of Sports, and exerciſe of Arms all the year " long; ſuch as in the ſpace of ten years will equip 30000 Men,

* Marcus Curius Conſul cum ſubitum delectum edicere coactus eſſet, & juniorum nemo reſpondiſſet, conjectis in ſortem omnibus, Poliæ quæ proxima exierat, primum nomen urnâ extractum citari juſſit, neque eo reſpondente, bona adoleſcentis haſtâ ſubjecit. *Val.* † Quod per magnos tumultus fieri ſolitum erat, juſtitio indicto, delectus ſine vacationibus habitus eſt. *Liv.* || Curiatis. ** Centuriatis.

" Horſe

" Horſe and Foot, with ſuch Arms for their Forge, Proof, and Beau-
" ty, as (notwithſtanding the *Argyraſpides*, or ſilver Shields of
" ALEXANDER's Guards) were never worn by ſo many; ſuch
" as will preſent marks of Virtue and Direction to your General or
" Strategus in the diſtribution of his Army, which doubles the va-
" lue of them to the Proprietors, who are bound to wear them, and
" eaſes the Common-wealth of ſo much Charge, ſo many being
" arm'd already.

" BUT here will be the Objection now. How ſhall ſuch a Revenue
" be compas'd? Fifty pounds a year in every Hundred is a great deal,
" not ſo eaſily rais'd: Men will not part with their Money; nor would
" the ſum as it is propos'd by the Order of *Pompe*, riſe in many years.
" Theſe are difficulties that fit our Genius exactly: And yet a thou-
" ſand pounds in each Hundred once levy'd, eſtabliſhes the Revenue for
" ever. Now the Hundreds one with another are worth ten thouſand
" pounds a year dry Rent, over and above perſonal Eſtates, which
" bring it to twice the value: So that a twentieth part of one year's
" Revenue of the Hundred does it. If you cannot afford this while
" you pay Taxes, tho' from henceforth they will be but ſmall ones, do
" it when you pay none. If it be then too much for one year, do it
" in two: If it be too much for two years, do it in four. What
" Huſbands have we hitherto been? What is become of greater Sums?
" My Lords, if you ſhould thus caſt your Bread upon the Waters,
" after many days you would find it: ſtand not huckling when you
" are offer'd Corn and your Money again in the mouth of the Sack.

" BUT to proceed: The firſt Eſſay being officer'd at the Hundreds,
" and muſter'd at the * Tribes (where they are entertain'd with other
" Sports, which will be very fine ones) proceeds to the Election of the
" ſecond Eſſay, or ſtanding Army of this Nation, conſiſting of thirty
" thouſand Foot, and ten thouſand Horſe; and theſe, upon a War
" decreed, being deliver'd at the Rendevouz of *Oceana* to the Stra-
" tegus, are the third Eſſay, which anſwers to the *Roman* Legions.
" But you may obſerve, that whereas the Conſuls elected the military
" Tribunes, and rais'd commanded Men out of the Veterans at their
" own diſcretion; our Polemarchs or Field Officers are elected by the
" Scrutiny of the Council of War: and our Veterans not otherwiſe
" taken on than as Volunteers, and with the conſent of the Pole-
" marchs; which may ſerve for the removal of certain ſcruples which
" might otherwiſe be incident in this place, tho' without encourage-
" ment by the *Roman* way of proceeding, much leſs by that which
" is propos'd. But whereas the *Roman* Legions in all amounted not
" in one Army to above 30000 Men, or little more, you have here
" forty thouſand; and whereas they added Auxiliaries, it is in this
" regard that *Marpeſia* will be a greater Revenue to you, than if you
" had the *Indies*; for whereas heretofore ſhe has yielded you nothing
" but her native Thiſtles, in plowing out the rankneſs of her Ariſto-
" cracy by your Agrarian, you will find her an inexhauſtible Maga-
" zine of Men, and to her own advantage, who will make a far better
" account by the Arms, than by the Pins of *Poland*. Wherefore as a
" Conſular Army conſiſted of about an equal number of Auxiliaries
" added to their Legions by their *Latin* or *Italian* Aſſociates, you may

* Tributis.

" add

" add to a Parliamentary Army an equal number of *Marpeſians* or *Pa-*
" *nopeans*, as that Colony ſhall hereafter be able to ſupply you: By
" which means the Common-wealth will be able to go forth to Battle
" with fourſcore thouſand Men. To make Wars with ſmall Forces
" is no Huſbandry, but a waſte, a diſeaſe, a lingring and painful con-
" ſumption of Men and Money: the *Romans* making theirs thick, made
" them ſhort, and had little regard to Money, as that which they who
" have Men enow, can command where it is fitteſt that it ſhould be
" levy'd. All the antient Monarchies by this means got on wing, and
" attain'd to vaſt Riches. Whereas your modern Princes being dear
" purchaſers of ſmall parcels, have but empty pockets. But it may
" be ſome will accuſe the Order of raſhneſs, in that it commits the ſole
" Conduct of the War to the General; and the Cuſtom of *Venice* by
" her *Proveditori*, or checks upon her Commanders in chief, may
" ſeem to be of greater Prudence: but in this part of our Government
" neither *Venice* nor any Nation that makes uſe of mercenary Forces
" is for our inſtruction. A mercenary Army, with a ſtanding Gene-
" ral, is like the fatal Siſter that ſpins; but proper Forces, with an
" annual Magiſtrate, are like her that cuts the thread. Their Intereſts
" are quite contrary, and yet you have a better Proveditor than the
" *Venetian*, another Strategus ſitting with an Army ſtanding by him;
" whereupon that which is marching, if there were any probability
" it ſhould, would find as little poſſibility that it could recoil, as a
" foreign Enemy to invade you. Theſe things conſider'd, a War will
" appear to be of a contrary nature to that of all other reckonings, in-
" aſmuch as of this you muſt never look to have a good account if
" you be ſtrict in impoſing checks. Let a Council of Huntſmen
" aſſembl'd beforehand, tell you which way the Stag ſhall run, where
" you ſhall caſt about at the fault, and how you ſhall ride to be in at
" the chaſe all the day: but theſe may as well do that, as a Council
" of War direct a General. The hours that have painted wings, and
" of different colours, are his Council: he muſt be like the Eye that
" makes not the Scene, but has it ſo ſoon as it changes. That in many
" Counſellors there is ſtrength, is ſpoken of Civil Adminiſtrations:
" as to thoſe that are military, there is nothing more certain, than
" that in many Counſellors there is weakneſs. Joint Commiſſions in
" military affairs, are like hunting your Hounds in their Couples. In
" the *Attic* War CLEOMENES and DEMARATUS, Kings of *Lace-*
" *demon*, being thus coupled, tug'd one againſt another; and while
" they ſhould have join'd againſt the *Perſian*, were the cauſe of the
" common calamity: whereupon that Common-wealth took better
" Council, and made a Law, whereby from thenceforth there went
" at once but one of her Kings to Battle.

" *THE* Fidenati *being in rebellion, and having ſlain the Colony of*
" *the* Romans, *four Tribunes with Conſular Power were created by the Peo-*
" *ple of* Rome, *whereof one being left for the guard of the City, the other*
" *three were ſent againſt the* Fidenati, *who, thro' the diviſion that happen'd*
" *among them, brought nothing home but Diſhonour: whereupon the* Ro-
" mans *created the Dictator, and* LIVY *gives his Judgment in theſe*
" *words:* * *The three Tribunes with Conſular Power were a leſſon how uſeleſs*

* Tres Tribuni, poteſtate Conſulari, documento fuêre, quàm plurium imperium bello inutile eſſet; tendendo ad ſua quiſque conſilia, cum alii aliud videretur, aperuerunt ad occaſionem, locum hoſti.

" *in*

" *in War is the joint Command of ſeveral Generals; for each following* " *his own Counſils, while they all differ'd in their opinions, gave by this* " *opportunity an advantage to the Enemy. When the Conſuls* QUINTIUS " *and* AGRIPPA *were ſent againſt the* ÆQUI, AGRIPPA *for this rea-* " *ſon refus'd to go with his Colleague, ſaying,* * *That in the admini-* " *ſtration of great Actions it was moſt ſafe that the chief Command* " *ſhould be lodg'd in one Perſon. And if the Ruin of modern Armies* " *were well conſider'd, moſt of it would be found to have faln upon this* " *point: it being in this caſe far ſafer to truſt to any one Man of common* " *Prudence, than to any two or more together of the greateſt Parts.* The " Conſuls indeed being equal in Power, while one was preſent with " the Senate, and the other in the Field with the Army, made a good " Balance; and this with us is exactly follow'd by the Election of a " new Strategus upon the march of the old one.

" THE ſeven and twentieth Order, whereby the Elders in caſe " of Invaſion are oblig'd to equal duty with the Youth, and each " upon their own charge, is ſuitable to Reaſon (for every Man de- " fends his own Eſtate) and to our Copy, as in the War with the " *Samnites* and *Tuſcans.* † *The Senate order'd a Vacation to be proclaim'd* " *and a Levy to be made of all ſorts of Perſons: And not only the Free-* " *men and Youths were liſted, but Cohorts of the old Men were likewiſe* " *form'd.* This Nation of all others is the leaſt obnoxious to Invaſion. " *Oceana,* ſays a *French* Politician, is a Beaſt that cannot be devour'd " but by herſelf; nevertheleſs, that Government is not perfect which " is not provided at all points; and in this *(ad Triarios res rediit)* " the Elders being ſuch as in a martial State muſt be Veterans, the " Common-wealth invaded gathers ſtrength like ANTÆUS by her " fall, while the whole number of the Elders conſiſting of five hun- " dred thouſand, and the Youth of as many, being brought up ac- " cording to the Order, give twelve ſucceſſive Battles, each Battle " conſiſting of eighty thouſand Men, half Elders and half Youth. " And the Common-wealth whoſe Conſtitution can be no ſtranger to " any of thoſe Virtues which are to be acquir'd in human life, grows " familiar with Death ere ſhe dies. If the hand of God be upon her " for her Tranſgreſſions, ſhe ſhall mourn for her Sins, and lie in the " duſt for her Iniquities, without looſing her Manhood.

Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidam ferient ruinæ.

THE remaining part, being the Conſtitution of the Provincial Orb, is partly Civil, or conſiſting of the Elders; and partly Military, or conſiſting of the Youth. The Civil part of the provincial Orb is directed by

Conſtitution of the Civil part of the Provincial Orb.

THE twenty eighth ORDER, whereby the Council of a Province being conſtituted of twelve Knights, divided by four into three Regions (for their term and revolution conformable to the Parliament) is perpetuated by the annual election at the Tropic of four Knights (being triennial Magiſtrates) out of the Region of the Senate whoſe term expires; and of one Knight out of the ſame Region to be Strategus or General of

28. Order.

* Saluberrimum in adminiſtratione magnarum rerum, ſummam imperii apud unum eſſe.
† Senatus juſtitium indici, delectum omnis generis hominum haberi juſſit: nec ingenui modo, & juniores Sacramento adacti ſunt, ſed ſeniorum etiam cohortes factæ.

the Province, which Magiſtracy is annual. The Strategus or Magiſtrate thus choſen ſhall be as well Preſident of the Provincial Council with power to propoſe to the ſame, as General of the Army. The Council for the reſt ſhall elect weekly Provoſts, having any two of them alſo right to propoſe after the manner of the Senatorian Councils of *Oceana*. And whereas all Provincial Councils are Members of the Council of State, they may and ought to keep diligent correſpondence with the the ſame, which is to be done after this manner: Any Opinion or Opinions legitimately propos'd and debated at a Provincial Council, being thereupon ſign'd by the Strategus, or any two of the Provoſts, may be tranſmitted to the Council of State in *Oceana*; and the Council of State proceeding upon the ſame in their natural courſe (whether by their own Power, if it be a matter within their Inſtructions, or by Authority of the Senate thereupon conſulted, if it be a matter of State which is not in their Inſtructions; or by Authority of the Senate and command of the People, if it be a matter of Law, as for the Levies of Men or Money upon common uſe and ſafety) ſhall return ſuch Anſwers, Advice, or Orders, as in any of the ways mention'd ſhall be determin'd upon the caſe. The Provincial Councils of *Marpeſia* and *Panopea* reſpectively ſhall take ſpecial care that the Agrarian Laws, as alſo all other Laws that be or ſhall from time to time be enacted by the Parliament of *Oceana*, for either of them, be duly put in execution: they ſhall manage and receive the cuſtoms of either Nation for the Shipping of *Oceana*, being the common Guard: they ſhall have a care that moderate and ſufficient pay upon the reſpective Province be duly rais'd for the ſupport and maintenance of the Officers and Soldiers, or Army of the ſame in the moſt effectual, conſtant and convenient way: they ſhall receive the *Regalia*, or public Revenues of thoſe Nations, out of which every Counſellor ſhall have for his term, and to his proper uſe, the Sum of 500 *l. per annum*, and the Strategus 500 *l.* as Preſident, beſides his pay as General, which ſhall be 1000 Pounds; the remainder to go to the uſe of the Knights and Deputies of the reſpective Provinces, to be paid, if it will reach, according to the rates of *Oceana*; if not, by an equal diſtribution, reſpectively; or the overplus, if there be any, to be return'd to the Treaſury of *Oceana*. They ſhall manage the Lands (if there be any ſuch held in either of the Provinces by the Common-wealth of *Oceana*, in Dominion) and return the Rents into the Exchequer. If the Common-wealth comes to be poſſeſt of richer Provinces, the pay of the General or Strategus, and of the Councils, may be reſpectively encreas'd. The People for the reſt ſhall elect their own Magiſtrates, and be govern'd by their own Laws, having Power alſo to appeal from their native or provincial Magiſtrates, if they pleaſe, to the People of *Oceana*. And whereas there may be ſuch as receiving Injury, are not able to proſecute their Appeals at ſo great a diſtance, eight Serjeants at Law being ſworn by the Commiſſioners of the Seal, ſhall be ſent by four into each Province once in two years; who, dividing the ſame by Circuits, ſhall hear ſuch cauſes; and having gather'd and introduc'd them, ſhall return to the ſeveral Appellants, *gratis*, the Determinations and Decrees of the People in their ſeveral caſes.

THE term of a Knight in a Provincial Orb, as to domeſtic Magiſtracies, ſhall be eſteemed a Vacation, and no bar to preſent Election to any other Honour, his provincial Magiſtracy being expir'd.

THE

THE *Quorum* of a Provincial Council, as alſo of every other Council or Aſſembly in *Oceana*, ſhall in time of health conſiſt of two parts in three of the whole number proper to that Council or Aſſembly; and in a time of ſickneſs, of one part in three: But of the Senate there can be no *Quorum* without three of the Signory; nor of a Council without two of the Provoſts.

THE Civil part of the Provincial Orb being declar'd by the foregoing Order: the Military part of the ſame is conſtituted by

THE twenty ninth ORDER; whereby the Stratiots of the third Eſſay having drawn the Gold Balls mark'd with the Letter *M*, and being ten Horſe and fifty Foot in a Tribe, that is to ſay, five hundred Horſe, and two thouſand five hundred Foot in all, the Tribes ſhall be deliver'd by the reſpective Conductors to the provincial Strategus or General, at ſuch a time and place, or Rendevouz, as he ſhall appoint by Order and Certificate of his Election: and the Strategus having receiv'd the Horſe and Foot mention'd, which are the third Claſſis of his provincial Guard or Army, ſhall forthwith lead them away to *Marpeſia*, where the Army conſiſts of three Claſſes, each Claſſis containing three thouſand Men, whereof five hundred are Horſe; and receiving the new Strategus with the third Claſſis, the old Strategus with the firſt Claſſis ſhall be diſmiſt by the Provincial Council. The ſame method with the Stratiots of the letter *P*, is to be obſerv'd for the provincial Orb of *Panopea:* and the Common-wealth coming to acquire new Provinces, the Senate and the People may erect new Orbs in like manner, conſiſting of greater or leſs numbers, according as is requir'd by the reſpective occaſion. If a *Stratiot* has once ſerv'd his term in a Provincial Orb, and happens afterwards to draw the Letter of a Province at the Election of the ſecond Eſſay, he may refuſe his Lot; and if he refuſes it, the Cenſor of that Urn ſhall cauſe the Files balloting at the ſame to make a halt; and if the Stratiot produces the Certificate of his Strategus or General, that he has ſerv'd his time accordingly, the Cenſor throwing the Ball that he drew into the Urn again, and taking out a Blank, ſhall diſmiſs the Youth and cauſe the Ballot to proceed.

29. Order. *Conſtitution of the Military part of the Provincial Orb.*

TO perfect the whole Structure of this Common-wealth, ſome Directions are given to the third Eſſay, or Army marching, in

THE thirtieth ORDER. *When thou goeſt to battle againſt thy Enemies, and ſeeſt Horſes and Chariots, and a People more than thou; be not afraid of them, for the Lord thy God is he that goes with thee to fight for thee againſt thy Enemies. And when thou divideſt the Spoil, it ſhall be as a Statute and an Ordinance to thee, that as his part is that goes down to the battle, ſo ſhall his part be that tarries by the Stuff:* that is, (as to the Common-wealth of *Oceana*) The Spoil taken of the Enemy (except Cloaths, Arms, Horſes, Ammunition and Victuals, to be divided to the Soldiery by the Strategus and the Polemarchs upon the place according to their diſcretion) ſhall be deliver'd to four Commiſſaries of the Spoils elected and ſworn by the Council of War; which Commiſſaries ſhall be allowed Shipping by the State, and Convoys according as occaſion ſhall require by the Strategus; to the end that having a Bill of Lading ſign'd by three or more of the Polemarchs, they may ſhip and bring, or cauſe ſuch Spoils to be brought to the Prize-

30. Order. Deut. 20. 1. 1 Sam. 30. 24.

Prize-Office in *Oceana*, where they ſhall be ſold; and the Profit ariſing by ſuch Spoils ſhall be divided into three parts, whereof one ſhall go to the Treaſury, another ſhall be paid to the Soldiery of this Nation, and a third to the Auxiliaries at their return from their Service, provided that the ſaid Auxiliaries be equal in number to the proper Forces of this Nation, otherwiſe their Share ſhall be ſo much leſs as they themſelves are fewer in number: the reſt of the two thirds to go to the Officers and Soldiers of the proper Forces. And the Spoils ſo divided to the proper Forces, ſhall be ſubdivided into three equal parts, whereof one ſhall go to the Officers, and two to the common Soldiers: The like for the Auxiliaries. And the Share allotted to the Officers ſhall be divided into four equal parts, whereof one ſhall go to the Strategus, another to the Polemarchs, a third to the Colonels, and a fourth to the Captains, Cornets, Enſigns, and under Officers, receiving their ſhare of the Spoil as common Soldiers: The like for the Auxiliaries. And this upon pain, in the caſe of failure, of what the People of *Oceana* (to whom the Cognizance of Peculat or Crimes of this nature is properly appertaining) ſhall adjudge or decree.

UPON theſe three laſt Orders the ARCHON *ſeem'd to be haranguing at the head of his Army in this manner.*

My Dear Lords and Excellent Patriots;

" A GOVERNMENT of this make is a Common-wealth
" for Increaſe. Of thoſe for Preſervation, the Inconveniencies
" and Frailties have been ſhewn: Their Roots are narrow, ſuch as do
" not run, have no Fibers, their tops weak and dangerouſly expos'd
" to the weather; except you chance to find one, as *Venice*, planted
" in a Flower-pot; and if ſhe grows, ſhe grows top-heavy, and falls
" too. But you cannot plant an Oak in a Flower-pot; ſhe muſt have
" Earth for her Root, and Heaven for her Branches.

Imperium Oceano, famam quæ terminet aſtris.

" *ROME* was ſaid to be broken by her own weight, but poeti-
" cally: For that weight by which ſhe was pretended to be ruin'd,
" was ſupported in her Emperors by a far ſlighter Foundation. And
" in the common experience of good Architecture, there is nothing
" more known, than that Buildings ſtand the firmer and the longer
" for their own weight; nor ever ſwerve thro' any other internal
" cauſe, than that their Materials are corruptible: But the People ne-
" ver die; nor, as a political Body, are ſubject to any other Corrup-
" tion than that which derives from their Government. Unleſs a
" Man will deny the Chain of Cauſes, in which he denies God, he
" muſt alſo acknowledge the Chain of Effects; wherefore there can be
" no effect in Nature, that is not from the firſt Cauſe, and thoſe ſuc-
" ceſſive Links of the Chain, without which it could not have been.
" Now except a Man can ſhew the contrary in a Common-wealth; if
" there be no cauſe of Corruption in the firſt make of it, there can
" never be any ſuch Effect. Let no Man's Superſtition impoſe Pro-
" faneneſs upon this Aſſertion; for as Man is ſinful, but yet the Uni-
" verſe is perfect, ſo may the Citizen be ſinful, and yet the Com-
" mon-wealth be perfect. And as Man, ſeeing the World is perfect,
" can never commit any ſuch Sin as ſhall render it imperfect, or bring

" it

" it to a natural diſſolution; ſo the Citizen, where the Common-
" wealth is perfect, can never commit any ſuch Crime as will render
" it imperfect, or bring it to a natural diſſolution. To come to ex-
" perience; *Venice*, notwithſtanding we have found ſome flaws in
" it, it is the only Common-wealth in the Make whereof no man can
" find a cauſe of diſſolution; for which reaſon we behold her (tho'
" ſhe conſiſts of men that are not without ſin) at this day with one
" thouſand Years upon her back, yet for any internal cauſe, as young,
" as freſh, and free from decay, or any appearance of it, as ſhe was
" born: but whatever in nature is not ſenſible of decay by the courſe
" of a thouſand Years, is capable of the whole Age of Nature; by
" which Calculation, for any check that I am able to give my ſelf, a
" Common-wealth, rightly order'd, may, for any internal cauſes, be
" as immortal or long-liv'd as the World. But if this be true, thoſe
" Common-wealths that are naturally fall'n, muſt have deriv'd their
" Ruin from the riſe of them. *Iſrael* and *Athens* dy'd not natural but
" violent deaths; in which manner the World it ſelf is to die. We
" are ſpeaking of thoſe cauſes of Diſſolution which are natural to
" Government; and they are but two, either Contradiction or In-
" equality: If a Common-wealth be a Contradiction, ſhe muſt needs
" deſtroy her ſelf; and if ſhe be inequal, it tends to ſtriſe, and ſtriſe
" to ruin. By the former of theſe fell *Lacedemon*, by the latter *Rome*.
" *Lacedemon* being made altogether for War, and yet not for Increaſe,
" her natural Progreſs became her natural Diſſolution, and the build-
" ing of her own victorious Hand too heavy for her Foundation; ſo
" that ſhe fell indeed by her own weight. But *Rome* periſh'd thro'
" her native Inequality, which how it inveterated the Boſoms of the
" Senate and the People each againſt other, and even to death, has been
" ſhewn at large.

" LOOK well to it, my Lords, for if there be a contradiction or
" inequality in your Common-wealth, it muſt fall; but if it has neither
" of theſe, it has no principle of Mortality. Do not think me impu-
" dent; if this be truth, I ſhould commit a groſs indiſcretion in con-
" cealing it. Sure I am that MACHIAVEL is for the immortality of
" a Common-wealth upon far weaker Principles. *If a Common-* Diſc. B. 3. c.
" *wealth*, ſays he, *were ſo happy as to be provided often with men, that,* 22. b. 3. c. 29.
" *when ſhe is ſwerving from her Principles, ſhould reduce her to her*
" *Inſtitution, ſhe would be immortal.* But a Common-wealth, as we
" have demonſtrated, ſwerves not from her Principles, but by and
" thro' her Inſtitution; if ſhe brought no Biaſs into the world with
" her, her courſe for any internal cauſe muſt be ſtreight forward,
" as we ſee in that of *Venice*. She cannot turn to the right hand,
" nor to the left, but by ſome rub, which is not an internal but exter-
" nal cauſe; againſt ſuch ſhe can be no way fortify'd, but thro'
" her Situation, as is *Venice*; or thro' her Militia, as was *Rome*: by
" which examples a Common-wealth may be ſecure of thoſe alſo.
" Think me not vain, for I cannot conceal my opinion here; a Com-
" mon-wealth that is rightly inſtituted can never ſwerve, nor one that
" is not rightly inſtituted be ſecur'd from ſwerving by reduction to her
" firſt Principles: Wherefore it is no leſs apparent in this place, that
" MACHIAVEL underſtood not a Common-wealth as to the whole
" piece, than where having told you, *That a Tribune, or any other Ci-* Diſc. B. 1. c.
" *tizen of* Rome, *might propoſe a Law to the People, and debate it with* 18.

" *them*; he adds, *this Order was good, while the People were good; but* " *when the People became evil, it became moſt pernicious.* As if this Or- " der (thro' which, with the like, the People moſt apparently became " evil) could ever have been good; or that the People, or the Common- " wealth could ever have become good, by being reduc'd to ſuch Princi- " ples as were the Original of their Evil. The diſeaſe of *Rome* was, " as has been ſhewn, from the native inequality of her Balance, and no " otherwiſe from the Empire of the World, than as, this falling into " one Scale, that of the Nobility (an evil in ſuch a Fabric inevitable, " kick'd out the People. Wherefore a Man that could have made her " to throw away the Empire of the World, might in that have re- " duc'd her to her Principles; and yet have been ſo far from rendering " her immortal, that going no further, he ſhould never have cur'd " her. But your Common-wealth is founded upon an equal Agrari- " an; and if *the Earth be given to the Sons of men*, this Balance is the " Balance of Juſtice, ſuch a one as in having due regard to the diffe- " rent Induſtry of different men, yet *faithfully judges the Poor. And*
Prov. 29. 14. " *the King that faithfully judges the Poor, his Throne ſhall be eſtabliſh'd* " *for ever*; much more the Common-wealth, ſeeing that equality " which is the neceſſary diſſolution of Monarchy, is the Generation, " the very Life and Soul of a Common-wealth. And now, if ever, " I may be excuſable, ſeeing my aſſertion, that the Throne of a Com- " mon-wealth may be eſtabliſh'd for ever, is conſonant to the holy " Scriptures.

" THE Balance of a Common-wealth that is equal, is of ſuch a " nature, that whatever falls into her Empire, muſt fall equally; and " if the whole Earth falls into your Scales, it muſt fall equally; and " ſo you may be a greater People, and yet not ſwerve from your Prin- " ciples one hair. Nay, you will be ſo far from that, that you muſt " bring the world in ſuch a caſe to your Balance, even to the Balance " of Juſtice. But hearken, my Lords; are we on Earth? do we ſee " the Sun? or are we viſiting thoſe ſhady places which are feign'd by " the Poets?

Continuò auditæ voces, vagitus & ingens.

" Theſe *Gothic* Empires that are yet in the world, were at the firſt, " tho' they had legs of their own, but a heavy and unweildy burden; " but their Foundations being now broken, the Iron of them enters " even into the Souls of the Oppreſt; and hear the voice of their Com- " forters: *My Father hath chaſtis'd you with Whips, but I will chaſtiſe* " *you with Scorpions.* Hearken, I ſay; if thy Brother cries to thee in " affliction, wilt thou not hear him? This is a Common-wealth of the " Fabric, that has an open ear and a public concern; ſhe is not made " for her ſelf only, but given as a Magiſtrate of God to Mankind, for " the vindication of common Right, and the Law of Nature. Where- " fore ſays CICERO of the like, that of the *Romans*, * *We have ra-* " *ther undertaken the Patronage, than the Empire of the World.* If you, " not regarding this Example, like ſome other Nations that are upon " the point to ſmart for it, ſhall, having attain'd to your own Liberty, " *bear the Sword* of your common Magiſtracy *in vain*, ſit ſtill, and

* Nos magis Patronatum orbis terrarum ſuſcepimus, quam Imperium.

" fold

" fold your Arms, or, which is worſe, let out the Blood of your Peo-
" ple to Tyrants, to be ſhed in the defence of their Yokes like Water,
" and ſo not only *turn the Grace of God into wantonneſs*, but his *Juſtice*
" *into Wormwood:* I ſay if you do thus, you are not now making a Com-
" mon-wealth, *but heaping coals of fire upon your own heads.* A Com-
" mon-wealth of this make is a Miniſter of God upon Earth, to the end
" that the World may be *govern'd with Righteouſneſs.* For which cauſe
" (that I may come at length to our preſent buſineſs) the Orders laſt
" rehears'd are buds of Empire, ſuch as with the bleſſing of God may
" ſpread the Arms of your Common-wealth, like a holy *Aſylum*, to the
" diſtreſs'd World, and give the Earth her Sabbath of years, or reſt
" from her Labours, under the ſhadow of your Wings. It is upon this
" point where the Writings of MACHIAVEL, having for the reſt ex-
" cel'd all other Authors, come as far to excel themſelves.

" *COMMON-WEALTHS*, ſays he, *have had three ways of* Diſc. B. 2. C. 4.
" *propagating themſelves*, one after the manner of Monarchies, *by im-*
" *poſing the Yoke, which was the way of* Athens, *and towards the latter*
" *times of* Lacedemon; *another by equal Leagues, which is the way of*
" Switzerland; (I ſhall add of *Holland*, tho' ſince his time) *a third by*
" *inequal Leagues, which, to the ſhame of the World, was never prac-*
" *tis'd*, nay nor ſo much as ſeen or minded, *by any other Common-*
" *wealth but that only of* Rome. They will each of them, either for
" caution or imitation, be worthy to be well weigh'd, which is the
" proper work of this place. *Athens* and *Lacedemon* have been the
" occaſion of great ſcandal to the world, in two, or at leaſt one
" of two regards: the firſt their Emulation, which involv'd *Greece*
" in perpetual Wars; the ſecond their way of Propagation, which by
" impoſing Yokes upon others, was plainly contradictory to their own
" Principles.

" FOR the firſt: Governments, be they of what kind ſoever, if
" they be planted too cloſe, are like Trees, that impatient in their
" growth to have it hinder'd, eat out one another. It was not un-
" known to theſe in ſpeculation, or, if you read the ſtory of AGE-
" SILAUS, in action, that either of them with thirty thouſand men
" might have maſter'd the Eaſt; and certainly, if the one had not
" ſtood in the others light, ALEXANDER had come too late to that
" end, which was the means (and would be if they were to live
" again) of ruin, at leaſt to one of them: wherefore with any man
" that underſtands the nature of Government this is excuſable. So it
" was between *Oceana* and *Marpeſia*; ſo it is between *France* and
" *Spain*, tho' leſs excuſable; and ſo it ever will be in the like caſes.
" But to come to the ſecond occaſion of Scandal by them given, which
" was in the way of their propagation, it is not excuſable: for they
" brought their Confederates under bondage; by which means *Athens*
" gave occaſion of the *Peloponneſian* War, the wound of which ſhe
" dy'd ſtinking, when *Lacedemon*, taking the ſame Infection from
" her Carcaſe, ſoon follow'd.

" WHEREFORE, my Lords, let theſe be warnings to you,
" not to make that Liberty which God has given you a ſnare to
" others, in practiſing this kind of enlargement of your ſelves.

" THE ſecond way of Propagation or Enlargement us'd by Com-
" mon-wealths, is that of *Switzerland* and *Holland*, equal Leagues:
" This, tho' it be not otherwiſe miſchievous, is uſeleſs to the World,

" and

" and dangerous to themſelves: uſeleſs to the World; for as the for-
" mer Governments were Storks, theſe are Blocks, have no ſenſe of
" Honour, or concern in the Sufferings of others. But as the *Ætolians*,
" a State of the like Fabric, were reproach'd by PHILIP of *Mace-*
" *don*, to proſtitute themſelves, by letting out their Arms to the Luſts
" of others, while they leave their own Liberty barren, and without
" legitimate iſſue; ſo I do not defame theſe People: the *Switzer* for
" Valour has no Superior, the *Hollander* for Induſtry no equal; but
" themſelves in the mean time ſhall ſo much the leſs excuſe their Go-
" vernments, ſeeing that to the *Switz* it is well enough known that the
" Enſigns of his Common-wealth have no other *Motto* than *in te con-*
" *verte manus:* and that of the *Hollander*, tho' he ſweats more Gold
" than the *Spaniard* digs, lets him languiſh in debt; for ſhe her ſelf
" lives upon charity. Theſe are dangerous to themſelves, precarious
" Governments, ſuch as do not command, but beg their Bread from
" Province to Province, in Coats that being patch'd up of all colours
" are in effect of none. That their Cantons and Provinces are ſo
" many Arrows, is good; but they are ſo many Bows too, which is
" naught.

" LIKE to theſe was the Common-wealth of the antient *Tuſcans*,
" hung together like Bobbins, without a hand to weave with them;
" therefore eaſily overcome by the *Romans*, tho' at that time, for num-
" ber, a far leſs conſiderable People. If your Liberty be not a Root
" that grows, it will be a Branch that withers; which conſideration
" brings me to the Paragon, the Common-wealth of *Rome*.

" THE ways and means whereby the *Romans* acquir'd the Patro-
" nage, and in that the Empire of the World, were different, ac-
" cording to the different condition of their Common-wealth in her
" riſe, and in her growth: in her riſe ſhe proceeded rather by Colonies;
" in her growth by unequal Leagues. Colonies without the bounds of
" *Italy* ſhe planted none (ſuch diſperſion of the *Roman* Citizen as to
" plant him in foreign parts, till the contrary Intereſt of the Emperors
" brought in that Practice, was unlawful) nor did ſhe ever demoliſh
" any City within that compaſs, or deveſt it of Liberty; but where-
" as the moſt of them were Common-wealths, ſtir'd up by emula-
" tion of her great felicity to war againſt her, if ſhe overcame any,
" ſhe confiſcated ſome part of their Lands that were the greateſt
" Incendiaries, or cauſes of the Trouble, upon which ſhe planted
" Colonies of her own People, preſerving the reſt of their Lands and
" Liberties for the Natives or Inhabitants. By this way of proceed-
" ing, that I may be as brief as poſſible, ſhe did many and great
" things. For in confirming of Liberty, ſhe propagated her Empire;
" in holding the Inhabitants from Rebellion, ſhe put a curb upon the
" incurſion of Enemies; in exonerating her ſelf of the poorer ſort, ſhe
" multiply'd her Citizens; in rewarding her Veterans, ſhe render'd
" the reſt leſs ſeditious; and in acquiring to her ſelf the reverence of
" a common Parent, ſhe from time to time became the Mother of
" new-born Cities.

" IN her farther growth the way of her Propagation went more
" upon Leagues, which for the firſt diviſion were of two kinds, So-
" cial and Provincial.

" AGAIN, Social Leagues, or Leagues of Society, were of two
" kinds.

" THE

" THE firſt call'd *Latinity* or *Latin*, the ſecond *Italian Right*.
" THE League between the *Romans* and the *Latins*, or Latin
" Right, approach'd neareſt to *Jus Quiritium*, or the Right of a na-
" tive *Roman*. The Man or the City that was honour'd with this
" Right, was *Civitate donatus cum ſuffragio*, adopted a Citizen of *Rome*,
" with the Right of giving Suffrage with the People in ſome caſes, as
" thoſe of Confirmation of Law, or Determination in Judicature, if
" both the Conſuls were agreed, not otherwiſe; wherefore that com-
" ing to little, the greateſt and moſt peculiar part of this Priviledge
" was, that who had born Magiſtracy (at leaſt that of *Ædil* or *Quæ-
" ſtor*) in any Latin City, was by conſequence of the ſame, a Citizen
" of *Rome* at all points.

" ITALIAN *Right* was alſo a donation of the City, but with-
" out Suffrage: they who were in either of theſe Leagues, were go-
" vern'd by their own Laws and Magiſtrates, having all the Rights, as
" to Liberty, of Citizens of *Rome*, yielding and paying to the Com-
" mon-wealth as head of the League, and having in the conduct of all
" Affairs appertaining to the common Cauſe, ſuch aid of Men and
" Money as was particularly agreed to upon the merit of the Cauſe, and
" ſpecify'd in their reſpective Leagues, whence ſuch Leagues came to
" be call'd equal or inequal accordingly.

" PROVINCIAL *Leagues* were of different extention, accord-
" ing to the Merit and Capacity of a conquer'd People; but they were
" all of one kind: for every Province was govern'd by *Roman* Ma-
" giſtrates, as a Prætor or a Pro-conſul, according to the dignity of the
" Province, for the Civil Adminiſtration and Conduct of the Provin-
" cial Army: and a Quæſtor for the gathering of the public Revenue,
" from which Magiſtrates a Province might appeal to *Rome*.

" FOR the better underſtanding of theſe Particulars, I ſhall exem-
" plify in as many of them as is needful: and firſt in *Macedon:*

" THE *Macedonians* were thrice conquer'd by the *Romans*, firſt
" under the Conduct of TITUS QUINTUS FLAMINIUS; ſecond-
" ly, under that of LUCIUS ÆMILIUS PAULUS; and, thirdly,
" under that of QUINTUS CÆCILIUS METELLUS, thence call'd
" MACEDONICUS.

" FOR the firſt time PHILIP of *Macedon*, who (poſſeſt of *Acro-
" corinthus*) boaſted no leſs than was true, that he had *Greece* in fet-
" ters, being overcome by FLAMINIUS, had his Kingdom reſtor'd to
" him, upon condition that he ſhould immediately ſet all the Cities
" which he held in *Greece* and in *Aſia* at liberty; and that he ſhould
" not make war out of *Macedon*, but by leave of the Senate of *Rome*;
" which PHILIP (having no other way to ſave any thing) agreed
" ſhould be done accordingly.

" THE *Grecians* being at this time aſſembl'd at the *Iſthmian* Games,
" where the Concourſe was mighty great, a Crier, appointed to the
" office by FLAMINIUS, was heard among them proclaiming all
" *Greece* to be free; to which the People, being amaz'd at ſo hopeleſs a
" thing, gave little credit, till they receiv'd ſuch teſtimony of the
" truth as put it paſt all doubt: whereupon they fell immediately on
" running to the Pro-conſul with Flowers and Garlands, and ſuch vio-
" lent expreſſions of their Admiration and Joy, as, if FLAMINIUS,
" a young man, about thirty three, had not alſo been very ſtrong, he
" muſt have dy'd of no other death than their kindneſs, while every

" one ſtriving to touch his hand, they bore him up and down the field " with an unruly throng, full of ſuch Ejaculations as theſe: How! " Is there a People in the world, that at their own charge, at their own " peril, will fight for the Liberty of another? Did they live at the " next door to this fire? Or what kind of men are theſe, whoſe buſi- " neſs it is to paſs the Seas, that the World may be govern'd with " Righteouſneſs? The Cities of *Greece* and of *Aſia* ſhake off their Iron " Fetters at the voice of a Cryer! Was it madneſs to imagine ſuch a " thing, and is it done? O Virtue! O Felicity! O Fame!

" IN this Example your Lordſhips have a donation of Liberty, or " of *Italian* Right to a People, by reſtitution to what they had for- " merly enjoy'd; and ſome particular Men, Families, or Cities, accord- " ing to their merit of the *Romans*, if not upon this, yet upon the like " occaſions, were gratify'd with Latinity.

" BUT PHILIP's ſhare by this means did not pleaſe him, where- " fore the League was broken by his Son PERSEUS; and the *Mace-* " *donians* thereupon for the ſecond time conquer'd by ÆMILIUS " PAULUS, their King taken, and they ſome time after the Victory " ſummon'd to the Tribunal of the General; where remembring how " little hope they ought to have of Pardon, they expected ſome dread- " ful Sentence; When ÆMILIUS in the firſt place declar'd the *Ma-* " *cedonians* to be free, in the full poſſeſſion of their Lands, Goods, and " Laws, with Right to elect annual Magiſtrates, yielding and paying " to the People of *Rome* one half of the Tribute which they were " accuſtom'd to pay to their own Kings. This done he went on, " making ſo skilful a diviſion of the Country in order to the metho- " dizing of the People, and caſting them into a form of popular Go- " vernment, that the *Macedonians*, being firſt ſurpriz'd with the Vir- " tue of the *Romans*, began now to alter the ſcene of their Admirati- " on, that a Stranger ſhould do ſuch things for them in their own " Country, and with ſuch facility, as they had never ſo much as once " imagin'd to be poſſible. Nor was this all, for ÆMILIUS, as if not " dictating to conquer'd Enemies, but to ſome well deſerving Friends, " gave them in the laſt place Laws ſo ſuitable, and contrived with ſuch " care and prudence, that long uſe and experience (the only Correctreſs " of Works of this nature) could never find a fault in them.

" IN this Example you have a Donation of Liberty, or of *Italian* " Right, to a People that had not taſted of it before, but were now " taught how to uſe it.

" MY LORDS, The Royaliſts ſhould compare what we are do- " ing, and we what hitherto we have done for them, with this example. " It is a ſhame that while we are boaſting up our ſelves above all o- " thers, we ſhould yet be ſo far from imitating ſuch examples as theſe, " that we do not ſo much as underſtand that if Government be the Pa- " rent of Manners, where there are no Heroic Virtues, there is no He- " roic Government.

" BUT the *Macedonians* rebelling, at the name of a falſe PHILIP, " the third time againſt the *Romans*, were by them judg'd incapable " of Liberty, and reduc'd by METELLUS to a Province.

" NOW whereas it remains, that I explain the nature of a Province, " I ſhall rather chooſe that of *Sicily*, becauſe having been the firſt which " the *Romans* made, the deſcriptions of the reſt relate to it.

" *WE*

" *WE have ſo receiv'd the* Sicilian *Cities into Amity*, ſays CICERO, " *that they enjoy their antient Laws; and upon no other condition than* " *of the ſame obedience to the People of* Rome, *which they formerly* " *yielded to their own Princes or Superiors.* So the *Sicilians*, whereas " they had been parcel'd out to divers Princes, and into divers States " (the cauſe of perpetual Wars, whereby, hewing one another down, " they became Sacrifices to the Ambition of their Neighbours, or of " ſome Invader) were now receiv'd at the old rate into a new Protec- " tion which could hold them, and in which no Enemy durſt touch " them; nor was it poſſible, as the caſe then ſtood, for the *Sicilians* " to receive, or for the *Romans* to give more.

" A ROMAN *Province* is defin'd by SIGONIUS, *a Region hav-* " *ing Provincial Right.* Provincial Right in general was to be go- " vern'd by a *Roman Prætor*, or *Conſul*, in matters at leaſt of State, " and of the *Militia:* And by a *Quæſtor*, whoſe Office it was to re- " ceive the Public Revenue. Provincial Right in particular was dif- " ferent, according to the different Leagues or Agreements between " the Common-wealth, and the People reduc'd into a Province. *Si-* " *culi hoc jure ſunt, ut quod civis cum cive agat, domi certet ſuis legi-* " *bus; quod Siculus cum Siculo non ejuſdem Civitatis, ut de eo Prætor* " *Judices, ex P. Rupilii Decreto, ſortiatur. Quod privatus a Populo* " *petit, aut populus a privato, Senatus ex aliqua Civitate, qui judicet,* " *datur, cui alternæ Civitates rejectæ ſunt. Quod civis Romanus a Si-* " *culo petit, Siculus Judex datur; quod Siculus a cive Romano, civis* " *Romanus datur. Cæterarum rerum ſelecti Judices ex civium Roma-* " *norum conventu proponi ſolent. Inter aratores & decumanos lege fru-* " *mentaria, quam Hieronicam appellant, judicia fiunt.* Becauſe the " reſt would oblige me to a diſcourſe too large for this place, it ſhall " ſuffice that I have ſhew'd you how it was in *Sicily.*

" MY LORDS, Upon the Fabric of your Provincial Orb I ſhall " not hold you; becauſe it is ſufficiently deſcrib'd in the Order, and I " cannot believe that you think it inferior to the way of a *Prætor* and " a *Quæſtor*. But whereas the Provincial way of the *Roman* Common- " wealth was that whereby it held the Empire of the World, and your " Orbs are intended to be capable at leaſt of the like uſe; there may " ariſe many Controverſies: As whether ſuch a courſe be lawful; whe- " ther it be feizible; and, ſeeing that the *Romans* were ruin'd upon " that point, whether it would not be to the deſtruction of the Com- " mon-wealth.

" FOR the firſt, If the Empire of a Common-wealth be an occa- " ſion to aſk whether it be lawful for a Common-wealth to aſpire to " the Empire of the World, it is to aſk whether it be lawful for it to " do its duty, or to put the World into a better condition than it was " before.

" AND to aſk whether this be feizible, is to aſk why the *Oceaner* " being under the like adminiſtration of Government, may not do as " much with two hundred men as the *Roman* did with one hundred; " for comparing their Common-wealths in their riſe, the difference is " yet greater. Now that *Rome (ſeris Avaritia Luxuriaque)* thro' the na- " tural thirſt of her conſtitution, came at length with the fulneſs of her " Provinces to burſt her ſelf, this is no otherwiſe to be underſtood, than " as when a man that from his own evil Conſtitution had contracted " the Dropſy, dies with drinking: It being apparent that in caſe her

" Agrarian

" Agrarian had held, ſhe could never have been thus ruin'd; and I " have already demonſtrated that your Agrarian being once pois'd, " can never break or ſwerve.

" WHEREFORE to draw towards ſome concluſion of this " Diſcourſe, let me inculcate the uſe, by ſelecting a few Conſiderations " out of many. The regard had in this place to the Empire of the " World appertains to a well-order'd Common-wealth, more eſpe- " cially for two reaſons.

" 1. THE facility of this great Enterprize, by a Government of " the Model propos'd.

" 2. THE danger that you would run in the omiſſion of ſuch a " Government.

" THE facility of this Enterprize, upon the grounds already laid, " muſt needs be great, foraſmuch as the Empire of the World has " been, both in Reaſon and Experience, the neceſſary conſequence of " a Common-wealth of this nature only: for tho' it has been given to " all kinds to drive at it, ſince that of *Athens* or *Lacedemon*, if the one " had not hung in the others light, might have gain'd it; yet could " neither of them have held it: not *Athens*, thro' the manner of her " propagation, which, being by downright Tyranny, could not pre- " ſerve what ſhe had; nor *Lacedemon*, becauſe ſhe was overthrown by " the weight of a leſs Conqueſt. The facility then of this great En- " terprize being peculiar to popular Government, I ſhall conſider it, " firſt, In gaining; and ſecondly, In holding.

" FOR the former, *Volenti non fit injuria*; it is ſaid of the Peo- " ple under EUMENES, that they would not have chang'd their ſub- " jection for Liberty; wherefore the *Romans* gave them no diſtur- " bance. If a People be contented with their Government, it is a " certain ſign that it is good, and much good do them with it. The " Sword of your Magiſtracy is for a terror to them that do evil. " EUMENES had the fear of God, or of the *Romans* before his eyes; " concerning ſuch he has given you no Commiſſion.

" BUT till we can ſay here are the *Romans*, where is EUMENES? " Do not think that the late *appearances of God* to you have been al- " together for your ſelves; *he has ſurely ſeen the Affliction* of your Bre- " thren, *and heard their cry by reaſon of their Taſk-maſters.* For to be- " lieve otherwiſe, is not only to be mindleſs of his ways, but altoge- " ther deaf. If you have ears to hear, this is the way in which you " will certainly be call'd upon: For if, while there is no ſtock of Li- " berty, no ſanctuary of the afflicted, it be a common object to be- " hold a People caſting themſelves out of the Pan of one Prince into " the Fire of another; what can you think, but if the World ſhould " ſee the *Roman* Eagle again, ſhe would renew her age, and her flight? " Nor did ever ſhe ſpread her Wings with better Omen, than will be " read in your Enſigns; which if, call'd in by an oppreſs'd People, " they interpoſe between them and their Yoke, the People them- " ſelves muſt either do nothing in the mean time, or have no more " pains to take for their wiſh'd Fruit than to gather it, if that be not " likewiſe done for them. Wherefore this muſt needs be eaſy, and " yet you have a greater facility than is in the arm of fleſh; for if the " Cauſe of Mankind be the Cauſe of God, the Lord of Hoſts will be " your Captain, and you ſhall be a Praiſe to the whole Earth.

" THE

" THE facility of holding is in the way of your Propagation; if " you take that of *Athens* and *Lacedemon*, you ſhall rain Snares; but " either catch, or hold nothing. Lying lips are an abomination to the " Lord: If ſetting up for Liberty, you impoſe Yokes, he will infallibly " deſtroy you. On the other ſide, to go about a work of this nature " by a League without a Head, is to abdicate that Magiſtracy, where- " with he has not only indu'd you, but whereof he will require an " account of you: for, *curs'd is he that does the Work of the Lord neg-* " *ligently*. Wherefore you are to take the courſe of *Rome:* if you have " ſubdu'd a Nation that is capable of Liberty, you ſhall make them a " preſent of it, as did FLAMINIUS to *Greece*, and ÆMILIUS to " *Macedon*, reſerving to your ſelves ſome part of that Revenue which " was legally paid to the former Government, together with the " right of being Head of the League, which includes ſuch Levies of " Men and Money as ſhall be neceſſary for the carrying on of the Pub- " lic Work. For if a People have by your means attain'd to freedom, " they owe both to the Cauſe and you, ſuch aid as may propagate the " like Fruit to the reſt of the World. But whereas every Nation is " not capable of her Liberty to this degree, leſt you be put to doing " and undoing of things, as the *Romans* were in *Macedon*, you ſhall " diligently obſerve what Nation is fit for her Liberty to this degree, " and what not: Which is to be done by two marks, the firſt if ſhe be " willing to *help the Lord againſt the Mighty*; for if ſhe has no care of " the Liberty of Mankind, ſhe deſerves not her own. But becauſe " in this you may be deceiv'd by Pretences, which, continuing for a " while ſpecious, may afterwards vaniſh; the other is more certain, " and that is if ſhe be capable of an equal Agrarian; which that it " was not obſerv'd by excellent ÆMILIUS in his donation of Liber- " ty, and introduction of a Popular State among the *Macedonians*, " I am more than mov'd to believe for two reaſons: the firſt, becauſe " at the ſame time the Agrarian was odious to the Roman *Patricians*; " the ſecond, that the PSEUDO-PHILIP could afterwards ſo eaſily " recover *Macedon*, which could not have happen'd but by the Nobi- " lity, and their impatience, having great Eſtates, to be equal'd with " the People; for that the People ſhould otherwiſe, at the mere ſound " of a Name, have thrown away their Liberty, is incredible. Where- " fore be aſſur'd, that the Nation where you cannot eſtabliſh an equal " Agrarian, is incapable of its Liberty as to this kind of Donation. " For example, except the Ariſtocracy in *Marpeſia* be diſſolv'd, nei- " ther can that People have their Liberty there, nor you govern at " home; for they continuing ſtill liable to be ſold by their Lords to fo- " reign Princes, there will never (eſpecially in a Country of which there " is no other profit to be made) be want of ſuch Merchants and Dro- " vers, while you muſt be the Market where they are to receive their " ſecond Payment.

" NOR can the Ariſtocracy there be diſſolv'd but by your means, " in relation whereto you are provided with your Provincial Orb; " which being proportion'd to the meaſure of the Nation that you " have vindicated or conquer'd, will eaſily hold it: for there is not a " People in the World more difficult to be held than the *Marpeſians*, " which tho' by themſelves it be aſcrib'd to their own nature, is truly " to be attributed to that of their Country. Nevertheleſs you hav- " ing nine thouſand men upon the continual guard of it, that, threa-

" ten'd by any ſudden inſurrection, have places of retreat; and an
" Army of forty thouſand men upon a days warning ready to march
" to their reſcue; it is not to be rationally ſhewn which way they can
" poſſibly ſlip out of your hands. And if a man ſhall think that up-
" on a Province more remote, and divided by the Sea, you have not
" the like hold, he has not ſo well conſider'd your Wings as your
" Talons, your ſhipping being of ſuch a nature, as makes the deſcent
" of your Armies almoſt of equal facility in any Country: ſo that
" what you take, you hold, both becauſe your Militia, being already
" populous, will be of great growth in it ſelf; and alſo thro' your
" Confederates, by whom in taking and holding you are ſtill more in-
" abled to do both.

" NOR ſhall you eaſilier hold, than the People under your Em-
" pire or Patronage may be held. My Lords, I would not go to the
" door to ſee whether it be cloſe ſhut; this is no underhand dealing,
" nor a game at which he ſhall have any advantage againſt you who
" ſees your Cards, but on the contrary the Advantage ſhall be your
" own: for with eighteen thouſand men (which number I put, be-
" cauſe it circulates your Orb by the annual change of ſix thouſand)
" having eſtabliſh'd your matters in the order ſhewn, you will be able
" to hold the greateſt Province; and eighteen thouſand men, allow-
" ing them greater pay than any Prince ever gave, will not ſtand
* *This by the pay of a Parliamentary Army, is demonſtrated in the Corollary.*
" the Province in one million Revenue; * in conſideration whereof,
" they ſhall have their own Eſtates free to themſelves, and be govern'd
" by their own Laws and Magiſtrates; which, if the Revenue of the
" Province be in dry Rent (as there may be ſome that are four times
" as big as *Oceana*) forty millions, will bring it with that of Indu-
" ſtry, to ſpeak with the leaſt, to twice the value: So that the Peo-
" ple there, who at this day are ſo oppreſt that they have nothing at
" all whereon to live, ſhall for one Million paid to you, receive at
" leaſt ſeventy nine to their proper uſe: in which place I appeal to any
" man, whether the Empire deſcrib'd can be other than the Patronage
" of the World.

" NOW if you add to the propagation of Civil Liberty (ſo na-
" tural to this Common-wealth that it cannot be omitted) the propa-
" gation of the Liberty of Conſcience, this Empire, this Patronage of
" the World is the Kingdom of Chriſt: For as the Kingdom of God
" the Father was a Common-wealth, ſo ſhall be the Kingdom of God
Pſal. 110. 3. " the Son; *The People ſhall be willing in the day of his Power.*

" HAVING ſhew'd you in this and other places, ſome of thoſe
" ineſtimable Benefits of this kind of Government, together with the
" natural and facile Emanation of them from their Fountain, I come
" (leſt God, who has appear'd to you, for he is the God of Nature,
" in the glorious Conſtellation of theſe ſubordinate Cauſes, whereof we
" have hitherto been taking the true Elevation, ſhould ſhake off the
" duſt of his Feet againſt you) to warn you of the Dangers, which
" you, not taking the opportunity, will incur by omiſſion.

" *MACHIAVEL* ſpeaking of the defect of *Venice*, thro' her
" want of proper Arms, cries out, † *This cut her Wings, and ſpoil'd her*
" *mount to Heaven.* If you lay your Common-wealth upon any other

† Queſto tagliogli le gambe da montar in cielo.

" Foundation

" Foundation than the People, you fruſtrate your ſelf of proper Arms, " and ſo loſe the Empire of the World; nor is this all, but ſome other " Nation will have it.

" *COLUMBUS* offer'd Gold to one of your Kings, thro' whoſe " happy incredulity another Prince has drunk the Poiſon, even to the " conſumption of his People; but I do not offer you a Nerve of War " that is made of Purſe-ſtrings, ſuch a one as has drawn the face of the " Earth into Convulſions, but ſuch as is natural to her Health and " Beauty. Look you to it, where there is tumbling and toſſing up- " on the bed of ſickneſs, it muſt end in death or recovery. Tho' the " People of the World, in the dregs of the *Gothic* Empire, be yet " tumbling and toſſing upon the bed of ſickneſs, they cannot die; " nor is there any means of recovery for them but by antient pru- " dence, whence of neceſſity it muſt come to paſs, that this Drug be " better known. If *France*, *Italy*, and *Spain*, were not all ſick, all " corrupted together, there would be none of them ſo; for the ſick " would not be able to withſtand the ſound, nor the ſound to preſerve " their health without curing of the ſick. The firſt of theſe Nations " (which, if you ſtay her leiſure, will in my mind be *France)* that " recovers the health of antient Prudence, ſhall certainly govern the " World; for what did *Italy* when ſhe had it? And as you were in " that, ſo ſhall you in the like caſe be reduc'd to a Province; I do " not ſpeak at random. *Italy*, in the Conſulſhip of LUCIUS ÆMI- " LIUS PAPUS, and CAIUS ATILIUS REGULUS, arm'd upon the " *Gallic* Tumult that then happen'd of her ſelf, and without the Aid " of foreign Auxiliaries, ſeventy thouſand Horſe, and ſeven hundred " thouſand Foot: But as *Italy* is the leaſt of thoſe three Countries in " extent, ſo is *France* now the moſt populous.

I, decus, I, noſtrum, melioribus utere fatis.

" *MY dear Lords*, Oceana *is as the Roſe of* Sharon, *and the Lilly of* " *the Valley. As the Lilly among Thorns, ſuch is my Love among the* " *Daughters. She is comely as the Tents of* Kedar, *and terrible as an* " *Army with Banners. Her Neck is as the Tower of* David, *builded* " *for an Armory, whereon there hang a thouſand Bucklers and Shields* " *of mighty Men. Let me hear thy Voice in the morning, whom my* " *Soul loves. The South has drop'd, and the Weſt is breathing upon thy* " *Garden of Spices. Ariſe, Queen of the Earth, Ariſe, holy Spouſe of* " *Jeſus; for lo the Winter is paſt, the Rain is over and gone; the* " *Flowers appear on the Earth, the time for the ſinging of Birds is* " *come, and the Voice of the Turtle is heard in our Land. Ariſe, I ſay,* " *come forth, and do not tarry: Ah! wherefore ſhould my eyes behold* " *thee by the Rivers of* Babylon, *hanging thy Harps upon the Willows,* " *thou faireſt among Women?*

" EXCELLENT PATRIOTS; If the People be Sove- " reign, here is that which eſtabliſhes their Prerogative: If we be ſin- " cere, here is that which diſburdens our Souls, and makes good all " our Engagements: If we be charitable, here is that which embraces " all Parties: If we would be ſettl'd, here is that which will ſtand, " and laſt for ever.

" IF our Religion be any thing elſe but a vain boaſt, ſcratching and " defacing human Nature or Reaſon, which, being the Image of " God,

" God, makes it a kind of Murder; here is that Empire whence *Ju-*
Amos 5. 24. " *ſtice ſhall run down like a River, and Judgment like a mighty Stream.*
" Who is it then that calls us? or what is in our way? a Lion! is it
" not *the Dragon that old Serpent?* for what wretched ſhifts are theſe?
" Here is a great deal, might we not have ſome of this at one time,
" and ſome at another?

" *MY LORDS, permit me to give you the Sum, or brief EPITOME of the whole COMMON-WEALTH.*

THE Center or Fundamental Laws are, firſt, the Agrarian, proportion'd at two thouſand Pounds a Year in Land, lying and being within the proper Territory of *Oceana*, and ſtating Property in Land at ſuch a balance, that the Power can never ſwerve out of the hands of the Many.

SECONDLY, The Ballot conveying this equal Sap from the Root, by an equal Election or Rotation, into the Branches of Magiſtracy or Sovereign Power.

THE Orbs of this Common-wealth being Civil, Military or Provincial, are, as it were, caſt upon this Mold or Center by the Diviſions of the People; Firſt into Citizens and Servants: Secondly, into Youth and Elders: Thirdly, into ſuch as have one hundred Pounds a year in Lands, Goods or Monies, who are of the Horſe; and ſuch as have under, who are of the Foot: Fourthly, they are divided by their uſual reſidence, into Pariſhes, Hundreds, and Tribes.

THE Civil Orbs conſiſt of the Elders, and are thus created; every Monday next enſuing the laſt of *December*, the Elders in every Pariſh elect the fifth man to be a Deputy; which is but half a days work: every Monday next enſuing the laſt of *January*, the Deputies meet at their reſpective Hundred, and elect out of their number one Juſtice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Coroner, and one High Conſtable of the Foot; one days work.

EVERY Monday next enſuing the laſt of *February*, the Hundreds meet at their reſpective Tribe, and there elect the Lords High Sheriff, Lieutenant, *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, the Conductor, the two Cenſors out of the Horſe, the Magiſtrates of the Tribe and of the Hundreds, with the Jurymen conſtituting the Phylarch, and who aſſiſt in their reſpective Offices at the Aſſizes, hold the Quarter Seſſions, *&c.* The day following the Tribe elects the annual Galaxy, conſiſting of two Knights, and three Deputies out of the Horſe, with four Deputies out of the Foot, thereby endu'd with Power, as Magiſtrates of the whole Nation, for the term of three years. An Officer choſen at the Hundred may not be elected a Magiſtrate of the Tribe; but a Magiſtrate or Officer either of the Hundred or of the Tribe, being elected into the Galaxy, may ſubſtitute any one of his own Order to his Magiſtracy or Office in the Hundred, or in the Tribe. This of the Muſter is two days work. So the body of the People is annually, at the charge of three days work and a half, in their own Tribes, for the perpetuation of their Power, receiving over and above the Magiſtracies ſo divided among them.

EVERY Monday next enſuing the laſt of *March*, the Knights, being a Hundred in all the Tribes, take their places in the Senate; the Knights, having

having taken their places in the Senate, make the third Region of the ſame; and the Houſe proceeds to the Senatorian Elections. Senatorian Elections are annual, biennial, or emergent.

THE annual are perform'd by the Tropic.

THE Tropic is a Schedule conſiſting of two parts; the firſt by which the Senatorian Magiſtrates are elected; and the ſecond, by which the Senatorian Councils are perpetuated.

THE firſt part is of this Tenor.

THE Lord Strategus,
THE Lord Orator,
THE firſt Cenſor,
THE ſecond Cenſor,
} Annual Magiſtrates, and therefore ſuch as may be elected out of any Region; the term of every Region having at the Tropic one year at the leaſt unexpir'd.

THE third Commiſſioner of the Seal,
THE third Commiſſioner of the Treaſury.
} Triennial Magiſtrates, and therefore ſuch as can be choſen out of the third Region only, as that alone which has the term of three years unexpir'd.

THE Strategus and the Orator ſitting, are Conſuls, or Preſidents of the Senate.

THE Strategus marching is General of the Army, in which caſe a new Strategus is elected to ſit in his room.

THE Strategus ſitting with the ſix Commiſſioners, being Counſillors of the Nation, are the Signory of the Common-wealth.

THE Cenſors are Magiſtrates of the Ballot, Preſidents of the Council for Religion, and Chancellors of the Univerſities.

THE ſecond part of the Tropic perpetuates the Council of State, by the election of five Knights out of the firſt Region of the Senate, to be the firſt Region of that Council conſiſting of fifteen Knights, five in every Region.

THE like is done by the election of four into the Council of Religion and four into the Council of Trade, out of the ſame Region in the Senate; each of theſe Councils conſiſting of twelve Knights, four in every Region.

BUT the Council of War conſiſting of nine Knights, there in every Region, is elected by and out of the Council of State, as the other Councils are elected by and out of the Senate. And if the Senate add a Juncta of nine Knights more, elected out of their own number, for the term of three months, the Council of War, by virtue of that addition, is Dictator of *Oceana* for the ſaid term.

THE Signory jointly or ſeverally has right of Seſſion and Suffrage in every Senatorian Council, and to propoſe either to the Senate, or any of them. And every Region in a Council electing one weekly Provoſt, any two of thoſe Provoſts have Power alſo to propoſe to their reſpective Council, as the proper and peculiar Propoſers of the ſame: for which cauſe they hold an Academy, where any man either by word of mouth, or writing, may propoſe to the Propoſers.

NEXT to the Elections of the Tropic is the biennial Election of one Embaſſador in ordinary, by the Ballot of the Houſe, to the Reſidence of *France*; at which time the Reſident of *France* removes to *Spain*, he of *Spain* to *Venice*, he of *Venice* to *Conſtantinople*, and he of *Conſtantinople* returns. So the Orb of the Reſidents is wheel'd about in eight years, by the biennial Election of one Embaſſador in Ordinary.

THE laſt kind of Election is emergent. Emergent Elections are made by the Scrutiny. Election by Scrutiny is when a Competitor being made by a Council, and brought into the Senate, the Senate chooſes four more Competitors to him; and putting all five to the Ballot, he who has moſt above half the Suffrages, is the Magiſtrate. The Pole-marches or Field Officers are choſen by the Scrutiny of the Council of War; an Embaſſador Extraordinary by the Scrutiny of the Council of State; the Judges and Serjeants at Law by the Scrutiny of the Seal; and the Barons and prime Officers of the Exchequer, by the Scrutiny of the Treaſury.

THE Opinion or Opinions that are legitimately propos'd to any Council muſt be debated by the ſame, and ſo many as are reſolv'd upon the Debate are introduc'd into the Senate, were they are debated and reſolv'd, or rejected by the whole Houſe: that which is reſolv'd by the Senate is a Decree, which is good in matters of State, but no Law except it be propos'd to, and reſolv'd by the Prerogative.

THE Deputies of the Galaxy being three Horſe and four Foot in a Tribe, amount in all the Tribes to one hundred and fifty Horſe, and two hundred Foot; which, having enter'd the Prerogative, and choſen their Captains, Cornet and Enſign (triennial Officers) make the third Claſſis, conſiſting of one Troop, and one Company; and ſo joining with the whole Prerogative, elect four annual Magiſtrates, call'd Tribunes, whereof two are of the Horſe, and two of the Foot. Theſe have the Command of the Prerogative Seſſions, and Suffrage in the Council of War, and Seſſions without Suffrage in the Senate.

THE Senate having paſt a Decree which they would propoſe to the People, cauſe it to be printed and publiſh'd, or promulgated for the ſpace of ſix weeks; which being order'd, they chooſe their Propoſers. The Propoſers muſt be Magiſtrates, that is, the Commiſſioners of the Seal, thoſe of the Treaſury, or the Cenſors. Theſe being choſen, deſire the Muſter of the Tribunes, and appoint the day. The People being aſſembl'd at the day appointed, and the Decree propos'd, that which is propos'd, by authority of the Senate, and commanded by the People, is the Law of *Oceana*, or an Act of Parliament.

SO the Parliament of *Oceana* conſiſts of the Senate propoſing, and the People reſolving.

THE People or Prerogative are alſo the Supreme Judicatory of this Nation, having Power of hearing and determining all Cauſes of Appeal from all Magiſtrates, or Courts Provincial, or Domeſtic; as alſo to queſtion any Magiſtrate, the term of his Magiſtracy being expir'd, if the Caſe be introduc'd by the Tribunes, or any one of them.

THE Military Orbs conſiſt of the Youth, that is, ſuch as are from eighteen to thirty years of Age; and are created in the following manner.

EVERY Wedneſday next enſuing the laſt of *December*, the Youth of every Pariſh aſſembling, elect the fifth of their number to be their Deputies; the Deputies of the Youth are call'd Stratiots, and this is the firſt Eſſay.

EVERY Wedneſday next enſuing the laſt of *January*, the Stratiots aſſembled at the Hundred, elect their Captain and their Enſign, and fall to their Games and Sports.

EVERY Wedneſday next enſuing the laſt of *February*, the Stratiots are receiv'd by the Lord Lieutenant their Commander in Chief, with the Conductors and the Cenſors; and, having been diſciplin'd and entertain'd with other Games, are call'd to the Urns, where they elect the ſecond Eſſay conſiſting of two hundred Horſe and ſix hundred Foot in a Tribe; that is,

of

of ten thouſand Horſe, and thirty thouſand Foot in all the Tribes, which is the Standing Army of this Nation, to march at any warning. They alſo elect at the ſame time a part of the third Eſſay, by the mixture of Balls mark'd with the letter *M*, and the letter *P*, for *Marpeſia* and *Panopea*; they of either mark being ten Horſe and fifty Foot in a Tribe, that is, five hundred Horſe and two thouſand five hundred Foot in all the Tribes, which are forthwith to march to their reſpective Provincns.

BUT the third Eſſay of this Nation more properly ſo call'd, is when the Strategus with the Polemarchs (the Senate and the People, or the Dictator having decreed a War) receive in return of his Warrants the ſecond Eſſay from the hands of the Conductors at the Rendevouz of *Oceana*; which Army marching with all Accommodations provided by the Council of War, the Senate elects a new Strategus, and the Lords Lieutenants a new ſecond Eſſay.

A YOUTH, except he be an only Son, refuſing any one of his three Eſſays, without ſufficient cauſe ſhewn to the Phylarch or the Cenſors, is incapable of Magiſtracy, and is fin'd a fifth part of his yearly Rent, or of his Eſtate, for Protection. In caſe of Invaſion the Elders are oblig'd to like duty with the Youth, and upon their own charge.

THE Provincial Orb conſiſting in part of the Elders, and in part of the Youth, is thus created.

FOUR Knights out of the firſt Region falling, are elected in the Senate to be the firſt Region of the Provincial Orb of *Marpeſia*; theſe being triennial Magiſtrates take their places in the Provincial Council, conſiſting of twelve Knights, four in every Region, each Region chooſing their weekly Provoſts of the Council thus conſtituted. One Knight more choſen out of the ſame Region in the Senate, being an annual Magiſtrate, is Preſident, with Power to propoſe; and the Opinions propos'd by the Preſident, or any two of the Provoſts, are debated by the Council, and, if there be occaſion of farther Power or Inſtruction than they yet have tranſmitted to the Council of State, with which the Provincial is to hold Intelligence.

THE Preſident of this Council is alſo Strategus, or General of the Provincial Army; wherefore the Conductors upon notice of his Election, and appointment of his Rendevouz, deliver to him the Stratiots of his Letter, which he takes with him into his Province: and the Provincial Army having receiv'd the new Strategus with the third Claſſis, the Council diſmiſſes the old Strategus with the firſt Claſſis. The like is done for *Panopea*, or any other Province.

BUT whereas the term of every other Magiſtracy or Election in this Common-wealth, whether annual or triennial, requires an equal Vacation, the term of a Provincial Counſellor or Magiſtrate requires no Vacation at all. The *Quorum* of a Provincial, as alſo that of every other Council and Aſſembly, requires two thirds in a time of health, and one third in a time of ſickneſs.

" I THINK I have omitted nothing but the Props and Scaffolds, " which are not of uſe but in building. And how much is here? " Shew me another Common-wealth in this compaſs? How many " things? Shew me another entire Government conſiſting but of thirty " Orders. If you now go to Law with any body, there lie to ſome " of our Courts two hundred Original Writs: If you ſtir your hand, " there go more Nerves and Bones to that motion: If you play, you " have more Cards in the pack; nay you could not ſit with your

" eaſe

" eaſe in that Chair, if it conſiſted not of more parts. Will you not " then allow to your Legiſlator, what you can afford your Upholder; or to the Throne, what is neceſſary to a Chair?

" MY LORDS, If you will have fewer Orders in a Commonwealth, you will have more; for where ſhe is not perfect at firſt, every day, every hour will produce a new Order, the end whereof is to have no Order at all, but to grind with the clack of ſome Demagog. Is he providing already for his golden Thumb? Lift up your heads; Away with Ambition, that fulſome complexion of a Stateſman, temper'd like SYLLA's, with blood and muck. *And the Lord give to his Senators Wiſdom; and make our faces to ſhine, that we may be a Light to them that ſit in darkneſs and the ſhadow of death, to guide their feet in the way of Peace.*——In the name of God, what's the matter!——

PHILADELPHUS the Secretary of the Council having perform'd his taſk in reading the ſeveral Orders as you have ſeen, upon the receipt of a Packet from his Correſpondent BOCCALINI, Secretary of *Parnaſſus*, in reading one of the Letters, burſt forth into ſuch a violent paſſion of weeping and downright howling, that the Legiſlators being ſtartled with the apprehenſion of ſome horrid news; one of them had no ſooner ſnatch'd the Letter out of his hand, than the reſt crying, Read, Read, he obey'd in this manner.

Trojano Boccalini, Centuria 1. Raggual. 21.

THE 3d inſtant his *Phœbean* Majeſty having taken the nature of Free States into his Royal conſideration, and being ſteadily perſuaded that the Laws in ſuch Governments are incomparably better and more ſurely directed to the good of Mankind than in any other; that the Courage of ſuch a People is the apteſt tinder to noble fire; that the Genius of ſuch a Soil is that wherein the roots of good Literature are leaſt worm-eaten with Pedantiſm, and where their Fruits have ever come to the greateſt maturity and higheſt reliſh; conceiv'd ſuch a loathing of their Ambition and Tyranny, who, uſurping the liberty of their native Countries, become ſlaves to themſelves, inaſmuch as (be it never ſo contrary to their own Nature or Conſciences) they have taken the earneſt of Sin, and are engag'd to perſecute all Men that are good with the ſame or greater rigour than is ordain'd by Laws for the wicked: For * *none ever adminiſter'd that Power by good, which he purchas'd by ill Arts:* PHOEBUS, I ſay, having conſider'd this, aſſembl'd all the Senators reſiding in the learned Court at the Theatre of MELPOMENE, where he caus'd CÆSAR the Dictator to come upon the ſtage, and his Siſter ACTIA, his Nephew AUGUSTUS, JULIA his Daughter, with the Children which ſhe had by MARCUS AGRIPPA, LUCIUS and CAIUS CÆSARS, AGRIPPA POSTHUMUS, JULIA, and AGRIPPINA, with the numerous Progeny which ſhe bore to her renown'd Huſband GERMANICUS, to enter. A miſerable Scene in any, but moſt deplorable in the eyes of CÆSAR, thus beholding what havock his prodigious Ambition, not ſatisfy'd with his own bloody Ghoſt, had made upon his more innocent Remains, even to the total extinction of his Family. For it is (ſeeing where there is any humanity, there muſt be ſome compaſſion) not to be ſpoken without tears, that of the

* Nemo unquam imperium flagitio quæſitum bonis artibus exercuit.

full

full branches deriving from OCTAVIA the elder Sister, and JULIA the Daughter of AUGUSTUS, there should not be one fruit or blossom that was not cut off or blasted by the Sword, Famine, or Poison. Now might the great Soul of CÆSAR have been full; and yet that which pour'd in as much or more, was to behold that execrable race of the CLAUDII, having hunted and suck'd his Blood with the thirst of Tigers, to be rewarded with the *Roman* Empire, and remain in full possession of that famous Patrimony: a Spectacle to pollute the Light of Heaven! Nevertheless as if CÆSAR had not yet enough, his *Phœbean* Majesty caus'd to be introduc'd on the other side of the Theatre, the most illustrious and happy Prince ANDREA DORIA, with his dear Posterity, imbrac'd by the soft and constant arms of the City of *Genoa*, into whose bosom, ever fruitful in her gratitude, he had dropt her fair LIBERTY like the dew of Heaven; which when the *Roman* Tyrant beheld, and how much more fresh that Laurel was worn with a firm root in the Hearts of the People, than that which he had torn off, he fell into such a horrid distortion of limbs and countenance, that the Senators who had thought themselves steel and flint at such an object, having hitherto stood in their reverend snow-like thawing Alps, now cover'd their faces with their large sleeves.

" *MY Lords*, said the ARCHON rising, witty PHILADELPHUS " has given us a grave admonition in a dreadful Tragedy. *Discite* " *justitiam moniti, & non temnere Divos.* Great and glorious *Cæsar*, " the highest character of flesh, yet could not rule but by that part " of Man which is the beast: but a Common-wealth is a Monarchy; " to her God is King, in as much as Reason, his dictate, is her Sove- " reign Power.

WHICH said, he adjourn'd the Council. And the Model was soon after promulgated. *Quod bonum, fælix, faustumque sit huic Reipublicæ. Agite Quirites, censuere Patres, jubeat Populus: The Sea roar'd, and the Floods clapt their hands.*

LIBERTAS.

The Proclamation of his Highness the Lord ARCHON of OCEANA upon Promulgation of the Model.

WHEREAS his Highness and the Council, in the framing of the Model promulgated, have had not any private interest, or ambition, but the fear of God, and the good of this People before their eyes; and it remains their desire that this great Work may be carry'd on accordingly: This present greeting is to inform the good People of this Land, that as the Council of Prytans *sat during the framing of the Model, to receive from time to time such Propositions as should be offer'd by any wise-hearted or public spirited man, towards the Institution of a well order'd Common-wealth, so the said Council is to sit as formerly in the great Hall of the* Pantheon *during Promulgation (which is to continue for the space of three months)*

See the course of the Decemvirs *in the promulgation of the first ten of their twelve Tables in* LIVY.

to receive, weigh, and, as there ſhall be occaſion, tranſmit to the Council of Legiſlators, all ſuch Objections as ſhall be made againſt the ſaid Model, whether in the whole, or in any part. Wherefore, that nothing be done raſhly, or without conſent of the People, ſuch, of what party ſoever, with whom there may remain any doubts or difficulties, are deſir'd with all convenient ſpeed to addreſs themſelves to the ſaid Prytans; *where, if ſuch objections, doubts, or difficulties receive ſolution to the ſatisfaction of the Auditory, they ſhall have public thanks: but if the ſaid objections, doubts or difficulties, receive no ſolution to the ſatisfaction of the Auditory, then the Model promulgated ſhall be review'd, and the party that was the occaſion of the review, ſhall receive public thanks, together with the beſt Horſe in his Highneſs's Stable, and be one of the Council of Legiſlators. And ſo God have you in his keeping.*

I SHOULD now write the ſame Council of the *Prytans*, but for two reaſons; the one, that having but a ſmall time for that which is already done, I am over-labour'd; the other, that there may be new Objections. Wherefore if my Reader has any ſuch as to the Model, I intreat him to addreſs himſelf by way of Oration, as it were, to the *Prytans*, that when this rough draught comes to be a work, his Speech being faithfully inſerted in this place, may give, or receive correction to amendment: For what is written will be weigh'd. But Converſation, in theſe days, is a game, at which they are beſt provided that have light Gold: It is like the ſport of Women that make Flowers of ſtraws, which muſt be ſtuck up, but may not be touch'd. Nor, which is worſe, is this the fault of Converſation only: But to the Examiner, I ſay, *If to invent method, and to teach an art, be all one*, let him ſhew that this method is not truly invented, or this Art is faithfully taught.

Ariſt. Rhet.

I CANNOT conclude a Circle (and ſuch is this Common-wealth) without turning the end into the beginning. The time of Promulgation being expir'd, the Surveyors were ſent down, who having in due ſeaſon made report that their work was perfect, the Orators follow'd; under the adminiſtration of which Officers and Magiſtrates the Common-wealth was ratify'd and eſtabliſh'd by the whole body of the People, in their * Parochial, Hundred, and County Aſſemblies. And the Orators being, by virtue of their Scrols or Lots, Members of their reſpective Tribes, were elected each the firſt Knight of the third Liſt, or Galaxy: wherefore having at their return aſſiſted the ARCHON in putting the Senate, and the People or Prerogative into motion, they abdicated the Magiſtracy both of Orators and Legiſlators.

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* Curiatis, Centuriatis, & Tributis Comitiis.

The COROLLARY.

FOR the reſt (ſays PLUTARCH, cloſing up the ſtory of LYCURGUS) when he ſaw that his Government had taken root, and was in the very Plantation ſtrong enough to ſtand by it ſelf, he conceiv'd ſuch a delight within him, as GOD is deſcrib'd by PLATO to have done when he had finiſh'd the Creation of the World, and ſaw his own Orbs move below him: For in the Art of Man (being the imitation of Nature, which is the * Art of GOD) there is nothing ſo like the firſt call of beautiful Order out of Chaos and Confuſion, as the Architecture of a well-order'd Common-wealth. Wherefore LYCURGUS ſeeing in effect, that his Orders were good, fell into deep Contemplation how he might render them, ſo far as could be effected by human Providence, unalterable and immortal. To which end he aſſembl'd the People, and remonſtrated to them, That for ought he could perceive, their Policy was already ſuch, and ſo well eſtabliſh'd, as was ſufficient to intail upon them and theirs all that Virtue and Felicity whereof human Life is capable: Nevertheleſs that there being another thing of greater concern than all the reſt, whereof he was not yet provided to give them a perfect account, nor could, till he had conſulted the Oracle of APOLLO, he deſir'd that they would obſerve his Laws without any change or alteration whatſoever, till his return from *Delphos*; to which all the People chearfully and unanimouſly engag'd themſelves by promiſe, deſiring him that he would make as much haſte as he could. But LYCURGUS before he went, began with the Kings and the Senators, and thence taking the whole People in order, made them all ſwear to that which they had promis'd, and then took his Journey. Being arrived at *Delphos*, he ſacrific'd to APOLLO, and afterwards enquir'd if the Policy which he had eſtabliſh'd, was good and ſufficient for a virtuous and a happy Life? By the way, it has been a Maxim with Legiſlators not to give checks to the preſent Superſtition, but to make the beſt uſe of it, as that which is always the moſt powerful with the People; otherwiſe tho' PLUTARCH being a Prieſt, was intereſted in the cauſe, there is nothing plainer than CICERO in his Book *De Divinatione* has made it, that there was never any ſuch thing as an Oracle, except in the cunning of the Prieſts. But to be civil to the Author, The God anſwer'd to LYCURGUS, that his Policy was exquiſite, and that his City, holding to the ſtrict obſervation of his form of Government, ſhould attain to the height of fame and glory. Which Oracle LYCURGUS cauſing to be written, fail'd not of tranſmitting to his *Lacedemon*. This done, that his Citizens might be for ever inviolably bound by their Oath, that they would alter nothing till his return, he took ſo firm a reſolution to die in the place, that from thenceforward receiving no manner of Food, he ſoon after perform'd it accordingly. Nor was he deceiv'd in the conſequence; for his City became the firſt in glory and excellency of Government in the whole World. And ſo much for LYCURGUS according to PLUTARCH.

* *Hobbs.*

MY

MY Lord ARCHON when he beheld not only the rapture of motion, but of joy and harmony, into which his Spheres (without any manner of obſtruction or interfering, but as if it had been naturally) were caſt, conceiv'd not leſs of exultation in his Spirit; but ſaw no more neceſſity or reaſon why he ſhould adminiſter an Oath to the Senate and the People that they would obſerve his Inſtitutions, than to a Man in perfect health and felicity of Conſtitution, that he would not kill himſelf. Nevertheleſs whereas Chriſtianity, tho' it forbids violent hands, conſiſts no leſs in ſelf-denial than any other Religion, he reſolv'd that all unreaſonable Deſires ſhould die upon the ſpot; to which end that no manner of food might be left to Ambition, he enter'd into the Senate with a unanimous Applauſe, and having ſpoken of his Government as LYCURGUS did when he aſſembl'd the People, he abdicated the Magiſtracy of ARCHON. The Senate, as ſtruck with aſtoniſhment, continu'd ſilent; Men upon ſo ſudden an Accident being altogether unprovided of what to ſay; till the ARCHON withdrawing, and being almoſt at the door, divers of the Knights flew from their Places, offering as it were to lay violent hands on him, while he eſcaping left the Senate with the tears in their Eyes like Children that had loſt their Father; and to rid himſelf of all farther importunity, retir'd to a Country Houſe of his, being remote, and very private, in ſo much that no man could tell for ſome time what was become of him. Thus the Law-maker happen'd to be the firſt object and reflection of the Law made: For as Liberty of all things is the moſt welcome to a People, ſo is there nothing more abhorrent from their nature than Ingratitude. We, accuſing the *Roman* People of this Crime againſt ſome of their greateſt Benefactors, as CAMILLUS, heap miſtake upon miſtake; for being not ſo competent Judges of what belongs to Liberty as they were, we take upon us to be more competent Judges of Virtue. And whereas Virtue, for being a vulgar thing among them, was of no leſs rate than Jewels are with ſuch as wear the moſt; we are ſelling this precious Stone, which we have ignorantly rak'd out of the *Roman* ruins, at ſuch a rate as the *Switzers* did that which they took in the Baggage of CHARLES of *Burgundy*. For that CAMILLUS had ſtood more firm againſt the ruin of *Rome* than her Capitol, was acknowledg'd; but on the other ſide that he ſtood as firm for the *Patricians* againſt the Liberty of the People, was as plain: wherefore he never wanted thoſe of the People that would die at his foot in the Field, nor that would withſtand him to his beard in the City. An example in which they that think CAMILLUS had wrong, neither do themſelves right, nor the People of *Rome*; who in this ſignify no leſs than that they had a ſcorn of Slavery beyond the fear of Ruin, which is the height of Magnanimity. The like might be ſhewn by other examples objected againſt this, and other Popular Governments, as in the Baniſhment of ARISTIDES the *Juſt* from *Athens*, by the Oſtraciſm, which, firſt, was no puniſhment, nor ever underſtood for ſo much as a diſparagement; but tended only to the Security of the Common-wealth, thro' the removal of a Citizen (whoſe Riches or Power with a Party was ſuſpected) out of harms way for the ſpace of ten years, neither to the diminution of his Eſtate or Honour. And next, tho' the virtue of ARISTIDES might in it ſelf be unqueſtion'd, yet for him under the name of the *Juſt* to become Univerſal Umpire of the People in all caſes, even to the neglect of the legal

Never Ingratitude, but too much Love, the conſtant fault of the People.

legal ways and orders of the Common-wealth approach'd ſo much to the Prince, that the *Athenians*, doing ARISTIDES no wrong, did their Government no more than right in removing him; which therefore is not ſo probable to have come to paſs, as PLUTARCH preſumes, thro' the envy of THEMISTOCLES, ſeeing ARISTIDES was far more popular than THEMISTOCLES, who ſoon after took the ſame walk upon a worſe occaſion. Wherefore as MACHIAVEL for any thing ſince alledg'd, has irrefragably prov'd that Popular Governments are of all others the leaſt ingrateful; ſo the obſcurity, I ſay, into which my Lord ARCHON had now withdrawn himſelf, caus'd a univerſal ſadneſs and cloud in the minds of Men upon the glory of his riſing Common-wealth.

MUCH had been ventilated in private diſcourſe, and the People (for the Nation was yet divided into Parties that had not loſt their animoſities) being troubled, bent their eyes upon the Senate, when, after ſome time ſpent in devotion, and the ſolemn action of Thankſgiving, his Excellency NAVARCHUS DE PARALO in the Tribe of *Dorean*, Lord *Strategus* of *Oceana* (tho' in a new Common-wealth a very prudent Magiſtrate) propos'd his part or opinion in a ſuch manner to the Council of State, that paſſing the Ballot of the ſame with great unanimity and applauſe, it was introduc'd into the Senate, where it paſt with greater. Wherefore the Decree being forthwith printed and publiſh'd, Copies were return'd by the Secretaries to the *Phylarchs* (which is the manner of Promulgation) and the Commiſſioners of the Seal, that is to ſay, the Right Honourable PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE in the Tribe of *Eudia*, DOLABELLA D' ENYO in the Tribe of *Turmæ*, and LINCEUS DE STELLA in the Tribe of *Nubia*, being elected Propoſers *pro tempore*, beſpoke of the Tribunes a Muſter of the People to be held that day ſix weeks, which was the time allow'd for Promulgation at the *Halo*.

THE Satisfaction which the People throughout the Tribes receiv'd upon promulgation of the Decree, loaded the Carriers with weekly Letters beetween Friend and Friend, whether Magiſtrates or private Perſons. But the day for Propoſition being come, and the Prerogative upon the Place appointed in Diſcipline, SANGUINE DE RINGWOOD in the Tribe of *Saltum*, Captain of the *Phœnix*, march'd by order of the Tribunes with his Troop to the Piazza of the *Pantheon*, where his Trumpets entering into the great Hall by their Blazon gave notice of his Arrival; at which the Serjeant of the Houſe came down, and returning inform'd the Propoſers, who deſcending were receiv'd at the foot of the Stairs by the Captain, and attended to the Coaches of State, with which CALCAR DE GILVO in the Tribe of *Phalera* Maſter of the Horſe, and the Ballotins upon their great Horſes, ſtood waiting at the Gate.

THE Propoſers being in their Coaches, the Train for the Pomp, the ſame that is us'd at the reception of Embaſſadors, proceded in this order: In the Front march'd the Troop with the Cornet in the Van, and the Captain in the Rear: next the Troop came the twenty Meſſengers or Trumpets; the Ballotins upon the Curvet with their Uſher in the Van, and the Maſter of the Horſe in the Rear: Next the Ballotins, BRONCUS DE RAUCO in the Tribe of *Beſtia* King of the Heralds, with his Fraternity in their Coats of Arms; and next to Sir BRONCHUS, BORISTHENES DE HOLIWATER in the

the Tribe of *Ave*, Maſter of the Ceremonies: The Mace and the Seal of the Chancery went immediately before the Coaches; and on either ſide, the Doorkeepers or Guard of the Senate, with their Pole-axes, accompany'd with ſome three or four hundred Footmen belonging to the Knights or Senators; the Trumpeters, Ballotins, Guards, Poſtilions, Coachmen and Footmen, being very gallant in the Liveries of the Common-wealth; but all, except the Ballotins, without Hats, in lieu whereof they wore black velvet Calots, being pointed with a little peak at the forehead. After the Propoſers came a long file of Coaches full of ſuch Gentlemen as uſe to grace the Common-wealth upon the like occaſions. In this poſture they mov'd ſlowly thro' the ſtreets (affording in the gravity of the Pomp, and the welcomeneſs of the end, a moſt reverend and acceptable Proſpect to the People all the way from the *Pantheon*, being about half a mile) and arriv'd at the *Halo*, where they found the Prerogative in a cloſe body environ'd with Scaffolds that were cover'd with Spectators. The Tribunes receiv'd the Propoſers, and conducted them into a Seat plac'd in the front of the Tribe, like a Pulpit, but that it was of ſome length, and well adorn'd by the Heralds with all manner of Birds and Beaſts, except that they were ill painted and never a one of his natural colour. The Tribunes were plac'd at a Table that ſtood below the long Seat, thoſe of the Horſe in the middle, and thoſe of the Foot at either end, with each of them a Bowl or Baſon before him, that on the right hand being white, and the other green: In the middle of the Table ſtood a third which was red. And the Houſe-keeper of the Pavilion, who had already deliver'd a proportion of linen Balls or Pellets to every one of the Tribe, now preſented Boxes to the Ballotins. But the Propoſers as they enter'd the Gallery, or long Seat, having put off their Hats by way of Salutation, were anſwer'd by the People with a ſhout; whereupon the younger Commiſſioners ſeated themſelves at either end; and the firſt ſtanding in the middle, ſpoke after this manner.

My Lords, the People of Oceana.

" WHILE I find in my ſelf what a felicity it is to ſalute you " by this Name, and in every Face, anointed as it were with " the Oil of Gladneſs, a full and ſufficient teſtimony of the like ſenſe, " to go about to feaſt you with words, who are already fill'd with " that Food of the mind, which being of pleaſing and wholeſome di- " geſtion, takes in the definition of true Joy, were a needleſs Enter- " terprize, I ſhall rather put you in mind of that thankfulneſs which " is due, than puff you up with any thing that might ſeem vain. Is " it from the arms of fleſh that we derive theſe Bleſſings? Behold the " Common-wealth of *Rome* falling upon her own victorious Sword. " Or is it from our own Wiſdom, whoſe Councils had brought it even " to that paſs, that we began to repent our ſelves of Victory? Far be " it from us, my Lords, to ſacrifice to our own Nets, which we our " ſelves have ſo narrowly eſcap'd! Let us rather lay our mouths in " the duſt, and look up (as was taught the other day when we were " better inſtructed in this Leſſon) to the Hills with our Gratitude. " Nevertheleſs ſeeing we read how God upon the neglect of his Pro- " phets has been provok'd to wrath, it muſt needs follow that he ex- " pects Honour ſhould be given to them by whom he has choſen to

" work

" work as his Inſtruments. For which cauſe, nothing doubting of " my Warrant, I ſhall proceed to that which more particularly con- " cerns the preſent occaſion, the diſcovery of my Lord ARCHON's " Virtues and Merit, to be ever plac'd by this Nation in their true " Meridian.

My Lords,

" I AM not upon a Subject which perſuades me to balk, but ne- " ceſſitates me to ſeek out the greateſt Examples. To begin with " ALEXANDER erecting Trophies common to his Sword and the " Peſtilence; To what good of Mankind did he infect the Air with " his heaps of Carcaſes? The Sword of War, if it be any otherwiſe " us'd than as the Sword of Magiſtracy, for the fear and puniſhment " of thoſe that do evil, is as guilty in the ſight of God, as the Sword " of a Murderer; nay more, for if the Blood of ABEL, of one inno- " cent Man, cry'd in the ears of the Lord for Vengeance, what ſhall " the Blood of an innocent Nation? Of this kind of Empire, the " Throne of Ambition, and the Quarry of a mighty Hunter, it has " been truly ſaid, that it is but a great Robbery. But if ALEXANDER " had reſtor'd the Liberty of *Greece*, and propagated it to mankind, " he had done like my Lord ARCHON, and might have been truly " call'd the Great. ALEXANDER car'd not to ſteal a Victory that " would be given: But my Lord ARCHON has torn away a Victory " which had been ſtol'n, while we were tamely yielding up Obe- " dience to a * Nation reaping in our Fields, whoſe Fields he has " ſubjected to our Empire, and nail'd them with his victorious Sword " to their native *Caucaſus*.

* *The* Scotiſh *Royal Line.*

" *MACHIAVEL* gives a handſome caution, Let no man, " ſays he, be circumvented with the Glory of CÆSAR, from the falſe " reflection of their Pens, who thro' the longer continuance of his " Empire in the Name than in the Family, chang'd their Freedom " for Flattery. But if a man would know truly what the *Romans* " thought of CÆSAR, let him obſerve what they ſaid of CATI- " LIN.

" AND yet by how much he who has perpetrated ſome heinous " Crime, is more execrable than he who did but attempt it; by ſo " much is CÆSAR more execrable than CATILIN. On the con- " trary, let him that would know what antient and heroic Times, " what the *Greeks* and *Romans* would both have thought and ſaid of " my Lord ARCHON, obſerve what they thought and ſaid of So- " LON, LYCURGUS, BRUTUS, and PUBLICOLA. And yet by " how much his Virtue, that is crown'd with the perfection of " his Work, is beyond theirs, who were either inferior in their aim, " or in their performance; by ſo much is my Lord ARCHON to " be prefer'd before SOLON, LYCURGUS, BRUTUS, and PUBLI- " COLA.

" NOR will we ſhun the moſt illuſtrious Example of SCIPIO: " This Hero, tho' never ſo little leſs, yet was he not the founder of a " Common-wealth; and for the reſt, allowing his Virtue to have been " of the moſt untainted Ray, in what did it outſhine this of my " Lord ARCHON? But if dazling the Eyes of the Magiſtrates it over- " aw'd Liberty, *Rome* might be allow'd ſome excuſe that ſhe did not

" like

" like it, and I, if I admit not of this compariſon: For where is my " Lord ARCHON? Is there a Genius, how free ſoever, which in his " preſence would not find it ſelf to be under power? He is ſhrunk in- " to Clowds, he ſeeks Obſcurity in a Nation that ſees by his Light. " He is impatient of his own Glory, leſt it ſhould ſtand between you " and your Liberty.

" LIBERTY! What is even that, if we may not be grateful? " And if we may, we have none: For who has any thing that he does " not owe? My Lords, there be ſome hard conditions of Virtue: If " this Debt were exacted, it were not due; whereas being cancel'd, " we are all enter'd into Bonds. On the other ſide, if we make ſuch " a payment as will not ſtand with a free People, we do not enrich " my Lord ARCHON, but rob him of his whole Eſtate, and his im- " menſe Glory.

" THESE Particulars had in due deliberation and mature debate, " according to the Orders of this Common-wealth, *It is propos'd by* " *Authority of the Senate, to you my Lords the People of* Oceana.

" I. THAT the Dignity and Office of ARCHON, or Protector " of the Common-wealth of *Oceana*, be, and is hereby confer'd by " the Senate and the People of *Oceana*, upon the moſt Illuſtrious " Prince, and ſole Legiſlator of this Common-wealth, OLPHAUS " MEGALETOR, *Pater Patriæ*, whom God preſerve, for the term of " his natural Life.

" II. THAT three hundred and fifty thouſand pounds *per annum* " yet remaining of the antient Revenue, be eſtated upon the ſaid Il- " luſtrious Prince, or Lord ARCHON, for the ſaid term, and to the " proper and peculiar uſe of his Highneſs.

" III. THAT the Lord ARCHON have the reception of all fo- " reign Embaſſadors, by and with the Council of State, according to " the Orders of this Common-wealth.

" IV. THAT the Lord ARCHON have a ſtanding Army of " twelve thouſand men, defray'd upon a monthly Tax, during the " term of three years, for the protection of this Common-wealth " againſt diſſenting Parties; to be govern'd, directed, and command- " ed by and with the advice of the Council of War, according to the " Orders of this Common-wealth.

" V. THAT this Common-wealth make no diſtinction of Per- " ſons or Parties, but every man being elected and ſworn, according " to the Orders of the ſame, be equally capable of Magiſtracy; or " not elected, be equally capable of Liberty, and the enjoyment of " his Eſtate free from all other than common Taxes.

" VI. THAT a man putting a diſtinction upon himſelf, re- " fuſing the Oath upon Election, or declaring himſelf of a Party " not conformable to the Civil Government, may within any time " of the three years ſtanding of the Army, tranſport himſelf and " his Eſtate, without moleſtation or impediment, into any other " Nation.

" VII. THAT in caſe there remains any diſtinction of Parties not " conforming to the Civil Government of this Common-wealth, af- " ter the three years of the ſtanding Army be expir'd, and the Com- " mon-wealth be thereby forc'd to prolong the term of the ſaid Ar- " my, the pay from thenceforth of the ſaid Army be levy'd upon the

" Eſtates

" Eſtates of ſuch Parties ſo remain unconformable to the Civil Go-
" vernment.

THE propoſer having ended his Oration, the Trumpets ſounded; and the Tribunes of the Horſe being mounted to view the Ballot, caus'd the Tribe (which thronging up to the Speech, came almoſt round the Gallery) to retreat about twenty paces, when LINCEUS DE STELLA receiving the Propoſitions, repair'd with BRONCHUS DE RAUCO the Herald, to a little Scaffold erected in the middle of the Tribe, where he ſeated himſelf, the Herald ſtanding bare upon his right hand. The *Ballotins* having their Boxes ready, ſtood before the Gallery, and at the command of the Tribunes march'd, one to every Troop on Horſeback, and one to every Company on Foot; each of them being follow'd by other Children that bore red Boxes: now this is putting the Queſtion, whether the Queſtion ſhould be put. And the Suffrage being very ſuddenly return'd to the Tribunes at the Table, and number'd in the view of the Propoſers, the Votes were all in the Affirmative: whereupon the red or doubtful Boxes were laid aſide, it appearing that the Tribe, whether for the Negative or Affirmative, was clear in the matter. Wherefore the Herald began from the Scaffold in the middle of the Tribe, to pronounce the firſt Propoſition, and the *Ballotins* marching with the Negative and Affirmative only, BRONCHUS with his Voice like Thunder, continu'd to repeat the Propoſition over and over again, ſo long as it was in Balloting. The like was done for every Clauſe, till the Ballot was finiſh'd, and the Tribunes aſſembling, had ſign'd the Points, that is to ſay, the number of every ſuffrage, as it was taken by the Secretary upon the tale of the Tribunes, and in the ſight of the Propoſers; for this may not be omitted, it is the pulſe of the People. Now whereas it appertains to the Tribunes to report the Suffrage of the People to the Senate, they caſt the Lot for this Office with three ſilver Balls, and one gold one; and it fell upon the Right Worſhipful ARGUS DE CROOKHORN in the Tribe of *Paſcua*, firſt Tribune of the Foot. ARGUS being a good ſufficient man in his own Country, was yet of the mind that he ſhould make but a bad Spokeſman; and therefore became ſomething blank at his luck, till his Colleagues perſuaded him that it was no ſuch great matter, if he could but read, having his Paper before him. The Propoſers taking Coach, receiv'd a Volly upon the Field, and return'd in the ſame order, ſave that being accompany'd with the Tribunes, they were alſo attended by the whole Prerogative to the Piazza of the *Pantheon*, where with another Volly they took their leaves. ARGUS, who had not thought upon his Wife and Children all the way, went very gravely up: and every one being ſeated, the Senate by their ſilence ſeem'd to call for the Report; which ARGUS ſtanding up, deliver'd in this wiſe,

Right Honourable Lords and Fathers aſſembled in Parliament;

" SO it is, that it has fallen to my lot to report to your Excellencies
" the Votes of the People, taken upon the third inſtant, in the
" firſt year of this Common-wealth, at the *Halo*; the Right Ho-
" nourable PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE in the Tribe of *Eudia*, DOLA-
" BELLA DE ENYO in the Tribe of *Turmæ*, and LINCEUS DE

" STELLA in the Tribe of *Nubia*, Lords Commiſſioners of the Great " Seal of *Oceana*, and Propoſers *pro temporibus*——together with my " Brethern the Tribunes, and my ſelf being preſent. Wherefore " theſe are to certify to your Fatherhoods, that the ſaid Votes of the " People were as follows; that is to ſay:

" TO the firſt Propoſition. *Nemine contradicante*——
" TO the ſecond, *Nemine contradicante*——
" TO the third the like.
" TO the fourth 211, above half.
" TO the fifth 201, above half.
" TO the ſixth 150, above half, in the Affirmative.
" TO the ſeventh, *Nomine* again, and ſo forth——

" MY LORDS, It is a Language that is out of my Prayers, " and if I be out at it, no harm——

" BUT as concerning my Lord ARCHON (as I was ſaying) theſe " are to ſignify to you the true-heartedneſs and good-will which is in " the People, ſeeing by joining with you, as one man, they confeſs " that all they have to give, is too little for his Highneſs. For truly, " Fathers, if he who is able to do harm, and does none, may well be " call'd honeſt; What ſhall we ſay to my Lord ARCHON's High- " neſs, who having had it in his Power to have done us the greateſt " miſchief that ever befel a poor Nation, ſo willing to truſt ſuch as " they thought well of, has done us ſo much good, as we ſhould never " have known how to do ourſelves? which was ſo ſweetly deliver'd " by my Lord Chancellor PHOSPHORUS to the People, that I dare " ſay there was never a one of them could forbear to do as I do—— " An't pleaſe your Fatherhoods, they be tears of Joy. Ay, my Lord " ARCHON ſhall walk the ſtreets (if it be for his eaſe I mean) with " a Switch, while the People run after him, and pray for him: he " ſhall not wet his foot; they will ſtrew flowers in his way: he ſhall " ſit higher in their hearts, and in the Judgment of all good men, " than the Kings that go up ſtairs to their Seats; and one of theſe had " as good pull two or three of his fellows out of their great Chairs, " as wrong him, or meddle with him; he has two or three hundred " thouſand men, that when you ſay the word, ſhall ſell themſelves " to their ſhirts for him, and die at his Foot. His Pillow is of Down, " and his Grave ſhall be as ſoft, over which they that are alive ſhall " wring their hands. And to come to your Fatherhoods, moſt truly " ſo call'd, as being the loving Parents of the People, truly you do " not know what a feeling they have of your Kindneſs, ſeeing you " are ſo bound up, that if there comes any harm, they may thank " themſelves. And, alas! poor Souls, they ſee that they are given " to be of ſo many minds, that tho' they always mean well, yet if " there comes any good, they may thank them that teach them better. " Wherefore there was never ſuch a thing as this invented, they do ve- " rily believe that it is no other than the ſame which they always " had in their very heads, if they could have but told how to bring " it out. As now for a ſample; My Lords the Propoſers had no " ſooner ſaid your minds, than they found it to be that which heart " could wiſh. And your Fatherhoods may comfort your ſelves, that " there is not a People in the world more willing to learn what is for

" their

" their own good, nor more apt to ſee it, when you have ſhew'd it
" them. Wherefore they do love you as they do their own ſelves;
" honour you as Fathers; reſolve to give you as it were Obedience
" for ever: and ſo thanking you for your moſt good and excellent
" Laws, they do pray for you as the very Worthies of the Land,
" Right Honourable Lords and Fathers aſſembl'd in Parliament.

ARGUS came off beyond his own expectation; for thinking right, and ſpeaking as he thought, it was apparent by the Houſe, and the thanks they gave him, that they eſteem'd him to be abſolutely of the beſt ſort of Orators; upon which having a mind that till then miſgave him, he became very crounſe, and much delighted with that which might go down the next week in print to his Wife and Neighbours. LIVY makes the *Roman* Tribunes to ſpeak in the ſame ſtile with the Conſuls, which could not be, and therefore for ought in him to the contrary, VOLERO and CANULEIUS might have ſpoken in no better ſtile than ARGUS. However, they were not created the firſt year of the Common-wealth; and the Tribunes of *Oceana* are ſince become better Orators than were needful. But the Laws being enacted, had the Preamble annex'd, and were deliver'd to BRONCHUS, who lov'd nothing in the Earth ſo much as to go ſtaring and bellowing up and down the Town, like a Stag in a Forreſt, as he now did, with his fraternity in their Coats of Arms, and I know not how many Trumpets, proclaiming the Act of Parliament; when meeting my Lord ARCHON, who from a retreat that was without Affectation, as being for Devotion only, and to implore a Bleſſing by Prayer and Faſting upon his Labours, now newly arriv'd in Town, the Herald of the Tribe of *Beſtia* ſet up his throat, and having chanted out his Leſſon, paſt as haughtily by him, as if his own had been the better Office; which in this place was very well taken, tho' BRONCHUS for his high mind happen'd afterwards upon ſome diſaſters, too long to tell, that ſpoil'd much of his Embroidery.

MY Lord ARCHON's Arrival being known, the Signory, accompany'd by the Tribunes, repair'd to him, with the news he had already heard by the Herald; to which my Lord Strategus added, That his Highneſs could not doubt upon the Demonſtrations given, but the minds of Men were firm in the opinion, that he could be no ſeeker of himſelf in the way of earthly Pomp and Glory: and that the Gratitude of the Senate and the People, could not therefore be underſtood to have any ſuch reflection upon him. But ſo it was, that in regard of Dangers abroad, and Parties at home, they durſt not truſt themſelves without a ſtanding Army, nor a ſtanding Army in any man's hands but thoſe of his Highneſs.

THE ARCHON made anſwer, that he ever expected this would be the ſenſe of the Senate and the People; and this being their ſenſe, he ſhould have been ſorry they had made choice of any other than himſelf for a ſtanding General: Firſt, Becauſe it could not have been more to their own ſafety: And, Secondly, Becauſe ſo long as they ſhould have need of a ſtanding Army, his work was not done: That he would not diſpute againſt the Judgment of the Senate and the People, nor ought that to be. Nevertheleſs, he made little doubt but experience would ſhew every Party their own Intereſt in this Government, and that better improv'd than they could expect from any other; that Men's animoſities

moſities ſhould over-balance their Intereſt for any time, was impoſſible; that humour could never be laſting, nor, thro' the Conſtitution of the Government, of any effect at the firſt charge. For ſuppoſing the worſt, and that the People had choſen no other into the Senate and the Prerogative than Royaliſts, a matter of fourteen hundred men muſt have taken their Oaths at their Election, with an intention to go quite contrary, not only to their Oaths ſo taken, but to their own Intereſt; for being eſtated in the Sovereign Power, they muſt have decreed it from themſelves (ſuch an example for which there was never any experience, nor can there be any reaſon) or holding it, it muſt have done in their hands as well every whit as in any other. Furthermore, they muſt have removed the Government from a Foundation that apparently would hold, to ſet it upon another which apparently would not hold; which things if they could not come to paſs, the Senate and the People conſiſting wholly of Royaliſts, much leſs by a parcel of them elected. But if the fear of the Senate and of the People deriv'd from a Party without, ſuch a one as would not be elected, nor engage themſelves to the Common-wealth by an Oath; this again muſt be ſo large, as would go quite contrary to their own Intereſt, they being as free and as fully eſtated in their Liberty as any other, or ſo narrow that they could do no hurt, while the People being in Arms, and at the beck of the Strategus, every Tribe would at any time make a better Army than ſuch a Party; and there being no Parties at home, fears from abroad would vaniſh. But ſeeing it was otherwiſe determin'd by the Senate and the People, the beſt courſe was to take that which they held the ſafeſt, in which with his humble thanks for their great bounty, he was reſolv'd to ſerve them with all Duty and Obedience.

A VERY ſhort time after the Royaliſts, now equal Citizens, made good the ARCHON's Judgment, there being no other that found any thing near ſo great a ſweet in the Government. For he who has not been acquainted with Affliction, ſays SENECA, knows but half the things of this world.

MOREOVER they ſaw plainly, that to reſtore the antient Government, they muſt caſt up their Eſtates into the hands of three hundred men; wherefore in caſe the Senate and the Prerogative, conſiſting of thirteen hundred men, had been all Royaliſts, there muſt of neceſſity have been, and be for ever, one thouſand againſt this or any ſuch Vote. But the Senate being inform'd by the Signory, that the ARCHON had accepted of his Dignity and Office, caus'd a third Chair to be ſet for his Highneſs, between thoſe of the Strategus and the Orator in the Houſe, the like at every Council; to which he repair'd, not of neceſſity, but at his pleaſure, being the beſt, and, as ARGUS not vainly ſaid, the greateſt Prince in the World: for in the Pomp of his Court he was not inferior to any, and in the Field he was follow'd with a Force that was formidable to all. Nor was there a cauſe in the nature of this Conſtitution to put him to the charge of Guards, to ſpoil his ſtomach or his ſleep: Inſomuch, as being handſomely diſputed by the Wits of the Academy, whether my Lord ARCHON, if he had been ambitious, could have made himſelf ſo great, it was carry'd clear in the Negative; not only for the Reaſons drawn from the preſent balance, which was Popular; but putting the caſe the balance had been Monarchical. For there be ſome Nations,

whereof

whereof this is one, that will bear a Prince in a Common-wealth far higher than it is poſſible for them to bear a Monarch. *Spain* look'd upon the Prince of *Orange* as her moſt formidable Enemy; but if ever there be a Monarch in *Holland*, he will be the *Spaniards* beſt friend. For whereas a Prince in a Common-wealth derives his Greatneſs from the root of the People, a Monarch derives his from one of thoſe balances which nip them in the root; by which means the *Low Countries* under a Monarch were poor and inconſiderable, but in bearing a Prince could grow to a miraculous height, and give the Glory of his Actions by far the upper hand of the greateſt King in *Chriſtendom*. There are Kings in *Europe*, to whom a King of *Oceana* would be but a *petit Companion*. But the Prince of this Common-wealth is the Terror and the Judge of them all.

THAT which my Lord ARCHON now minded moſt, was the Agrarian, upon which debate he inceſſantly thruſt the Senate and the Council of State; to the end it might be planted upon ſome firm root, as the main point and baſis of perpetuity to the Common-wealth.

AND theſe are ſome of the moſt remarkable Paſſages that happen'd in the firſt year of this Government. About the latter end of the ſecond, the Army was disbanded, but the Taxes continu'd at thirty thouſand Pounds a month, for three years and a half. By which means a piece of Artillery was planted, and a portion of Land to the value of 50 *l.* a year purchas'd for the maintenance of the Games, and of the Prize arms for ever, in each Hundred.

WITH the eleventh year of the Common-wealth, the term of the Exciſe, allotted for the maintenance of the Senate and the People, and for the raiſing of a public Revenue, expir'd. By which time the Exchequer, over and above the annual Salaries, amounting to three hundred thouſand Pounds accumulating every year out of one Million income ſeven hundred thouſand Pounds in Banco, brought it with a product of the Sum, riſing to about eight Millions in the whole: whereby at ſeveral times they had purchas'd to the Senate and the People four hundred thouſand Pounds *per annum* ſolid Revenue; which, beſides the Lands held in *Panopea*, together with the Perquiſites of either Province, was held ſufficient for a public Revenue. Nevertheleſs, Taxes being now wholly taken off, the Exciſe of no great burden (and many ſpecious advantages not vainly propos'd in the heightning of the public Revenue) was very chearfully eſtabliſh'd by the Senate and the People, for the term of ten years longer; and the ſame courſe being taken, the public Revenue was found in the one and twentieth of the Common-wealth, to be worth one Million in good Land. Whereupon the Exciſe was ſo aboliſh'd for the preſent, as withall reſolv'd to be the beſt, the moſt fruitful and eaſy way of raiſing Taxes, according to future Exigencies. But the Revenue being now ſuch as was able to be a yearly Purchaſer, gave a jealouſy that by this means the balance of the Common-wealth, conſiſting in private Fortunes, might be eaten out; whence this year is famous for that Law whereby the Senate and the People forbidding any further purchaſe of Lands to the Public within the Dominions of *Oceana* and the adjacent Provinces, put the Agrarian upon the Common-wealth her ſelf. Theſe Increaſes are things which Men, addicted to Monarchy, deride as impoſſible, whereby they unwarily urge a ſtrong Argument againſt that which they would defend. For having their eyes fix'd upon the Pomp and

Expence, by which not only every Child of a King being a Prince, exhauſts his Father's Coffers; but Favourites and ſervile Spirits, devoted to the flattery of thoſe Princes, grow inſolent and profuſe, returning a fit Gratitude to their Maſters, whom while they hold it honourable to deceive, they ſuck and keep eternally poor: It follows that they do not ſee how it ſhould be poſſible for a Common-wealth to cloath her ſelf in Purple, and thrive ſo ſtrangely upon that which would make a Prince's hair grow thro' his hood, and not afford him bread. As if it were a Miracle that a careleſs and prodigal Man ſhould bring ten thouſand Pounds a year to nothing, or that an induſtrious and frugal Man brings a little to ten thouſand Pounds a year. But the fruit of one man's induſtry and frugality can never be like that of a Common-wealth; Firſt, becauſe the greatneſs of the Increaſe follows the greatneſs of the Stock or principal: And, ſecondly, becauſe a frugal Father is for the moſt part ſuceeded by a laviſh Son; whereas a Common-wealth is her own Heir.

THIS year a part was propos'd by the Right Honourable AUREUS DE WOOLSACK in the Tribe of *Pecus*, firſt Chmmiſſioner of the Treaſury, to the Council of State, which ſoon after paſt the Ballot of the Senate and the People: by which the Lands of the Public Revenue, amounting to one Million, were equally divided into five thouſand Lots, enter'd by their names and parcels into a Lot-book preſerv'd in the Exchequer. And if any Orphan, being a Maid, ſhould caſt her Eſtate into the Exchequer for fourteen hundred Pounds, the Treaſury was bound by the Law to pay her quarterly two hundred Pounds a year, free from Taxes, for her Life, and to aſſign her a Lot for her Security: if ſhe marry'd, her Huſband was neither to take out the Principal without her conſent (acknowledg'd by her ſelf to one of the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury who according as he found it to be free, or forc'd, was to allow or diſallow of it) nor any other way engage it, than to her proper uſe. But if the Principal were taken out, the Treaſury was not bound to repay any more of it than one thouſand Pounds; nor might that be repaid at any time, ſave within the firſt year of her Marriage: the like was to be done by a half or quarter Lot reſpectively.

THIS was found to be a great Charity to the weaker Sex, and as ſome ſay, who are more skilful in the like Affairs than my ſelf, of good Profit to the Common-wealth.

NOW began the native Spleen of *Oceana* to be much purg'd, and Men not to affect Sullenneſs and Pedantiſm. The Elders could remember that they had been Youth. Wit and Gallantry were ſo far from being thought Crimes in themſelves, that care was taken to preſerve their innocence. For which cauſe it was propos'd to the Council for Religion by the Right Honourable CADISCUS DE CLERO, in the Tribe of *Stamnum*, firſt Cenſor, That ſuch Women as living in Gallantry and View about the Town, were of evil fame, and could not ſhew that they were maintain'd by their own Eſtates or Induſtry; or ſuch as having Eſtates of their own, were yet waſteful in their way of life, and of ill example to others, ſhould be obnoxious to the animadverſion of the Council of Religion, or of the Cenſors: In which the proceeding ſhould be after this manner. Notice ſhould be firſt given of the ſcandal to the party offending, in private: if there were no amendment within the ſpace of ſix months, ſhe ſhould be

ſummon'd

ſummon'd and rebuk'd before the ſaid Council or Cenſors; and, if after other ſix months it were found that neither this avail'd, ſhe ſhould be cenſured not to appear at any public Meetings, Games, or Recreations, upon penalty of being taken up by the Door-keepers, or Guards of the Senate, and by them to be detain'd, till for every ſuch Offence, five Pounds were duly paid for her enlargement.

FURTHERMORE, if any common Strumpet ſhould be found, or any ſcurrility or profaneneſs repreſented at either of the Theatres, the Prelates for every ſuch Offence ſhould be fin'd twenty Pounds by the ſaid Council, and the Poet, for every ſuch offence on his part, ſhould be whipt. This Law relates to another, which alſo was enacted the ſame year upon this occaſion.

THE Youth and Wits of the Academy having put the Buſineſs ſo home in the defence of Comedies, that the Provoſts had nothing but the Conſequences provided againſt by the foregoing Law to object, prevail'd ſo far, that two of the Provoſts of the Council of State join'd in a Propoſition, which after much ado came to a Law, whereby one hundred thouſand pounds was allotted for the building of two Theatres on each ſide of the Piazza of the *Halo:* and two annual Magiſtrates call'd *Prelates*, choſen out of the Knights, were added to the Tropic, the one call'd the Prelate of the Buſkin, for inſpection of the Tragic Scene call'd *Melpomene*; and the other the Prelate of the Sock, for the Comic call'd *Thalia*, which Magiſtrates had each five hundred pounds a year allow'd out of the Profits of the Theatres; the reſt, except eight hundred a year to four Poets, payable into the Exchequer. A Poet Laureat created in one of theſe Theatres, by the *Strategus* receives a Wreath of five hundred pounds in Gold, paid out of the ſaid Profits. But no man is capable of this Creation, that had not two parts in three of the Suffrages at the Academy, aſſembl'd after ſix weeks warning, and upon that occaſion.

THESE things among us are ſure enough to be cenſur'd, but by ſuch only as do not know the nature of a Common-wealth: for to tell men that they are free, and yet to curb the genius of a People in a lawful Recreation, to which they are naturally inclin'd, is to tell a tale of a Tub. I have heard the Proteſtant Miniſters in *France*, by men that were wiſe, and of their own profeſſion, much blam'd in that they forbad Dancing, a Recreation to which the genius of that Air is ſo inclining, that they loſt many who would not loſe that: Nor do they leſs than blame the former determination of raſhneſs, who now gently connive at that which they had ſo roughly forbidden. Theſe Sports in *Oceana* are ſo govern'd, that they are pleaſing for private diverſion, and profitable to the Public: For the Theatres ſoon defray'd their own charge, and now bring in a good Revenue. All this is ſo far from the detriment of Virtue, that it is to the improvement of it, ſeeing Women that heretofore made havock of their Honours that they might have their Pleaſures, are now incapable of their Pleaſures, if they loſe their Honours.

ABOUT the one and fortieth year of the Common-wealth, the Cenſors, according to their annual Cuſtom, reported the Pillar of *Nilus*, by which it was found that the People were encreas'd very near one third. Whereupon the Council of War was appointed by the Senate to bring in a State of War, and the Treaſurers the State of the Treaſury. The State of War, or the Pay and Charge of an Army, was ſoon after exhibited by the Council in this Account.

The

The Field Pay of a Parliamentary Army.

	l. per ann.
THE Lord Strategus, *Marching*	10000
Polemarchs. General of the Horſe	2000
Lieutenant General	2000
General of the Artillery	1000
Commiſſary General	1000
Major General	1000
Quarter-maſter General	1000
Two Adjutants to the Major General	1000
Forty Colonels	40000
100 Captains of Horſe, at 500*l.* a Man	50000
300 Captains of Foot, at 300*l.* a Man	90000
100 Cornets, at 100*l.* a Man	10000
300 Enſigns at 50*l.* a Man	15000
800 Quarter-maſters, Serjeants, Trumpeters, Drummers	20000
10000 Horſe, at 2*s.* 6*d. per* day each	470000
30000 Foot, at 1*s. per* day each	500000
Chirurgeons	400
Sum	1114400
40000 Auxiliaries, amounting to within a little as much	1100000
THE Charge of mounting 20000 Horſe	300000
THE Train of Artillery, holding a 3*d.* to the whole	900000
Summa totalis	1414400

ARMS and Ammunition are not reckon'd, as thoſe which are furniſh'd out of the Store or Arſenal of *Emporium:* Nor waſtage, as that which goes upon the account of the Fleet, maintain'd by the Cuſtoms; which Cuſtoms, thro' the care of the Council for Trade, and growth of Traffic, were long ſince improv'd to about a Million Revenue. The Houſe being thus inform'd of a State of War, the Commiſſioners brought in

THE ſtate of the Treaſury this preſent year, being the one and fortieth of the Common-wealth.

	l.
RECEIVED from the one and twentieth of this Common-wealth, by 700000*l.* a year in bank, with the Product of the Sum riſing	16000000

EX-

EXPENDED from the one and twentieth of this Common-wealth.

	l.
IMPRIMIS, For the Addition of Arms for 100000 Men, to the Arſenal, or Tower of *Emporium*	1000000.
FOR the ſtoring of the ſame with Artillery	300000.
FOR the ſtoring of the ſame with Ammunition	200000.
FOR beautifying the Cities, Parks, Gardens, Public Walks, and Places for Recreation of *Emporium* and *Hiera*, with Public Buildings, Aquæducts, Statues, and Fountains, *&c.*	1500000.
EXTRAORDINARY Embaſſies	150000.
Sum	3150000.
REMAINING in the Treaſury, the Salaries of the Exchequer being defalk'd	12000000

BY compariſon of which Accounts, if a War with an Army of 80000 Men were to be made by the Penny, yet was the Common-wealth able to maintain ſuch a one above three years, without levying a Tax. But it is againſt all Experience, Senſe and Reaſon, that ſuch an Army ſhould not be ſoon broken, or make a great progreſs; in either of which caſes the Charge ceaſes; or rather, if a right courſe be taken in the latter, Profit comes in: for the *Romans* had no other conſiderable way but Victory whereby to fill their Treaſury, which nevertheleſs was ſeldom empty. ALEXANDER did not conſult his Purſe upon his Deſign for *Perſia:* It is obſerv'd by MACHIAVEL, that LIVY arguing what the event in reaſon muſt have been had that King invaded *Rome*, and diligently meaſuring what on each ſide was neceſſary to ſuch a War, never ſpeaks a word of Money. No man imagines that the *Gauls*, *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Huns*, *Lombards*, *Saxons*, *Normans*, made their Inroads or Conqueſts by the ſtrength of the Purſe; and if it be thought enough, according to the dialect of our age, to ſay in anſwer to theſe things, that thoſe times are paſt and gone; what Money did the late GUSTAVUS, the moſt victorious of modern Princes, bring out of *Sweden* with him into *Germany?* An Army that goes upon a golden Leg, will be as lame as if it were a wooden one; but proper Forces have Nerves and Muſcles in them, ſuch for which, having four or five Millions, a Sum eaſy enough, with a Revenue like this of *Oceana*, to be had at any time in readineſs, you need never, or very rarely charge the People with Taxes. What influence the Common-wealth by ſuch Arms has had upon the world, I leave to Hiſtorians, whoſe cuſtom it has been of old, to be as diligent Obſervers of foreign Actions, as careleſs of thoſe domeſtic Revolutions which (leſs pleaſant it may be, as not partaking ſo much of the Romance) are to Stateſman of far greater profit; and this fault, if it be not mine, is ſo much more frequent with modern Writers, as has caus'd me to undertake this Work; on which to give my own Judgment, it is perform'd as much above the time I have been about it, as below the dignity of the matter.

BUT I cannot depart out of this Country, till I have taken leave of my Lord ARCHON, a Prince of immenſe Felicity, who having built as high with his Counſils, as he dig'd deep with his Sword, had now ſeen fifty years meaſur'd with his own inerring Orbs.

Plutarch *in the Life of* Timoleon.

TIMOLEON (ſuch a hater of Tyrants, that not able to perſuade his Brother TIMOPHANES to relinquiſh the Tyranny of *Corinth* he ſlew him) was afterwards elected by the People (the *Sicilians* groaning to them from under the like burden) to be ſent to their relief: Whereupon TELECLIDES the Man at that time of moſt Authority in the Common-wealth of *Corinth*, ſtood up, and giving an Exhortation to TIMOLEON, how he ſhould behave himſelf in his Expedition, told him that if he reſtor'd the *Sicilians* to Liberty, it would be acknowledg'd that he had deſtroy'd a Tyrant; if otherwiſe, he muſt expect to hear that he had murder'd a King. TIMOLEON taking his leave, with a very ſmall Proviſion for ſo great a deſign, purſu'd it with a Courage not inferior to, and a Felicity beyond any that had been known to that day in mortal Fleſh, having in the ſpace of eight years utterly rooted out of all *Sicily* thoſe Weeds of Tyranny, thro' the deteſtation whereof men fled in ſuch abundance from their Native Country, that whole Cities were left deſolate; and brought it to ſuch a paſs, that others thro' the fame of his Virtues, and the excellency of the Soil, flockt as faſt from all Quarters to it, as to the Garden of the World: While he, being preſented by the People of *Syracuſa* with his Town-houſe, and his Country Retreat, the ſweeteſt Places in either, liv'd with his Wife and Children a moſt quiet, happy, and holy Life; for he attributed no part of his Succeſs to himſelf, but all to the Bleſſing and Providence of the Gods. As he paſt his time in this manner, admir'd and honour'd by Mankind, LAPHISTIUS an envious Demagog, going to ſummon him upon ſome pretence or other to anſwer for himſelf before the Aſſembly, the People fell into ſuch a Mutiny, as could not be appeas'd but by TIMOLEON, who underſtanding the matter, reprov'd them, by repeating the pains and travel which he had gone thro', to no other end than that every Man might have the free uſe of the Laws. Wherefore when DÆMENETUS another Demagog, had brought the ſame Deſign about again, and blam'd him impertinently to the People for things which he did when he was General, TIMOLEON anſwer'd nothing, but raiſing up his hands, gave the Gods thanks for their return to his frequent Prayers, that he might but live to ſee the *Syracuſians* ſo free, that they could queſtion whom they pleas'd.

NOT long after being old, thro' ſome natural imperfection, he fell blind; but the *Syracuſians* by their perpetual viſits held him, tho' he could not ſee, their greateſt Object: if there arriv'd Strangers, they brought them to ſee this ſight. Whatever came in debate at the Aſſembly, if it were of ſmall conſequence, they determin'd it themſelves; but if of importance, they always ſent for TIMOLEON; who being brought by his Servants in a Chair, and ſet in the middle of the Theatre, there ever follow'd a great ſhout, after which ſome time was allow'd for the Benedictions of the People; and then the matter propos'd, when TIMOLEON had ſpoken to it, was put to the Suffrage; which given, his Servants bore him back in his Chair, accompany'd by the People clapping their hands, and making all expreſſions of Joy and Applauſe, till leaving him at his Houſe, they return'd

turn'd to the diſpatch of their Buſineſs. And this was the Life of TIMOLEON, till he dy'd of Age, and drop'd like a mature Fruit, while the Eyes of the People were as the Showers of Autumn.

THE Life and Death of my Lord ARCHON (but that he had his Senſes to the laſt, and that his Character, as not the Reſtorer, but the Founder of a Common-wealth, was greater) is ſo exactly the ſame, that (ſeeing by Men wholly ignorant of Antiquity, I am accus'd of writing Romance) I ſhall repeat nothing: but tell you that this year the whole Nation of *Oceana*, even to the Women and Children, were in mourning, where ſo great or ſad a Funeral Pomp had never been ſeen or known. Sometime after the performance of the Exequies, a *Coloſſus*, mounted on a brazen Horſe of excellent Fabric, was erected in the Piazza of the *Pantheon*, engrav'd with this Inſcription on the Eaſtern ſide of the Pedeſtal:

HIS

NAME

IS AS

Precious Ointment.

And on the Weſtern with the following:

GRATA

GRATA PATRIA

Piæ & Perpetuæ Memoriæ

D. D.

Olphaus Megaletor

Lord ARCHON, *and ſole* LEGISLATOR

OF

OCEANA.

PATER PATRIÆ.

Invincible in the Field.
Inviolable in his Faith.
Unfained in his Zeal.
Immortal in his Fame.

The Greateſt of Captains.
The Beſt of Princes.
The Happieſt of Legiſlators.
The Moſt Sincere of Chriſtians.

Who ſetting the Kingdoms of Earth *at Liberty,*
Took the Kingdom of the Heavens *by Violence;*

Anno { Ætat. ſuæ 116.
Hujus Reipub. 50.

THE

PREROGATIVE

OF

Popular Government.

BEING A

POLITICAL DISCOURSE

In Two BOOKS.

The FORMER

Containing the first Preliminary of OCEANA inlarg'd, interpreted, and vindicated from all such Mistakes or Slanders as have been alledg'd against it under the Notion of Objections.

The SECOND

Concerning Ordination, against D. H. HAMMOND, Dr. L. SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow.

In which Two Books is contain'd the whole Common-wealth of the *Hebrews*, or of *Israel*, Senate, People, and Magistracy, both as it stood in the Institution by MOSES, and as it came to be form'd after the Captivity.

As also the different Policies introduc'd into the Church of CHRIST, during the time of the Apostles.

Without Council Purposes are disappointed; but in the Multitude of Counsellors they are establish'd. SOLOMON.

La multitudine è piu Savia è piu costante ch'un Principe. MACHIAVEL.

EPISTLE to the READER.

WHOSOEVER ſheds mans blood, by man ſhall his blood be ſhed; for in the Image of God made he Man. If this Rule holds as well in ſhedding the Blood of a *Turk* as of a *Chriſtian*, then *that wherein Man is the Image of God is REASON.* Of all Controverſies, thoſe of the Pen are the moſt honourable: for in thoſe of Force, there is more of the Image of the Beaſt, but in thoſe of the Pen there is more of the Image of God. In the Controverſies of the Sword, there is but too often no other Reaſon than Force; but the Controverſy of the Pen has never any Force but Reaſon. Of all Controverſies of the Pen next thoſe of Religion, thoſe of Government are the moſt honourable, and the moſt uſeful; the true end of each, tho' in a different way, being that the Will of God may be *done in Earth as it is in Heaven.* Of all Controverſies of Government, thoſe in the vindication of Popular Government are the moſt noble, as being that Conſtitution alone, from whence all we have that is good is deſcended to us; and which, if it had not exiſted, Mankind at this day had been but a Herd of Beaſts. The Prerogative of Popular Government muſt either be in an ill hand, or elſe it is a game againſt which there is not a Card in the whole pack; for we have the Books of MOSES, thoſe of the *Greeks* and of the *Romans*, not to omit MACHIAVEL, all for it. What have the Aſſerters of Monarchy; what can they have againſt us? A Sword; but that ruſts or muſt have a Scabbard; and the Scabbard of this kind of Sword is a good frame of Government.

A MAN may be poſſeſt of a piece of Ground by force, but to make uſe or profit of it, he muſt build upon it, and till it by Reaſon; *for whatever is not founded upon Reaſon, cannot be permanent.* In Reaſon there are two parts, *Invention* and *Judgment:* As to the latter, *In a multitude of Councillors* (ſay both SOLOMON and MACHIAVEL) *there is ſtrength.* Nay as for Judgment, there is not that order in Art or Nature that can compare with a Popular Aſſembly. *THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE IS THE VOICE OF GOD.* Hence it is that in all well-order'd Policies the People have the ultimate reſult: but unleſs there be ſome other to invent, a Popular Aſſembly can be of no effect at all but Confuſion. *Invention* is a ſolitary thing. All the Phyſicians in the world put together, invented not the Circulation of the Blood, nor can invent any ſuch thing, tho' in their own Art; yet this was invented by one alone, and being invented, is unanimouſly voted and embrac'd by the generality of Phyſicians. The Plow and Wheels were at firſt, you muſt think, the invention of ſome rare Artiſts; but who or what ſhall ever be able to tear the uſe of them from the People? Hence, where Government is at a loſs, a ſole Legiſlator is of abſolute neceſſity; nay where it is not at a loſs, if well model'd, as in *Venice*, the Propoſers, tho' frequently changeable, as in that caſe is neceſſary, are very few, as the *Counſillors*, the *Savi*, the *Provoſts.* Wherever a Common-wealth is thus propos'd to, the Balance or Popular Aſſembly will do her duty to admiration, but till then never. Yet ſo it has been with us of late years, that altho' in Royal Authority

thority there was no more than the right of Propoſing, and the King himſelf was to ſtand *(legibus & conſuetudinibus quas vulgus elegerit)* to the reſult of the People, yet the popular Council has been put upon Invention, and they that have been the prevailing Party have us'd means to keep the Reſult to themſelves, quite contrary to the nature of Popular Adminiſtration. *Let one ſpeak, and the reſt judge.* Of whatever any one man can ſay or do, Mankind is the natural and competent Judge, in which is contain'd the very reaſon of Parliaments; thro' the want of underſtanding this came in confuſion. *Man that is in Honour, and has no underſtanding, is like the Beaſts that periſh.* Nor can we poſſibly return to Order, but by mending the Hedge where it was broken. A prudent, entire and fit Propoſition made to a free Parliament, recovers all. To them who are of the greateſt Eminency or Authority in a Common-wealth, belongs naturally that part of Reaſon which is Invention; and uſing this, they are to propoſe: but what did our Grandees ever invent or propoſe, that might ſhew ſo much as that themſelves knew what they would be at? and yet how confidently do they lay the Fault upon the People, and their unfitneſs, forſooth, for Government: in which they are wondrous wiſe! For, this I will boldly ſay, where there was an Ariſtocracy that perform'd their duty, there never was, nor ever can be a People unfit for Government; but on the contrary, where the Ariſtocracy have failed, the People being once under Orders, have held very often. But while they are not under Orders, if they fail it is not their fault, but the fault of the Ariſtocracy; for who elſe ſhould model a Government but men of Experience? There is not in *England*, I ſpeak it to their ſhame, one GRANDEE that has any perfect knowledge of the Orders of any one Common-wealth that ever was in the World. Away with this ſame grave complexion, this huff of Wiſdom maintain'd by making faces. The People cannot do their duty conſiſting in Judgment, but by virtue of ſuch Orders as may bring them together, and direct them; but the duty of the Ariſtocracy conſiſting in Invention, may be done by any one man, and in his ſtudy; and where is that one man among all the Grandees that ſtudies? They are ſo far from knowing their own duty, that a man for propoſing that in which none can find a flaw has done enough to be ridiculous to them, who are themſelves ridiculous to the whole World, in that they could never yet propoſe any thing that would hold.

BUT if this amounts to a Demonſtration, it amounts to a clear detection of your profound Grandees, and a full proof that they are Phanatical Perſons, State Jeſuits, ſuch as have reduc'd the Politics to mental Reſervation and implicit Faith in their nods or nightcaps.

GOD, to propoſe his Commandments to the People of *Iſrael*, wrote them on two Tables; the *Decemviri*, to propoſe their Commandments to the People of *Rome*, wrote them on twelve Tables; the *Athenians* propos'd in writing, ſign'd with the name of the particular Inventor; after this pattern do the *Venetians*, as was ſaid, the ſame at this day. But no Gooſe-quill, no Scribling: Your Grandees are above this.

MOSES, who was the firſt Writer in this kind, ſhall be pardon'd; but MACHIAVEL, the firſt in later times that has reviv'd his Principles, or trod in his ſteps, is deſervedly pelted for it by Sermons. They are not for the Scripture, but the *Cabala*.

I WILL tell you a ſtory out of BOCCALINI: APOLLO having ſpy'd the Philoſopher and great Maſter of Silence HARPOCRATES in

the

the Court of *Parnaſſus*, us'd ſuch importunity with him, that for once he was perſuaded to ſpeak; upon which ſuch apparent diſcovery was made of the Hypocrite, and the groſs ignorance he had ſo long harbour'd under a deceitful ſilence, that he was immediately baniſh'd the Court. Were there cauſe, I could be modeſt; but this Virtue, to the diminution of ſound and wholſome Principles, would be none: wherefore let a Grandee write, and I will ſhew you HARPOCRATES.

THUS having ſufficiently defy'd Sir GUY, I may with the leſs impeachment of reputation deſcend to TOM THUMB. Not that I hold my ſelf a fit Perſon to be exercis'd with Boys play, but that ſome, who ſhould have more wit, have ſo little as to think this ſomething. A good Rat-catcher is not ſo great a bleſſing to any City, as a good Juggler-catcher would be to this Nation. Now becauſe I want an Office, I ſhall ſhew my Parts to my Country, and how fit I am for the white Staff, or long Pole of ſo worſhipful a Preferment.

Ridiculus ne ſis, eſto.

THE

THE

FIRST BOOK,

CONTAINING

The firſt Preliminary of OCEANA, inlarg'd, interpreted, and vindicated from all ſuch Miſtakes or Slanders as have been alledg'd againſt it under the notion of Objections.

Εἰ μὴ πρακτέον ἁπάντων χαλεπῶν ὄντων
Οἰόμην ὀλίγα μὲν ἂν καὶ πάνυ ἁπλᾶ χρῆσθαι.

A full Anſwer to all ſuch OBJECTIONS *as have hitherto been made againſt* OCEANA.

NEITHER the Author or Authors of the Conſiderations upon OCEANA, nor any other, have yet ſo much as once pretended one Contradiction or one Inequality to be in the whole Common-wealth. Now this is certain, *That Frame of Government which is void of any contradiction, or any inequality, is void of all internal cauſes of Diſſolution, and muſt, for ſo much as it embraces, have attain'd to full perfection.* This by wholeſale is a full Anſwer to the Conſiderations, with all other Objections hitherto; and will Be (with any man that comprehends the nature of Government) to thouſands of ſuch Books, or Myriads of ſuch tittle tattle. Nevertheleſs, becauſe every man is not provided with a Sum, in the following Diſcourſe I ſhall comply with them that muſt have things by Retail, or ſomewhat for their Farthing.

The

The PREFACE.

IT is commonly ſaid, and not without encouragement by ſome who think they have Parnaſſus *by the horns,* that the Univerſity has laſh'd me: *ſo it ſeems I have to do with the Univerſity, and laſhing is lawful; with both which I am contented. In* Moorfields, *while the People are buſy at their ſports, they often and ridiculouſly loſe their Buttons, their Ribbands, and their Purſes; where if they light, as ſometimes they do, upon the Maſters of that Art, they fall a kicking them a-while (which one may call a* rude charge) *and then to their work again. I know not whether I invite you to* Moorfields, *but* (difficile eſt Satyram non ſcribere) *all the favour I deſire at your hands is but this, that you would not ſo condemn one man for kicking, as in the ſame Act to pardon another for cutting of Purſes. A Gentleman that commits a fallacious Argument to writing, or goes about to ſatisfy others with ſuch Reaſons as he is not ſatisfy'd with himſelf, is no more a Gentleman but a Pick-pocket; with this in my mind, I betake my ſelf to my work, or rather to draw open the Curtain, and begin the Play.*

ONE that has written Conſiderations upon OCEANA, *ſpeaks the Prologue in this manner:* I beſeech you Gentlemen, are not we the Writers of Politics ſomewhat a ridiculous ſort of People? Is it not a fine piece of Folly for private men ſitting in their Cabinets to rack their brains about Models of Government? Certainly our Labours make a very pleaſant recreation for thoſe great Perſonages, who, ſitting at the Helm of Affairs, have by their large Experience not only acquir'd the perfect Art of Ruling, but have attain'd alſo to the comprehenſion of the Nature and Foundation of Government. *In which egregious Compliment the Conſiderer has loſt his conſidering Cap.* Epiſt.

IT was in the time of ALEXANDER, *the greateſt Prince and Commander of his age, that* ARISTOTLE, *with ſcarce inferior Applauſe and equal Fame, being a private man, wrote that excellent piece of Prudence in his Cabinet, which is call'd his* Politics, *going upon far other Principles than thoſe of* ALEXANDER's *Government, which it has long outliv'd. The like did* TITUS LIVIUS *in the time of* AUGUSTUS, *Sir* THOMAS MOOR *in the time of* HENRY *the Eighth, and* MACHIAVEL *when* Italy *was under Princes that afforded him not the ear. Theſe Works nevertheleſs are all of the moſt eſteem'd and applauded in this kind; nor have I found any man, whoſe like Endeavours have been perſecuted ſince* PLATO *by* DIONYSIUS. *I ſtudy not without great Examples, nor out of my Calling; either Arms or this Art being the proper Trade of a Gentleman. A man may be intruſted with a Ship, and a good Pilot too, yet not underſtand how to make Sea-charts. To ſay that a man may not write of Government except he be a Magiſtrate, is as abſurd as to ſay, that a man may not make a Sea-chart, unleſs he be a Pilot. It is known that* CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS *made a Chart in his Cabinet, that found out the* Indies. *The Magiſtrate that was good at his Steerage never took it ill of him that brought him a Chart, ſeeing whether he would uſe it or no, was at his own choice; and if Flatterers, being the worſt ſort of Crows, did not pick out the eyes of the living, the Ship of Government*

at

at this day throughout Chriſtendom had not ſtruck ſo often as ſhe has done.

Arte della Guer. Proem.

To treat of Affairs, ſays MACHIAVEL, which as to the conduct of 'em appertain to others, may be thought a great boldneſs; but if I commit Errors in writing, theſe may be known without danger, whereas if they commit Errors in acting, ſuch come not otherwiſe to be known, than in the ruin of the Common-wealth. *For which cauſe I preſume to open the Scene of my Diſcourſe, which is to change according to the variety of theſe following Queſtions.*

1. WHETHER Prudence be well diſtinguiſh'd into Antient and Modern?

2. WHETHER a Common-wealth be rightly defin'd to be a Government of Laws, and not of Men; and Monarchy to be a Government of ſome Man, or a few Men, and not of Laws?

3. WHETHER the Balance of Dominion in Land be the natural cauſe of Empire?

4. WHETHER the Balance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial? and whether theſe two, or any Nations that are of diſtinct Balance, coming to depend upon one and the ſame head, ſuch a mixture creates a new Balance?

5. WHETHER there be any common Right or Intereſt of Mankind diſtinct from the parts taken ſeverally? and how by the Orders of a Common-wealth this may beſt be diſtinguiſh'd from private Intereſt?

6. WHETHER the *Senatuſconſulta*, or Decrees of the *Roman* Senate, had the power of Laws?

7. WHETHER the ten Commandments propos'd by GOD or MOSES were voted by the People of *Iſrael?*

8. WHETHER a Common-wealth coming up to the perfection of the kind, comes not up to the perfection of Government, and has no flaw in it?

9. WHETHER Monarchy, coming up to the perfection of the kind, comes not ſhort of the perfection of Government, and has not ſome flaw in it? in which is alſo treated of the Balance of *France*, of the Original of a landed Clergy, of Arms, and their kinds.

10. WHETHER a Common-wealth that was not firſt broken by it ſelf, was ever conquer'd by any Monarch?

11. WHETHER there be not an Agrarian, or ſome Law or Laws of that nature to ſupply the defect of it, in every Common-wealth? and whether the Agrarian, as it is ſtated in *Oceana*, be not equal and ſatisfactory to all Intereſts or Parties?

12. WHETHER Courſes or a Rotation be neceſſary to a well-order'd Common-wealth? In which is contain'd the *Parembole* or Courſes of *Iſrael* before the Captivity; together with an Epitome of the whole Common-wealth of *Athens*, as alſo another of the Common-wealth of *Venice*.

Antient and Modern Prudence.

CHAP. I.

Whether Prudence be well diſtinguiſh'd into Antient and Modern.

THE Conſiderer (where by Antient Prudence I underſtand the Policy of a Common-wealth, and by Modern Prudence that of King, Lords, and Commons, which introduc'd by the *Goths* and *Vandals* upon the ruin of the *Roman* Empire has ſince reign'd in theſe Weſtern Countries, till by the predominating of ſome one of the three parts, it be now almoſt univerſally extinguiſh'd) thinks it enough for the confutation of this diſtinction, to ſhew out of THUCYDIDES that of Monarchy to be a more antient Policy than that of a Common-wealth. Upon which occaſion, I muſt begin here to diſcover that which, the further I go, will be the more manifeſt; namely, that there is a difference between quoting Authors, and ſaying ſome part of them without book: this may be done by their words, but the former no otherwiſe than by keeping to their ſenſe. Now the ſenſe of THUCYDIDES, as he is tranſlated by Mr. HOBBS in the place alleg'd, is thus: *The manner*, ſays he, *of living in the moſt antient times of* Greece *was Thieving; the ſtronger going abroad under the conduct of their moſt puiſſant Men, both to enrich themſelves, and fetch home maintainance for the weak:* for there was neither Traffic, property of Lands, nor conſtant Abode, till MINOS *built a Navy, and expelling the Malefactors out of the Iſlands, planted Colonies of his own, by which means they who inhabited the Seacoaſts, becoming more addicted to Riches, grew more conſtant to their dwellings: of whom ſome, grown now rich, compaſs'd their Towns about with Walls. For out of a deſire of Gain, the meaner ſort under-went Servitude with the Mighty; and the Mighty* (thus over-balancing at home) *with their Wealth, brought the leſſer Cities* (abroad) *into ſubjection.* Thus PELOPS, *tho' he was a ſtranger, obtain'd ſuch Power in* Peloponneſus, *that the Country was call'd after his name.* Thus ATREUS *obtain'd the Kingdom of* Mycenæ; and thus *Kingdoms with Honours limitted came to be hereditary*; and riſing to Power, proceeded afterwards to the War againſt *Troy*. After the War with *Troy, tho' with much ado, and in a long time* Greece *had conſtant reſt* (and Land without doubt came to Property) for *ſhifting their ſeats no longer, at length they ſent Colonies abroad; the* Athenians *into* Ionia *with the Iſlands, the* Peloponneſians *into* Italy, Sicily, *and others parts. The Power of* Greece *thus improv'd, and the deſire of Money withal, their Revenues* (in what? not in Money, if yet there was no Uſury; therefore except a man can ſhew that there was Uſury in Land) *being inlarg'd, in moſt of the Cities there were erected Tyrannies.* Let us lay this place to the former, when *out of a deſire of Gain the meaner ſort under-went Servitude with the Mighty*, it caus'd *hereditary Kingdoms with Honours limitted*, as happen'd alſo with us ſince the time of the *Goths* and *Vandals*. But when the People came to property in Land, and their *Revenues were inlarg'd*, ſuch as aſſum'd Power over them,

Thu. B. 1. P. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Book 1. them, not according to the nature of their Property or Balance, were Tyrants: well, and what remedy? why, *then it was,* ſays the Conſiderer, *that the* Grecians *out of an extreme averſion to that which was the cauſe of their preſent Sufferings, ſlipt into popular Government, not that upon calm and mature Debates they found it beſt, but that they might put themſelves at the greateſt diſtance (which Spirit uſually accompanies all Reformations) from that with which they were grown into diſlike.* Whereby he agrees exactly with his Author in making out the true Force and Nature of the Balance, working even without deliberation, and whether men will or no. For the Government that is natural and eaſy, being in no other direction than that of the reſpective Balance, is not of choice but of neceſſity. The Policy of King, Lords and Commons, was not ſo much from the Prudence of our Anceſtors, as from their neceſſity. If three hundred men held at this day the like overbalance to the whole People, it was not in the Power of Prudence to inſtitute any other than the ſame kind of Government, thro' the ſame neceſſity. Thus the meaner ſort with THUCYDIDES *ſubmitting to the Mighty,* it came to *Kingdoms with hereditary Honours:* but the People coming to be wealthy, call'd their Kings, tho' they knew not why, *Tyrants*; nay, and uſing them accordingly, found out means, with as little deliberation it may be as a Bull takes to toſs a Dog, or a Hern to ſplit a Hawk (that is, rather, as at the long-run they will ever do in the like caſes, by Inſtinct, than Prudence or Debate) to throw down that, which by the mere information of ſenſe they could no longer bear; and which being thrown down, they found themſelves eas'd. But the queſtion yet remains, and that is, forſooth, whether of theſe is to be call'd *Antient Prudence.* To this end, never man made a more unlucky choice than the Conſiderer has done for himſelf of this Author, who in the very beginning of his Book, ſpeaking of the *Peloponneſian* War, or that between the Common-wealths of *Athens* and *Lacedemon*, ſays, that *the Actions which preceded this, and thoſe again that were more antient, tho' the truth of them thro' length of time cannot by any means be clearly diſcover'd; yet for any Argument that (looking into times far paſt) he had yet lighted on to perſuade him, he does not think they have been very great either for matter of War or otherwiſe*; that is, for matter of Peace or Government. And leſt this ſhould not be plain enough, he calls the Prudence of the three Periods, obſerv'd by Mr. HOBBS, *viz.* that from the beginning of the *Grecian* Memory to the *Trojan* War, that the *Trojan* War it ſelf, and that from thence to the preſent Common-wealths and Wars, whereof he treats *The Imbecillity of antient Times.* Wherefore certainly this Prevaricator, to give him his own fees, has *leſs diſcretion than a common Attorney, who will be ſure to examine only thoſe Witneſſes that ſeem to make for the Cauſe in which he is entertain'd.* Seeing that which he affirms to be antient Prudence is diſpos'd by his own witneſs to have been *the Imbecillity of antient Times,* for which I could have ſo many more than I have leiſure to examine, that (to take only of the moſt Authentic) as you have heard one *Greek,* I ſhall add no more than one *Roman,* and that is FLORUS in his Prologue, where (computing the Ages of the *Romans,* in the ſame manner THUCYDIDES did thoſe of the *Greeks*) he affirms *the time while they liv'd under their Kings, to have been their Infancy; that from the Conſuls till they conquer'd* Italy, *their Youth; that from hence to their Emperors, their manly age;*

Conſid. *p.* 4.

Mr. Hobbs *in the* Magire.

Thu. B. 1. p. 3.

Conſid. *p.* 34.

and

and the reſt (with a Complement or Salvo to TRAJAN his preſent Lord) *their Dotage.* Chap. 1.

THESE things, tho' *originally all Government among the* Greeks *and the* Romans *was Regal*, are no more than *they who have not yet paſt their Novitiate in ſtory, might have known.* Yet ſays the Conſiderer, *It ſeems to be a defect of experience to think that the* Greek *and the* Roman *Actions are only conſiderable in Antiquity.* But is it ſuch a defect of Experience to think them only conſiderable, as not to think them chiefly conſiderable in Antiquity, or that the name of Antient Prudence does not belong to that Prudence which was chiefeſt in Antiquity? *True*, ſays he, *it is very frequent with ſuch as have been converſant with* Greek *and* Roman *Authors, to be led by them into a belief that the reſt of the World was a rude inconſiderable People, and, which is a term they very much delight in, altogether Barbarous.* This ſhould be ſome fine Gentleman that would have Univerſities pull'd down; for the Office of a Univerſity is no more than to preſerve ſo much of Antiquity as may keep a Nation from ſtinking, or being barbarous; which Salt grew not in Monarchies, but in Common-wealths: or whence has the Chriſtian World that Religion and thoſe Laws which are now common, but from the *Hebrews* and *Romans?* or from whence have we Arts but from theſe or the *Greeks*? That we have a Doctor of Divinity, or a Maſter of Arts, we may thank Popular Government; or with what Languages, with what things are Scholars converſant that are otherwiſe deſcended? will they ſo plead their own Cauſe as to tell us it is poſſible there ſhould be a Nation at this day in the world without Univerſities, or Univerſities without *Hebrew*, *Greek* and *Latin*, and not be Barbarous, that is to ſay, rude, unlearn'd, and inconſiderable? Yes, *this humour even among the* Greeks *and* Romans *themſelves was a ſervile addiction to narrow Principles, and a piece of very pedantical Pride.* What, man! the *Greeks* and the *Romans* that of all other would not ſerve, ſervile! their Principles, their Learning, with whoſe ſcraps we ſet up for Batchelors, Maſters, and Doctors of fine things, narrow! their inimitable Eloquence a piece of very pedantical Pride! The World can never make ſenſe of this any otherwiſe than that ſince Heads and Fellows of Colleges became the only *Greeks* and *Romans*, the *Greeks* and *Romans* are become ſervily addicted, of narrow Principles, very Pedants, and prouder of thoſe things they do not underſtand, than the other were of thoſe they did: For, ſay they, *in this Queſtion, the Examples of the* Babylonians, Perſians *and* Egyptians (not to omit the antient and like modern Diſcoveries of the Queen of the *Amazons*, and of the King of *China*) *cannot without groſs partiality be neglected.* This is pretty; they who ſay nothing at all to the Policy of theſe Governments, accuſe me, who have fully open'd it, of negligence. The *Babylonian*, *Perſian*, and, for ought appears to the contrary, the *Chineſe* Policy, is ſum'd up, and far excell'd by that at this day of *Turky*; and in opening this latter, I have open'd them all, ſo far from neglect, that I every where give the *Turk* his due, whoſe Policy I aſſert to be the beſt of this kind, tho' not of the beſt kind. But they will bear me down, and but with one Argument, which I beſeech you mark, that it is abſolutely of the beſt kind; for ſay they, *it is of a more abſolute form* (has more of the Man and leſs of the Law in it) *than is to be met with in any Kingdom of* Europe. Conſid. p. 2, 3.

I AM

Book I. I AM amaz'd! This is that kind of Government which to hold Barbarous, was in the *Greeks* and *Romans Pedantical Pride, but would be in us who have not the ſame Temptation of Intereſt, downright Folly.* The Intereſt of a People is not their Guide but their Temptation! We that hold our Land divided among us, have not the ſame Temptation of Intereſt that had the ſervile *Hebrews*, *Greeks*, and *Romans*; but the ſame that had the free People of *Babylon*, *Perſia*, and *Egypt*, where not the People but the Prince was ſole Landlord! O the Arts in which theſe men are Maſters! To follow the pedantical Pride of MOSES, LYCURGUS, SOLON, ROMULUS, were with us downright Folly; but to follow humble and learned MAHOMET or OTTOMAN, in whoſe only Model the Perfection of the *Babylonian*, *Perſian*, *Egyptian* Policy is conſummated, is Antient Prudence! Exquiſite Politicians! egregious Divines, for the leading of a People into *Egypt* or *Babylon!* Theſe things conſidered, whether Antient Prudence, as I have ſtated it, be downright Folly, or as they have ſtated it, be not downright Knavery, I appeal to any Court of Claims in the world, where the Judges, I mean, have not more in their Caps than in their Heads, and in their Sleeves than the Scarlet. And whereas Men love compendious works, if I gain my Cauſe, the Reader, for an anſwer to the *Oxford* Book, needs look no further than this Chapter. For if Riches and Freedom be the end of Government; and theſe Men propoſe nothing but Slavery, Beggary, and Turciſm, what need more words?

CHAP. II.

Whether a Common-wealth be rightly defin'd to be a Government of Laws and not of Men, and a Monarchy to be the Government of ſome Man, or a few Men, and not of Laws?

THAT part of the Preliminaries which the Prevaricator, as is uſual with him, recites in this place falſly and fraudulently, is thus: Relation had to theſe two times (that of Antient and that of Modern Prudence) the one, as is computed by JANOTTI, ending with the Liberty of *Rome*, the other beginning with the Arms of CÆSAR (which extinguiſhing Liberty, became the Tranſlation of Antient into Modern Prudence, introduc'd in the Ruin of the *Roman* Empire by the *Goths* and *Vandals*) *GOVERNMENT (to define it* de jure, or according to Antient Prudence) *is an Art whereby a civil Society of Men is inſtituted and preſerv'd, upon the Foundation of Common Right or Intereſt; or (to follow* ARISTOTLE *and* LIVY) *it is an Empire of Laws, and not of Men.*

AND Government to define it de facto, or according to Modern Prudence, *is an Art whereby ſome Man, or ſome few Men, ſubject a City or a Nation, and rule it according to his or their private Intereſt; which, becauſe Laws in ſuch caſes are made according to the Intereſt of a Man, or ſome few Families, may be ſaid to be an Empire of Men, and not of Laws.*

HEREBY it is plain, whether in an Empire of Laws, and not of Men, as a Common-wealth; or in an Empire of Men, and not of Laws, as Monarchy: Firſt, That Law muſt equally proceed from Will,

Will, that is either from the Will of the whole People, as in a Common-wealth; from the Will of one Man, as in an Abſolute, or from the Will of a few Men, as in a regulated Monarchy. Chap. 2.

SECONDLY, That Will, whether of one, or more, or all, is not preſum'd to be, much leſs to act without a Mover.

THIRDLY, That the Mover of the Will is Intereſt.

FOURTHLY, That Intereſts alſo being of one, of more, or of all; thoſe of one Man, or of a few Men, where Laws are made accordingly, being more private than comes duly up to the Law, the nature whereof lies not in Partiality but in Juſtice, may be call'd the Empire of Men, and not of Laws: And that of the whole People coming up to the public Intereſt (which is no other than common Right and Juſtice, excluding all Partiality or private Intereſt) may be call'd the Empire of Laws, and not of Men. By all which put together, whereas it is demonſtrable that in this diviſion of Government I do not ſtay at the Will, which muſt have ſome Motive or Mover, but go to *the firſt and the remoteſt Notion of Government, in the Foundation and Origination of it, in which lies the Credit of this Diviſion, and the Definition of the ſeveral Members*, that is to ſay, of Intereſt, whether private or public; the Prevaricator tells me, That this *diviſion of Government having* (he knows not how) *loſt its Credit, the definitions of the ſeveral Members of it need not be conſider'd further, than that they come not at all up to the firſt and remoteſt Notion of Government in the Foundation and Origination of it, in which lies all the difficulty; and being here neglected, there is little hope the ſubſequent Diſcourſe can have in it the light of probable Satisfaction, much leſs the Force of infallible Demonſtration.* Conſid. *p.* 6.

VERY good! Intereſt it ſhould ſeem then is not the *firſt and remoteſt Notion of Government*, but that which he will out-throw; and at this caſt, by ſaying, *that the Declaration of the will of the Sovereign Power is call'd Law: which if it out-lives the Perſon whoſe Will it was, it is only becauſe the Perſons who ſucceed in Power are preſum'd to have the ſame will, unleſs they manifeſt the contrary, and that is the Abrogation of the Law; ſo that ſtill the Government is not in the Law but in the Perſon whoſe Will gave a being to that Law.* I might as well ſay, The Declaration to all men by theſe preſents that a man owes Money is call'd a Bond; which if it out-lives the Perſon that enter'd into that Bond, it is only becauſe the Perſons that ſucceed him in his Eſtate, are preſum'd to have the ſame will, unleſs they manifeſt the contrary, and that is the abrogation or cancelling of the Bond; ſo that ſtill the Debt is not in the Bond, but in his Will who gave a being to that Bond. If it be alledg'd againſt this example, that it is a private one, the caſe may be put between ſeveral Princes, States, or Governments, or between ſeveral States of the ſame Principallity or Government, whether it be a Regulated Monarchy or a Common-wealth; for in the like Obligation of the States (as of the King, the Lords, and Commons) or Parties agreeing, *Authoritate Patrum & juſſu Populi*, till the Parties that ſo agreed to the Obligation, ſhall agree to repeal or cancel it, lies all Law that is not merely in the Will of one Man, or of one State, or Party, as the Oligarchy. But not to diſpute theſe things further in this place, let the Government be what it will, for the Prevaricator to fetch the Origination of Law no further than the will (while he knows very well that I fetch'd it from Intereſt, the Antecedent of Will) and yet Conſid. *p.* 8.

Book. I. to boaſt that he has out-thrown me, I ſay he is neither an *honeſt Man, nor a good Bowler.* No matter, he will be a better Gunner; for where I ſaid that the Magiſtrate upon the Bench is that to the Law, which a Gunner upon his Plat-form is to his Cannon, he goes about to take better aim, and ſays, *If the proportion of things be accurately conſider'd, it will appear that the laden Cannon anſwers not to the Laws, but to the Power of the Perſon whoſe Will created thoſe Laws:* Which if ſome of them that the Power of the Perſon whoſe Will created them, intended ſhould be of as good Stuff or Carriage as the reſt, do nevertheleſs according to the nature of their Matter or of their Charge, come ſhort or over, and others break or recoil; ſure this Report of the Prevaricator is not according to the bore of my Gun, but according to the bore of ſuch a Gunner. Yet again, if he be not ſo good a Gunner, he will be a better Anatomiſt; for whereas I affirm, that to ſay, ARISTOTLE and CICERO wrote not the Rights or Rules of their Politicks from the Principles of Nature, but tranſcrib'd them into their Books out of the practice of their own Common-wealths, is as if a man ſhould ſay of famous HARVEY, that he tranſcrib'd his Circulation of the Blood, not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that Body: He anſwers, that *the whole force of this Objection amounts but to this, that becauſe* HARVEY *in his Circulation has follow'd the Principles of Nature, therefore* ARISTOTLE *and* CICERO *have done ſo in their Diſcourſes of Government.*

PRETTY! It is ſaid in Scripture, *Thy word is ſweet as Honey:* Amounts that but to this, Becauſe Honey is ſweet, therefore the Word of God is ſweet? To ſay that my Lord Protector has not conquer'd many Nations, were as if one ſhould ſay, that CÆSAR had not conquer'd many Nations: Amounts that but to this, that becauſe CÆSAR conquer'd many Nations, therefore my Lord Protector has conquer'd many Nations? What I produce as a Similitude, he calls an Objection; where I ſay, *as*, he ſays, *becauſe:* what ingenuous man does not deteſt ſuch a cheat! A Similitude is brought to ſhew how a thing is or may be, not to prove that it is ſo; it is us'd for Illuſtration, not as an Argument: The Candle I held did not ſet up the Poſt, but ſhew where the Poſt was ſet, and yet this blind Buzzard has run his head againſt it. Nor has he yet enough; if he be not the better Naturaliſt, he will be the better Divine, tho' he ſhould make the worſe Sermon. My Doctrine and Uſe upon that of SOLOMON, *I have ſeen Servants upon Horſes, and Princes walking as Servants upon the Ground,* diſcovers the true means whereby the Principles of Power and Authority, the Goods of the Mind and of Fortune, may ſo meet and twine in the Wreath or Crown of Empire, that the Government ſtanding upon Earth like a holy Altar, and breathing perpetual Incenſe to Heaven in Juſtice and Piety, may be ſomething, as it were, between Heaven and Earth; while that only which is propos'd by the beſt, and reſolved by the moſt, becomes Law; and ſo the whole Government an Empire of Laws, and not of Men. This he ſays, is a *goodly Sermon*; it is honeſt, and ſenſe. But let any man make ſenſe or honeſty of this Doctrine, which is his own; *To ſay that Laws do or can govern, is to amuſe our ſelves with a Form of Speech, as when we ſay Time, or Age, or Death, does ſuch a thing; to which indeed the Phanſy of Poets, and Superſtition of Women, may adapt a Perſon, and give a Power of Action: but wiſe Men know they are only Expreſſions*

Conſid. *p.* 7.

preſſions of ſuch Actions or Qualifications as belong to Things or Perſons. Chap. 3.

SPEAK out; Is it the Word of God, or the Knavery and Nonſenſe of ſuch Preachers that ought to govern? Are we to hearken to that of the *Talmud*, *There is more in the word of a Scribe, than in the words of the Law*; or that which Chriſt thereupon ſays to the Phariſees, *You have made the Word of God of no effect by your Traditions?* Mat. 15. 6. Say, is the Common-wealth to be govern'd in the Word of a Prieſt or a Phariſee, or by the Vote of the People, and the Intereſt of Mankind?

CHAP. III.

Whether the Balance of Dominion in Land be the natural Cauſe of Empire?

THE Doctrine of the Balance is that, tho' he ſtrains at it, which choaks the Prevaricator: for this of all others is that Principle which makes the Politics, not ſo before the invention of the ſame, to be undeniable throughout, and (not to meddle with the Mathematics, an Art I underſtand as little as Mathematicians do this) the moſt demonſtrable of any whatſoever.

FOR this cauſe I ſhall rather take pleaſure than pains to look back, or tread the ſame path with other, and perhaps plainer ſteps: as thus; If a man having one hundred pounds a year may keep one Servant, or have one man at his command, then having one hundred times ſo much, he may keep one hundred Servants; and this multiply'd by a thouſand, he may have one hundred thouſand men at his command. Now that the ſingle Perſon, or Nobility of any Country in *Europe*, that had but half ſo many men at command, would be King or Prince, is that which I think no man will doubt. But * *no Money, no Switzers*, as the *French* ſpeak: If the Money be flown, ſo are the Men alſo. Tho' Riches in general have Wings, and be apt to bate; yet thoſe in Land are the moſt hooded, and ty'd to the Perch, whereas thoſe in Money have the leaſt hold, and are the ſwifteſt of flight. A Bank where the Money takes not wing, but to come home ſeiz'd, or like a Coyduck, may well be great; but the Treaſure of the *Indies* going out, and not upon returns, makes no Bank. Whence a Bank never paid an Army; or paying an Army, ſoon became no Bank. But where a Prince or a Nobility has an Eſtate in Land, the Revenue whereof will defray this Charge, there their Men are planted, have Toes that are Roots, and Arms that bring forth what Fruit you pleaſe.

THUS a ſingle Perſon is made, or a Nobility makes a King, not with difficulty, or any great prudence, but with eaſe, the reſt coming home, as the *Ox that not only knows his Maſter's Crib*, but muſt ſtarve or repair to it. Nor for the ſame reaſon is Government acquir'd with more eaſe than it is preſerv'd; that is, if the Foundation of Property

* Point de Argent, point de Suiſſe.

be

Book I. be in Land: but if in Money, *lightly come, lightly go.* The reaſon why a ſingle Perſon, or the Nobility that has one hundred thouſand men, or half ſo many at command, will have the Government, is that the Eſtate in Land, whereby they are able to maintain ſo many, in any *European* Territory, muſt over-balance the reſt that remains to the People, at leaſt three parts in four, by which means they are no more able to diſpute the Government with him or them, than your Servant is with you. Now for the ſame reaſon, if the People hold three parts in four of the Territory, it is plain there can neither be any ſingle Perſon nor Nobility able to diſpute the Government with them; in this caſe therefore, except Force be interpos'd, they govern themſelves. So by this computation of the Balance of Property or Dominion in Land, you have according to the threefold Foundation of Property, the Root or Generation of the threefold kind of Government or Empire.

Oceana, *p.* 39. IF one man be ſole Landlord of a Territory, or over-balance the whole People, three parts in four, or thereabouts, he is Grand Signior; for ſo the *Turk*, not from his Empire, but his Property is call'd; and the Empire in this caſe is abſolute Monarchy.

IF the Few, or a Nobility, or a Nobility with a Clergy, be Landlords to ſuch a proportion as over-balances the People in the like manner, they may make whom they pleaſe King; or if they be not pleas'd with their King, down with him, and ſet up whom they like better; a HENRY the Fourth, or the Seventh, a GUISE, a MONTFORT, a NEVIL, or a PORTER, ſhould they find that beſt for their own ends and purpoſes: For as not the Ballance of the King, but that of the Nobility in this caſe is the cauſe of the Government, ſo not the Eſtate or Riches of the Prince or Captain, but his Virtue or Ability, or fitneſs for the ends of the Nobility, acquires that Command or Office. This for Ariſtocracy or mix'd Monarchy. But if the whole People be Landlords, or hold the Land ſo divided among them, that no one man or number of men within the compaſs of the Few, or Ariſtocracy over-balance them, it is a Common-wealth. Such is the Branch in the Root, or the Balance of Property naturally producing Empire; which not confuted, no man ſhall be able to batter my Superſtructures, and which confuted, I lay down my Arms. Till then, if the cauſe neceſſarily precede the effect, Property muſt have a being before Empire, or beginning with it, muſt be ſtill firſt in order.

PROPERTY comes to have a being before Empire or Government two ways, either by a natural or violent Revolution. Natural Revolution happens from within, or by Commerce, as when a Government erected upon one Balance, that for example of a Nobility or a Clergy, thro' the decay of their Eſtates comes to alter to another Balance; which alteration in the Root of Property, leaves all to confuſion, or produces a new Branch or Government, according to the kind or nature of the Root. Violent Revolution happens from without, or by Arms, as when upon Conqueſt there follows Confiſcation. Confiſcation again is of three kinds, when the Captain taking all to himſelf, plants his Army by way of military Colonies, Benefices, or Timars, which was the Policy of MAHOMET; or when the Captain has ſome Sharers, or a Nobility that divides with him, which was the Policy introduc'd by the *Goths* and *Vandals*; or when the Captain divides the Inheritance by Lots, or otherwiſe, to the whole People; which

which Policy was inſtituted by GOD or MOSES in the Common-wealth of *Iſrael.* This triple diſtribution, whether from natural or violent Revolution, returns as to the generation of Empire to the ſame thing, that is to the nature of the Balance already ſtated and demonſtrated. Now let us ſee what the Prevaricator will ſay, which firſt is this. Chap. 3.

THE Aſſertion, that Property producing Empire conſiſts only in Land, appears too poſitive. A Pig of my own Sow; this is no more than I told him, only there is more imply'd in what I told him, than he will ſee; which therefore I ſhall now further explain. The balance in Money may be as good or better than that of Land in three caſes. Firſt, where there is no Property of Land yet introduc'd, as in *Greece* during the time of her antient Imbecillity; whence, as is noted by THUCYDIDES, *the meaner ſort thro' a deſire of Gain underwent the Servitude of the Mighty.* Secondly, in Cities of ſmall Territory and great Trade, as *Holland* and *Genoa*, the Land not being able to feed the People, who muſt live upon Traffic, is over-balanc'd by the means of that Traffic, which is Money. Thirdly, in a narrow Country, where the Lots are at a low ſcantling, as among the *Iſraelites*, if care be not had of Money in the regulation of the the ſame, it will eat out the balance of Land. For which cauſe tho' an *Iſraelite* might both have Money, and put it to Uſury *(thou ſhalt lend* [upon uſury] *to many Nations)* yet might he not lend it upon uſury to a Citizen or Brother: whence two things are manifeſt: Firſt, that Uſury in itſelf is not unlawful: And next, that Uſury in *Iſrael* was no otherwiſe forbidden, than as it might come to overthrow the Balance or Foundation of the Government: for where a Lot as to the general amounted not perhaps to four Acres, a man that ſhould have had a thouſand Pounds in his Purſe, would not have regarded ſuch a Lot in compariſon of his Money; and he that ſhould have been half ſo much in debt, would have been quite eaten out. Uſury is of ſuch a nature, as, not forbidden in the like caſes, muſt devour the Government. The *Roman* People, while their Territory was no bigger, and their Lots, which exceeded not two Acres a man, were yet ſcantier, were flead alive with it; and if they had not help'd themſelves by their Tumults, and the Inſtitution of their Tribunes, it had totally ruin'd both them and their Government. In a Common-wealth, whoſe Territory is very ſmall, the Balance of the Government being laid upon the Land, as in *Lacedemon*, it will not be ſufficient to forbid Uſury, but Money itſelf muſt be forbidden. Whence LYCURGUS allow'd of none, or of ſuch only as being of old, or otherwiſe uſeleſs Iron, was little better, or, if you will, little worſe than none. The Prudence of which Law appear'd in the neglect of it, as when LYSANDER, General for the *Lacedemonians* in the *Peloponneſian* War, having taken *Athens*, and brought home the ſpoil of it, occaſion'd the Ruin of that Common-wealth in her Victory. The Land of *Canaan* compar'd with *Spain* or *England*, was at the moſt but a *Yorkſhire*, and *Laconia* was leſs than *Canaan.* Now if we imagine *Yorkſhire* divided, as was *Canaan*, into ſix hundred thouſand Lots, or as was *Laconia*, into thirty thouſand; a *Yorkſhire* man having one thouſand Pounds in his Purſe, would, I believe, have a better Eſtate in Money than in Land; wherefore in this caſe, to make the Land hold the Balance, there is no way but either that of *Iſrael* by forbidding Uſury, or that of *Lacedemon* by forbidding Money. Where a ſmall Sum may come to

Confid. *p.* 14.

Deut. 15. 6. & 23. 19.

Book. I. over-balance a man's Eſtate in Land, there I ſay Uſury or Money for the preſervation of the Balance in Land, muſt of neceſſity be forbidden, or the Government will rather reſt upon the Balance of Money, than upon that of Land, as in *Holland* and *Genoa*. But in a Territory of ſuch extent as *Spain* or *England*, the Land being not to be over-balanc'd by Money, there needs no forbidding of Money or Uſury. In *Lacedemon* Merchandize was forbidden, in *Iſrael* and *Rome* it was not exercis'd; wherefore to theſe Uſury muſt have been the more deſtructive: but in a Country where Merchandize is exercis'd, it is ſo far from being deſtructive, that it is neceſſary; elſe that which might be of profit to the Common-wealth would ruſt unprofitably in private purſes, there being no man that will venture his Money but thro' hope of ſome Gain; which if it be ſo regulated that the Borrower may gain more by it than the Lender, as at four in the hundred, or thereabouts, Uſury becomes a mighty Profit to the Public, and a Charity to private Men; in which ſenſe we may not be perſuaded by them that do not obſerve theſe different cauſes, that it is againſt Scripture. Had Uſury to a Brother been permitted in *Iſrael*, that Government had been overthrown: but that ſuch a Territory as *England* or *Spain* cannot be over-balanc'd by Money, whether it be a ſcarce or a plentiful Commodity, whether it be accumulated by Parſimony, as in the purſe of HENRY the *7th*, or preſented by Fortune, as in the Revenue of the *Indies*, is ſufficiently demonſtrated, or ſhall be.

FIRST, by an Argument *ad hominem*, one good enough for the Prevaricator, who argues thus; *The Wiſdom or the Riches of another man can never give him a Title to my Obedience, nor oblige Mr.* HARRINGTON *to give his Clothes or Money to the next man he meets, wiſer or richer than himſelf.*

Confid. *p.* 12.

IF he had ſaid ſtronger, he had ſpoil'd all; for the parting with a man's Cloaths or Money in that caſe, cannot be help'd: now the richer as to the caſe in debate, is the ſtronger, that is, the advantage of Strength remains to the Balance. But well; he preſumes me to have Cloaths and Money of my own, let him put the ſame caſe in the People, or the ſimilitude does not hold. But if the People have Cloaths and Money of their own, theſe muſt either riſe (for the bulk) out of Property in Land, or at leaſt out of the cultivation of the Land, or the Revenue of Induſtry; which if it be dependent, they muſt give ſuch a part of their Cloaths and Money to preſerve that dependence out of which the reſt ariſes to him or them on whom they depend, as he or they ſhall think fit, or parting with nothing to this end, muſt loſe all; that is, if they be Tenants, they muſt pay their Rent, or turn out. So if they have Cloaths and Money dependently, the Balance of Land is in the Landlord or Landlords of the People: but if they have Cloaths and Money independently, then the Balance of Land muſt of neceſſity be in the People themſelves, in which caſe they neither would, if there were any ſuch, nor can, becauſe there be no ſuch, give their Money or Cloaths to ſuch as are wiſer, or richer, or ſtronger than themſelves. So it is not a man's Cloaths and Money or Riches, that oblige him to acknowledge the Title of his Obedience to him that is wiſer or richer, but a man's no Cloaths or Money, or his Poverty, with which if the Prevaricator ſhould come to want, he could not ſo finely prevaricate but he muſt ſerve ſome body, ſo he were rich, no matter if leſs wiſe than himſelf. Wherefore ſeeing the People cannot be ſaid to have

have Cloaths and Money of their own without the balance in Land, and having the balance in Land, will never give their Cloaths, or Money, or Obedience to a ſingle Perſon, or a Nobility, tho' theſe ſhould be the richer in Money; the Prevaricator by his own Argument has evinc'd that in ſuch a Territory as *England* or *Spain*, Money can never come to over-balance Land. Chap. 3.

FOR a ſecond Demonſtration of this Truth, HENRY the Seventh, tho' he miſs'd of the *Indies*, in which for my part I think him happy, was the richeſt in Money of *Engliſh* Princes. Nevertheleſs this acceſſion of Revenue did not at all preponderate on the King's part, nor change the balance. But while making Farms of a Standard he encreas'd the Yeomanry, and cutting off Retainers he abas'd the Nobility, began that Breach in the balance of Land, which proceeding has ruin'd the Nobility, and in them that Government.

FOR a third, the Monarchy of *Spain*, ſince *the Silver of* Potoſi *ſail'd up the* Guadalquivir, which in *Engliſh* is, ſince that King had the *Indies*, ſtands upon the ſame balance in the Lands of the Nobility on which it always ſtood.

AND ſo the learned Concluſion of the Prevaricator *(That it is not to be doubted but a Revenue ſufficient to maintain a Force able* [to cry ware horns] *or beat down all oppoſition, does equally conduce to Empire, whether it ariſes from Rents, Lands, Profits of ready Money, Duties, Cuſtoms,* &c.) aſks you no more than where you ſaw the Premiſes. For unleſs they aſcended his *Monti*, and his Banks, it is not to be imagin'd which way they went; and with theſe, becauſe he is a profeſt Zealot for Monarchy, I would wiſh him by no means to be mountebanking or meddling: for the purſe of a Prince never yet made a Bank, nor, till ſpending and trading Money be all one, ever ſhall. The *Genoeſe*, which the King of *Spain* could never do with the *Indies*, can make you a Bank out of Letters of Exchange, and the *Hollander* with Herrings. Let him come no more here; where there is a Bank, ten to one there is a Common-wealth. A King is a Soldier, or a Lover, neither of which makes a good Merchant; and without Merchandize you will have a lean Bank. It is true, the Family of the MEDICI were both Merchants, and made a Bank into a Throne: but it was in Common-wealth of Merchants, in a ſmall Territory, by great purchaſes in Land, and rather in a mere confuſion than under any ſettl'd Government; which Cauſes, if he can give them all ſuch another meeting, may do as much for another man. Otherwiſe let it be agreed and reſolv'd, that in a Territory of any extent, the balance of Empire conſiſts in Land, and not in Money; always provided that in caſe a Prince has occaſion to run away, as HENRY the Third of *France* did out of *Poland*, *his Balance in ready Money is abſolutely the moſt proper for the carrying on of ſo great and ſudden an Enterprize.* Conſid. *p.* 16.

IT is an excellent way of diſputing, when a man has alledg'd no experience, no example, no reaſon, to conclude with *no doubt*. Certainly upon ſuch occaſions it is not unlawful nor unreaſonable to be merry. *Reaſons*, ſays one Comedian, *are not ſo common as Black-berries.* For all that, ſays another Comedian, *no doubt but a Revenue in Taxes is as good as a Revenue in Feeſimple*; for this, in brief, is the ſenſe of his former particular, or that part of it, which, the *Monti* and the Banks being already diſcharg'd, remains to be anſwer'd. Yet that the Rents and Profits of a man's Land in Feeſimple or Property, come

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Book I. in naturally and eaſily, by common conſent or concernment, that is, by virtue of the Law founded upon the public Intereſt, and therefore voluntarily eſtabliſh'd by the whole People, is an apparent thing. So a man that will receive the Rents and Profits of other men's Land, muſt either take them by mere force, or bring the People to make a Law diveſting themſelves of ſo much of their Property; which upon the matter is all one, becauſe a People poſſeſt of the Balance, cannot be brought to make ſuch a Law, further than they ſee neceſſary for their common defence, but by force, nor to keep it any longer than that Force continues. It is true, there is not only ſuch a thing in nature as health, but ſickneſs too: nor do I deny that there is ſuch a thing as a Government againſt the Balance. But look about, ſeek, find where it ſtood, how it was nam'd, how lik'd, or how long it laſted. Otherwiſe the comical Propoſition comes to this, *It is not to be doubted but that Violence may be permanent or durable*, and the *Blackberry*, for it is becauſe Nature is permanent or durable! What other conſtruction can be made of theſe words? *It is not to be doubted but a Revenue ſufficient to maintain a Force able to beat down all oppoſition* (that is, a Force able to raiſe ſuch a Revenue) *does equally* (on which word grows the *Blackberry) conduce to Empire*; that is, as much as could any natural Balance of the ſame! He may ſtain mouths, as he has done ſome, but he ſhall never make a Politician. The Earth yields her natural encreaſe without loſing her heart; but if you come once to force her, look your Force continue, or ſhe yields you nothing: and the balance of Empire conſiſting of Earth, is of the nature of her Element.

DIVINES are given to ſpeak much of things which the Conſiderer balks in this place that would check them, to the end he may fly out with them in others, whereto they do not belong, as where he

Conſid. *p.* 23. ſays, *that Government is founded either upon Paternity, and the natural Advantage the firſt Father had over all the reſt of Mankind, who were his Sons; or elſe from the encreaſe of Strength and Power in ſome Man or Men, to whoſe Will the reſt ſubmit, that by their ſubmiſſion they may avoid ſuch miſchief, as otherwiſe would be brought upon them.* Which two Vagaries are to be fetch'd home to this place.

FOR the former; If ADAM had liv'd till now, he could have ſeen no other than his own Children; and ſo that he muſt have been King by the right of Nature, was his peculiar Prerogative. But whether the eldeſt Son of his Houſe, if the Prevaricator can find him at this time of day, has the ſame right, is ſomewhat diſputable; becauſe it was early when ABRAHAM and LOT dividing Territories, became ſeveral Kings: and not long after when the Sons of JACOB being all Patriarchs, by the appointment of God, whoſe Right ſure was not inferior to that of ADAM, tho' he had liv'd, came under Popular Government. Wherefore the advantage of the firſt Father is for grave men a pleaſant fancy; nevertheleſs if he had liv'd till now, I hope they underſtand that the whole Earth would have been his Demeans, and ſo the Balance of his Property muſt have anſwer'd to his Empire, as did that alſo of ABRAHAM and LOT to theirs. Wherefore this way of Deduction comes directly home again to the Balance. *Paterfamilias*

De jure belli, l. 1. c. 5. *Latifundia poſſidens, & neminem aliâ lege in ſuas terras recipiens quam ut ditioni ſuæ, qui recipiuntur, ſe ſubjiciant, eſt Rex*, ſays GROTIUS. Fathers of Families are of three ſorts, either a ſole Landlord, as ADAM, and then he is an abſolute Monarch; or a few Landlords,

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as LOT and ABRAHAM, with the Patriarchs of thoſe days; who if they join'd not together, were ſo many Princes; or if they join'd, made a mix'd Monarchy: or, as GROTIUS believes, a kind of Common-wealth adminſter'd in the Land of *Canaan* by MELCHISEDEC, to whom as King and Prieſt ABRAHAM paid Tythes of all that he had. Such a Magiſtracy was that alſo of JETHRO, King and Prieſt in the Common-wealth of *Midian*. Fathers of Families for the third ſort, as when the Multitude are Landlords (which happen'd in the diviſion of the Land of *Canaan*) make a Common-wealth. And thus much, however it was out of the Prevaricator's head in the place now deduc'd, he, excepting no further againſt the Balance than that it might conſiſt as well in Money as in Land, had confeſt before. Chap. 3.

HIS ſecond Vagary is in his deduction of Empire from increaſe of Strength, for which we muſt once more *round about our Coalfire*. The ſtrength whereby this effect can be expected, conſiſts not in a pair of Fiſts, but in an Army; and an Army is a Beaſt with a great Belly, which ſubſiſts not without very large paſtures: ſo if one man has ſufficient paſture, he may feed ſuch a Beaſt; if a few have the paſture they muſt feed the Beaſt, and the Beaſt is theirs that feed it. But if the People be the Sheep of their own paſtures, they are not only a flock of Sheep, but an Army of Lions, tho' by ſome accidents, as I confeſt before, they be for a ſeaſon confinable to their dens. So the advantage or increaſe of Strength depends alſo upon the Balance. There is nothing in the world to ſwear this Principle out of countenance, but the fame of PHALARIS, GELON, DIONYSIUS, AGATHOCLES, NABIS, *&c.* with which much good do them that like it. It is proper to a Government upon the Balance to take root at home, and ſpread outwards; and to a Government againſt the Balance to ſeek a root abroad, and to ſpread inwards. The former is ſure, but the latter never ſucceſsful. AGATHOCLES for having conquer'd *Africa*, took not the better root in *Syracuſa*. *Parvi ſunt arma foras, niſi ſit conſilium domi.*

To conclude this Chapter; the Prevaricator gives me this thanks for finding out the Balance of Dominion (being as antient in Nature as her ſelf, and yet as new in Art as my Writing) *that I have given the world cauſe to complain of a great diſappointment, who, while at my hand that Satisfaction in the Principles of Government was expected, which ſeveral great Wits had in vain ſtudy'd, have in diverſifying Riches in words only, as Property, Dominion, Agrarian, Balance, made up no more than a new Lexicon, expreſſing the ſame thing that was known before*; ſeeing the opinion *that Riches are Power is* (as antient as the firſt Book of THUCYDIDES, or the Politicks of ARISTOTLE, and) *not omitted by Mr.* HOBBS, or any other Politician. Which is as if he had told Dr. HARVEY, that whereas the Blood is the Life was an Opinion as antient as MOSES, and no Girl ever prick'd her finger, but knew it muſt have a courſe; he had given the world cauſe to complain of great diſappointment in not ſhewing a Man to be made of Gingerbread, and his Veins to run Malmſy.

CHAP. IV.

Whether the Balance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial; And whether theſe two, or any Nations that are of diſtinct Balance, coming to depend upon one and the ſame Head, ſuch a mixture creates a new Balance.

THE Balance of Empire that is National, as it is ſtated in the former Chapter, ſtands in a regulated or mix'd Monarchy upon the Property or native Intereſt of the Nobility; in a Common-wealth, upon the Property or native Intereſt of the People; ſo theſe are very natural. But the Balance of abſolute Monarchy, partaking of Force as well as Nature, is a mix'd thing, and not much different from the Balance of Provincial Empire, or the manner of holding a Province or conquer'd Country. In a Province, if the Native that is rich be admitted to Power, the Power grows up native, and over-tops the foreign: therefore you muſt either not plant your Citizens in your Provinces, where in time they will become native; or, ſo planting them, neither truſt them with Power nor with Arms. Thus the provincial Balance comes to be contrary to the National. And as where Empire is native or national, the adminiſtration of it can be no otherwiſe than according to the national Balance; ſo where Empire is foreign or provincial, the adminiſtration of it can be no otherwiſe than contrary to the national Balance. That *this may be admitted without oppoſition* the Conſiderer is inclining to allow, always provided he be *ſatisfy'd in this demand* (*Whether diſtinct Balances under the ſame Head or Governour, as thoſe of* Caſtile *and* Arragon, *the Power of the King* (I preſume he means by the Balance of a Nobility) *being greater in the one, and that of the People in the other, may not ſo poiſe one the other, as to produce a new Balance.* To which I anſwer, That no one Government whatſoever has any more than one of two Balances; that, except in the caſes excepted, of Land which is national, or that of Arms which is provincial. Wherefore if the King of *Spain* by his War againſt the Commons alter'd the Balance of *Arragon*, it muſt have been one of two ways, either by ſtrengthening the Balance of the Nobility, and governing the *Arragonian* People by them, in which caſe their Balance, tho' alter'd, remain'd yet National; or by holding both Nobility and People by a provincial Governour and an Army, in which caſe his Empire in that Kingdom is provincial. There is no third way; nor, putting the caſe that the Balance of *Caſtile* be national, and that of *Arragan* provincial, does this any more create in the Monarchy of *Spain* a third Balance of Empire, than did the multiplication of Aſſociations and Provinces, divers for their Balances, in the Common-wealth of *Rome*. *England* and *Scotland* being united in one Prince, made, if it had been righty us'd, an increaſe of Strength, but not a third Balance; nor do the Kingdoms in *Spain*. Whether a Sovereignty has many Territories and Provinces in ſubjection, or in League, it is all one as to this point; the ſtronger Union or League will give the ſtronger Balance: and the caſe of the preſent Sovereignties in *Europe* being no other, the more nice than wiſe Speculation of the Conſiderer, who has not been able to diſcern the Balance of a League from that of Empire, is a Mares neſt.

Conſid, p. 16, 17.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Chap. 5.

Whether there be any common Right or Intereſt of Mankind diſtinct from the parts taken ſeverally; and how by the Orders of a Common-wealth it may beſt be diſtinguiſh'd from private Intereſt.

IN the next place the Prevaricator does not go about to play the man, but the unlucky boy. Where I ſay that the *Soul of Man is Miſtreſs of two potent Rivals, Reaſon and Paſſion*; he does not ſtand to weigh the truth of the thing, or the fitneſs of the compariſon, either of which had been fair; but tumbles *Dick* upon *Sis*, the Logic upon the Rhetoric, the Senſe upon the Figure, and ſcuds away in this manner: *If I could be perſuaded Mr.* HARRINGTON *was ſo far in earneſt, as to expect any man ſhould be convinc'd by the metaphorical uſe of two or three words, ſome farther conſideration might be propos'd.* This is to uſe his Readers as the Fox does the Dogs, when having piſt upon his Tail, and flapt it in their Eyes, he gets away. Does not his Book deſerve to be gilded and carry'd in Stateſmen's Pockets? Alas! mine are nothing? *Quis leget hæc? vel duo vel nemo:* they break the Stationer. And yet let me comfort my ſelf, Whoſe are better? the Prevaricator ſeems to ſet every whit as light by thoſe of HOOKER and GROTIUS, at leaſt where they favour me. *The Opinions of* GROTIUS, ſays he, *cannot oblige us beyond the Reaſons whereon they are founded*; and what are thoſe? he will diſpute againſt that which he dares not repeat: that his Comment may take you by the Noſe, he has left out the Text. The words of GROTIUS are of this ſenſe: *Tho' it be truly ſaid that the Creatures are naturally carry'd to their proper Utility, this ought not to be taken in too general a ſenſe, ſeeing divers of them abſtain from their own Profit, either in regard of thoſe of the ſame kind, or at leaſt of their Young.* Which words, ſays the Prevaricator, *carry a great reſtriction in them, and the way of producing Actions in Beaſts is ſo different from the emanation of human Reaſon* (mark the Impoſtor! the Author is ſpeaking of natural Affection, and he wipes out that, and puts in *human Reaſon) that the Inferences from* (the natural Affection of) *the one, to the* (degree of Reaſon which is in the) *other, muſt needs be very weak.* Excellent! does it therefore follow that the eminent degree of Reaſon, wherewithal God has endu'd Man, muſt in him deface that natural Affection, and deſertion in ſome caſes of private for common good, which is apparent even in Beaſts? What do reverend Divines mean to cry up this Infidel? Nay, is *not he worſe than an Infidel that provides not for his own Family?* A Common-wealth is but a great Family; and a Family is a little Common-wealth. Even Beaſts, in ſparing out of their own mouths, and expoſing themſelves to danger for their young, provide for their Families; and in providing for their Families, provide for their whole Common-wealth; that is, forſake in ſome things their private good and ſafety, for the good of the public, or of the kind. In this caſe it is that *even Stones or heavy things*, ſays HOOKER, *forſake their ordinary wont or center, and fly upwards to relieve the diſtreſs of Nature in common.* Wretch that he is, ſhall a Stone upon this occaſion fly upwards, and will he have a Man to go down

Conſid. *p.* 19. 20.

In Proleg. de jure B. ac. P.

Book 1.

Book I. downwards! Yes, *Mr.* HOOKER's *Expreſſion*, ſays he, *is altogether figurative; and it is eaſier to prove from thence that things wanting Senſe make Diſcourſes, and act by Election, than that there is ſuch a thing as a common Intereſt of Mankind.* This is like the reſt, HOOKER ſpeaks of the neceſſity that is in Nature, and this Gentleman tranſlates that Senſe into the word *Election.* So becauſe a Stone is neceſſitated to comply with the common intereſt of Nature, without Diſcourſe or Election; therefore it rather follows from hence, *that things wanting Senſe make Diſcourſes, and act by Election, than that there is ſuch a thing as a common Intereſt of Mankind.* His old Trick. I do not ſay, that becauſe it is ſo with the other Creatures, therefore it muſt be ſo with Man: but as we ſee it is with the Creatures in this part, ſo we find it to be with Man. And that ſo, and more than ſo, we find it to be with Man (who tho' he *be evil, gives good things to his Children,* will work hard, lay up, deny himſelf, venture his Life for his little Common-wealth) is thus further demonſtrated. All civil Laws acknowledge that there is a common Intereſt of Mankind, and all civil Laws proceed from the Nature of Man; therefore it is in the Nature of Man to acknowledge that there is a common Intereſt of Mankind. Upon this acknowledgement of Mankind, a Man that ſteals is put to death, which certainly is none of his private Intereſt; nor is a Man put to death for any other Man's private Intereſt: therefore there is a common Intereſt of Mankind diſtinct from the parts taken ſeverally. But this, tho' acknowledg'd in part by all Governments, yet thro' their natural frailty is nothing ſo well provided for in ſome as in others: for if the Power be in one or a few Men, one or a few Men, we know, may be Thieves, and the rather, becauſe applying Money that is public, without a conſideration that is public, to uſes that are private, is thieving. But ſuch Thieves will not be hang'd; in this caſe therefore the Government goes not upon public but private Intereſt. In the frame of ſuch a Government as can go upon no other than the public Intereſt, conſiſts that *whole Philoſophy of the Soul* which concerns Policy: and this *whole Philoſophy of the Soul* being throughout the Common-wealth of *Oceana* demonſtrated; for the Prevaricator to inſinuate that I have omitted it, is to ſhew what it is that he loves more than Truth. The main of this Philoſophy conſiſts in depoſing Paſſion, and advancing Reaſon to the Throne of Empire. I expected news in this place, that this were to promiſe more for the Magiſtrate or the People than has been perform'd by the Stoics; but two Girls, meaning no body any harm, have provok'd his Wrath, forſooth, to ſuch extravagancy by the way, that tho' in all modeſty it were forbid, as he confeſſes, by their cheeks, which diſcovering the Green-ſickneſs, ſhew'd that they were paſt the rod, he has taken them up! *Tantæne animis cœleſtibus iræ!* What he may have in School-Divinity for ſo rude a charge, I do not know; but he ſhall never be able to ſhew any Maxim for this kind of Diſcipline or *Philoſophy of the Soul*, either in Chevalry or the Politics. The offence of the Girls was no more, than that having a Cake (by the gift of an Uncle or Aunt, or by purchaſe, or ſuch a one perhaps as was of their own making) in common, or between them, the one had moſt accurately divided, and the other was about to chuſe; when in

Conſid. *p.* 22. comes this rude fellow: *How now Gentlewomen*, ſays he, *What, dividing*
23. *and chuſing! Will no leſs ſerve your turn than the whole Myſtery of a well-order'd Common-wealth? Who has taught you to caſt away Paſſion, an't pleaſe you,*

you like the Bran, and work up Reaſon as pure as the Flower of your Cake? Are you acquainted with the Author of Oceana, *that has ſeen Foreign Countries, convers'd with the* Speculativi, *learn'd of the moſt ſerene Lady* VENETIA *to work with Bobbins, makes you a Magiſtracy like a Pippin Py, and ſells Butterprints with* S. P. Q. R.*? Have done, as you dread Ballads, ſuſty Pamphlets, or the Oſtraciſm of* Billinſgate. *Have done, I ſay; will you vy that green in your Cheeks with the purple of the State? muſt your Mother, who was never there her ſelf, ſeek you in the Oven? Come, when I live to ſee* MACHIAVEL *in puffpaſte, a Common-wealth come out of a Bake-Houſe, where Smocks were the Boulters, let me be a Mil-horſe.*——But now you muſt know comes the beſt Jeſt of all, and I need not ſay that it comes from *Oxford*; he tells them that *their Cake is Dow* (let it not be loſt I beſeech you) and ſo ſnatching it away, eats it, for all the World as Jackpudding eats the Cuſtard. Did you ever ſee ſuch a *Beſtia*? Chap. 5.

BUT whereas either Office, that of dividing or chooſing, was communicable to either of the Girls, it is not indifferent in the Diſtribution of a Common-wealth, becauſe dividing is ſeparating one thing, one reaſon, one intereſt, or Conſideration from another, which they that can ſo diſcern in private Affairs are called *diſcrete*, but they that can do it in public are *prudent*; and the way of this kind of dividing in the language of a Common-wealth is Debating. But they that are capable of this kind of dividing or debating are few among many, that when things are thus divided and debated, are able enough to chooſe, which in the language of a Common-wealth is to reſolve. Hence it is that the Debate of the Few, becauſe there be but few that can Debate, is the wiſeſt Debate; and the Reſult of the Many (becauſe every Man has an Intereſt what to chooſe, and that choice which ſutes with every man's Intereſt, excludes the diſtinct or private Intereſt or Paſſion of any man, and ſo comes up to the common and public Intereſt or Reaſon) is the wiſeſt Reſult. To this end, God, who does nothing in vain, has ſo divided Mankind into the Few or the natural Ariſtocracy, and the Many or the natural Democracy, that there can hardly be upon any occaſion a meeting of twenty men, wherein it will not be apparent, or in which you may not ſee all thoſe Lines which are requiſite to the face of a beautiful Common-wealth. For example, among any twenty men, occaſionally met, there will be ſome few, perhaps ſix, excelling the fourteen in greatneſs of Parts. Theſe ſix falling into diſcourſe of buſineſs, or giving their judgment upon Perſons or Things, tho' but by Way of mere Converſation, will diſcover their Abilities; whereupon they ſhall be liſten'd to and regarded by the Fourteen; that is, the Six will acquire an Authority with, and imprint a Reverence upon the Fourteen: which Action and Paſſion in the *Roman* Common-wealth were call'd *Autboritas Patrum & Verecundia Plebis.* Nevertheleſs if the ſix endeavour to extend the Authority, which they find thus acquir'd, to Power, that is, to bring the fourteen to terms or conditions of obedience, or ſuch as would be advantageous to the Few, but prejudicial to the Many; the Fourteen will ſoon find, that conſenting, they hurt not only themſelves by indamaging their own Intereſts, but hurt the Six alſo who by this means come to loſe their Virtue, and ſo ſpoil their Debate, which, while ſuch advantages are procurable to themſelves, will go no further upon the common Good, but their private Benefit. Wherefore in this caſe they

Book. I. will not conſent, and not conſenting, they preſerve not only their own Liberty, but the integrity of the Six alſo, who perceiving that they cannot impair the common Intereſt, have no other intereſt left but to improve it. And neither any Converſation, nor any People, how dull ſoever and ſubject by fits to be deluded, but will ſoon ſee thus much, which is enough, becauſe what is thus propos'd by the Authority of the Six or of the Senate, and reſolved by the Fourteen, or by the People, is enacted by the Whole, and becomes that Law, than which, tho' Mankind be not infallible, there can be nothing leſs fallible in Mankind. Art is the imitation of Nature; by obſervation of ſuch Lines as theſe in the face of Nature, a Politician limns his Common-wealth.

Conſid. p. 26. But ſays the Prevaricator, *the Paralogiſm lies in this, that the twenty men are firſt ſuppoſed to be a Common-wealth, and then it is conſidered how they would diſpoſe of the Government.* What is this? Art is the imitation of Nature; therefore Art preſumes Nature to be Art. A Picture is the repreſentation of a Face; therefore the Picture-drawer preſum'd the Face to be a Picture; and in this ſame, there is lying, being, or ſquatting, a thing call'd a Paralogiſm. Did you ever hear ſuch a Paraketiſm? for to ſpeak a word without underſtanding the ſenſe of it, is like a Parrat. And yet I wrong the Parrat in this compariſon; for ſhe, tho' ſhe do not underſtand herſelf, is underſtood by others, whereas neither can this Prevaricator tell what he means, nor any man elſe. Or riddle me, riddle me what is this? *The ſenſe of want among men that*

Conſid, p. 27. *are in equality of Power may beget a deſire of exchange; as let me have your Horſe, and you ſhall have my Cow, which is the fountain of private Contracts: but it is not to be with reaſon imagined, that this ſhould be enough to make a man part with a natural freedom, and put himſelf into the hands of a Power from which he can afterwards have no ſhield, tho' it ſhould be us'd to his own deſtruction.*

MOST victorious Nonſenſe! for he that ſays nothing, cannot be anſwer'd. It ſhould ſeem, if the twenty men were indeed a Common-wealth, or in equality of Power, for ſo he puts the caſe, they might truck Horſes and Cows, but not by any means conſider, or once let it enter into their heads, how by art to make good their natural Freedom: That (unleſs they ſet up a Prince, as you ſhall ſee anon) were *to part with their natural Freedom, and put themſelves into the hands of a Power from which* (there being no other Power but themſelves) *they can afterwards have no ſhield. To read it thoroughly for the underſtanding,* as is intimated in his Epiſtle, *will be more,* I doubt, *than his Book will obtain of any Reader.* Yet is he, in his own conceit, as ſure-footed as any Mule, and knows the Road. But Mr. HARRINGTON *has not loſt his way without company*; his Brother GROTIUS *complains, that they who treat of* Jus Gentium *do commonly miſtake ſome Part of the Roman* Jus Civile *for it:* And even ſo he laments (an't pleaſe you) *that while men profeſs to conſider the Principles of Government, they fall upon Notions which are the mere effects of Government.* But as an Ape is the more ugly for being like a Man; ſo this Prevaricator, for making Faces like GROTIUS. I, who am complained of, deriving Government from the true Principle of the ſame, in the Balance or Foundation, ſet the Superſtructures accordingly; and he who complains forſooth, never ſo much as propoſes any thing like a principle or Superſtructure, but runs altogether upon mere Notions: As where he

Conſid. p. 28. asks me, *What Security will you give, that the Six in their Conſultati-*

ons

ons ſhall not rather aim at their own advantage, than that of the Fourteen, and ſo make uſe of the eminence of their Parts to circumvent the reſt? In another place he can anſwer himſelf and ſay, that the *Fourteen*, or the *People in this Conſtitution, have the Vote and the Sword too.* How then ſhould the Six circumvent them? What Security has a Prince, that his People will not pull him out of his Throne? why, a Nobility or an Army: And are not the People in a Common-wealth their own Army? Is this to mind Principles? *On the other ſide, How,* ſays he, *ſhall we be ſatisfy'd that the Fourteen will not ſoon begin to think themſelves wiſe enough to conſult too, and making uſe of their exceſs in Power, pull the Six off their Cuſhions?* As if there were any experience public or private, any ſenſe or reaſon, that men having the whole Power in their own hands, would deprive themſelves of Councillors; or that ever a Common-wealth depos'd the Senate, or can depoſe the Senate, and remain a Common-wealth. The People of *Capua* being inrag'd to the full height, reſolv'd and aſſembl'd together (the Senate, if the People will, being always in their power) on purpoſe to cut the throats of the Senators, when PACUVIUS CALAVIUS exhorted them that ere they went upon the deſign, they would firſt make election among themſelves of a new Senate, which, the throats of the old being cut, might for the ſafety of the Common-wealth immediately take their places; for, ſaid he, * *You muſt either have a King, which is to be abhor'd; or whatever becomes of this, you muſt have ſome other Senate: for the Senate is a Council of ſuch a nature as without it no free City can ſubſiſt.* By which Speech of PACUVIUS, the People who thought themſelves, as the Conſiderer has it, *wiſe enough to conſult*, being convinced, fell to work for the Election of a ſucceeding Senate out of themſelves (the Prevaricator ſhould not tell me of Notions, but learn that *in a Common-wealth there muſt be a Senate*, is a Principle) while the People of *Capua* were intent upon chooſing this new Senate, the Parties propos'd ſeemed to them to be ſo ridiculouſly unfit for ſuch an Office, that by this means coming to a nearer ſight of themſelves, they were ſecretly ſo fill'd with the ſhame of their Enterprize, that ſlinking away, they would never after be known ſo much as to have thought upon ſuch a thing. Nor ever went any other People ſo far, not the *Florentins* themſelves, tho' addicted to Innovation or changing of the Senate beyond all other Examples. Sons of the Univerſity, Brothers of the College, Heads and Points; you love fine words. Whether tends to bring all things into ſervitude, my Hypotheſis, or his † Hypothytes? For ſays he, *I am willing to gratify Mr.* HARRINGTON *with his partition of the twenty men into ſix and fourteen; but if I had been in a humour of Contradiction, it had been as free for me to have ſaid that ſome one of the twenty would have excel'd all the reſt in Judgment, Experience, Courage, and height of Genius, and then told him, that this had been a natural Monarchy, eſtabliſhed by God himſelf over Mankind:* As if the twenty would *give their Clothes or Money to the next man they meet wiſer or richer than themſelves*, which before he deny'd; *Oportet mendacem eſſe memorem.* God eſtabliſh'd Kings no otherwiſe than by election of the People; and the twenty *will neither give their Clothes nor Money:* How then? why in comes a Gallant with a file

Chap. 5.

† Arochet.

* Senatum omnino non habere non vultis: Quippe aut Rex, quod abominandum; aut, quod unum liberæ civitatis Concilium eſt, Senatus habendus eſt. *Liv.*

of

Book I. of Musketeers; What, ſays he, are you dividing and chooſing here? Go to, I will have no dividing, give me all. Down go the pots, and up go their heels: What is this? Why a *King!* What more? By *Divine Right!* As he took the Cake from the Girls!

CHAP. VI.

Whether the Senatuſconſulta, *or Decrees of the* Roman Senate, *had the Power of Laws.*

AMONG divers and weighty Reaſons why I would have that Prince look well to his file of Musketeers, this is no ſmall one, that he being upon no balance, will never be able to give Law without them. For to think that he ſucceeds to the Senate, or that the Power of the Senate may ſerve his turn, is a preſumption that will fail him. The Senate, as ſuch, has no power at all, but mere Authority of propoſing to the People, who are the makers of their own Laws; whence the Decrees of the Senate of *Rome* are never Laws, nor ſo call'd, but *Senatuſconſulta.* It is true that a King coming in, the Senate, as there it did, may remain to his aid and advantage; and then they propoſe not as formerly to the People, but to him, who comes not in upon the right of the Senate, but upon that of the People: Whence ſays JUSTINIAN; * *The Princes Pleaſure has the force of Law, ſince the People have by the* Lex Regia *concerning his Power, made over to him all their own Empire and Authority.* Thus the *Senatusconſultum Macedonicum, with the reſt that had place allow'd by* JUSTINIAN *in compilement of the Roman Laws,* were not Laws in that they were *Senatusconſulta,* or propos'd by the Senate, but in that they were allow'd by JUSTINIAN or the Prince, in whom was now the right of the People. Wherefore the Zealot for Monarchy has made a *pas de clerc,* or foul ſtep in his proceſſion, where he argues thus out of CUJACIUS: *It was ſoon agreed that the diſtinct Decrees of the Senate and People ſhould be extended to the nature of Laws*; therefore the diſtinct Decrees of the Senate are Laws, whether it be ſo agreed by the People, or by the Prince, or no. For thus he has no ſooner made his Prince, than he kicks him heels over head; ſeeing where the Decrees of the Senate are Laws without the King, that ſame is as much a King as the Prevaricator a Politician. A Law is that which was paſt by the Power of the People, or of the King. But out of the Light; in this place he takes a *Welſh* Bait, and looking back, makes a muſter of his Victories, like the buſſing Gaſcon, who to ſhew what he had thrown out of the windows in his Debauchery, made a formal repetition of the whole inventory of the Houſe.

Conſid. *p.* 30. 31.

Conſid. *p.* 32.

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* Quod Principi placuit legis habet vigorem, quum lege Regia quæ de ejus imperio lata eſt, Populus ei, & in eum omne imperium ſuum & poteſtatem concedat.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Whether the Ten Commandments were propos'd by God *or* Moses, *and voted by the People of* Iſrael.

ONE would think the Gaſcon had done well; Is he ſatisfy'd? No, he will now *throw the Houſe out of the windows. The principal ſtones being already taken from the Foundation,* he has a bag of certain Winds wherewithal *to reverſe the Superſtructures.* The firſt Wind he lets go is but a Puff, where he tells me, *that I bring* Switzerland *and* Holland *into the enumeration of the Heathen Common-wealths:* which if I had done, their Liberties in many parts and places being more antient than the Chriſtian Religion in thoſe Countries (as is plain by Tacitus, where he ſpeaks of Civilis, and of the Cuſtoms of the *Germans*) I had neither wrong'd them nor my ſelf; but I do no ſuch matter, for having enumerated the Heathen Common-wealths, I add *that the Proceedings of* Holland *and* Switzerland, *tho' after a more obſcure manner, are of the like nature.* The next is a Storm, while reproaching me with Rudeneſs, he brings in Dr. Fern and the Clergy by head and ſhoulders, who till they undertake the quarrel of Monarchy, to the confuſion of the Common-wealth of *Iſrael,* at leaſt ſo far that there be no weight or obligation in ſuch an Example, are poſted. As if for a Chriſtian Common-wealth to make ſo much uſe of *Iſrael* as the *Roman* did of *Athens,* whoſe Laws ſhe tranſcrib'd, were againſt the Intereſt of the Clergy, which, it ſeems, is ſo hoſtile to popular Power, that to ſay the Laws of Nature, tho' they be the Fountains of all Civil Law, are not the Civil Law, till they be the Civil Law; or thus, that *thou ſhalt not kill, thou ſhalt not ſteal,* tho' they be in natural Equity, yet were not the Laws of *Iſrael* or of *England,* till voted by the People of *Iſrael,* or the Parliament of *England,* is *to aſſert the People into the mighty Liberty of being free from the whole moral Law*; and, inaſmuch as *to be the Adviſer or Perſuader of a thing, is leſs than to be the Author or Commander of it, to put an Indignity upon God himſelf.* In which Fopperies the Prevaricator, boaſting of Principles, but minding none, firſt confounds Authority and Command or Power; and next forgets that the dignity of the Legiſlator, or, which is all one, of the Senate ſucceeding to his Office, as the *Sanhedrim* to Moses, is the greateſt dignity in a Common-wealth: and yet that the Laws or Orders of a Common-wealth derive no otherwiſe, whether from the Legiſlator, as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, *&c.* or the Senate, as thoſe of *Iſrael, Lacedemon,* or *Athens,* than from their Authority receiv'd and confirm'd by the Vote or Command of the People. It is true, that with Almighty God it is otherwiſe than with a mortal Legiſlator, but thro' another Nature which to him is peculiar, from whom as he is the cauſe of being, or the Creator of Mankind, Omnipotent Power is inſeparable; yet ſo equal is the goodneſs of this Nature to the greatneſs thereof, that as he is the cauſe of wel-being by way of Election, for example in his choſen People *Iſrael,* or of Redemption, as in the Chriſtian Church, himſelf has prefer'd his Authority or Propoſition before his Empire. What elſe is the

Conſid. *p.* 33. 35.

Oceana, *p.* 51,

Conſid. *p.* 35, 40.

Book I. meaning of theſe words, or of this proceeding of his? *Now therefore if ye will obey my Voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, ye ſhall be to me a*
Exod. 19. 5. *Kingdom*, or I will be your King; which propoſition being voted by the People in the Affirmative, God proceeds to propoſe to them the ten Commandments in ſo dreadful a manner, that the People being ex-
Exod. 20. 19. ceedingly afrighted, ſay to Moses, *Speak thou with us, and we will hear thee:* that is, be thou henceforth our Legiſlator or Propoſer, and we will reſolve accordingly; *but let not God ſpeak with us, leſt we die.* From whenceforth God propoſes to the People no otherwiſe than by Moses, whom he inſtructs in this manner; *Theſe are the Judgments which thou ſhalt propoſe or ſet before them.* Wherefore it is ſaid of the
Deut. 29. 1. Book of *Deuteronomy*, containing *the Covenant which the Lord commanded* Moses *to make with the Children of* Iſrael *in the Land of* Moab, *beſides the Covenant which he made with them in* Horeb; *This is the Law which* Moses *ſet before the Children of* Iſrael. Neither did
Deut. 4. 44. God in this caſe make uſe of his Omnipotent Power, nor Christ in the like, who alſo is King after the ſame manner in his Church, and would have been in *Iſrael*, where when to this end he might have muſter'd up Legions of Angels, and been victorious with ſuch Armies,
Matth. 23. 37. or *Argyraſpides*, as never Prince could ſhew the like, he ſays no more than, *O* Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, *how often would I have gather'd thee and thy Children, as a Hen gathers her Chickens under her wings, and ye would not?* where it is plain that the *Jews rejecting* Christ, *that he ſhould not reign over them*, the Law of the Goſpel came not to be the Law of the *Jews*; and ſo if the ten Commandaments came to be the Law of *Iſrael*, it was not only becauſe God propos'd them, ſeeing Chriſt alſo propos'd his Law, which nevertheleſs came not to be the Law of the *Jews*, but becauſe the People receiv'd the one, and rejected the other. It is not in the nature of Religion that it ſhould be thought a profane ſaying, that if the Bible be in *England*, or in any other Government, the Law or Religion of the Land, it is not only becauſe God has propos'd it, but alſo becauſe the People or Magiſtrate has receiv'd it, or reſolv'd upon it; otherwiſe we muſt ſet lighter by a Nation or Government than by a private Perſon who can have no part nor portion in this Law, unleſs he vote it to himſelf in his own Conſcience, without which he remains in the condition he was before, and as the Heathen, *who are a Law to themſelves.* Thus whereas in a Covenant there muſt be two Parties, the Old and New Teſtament being in ſome the Old and New Covenant; theſe are that Authority and Propoſition of God and Christ, to which they that refuſe their Vote or Reſult may be under the Empire of a Clergy, but are none of his Common-wealth. Nor, ſeeing I am gone ſo far, does this at all imply Free-will, but, as is admirably obſerv'd by Mr. Hobbs, the freedom of that which naturally precedes Will, namely, Deliberation or Debate, in which, as the Scale by the weight of Reaſon or Paſſion comes to be turn'd one way or other, the Will is caus'd, and being caus'd, is neceſſitated. When God comes in thus upon the Soul of Man, *he gives both the Will and the Deed*; from which like Office of the Senate in a Common-wealth, that is, from the excellency of their Deliberation and Debate, which prudently and faithfully unfolded to the People, does alſo frequently cauſe and neceſſitate both the Will and the Deed. God himſelf has ſaid of the Senate, *that they are Gods:* an expreſſion, tho' divine, yet not unknown to the Heathens; *Homo homini*

homini Deus, one man, for the excellency of his Aid, may be a God to another. But let the Prevaricator look to it; for he that leads the blind out of his way, is his Devil. Chap. 8.

FOR the things I have of this kind, as alſo for what I have ſaid upon the words *Chirotonia* and *Eccleſia*, the Prevaricator *is delighted to make me beholden underhand to Mr.* HOBBS, *notwithſtanding the open enmity which he ſays I profeſs to his Politics.* As if JOSEPHUS upon that of SAMUEL, *They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me that I ſhould not reign over them*, had not ſaid of the People (Θεὸν ἀπεχειροτόνουν τῆς βασιλείας) *that they unchirotoniz'd or unvoted God of the Kingdom.* Now if they unchirotoniz'd or unvoted God of the Kingdom, then they had chirotoniz'd or voted him to the Kingdom; and ſo not only the Doctrine that God was King in *Iſrael* by Compact or Covenant, but the uſe of the word *Chirotonia* alſo in the ſenſe I underſtand it, is more antient than Mr. HOBBS. I might add that of CAPELLUS, * *God was a Political King and Civil Legiſlator of the Jews.* And for the uſe I have made of the word *Eccleſia*, as no man can read ſuch as have written of the *Grecian* Common-wealths, and miſs it, ſo I do not remember that Mr. HOBBS has ſpoken of it. To theſe things fuller ſatisfaction will be given in the ſecond Book; which nevertheleſs I do not ſpeak to the end I might wave Obligation to ſo excellent an Author in his way. It is true, I have oppos'd the Politics of Mr HOBBS, to ſhew him what he taught me, with as much diſdain as he oppos'd thoſe of the greateſt Authors, in whoſe wholeſome Fame and Doctrine the good of Mankind being concern'd, my Conſcience bears me witneſs that I have done my duty. Nevertheleſs in moſt other things I firmly believe that Mr. HOBBS is, and will in future Ages be accounted the beſt Writer, at this day, in the World. And for his Treatiſes of human Nature, and of Liberty and Neceſſity, they are the greateſt of new Lights, and thoſe which I have follow'd, and ſhall follow. 1. Sam. 8. 7.

CHAP. VIII.

Whether a Common-wealth coming up to the perfection of the kind, comes not up to the perfection of Government, and has no Flaw in it.

WHAT a Common-wealth coming up to the perfection of the kind is, I have ſhewn both by the definition of an equal Common-wealth, and the Exemplification of it in all the parts.

THE Definition is contain'd in the firſt of my Preliminaries; which, becauſe it is ſhort, I ſhall repeat.

An equal Common-wealth is a Government eſtabliſh'd upon an equal Agrarian, ariſing into the Superſtructures or three Orders, the Senate debating and propoſing, the People reſolving, and the Magiſtracy executing, by an equal Rotation, or interchangeable Election, thro' the ſuffrage of the People given by the Ballot. The Exemplification is the whole Common-

* Deus Populi Judaici Rex erat veluti politicus, & civilis Legiſlator. *In Diatriba de Voto Jephthæ.*

wealth

Book I. wealth of *Oceana*. Each of which by him, who, if his Doctrine of pure and abſolute Monarchy be obſerv'd, can be no *Engliſhman*, is called an *Iriſh Bog*; as in ſome ſenſe it is, ſeeing the Prevaricator has ſet never a foot in it that will ſtand, nor has more to ſay, than that *Where there is one ambitious poor man, or one vicious rich man, it is impoſſible there ſhould be any ſuch Government as can be ſecure from Sedition.*

Conſid. p. 43.

WHICH, Firſt, is rather to make all Governments ineffectual, or to make all Governments alike, than to object againſt any, ſeeing That there ſhould not be *one ambitious poor man*, or *one vicious rich man*, is equally, if not more, improbable in a Monarchy than in a Common-wealth.

SECONDLY, That one man alone, whether he be rich or poor, ſhould without a Party be able to diſturb a Common-wealth with Sedition, is an abſurdity; nor is ſuch a party, as may be able in ſome ſort to diſturb the Peace by robbing upon the Highway, or ſome ſuch diſorder, always able to diſturb a Government with Sedition. Wherefore this feat goes not ſo much upon the ability of any one man, rich or poor, as the Power of the Party he is able to make; and this ſtrength of the Party goes upon the nature of the Government, and the content or diſcontents thence deriving to the Few, or the Many. The Diſcontents, whether of the Few or the Many, derive from that which is, or by them is thought to be ſome bar to their Intereſt; and thoſe Intereſts which are the cauſes of Sedition are three, the deſire of Liberty, the deſire of Power, and the deſire of Riches; nor be there any more: for where the People thro' want of Bread, thro' Violence offer'd to their Women, or Oppreſſion, riſe up againſt their Governors, it relates to the deſire of Liberty; thoſe alſo under the name of Religion make not a fourth, but come to one of the three.

NOW to ſpeak in the firſt place of the Many, and anon of the Few; the People in an equal Common-wealth have none of theſe three Intereſts: Not the deſire of Liberty, becauſe the whole Frame of an equal Common-wealth is nothing elſe but ſuch a method whereby the Liberty of the People is ſecur'd to them: Not of Power, becauſe the Power which otherwiſe they could not exerciſe, is thus eſtated in them: Nor of Riches, becauſe where the Rich are ſo bounded by an Agrarian that they cannot over-balance (and therefore neither oppreſs the People, nor exclude their Induſtry or Merit from attaining to the like Eſtate, Power, or Honour) the whole People have the whole Riches of the Nation already equally divided among them; for that the Riches of a Common-wealth ſhould not go according to the difference of men's Induſtry, but be diſtributed by the Poll, were unequal. Wherefore the People in an equal Common-wealth having none of thoſe Intereſts which are the cauſes of Sedition, can be ſubject to no ſuch effect.

TO affirm then with the Conſiderer, *that the whole of this Libration is reduc'd to the want of Power to diſturb the Common-wealth*, muſt needs be a miſtake, ſeeing in the Common-wealth propos'd the People have the Power, but can have no ſuch Intereſt; and the People having no ſuch Intereſt, no Party can have any ſuch Power, it being impoſſible that a Party ſhould come to over-balance the People, having their Arms in their own hands. The *whole matter being thus reduc'd to the want of Power to diſturb the Government*; this, according to his own Argument, will appear to be the Libration in which the Power, *whereof*

the

the Governor is poſſeſt, ſo vaſtly exceeds the Power remaining with thoſe who are to obey (which in caſe of conteſt muſt be ſo ſmall a Party) *that it would be deſperately unreaſonable for them to hope to maintain their Cauſe. If the true method* then *of attaining to perfection in Government be to make the Governor abſolute,* and the People in an equal Common-wealth be abſolute, then there can be none in this Government, *that upon probable terms can diſpute the Power with the Governour,* and ſo this State by his own Argument muſt be free from Sedition. Thus far upon occaſion of the ambitious poor Man objected. I have ſpoken of the Many; and in ſpeaking of the Many, implicitely of the Few: for as in an equal Common-wealth, for example in *England* during the Peerage or Ariſtocracy, the Many depended upon or were included in the Few; ſo in an equal Common-wealth the Few depend upon or are included in the Many, as the Senate of *Venice* depends upon, or is included in the Great Council, by which it is annually elected in the whole or in ſome part. So what was ſaid in an equal Common-wealth of the Many or the poorer ſort, is alſo ſaid of the Few or of the Richer; who, thro' the virtue of the Agrarian, as in *Oceana*, or of other Orders ſupplying the defect of an Agrarian, as in *Venice*, not able to over-balance the People, can never have any Power to diſturb the Common-wealth in caſe they had ſuch an Intereſt, nor can have any ſuch Intereſt in caſe they had ſuch Power. For example in *Oceana*, putting the caſe that the Few were as powerful as it is poſſible they ſhould be; that is, that the whole Land was fallen into five thouſand hands: The five thouſand, excluding the People, could get no more Riches by it, becauſe they have the whole Land already; no more Liberty by it, becauſe they were in perfect Liberty before; nor any more Power by it, becauſe thro' the equality of the Balance, or of their Eſtates, they can be no more by themſelves than an equal Common-wealth, and that they were already with the People: but would be much leſs, the Power or Common-wealth, in which there be five thouſand Equals, being not greater, but much leſs than the Power or Common-wealth wherein the whole People are equal; becauſe the Power or Effect of a greater People is proportionably greater than the Power or Effect of a leſſer People, and the Few by this means would get no more than to be the leſſer People. So the People being no bar to the Riches, Liberty, nor Power of the five thouſand, and the deſire of Liberty, Riches and Power, being the only cauſes of Sedition; there could ariſe no Sedition in this Common-wealth by Reaſon of the Nobility, who have no ſuch Intereſt if they had the Power, nor have any ſuch Power if they had the Intereſt, the People being equally poſſeſt of the Government, of the Arms, and far ſuperior in number. In ſome, an equal Common-wealth conſiſts but of one hereditary Order, the People, which is by election divided into two Orders, as the Senate and the Congregation in *Lacedemon*, or the Senate and the Great Council in *Venice*; for the Gentlemen of *Venice*, as has been often ſaid, are the People of *Venice*, the reſt are Subjects. And an inequal Common-wealth conſiſts of two Hereditary Orders, as the *Patricians* and *Plebeians* in *Rome*, whereof the former only had a hereditary Capacity of the Senate: whence it comes to paſs that the Senate and the People in an equal Common-wealth having but one and the ſame Intereſt, never were nor can be at variance; and that the Senate and the People in an inequal Common-wealth having two diſtinct Intereſts,

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tereſts, never did nor can agree. So an equal Common-wealth cannot be ſeditious, and an inequal Common-wealth can be no other than ſeditious.

IF a man be reſolv'd, as the Conſiderer is, to huddle theſe things together, there is no making any thing of this kind of Policy; of which therefore it will be a folly to talk. For example, *Lacedemon* is either to be conſider'd as not taking in the Helots; and then in her ſelf ſhe was an equal Common-wealth void of any Sedition, or cauſe of it, how much ſoever ſhe were troubl'd with the Helots; So the Objection made by him, of her Troubles by the Helots, is impertinently urg'd, to ſhew that ſhe was a ſeditious Common-wealth: Or if he will needs have it, that ſhe took in the Helots, it is undeniable that ſhe took them in inequally, and ſo was inequal; whence the Troubles by the Helots muſt needs be impertinently urg'd againſt an equal Common-wealth.

AGAIN, when I alledge *Venice* from PIERO GRADENIGO, that is, for the ſpace of about four hundred years from the preſent date, at which time the Reformation, yet in force, began, as an Example of an equal Common-wealth; for him to inſtance in the times before, when tho' the Common-wealth, according to the intention, was as equal as now, yet being not bound by ſufficient Orders to give her ſelf ſecurity of her native Liberty, her Dukes on the one ſide did what they pleas'd, and the inrag'd People on the other ſide baniſh'd, condemn'd to death, or murder'd them; who ſees not the Impoſture? Indeed he bluſhes at it himſelf. Wherefore my aſſertion being not yet knock'd on the head, he promiſes to kill it better, firſt by the example of *Lacedemon leaving out the Helots*, and next by that of *Venice ſince the time of* PIERO GRADENIGO.

Conſid, *p.* 60. Pauſan. Lacon.

FOR the firſt you muſt know that once upon a time there was a quarrel between CLEOMENES and DEMARATUS Kings of *Lacedemon* about Succeſſion, which was derermin'd by the *Ephori*, that is, by a Court of Juſtice, and not by the Sword; the like happen'd in LEOTYCHIDES the known Baſtard of ALCIBIADES, or ſo conteſt to be by his Mother to divers of her Maids. Now this is a Maxim in the Politicks, *Where the differences of Kings can go no further than a Court of Juſtice, there the Government is Seditious.* Moſt ridiculous! Is there a ſtronger Argument that ſuch a Government is not ſeditious? No matter, give him room; *Much more fatal was the conteſt between* CLEONYMUS *and his Brother* AREUS *the Son of* ACROTATUS, *by whoſe War* ZARAX *was ruin'd, and* PYRRHUS *came into the game, who beſieg'd the Capital City: the Reign of* AGIS *and* CLEOMENES *was ſo full of turbulency, as would put a man out of breath to relate.* Fair and ſoftly: was not all this after LYSANDER, and the Spoils of *Athens* had broken the Agrarian, and ſo ruin'd *Lacedemon?* I affirm there can be no Sedition in an equal Common-wealth; and he to oppoſe me, ſhews that there was Sedition in an inequal one: whether does this affirm his Aſſertion or mine?

Plut. Alcib.

BUT for better luck in *Venice*. *This City by Mr.* HARRINGTON'S *own confeſſion is poſſeſt of ſeveral Advantages.* Yes, I ſay that the Common-wealth of *Venice*, thus ſeated, is like a man in a Citadel, who thereby may be the ſafer from his Enemies, but ne're a whit the ſafer from diſeaſes. What concluſion would you expect he ſhould infer from hence? *Why among theſe therefore there is good cauſe to reckon her Immu-*

Immunity from Seditions: Does not our Logician repeat faithfully, and diſpute honeſtly? Again, Sir, *ſhe is like a Ship ready to be boarded by Pirates, has the* Turk *on this Frontier, the Pope on that, the King of* Spain *on another.* As if this were an Argument every Government muſt not be void of Sedition, ſeeing there is none except they be Iſlands, whoſe Frontiers are not bounded by the Territories of other Princes. Well, *but ſince the laſt Reglement* (in Engliſh, Reformation) *in the time of* GRADENIGO, you have had three Seditions in *Venice*, that of MARINO BOCCONI, that of BAIAMONTE TIEPOLO, and that of MARINO FALERIO. Book I.

BODIN has been long ſince beaten for this like Stock-fiſh, and yet our Author will be ſerving it up for a Courtly Diſh. BOCCONI would have kill'd the Duke, but was hang'd before he could do it. FELTON kill'd a Duke that had greater power here than the other in *Venice*, and was hang'd afterwards, therefore *England* was a ſeditious Government; for this muſt either be undeniable for FELTON's ſake, or why muſt the other be ſo for BOCCONI's? Again, FALERIO and his Complices would have deſtroy'd the Great Council, but were hang'd before they could do it. VAUX and his Accomplices would have blown up the Parliament, but were hang'd before they could do it; therefore *England* was in this relation a ſeditious Government, elſe why was *Venice*? There paſſes not a month but there die Rogues at *Tyburn*, is the Government therefore ſeditious? or is this one regard in which it is not? Where all that ſo invade the Government are by virtue of the ſame brought to that end, there the Common-wealth, or the Orders of it, are not the cauſe but the cure of Sedition; and ſo theſe are undeniable Arguments that *Venice* is not ſeditious, where, ſince the Reformation, there has not been a cut finger upon this ſcore, ſave only thro' the conſpiracy of BAIAMONTE, which indeed came to blows. Nor for this yet can *Venice* be call'd a ſeditious Common-wealth. You find no man accuſing *Rome* of Sedition, in that ſhe had a MANLIUS or a MELIUS that dangerouſly affected Monarchy, becauſe to theſe her Orders, by which they ſuffer'd Death, as ſoon apply'd the Remedy. But *Rome* was a ſeditious Common-wealth, becauſe the perpetual feud that was between the Senate and the People ſprung out of her Orders, and was that to which there was no Remedy to apply. *England* was not a ſeditious Government becauſe it had a VAUX or a FELTON, but becauſe the Power antiently of the Nobility, and late of the People, was ſuch by the Orders of the ſame as might at any time occaſion Civil War. Put the caſe a Slave or ſome deſperate fellow has kill'd the Great *Turk*, the Government for that cannot be ſaid to be ſeditious, but in this, that thro' the very nature of the Policy, the *Janizaries* at any time may do as much, it is undeniably ſeditious. BAIAMONTE's Conſpiracy he will not ſay was of this nature. It was not a Diſeaſe in the Bones of the Common-wealth, but a thing that no ſooner appear'd, or broke out (tho' it be true, there happen'd a little ſcratching firſt) than it fell off like a Scab; ſuch an accident may befal the beſt Conſtitution, and *Venice* never had the like but once: if he could ſay as much of a Monarchy, he gains no advantage; yet let him ſay it, and prove it, I give him all. I omit many Falſhoods and Abſurdities in the proceeding of the Prevaricator, as where he intimates the Power of the Dukes to have been that whereby *Venice* gain'd I know not what, and yet to have been

Book I. been that alſo by which FALERIO had like to have ſpoil'd all: each of which, the Duke of *Venice* having no power at all, is known to be falſe. Why ſhould I ſtay to put you in mind that having affirm'd *Venice* to derive her Immunity from inteſtine Diſcord no otherwiſe than a Ship that is ready to be boarded by Pirates, he inſtances in ſuch examples to the contrary, as took occaſion by the hair of a foreign ſcalp, while in thoſe of BOCCONI and TIEPOLO the Common-wealth by her Wars with the *Genoeſes* and *Ferrara*, was put to her plunges, and in that of FALERIO reduc'd to the laſt extremity? I ſhall only note, that if ſuch ſudden flaſhes as theſe may come under the name of Sedition, he has done a fine Office for Monarchy, ſeeing no Senate is ſo much expos'd to like blows as any Prince.

WELL; but for all this it is confeſt that there may be ſuch a thing as a ſeditious Common-wealth, in that the feud between the Senate and
Conſid. *p.* 48. the People of *Rome* could not be cur'd; *What Security*, ſays he, *will you give us, that the like may not happen in* Oceana, *or that the whole body of the People being intruſted with giving a Vote, and keeping a Sword, may not by way of Council or Arms, fall to ſuch work as levelling the five thouſand, or bringing the Agrarian from two to one thouſand pounds a year, or leſs, as they fancy?*

TO which I anſwer by a like queſtion, What ſecurity will he give me that the People of any Common-wealth ſhall not caſt themſelves into the Sea? A Prince may be mad, and do ſo, but the People are naturally incapable of ſuch madneſs. If Men will boaſt of their knowledge in Principles, and yet talk of nothing but effects, why may not a Man fly as well as a Bird? but if Cauſes may be regarded, let him once ſhew how the Will, ſeeing it is not free, nor mov'd without ſome Object, ſhould move the People in ſuch a manner; or for what, they having all the Liberty and all the Power that can be had, ſhould it ſtrive? Well, that is ſoon done, for *the Land may come into the hands of five thouſand, and ſo the Booty may be great, and the reſiſtance ſmall.* Good: The *Romans* being the wiſeſt of all People, went no further towards the Remedy of their Grievances, than to ſtrive for the introduction of an Agrarian, in which they fainted too, even to the deſtruction of that Government. Except theſe, none have been ſo wiſe; and if there be any ſuch thing familiar with the nature of the People, why appear'd it but once, and then vaniſh'd without effect? why did not the People for example under the late Monarchy (when the Dominion or Freehold of the Nation, by greater ſhares, was in a ſmaller Party, and they had not only Riches, but Liberty and Power too, to whet them on) ever ſo much as think of levelling three hundred Men? for the Nobility and Clergy, in whom was the Balance, were no more. If it be reply'd that the People were not arm'd; by whom did the Barons make War with the Kings? If they were not truſted with a Vote; what was that of the Houſe of Commons? Let Dominion or Freehold ſtand upon what balance you will, unequal or equal, from the beginning of the world you ſhall never find a People turning Levellers. And as Reaſon is Experience in the root, ſo Experience is Reaſon in the branch, which might therefore be ſufficient in the caſe. Nevertheleſs for clearer ſatisfaction in a point of ſuch concernment, I ſhall endeavour to dig up and diſcover the root of this branch, or the reaſon of this Experience. That which in Beaſts is Inſtinct, whereof they can give no account, is in it ſelf that Wiſdom of God whereby

whereby he provides for them; ſo it is with the People, they are not Levellers, nor know they why, and yet it is, becauſe to be Levellers were to deſtroy themſelves. For, ſeeing I muſt repeat, to repeat briefly there is no Territory of any Extent and Populouſneſs where the Revenue of Induſtry is not twice as much as the dry Rent. This has been demonſtrated in *Oceana*. The Revenue of Induſtry is in thoſe that work, that is, the People: Wherefore the Revenue of the People, where their Induſtry is not obſtructed, is twofold to that of the Nobility, holding the whole Territory in Freehold. But where their Induſtry is obſtructed, their Revenue is nothing. Civil War being of all other the greateſt Obſtruction of Induſtry, the People in taking Arms muſt venture all they have, for that, which if they obtain they loſe two for one; and if they obtain not, all for nothing. Wherefore a People never will, nor ever can; never did, nor ever ſhall take Arms for Levelling. *But they are intruſted with a Vote*; and therefore taking away the Lands of the five thouſand, or diminiſhing the Agrarian by way of Council, they need not obſtruct their Induſtry: but, preſerving the Revenue of that, may bring themſelves into the poſſeſſion of the Land too. This will they, this can they leſs do, becauſe being in Council, they muſt propoſe ſomething for the advantage of the Common-wealth, or of themſelves, as their end in ſuch an Action. But the Land coming to be in the Poſſeſſion of five thouſand, falls not into a number that is within the compaſs of the Few, or ſuch an one as can be Princes, either in regard of their Number, or of their Eſtates; but to ſuch an one as cannot conſent to aboliſh the Agrarian, becauſe that were to conſent to rob one another: nor can they have any Party among them, or againſt their common Intereſt, ſtrong enough to force them, or to break it: which remaining, the five thouſand neither are nor can be any more than a Popular State, and the Balance remains every whit as equal, as if the Land were in never ſo many more hands. Wherefore the Common-wealth being not to be better'd by this means, the People by Council can never go about to level nor diminiſh the Agrarian for the good of the Common-wealth. Nor can they undertake it for the inrichment of themſelves, becauſe the Land of *Oceana*, as has been demonſtrated, being levell'd or divided equally among the Fathers of Families only, comes not to above ten pounds a year to each of them, whereas every Footman coſts his Maſter twenty pounds a year; and there is not a Cottager having a Cow upon the Common, but with his own Labour, at one ſhilling a day, gets twenty pounds a year; which, the Land being level'd, were impoſſible, becauſe there would be no body able to ſet a Labourer on Work, or to keep a Servant: Wherefore neither would, nor could the People by Council go about any ſuch buſineſs. So there being no poſſible cauſe of Diſagreement between the Few and the Many, the Senate and the People, there can be no ſuch effect; whence this is the *Government, which being perfectly equal, has ſuch a Libration in the frame of it, that no man in or under it can contract ſuch an Intereſt or power, as ſhould be able to diſturb the Common-wealth with Sedition.* Yet after all this, the Prevaricator *will only tell Mr.* HARRINGTON (for to deny the Concluſion is a fair way of diſputing) *that this Libration is of the ſame nature with a perpetual Motion in the Mechanics.* But let me tell him, that in the Politics there is nothing mechanic, or like it. This is but an Idiotiſm of ſome Mathe-

Chap. 8.

Conſid. p. 67.

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Ruſticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille
Labitur & labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

The ſilly Swain upon a River ſtood,
In hope the rolling bottom of the Flood
Would once unwind it ſelf, whoſe liquid Clew
The ſilver Thread for ever ſhall renew.

The Mathematician muſt take not God to be ſuch an one as he is. Is that of the Sun, of the Stars, of a River, a perpetual Motion? Even ſo *one Generation goes and another comes. Nature*, ſays GALEN, *has a tendency to make her Creature immortal, if it were in the capacity of the matter on which ſhe has to work:* but the People never dies. This motion of theirs is from the hand of a perpetual Mover, even God himſelf, *in whom we live and move and have our being*; and to this Current the Politician adds nothing but the Banks, to which end, or none, the ſame God has alſo created human Prudence. Wherefore there is not any thing that raiſes itſelf againſt God or Right Reaſon, if I ſay that it is in human Prudence ſo to apply theſe Banks, that they may ſtand as long as the River runs; or let this Conſiderer conſider again, and tell me out of Scripture or Reaſon, why not. Mathematicians, it is true, pretended to be the Monopoliſts of Demonſtration; but ſpeak ingeniouſly, have they, as to the Politics, hitherto given any other Demonſtration, than that *there is a difference between Seeing and making of Spectacles?* Much more is that Compariſon of the Politics, going upon certain and demonſtrable Principles, to Aſtrologers and Fortune-tellers, who have none at all, vain and injurious. For as in relation to what DAVID has ſaid, and Experience confirm'd, of the Age of Man, that it is *threeſcore years and ten*; I may ſay, that if a Man lies bed-rid, or dies before threeſcore years and ten, of any natural Infirmity or Diſeaſe, it was not thro' any imperfection of Mankind, but of his particular Conſtitution: So in relation to the Principles and Definition of an equal Common-wealth yet unſhaken, nay untouch'd by this Prevaricator, I may ſafely affirm, that a Common-wealth is a Government, which if it has been ſeditious, it has not been from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular Conſtitution, which where the like has happen'd, muſt have been unequal. My Retreat to theſe Principles is call'd *running into a Bog*; as if ſuch as have no Principles were not Bogs, *Informis limus, Stygiæque paludes.*

Galen. de uſu partium, *l.* 4.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Whether Monarchy comingup to the Perfection of the kind, comes not ſhort of the perfection of Government, and has not ſome Flaw in it. In which is alſo treated of the Balance of France; *of the Original of a landed Clergy of Arms, and their kinds.*

ON Monarchy I have ſaid, that whereas it is of two kinds, the one by Arms, the other by a Nobility; for that by Arms, as (to take the moſt perfect model) in *Turky*, it is not in Art or Nature to cure it of this dangerous flaw, that the *Janizaries* have frequent Intereſt, and perpetual Power to raiſe a Sedition, or tear the Magiſtrate in pieces. For that by a Nobility, as (to take the moſt perfect Model!) of late in *Oceana*, it was not in Art or Nature to cure it of that dangerous flaw, that the Nobility had frequent Intereſt and perpetual Power by their Retainers and Tenants to raiſe Sedition, and levy War; whence I conclude that Monarchy reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches not the perfection of Government, but muſt ſtill have ſome dangerous flaw in it.

THIS place (tho I did not intend by it to make work for a Tinker) could not be of leſs concernment, than it proves to the Prevaricator, who, as if he were obliged to mend all, falls firſt to patching with a Monarchy by Arms, then with a Monarchy by a Nobility; at length deſpairing, throws away each, and betakes himſelf with egregious confidence, to make out of both a new Monarchy, which is neither. By obſervation of theſe three flouriſhes, the preſent Chapter may be brought into ſome method. The firſt blow of his Hammer, or that whereby he intends the flaw or hole in Monarchy by Arms ſhall henceforth be mended and tite, is this: *That the Guards of the King's Perſon be not increaſed beyond the neceſſity of ſecurity; that they be not ſuffered to ſtagnate at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon ſervice; and chiefly that they conſiſt not of one entire Body united under the ſame Head, but be divided into diſtinct Parties and Commands; as we may ſee in* France, *where, (tho' in proportion to the extent of their Dominions) the King's Guards be more numerous than thoſe of the* Roman *or* Turkiſh *Emperors, yet being divided into diſtinct Bodies of* French, Scots, *and* Switzers, *under their ſeveral Colonels and Captains, they have never been the Authors of any the leaſt Sedition. And in* Turky *of late years they begin to learn the Art of poiſing the* Janizaries *by the* Spahys, *and ſo have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinies.* Which fine work at firſt view goes upon this falſe ground, *that the Foundation of Monarchy by Arms is laid upon the Princes Guards, or the Court of Militia*, whereas Monarchy by Arms conſiſts in no other Balance than the Princes being ſole Landlord, which, where imperfect, as it was in that of the *Roman* Emperors, the Empire is the moſt troubl'd, and where perfect, as in *Turky*, the Empire is leſs ſeditious. For that which he ſays of *France*, it relates to Monarchy by a Nobility; and therefore is not to be confounded, according to his method, with this, but refer'd to the next branch. Conſid. *p.* 28.

AS

Book I.

AS to Monarchy by Arms, tho' it be true that the balance of Dominion in any of the three kinds may be ſaid to be natural, in regard of the effect; yet ſeeing God *has given the Earth to the Sons of Men*, that of a ſole Landlord, as *Turky*, is not ſo natural in the cauſe or foundation, as the *Timars*, and therefore requires the application of ſome kind of force, as the *Janizaries*, who are not the root of the Government, that being planted in the Earth of the *Timars*, or military Farms and Colonies (for that the *Janizaries* are not the foundation of this Empire, which was founded long before, is plain, in that this Order was not introduced till AMURATH the Second) but the Dragon that lies at that root, and without which the Fruit would fall into the mouths of the *Timariots* by way of Property (as when the Knights fees granted firſt for life, and became afterwards hereditary in *Oceana)* which would cauſe ſuch a fall from Monarchy, that it would become, as we have ſeen, the riſe of popular Power (the Lots, in caſe this ſhould happen, of the *Timariots*, little differing from thoſe divided by JOSHUA to the Children of *Iſrael* (wherefore when this happens in the *Turkiſh* Monarchy, it is at an end. And that this does not happen, tho' there be divers other concurrent Policys, I would have any man ſhew me, how it could be but for the *Janizaries*. Otherwiſe it is plain that the *Janizaries* being a flying Army, on wing at all games, and upon all occaſions, are not ſo much the guard of the Prince, as of the Empire; which ruin'd, the Prey falls to the *Timariots*, as thoſe that are in poſſeſſion, except theſe be ruin'd too, who being all Horſe, and far greater in number than the *Janizaries* that are Foot, would in caſe the awe of the Prince, and the Policy of the Government which holds them divided, were broken) be invincible by the *Janizaries*, who nevertheleſs by theſe aids can eaſily contain them. *Whence the Sedition of the* Janizaries, *like that of a Nobility, may be dangerous to the Prince, but never threatens the Throne; whereas the Sedition of the* Timariots, *like that of a People, would be more againſt the Throne than the Prince.* Theſe things conſider'd, and in them the Nature, Conſtitution, or Diſeaſe of Monarchy by Arms, we may conſult the more rationally with the Conſiderer upon the Applications or Remedies by him offer'd, which are three.

FIRST, *That the Guards of the King's Perſon be not increaſed beyond the neceſſity of Security.* But of what Security, that of his Perſon, or of his Empire, or of both? for ſpeaking of a Monarchy by Arms, in this latter Senſe only it is true: and if ſo, then this ſingular Maxim of State *(Fruſtra fit per plura, quod fieri poteſt per pauciora)* might have been ſpar'd *(Cela s'en va ſans le dire, comme les heures de noſtre cure.)*

SECONDLY, *That they be not ſuffered to ſtagnate at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon ſervice*; for if there be not perpetual ſervice, it ſhould ſeem, men might be apt to think that Government was inſtituted for Peace as well as War. I add no more than is imply'd in his words, which as to this of *Turky* have chanc'd well: where not the Stagnation of the *Janizaries* only, but of the Court it ſelf (which by the inſtitution ſhould always be in exerciſe of Arms) is the cauſe of that preſent decay, ſo perceivable in this Empire. But the Prince ſitting ſtill or ſtagnating, to what the Circulation of the *Janizaries* (whoſe Alienation from the Government, or Intelligence with the *Timariots*, muſt needs be of dangerous conſequence) could tend,

tend, ſhould have been thought on: otherwiſe to expoſe the Empire to danger for the ſafety of the Prince, is no cure of the Government. Chap. 9.

BUT his chief Remedy remains: *This Court Militia muſt not conſiſt of one intire body united under the ſame head, but be divided under ſeveral Colonels, Captains, Parties Brigades,* and diſtributed to ſeveral Quarters. As if this were a cure, there were any Army that could be mutinous: but where he ſays, *not united under the ſame Head,* he intimates perhaps divers Generals, and divers Armies; now ſuch are the *Turkiſh Beglerbegs*, and the Provinces under their Governments. That theſe therefore be kept divided, ſo that not any two of them can lay their heads together without having them cut off, nor any Son ſucceed the Father in Government, requires that there be always a ſufficient force (diſtinct from the Intereſt of the *Timariots* and *Beglerbegs*) united, and ſtill ready upon occaſion of this ſervice; and the *Janizaries* with the *Spahies* or Court-Horſe being united, are no more than ſufficient for this ſervice. Wherefore if theſe alſo were ſo divided as thereby to be weaken'd, they could not be ſufficient for this ſervice; and their diviſion, except ſuch as might weaken them, would be of no ſecurity to the Prince. That the Provinces, under this awe, are leſs apt to rebel, than the Court-Guards to mutiny, is no wonder; but the Court-Guards being cur'd by the preſcription of this Phyſician, of the poſſibility of Mutiny, which without weakening them is impoſſible, the Provinces, if Liberty, or Riches, or Power be deſirable, would never indure the yoke of this Government. Wherefore it being inavoidable in the *Turkiſh* Empire, that either the *Janizaries*, or the *Timariots* may do what they liſt (in regard that whether of them be able to give Law to the other, muſt at the ſame time be able to give Law to the Prince; and to bring them to an equal Balance, were to make a Civil War, or at leaſt to ſow the Seed of it) the native Wound of Monarchy by Arms remains incur'd and incurable. What more may be done for Monarchy, *founded upon a Nobility*, comes next to be try'd. In this the Conſiderer gives his word, *that there never riſes any danger to the Crown, but when either a great part of the Sovereign Power is put into the hands of the Nobility, as in* Germany *and* Poland (where it ſhould ſeem by him, that the Electors and the Gentry do not put Power into the hands of the Emperor, or King, but the Emperor or King puts Power into the hands of the Electors or Gentry) *or when ſome Perſon or Family is ſuffer'd to over-top the reſt in Riches, Commands, and Dependence, as the Princes of the Blood and* Lorrain, *not long ſince, in* France; *and of old the* MONTFORTS *and* NEVILS *in* England. The firſt of theſe he declares to be *a vicious Government, and a Monarchy only in name:* The ſecond he undertakes ſhall *eaſily admit of this Remedy; That the great ones be reduc'd* (decimo ſexto) *to a leſſer Volume, and level'd into an Equality with the reſt of their Order.* Conſid. p. 47.

HIS Putpin is pretty: *The Emperor puts Power into the hands of the Electors; and the King of* Poland *puts Power into the hands of the Gentlemen: Which Governments therefore* (and all ſuch like, as when the King of *England* did put Power into the hands of the Barons, at ſuch a time as he was no longer able to keep it out of their fingers, by which means the antient and late Government of King, Lords and Commons, was reſtor'd) *are vicious Conſtitutions, and Monarchies only in name;* ſuch as he will not meddle with, and therefore let them go. Well; but where is the Patient then? if theſe be not Monarchies by Nobility,

Book. I. what do we mean by that thing? or what Government is it that we are to cure? Why ſuch a one, *where ſome Perſon or Family is ſuffer'd to over-top the reſt in Riches, Commands, and Dependence, as the Princes of the Blood and* Lorrain, *not long ſince, in* France; *and of old the* MONTFORTS *and the* NEVILS *in* England. So then the ſame again (for theſe are no other) upon recollection, are thoſe *that admit of this eaſy cure. Let the great Ones be reduc'd to a leſſer Volume, and level'd with the reſt of their Order.* But how? if they be the weaker Party, they are not the Great Ones; and if they be the ſtronger Party, how will he reduce them? Put the caſe a man has the Gout, his Phyſician does not bid him reduce his over-topping Toes to the Volume of the other Foot, nor to level them to equality with the reſt of their Order, but preſcribes his Remedies, and inſtitutes the Method that ſhould do this feat. What is the Method of our ÆSCULAPIUS? *Point de Novelle*; or where are we to find it? *e'en where you pleaſe. The Princes of the Blood, and of* Lorrain *in* France; *the* MONTFORTS *and the* NEVILS *in* England, over-top'd not their Order by their own Riches or Power, but by that of the Party, which for their Fidelity, Courage, or Conduct, intruſted them with the managing of their Arms or Affairs. So the Prince that would have level'd them, muſt have level'd their Party; which in caſe the Controverſy be upon the Right, or pretended Right of the Nobility in the Government, which commonly makes them hang together, may come to the whole Order: what then? Why then, ſays he, the Prince muſt *preſerve his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under, and yet not tall enough in any particular Perſon to meaſure with himſelf:* which abating the figure, is the ſame again; and ſo I have nothing to anſwer but the figure. Now for this, the Prince himſelf is no otherwiſe tall, than by being ſet upon the ſhoulders of the Nobility; and ſo if they ſet another upon the ſame ſhoulders (as in HENRY the *4th* or the *7th*, who had no Titles to the Crown, nor could otherwiſe have meaſur'd with the Prince) be he never ſo low, he comes to be tall enough in his particular perſon to meaſure with the Prince, and to be taller too, not only by thoſe old examples, but others that are younger than our ſelves, tho' ſuch (the Nobility having not of late been weighty enough to keep the People under) as derive from another Principle, that of popular Balance. A Prince therefore preſerving his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under, muſt preſerve in them the balance of that kind of Empire: and the balance containing the Riches, which are the Power, and ſo the Arms of the Nation; this being in the Nobility, the Nobility, when willing, muſt be able to diſpoſe of the King, or of the Government. Nor under a leſs weight is a Nobility qualify'd to keep down the People, as by an Argument from the contrary. HENRY the *7th* having found the ſtrength of his Nobility, that ſet him in a Throne to which he had no right, and fearing that the Tide of their Favour turning, they might do as much for another, abated the dependence of their Tenants, and cut off their Train of Retainers; which dimunition of their weight, releaſing the People by degrees, has caus'd that Plain or Level into which we live to ſee the Mountain of that Monarchy now ſunk and ſwallow'd: wherefore the Balance of the Nobility being ſuch as failing, that kind of Monarchy comes to ruin; and not failing, the Nobility, if they join, may give Law to the King, the inherent diſeaſe of a Monarchy by a Nobility remains alſo uncur'd, and incureable.

Conſid. *p.* 49.

THESE

Chap. 9.

THESE are points to which I had ſpoken before; but ſomething concerning *France* and foreign Guards was mumbl'd by the Prevaricator in a wrong place, while he was ſpeaking of *Turky*, where there is no ſuch thing. This, leſt I be thought to have courted oppoſition for nothing, ſhall open a new Scene; while I take the occaſion in this place to ſpeak firſt of the Balance of the *French* Monarchy, and next of the Nature and Uſe of foreign Guards.

The Balance of France.

THE whole Territory of *France*, except the Crown Lands, which on this account are not conſiderable, conſiſts of three ſhares or parts, whereof the Church holds one, the Nobility another; and the Preſidents, Advocates, other Officers of the Parliaments, Courts of Juſtice, the Citizens, Merchants, Tradeſmen, the Treaſurers, Receivers of the Cuſtoms, Aids, Taxes, Impoſitions, Gabels, all which together make a vaſt body, hold a third: by how equal Portions I am ſorry that I do not know, nor where to learn; but this is the Balance of the *French* Monarchy, to which the Peaſant holding nothing, but living (tho' in one of the beſt Countries of the World) in the meaneſt and moſt miſerable condition of a Labourer, or Hind, is of no account at all.

THE Parties that hold the Balance in a Territory are thoſe of whom the Government does naturally conſiſt, wherefore theſe are call'd Eſtates; ſo the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons, are the three Eſtates of *France*. Tho' the third, becauſe the Peaſant partaking not of the Balance can (in relation to Government) be of no account, is not call'd the Commons, but only the third Eſtate: whereas the Yeomanry and Gentry in *England* having weigh'd as well in the Balance as the Church and the Nobility, the three Eſtates of *England* (while the Monarchy was in vigour) were the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons. *The Conſent of Nations evinces that the Function of the Clergy, or Prieſt, except where otherwiſe determin'd by Law, appertains to the Magiſtrate. By this right* NOAH, ABRAHAM, JOB, *with the reſt of the Patriarchs, inſtructed their Families, or ſacrific'd. There ſeems to have been a kind of Common-wealth in* Canaan, *while* MELCHISEDEC *was both King and Prieſt. Such alſo was* MOSES *till he conſecrated* AARON, *and confer'd the Prieſthood upon the* Levites, *who are expreſly ſaid to ſucceed to the firſt-born, that is to the Patriarchs, who till then exerciſ'd that Function. Nor was it otherwiſe with the* Gentiles, *where they, who had the Sovereign Power, or were in eminent Magiſtracy, did alſo the Prieſtly Office* (omnino apud veteres qui rerum potiebantur, iidem Auguria tenebant: ut enim ſapere, ſic divinare, regale ducebant, *ſays* CICERO; *and* VIRGIL, REX ANIUS, Rex idem hominum, PHOEBIQUE Sacerdos.) *You find the Heroes, that is Princes, in Poets, ſacrificing. The* Ethiopian, Egyptian, Lacedemonian *Kings did the like. In* Athens *conſtantly and in* Rome, *when they had no Kings, occaſionally they elected a* Rex ſacrorum, *or King Prieſt.* So that a free People had thus far Power of electing their Prieſts, is not deny'd by any man. This came, it ſhould ſeem, to be otherwiſe eſtabliſh'd by the Law in *Egypt*, where the Prieſts (whoſe Lands JOSEPH when he bought thoſe of the People did not buy) being great Landlords, it may be to the Third of the whole Territory, were one of the three Eſtates of the Realm. And it is clear in Scripture that the People, till they ſold their Lands, became not Servants to

Grotius de Imp. Sum. Pot. circa ſacra. C. 2. S. 4.

Original of a Landed Clergy.

Gen. 47. 22.

PHA-

Book I. PHARAOH. While AGESILAUS was in *Egypt* they depos'd their King, which implies the recovery of their Balance; but ſo, ſeeing they ſet up another, as withal ſhews the Balance of the Nobility to have been predominant. Theſe Particulars ſeem to come near to the account of DIODORUS SICULUS, by whom the Balance of *Egypt* ſhould have ſtood thus: *The whole Revenue was divided into three Parts, whereof the Prieſt had the firſt, the King had the ſecond, and the Nobility had the third.* It ſeems to me that the Prieſts had theirs by their antient Right and Title, untouch'd by JOSEPH; that the Kings had all the reſt by the purchaſe of JOSEPH; and that in time, as is uſual in like caſes, a Nobility came thro' the bounty of ſucceeding Kings to ſhare with them in one half. But however it came about, *Egypt* by this means is the firſt example of a Monarchy upon a Nobility, at leaſt diſtributed into three Eſtates by means of a Landed Clergy, which by conſequence came to be the greateſt Counſellors of State, and, fitting Religion to their uſes, to bring the People to be the moſt ſuperſtitious in the whole World.

Xenoph. in Orat. de Ageſ.

L. 1.

WERE it not for this Example, I ſhould have ſaid, that the Endowment of a Clergy or religious Order with Lands, and the erecting of them into an Eſtate of the Realm or Government, were no antienter than the *Goths* and *Vandals*, who introducing a like Policy, which to this day takes place throughout the Chriſtian World, have been the cauſe;

FIRST, Why the Clergy have been generally great Counſellors to Kings, while the People are led into Superſtition.

SECONDLY, By planting a religious Order in the Earth, why Religion has been brought to ſerve wordly ends.

AND, Thirdly, by rendering the Miter able to make War; why of latter Ages we have had ſuch a thing as War for Religion, which till the Clergy came to be a third State or Landlords, was never known in the World: For that ſome Cities of *Greece*, taking Arms upon the Uſurpation or Violation of ſome Temple, have call'd it the *Holy War*; ſuch Diſputes having been put upon matter of Fact, and not of Faith, in which every man was free, came not to this account. MOSES *was learn'd in all the Learning of the* Egyptians; but a Landed Clergy introduc'd he not in *Iſrael:* nor went the Apoſtles about to lay any ſuch Foundation of a Church. Abating this one example of *Egypt*, till the *Goths* and *Vandals*, who brought in the third Eſtate, a Government, if it were unequal, conſiſted but of two Eſtates; as that of *Rome*, whether under the Kings or the Common-wealth, conſiſted of the *Patricians* and *Plebeians*, or of the Nobility and the People. And an equal Common-wealth conſiſts but of one, which is the People: for example of this you have *Lacedemon* and *Venice*, where the People being few, and having many Subjects or Servants, might alſo be call'd a Nobility, as in regard of their Subjects they are in *Venice*, and in regard of their Helots or Servants, they might have been in *Lacedemon*. That, I ſay, which, introducing two Eſtates, cauſes Diviſion, or makes a Common-wealth unequal, is not that ſhe has a Nobility, without which ſhe is depriv'd of her moſt ſpecial Ornament, and weaken'd in her Conduct, but when the Nobility only is capable of Magiſtracy, or of the Senate; and where this is ſo order'd, ſhe is unequal, as *Rome*. But where the Nobility is no otherwiſe capable of Magiſtracy, nor of the Senate, than by Election of the People,

Thucyd. l. 1.

People, the Common-wealth conſiſts but of one Order, and is equal, as *Lacedemon* or *Venice.* Chap. 9.

BUT for a Politician commend me to the Conſiderer, he will have *Rome* to have been an equal Common-wealth, and *Venice* to be an inequal one, which muſt be evinced by wiredrawing. For having elſewhere, as has been ſhewn, admitted without oppoſition that the Balance of *Empire is well divided into national and provincial,* the humour now takes him to ſpin that wedge into ſuch a thread, as by intangling of theſe two, may make them both eaſy to be broken. Hereto he betakes himſelf in this manner. *As Mr.* HARRINGTON *has well obſerv'd* (p. 40.) *where there are two Parties in a Republick with equal Power (as in that of* Rome, *the People had one half, and the Nobility had the other half) Confuſion and Miſery are there intail'd. For remedy whereof, or to avoid this, there can be no way but to make the Common-wealth very unequal.* Conſid. *p.* 16. 69. 70.

In anſwer to this, there will need no more than to repeat the ſame things honeſtly. Mr. HARRINGTON ſpeaks of the national Balance of Empire (p. 40.) to this ſenſe: *Where the Nobility holds half the Property, or about that proportion, and the People the other half* (the ſhares of the Land may be equal; but in regard the Nobility have much among Few, and the People little among many, the Few will not be contented to have Authority, which is all their proper ſhare in a Common-wealth, but will be bringing the People under Power, which is not their proper ſhare in a Common-wealth; wherefore this Common-wealth muſt needs be unequal. And except by altering the Balance as the *Athenians* did by the *Siſacthia,* or reciſion of Debts; or as the *Romans* went about to do by an Agrarian, it be brought to ſuch an equality, that the whole Power be in the People, and there remain no more than Authority to the Nobility) *there is no remedy but the one* (with perpetual feud) *will eat the other, as the People did the Nobility in* Athens, *and the Nobility of the People in* Rome. Where the Carcaſe is, there will be the Eagles alſo; where the riches are, there will be the Power. So if a few be as rich as all the reſt, a few will have as much Power as all the reſt; in which caſe the Common-wealth is unequal, and there can be no end of ſtaving and tailing, till it be brought to equality. Thus much for the national Balance; For the provincial, there Power does not follow Property, but the contrary: This the Prevaricator having acknowledg'd, lets ſlip, to the end he may take a gripe of *Venice,* which (becauſe the three or four thouſand of which originally conſiſted, and now conſiſts that whole Government, having acquir'd Provinces, and an increaſe of their City by later comers, do not admit theſe to participation of Power) he ſays is an unequal Common-wealth. He will be a Mill-horſe, whether the *Cake be Dow or not*; for this is to draw in a circle: and *Rome,* which by his former Arguments ſhould have been equal, by this again muſt be unequal, ſeeing *Rome* as little admitted her Provinces into the body of the Common-wealth, as does *Venice.* This claſh is but by way of Parentheſis; to return therefore to the buſineſs in preſent agitation.

THE Eſtates, be they one, or two, or three, are ſuch (as was ſaid) by virtue of the Balance, upon which the Government muſt naturally depend. Wherefore conſtitutively the Government of *France* (and all other Monarchies of like Balance) was adminiſter'd by an

PAGINATION INCORRECT

Book I. Aſſembly of the three Eſtates; and thus continued till that Nation being vanquiſh'd by the *Engliſh*, CHARLES the *7th* was put to ſuch ſhifts as, for the recovery of himſelf in the greateſt diſtreſs, he could make. To which recovery, while the Eſtates could not be legally call'd, he happening to attain without them, ſo ordered his affairs, that his Succeſſors, by adding to his Inventions, came to rule without this Aſſembly; a way not ſuting with the nature of their Balance, which therefore required ſome Aſſiſtance by force, and other concurring Policies of like nature, whereof the foreign Guards of that Monarchy are one; the great baits alluring the Nobility another; and the emergent Intereſt of the Church a third.

TO begin with the laſt of theſe; the Church (except it be in a War for Religion, as when they join'd with the Princes of *Lorrain*, and what Party of the *French* Nobility were made, or they could make againſt the King of *Navar*) are not of themſelves ſo hot at hand, or prompt to Arms: but the King being (to uſe their word) no Heretic, thro' their great apprehenſion of the third Eſtate, as that which is moſt addicted to the Proteſtant Religion, may be confident they will never ſide with the People. So by this emergent Intereſt or Accident he has the Church ſure enough.

FOR the Nobility, which is exceeding gallant, this Change has the greateſt baits; for whereas the Church being not ſpar'd, the third Eſtate is laden, and the Peaſant overladen with Taxes, the Nobility is not only at better eaſe in this regard, but for the greater or more conſiderable part, receives advantage by it: the King having always, whether in Peace or War, a great Cavalry, than which there is no better in the world for the Exerciſe, Entertainment, and Profit of the Nobility; Governments of Cities, Caſtles, Provinces in abundance, which he rarely diſtributes to any other. The greater Nobility are Marechals, Generals; the leſs Officers in the Armies, ſpecially of the Horſe, the Emoluments whereof they receive alſo in time of Peace; and many of this Order being Penſioners, taſte of the King's Liberality, without taking Pains, or having any Imployment at all. By which both that *France* is a Monarchy by a Nobility, and how ſhe holds her Nobility, is apparent.

NOW the Church and the Nobility ſtanding thus ingag'd to the King, by which means he has two parts of the Balance to one, it is demonſtrable that the Government muſt be quiet. Nor, ſeeing the Church for the reaſon ſhewn is ſure enough, comes the Government (ſince the Proteſtant Cities and Holds were demoliſhed) to be otherwiſe diſquieted than by the flying out of the Nobility, which, whenever it happens in any party conſiderable, either for the Number, or the Intereſt, cauſes the Crown to ſhake; for it ſeldom comes to paſs upon this Occaſion, but the third Eſtate, or ſome part of it, take up Arms immediately. In which place it is worthy to be obſerv'd, that Wealth, according to the diſtribution of the Balance, has contrary motions. The third Eſtate in *France* having Riches, and thoſe laden with Taxes, come to have ſomething to loſe, and ſomething to ſave: which keeps them in continual fear or hope. The Nobility holding to the King, the third Eſtate has ſomething to loſe, which withholds them from Arms thro fear; but the Nobility flying out, the third Eſtate has ſomething to ſave, which precipitates them into Arms thro hope: whereas the Peaſant having nothing to ſave or to loſe, to hope or to fear,

never

never ſtirs. The caſe ſtanding thus, the ſufficiency of the *French* Politician (ſince the Maſterpiece of Cardinal RICHLIEU, in demoliſhing thoſe Walls of the Proteſtants, which had otherwiſe by this time been a Refuge for the third Eſtate, and perhaps overturn'd the Monarchy) lys altogether in finding for the Nobility work abroad, or balancing them in ſuch ſort at home, that if a Party flys out, there may be a ſtronger within to reduce it, or at leaſt to be oppos'd to it. In this Caſe, leſt the native Intereſt of the Nobility, ſince the Aſſemblies of the three Eſtates were aboliſh'd, might cool the remaining Party, or make them ſlower in the redreſs of ſuch Diſorders or Diſcontents than were requiſite, the King is wiſely provided of Foreign Guards; which being always in readineſs, and not obnoxious to the native Intereſt, may upon like occaſions be of more Expedition and Truſt. Being come thus to foreign Arms, which is the point I more eſpecially propos'd to myſelf in the preſent Diſcourſe, one Objection in relation to what has been already ſaid, ſeems to interpoſe it ſelf. Seeing *France*, while it is not govern'd by the Aſſembly of States, is yet of the ſame Balance it was when govern'd by the Aſſembly of States; it may be ſaid that a Government of the ſame Balance may admit of divers Adminiſtrations. Chap. 9.

TO which I need make no other anſwer, than to put you in mind that while this Government was natural, or adminiſter'd by the Aſſembly of States, it is celebrated by MACHIAVEL to have been the beſt order'd of any Monarchy in the world; and that what it is, or has been of later times, you may believe your own eyes or ears.

THERE be yet, before I can come to foreign Guards, ſome previous Conſiderations. All Government, as is imply'd by what has been already ſhewn, is of theſe three kinds: *A Government of Servants: A Government of Subjects*; or, *a Government of Citizens.* The firſt is abſolute Monarchy, as that of *Turky:* The ſecond Ariſtocratical Monarchy, as that of *France:* The third a Commonwealth, as thoſe of *Iſrael*, of *Rome*, of *Holland.* Now (to follow MACHIAVEL in part) of theſe, the Government of Servants is the harder to be conquer'd, and the eaſier to be held: The Government of Subjects is the eaſier to be conquered, and the harder to be held. To which I ſhall preſume to add, that the Government of Citizens is both the hardeſt to be conquer'd, and the hardeſt to be held. *Of Arms, and their kind.*

My Author's Reaſons, why a Government of Servants is the hardeſt to be conquer'd, come to this that they are under perpetual Diſcipline and Command, void of ſuch Intereſts and Factions, as have Hands or Power to lay hold upon Advantages or Innovation; whence he that invades the *Turk* muſt truſt to his own ſtrength, and not rely upon Diſorders in the Government, or Forces which he ſhall be ſure enough to find united.

HIS Reaſons, why this Government, being once broken, is eaſily held, are, that the Armies once paſt hope of rallying, there being no ſuch thing as Families hanging together, or Nobility to ſtir up their Dependants to further Reluctancy for the preſent, or to preſerve themſelves by complacence with the Conquerors for future Diſcontents or Advantages, he that has won the Garland has no more to do but to extinguiſh the Royal Line, and wear it ever after in ſecurity. For the People having been always Slaves, are ſuch whoſe condition he may better, in which caſe they are Gainers by their Conqueror, but can never

Book I. never make worſe, and therefore they loſe nothing by him. Hence ALEXANDER having conquer'd the *Perſian* Empire, he and his Captains after him could hold it without the leaſt Diſpute, except it aroſe among themſelves. Hence MAHOMET the Second having taken *Conſtantinople*, and put PALÆOLOGUS the *Greece* Emperor (whoſe Government was of like nature with the *Perſian)* together with his whole Family, to the Sword, the *Turk* has held that Empire without reluctancy.

ON the other ſide, the Reaſons why a Government of Subjects is eaſilier conquer'd are theſe: That it is ſupported by a Nobility ſo antient, ſo powerful, and of ſuch hold and influence upon the People, that the King without danger, if not ruin to himſelf or the Throne (an example whereof was given in HEN. *7th of England)* can neither invade their Priviledges, nor level their Eſtates; which remaining, they have Power upon every diſcontent to call in an Enemy, as ROBERT Count of *Artois* did the *Engliſh*, and the Duke of *Guiſe* the *Spaniard* into *France*.

THE Reaſons why a Government of Subjects being ſo eaſily conquer'd, is nevertheleſs the harder to be held, are theſe: That the Nobility being ſoon out of countenance in ſuch a caſe, and repenting themſelves of ſuch a bargain, have the ſame means in their hands whereby they brought in the Enemy, to drive him out, as thoſe of *France* did both the *Engliſh* and the *Spaniard*.

FOR the Government of Citizens, as it is of two kinds, an equal or an unequal Common-wealth, the Reaſons why it is the hardeſt to be conquer'd, are alſo of two kinds; as firſt, the Reaſons why a Government of Citizens, where the Common-wealth is equal, is hardeſt to be conquer'd, are, that the Invader of ſuch a Society muſt not only truſt to his own ſtrength, inaſmuch as the Common-wealth being equal, he muſt needs find them united, but in regard that ſuch Citizens, being all Soldiers or train'd up to their Arms, which they uſe not for the defence of Slavery, but of Liberty (a condition not in this world to be better'd) they have more ſpecially upon this occaſion the higheſt Soul of Courage, (and if their Territory be of any extent) the vaſteſt Body of a well-diſciplin'd Militia that is poſſible in Nature: Wherefore *an example of ſuch an one overcome by the Arms of a Monarch, is not to be found in the World.* And if ſome ſmall City of this Frame has happen'd to be vanquiſh'd by a potent Common-wealth, *this is her Prerogative, her Towers are her Funeral Pile, and ſhe expires in her own flame, leaving nothing to the Conqueror but her Aſhes, as* Saguntum *overwhelm'd by* Carthage, *and* Numantia *by* Rome.

THE Reaſons why a Government of Citizens, where the Common-wealth is inequal, is, next the former, the hardeſt to be conquer'd, are the ſame, with this difference, that tho' her Peace be not perfect within, her condition is not to be better'd by any thing without. Wherefore *Rome* in all her ſtrife never call'd in an Enemy; and if an Enemy upon occaſion of her ſtrife, and hopes of advantage by it, came without calling, he preſented her with the moſt Sovereign Cure, who had no leiſure to deſtroy herſelf, till having no Enemy to find her work, ſhe became her own.

——Nondum tibi deſut hoſtis,
In te verte manus——

Nor

Nor is there any example that a Government of this kind was ever subdu'd by the Arms of a Monarch; tho' some indeed may be found that have call'd or suffer'd foreign Princes or Force to come in, as *Holland* by Marriages of their Princes, and *Genoa* thro' her Factions, as those of the FIESCI and ADORNI. Chap. 9.

TO conclude this part as to the Reasons why a Government of Citizens so acquir'd or possest, as thro' Marriage, or Faction, is the hardest to be held, there needs no more than that men accustom'd to their Arms and their Liberties will never indure the Yoke. Wherefore the *Spaniard*, tho' a mighty King, no sooner began in *Holland*, a small Common-wealth, to innovate or break her Orders, than she threw him off with such Courage and disdain, as is admirable to the World. And somewhat of the like kind did *Genoa* by the help of her DORIA in the vindication of her Liberty from *France*. Guic. l. 11.

TO come by this fartheſt way about as I think the neareſt way home: Arms are of two sorts, Proper or Improper; that this, Native or Foreign. Proper and Improper Arms.

PROPER and Native Arms are, according to the triple nature of Government, of three kinds; Servants in Arms, as the *Helots* in *Lacedemon*, the *Timariots* and *Janizaries* in *Turky*; Subjects in Arms, as the Horse in *France*, and the Sea-guards or Forces in *Venice*; or Citizens in Arms, as those upon the *Lexiarcha* in *Athens*, of the *Moræ* in *Lacedemon*, and the Legions in *Rome*.

IMPROPER or Foreign Arms are of two sorts; Auxiliaries, and Mercenaries.

AUXILIARIES are such as are supply'd by virtue of some League, as were those of the *Latins* and *Italians* to the *Romans*; and those of the Cantons of *Swiss* (except *Zuric*) to the King of *France*: or they may be such as are occasionally lent freely, or let forth for Money by one State to another, the latter whereof differ not much from Mercenaries.

MERCENARIES are Soldiers of Fortune that have no other Trade than their Arms, and let out themselves for Money; of such consisted the greatest part of the *Carthaginian* Strength, such is the Land Force of *Venice*, and, notwithstanding the antient League of *France* with those Nations, such at this day are the *Swiss* and *Scotish* Guards (and sometimes a good part of the Foot) in *France*.

MACHIAVEL discourses upon these Particulars in his Art of War, to admiration: by whom I shall therefore steer.

WHERE the Arms in bulk are proper, and consisting of Citizens, they have other Trades, and therefore are no Soldiers of Fortune; and yet because the Common-wealth has Arms for her Trade) in regard she is *a Magistrate given for the good of Mankind, and bears not her Sword in vain)* they are all educated as well in Military as Civil Discipline, taking their turns in service of either nature according to the occasion, and the Orders of the Common-wealth, as in *Israel*, *Athens*, *Lacedemon* and *Rome*, which had (if their Territories permitted, and sometimes, as I may say, whether their Territories permitted or no, as in *Israel*) the vastest, the highest temper'd, and the best disciplin'd Militia, that is to be found in the whole compass of Story. Some Armies of *Israel* have consisted of three or four hundred thousand men: *Rome* upon the Rumour of a *Gallic* Tumult, arm'd in *Italy* only, without foreign Aid, seventy thousand Horse and seven hundred thousand Foot; Plin. L. Æmilio Papo, C. Atilio Regulo Coss.

Book I. things in our days (when the *Turk* can hardly arm half ſo many) not to be credited.

HENCE *that a Common-wealth, which had not firſt broken her ſelf, or been broken by ſome other Common-wealth, ſhould not be found to have been conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch, is not miraculous, but a natural effect of an apparent Cauſe.* In this place, or upon this Text, Divines whom I would deſire not to be Enemies of popular Power, but to give MACHIAVEL his due, ſhall, if they pleaſe, hear him make a goodly Sermon, in theſe words: *If antient Common-wealths and Governments us'd Diligence in any other Order to make their People lovers of Peace, faithful to their Country, and to have the fear of God before their eyes, they doubl'd it in this of their Militia: for of whom ſhould your Country expect greater Faith, than of ſuch as have offer'd themſelves to die for her? Whom ſhould ſhe endeavour to make greater Lovers of Peace, than them who only can inſlave her by force? In whom ſhould there be greater Fear of God, than in ſuch as carry their Lives in their hands? This, when Lawgivers and Captains rightly conſider'd, was the cauſe why Soldiers were eſteem'd, honour'd, follow'd, and imitated above all men in the World; whereas ſince ſuch Orders are broken, and Cuſtom is altogether deviated from the courſe of antient Prudence, men are come to deteſt the Iniquity of the Camp, and fly the Converſation of ſuch as are in Arms, as the Peſtilence.* Where the Arms in bulk are proper, but conſiſt of Subjects, they are the beſt next; and but the beſt next, as appears by all Examples antient and modern. The Arms with which PYRRHUS Prince of *Epyrus* invaded the *Romans*, were of Subjects; yet that Prince, tho' he was not vanquiſh'd by the *Romans*, confeſt their advantage, and gave them over. The *Spaniard* being a far more potent King than was PYRRHUS, has acknowledg'd as much to the *Hollanders*, tho' a far leſs Common-wealth than *Rome:* So have the Princes of *Auſtria*, and of *Burgundy*, to the *Switzers*. That the Arms of Subjects are nevertheleſs as much ſuperior to the Arms of Servants, as inferior to the Arms of Citizens, is as plain; ſeeing as ALEXANDER, with thirty thouſand Subjects, vanquiſh'd DARIUS, having innumerable Slaves; ſo thirty thouſand Chriſtians are at this day a match for any Army of *Turks*: and we ſee *Venice*, whoſe Force by Sea conſiſts of Subjects, to have made him quit that Element near as fully to her Dominion or Empire, as did the *Perſian* to *Athens*.

Arte della Guer. Proem.

TO Arms that are proper, but conſiſt of Servants, all the preeminence that can be given is, that they are better than foreign Arms; a proof whereof we have in thoſe of SELIMUS, whereby he conquer'd the *Mamalucs*; who being but a foreign Force that held *Egypt* in ſubjection, the Country was irrecoverably loſt, and, for the reaſons already ſhewn, as eaſily kept.

IMPROPER Arms, whether Auxiliary or Mercenary, where the Force of a Prince or of a Common-wealth conſiſts, for the bulk or greater part, of no other, are the leaſt effectual, and the moſt dangerous of all. For Auxiliaries, or what effect has been found of them by Princes or Common-wealths, it was ſeen in *France* during the League by the *Spaniard*; and in *Holland* during the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH by the *Engliſh*; but eſpecially in the *Goths* and *Vandals* who having been Auxiliaries or Mercenaries, rely'd upon by the later Emperors, came thereby to ruin the *Roman* Empire.

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MERCENARIES who make their Arms their Trade, muſt of all others be the moſt pernicious; for what can we expect leſs of ſuch whoſe Art is not otherwiſe ſo profitable, than that they ſhould (as MACHIAVEL ſhews) *be breakers of their Faith, given up to Rapine, Enemies of Peace and Government?* Chap. 9.

TO inſtance in ſome Common-wealths, that of *Carthage* after her firſt War with the *Romans*, fell thro' the Rebellion of SPENDIUS and MATHO, Ringleaders of her Mercenaries, into another that was far more dangerous. Of ſuch a Dilemma were the Arms of this State, that if HANNIBAL had conquer'd *Rome*, he muſt have been King of *Carthage*; and not conquering *Rome*, *Carthage* was ruin'd. The Common-wealth of *Milan*, truſting her ſelf to F. SFORZA and his Mercenaries, became the Subject of her Servant, and he her Duke. Nor is *Venice*, whoſe Land-Forces are of the ſame kind, otherwiſe in ſafety as to theſe, than by her Situation. To give ſome inſtances of the ſame nature in Princes: The Father of F. SFORZA being Captain of a like mercenary Army, forc'd JOAN Queen of *Naples*, whom he left diſarm'd in the midſt of her Enemies, to lay her ſelf at the feet of the King of *Arragon*; and BRACCIO by ſuch another Treachery had plainly poſſeſt himſelf of the Kingdom of *Naples*, had he not been broken at *Aquila*, where Death intercepted his deſign. From what has been ſaid (firſt of Government, and then of Arms) if a Government of Servants be harder to be conquer'd, and eaſier to be held, then in this foreign Arms muſt needs be leaſt neceſſary, and moſt dangerous.

IF a Government of Subjects be eaſier to be conquer'd, and harder to be held, then in this foreign Arms may be more neceſſary, but muſt be leſs dangerous.

BUT tho' a Government of Citizens be both hardeſt to be conquer'd, and hardeſt to be held, yet as it is again in this regard of two kinds, this cannot be ſaid of each kind alike; wherefore I muſt diſtinguiſh.

IN a Government of Citizens, if the Common-wealth be not for increaſe, but preſervation only, as *Lacedemon*, *Carthage*, *Venice*, foreign Arms are both neceſſary and dangerous; but in a Government of Citizens, where the Common-wealth is both for increaſe and preſervation, as *Rome*, foreign Arms are neither neceſſary nor dangerous.

TO repeat the parts of this Concluſion, which being brief is obſcure, more fully and particularly.

THE Empire of *Turky* is of the harder kind to be conquer'd, wherefore the *Turk* needs not foreign Guards to defend him, but it is of the eaſier to be held; wherefore let him take heed of intruſting his Perſon with foreign Guards, who having a foreign Intereſt, may have a foreign Nation to aſſiſt them: and ſo the Perſon of the Prince being in their hands, they have no more to do than to extinguiſh the Royal Line; and the Empire being eaſily held, is their own thenceforth with ſecurity. Thus the *Mamalucs* which were at firſt foreign Guards, extinguiſhing the Royal Line of the Kings of *Egypt*, came to poſſeſs and hold that Realm without oppoſition. Who well conſiders this point, will never enough admire the Policy of the *Turk* in the creation (as it were) of his *Janizaries*, free from any national Intereſt that might make them dream of, or deſire Liberty; and yet ſo void of all foreign Intereſt or Knowledge, that they know not what, or who were their Country or Parents. Hence tho' they have Intereſt to murder the

Turk

Book I. *Turk*, and ſometimes do accordingly, they have no further Intereſt in the world but what depends upon the Government; and ſo the Empire is ſafe, tho' the Prince be in danger: whereas if they were foreign Guards, or had any native Intereſt, not only the Prince, but the Empire too would be in danger, the reſt being Servants, and ſuch whoſe condition might be better'd by a change, but could be no worſe. Wherefore a Government of Servants muſt by no means admit of foreign Guards or *Mamalucs*.

BUT the Empire of *France*, where the Nobility are not only ſubject to fly out, but to call in Strangers, may have uſe of foreign Guards, which not obnoxious to native Intereſt and Factions, as thoſe of the Nobility, are the readieſt and beſt help at this lift; yet not dangerous, tho' having the Prince in their power, becauſe by him they are ſafe from the Nobility, who, were it not for the Prince, would be ſo far from bearing or brooking foreign Guards, that in caſe a Foreigner came in upon their call, having the ſame means to help themſelves whereby they brought him in, they would ſhake the Yoke, and the ends why they call'd him in, being ſatisfy'd or repented of, drive him out again, as they did the *Spaniard* and the *Engliſh*. But if this Government being invaded or conquer'd, be ſo hard to be kept, how much harder being ſurpriz'd? Wherefore in a Government by Subjects, foreign Arms may be more neceſſary, but muſt be leſs dangerous.

IN a Common-wealth for preſervation, as *Lacedemon*, *Carthage*, *Venice*, foreign Arms are neceſſary; So *Lacedemon*, tho' able to defend her ſelf by her proper Forces againſt any one City, yet the Wars in *Greece* going much upon Leagues and Confederates, was forc'd alſo to make uſe of her Confederates, and ſometimes of her *Helots*.

BUT as antiently to *Carthage*, ſo now to *Venice*, foreign or mercenary Forces are eſſential, becauſe for Land-ſervice ſuch a Conſtitution can have no other: Yet is this courſe extremely dangerous, as appear'd by *Lacedemon*, who (being even in fear of her *Helots*) when ſhe had acquir'd upon the matter the whole Empire of *Greece*, came, by the Rebellion of her Confederates, not only to loſe all, but likewiſe to ruin. For *Carthage*, upon the Mutiny of SPENDIUS and MATHO, ſhe eſcap'd, as at other times upon like occaſions, very narrowly. That ſuch an Accident neither has befallen *Venice*, nor can befal her, is to be attributed to her Situation, by which, in this regard, ſhe is ſecure: Nevertheleſs, her Progreſs or Increaſe, which by this means either cannot be great, or being great, muſt render her but the more infirm, is fully bar'd.

TO a Common-wealth for increaſe, which always takes in the whole body of the People, foreign Arms (ſeeing ſhe abounds above all other kinds of Policy, with ſuch as are proper) muſt needs be the leaſt neceſſary; and they are the moſt ſafe, becauſe never admitting them, but for her mere convenience and frugality in expence of native Blood, ſhe receives no ſuch charge of them as can recoil, but muſt carry point blank, and as vigorouſly as her proper Intereſt, very near as her proper Arms. Thus did the *Latin* and *Italian* Auxiliaries, of which, join'd with the *Roman* Legions, conſiſted a Conſular Army.

BY thus much it ſeems *that an inference from the ſucceſs of Arms to the perfection of Government, and from the perfection of Government to the ſucceſs of Arms*, ſhould be no fallacious way of diſputing.

BUT

BUT this being ſweaty work with the Conſiderer, who loves his eaſe, it is enough to argue thus: *The* Switz, Scotiſh, *and* French *Guards, have never been the Authors of any Sedition, therefore the Seditiouſneſs of a Nobility may be mended by foreign Guards:* which is, as if one ſhould ſay, ſuch a Phyſician has never been the cauſe of the Gout; therefore the Gout may be cur'd by ſuch a Phyſician. That foreign Arms may be well enough apply'd in the caſe of a ſeditious Nobility, and have ſome good effects, is not deny'd: but is *France* therefore cur'd of her Sedition, or remains ſhe, notwithſtanding her foreign Guards, the moſt ſeditious Example in the world? If thus ſhe has not been, nor be, what has he read of the Princes of the Blood in former times, or heard of late from them? But if thus ſhe has been, and be, is it not a fine way of Cure to give us an example of the Diſeaſe for the Remedy? Nor are her Guards ſo void of Sedition neither; but the *Switzer*, if he wants his pay, dares threaten *Paris:* the *Scot*, at leaſt of late years, has not been ſo bold; but if a Prince flies out, the Enſigns of the *French* Guards will one way or other be Captains, while Soldier and Officer too follows his Affections or Intereſts, which way ſoever they frame. I ſhould be glad to know when a Dragon fell from that Court, that did not bear down Stars with his Train. But the Prevaricator is ſet upon it: whereas of late years the *Janizaries* are known to have been far more imbru'd in the Blood of their Princes than ever; he gives us his honeſt word, *that of late years in* Turky *they begin to learn the art of poiſing the* Janizaries (who are the Foot of the Princes Guard) *by the* Spahies (who are the Horſe of the ſame) *and ſo have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinies.* At which rate, ſeeing every Army conſiſts of Horſe and Foot, no Army could be mutinous. If theſe had not been meer ſlights, and ſo intended, he might have done well to have ſhewn us one Mutiny of the *Janizaries* appeas'd by the *Spahies.* But all the parts of his Politicks, as was ſaid of thoſe in Rhetoric, conſiſt of Pronunciation. Chap. 9.

THUS the Wounds of Monarchy, notwithſtanding the former, or this laſt Remedy of foreign Guards, are bleeding or feſtering.

BUT his Courage is undaunted *(aut viam inveniet aut faciet)* he will either mend a Government, or make one, by aſſerting without any example, but with egregious confidence, *That the perfection of Monarchy is free from thoſe flaws which are charg'd upon it, and that it conſiſts in governing by a Nobility, weighty enough to keep the People under, yet not tall enough in any particular Perſon to meaſure with the Prince; and by a moderate Army kept under the notion of Guards and Garriſons, which may be ſufficient to ſtrangle all Sedition in the Cradle: from which mixture, or counterpoiſe of a Nobility and an Army, ariſes the moſt excellent form of Monarchical Government.* Conſid. *p.* 48, 49.

THERE's for your learning now, A Model which is a ſhort Horſe, and a Legiſlator that has ſoon curry'd him. To the parts of it, conſiſting of a Nobility, and in force, I have already ſpoken ſeverally. I ſhall now ſpeak to the whole together; that is, to the imagin'd mixture or counterpoiſe of a Nobility and an Army; and becauſe there is nothing in Nature that has not had a natural effect by ſome example.

THE ſcale of Arms, or of Iron, continu'd in the Line of WILLIAM the Conqueror; and the ſcale of Property, or Gold, continu'd in the Barons of *England*, and their Succeſſors. But in this before the Barons Wars conſiſted not the perfection of the Monarchy,

Book I. becauſe it preponderated too much on the ſide of Arms; nor after the Barons Wars, becauſe the King, putting Power (which he could not keep out of their fingers) into the hands of the Nobility, it became *a vicious Conſtitution, and a Monarchy only in name* (ſo ſays the Conſiderer) therefore the Balance being then only even, when neither the King could over-balance or get the better of the Barons, nor the Barons over-balance or get the better of the King; the perfection of Monarchy conſiſted in the Barons Wars! LYCURGUS the Second!

MARK; the King by all means muſt have a Nobility weighty enough to keep down the People, and then he muſt have an Army to hold Gold weight with his Nobility: as if the Nobility in that caſe would keep down the People, and not fetch them up (as did the Barons) into their Scale, that ſo together they might weigh down the Army; which ſooner or later is the infallible conſequence of this Phanſy, or let it be ſhewn where it was ever otherwiſe. To inſtance in *France* is quite contrary, where all the conſiderable Offices and Commands being in the Nobility, or the richer ſort of that Nation, the Balance of Arms and of Property are not two, but one and the ſame. There is no way for Monarchy, but to have no Army, or no other than the Nobility, which makes the regulated Monarchy, as in *France*, *Spain*, &c. or to have an Army that may weigh down Nobility and People too; that is, deſtroy them both, which makes the abſolute way of Monarchy, as in *Turky:* the wit of man never found, nor ſhall find a third, there being no ſuch thing in Nature.

THIS Chapter is already with the longeſt, and yet I muſt give you a Corollary, *pouce de roy*, or a piece above meaſure; relating to a Queſtion on which the greeneſt Politician that ever brought his Verjuce to the Preſs, has ſpur'd me.

WHERE he deſires to *know my opinion of the way of governing by Councils, which he confeſſes he has always thought admirable; he does not mean ſuch as are co-ordinate with the Prince (which have been ſeen in the* Conſid. *p.* 49. 50. *World) but ſuch as thoſe of* Spain, *purely of Advice and Diſpatch, with power only to inform and perſuade, but not limit the Princes Will. For almoſt all the Weakneſſes which have been thought incident to Monarchy, are by this courſe prevented; and if there be any ſteadineſs and maturity in the Senate of a Common-wealth, this takes it all in.*

TO give my Council without a Fee, and deal ſincerely with a Prevaricator: Let the Prince (that is, ſuch an one as his) hold himſelf contented with his *Divan*, or Cabinet. If this be that he means, we are agreed; but if he would have more, I can make no leſs of his words, than a hankering after ſuch Councils as I have propos'd, and that theſe are ſuch as he *always thought admirable, ſuch as prevent almoſt all the Weakneſſes incident to Monarchy, and take in the ſteadineſs and maturity of a Common-wealth.*

HOW may we make this agree with that other place, where he ſays, *that there is no frame of Laws, or Conſtitution of Government, which will not decay and come to ruin, unleſs repair'd by the Prudence and* Conſid. *p.* 68. *Dexterity of them that govern? Now that this may not be expected from a Monarch, as well as from a Senate or Aſſembly of Men, he has not yet met with any conviction, but rather finds it reaſonable to think that where Debates are cleareſt, the reſult of them moſt ſecret, and the execution ſudden (which are the advantages of Monarchy) there the diſorders of a*

State

State will ſooneſt be diſcover'd, and the neceſſary Remedies beſt apply'd. In that former place he bethought himſelf, that the Debates of *Rome* were as clear as thoſe of ANTIOCHUS, that her Reſults were as ſecret as thoſe of PHILIP or PERSEUS, and of more ſudden execution than either of theirs. He doubted it might be true, which is affirm'd by good Authors, and commonly enough known, that for the clearneſs of Debate, and ſecreſy of Reſult, the world never ſaw any thing like the Senate of *Venice*; and that in all appearance they are for execution as quick with the Divan, as the Divan can be with them. Now when all this is done, to baniſh ſo generous Thoughts without ſhewing us for what cauſe, and knock under the table, is ſad news. But he ſhall find me, in any thing that is reaſonable, moſt ready to ſerve him. To the Queſtion then, how ſuch Councils as I have propos'd would do with a Prince; I anſwer, truly the beſt of them, I doubt, but untowardly. One, that is the popular Aſſembly, has no mean, but is either the wiſeſt in Nature, or has no brains at all. When affairs go upon no other than the public Intereſt, this having no other Intereſt to follow, nor eyes to ſee withal, is the wiſeſt Council: but ſuch ways are deſtructive to a Prince, and they will have no Nay. The Congregation of *Iſrael*, when REHOBOAM would not hearken to their advice, depos'd him: and we know what popular Councils, ſo ſoon as they came to ſufficient Power, did in *England*. If a Prince put a popular Council from this Ward, he does a great matter, and to little purpoſe; for they underſtand nothing elſe but themſelves. Wherefore the Kings of *France* and of *Spain* have diſſolv'd all ſuch Aſſemblies. It is true, where a Prince is not ſtrong enough to get Money out of them but by their conſent, they are neceſſary; yet then they are not purely of Advice and Diſpatch, but ſhare in the Government, and he cannot be medling with their Purſes, but they will be medling with his Laws. The Senate is of fitter uſe for a Prince, and yet, except he has the way of TIBERIUS, but a tickliſh piece, as appears by MAXIMINUS, who was deſtroy'd by PUPIENUS and BALBINUS, Captains ſet up againſt him by this Order. To go to the root: Theſe things are not otherwiſe in Prudence or Choice than by direction of the Balance; where this is popular, no Remedy but the Prince muſt be advis'd by the People, which if the late King would have endur'd, the Monarchy might have ſubſiſted ſomewhat longer: but while the Balance was Ariſtocratical, as during the great Eſtates of the Nobility and the Clergy, we find not the People to have been great or wiſe Counſellors. In ſum, if a King governs by a popular Council, or a Houſe of Commons, the Throne will not ſtand long: If he governs by a Senate, or a Houſe of Lords, let him never fear the Throne, but have a care of himſelf: there is no third, as I have ſaid often enough, but the Divan.

Chap. 9.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Whether a Common-wealth that was not firſt broken by her ſelf, was ever conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch?

I COME in this Chapter to reſume the Diſcourſe, where I broke off in the former, making good my aſſertion, That a Common-wealth is the Government, which from the beginning of the world to this day was never conquer'd by any Monarch; for if the Common-wealths of *Greece* came under the yoke of the Kings of *Macedon*, they were firſt broken by themſelves.

WHEN I ſpeak of a Common-wealth, in relation to this point, I am no more to be argu'd againſt out of the little Cities in *Aſia*, or thoſe of *Raguſa*, and *San Marino*, which cannot be ſhewn to have had the command of any conſiderable Army, than I argue againſt the Prevaricator, where he aſſerts Monarchy to conſiſt of a mixture of Arms and of a Nobility, from the King of *Yuetot*, who had neither.

THIS Aſſertion in the judgment of any rational man ought not to be encounter'd, but where there were a natural poſſibility of defence, in regard that a City which has no Army at all, as *Geneva* (which yet being invaded by the Duke of *Savoy*, found means to defend her ſelf) or ſuch a one as is not conſiderable, ſhould be ſubdu'd by ſome potent Monarch (if we could find the example) concerns the Government no more, than if it had been overwhelm'd by ſome Inundation, or ſwallow'd up by ſome Earthquake. And yet all that is oppos'd by the Conſiderer, amounts not to thus much. The Teſtimony he brings out of PAUSANIAS comes far ſhort; for it is recorded (ſays the Author ſpeaking of the *Lacedemonians*) *that being corrupted by the Bounty of* CRÆSUS, *they were the firſt that contracted Amity with the* Barbarians *at the time, when that King added the Territories inhabited by the* Dorians *upon the border of* Caria, *with other Common-wealths in* Aſia, *to his Empire.* So that CRÆSUS corrupted the *Lacedemonians* with Gifts, PAUSANIAS is expreſs; but whether he obtain'd the *Aſiatic* Cities (likely in this caſe to have been eaſilier corrupted than the *Lacedemonians*) by Arms or by Purchaſe, he is not expreſs: and the preſumption of the latter, as in other regards, ſo in this, is the ſtronger, that CRÆSUS by the teſtimony of SOLON, was more potent in Gold than in Iron. Now if it were ſo (and if otherwiſe, let the Conſiderer ſhew) that theſe Common-wealths, inveigl'd by the Treaſure of CRÆSUS, came firſt under the *Lydian*, and fell with that under the *Perſian* Empire, when CRÆSUS was ſubdu'd by CYRUS: all I can learn by this example is no more than that CRÆSUS, for ought that is perceivable, might have bought thoſe Common-wealths as COSIMO of MEDICIS did *Florence*; from whom it is affirm'd by MACHIAVEL, that *there was not a conſiderable Man in the whole City that had not receiv'd ſome conſiderable Sum.* So this example preſumes; but in the next, which is of *Sicily*, there is not ſo much as a Preſumption in favour of the Aſſertor: the State of *Sicily*, before that which the *Romans* call the firſt *Carthaginian* War, being clear in Story againſt his deſign. For that *Africa* for the gene-

Conſid. *p.* 53. Pauſ. Meſſen.

ration

ration of Monſters is not more famous than *Sicily* for that of Tyrants, *they who have paſs'd their Novitiate in Story are not ignorant*; nor how when TIMOLEON had freed her of this Vermine, and with Liberty ſhe had recover'd ſome ſtrength and virtue, ſhe relaps'd under AGATHOCLES and his horrid violation of Faith, while he was truſted with the Arms of her Citizens: how after him PYRRHUS was call'd in from *Epirus*; after PYRRHUS, HIERO uſurp'd; all by the ſame Arts, getting firſt into truſt or charge, and then recoiling upon them that would take no warning: by which it is apparent that the Common-wealths of *Sicily*, like thoſe of *Greece*, were ruin'd by themſelves, and their own Diſorders; and no more ſubdu'd upon theſe changes by foreign Arms, than was *Iſrael* by the *Canaanites*, or *Rome* by the *Gauls* or *Decemvirs*. Chap. 10

Fazello [illegible] de Sicil. Polyb. l. 1.

ISRAEL, having broken her Orders, was indeed ſometimes oppreſt by the *Canaanites*; *Rome* was ſack'd by the *Gauls*, and uſurp'd by the *Decemvirs*. But as the man that having got a fall in a Duel, throws of his Adverſary, recovers himſelf and his Sword, is not conquer'd, ſo neither the Common-wealth: wherefore neither *Holland* nor *Genoa*, tho' they have been under, being yet ſtanding, can be ſaid to be conquer'd by the Arms of *Spain* or *France*, but rather the contrary; ſeeing the Liberty of *Holland* (in many Cities more ancient than any Records or or other Monuments there can witneſs, aboue it ſelf than that of *Tacitus*, whereby CIVILIS, born of Princely Blood, is affirm'd to have vindicated the *Batavian* Freedom) is ſtill the ſame; and *Genoa*, tho' happy in her DORIA, remains as ſhe was before he was born. Nor did the Family of the MEDICIS baniſh'd out of *Florence* (where, by virtue of their prodigious Wealth, and the inevitable conſequence of the Balance, their Anceſtors had been Princes many years before CHARLES the Fifth was a Soldier) any more by the help of his Arms, thoſe of the Pope (at that time of the ſame Family) and their Party at home, than get into their known ſaddle. To inſiſt a little more at large upon the Stories of *Genoa* and *Florence* (becauſe upon theſe the Prevaricator ſets up his reſt that Mr. HARRINGTON muſt needs be afflicted) *Genoa* was and is an Oligarchy conſiſting of twenty eight Families, making the Great Council, or Aggregation, as they call it, none but theſe being capable of the Senate or of Magiſtracy; and if ever it could be ſaid of a Common-wealth, that ſhe had broken her ſelf, it might be ſaid, at the time related to, of *Genoa*, where not only the Faction of the *Guelphs* and *Gibelins*, which had deſtroy'd many Cities in *Italy*, then reign'd; but the feud between the People included, and the Subject excluded, was as great as ever had been between the Nobility and the People in *Rome*. Beſides the quarrel of the FIESCHI and the ADORNI, two Families, like CÆSAR and POMPEY, which having many years together as it were ingroſt the Magiſtracy of Duke, were nevertheleſs perpetually ſtriving each with other, which ſhould have it; and if one of theſe (as it did) brought in the King of *France*, there is nothing plainer than that this Common-wealth was ſubdu'd by her own Sedition, nor is there a man knowing any thing of her affairs, that makes any doubt of it. That of *Florence* indeed, if the Prevaricator could ſhew it had been ever up, I ſhould grant were down; but to relate the Story of this City, I muſt relate that of the Houſe of MEDICIS. From COSIMO, a Citizen famous throughout *Europe* both for his Wiſdom and

Decree of the States of Holland apud Grot. Hiſt. 4.

Book. I.

Comines. P. Jovius. Machiavel.

his Riches, this Family for the ſpace of ſixty years exercis'd, under the pretext of ſome Magiſtracy, very great Power in *Florence*. To COSIMO ſucceeded PETER, to PETER LAURENCE, a man in Prudence and Liberality eſembling his Grandfather, ſave that he us'd more abſolute Power in managing the Common-wealth; yet with gentleneſs, and not altogether to the ſuppreſſion of Liberty. Nevertheleſs he obtain'd of the Signory (which did for the moſt part as he would have them) ſome ſmall Guard for his Perſon: he was a man renown'd thro' *Italy*, and look'd upon by foreign Princes with much reſpect. To him ſucceeded his Son, another PETER, who thro' Youth and raſhneſs conceiving the Power exercis'd by his Predeceſſors to be no more than his due, took upon him the Government as abſolute Lord of all; and ſtanding moſt formidably upon his Guard, grew ſottiſhly profuſe of the public Money, and committed many Abſurdities and Violences: By which means having incurr'd the hatred of the Citizens, he was baniſh'd by the Signory, with Cardinal JOHN and JULIAN his Brothers. This JOHN coming after to be Pope LEO the Tenth, requir'd the revocation of his Brother's Baniſhment, and the reſtitution of the Houſe of MEDICIS; to which finding the prevailing Party of the *Florentines* to be refractory, he ſtir'd up the Arms of the Emperor CHARLES the Fifth againſt them, by whoſe joint aid the City, after a long ſiege, was reduc'd to her old Ward, and ALEXANDER of MEDICIS, Nephew to the Pope and Son in law to the Emperor, ſet in the known Saddle of his Anceſtors. This is the Action for which the Prevaricator will have a Common-wealth to have been conquer'd by the Arms of a Monarch, tho' whoever reads the Story may very ſafely affirm, Firſt, That *Florence* never attain'd to any ſuch Orders as could deſerve the name of a Common-wealth; and next, That the Purſe of COSIMO had done that long before, which is here attributed to the Arms of the Pope and the Emperor. Reaſon and Experience, as I ſaid, are like the Roots and the Branches of Plants and Trees: As of Branches, Fruits, and Flowers, being open and obvious to the eye, the ſmell, the touch, and taſte, every Girl can judge; ſo examples to vulgar capacities are the beſt Arguments. Let him that ſays a Common-wealth has been at any time conquer'd by a Monarch, to it again, and ſhew us the example. But tho' Fruits and Flowers be eaſily known each from other, their Roots are latent, and not only ſo, but of ſuch reſemblance, that to diſtinguiſh of theſe a man muſt be a Gardiner or a Herbaliſt. In this manner, the reaſon why a Common-wealth has not been overcome by a Monarch, has been ſhewn in the diſtribution of Arms, thoſe of a Prince conſiſting of Subjects or Servants, and thoſe of a Common-wealth rightly order'd of Citizens, which difference relates plainly to the perfection or imperfection of the Government.

Confid. *p.* 51.

BUT, ſays the Prevaricator, *this ſeems intended for a trial of our Noſes, whether they will ſerve us to diſcover the fallacy of an inference from the proſperous ſucceſs of arms to the perfection of Government.* If the Univerſity, who ſhould have ſome care of the Vineyard of Truth, ſhall lie pigging of wild Boars, to grunt in this manner and fear with their tusks, and I happen to ring ſome of them (as I have done this *Marcaſſin* for rooting) there is nothing in my faith why ſuch trial of their Noſes ſhould be Sin; but for fallacious Inferences, ſuch I leave to them whoſe Caps are ſquarer than their Play.

FOR

FOR all that, *Great and well policy'd Empires,* ſays he, *have been ſubverted by People ſo eloign'd from the perfection of Government, that we ſcarce know of any thing to tye them together, but the deſire of Booty.* Where, or how came he to know this? What Reaſon or Experience does he alledge for the proof of it? May we not ſay of this, it is for *the trial of our Noſes, whether they will ſerve us to diſcover that a Concluſion ſhould have ſome Premiſes?* He gives us leave to go look, and all the Premiſes that I can find are quite contrary. Chap. 10.

THE Arms of *Iſrael* were always victorious, till the death of JOSHUA, whereupon the Orders of that Common-wealth being neglected, they came afterwards to be ſeldom proſperous. ISOCRATES in his Oration to the *Areopagites,* ſpeaks thus of *Athens: The* Lacedemonians, *who when we were under Oligarchy, every day commanded us ſomething; now while we are under popular Adminiſtration, are our Petitioners that we would not ſee them utterly ruin'd by the* Thebans. Nor did *Lacedemon* fall to ruin till her Agrarian, the Foundation of her Government, was firſt broken. The Arms of *Rome* (ever noted by Hiſtorians, and clearly evinc'd by MACHIAVEL to have been the reſult of her Policy) during the popular Government were at ſuch a pitch, as if Victory had known no other wings than thoſe of her Eagles: nor ſeeing the *Goths* and *Vandals* are the Legiſlators, from whom we derive the Government of King, Lords, and Commons, were theſe when they overcame the *Roman* Empire, a People ſo eloign'd from the perfection of Government, but their Policy was then far better than that of the Emperors, which having been at firſt founded upon a broken Senate, and a few military Colonies, was now come to a Cabinet, and a mercenary Army. The Judgment of all Ages and Writers upon the Policy of the *Roman* Emperors, is in this place worthy, and thro' the pains already taken by ERASMUS and SLEIDAN, eaſy to be inſerted. *O miſerable and deplorable State,* ſays ERASMUS, *the Authority of the Senate, the Power of the Law, the Liberty of the People being trod underfoot! to a Prince, that got up in this manner, the whole World was a Servant, while he himſelf was a Servant to ſuch, as no honeſt man would have endur'd the like Servants in his Houſe: the Senate dreaded the Emperor, the Emperor dreaded his execrable Militia: the Emperor gave Laws to Kings, and receiv'd them from his Mercenaries.* To this is added by SLEIDAN, *That the condition of theſe Princes was ſo deſperate, it was a wonderful thing Ambition it ſelf could have the Courage to run ſuch a hazard; ſeeing from* CAIUS CÆSAR *ſlain in the Senate to* CHARLES *the Great, there had been above thirty of them murder'd, and four that had laid violent hands upon themſelves: For there was always ſomething in them that offended the Soldiery, which whether they were good or bad, was equally ſubject to pick Quarrels, upon the leaſt occaſion rais'd Tumults, and diſpatch'd even ſuch of them as they had forc'd to accept of that Dignity, for example* ÆLIUS PERTINAX. But if this be true, that of the *Goths* and *Vandals,* when they ſubdu'd this Empire, muſt have been the better Government; for ſo ill as this never was there any, except that only of the Kings of *Iſrael,* which certainly was much worſe. Thoſe of the *Britains* and the *Gauls* were but the dregs of this of *Rome,* when they were overcome by the *Saxons* and *Franks,* who brought in the Policy of the *Goths* and *Vandals.*

Judg. ch. 1, & 2.

Arte della Guerra.

In his Preface to Suetonius.

De quat. Imp.

WHEN

Book I. WHEN TAMERLANE overcame BAJAZET, the *Turkiſh* Policy had not attain'd to that extent of Territory which is plainly neceſſary to the nature of it, nor was the Order of the *Janizaries* yet inſtituted. The *Hollander*, who under a potent Prince was but a Fiſherman, with the reſtitution of the popular Government, is become the better Soldier; nor has he been match'd but by a riſing Common-wealth, whoſe Policy you will ſay was yet worſe, but then her Balance (being that eſpecially which produces men) was far better. For Vaſtneſs, for Fruitfulneſs of Territory, for Bodies of Men, for Number, for Courage, Nature never made a Country more potent than *Germany:* yet this Nation, antiently the Seminary of Nations, has of late years merely thro' the defect of her Policy (which intending one Common-wealth, has made a hundred Monarchies in her Bowels, whoſe croſs Intereſts twiſt her guts) been the Theatre of the ſaddeſt Tragedies under the Sun; nor is ſhe curable, unleſs ſome Prince falling to work with the Hammer of War, be able totally to deſtroy the old, and forge her a Government entirely new. But if this comes to paſs neither ſhall it be ſaid, that *a well-policy'd Empire was ſubverted*, nor by *a People ſo eloign'd from perfection of Government*, but theirs muſt be much better than the other. Let me be as ridiculous as you will, the World is *(in fæce Romuli)* ripe for great Changes which muſt come. And look to it, whether it be *Germany*, *Spain*, *France*, *Italy*, or *England*, that comes firſt to fix herſelf upon a firm Foundation of Policy, ſhe ſhall give Law to, and be obey'd by the reſt. There was never ſo much fighting as of late days to ſo little purpoſe; Arms, except they have a root in Policy, are altogether fruitleſs. In the War between the King and the Parliament, not the Nation only, but the Policy of it was divided; and which part of it was upon the better Foundation?

Conſid. *p.* 51. *BUT*, ſays he, Raguſa *and* San Marino *are commended for their upright and equal frame of Government, and yet have hardly extended their Dominion beyond the ſize of a handſome Mannor.*

HAVE *Raguſa* or *San Marino* been conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch? For this (I take it) is the queſtion; tho', if they had, theſe being Common-wealths unarm'd, it were nothing to the purpoſe. The queſtion of Increaſe is another point. *Lacedemon* could not increaſe (becauſe her frame was of another nature) without ruin; yet was ſhe not conquer'd by any Monarch.

Conſid. *p.* 52. COME, come, ſays he, for all this; *It is not the perfection of Government, but the populouſneſs of a Nation, the natural valour of the Inhabitants, the abundance of Horſes, Arms, and other things neceſſary for equipping of an Army, aſſiſted with a good military Diſcipline, that qualify a People for Conqueſt; and where theſe concur, Victory is intail'd upon them.* Very fine!

AS if theſe could concur any otherwiſe than by virtue of the Policy. For example, there is no Nation under Heaven more populous than *France:* Yet, ſays Sir FRANCIS BACON, *If the Gentlemen be too many, the Commons will be baſe, and not the hundredth Poll fit for a Helmet, as may be ſeen by compariſon of* England *with* France, *whereof the former, tho' far leſs in Territory and Populouſneſs, has been nevertheleſs the over-match; in regard the middle People in* England *make good Soldiers, which the Peaſants in* France *do not.* This therefore was from the Policy, by which the one has been the freeſt, and the other the moſt

Eſſay 29.

moſt inſlav'd Subject in the World, and not from Populouſneſs, in which caſe *France* muſt have been the Overmatch. Chap. 10.

THE like is obſervable in the natural valour of the People, there being no greater courage of an Infantry, than that of the middle People in *England*, whereas the Peaſant having none at all, is never us'd in Arms. Again, *France* has one of the beſt Cavalries in the World, which the *Engliſh* never had, yet it avail'd her not. Victory is more eſpecially intail'd upon Courage, and Courage upon Liberty, which grows not without a Root planted in the Policy or Foundation of the Government.

ALEXANDER with a handful of Freemen overcame *the greateſt abundance of Horſes, Arms, and other things neceſſary for the equipping of an Army*, the hugeſt Armies, the moſt vaſt and populous Empire in the World; and when he had done, could not by all theſe ſubdue that handful of freer men (tho' he kill'd CLYTUS with his own hand in the quarrel) to the ſervile Cuſtoms of that Empire. And that the beſt military Diſcipline deriv'd from the Policy of the *Romans*, I intimated before, and have ſhewn at large in other places.

BUT the Prevaricator neither minds what is ſaid, nor cares what he ſays; to affirm that a Common-wealth was never conquer'd by any Monarch, and that a Common-wealth has conquer'd many Monarchs, or frequently led mighty Kings in triumph, is to run upon the foil, the ſecond Propoſition being with him no more than only the converſion of the firſt. As if that *Rome* was not conquer'd by the World, and that the World was conquer'd by *Rome*, were but a ſimple converſion. So the World having not conquer'd *Venice*, it muſt follow, that *Venice* has conquer'd the World. Do we take, or are we taken? Nor is he thus ſatisfy'd to burn his fingers, but he will bliſter his tongue. Conſid. *p.* 55.

WHERE I ſaid that the *Common-wealth of Venice*, conſiſting of all them that firſt fled from the main Land to thoſe Iſlands where the City is now planted, at the Inſtitution took in the *whole People*, he would make you believe I had ſaid that the *Senate of Venice*, at the firſt Inſtitution, *took in the whole People:* It is matter of fact, and that in which his Integrity will be apparent to every man's judgment. I pray ſee the places. And yet when he has put this trick upon me, he tells me, *perhaps it is not true*; and this only I grant him paſt peradventure is falſe, whether that I ſaid it, or that the thing is poſſible. For how is it poſſible, that the Senate, which is no otherwiſe ſuch than as it conſiſts of the Ariſtocracy, or ſelect part of the People, ſhould take in the whole People? It is true, that good Authors, both antient and modern, when they ſpeak of the Senate of *Rome*, or of *Venice* hiſtorically, imply the People. MACHIAVEL ſpeaks of the Magiſtracy of PUBLILIUS PHILO, as prolong'd by the Senate of *Rome*, without making any mention of the People, by whom nevertheleſs it was granted: the like is uſual with other Authors. THUANUS ſeldom mentions the Common-wealth of *Venice*, but by the name of the Senate; which not underſtood by the learned Conſiderer, where CONTARINI ſpeaks in the ſame manner of the Courſes taken by the Common-wealth of *Venice*, for withholding the Subject in the City from Sedition, he takes him to be ſpeaking of the means whereby the Senate (an't pleaſe you) keeps the People under: and ſo having put one trick upon me, and another upon CONTARINI, Conſid. *p.* 70. Oceana, *p.* 43.

Book I. theſe two are his Premiſes, whence he draws this Concluſion, *That* Venice *is as much as any in the World an inequal Common-wealth.* Now the Concluſion you know no body can deny.

CHAP. XI.

Whether there be not an Agrarian, or ſome Law or Laws of that nature, to ſupply the defect of it in every Common-wealth: and whether the Agrarian, as it is ſtated in Oceana, *be not equal and ſatisfactory to all Intereſts.*

IN this Chapter the Prevaricator's Devices are the moſt wel-favour'd: for whereas the Agrarian of *Oceana* does no more than pin the basket, which is already fill'd, he gets up into the Tree where the Birds have long ſince eaten all the Cherries, and with what Clouts he can rake up, makes a moſt ridiculous Scarcrow. This pains he needed not to have taken, if he had not ſlighted overmuch the *Lexicon*, of which he allows me to be the Author; yet will have it, that he underſtood the words before, ſome of which nevertheleſs his ill underſtanding requires ſhould be further interpreted in this place, as Property, Balance, Agrarian, and Levelling.

PROPERTY is that which is every mans own by the Law of the Land; and of this there is nothing ſtir'd, but all intirely left as it was found by the Agrarian of *Oceana*.

PROPERTY in Money (except, as has been ſhewn, in Cities that have little or no Territory) comes not to the preſent account. But Property in Land, according to the diſtribution that happens to be of the ſame, cauſes the political Balance producing Empire of the like nature: that is, if the Property in Lands be ſo diffus'd thro' the whole People, that neither one Landlord, nor a few Landlords over-balance them, the Empire is popular. If the Property in Lands be ſo ingroſt by the few that they over-balance the whole People, the Empire is Ariſtocratical, or mix'd Monarchy; but if Property in Lands be in one Landlord, to ſuch a proportion as over-balances the whole People, the Empire is abſolute Monarchy. So the political Balance is threefold, Democratical, Ariſtocratical, and Monarchical.

EACH of theſe Balances may be introduc'd either by the Legiſlator at the inſtitution of the Government, or by civil Viciſſitude, Alienation, or Alteration of Property under Government.

EXAMPLES of the Balance introduc'd at the Inſtitution, and by the Legiſlator, are firſt thoſe in *Iſrael* and *Lacedemon*, introduc'd by GOD or MOSES, and LYCURGUS, which were Democratical or Popular. Secondly, Thoſe in *England*, *France* and *Spain*, introduc'd by the *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Saxons*, and *Franks*, which were Ariſtocratical, or ſuch as produc'd the Government of King, Lords, and Commons. Thirdly, Thoſe in the *Eaſt* and *Turky*, introduc'd by NIMROD, and MAHOMET or OTTOMAN, which were purely Monarchical.

EXAMPLES of the Balance introduc'd by civil Viciſſitude, Alienation, or Alteration of Property under Government, are in *Florence*, where

where the MEDICI attaining to exceſſive wealth, the Balance alter'd from Popular to Monarchical: *In* Greece, *where the Argives being lovers of Equality and Liberty, reduc'd the Power of their Kings to ſo ſmall a matter, that there remain'd to the Children and Succeſſors of* CISUS *little more than the Title,* where the Balance alter'd from Monarchical to Popular. In *Rome,* about the time of CRASSUS, the Nobility having eaten the People out of their Lands, the Balance alter'd from Popular, firſt to Ariſtocratical, as in the *Triumvirs,* CÆSAR, POMPEY and CRASSUS; and then to Monarchical, as when CRASSUS being dead, and POMPEY conquer'd, the whole came to CÆSAR. *In* Tarentum, *not long after the War with the* Medes, *the Nobility being waſted, and overcome by* Iapyges, *the Balance, and with that the Common-wealth, chang'd from Ariſtocratical to Popular:* The like of late has diſcover'd it ſelf in *Oceana.* When a Balance comes ſo thro' civil Viciſſitude to be chang'd, that the change cannot be attributed to human Providence, it is more peculiarly to be aſcrib'd to the hand of God; and ſo when there happens to be an irreſiſtible change of the Balance, not the old Government which God has repeal'd, but the new Government which he dictates as preſent Legiſlator, is of Divine Right.

Chap. 11.

Pauſan. Corinth.

Ariſt. Pol. l. 5. c. 9

THIS Volubility of the Balance being apparent, it belongs to Legiſlators to have eyes, and to occur with ſome prudential or legal Remedy or Prevention; and the Laws that are made in this caſe are call'd *Agrarian.* So *An Agrarian is a Law fixing the Balance of a Government in ſuch a manner that it cannot alter.*

THIS may be done divers ways, as by intailing the Lands upon certain Families, without power of Alienation in any caſe, as in *Iſrael* and *Lacedemon*; or, except with leave of the Magiſtrate, as in *Spain:* But this, by making ſome Families too ſecure, as thoſe in poſſeſſion, and others too deſpairing, as thoſe not in poſſeſſion, may make the whole People leſs induſtrious.

WHEREFORE the other way, which by the regulation of Purchaſes ordains only that a man's Land ſhall not exceed ſome certain proportion; for example, two thouſand Pounds a year; or, exceeding ſuch a proportion, ſhall divide in deſcending to the Children, ſo ſoon as, being more than one, they ſhall be capable of ſuch a diviſion, or ſubdiviſion, till the greater ſhare exceeds not two thouſand pounds a year in Land, lying and being within the native Territory, is that which is receiv'd and eſtabliſhed by the Common-wealth of *Oceana.*

BY Levelling, they who uſe the word ſeem to underſtand, when a People riſing invades the Lands and Eſtates of the richer ſort, and divides them equally among themſelves; as for example, —— No where in the World; this being that, both in the way and in the end, which I have already demonſtrated to be impoſſible. Now the words of this *Lexicon* being thus interpreted, let us hearken what the Prevaricator will ſay, and out it comes in this manner.

TO him that makes Property, and that in Lands, the Foundation of Empire, the eſtabliſhing of an Agrarian is of abſolute neceſſity, that by it the Power may be fix'd in thoſe hands to whom it was at firſt committed.

Conſid. p. 73.

WHAT need we then proceed any further, while he, having no where diſprov'd the Balance in theſe words, gives up the whole Cauſe? For as to that which he ſays of Money, ſeeing neither the vaſt Treaſure of HENRY the *7th* alter'd the Balance of *England,* nor the Revenue of the

Book I. the *Indies* alters that of *Spain*, this Retreat (except in the Caſes excepted) is long ſince barricado'd. But he is on and off, and, any thing to the contrary notwithſtanding, gives you this for certain.

THE Examples of an Agrarian are ſo infrequent, that Mr. HARRINGTON *is conſtrain'd to wave all but two Common-wealths; and can find in the whole extent of Hiſtory only* Iſrael *and* Lacedemon *to faſten upon.*

A MAN that has read my Writings, or is ſkill'd in Hiſtory, cannot chooſe but ſee how he ſlurs his Dice; nevertheleſs to make this a
Pol. L. 2. C. 5. little more apparent, *It has ſeemed to ſome* (ſays ARISTOTLE) *the main point of Inſtitution in Government, to order Riches right; whence otherwiſe derives all civil Diſcord. Upon this ground* PHALEAS *the* Chalcedonian *Legiſlator made it his firſt work to introduce equality of Goods; and* PLATO *in his Laws allows not increaſe to a poſſeſſion beyond certain bounds. The* Argives *and the* Meſſenians *had each their Agrarian after the manner of* Lacedemon. If a man ſhall tranſlate the words
Plut. Lycurg. (ἀρετὴ, δύναμις πολιτικὴ, *virtus & facultas civilis*) *Political Virtue or Faculty*, where he finds them in ARISTOTLE's Politics (as I make bold, and appeal to the Reader whether too bold to do) by the words *Political Balance*, underſtood as I have ſtated the thing, it will give ſuch a light to the Author, as will go nearer than any thing alledg'd (as before by this Prevaricator) to deprive me of the honour
Pol. L. 3. C. 9. of that invention. For example, where ARISTOTLE ſays, *If one man, or ſuch a number of men, as to the capacity of Government come within the compaſs of the Few, excel all the reſt* (κατ' ἀρετὴν) *in balance or in ſuch a manner, that the* (δύναμις πολιτικὴ) *Political Faculties or Eſtates of all the reſt be not able to hold weight with him or them, they will never condeſcend to ſhare equally with the reſt in power, whom they excel in Ballance; nor is it to any purpoſe to give them Laws, who will be as the Gods, their own Laws, and will anſwer the People as the Lions are ſaid by* ANTISTHENES *to have anſwer'd the Hares, when they had concluded, that every one ought to have an equal Portion. For this cauſe* (he adds) *Cities that live under Popular Power, have inſtituted the Oſtraciſm for the preſervation of Equality; by which, if a man increaſe in Riches, Retinue, or Popularity, above what is ſafe, they can remove him* (without loſs of Honour or Eſtate) *for a time.*

IF the Conſiderer thinks that I have ſtrain'd courteſy with ARISTOTLE (who indeed is not always of one mind) further than is warrantable, in relation to the Balance, be it as he pleaſes; I who muſt either have the more of Authority, or the leſs of Competition in the point, ſhall loſe neither way. However, it is in this place enough *that the Oſtraciſm being of like nature, was that which ſupply'd the defect, in the* Grecian *Cities, of an Agrarian.* To proceed then to *Rome*, that the People there, by ſtriving for an Agrarian, ſtrove to ſave their Liberty, is apparent, in that thro' the want of ſuch a Law, or the nonobſervance of it, the Common-wealth came plainly to ruin. If a *Venetian* ſhould keep a Table, or have his Houſe furniſh'd with Retainers, he would be obnoxious to the Council of Ten; and if the beſt of them appear with other State or Equipage than is allow'd to the meaneſt, he is obnoxious to the Officers of the Pomp: which two Orders in a Common-wealth where the Gentry have but ſmall Eſtates in Land, are as much as needs be in lieu of an Agrarian. But the *German* Republics have no more to ſupply the place of this Law, than that Eſtates deſcending are divided among

among the Children; which ſure no man but will ſay muſt needs be both juſt and pious: and we ask you no more in *Oceana*, where grant this, and you grant the whole Agrarian. Thus had I ſet him all the Common-wealths in the World before; and ſo it is no fault of mine, that he will throw but at three of them: Theſe are *Iſrael*, *Lacedemon*, and *Oceana*. Chap. 11.

FIRST at *Iſrael:* Mr. HARRINGTON (ſays he) *thinks not upon the Promiſe of* GOD *to* ABRAHAH *(whence the* Iſraelites *deriv'd their Right to the Land of* Canaan) *but conſiders the diviſion of the Lands, as a Politic Conſtitution upon which the Government was founded, tho' in the whole Hiſtory of the Bible there be not the leaſt footſtep of ſuch a deſign.* Conſid. p. 77.

WHAT means the man! *the Right of an* Iſraelite *to his Land deriv'd from the Promiſe of* GOD *to* ABRAHAH, therefore the Right of an *Oceaner* to his Land muſt derive from the Promiſe of GOD to ABRAHAM? Or, why elſe ſhould I in ſpeaking of *Oceana* (where Property is taken as it was found, and not ſtir'd a hair) think on the Promiſe to ABRAHAM! Nor matters it for the manner of diviſion, ſeeing that was made, and this was found made, each according to the Law of the Government. *But in the whole Bible* (ſays he) *there is not the leaſt footſtep that the end of the* Iſraelitiſh *Agrarian was Political, or that it was intended to be the Foundation of the Government.*

THE Footſteps of God, by the Teſtimony of DAVID, may be *ſeen in the deep Waters,* much more, by the conſent of the whole Bible, in Land, or in the Foundation of Empire; unleſs we make the Footſteps of God to be one thing, and his ways another, which as to Government are theſe.

GOD by the Ballot of *Iſrael* (more fully deſcrib'd in the next Book) divided the Land (ſome reſpect had to the Princes and Patriarchs for the reſt) *to every one his inheritance, according to the number of names,* which were drawn out of one Urn firſt, and the Lots of Land (the meaſure with the goodneſs of the ſame conſider'd) drawn afterwards out of the other Urn to thoſe names. Wherefore God ordaining the Cauſe, and the Cauſe of neceſſity producing the effect, God in ordaining this Balance intended Popular Government. But when the People admitting of no Nay, would have a King, God thereupon commanding SAMUEL to *ſhew them the manner of the King,* SAMUEL declar'd to the People concerning the manner or policy of the King, ſaying, *He will take your Field and your Vineyards, and your Oliveyards, even the beſt of them, and give to his Servants* (which kind of proceeding muſt needs create the Balance of a Nobility;) over and above this, *he will take the tenth of your Seed, and of your Vineyards, and of your Sheep* (by way of Tax, for the maintenance of his Armies) and thus your *Daughters ſhall come to be his Cooks and Confectioners, and your Sons to run before his Chariot.* There is not from the Balance to the Superſtructures a more perfect deſcription of a Monarchy by a Nobility. For the third Branch, the People of *Egypt* in time of the Famine, which was very ſore, come to JOSEPH, ſaying, *Buy us and our Land for Bread, and we and our Land will be Servants to* PHARAOH. *And* JOSEPH *bought all the Land of* Egypt *(except that of the Prieſts) for* PHARAOH. *So the Land became* PHARAOH's: who, leſt the remembrance of their former Property by lively marks and continual remembrancers ſhould ſtir them up (as the *Vandals* in *Africa,* ſtrip'd in like manner of their Property, and yet remaining in their antient Grot. ad Numb. 26. 53. 1 Sam. 8. Gen. 47. 19, 20. Grot. ad Gen. 47.

Dwellings, were ſtir'd up by their Women) to Sedition, remov'd the People thus ſold, or drove them like Cattle *even from one end of the borders of* Egypt *to the other end thereof.* In which you have the Balance of a ſole Landlord or abſolute Prince, with the miſerable, and yet neceſſary conſequence of an inſlav'd People. Now the Balance of Governments throughout the Scriptures being of theſe kinds, and no other, the Balance of *Oceana* is exactly calculated to the moſt approv'd way, and the cleareſt *Footſteps of God in the whole Hiſtory of the Bible:* and whereas the *Jubile* was a Law inſtituted for preſervation of the popular Balance from alteration, ſo is the Agrarian in *Oceana.*

BUT ſays the Prevaricator, " Hocus Pocus, or in the name of " Wonder, how can this Agrarian be the Foundation of that Govern- " ment which had ſubſiſted more than forty five years without it? " For they were ſo long after the giving of this Law for the diviſion " of the Land, before they had the Land to divide.

WHICH is as if one ſhould ſay upon that other Law of the like date, *Judges and Officers ſhalt thou make thee in all they gates*; *Hocus Pocus*, or in the name of Wonder, how ſhould the Children of *Iſrael* make them Judges and Officers in their gates, before they had any gates to make them in? fine ſport to be play'd by an Attorney for the Clergy with Scripture, where it is plain enough that the Laws of a Common-wealth were given by MOSES to an Army, to be put in execution when that Army ſhould become a Common-wealth, as happen'd under JOSHUA."

BUT no ſaying will ſerve his turn. " If this Agrarian were meant " as fundamental to the Government, the Proviſion *(he will have it)* " was weak, and not proper for attaining the end propos'd, there be- " ing nothing in the nature of the Agrarian to hinder, but that the " whole Conntry might for the ſpace of near fifty years, that is, the " time between the two Jubiles, have come into the hands of one man " and ſo have deſtroy'd Balance, Agrarian, Government and all.

THIS they that boaſt of their Mathematicks might have taken the pains (before they had been ſo confident) to have demonſtrated poſſible; as how or by what means one Lot could come in fifty years to be multiply'd ſix hundred thouſand times, and that without Uſury, which bar (the *Iſraelites* being no Merchants) was thought ſufficient to be given: or thus to call the prudence of God by their impracticable Phanſies in queſtion is abominable.

I WOULD have Divines (as this Prevaricator perſuades, and it ſhould ſeem has perſuaded ſome of them) to overthrow the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*; for otherwiſe I will give them my word they ſhall never be able to touch that of *Oceana*, which, except in the hereditary Succeſſion and Dignity of the Princes of the Tribes, and the Patriarchs, and that the Senate was for life, differs not from the former: for as to the divers working up of the Superſtructures in divers Common-wealths, according to the diverſity of occaſions, it comes to no accountable difference; and much, I conceive, of this carving or finiſhing in *Iſrael* (which had it been extant, would perhaps have ſhewn a greater reſemblance) is loſt. For the Senates, as to their numbers, that of the 300 in *Oceana*, conſidering the bulk of the People, exceeds not that of the Seventy in *Iſrael*; the Succeſſion and Dignity of the Princes of the Tribes and of the Patriarchs was ordain'd for the preſervation of the Pedigrees, which (CHRIST being born) are not any more to be of like

like conſequence; and that the Senators were for life, deriv'd from a former Cuſtom of ſuch a number of Elders exerciſing ſome Authority in *Egypt* (tho' not that of the Senate till it was inſtituted by God) from the deſcent of the Patriarchs into that Land, who being at their deſcent ſeventy Perſons, and governing their Families by the right of Paternity, as the People increaſed, and they came to die, had their Succeſſors appointed in ſuch a manner that the number of ſeventy, in remembrance of thoſe Patriarchs, was diligently preſerv'd. And forasmuch as the Patriarchs governing their own Families (which at firſt were all) in their own right, were conſequently for life, this alſo pleaſed in the ſubſtitution of others. Theſe things rightly conſidered, I have not vary'd from the Authority of *Iſrael* in a tittle, there being neither any ſuch neceſſary uſe of Pedigrees, nor uninterrupted Succeſſion of Elders for life in *Oceana*; and unleſs a man will ſay, That we ought to have the like Effect where there is not the like Cauſe (which were abſurd) the Authority of a Common-wealth holds no otherwiſe than from the Cauſe to the Effect. Chap. 11.

OCEANA, I ſay, cannot be wounded but by piercing the Authority of *Iſrael*, with which ſhe is arm'd *Cap a Pe*. It is true, as the Prevaricator ſays in another place, that *Law can oblige only thoſe to whom it was given; and that the Laws of* Iſrael *were given, as to the Power or Obligation of them, only to the Children of* Iſrael. But the Power, as has been ſhewn, of a Common-wealth, and her Authority, are different things; her Power extends no further than her own People, but her Authority may govern others, as that of *Athens* did *Rome*, when the latter wrote her *twelve Tables* by the Copy of the former. In this manner, tho' a man, or a Common-wealth, writing out of antient Governments, have liberty to chooſe that which ſutes beſt with the occaſion, out of any; (yet whether we conſider the Wiſdom and Juſtice of the Legiſlator ſupremely good, or the excellency of the Laws) the Prerogative of Authority, where the nature of the thing admits it, muſt needs belong to *Iſrael*. That this opinion ſhould go ſore with Divines, is ſtrange; and yet, if there be any feeling of their pulſe by this their Advocate or Attorney, it is as true. Conſid. *p.* 36.

For while he finds me writing out of *Venice*, he tells me, " I have " wiſely put my ſelf under her Protection or Authority, againſt whom " he dares not make War, leſt he ſhould take part with the *Turk*. *In his Epiſt.*

BUT when he finds me writing out of *Iſrael*, he tells me, that " he " is not aware of any Prerogative of Authority belonging to the *Iſrael-* " *itiſh* more than other Republic:" which is to take part with the Devil. Conſid. *p.* 39.

SO much for *Iſrael*. Now for *Lacedemon*; but you will permit me to ſhake a Friend or two by the hand, as I go.

THE firſt is ARISTOTLE, *in theſe words:*

" INEQUALITY is the ſource of all Sedition, as when the " Riches of one or the few come to cauſe ſuch an over-balance as " draws the Common-wealth into Monarchy or Oligarchy; for pre- " vention whereof the Oſtraciſm has been of uſe in divers places, as at " *Argos* and *Athens*. But it were better to provide in the beginning, " that there be no ſuch Diſeaſe in the Common-wealth, than to come " afterwards to her Cure." Pol. L. 5. c. 3.

THE

THE ſecond is PLUTARCH, *in theſe words:*

Plut. Lycurg "LYCURGUS judging that there ought to be no other ine-
"quality among Citizens of the ſame Common-wealth than what derives
"from their Virtues, divided the Land ſo equally among the *Lacede-*
"*monians*, that on a day beholding the Harveſt of their Lots lying by
"Cocks or Ricks in the field, he laughing ſaid, that it ſeem'd to him
"they were all Brothers."

THE third ſhould have been the Conſiderer, but he is at feud with us all.

Conſid. *p.* 16. *THE Deſign of* LYCURGUS, he profeſſes, *was not ſo much to attain an Equality in the frame of his Government, as to drive into exile Riches, and the effects of them, Luxury and Debauchery.*

GENTLEMEN, What do you ſay? you have the Judgment of three great Philoſophers, and may make your own choice; only except he that has but one hundred pounds a year, can have Wine and Women at as full command, and Retainers in as great plenty, as he that has ten thouſand, I ſhould think theſe advantages accru'd from Inequality, and that LYCURGUS had skill enough in a Common-wealth to ſee as much. No, ſays the Prevaricator, it appears far otherwiſe, *in that he admitted of no Money but old Iron, a Cartload of which was worth little.* Well, but in *Iſrael*, where Silver and Gold was worth enough, my Gentleman would have it, that *one man in the compaſs of fifty years might purchaſe the whole Land*, tho' that Country was much larger than this: and yet where, if the People had us'd Money, they would have us'd Trade, and uſing both, ſuch a thing, thro' the ſtraitneſs of the Territory, might have happen'd, he will not conceive the like to have been poſſible. No, tho' he has an example of it in LYSANDER, who by the ſpoil of *Athens* ruin'd the Agrarian, firſt by the over-balance that a man's Money came to hold to his Lot; then by eating out the Lots themſelves, and in thoſe the Equality of the Common-wealth. But theſe things he interprets pleaſantly, as if the *Vow of voluntary Poverty* (ſo he calls it) *being broken, the Common-wealth, like a forefworn Wretch, had gone and hang'd her ſelf*; a Phanſy too rank, I doubt, of the Cloyſter, to be good at this work.

BUT whereas PLUTARCH, upon the narrowneſs of theſe Lots (which had they been larger muſt have made the Citizens fewer than thirty thouſand, and ſo unable to defend the Common-wealth) and uſe of this ſame old and ruſty Iron inſtead of Money, obſerves it came by this means to paſs that there was neither a *fine Orator, Fortune-*
Plut. Lycurg. *teller, Baud, nor Goldſmith to be found in* Lacedemon; our Conſiderer profeſſes,

"THAT it is to him as ſtrange as any thing in Hiſtory, that
"LYCURGUS ſhould find credit enough to ſettle a Government, which
"carry'd along with it ſo much want and hardſhip to particular men,
"that the total abſence of Government could ſcarce have put them in-
"to a worſe condition; the Laws that he made prohibiting the uſe
"of thoſe things, which to enjoy with ſecurity, is that only to other
"men that makes the Yoke of Laws ſupportable.

HERE

HERE he is no Monk again; I would ask him no more, than that he would hold to ſomething, be it to any thing. It is true, we, who have been us'd to our Plumpottage, are like enough to make faces (as did the King of *Pontus*) at the *Lacedemonian* black broth: But who has open'd his mouth againſt Plumpottage, gilded Coaches, Pages, Lacquies, fair Mannor-houſes, good Tables, rich Furniture, full Purſes, Univerſities, good Benefices, Scarlet Robes, ſquare Caps, rich Jewels, or ſaid any thing that would not multiply all this? *Why*, ſays he, *you are ſo far right, that the voice of* LYCURGUS's *Agrarian was, Every man ſhall be thus poor; and that of yours is, That no man ſhall be more than thus rich.* This is an Argument (an't pleaſe you) by which he thinks he has prov'd, that there is no difference between the Agrarian that was in *Lacedemon*, and that which is in *Oceana:* For, Sir, whatſoever is thus and thus, is like: But the Agrarian of *Lacedemon* was thus, A man could have no Money, or none that deſerv'd that name; and the Agrarian of *Oceana* is thus, A man's Money is not confin'd: Therefore the Agrarian of the one, and of the other, are like. Was it not a great grievance in *Lacedemon*, think you, that they had no ſuch Logic nor Logician? Be this as it will, *It had been impoſſible*, ſays he, *for* LYCURGUS *to have ſettled his Government, had he not wiſely obtain'd a Reſponſe from the Oracle at* Delphos, *magnifying and recommending it: After which all reſiſtance would have been downright Impiety and Diſobedience, which concerns Mr.* HARRINGTON *very little.* The Bible then is not ſo good an Oracle as was that at *Delphos*. But this Reflection has a tang with it, that makes me think it relates to that where he ſays, *I know not how, but Mr.* HARRINGTON *has taken up a very great unkindneſs for the Clergy.* He will know nothing; neither that the Oracle of the Scripture is of all other the cleareſt for a Common-wealth, nor that the Clergy being generally againſt a Common-wealth, are in this below the Prieſts of *Delphos*, who were more for LYCURGUS than theſe are for MOSES. But have at the Agrarian of *Oceana* with the whole bail of Dice, and at five throws. Chap. 11. Conſid. *p.* 18.

THE firſt throw is, *That it is unjuſt:* For,

IF it be truly aſſerted (in Oceana, *Page the* 39th*) that Government is founded on Property, then Property conſiſts in Nature before Government, and Government is to be fitted to Property, not Property to Government. How great a Sin then would it be againſt the firſt and pureſt notion of Juſtice, to bring in a Government not only different from but directly deſtructive to the ſettled Property of* Oceana, *where (in the* 107th *Page) there are confeſt to be three hundred Perſons, whoſe Eſtates in Land exceed the Standard of two thouſand pounds a year. Let me not be choak'd with the example of* Lacedemon, *till Mr.* HARRINGTON *has ſhewn us the Power of his Perſuaſion with the Nobility of* Oceana, *as* LYCURGUS *with them of* Lacedemon, *to throw up their Lands to be parcel'd by his Agrarian (as* Page 111.*) and when that is done, I ſhall ceaſe to complain of the Injuſtice of it. Nor need any one of theſe three hundred be put to own a ſhame, for prefering his own Intereſt before that of a whole Nation; for tho' when Government is once fix'd, it may be fit to ſubmit private to public Utility, yet when the queſtion is of chooſing a Government every particular man is left to his own native Right, which cannot be preſcrib'd againſt by the Intereſt of all the reſt of Mankind.* Conſid. *p.* 81.

Book I. HOW many falſe Dice there are in this throw (becauſe you ſee I have little to do) will be worth counting.

WHEREAS I no where deny Property to derive her being from Law; he inſinuates that I preſume Property to be in Nature. There's *One.*

WHEREAS in natural and domeſtic Viciſſitude, I aſſert, That Empire is to follow the Legal State of Property; he impoſes, as if I had aſſerted, that Empire muſt follow the natural ſtate of Property. *Two.*

WHEREAS in violent or foreign Viciſſitude (as when *Iſraelites* poſſeſt themſelves of the Land of *Canaan*, the *Goths* and *Vandals* of *Italy*, the *Franks* of *France*, the *Saxons* of *England)* Property, in order to the Government to be introduc'd, is alterable; he inſinuates as if I had ſaid, that Empire muſt always follow the ſtate of Property, not as it may be alter'd in that relation, but as it is found. *Three.*

WHEREAS the Government of *Oceana* is exactly fitted to Property, as it was ſettl'd before; he inſinuates it to be deſtructive to the ſettl'd Property. *Four.*

WHEREAS I ſay, that to put it with the moſt, they that are Proprietors of Land in *Oceana*, exceeding two thouſand pounds a year, do not exceed three hundred Perſons; he ſays, that I have confeſt they be three hundred. *Five.*

WHEREAS I ſhew that the Nobility of *Lacedemon*, upon the perſuaſion of LYCURGUS, threw up their Eſtates to be parcel'd by his Agrarian; but that in *Oceana*, it is not needful or requir'd that any man ſhould part with a Farthing, or throw up one ſhovel-ful of his Earth: he impoſes, as if I went about to perſuade the Nobility to throw up their Lands. *Six.*

WHEREAS I have ſhewn that no one of thoſe within the three hundred can have any Intereſt againſt the Agrarian; he, without ſhewing what ſuch an Intereſt can be, inſinuates that they have an Intereſt againſt it. *Seven.*

WHEREAS the Government of *Oceana* goes altogether upon conſent, and happens not only to fit private to public, but even public to private Utility, by which means it is void of all Objection; he inſinuates, that it is againſt private Utility. *Eight.*

WHERE he ſays, that *in chooſing a Government every man is left to his own native Right*; he inſinuates that the Agrarian (which does no more than fix Property, as ſhe found it) is againſt native Right. *Nine.*

WHEREAS God has given the Earth to the Sons of men, which native Right (as in caſe a man for hunger takes ſo much as will feed him, and no more, of any other man's meat or herd) preſcribes againſt legal Property, and is the cauſe why the Law eſteems not ſuch an Action to be Theft; he inſinuates that there is a native Right in legal Property, *which cannot be preſcrib'd againſt by the Intereſt of all the reſt of Mankind.* Ten.

WHILE he pleaded the caſe of Monarchy, Levelling was concluded lawful; in the caſe of a Common-wealth, which aſks no ſuch favour, Levelling is concluded unlawful. *Eleven.*

IN the Reformation or Level as to Monarchy, tho' Property ſubſiſted before that Level, yet Property was to be fitted to the Government, and not the Government to Property; but in the caſe of a Common-wealth

mon-wealth the Government is to be fitted to Property, and not Property to the Government. *Twelve.* Chap. 11.

IN that, any man was bound to relinquiſh his native Right, elſe how could a Prince level his Nobility? In this, no man is bound to relinquiſh his native Right. *Thirteen.*

IN that, this ſame native Right might be preſcrib'd againſt by the Prince; in this, it cannot be preſcrib'd againſt by the Intereſt of Mankind. *Fourteen.*

IN that, no Nobleman but ought to own a ſhame if he prefer'd his Intereſt before that of the Prince; in this, *no Nobleman ought to own a ſhame for prefering his own Intereſt before that of a whole Nation.* Fifteen.

WOULD you have any more? theſe fifteen *majors* and *minors*, or falſe Dice, are ſoop'd up again, and put all into this Concluſion or Box, like themſelves.

THUS the Intereſt of the three hundred is not balanc'd with that of a whole Nation, but that of ſome few extravagant Spirits; who, by making Dams in the Current of other men's Eſtates, hope to derive ſome Water to their own parch'd Fortunes.

CALUMNIARE fortiter, nihil adhærebit. If a River has but one natural Bed or Channel, what Dam is made in it by this Agrarian? but if a River has had many natural Beds or Channels, to which ſhe has forgot to reach her Breaſt, and whoſe Mouths are dry'd up or obſtructed; theſe are Dams which the Agrarian does not make, but remove: and what parch'd Fortunes can hereby hope to be water'd, but theirs only, whoſe Veins having drunk of the ſame Blood, have a right in Nature to drink of the ſame Milk? The Law of MOSES allow'd the firſt-born but a double portion: was his an extravagant Spirit?

HIS ſecond throw is, That *the nature of the Agrarian is ſuch as cannot be fix'd, in regard that the People being intruſted with a Vote and a Sword, may alter it for the leſs, or come to downright Levelling.* But as to this, in the 8*th* Chapter I have bar'd his Dice, that being the place in which I thought moſt proper to give a full Anſwer to this Objection.

AT the third throw, he is extreme aukward. For whereas the *Iſraelites* (notwithſtanding the *Voyages of* SOLOMAN, and what is ſaid of *the Ships of* Tharſis) during their Agrarian, or while they had Land, were a Common-wealth of Huſbandmen, and not of Merchants, nor came to the exerciſe of this Trade, till they had no Land, or after their diſperſion by the Emperor ADRIAN; he ſcrues it in, after this manner——*As the* Jews *who have no Lands, are every where great Traders; ſo the poſſeſſion of Lands being limited by this Agrarian, men who are either covetous or ambitious* (as if Eſtates were not got by Induſtry, but by Covetouſneſs and Ambition) *will employ themſelves and their Eſtates in foreign Traffic, which being in a manner wholly ingroſt by the Capital City of* Oceana, *that City, already too great, will immediately grow into an exceſs of Power and Riches, very dangerous to the Common-wealth*; Amſterdam *being come by ſuch means to exerciſe of late a Tyranny in the diſpoſal of ſome public Affairs, much to the prejudice both of the Liberty and Intereſt of the reſt of the Union. An equal, if not greater Incommodity to* Oceana, *would be created by the Agrarian which making* Emporium *a City of Princes, would render the Country* Confid. p. 85.

a Com-

a Common-wealth of Cottagers, able to diſpute Precedence with the Beggar's-Buſh.

NEWS, not from *Tripoli*, nor any other corner of the whole World but one. Bate me this, and ſhew me in what other City increaſe of Houſes or new Foundations was ever held a Nuſance. This ſure is a Phanſy that regards not the old Folks, or antient Prudence.

ONE of the Bleſſings that God promis'd to ABRAHAM, was, that *his Seed ſhould be multiply'd as the Stars of Heaven:* And the Common-wealth of *Rome*, by multiplying her Seed, came to bound her Territory with the Ocean, and her Fame with the Stars of Heaven. That ſuch a Populouſneſs is that without which there can be no great Common-wealth, both Reaſon and good Authors are clear; but whether it ought to begin in the Country, or in the City, is a ſcruple I have not known them make. That of *Iſrael* began in the Country, that of *Rome* in the City. Except there be obſtruction or impediment by the Law, as in *Turky* where the Country, and in *England* where the City is forbid to increaſe; wherever there is a populous Country, for example *France*, it makes a populous City, as *Paris*; and wherever there is a populous City, as *Rome* after the ruin of *Alba*, and *Amſterdam* after the ruin (as to Trade) of *Antwerp*, it makes a populous Territory, as was that of the Ruſtic Tribes, and is that of *Holland*.

BUT the ways how a populous City comes to make a populous Country, and how a populous Country comes to make a populous City, are contrary; the one happening thro' ſucking, as that of the City, and the other thro' weaning, as that of the Country.

FOR proof of the former: the more mouths there be in a City, the more meat of neceſſity muſt be vented by the Country, and ſo there will be more Corn, more Cattle, and better Markets; which breeding more Labourers, more Huſbandmen, and richer Farmers, bring the Country ſo far from a Common-wealth of Cottagers, that where the Bleſſings of God, thro' the fruitfulneſs of late years with us, render'd the Huſbandmen unable *to diſpute Precedence with the Beggar's-Buſh*, his Trade thus uninterrupted, in that his Markets are certain, goes on with increaſe of Children, of Servants, of Corn, and of Cattle: for there is no reaſon why the Fields adjoining to *Emporium*, being but of a hard ſoil, ſhould annually produce two Crops, but the Populouſneſs of the City.

THE Country then growing more populous, and better ſtock'd with Cattle, which alſo encreaſes Manure for the Land, muſt proportionably encreaſe in fruitfulneſs. Hence it is that (as the *Romans* alſo were good at ſuch works) in *Holland* there is ſcarce a puddle undrain'd, nor a bank of Sand caſt up by the Sea, that is not cover'd with Earth, and made fruitful by the People; theſe being ſo ſtrangely, with the growth of *Amſterdam*, encreas'd, as comes perhaps to two parts in three: nor, the Agrarian taking place in *Oceana*, would it be longer diſputed, whether ſhe might not deſtroy Fiſhes to plant Men. Thus a populous City makes a Country milch, or populous by ſucking; and whereas ſome may ſay, that ſuch a City may ſuck from foreign parts, it is true enough, and no where more apparent than in *Amſterdam*. But a City that has recourſe to a foreign Dug, e'er ſhe had firſt ſuck'd that of her proper Nurſe or Territory dry, you ſhall hardly find; or finding (as in ſome Plantation not yet wean'd) will hardly be

be able to make that Objection hold, ſeeing it will not lie ſo much againſt the Populouſneſs of the place, as the contrary. Chap. ii.

BUT a populous Country makes a populous City by weaning; for when the People increaſe ſo much, that the dug of Earth can do no more, the overplus muſt ſeek ſome other way of Livelihood: which is either Arms, ſuch were thoſe of the *Goths* and *Vandals*; or Merchandize and Manufacture, for which ends it being neceſſary that they lay their Heads and their Stock together, this makes populous Cities. Thus *Holland* being a ſmall Territory, and ſuck'd dry, has upon the matter wean'd the whole People, and is thereby become as it were one City that ſucks all the World.

BUT by this means, ſays the Conſiderer, Emporium *being already too great* (while indeed *Amſterdam*, conſidering the narrowneſs of the Territory, or the ſmallneſs of *Holland*, is much more populous) *would immediately grow into an exceſs of Power and Riches, very dangerous to Liberty, an example whereof was ſeen in the late Tyranny of that City:* As if it were not ſufficiently known that *Amſterdam* contributes, and has contributed more to the defence of the Common-wealth, or United Provinces, than all the reſt of the League, and had in thoſe late Actions which have been ſcandaliz'd, reſiſted not the Intereſt of Liberty, but of a Lord. That the increaſe of *Rome*, which was always ſtudy'd by her beſt Citizens, ſhould make her Head too great for her Body, or her Power dangerous to the Tribes, was never ſo much as imagin'd; and tho' ſhe were *a City of Princes*, her ruſtic Tribes were ever had in greateſt eſteem and Honour; inſomuch, that a Patrician would be of no other.

BUT the Authority of antient Common-wealths is needleſs; the Prevaricator by his own Argumentation or Might, lays himſelf neck and heels.

FOR, ſays he, *Were this Agrarian once ſettled*, Emporium *would be a City of Princes, and the Nobility ſo throughly plum'd, that they would be juſt as ſtrong of wing, as wild Fowl in moulting time.* There would be a City of Princes, and yet no Nobility. He is ſo faſt that I have pity on him, if I knew but which way to let him looſe. He means perhaps, that the Merchants growing rich, would be the Nobility; and the Nobility growing poor, would be Graſiers. Conſid. p. 93.

BUT ſo for ought I know it was always, or worſe, that is, men attain'd to Riches and Honours by ſuch or worſe Arts, and in Poverty made not always ſo honeſt Retreats. To all which Infirmities of the State, I am deceiv'd if this Agrarian does not apply the proper Remedies. For ſuch an Agrarian makes a Common-wealth for increaſe: the Trade of a Common-wealth for increaſe, is Arms; Arms are not born by Merchants, but by Noblemen and Gentlemen. The Nobility therefore having theſe Arms in their hands, by which Provinces are to be acquir'd, new Provinces yield new Eſtates; ſo whereas the Merchant has his returns in Silk or Canvas, the Soldier will have his return in Land. He that repreſents me as an Enemy to the Nobility, is the man he ſpeaks of; for if ever the Common-wealth attains to five new Provinces (and ſuch a Common-wealth will have Provinces enow) it is certain, that (beſides Honours, Magiſtracies, and the Revenues annex'd) there will be more Eſtates in the Nobility of *Oceana*, of fourteen thouſand pounds Land a year, than ever were, or can otherwiſe be of four; and that without any the leaſt danger to the

Book I. Common-wealth: for if *Rome* had but look'd ſo far to it, as to have made good her Agrarian in *Italy*, tho' ſhe had neglected the reſt, the Wealth of her Nobility might have ſuck'd her Provinces, but muſt have inrich'd the People; and ſo rather have water'd her Roots, than ſtarv'd and deſtroy'd them, as it did. In this caſe therefore the Nobility of *Oceana* would not moulter like wild Fowl, but be ſtrong of wing as the Eagle.

ONE Argument more I have heard urg'd againſt the Populouſneſs of the Capital City, which is, That the Rich in time of ſickneſs forſaking the place, by which means the Markets come to fail, the Poor, leſt they ſhould ſtarve, will run abroad, and infect the whole Country. But ſhould a man tell them at *Paris*, or *Grand Cairo* (in the latter whereof the Plague is more frequent and furious than happens with us) that they are not to build Houſes, nor increaſe ſo much, leſt they ſhould have the Plague; or that Children are not to be born ſo faſt, leſt they die, they would think it ſtrange news. A Common-wealth is furniſh'd with Laws, and Power to add ſuch as ſhe ſhall find needful. In caſe a City be in that manner viſited, it is the duty of the Country, and of the Government, to provide for them by contribution.

Confid. *p.* 87. *THE difficulty in making the Agrarian equal and ſteddy thro' the riſe or fall that may happen in Money*, which is the fourth throw of the Prevaricator, is that which it might have been for his eaſe to have taken notice was long ſince ſufficiently bar'd, where it is ſaid, That if a new Survey at the preſent Rent was taken, an Agrarian ordaining that no man ſhould thenceforth hold above ſo much Land as is there valu'd at the rate, however Money might alter, would be equal and ſteddy enough.

Confid. *p.* 89. HIS laſt caſt is, *That the Agrarian would mak War againſt univerſal and immemorial Cuſtom; which being without doubt more prevalent than that of Reaſon, there is nothing of ſuch difficulty as to perſuade men at once, and crudely, that they and their Forefathers have been in an Error.*

WISE men, I ſee, may differ in Judgment or Counſil: for, ſays Sir FRANCIS BACON, " Surely every Medicine is an Innovation, and
Eſſay 24. " he that will not apply new Remedies muſt expect new Evils: for " Time is the greateſt Innovator; and if Time of courſe alters things " to the worſe, and Wiſdom and Council may not alter them to the " better, what muſt be the end?

BUT the caſe of the Agrarian receives equal ſtrength from each of theſe Counſillors or Opinions: from the latter, in that it goes upon grounds which *Time has not innovated for the worſe, but for the better*; and ſo according to the former comes not to have been at once, and crudely perſuaded, but introduc'd by Cuſtom, now grown univerſal and immemorial. For who remembers the Gentry of this Nation to have worn the blue Coats of the Nobility, or the lower ſort of People to have liv'd upon the ſmoak of their Kitchens? On the contrary, Is it not now an univerſal Cuſtom for men to rely upon their own Fortunes or Induſtry, and not to *put their truſt in Princes*, ſeeking in their Liberality or Dependence the means of living? The Prevaricator might as well jump into his great Grandfather's old Breeches, and perſuade us that he is *a la mode*, or in the new cut, as that the ways of our Forefathers would agree with our Cuſtoms. Does not every man now

now ſee, that if the Kings in thoſe days had ſettl'd the Eſtates of the Nobility by a Law, reſtraining them from ſelling their Land, ſuch a Law had been an Agrarian, and yet not warring againſt their antient Cuſtoms, but preſerving them? Wherefore neither does the Agrarian propos'd, taking the Balance of Eſtates as ſhe now finds them, make War againſt, but confirm the preſent Cuſtoms. The only Objection that can ſeem in this place to lie, is, that whereas it has been the Cuſtom of *Oceana* that the bulk of the Eſtate ſhould deſcend to the eldeſt Son, by the Agrarian he cannot, in caſe he has more Brothers, inherit above two thouſand pounds a year in Land, or an equal ſhare. But neither does this, whether you regard the Parents or the Children, make War with Cuſtom. For putting the caſe the Father has twenty thouſand pounds a year in Land, he goes not the leſs in his cuſtom or way of Life for the Agrarian, becauſe for this he has no leſs: and if he has more or fewer Sons to whom this Eſtate deſcends by equal or unequal portions, neither do they go leſs in their ways or cuſtoms of Life for the Agrarian, becauſe they never had more. *But*, ſays ARISTOTLE (ſpeaking of the Oſtraciſm as it ſupplies the defect of an Agrarian) *this courſe is as neceſſary to Kings as to Common-wealths.* By this means the Monarchies of *Turky* and of *Spain* preſerve their Balance; thro' the neglect of this has that of the Nobility of *Oceana* been broken: and this is it which the Prevaricator, in adviſing that the Nobility be no further level'd than will ſerve to keep the People under, requires of his Prince. So, That an Agrarian is neceſſary to Government, be it what it will, is on all hands concluded.

Chap. 12.

Pol. L. 3. c. 9.

CHAP. XII.

Whether Courſes or a Rotation be neceſſary to a well-order'd Common-wealth. In which is contain'd the Courſes or Parembole of Iſrael *before the Captivity, together with the Epitome of* Athens *and* Venice.

ONE bout more and we have done: This (as reaſon good) will be upon Wheels or Rotation: For,

Oceana, *p.* 54.

AS the Agrarian anſwers to the equality of the Foundation or Root, ſo does Rotation to the equality of the Superſtructures or Branches of a Common-wealth.

EQUAL Rotation is equal Viciſſitude in, or Succeſſion to Magiſtracy confer'd for equal terms, injoining ſuch equal Vacations, as cauſe the Government to take in the Body of the People, by parts ſucceeding others, thro' the free Election or Suffrage of the whole.

THE contrary whereto is prolongation of Magiſtracy, which, traſhing the wheel of Rotation, deſtroys the Life or natural Motion of a Common-wealth.

THE Prevaricator, whatever he has done for himſelf, has done this for me, that it will be out of doubt whether my Principles *be capable of greater Obligation or Confirmation, than by having Objections made againſt them.* Nor have I been altogether ungrateful, or nice of my Labour, but gone far (much farther than I needed) about, that I might return with the more valuable Preſent to him that ſent me on the errand:

Book I. errand: I ſhall not be ſhort of like proceeding upon the preſent Subject, but rather over.

ROTATION in a Common-wealth is of the Magiſtracy, of the Senate, of the People; of the Magiſtracy and the People; of the Magiſtracy and the Senate; or of the Magiſtracy, of the Senate, and of the People: which in all come to ſix kinds.

Grot. FOR example of Rotation in the Magiſtracy, you have the Judge of *Iſrael*, call'd in Hebrew *Shophet*. The like Magiſtracy after the Kings ITHOBAL and BAAL came in uſe with the *Tyrians*; from theſe, with their Poſterity the *Carthaginians*, who alſo call'd their ſupreme Magiſtrates, being in number two, and for their Term Annual, *Shophetim*, which the Latins by a ſofter Pronunciation render *Suffetes*.

THE *Shophet* or *Judge of Iſrael* was a Magiſtrate, not, that I can find, oblig'd to any certain term, throughout the Book of *Judges*; nevertheleſs, it is plain, that his Election was occaſional, and but for a time, after the manner of a Dictator.

TRUE it is, that ELI and SAMUEL rul'd all their lives; but upon this ſuch impatience in the People follow'd, thro' the corruption of their Sons, as was the main cauſe of the ſucceeding Monarchy.

THE Magiſtrates in *Athens* (except the *Areopagites*, being a Judicatory) were all upon Rotation. The like for *Lacedemon* and *Rome*, except the Kings in the former, who were indeed hereditary, but had no more Power than the Duke in *Venice*, where all the reſt of the Magiſtrates (except the *Procuratori*, whoſe Magiſtracy is but mere Ornament) are alſo upon Rotation.

Pol. l. 2. c. 7. FOR the Rotation of the Senate you have *Athens*, the *Achæans*, *Ætolians*, *Lycians*, the *Amphictionium*; and the Senate of *Lacedemon* reprov'd, in that it was for life, by ATISTOTLE: Modern Examples of like kind are the Diet of *Switzerland*, but eſpecially the Senate of *Venice*.

FOR the Rotation of the People, you have firſt *Iſrael*, where the Congregation (which the *Greeks* call *Eccleſia*; the *Latins*, *Comitia*, or *Concio*) having a twofold capacity; firſt, that of an Army, in which they were the conſtant Guard of the Country; and, ſecondly, that of a Repreſentative, in which they gave the Vote of the People, at the creation of their Laws, or election of their Magiſtrates, was Monthly. 1 Chron. 27. 1. *Now the Children of* Iſrael *after their Number, to wit, the chief Fathers and Captains of thouſands and hundreds, and their Officers that ſerv'd the King in any matter of the Courſes, which came in and went out month by month, throughout all the months of the year, of every Courſe were twenty and four thouſand.*

Grot. ad loc. SUCH a multitude there was of military Age, that without inconvenience, four and twenty thouſand were every month in Arms, whoſe term expiring, others ſucceeded, and ſo others; by which means the Rotation of the whole People came about in the ſpace of one year. The Tribunes, or Commanders of the Tribes in Arms, or of the Prerogative for the month, are nam'd in the following part of the Chapter, to the ſixteenth Verſe; where begins the enumeration of the Princes (tho' GAD and ASHUR, for what reaſon I know not, be omitted) of the Tribes, remaining in their Provinces, where they judg'd the People, and as they received Orders, were to bring or ſend ſuch farther Inforcement or Recruits as occaſion requir'd to the Army: after theſe, ſome other

other Officers are mention'd. There is no queſtion to be made but this Rotation of the People, together with their Prerogative or Congregation, was preſerv'd by the monthly Election of two thouſand Deputies in each of the twelve Tribes, which in all came to four and twenty thouſand; or let any man ſhew how otherwiſe it was likely to be done, the nature of their Office being to give the Vote of the People, who therefore ſure muſt have choſen them. By theſe the Vote of the People was given to their Laws, and at Elections of their Magiſtrates. Chap. 12.

TO their Laws, as where DAVID propoſes the reduction of the Ark: *And* DAVID *conſulted with the Captains of thouſands and hundreds, and with every Leader. And* DAVID *ſaid to all the Congregation of* Iſrael, *If it ſeems good to you, and it be of the Lord God, let us ſend abroad to our Brethren every where* (the Princes of Tribes in their Provinces) *that are left in the Land of* Iſrael, *and with them alſo to the Prieſts and Levites, which are in the Cities and Suburbs, that they may gather themſelves to us; and let us bring again the Ark of our God to us, for we enquir'd not at it in the days of* SAUL. *And all the Congregation* (gave their Suffrage in the Affirmative) *ſaid that they would do ſo; for the thing was right in the eyes of the People. Nulla lex ſibi ſoli conſcientiam Juſtitiæ ſuæ debet, ſed eis a quibus obſequium expectat.* Now that the ſame Congregation or Repreſentative gave the Vote of the People alſo in the Election of Prieſts, Officers and Magiſtrates; *Moreover* DAVID *and the Captains of the Hoſt ſeparated to the Service of the Sons of* ASAPH, *and of* HEMAN, *and of* JEDUTHUN, *who ſhould propheſy with Harps, with Pſalteries, and with Cymbals.* But upon the occaſion to which we are more eſpecially beholden for the preſervation and diſcovery of this admirable Order (DAVID having propos'd the buſineſs in a long and pious ſpeech) the Congregation *made* SOLOMON *the Son of* DAVID *King the ſecond time, and anointed him to the Lord to be chief Governor, and* ZADOK *to be Prieſt.* For as to the firſt time that SOLOMON was made King, it happen'd, thro' the Sedition of ADONIJAH, to have been done in haſte and tumultuouſly by thoſe only of *Jeruſalem*; and the reaſon why ZADOK is here made Prieſt, is, that ABIATHAR was put out for being of the Conſpiracy with ADONIJAH.

1 Chron. 13. Grot. & Tertul. 1 Chron. 25. 1 Chron. 28. 2. 1 Chron. 29. 22. 1 Kings 1.

I MAY expect (by ſuch Objections as they afford me) it ſhould be alledg'd, that to prove an Order in a Common-wealth, I inſtance in a Monarchy; as if there were any thing in this Order monarchical, or that could, if it had not been ſo receiv'd from the Common-wealth, have been introduc'd by the Kings, to whom in the judgment of any ſober man (the Prevaricator only excepted, who has been huckling about ſome ſuch Council for his Prince) no leſs could have follow'd upon the firſt frown of the People, than did in REHOBOAM, who having us'd them roughly, was depos'd by the Congregation, or the *major* part. It is true, that while *Iſrael* was an Army, the Congregation, as it needed not to aſſemble by way of Election or Repreſentative, ſo I believe it did not; but that by all *Iſrael* aſſembl'd to this end, ſhould be meant the whole People after they were planted upon their Lots, and not their Repreſentative, which in a political ſenſe is as properly ſo called, were abſurd and impoſſible. Nor need I go upon preſumption only, be the ſame never ſo ſtrong, ſeeing it is ſaid in Scripture of the *Korathites, that they were keepers of the Gates of the Tabernacle, and their Fathers being over the Hoſt of the Lord, were keepers of the Entry:* That is, (according to the Interpretation of GROTIUS) the *Korathites* were

1 Kings 12. 1 Chron. 9. 29.

Book. I. now keepers of the Gates, as it appears in the Book of *Numbers*, their Anceſtors the *Kohathites* had been in the Camp, or while *Iſrael* was yet
Numb. 4. an Army. But our Tranſlation is lame in the right foot, as to the true diſcovery of the antient manner of this ſervice, which according to the Septuagint and the vulgar Latin was thus, *they were keepers of the gates of the Tabernacle* (ἡ πατὴρ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῆς παρεμβολῆς, *& familiæ eorum per vices) and their Fathers by turns, or Rotation.* So that Offices and Services by Courſes, Turns, or Rotation, are plainly more antient than Kings in the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*; tho' it be true that when the Courſes or Rotation of the Congregation or Repreſentative of the People were firſt introduced, is as hard to ſhew, as it would be how, after the People were once planted upon their Lots, they could be otherwiſe aſſembled. If Writers argue well and lawfully from what the *Sanhedrim* was in the inſtitution by JEHOSAPHAT, to what it had more antiently been; to argue from what the Congregation was in the inſtitution by DAVID, to what it had more antiently been is ſufficiently warranted.

THESE things rightly conſidered, there remains little doubt but we have the courſes of *Iſrael* for the firſt example of Rotation in a popular Aſſembly. Now to come from the *Hebrew* to the *Grecian* Prudence, the ſame is approved by ARISTOTLE, which he exemplifys in the Common-wealth of THALES MILESIUS, where the People,
Pol. l. 4. c. 14. he ſays aſſembl'd (τὸ κατὰ μέρος, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντας ἀθρόους) *by turns or Rotation.* Nor is the *Roman* Prudence without ſome ſhadow of the like Proceeding, where the Prerogative *(pro tempore)* with the *jure vocatæ*, being made by Lot, gave frequently the Suffrage of the whole People. But the *Gothic* Prudence in the Policy of the third State runs altogether upon the Collection of a Repreſentative by the Suffrage of the People tho' not ſo diligently regulated, by Terms and Vacations, as to a ſtanding Aſſembly were neceſſary, by Turns, Rotation, Parembole or Courſes) as in the election of the late Houſe of Commons and the conſtitutive Viciſſitude of the Knights and Burgeſſes, is known by ſufficient Experience.

WHEN the Rotation of a Common-wealth is both in the Magiſtracy and the People, I reckon it to be a fourth kind, as in *Iſrael*, where both the Judge and the Congregation were ſo elected.

THE fifth kind is when the Rotation of a Common-wealth is in the Magiſtracy and the Senate, as in thoſe of *Athens*, of the *Acheans*, of the *Ætolians*, of the *Lycians*, and of *Venice*; upon which Examples rather for the influence each of them, at leaſt *Athens*, may have upon the following Book, than any great neceſſity from the preſent occaſion, I ſhall inlarge in this place.

THE Common-wealth of *Athens* was thus adminiſter'd.

Epitome of the Athenian *Common-wealth.*

THE *Senate of the Bean* being the propoſing Aſſembly (for that of the *Areopagits*, call'd alſo a *Senate*, was a *Judicatory*) conſiſted of four hundred Citizens choſen by Lot, which was perform'd with Beans. Theſe were annually remov'd all at once: By which means *Athens* became fruſtrated of the natural and neceſſary uſe of an Ariſtocracy, while neither her Senators were choſen for their parts, nor remain'd long enough in this Function to acquire the right underſtanding of their proper Office. Theſe thus elected, were ſubdivided by Lot into four equal parts, call'd *Prytanys*, each of which for one quarter of the year

was

was in office. The *Prytany*, or *Prytans* in office, elected ten Presidents, call'd *Proedri*, out of which *Proedri* or Presidents they weekly chose the Provost of the Council, who was call'd the *Epistata*, The *Epistata* and the *Proedri* were the more peculiar Proposers to the *Prytans*, and to the *Prytans* it belong'd especially to prepare business; (προ τῆς ἡ βουλῆς ἡ προ τῆς ἐκκλησιας) for the Senate. They gave also audience to any that would propose any thing concerning the Common-wealth, which if, when reported by the *Prytans*, it were approv'd by the Senate, the party that propos'd might promulgate the business; and Promulgation being made, the Congregation assembled, and determin'd of it. *Sic data concio Lælio est, processit ille, & Græcus apud Græcos non de culpa sua dixit, sed de pœna quæstus est porrexerunt manus, Psephisma natum est.* Petit. de Leg. Att. Cic. pro Flac.

THE *Prytans* and their Magistrates had right to assemble the Senate, and propose to them; and what the Senate determined upon such a Proposition, if forthwith to be offered to the People, as in private cases, was call'd *Proboulema*; but if not to be propos'd till the People had a years trial of it, as was the ordinary way in order to Laws to be enacted, it was called *Psephisma*; each of which words, with that difference, signifys a Decree. A Decree of the Senate in the latter sense had for one year the power of a Law, after which trial it belong'd to the *Thesmothetæ* (θεσμοθέται) to hang it in writing upon the Statues of the Heroes and assemble the Congregation. These Magistrates were of the number of the *Archons*, which in all were nine; the chief, more peculiarly so call'd, was ARCHON EPONYMUS, he by whose name the year was reckoned or denominated (his Magistracy being of a Civil concernment) the next was the King (a Magistrate of a Spiritual concernment) the third the Polemarch (whose Magistracy was of a Military concernment (the other six were the *Thesmothetæ*, who had several Functions common with the nine; others peculiar or proper to themselves, as (θεσμοθέται) to give the People (by Placarts) notice when the Judicatories were to assemble, that is, when the People were to assemble in that capacity, and to judge according to the Law made; or, when the Senate or the People were to assemble upon an ἀναγκαῖα, a Crime, that was not provided against by the Law, as that of ALCIBIADES (the Wits about that time in *Athens* being most of them Atheists) for laughing at CERES, discovering her Secrets, and shaving of the MERCURYS. If an *Archon* or *Demagog* was guilty of such a Crime, it belong'd to the cognizance of the Senate, otherwise to that of the People, whom the *Thesmothetæ* were also in like manner to warn, when they were to come to the Suffrage. Ulpian. ad Phil. 1. Poll. l. 8. c. 8. L. 8. c. 16.

THESE six, like the Electors in *Venice*, presided at all Elections of Magistrates, whether made by the Lot as the Judges, or by Suffrage as the new Archons, the Strategeus or General, and most of the rest. They had also the hearing and introducing of all Causes into the Judicatories.

BUT the right of assembling the *Ecclesia* or Congregation belong'd to the *Prytans*, by whom the Senate propos'd to the People.

THE Congregation consisted of all them that were upon the Roll of the *Lexiarcha*, that is to say of the whole People having right to the City. The *Prytans* seated upon a Tribunal, were Presidents of this Assembly; the Assembly having sacrific'd and made Oath of Fidelity to the Common-wealth, the *Proedri* or Presidents of the *Prytans* propos'd

Book I. propos'd by *Authority of the Senate to the People* in this manner: July *the* 16th POLICLES *being* Archon, *and the Tribe of* Pandion *in the Prytaneat*, DEMOSTHENES PÆANEUS *thought thus, or was of this opinion.* The ſame Cuſtom whereby the firſt Propoſer ſubſcribes his Opinion or Part with his Name, is at this day in *Venice.* Propoſition being made, ſuch of the People as would ſpeak were call'd to the Pulpit; they that were fifty years of Age, or upwards, were to come firſt, and the younger afterwards; which cuſtom of prating in this manner made excellent Orators or Demagogs, but a bad Common-wealth.

FROM this, that the People had not only the Reſult of the Common-wealth, but the Debate alſo, *Athens* is called a Democracy; and this kind of Government is oppos'd to that of *Lacedemon*, which, becauſe the People there had not the power of Debate, but of Reſult only, was called an *Ariſtocracy*, ſometimes an *Oligarchy*: thus the *Greeks* commonly are to be underſtood, to diſtinguiſh theſe two; while according to my Principles, if you like them, Debate in the People makes Anarchy; and where they have the Reſult and no more, the reſt being manag'd by a good Ariſtocracy, it makes that which is properly and truly to be called *Democracy*, or *Popular Government.* Neither is this Opinion of mine new, but according to the Judgment of ſome of the *Athenians* themſelves; for ſays ISOCRATES in his Oration to the *Areopagits* for Reformation of the *Athenian* Government, *I know the main reaſon why the* Lacedemonians *flouriſh to be, that their Common-wealth is popular.* But to return. As many of the People as would, having ſhew'd their Eloquence, and with theſe the Demagogs, who were frequently brib'd, conceal'd their Knavery; the *Epiſtata*, or Provoſt of the *Proedri*, put the Decree or Queſtion to the Vote, and the People gave the Reſult of the Common-wealth by their *Chirotonia*, that is, by holding up their Hands: the Reſult thus given, was the Law or *Pſephiſma* of the People.

Dem. Phil. 1. NOW for the Functions of the Congregation, they were divers; as firſt, Election of Magiſtrates; (ὁυκ ἀχειροτονητὶ δὲ ἐξ ὑμῶν ἀυτῶν δέκα Ταξιάρχους καὶ Στρατηγοὺς καὶ Φυλάρχους καὶ Ἱππάρχους δύο) namely, the Archons, the Strategus or General, the Field Officers, the Admirals, with divers others, all, or the chief of them annual, and commonly upon Terms and Vacations; though it be true, as PLUTARCH has it, that PHOCION was Strategus four years together, having that Honour ſtill put upon him by the Congregation without his ſeeking. The next Office of this Aſſembly was to elect Judges into five Courts or Judicatories; for the People being in the Bulk too unweildy a Body for the performance of this Duty, they exercis'd the ſupreme Judicature by way of Repreſentative, into which Election was made by Lottery, in ſuch a manner that five hundred, one thouſand, or 1500 of them (according to the importance of the occaſion) being above thirty years of Age, and within the reſt of the Qualifications in that caſe provided by the Law, became the Sovereign Judicatory, called the *Heliæa.* In all Elections, whether by Lot or Suffrage, the *Theſmothetæ* were Preſidents, and ordered the Congregation. Furthermore, if they would amend, alter, repeal, or make a Law, this alſo was done by a Repreſentative, of which no man was capable that had not been of the *Heliæa*, for the reſt elected out of the whole People: this amounting to one thouſand, was called the *Nomothetæ* or Legiſla-

Legiſlators. No Law receiv'd by the People could be abrogated but by the *Nomothetæ*; by theſe any *Athenian*, having obtained leave of the Senate, might abrogate a Law, provided withal he put another in the place of it. Theſe Laws the *Proedri* of the *Prytans* were to put to the Suffrage. Chap. 12.

FIRST, the old, whether it agreed with the *Athenian* People, or not? then the new; and whether of theſe happen'd to be chirotoniz'd or voted by the *Nomothetæ*, was ratify'd, according to that piece of the *Athenian* Law cited by DEOMSTHENES againſt TIMOCRATES, ὁπότερον δ' ἂν τῶν νόμων χειροτονήσωσιν οἱ νομοθέται, τοῦτον κύριον εἶναι. What has been ſaid of the Common-wealth of *Athens*, in relation to the preſent purpoſe, amounts to thus much, That not only the Senate and the Magiſtracy in this Policy was upon Rotation, but even the People alſo, at leaſt as to the *Nomothetæ*, or their Legiſlative Power, and the Supreme Judicatory of the *Heliæa*, each of theſe being a Repreſentative, conſtituted of one thouſand, or fifteen hundred Citizens.

BUT for what follows in the ſecond Book, it is neceſſary that I obſerve in this place the proceeding of certain Divines, who endeavour to make uſe of this Common-wealth for ends of their own, as particularly Dr. SEAMAN; who in his Book call'd *Four Propoſitions*, argues after this manner.

" CHIROTONIA (as SUIDAS has it) ſignifies both *Plebiſci-*
" *tum*, a Law made by the People, and *Pſephiſma*. Now, *ſays he*,
" *Pſephiſma* is the ordinary word us'd in the *Attic* Laws, and in
" DEMOSTHENES for *Senatuſconſultum*, a Law made by the Senate:
" *whence he draws this Concluſion*; As, when the People make a Law,
" they are ſaid to Chirotonize; ſo may the Rulers, in like manner,
" in thoſe Laws that are made by themſelves alone.

THESE ways with Divines are too bad. The words of SUIDAS are theſe (χειροτονία, ἐκλογὴ, πάντων κύρωσις) Chirotonia *is Election or Ratification by the Many:* which expreſly excludes the Few or the Senate from being otherwiſe contain'd by the word *Chirotonia*, than a part is by the whole. Nor has the Author the word *Pſephiſma* or *Plebiſcitum* in the place. I would fain know what other word there is in *Greek* for *Plebiſcitum* but *Pſephiſma*; and yet the Doctor puts it upon SUIDAS, that he diſtinguiſhes between theſe two, and taking that for granted where he finds *Pſephiſma* in DEMOSTHENES and the *Attic* Laws, will have it to ſignify no more than a Decree of the Senate. It is true that ſome Decrees of the Senate were ſo call'd, but thoſe of the People had no other name; and whenever you find *Pſephiſma* in DEMOSTHENES or the *Attic* Laws, for a Law, there is nothing more certain than that it is to be underſtood of the People: for to ſay that a Law in a Popular Common-wealth can be made without the People, is a Contradiction.

THE ſecond Paſſage is a What think you of theſe words of POLLUX, ἰδία δὲ οἱ μὲν θεσμοθέται προγράφουσι, πότε δεῖ δικάζειν τὰ δικαστήρια, καὶ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας εἰσαγγέλλουσιν εἰς τὸν δῆμον καὶ τὰς χειροτονίας. Which the Doctor having engliſh'd in this manner, *The* Theſmothetæ *do privately preſcribe when Judgment is to be given, and promulge public Accuſations and Suffrages to the People*, aſks you *whoſe Suffrages were theſe, if not the Rulers?* By which ſtrange Conſtruction, where POLLUX having firſt related in what part Poll. lib. 8. c. 9

Book II. the function of the *Theſmothetæ* was common with that of the nine Archons, comes (ἰδία δὲ) to ſhew you what was peculiar to themſelves, namely, to give notice when the *Heliæa* or other Judicatories were to aſſemble; the Doctor renders it, *they do privately preſcribe:* as if the Seſſion of a Court of Juſtice, and ſuch a one as contain'd a thouſand Judges, being the Repreſentative of the whole People, were to be privately preſcrib'd. Then to this *private preſcribing of Juſtice*, he adds, that they do *publickly promulge* (εἰσαγγελίας) Citations upon Crimes not within the written Law; as if private Preſcription and public Promulgation could ſtand together. Next, whereas Promulgation in the very nature of the word ſignifies an Act before a Law made, he preſumes the Law to be firſt made by the Rulers, and then promulgated by the *Theſmothetæ* to the People, kim kam to the experience of all Common-wealths, the nature of Promulgation, and the ſenſe of his Author, whoſe words, as I ſhew'd before, declare it to have been the *proper or peculiar office of the* Theſmothetæ *to give the People notice when they were to aſſemble for Judicature, or when for giving their* Chirotonia *or Suffrage, by Promulgation of the Cauſe* (εἰ. ταὶ δᾶμον) *upon which they were to determine.*

FOR the third Paſſage, the Doctor quoting a wrong place for theſe words, χειροτονήσωσι, ὃι νομοθέται, that the *Nomothetæ* (being a Repreſentative, as I ſhew'd, of the whole People, choſen by Lot, and in number one thouſand) *chirotoniz'd, or gave the Legiſlative Suffrage*; thence infers, that the *Rulers chirotoniz'd, voted or made Laws by themſelves without the People:* which is as if one ſhould ſay, that the Prerogative Tribe in *Rome*, or the Houſe of Commons in *England*, gave their Vote to ſuch or ſuch a Law, therefore it was made by the Rulers alone, and not by the People of *Rome* or of *England*.

FOR the fourth Paſſage, STEPHANUS quotes DEMOSTHENES at large in theſe words, ὄυτε βουλῆς, ὄυτε δήμυ χειροτονήσαντος ἀυτόν. This the Doctor interprets of an Officer; to which I ſhall ſay more, when he ſhews me where the Sentence is, or what went before: for as yet I do not know of an Officer in any Common-wealth, whoſe Election was indifferently made, either by the Senate or by the People; nor do I think the Doctor has look'd further for this than STEPHENS, who has not interpreted it.

THE fifth Paſſage is, *That a Decree of the Senate in* Athens *had the force of a Law for one year, without the People.* So had the Edicts of the Prætors in *Rome:* but I would fain know, whence the Senate in *Athens*, or the Prætors in *Rome*, originally deriv'd this Right (which was no more than that ſuch Laws might be Probationers, and ſo better underſtood when they came to the vote) but from the *Chirotonia*, or Suffrage of the People.

THE ſixth Paſſage ſtops the mouths of ſuch as having nothing to ſay to the matter of my writing, pick quarrels with the manner or freedom of it, the Liberty I take in the defence of Truth; ſeeing the Doctor takes a greater liberty upon other terms, while he bids his Antagoniſt (one that defended the Cauſe now in my hand) *go and conſult his Authors*, namely, STEPHENS and BUDÆUS again: for, ſays he, *you wrong thoſe learned Men, while you would have us believe that they were as ignorant of the* Greek *Story as your ſelf, or that things are to be found in them which are not.* To which Confidence I have better leave

leave to ſay, that the Doctor ſhould do well to take no worſe Counſil than he gives. Chap. 12.

BUT what is become of my Prevaricator? I have quite loſt him, elſe I ſhould have intreated him to compare his Notes out of my Sermon, with theſe out of the Doctor's; or retract that ſame affectation, in ſaying, *I know not how, but Mr.* HARRINGTON *has conceiv'd a great unkindneſs for the Clergy.* As if theſe their Stratagems, with which they make perpetual War againſt the unwary People, did not concern a man that has undertaken the cauſe of Popular Government.

THE Policy of the *Achæans* conſiſted of divers Common-wealths under one, which was thus adminſter'd. The Cities ſent their Deputies twice every year of courſe, and oftner if they were ſummon'd by their *Strategus*, or their *Demiurges*, to the place appointed. The *Strategus* was the Supreme Magiſtrate both Military and Civil, and the *Demiurges* being ten, were his Council, all Annual Magiſtrates elected by the People. This Council thus conſtituted, was call'd the *Synarchy*, and perform'd like Duties, in relation to the Senate, conſiſting of the Deputies ſent by their peculiar Sovereignties or Cities, as the *Prytans* to that in *Athens*. The Policies of the *Ætolians* and *Lycians* are ſo near the ſame again, that in one you have all. So both the Senates and the Magiſtracy of theſe Common-wealths were upon Rotation. To conclude with *Venice*.

Epitome of the Common-wealth of Venice.

THE Common-wealth of *Venice* conſiſts of four parts; the Great Council, the Senate, the College, and the Signory.

THE Great Council is the aggregate Body of the whole People, or Citizens of *Venice*, which, for the paucity of their number, and the Antiquity of their Extraction, are call'd *Gentlemen*, or *Noble Venetians*. Every one of them at five and twenty years of age has right of Seſſion and Suffrage in this Council; which right of Suffrage, becauſe throughout this Common-wealth, in all Debates and Elections, it is given by the Ballot, is call'd *the right of Balloting*, whereby this Council being the Sovereign Power, creates all the reſt of the Orders, Councils or Magiſtracies; and has conſtitutively the ultimate Reſult, both in caſes of Judicature, and the Conſtitution of Laws.

The Senate.

THE Senate, call'd alſo the *Pregati*, conſiſts of ſixty Senators properly ſo ſtil'd, whereof the great Council elects ſix on a day, beginning ſo long before the month of *October*, that theſe being all choſen by that time, then receive their Magiſtracy: it conſiſts alſo of ſixty more, call'd the *Junta*, which are elected by the Scrutiny of the Old Senate, that is, by the Senate propoſing, and the Great Council reſolving; the reſt of their Creation is after the ſame manner with the former. In the Sixty of the Senate, there cannot be above three of any one Kindred or Family, nor in the *Junta* ſo many, unleſs there be fewer in the former. Theſe Magiſtracies are all annual, but without interval, ſo that it is at the pleaſure of the Great Council, whether a Senator having finiſh'd his year, they will elect him again.

The College.

THE College is a Council conſiſting more eſpecially of three Orders of Magiſtrates, call'd in their Language *Savi*; as the *Savi grandi*, to whoſe cognizance or care belong the whole affairs of Sea and Land; the *Savi di Terra ferma*, to whoſe care and cognizance belong the affairs of the Land; and the *Savi di Mare*, to whoſe cognizance appertain

Book I. pertain the affairs of the Sea, and of the Iſlands. Theſe are elected by the Senate, not all at once; but for the *Savi grandi*, who are ſix, by three at a time, with the interpoſition of three months; and for the *Savi di Terra ferma*, and the *Savi di Mare*, who are each five, after the ſame manner, ſave only that the firſt Election conſiſts of three, and the ſecond of two. Each Order of the *Savi* elects weekly one Provoſt, each of which Provoſts has Right in any affair belonging to the cognizance of his Order, to propoſe to the College. Audience of Embaſſadors, and matters of foreign Negotiation, belong properly to this Council.

The Signory. THE Signory conſiſts of the Duke and of his Counſillors. The Duke is a Magiſtrate created by the Great Council for life, to whom the Common-wealth acknowledges the Reverence due to a Prince, and all her Acts run in his name; tho' without the Counſillors he has no Power at all, while they can perform any Function of the Signory without him. The Counſillors, whoſe Magiſtracy is annual, are elected by the Scrutiny of the Senate, naming one out of each Tribe (for the City is locally divided into ſix Tribes) and the Great Council approving; ſo the Counſillors are ſix, whoſe Function in part is of the nature of Maſters of Requeſts, having withal power to grant certain Privileges: but their greateſt pre-eminence is, that all or any one of them may propoſe to any Council in the Common-wealth.

Certain Rights of the Councils. THE Signory has Seſſion and Suffrage in the College, the College has Seſſion and Suffrage in the Senate, and the Senate has Seſſion and Suffrage in the Great Council. The Signory, or the Provoſts of the *Savi*, have power to aſſemble the College, the College has power to aſſemble the Senate, and the Senate has power to aſſemble the Great Council; the *Signiori*, but more peculiarly the Provoſts of the *Savi* in their own Offices and Functions, have power to propoſe to the College, the College has power to propoſe to the Senate, and the Senate has power to propoſe to the Great Council. Whatever is thus propos'd and reſolv'd, either by the Senate (for ſometimes, thro' the ſecurity of this Order, a Propoſition goes no further) or by the Great Council, is ratify'd, or becomes the Law of the Common-wealth. Over and above theſe Orders, they have three Judicatories, two Civil and one Criminal, in each of which forty Gentlemen elected by the Great Council are Judges for the term of eight months; to theſe Judicatories belong the *Avogadori* and the *Auditori*, who are Magiſtrates, having power to hear cauſes apart, and, as they judge fitting, to introduce them into the Courts.

IF a man tells me, that I omit many things, he may perceive I write an Epitome, in which no more ſhould be comprehended, than that which underſtood may make a man underſtand the reſt. But of theſe principal parts conſiſts the whole body of admirable *Venice*.

THE *Conſiglio de' Dieci*, or Council of Ten, being that which partakes of Dictatorian Power, is not a limb of her but as it were a Sword in her hand. This Council (in which the Signory has alſo Seſſion and Suffrage) conſiſts more peculiarly of ten annual Magiſtrates, created by the Great Council, who afterwards elect three of their own number by Lot, which ſo elected are call'd *Capi de' Dieci*, their Magiſtracy being monthly: Again, out of the three *Capi*, one is taken by Lot, whoſe Magiſtracy is weekly: this is he, who over againſt the Tribunal in the Great Council ſits like another Duke, and is call'd the Provoſt

Provoſt of the *Dieci*. It belongs to theſe three Magiſtrates to aſſemble the Council of Ten, which they are oblig'd to do weekly of courſe, and oftner as they ſee occaſion. The Council being aſſembl'd, any one of the Signory, or two of the *Capi* may propoſe to it: the power which they now exerciſe (and wherein for their aſſiſtance they create three Magiſtrates call'd the *Grand Inquiſitors*) conſiſts in the puniſhment of certain heinous Crimes, eſpecially that of Treaſon; in relation whereto they are as it were Sentinels, ſtanding upon the guard of the Common-wealth: But conſtitutively (with the addition of a *Junta*, conſiſting of other fifteen, together with ſome of the chief Magiſtrates having Right in caſes of important ſpeed or ſecreſy to this Council) they have the full and abſolute Power of the whole Common-wealth as Dictator. Chap. 12.

THAT *Venice* either tranſcrib'd the whole and every part of her Conſtitution out of *Athens* and *Lacedemon*, or happens to be fram'd as if ſhe had ſo done, is moſt apparent. The reſult of this Common-wealth is in the Great Council, and the Debate in the Senate: ſo was it in *Lacedemon*. A Decree made by the Senate of *Athens* had the power of a Law for one year without the People, at the end whereof the People might revoke it: A Decree of the Senate of *Venice* ſtands good without the Great Council, unleſs theſe ſee reaſon to revoke it. The *Prytans* were a Council preparing buſineſs for the Senate; ſo is the *Collegio* in *Venice*: the Preſidents of the *Prytans* were the ten *Proedri*; thoſe of the *Collegio* are the three Provoſts of the *Savi*. The Archons or Princes of *Athens* being nine, had a kind of Sovereign Inſpection upon all the Orders of the Common-wealths; ſo has the Signiory of *Venice*, conſiſting of nine beſides the Duke. The Quarancies in *Venice* are Judicatories of the nature of the *Heliæa* in *Athens*: and as the *Theſmothetæ* heard and introduc'd the cauſes into that Judicatory, ſo do the *Avogadori* and the *Auditori* into theſe. The *Conſiglio de' Dieci* in *Venice* is not of the Body, but an Appendix of the Common-wealth; ſo was the Court of the *Ephori* in *Lacedemon*: and as theſe had power to put a King, a Magiſtrate, or any Delinquent of what degree ſoever to death, ſo has the *Conſiglio de' Dieci*. This again is wrought up with the *Capi de' Dieci*, and the weekly Provoſt, as were the *Prytans* with the *Proedri*, and the weekly *Epiſtata*; and the Ballot is lineally deſcended from the Bean: yet is *Venice* in the whole, and in every part, a far more exquiſite Policy than either *Athens* or *Lacedemon*.

A POLITICAL is like a natural Body. Common-wealths reſemble and differ, as Men reſemble and differ; among whom you ſhall not ſee two Faces, or two Diſpoſitions, that are alike. PETER and THOMAS in all their parts are equally Men, and yet PETER and THOMAS of all Men may be the moſt unlike; one may have his greater ſtrength in his Arms, the other in his Legs; one his greater Beauty in his Soul, the other in his Body; one may be a fool, the other wiſe; one valiant, the other cowardly. Theſe two, which at a diſtance you will not know one from the other, when you look nearer, or come to be better acquainted with, you will never miſtake. Our Conſiderer (who in his Epiſtle would make you believe that *Oceana* is but a mere Tranſcription out of *Venice*) has Companions like himſelf; and how near they look into matters of this nature is plain, while one knows not JETHRO from MOSES, and the

other takes a ſtate of Civil War to be the beſt model of a Civil Government.

LET a Man look near, and he ſhall not find any one Order in *Oceana* (the Ballot only excepted) that has not as much difference from, or reſemblance to any one Order in *Rome* or *Venice*, as any one Order in *Rome* or *Venice* has from, or to any one Order in *Athens* or *Lacedemon:* Which different temper of the parts muſt of neceſſity in the whole yield a Reſult, a Soul or Genius, altogether new in the World, as imbracing both the Arms of *Rome*, and the Counſils of *Venice*; and yet neither obnoxious to the Turbulency of the one, nor the narrowneſs of the other.

BUT the ſum of what has been ſaid of *Venice*, as to the buſineſs in hand, comes to no more than that the Senate and the Magiſtracy of this Common-wealth are upon Rotation. No more: nay I am well if it comes to ſo much. For the Prevaricator catching me up, where I ſay, that for all this the greater Magiſtracies in *Venice* are continually wheel'd thro' a few hands, tells me, that *I have confeſt it to be otherwiſe*. I have indeed confeſt, that tho' the Magiſtracies are all confer'd for certain terms, yet thoſe terms do not neceſſitate Vacations; that is, the term of a Magiſtracy being expir'd, the Party that bore it is capable upon a new Election of baring it again without interval or vacation: which does not altogether fruſtrate the Rotation of the Common-wealth, tho' it renders the ſame very imperfect. This infirmity of *Venice* derives from a complication of Cauſes, none of which is incident to a Common-wealth conſiſting of the Many: wherefore there lies no obligation upon me to diſcover the reaſon in this place. But on the contrary, ſeeing, let me ſhew things never ſo new, they are ſlighted as old, I have an obligation in this place, to try whether I may get eſteem by concealing ſomething. What is ſaid, every body knew before; this is not ſaid, who knows it?

Confid. *p.* 93.

A Riddle.

" RIDDLE me, Riddle me, what is this? The Magiſtracies in " *Venice* (except ſuch as are rather of Ornament than of Power) are all " annual, or at moſt biennial. No man whoſe term is expir'd, can " hold his Magiſtracy longer, but by a new Election. The Elections " are moſt of them made in the great Council, and all by the Ballot, " which is the moſt equal and impartial way of Suffrage, And yet " the greater Magiſtracies are perpetually wheel'd thro' a few hands."

IF I be worthy to give advice to a man that would ſtudy the Politicks, let him underſtand *Venice*; he that underſtands *Venice* right, ſhall go neareſt to judge (notwithſtanding the difference that is in every Policy) right of any Government in the World. Now the aſſault of the Conſiderer deriving but from ſome Pique or Emulation which of us ſhould be the abler Politician, if the Council of State had the curioſity to know either that, or who underſtands *Venice*, this Riddle would make the diſcovery; for he that cannot eaſily unfold this Riddle, does not underſtand her.

THE ſixth kind of Rotation is when a Common-wealth goes upon it in all her Orders, Senate, People, and Magiſtracy. Such a one taking in the Many, and being fix'd upon the foot of a ſteady Agrarian, has attain'd to perfect Equality. But of this an example there is none, or you muſt accept of *Oceana*.

THE

Chap. 12.

Rotation of Oceana.

THE Rotation of *Oceana* is of two parts, the one of the Electors which is annual, and the other of the Elected which is triennial.

SPEAKING of Electors in this ſenſe, I mean as the great Council in *Venice* are Electors of all other Orders, Councils or Magiſtrates. But the Common-wealth of *Oceana* taking in the whole People, cannot, as does the Great Council of *Venice* (wherein they that have right are but a few) attain to this capacity at one ſtep: for which cauſe ſhe takes three ſteps; one at the Pariſhes, where every fifth Elder is annually elected by the whole People. There is no doubt but there was ſome ſuch Order in *Iſrael* whereby the monthly Rotation of her Congregation or Prerogative, by election of two thouſand in each Tribe, was preſerv'd. The next ſtep ſhe takes is at the Hundred, whereby election of Officers and Magiſtrates, the Troops choſen at the Pariſhes, are very near form'd. Her third ſtep is at the Tribe, where the whole body of her Deputies are in exact Form, Diſcipline and Function, headed by proper Officers and Magiſtrates, theſe altogether conſiſting of one fifth part of the whole People. This Rotation being in it ſelf annual, comes in regard of the body of the People to be quinquennial, or ſuch as in the ſpace of five years gives every man his turn in the power of Election.

BUT tho' every man be ſo capable of being an Elector, that he muſt have his turn; yet every man is not ſo capable of being elected into thoſe Magiſtracies that are Sovereign, or have the leading of the whole Common-wealth, that it can be ſafe to lay a neceſſity that every man muſt take his turn in theſe alſo: but it is enough that every man, who in the Judgment and Conſcience of his Country is fit, may take his turn. Wherefore upon the Conſcience of the Electors, ſo conſtituted as has been ſhewn, it goes to determine who ſhall partake of Sovereign Magiſtracy, or be at the Aſſembly of a Tribe elected into the Senate or Prerogative; which Aſſemblies are ſo triennial, that one third part of each falling every year, and another being elected, the Parliament is thereby perpetuated.

SUCH was the Conſtitution of thoſe Councils which the Prevaricator has confeſt he always thought admirable, but now the toy makes him to be quite of another mind; for, ſays he, *That antient Republics have thro' a malicious Jealouſy* (let them take it among them) *made it unlawful even for Perſons of the cleareſt merit to continue long in command, but have by perpetual viciſſitude ſubſtituted new men in the Government, is manifeſt enough; but with what ſucceſs they did this, will beſt appear by* VETURIUS, VARRO, *and* MANCINUS. He is ſtill admirable: One would wonder what he means; if it be that there were but three weak or unfortunate Generals in the whole courſe of *Rome*, how ſtrange is it to urge this as an Argument againſt Rotation, which is as ſtrong a one as can be urg'd for Rotation? If the *Romans* by this way of Election having experience of an able General, knew ever after where to have him; or lighting upon one they found not ſo fit for their purpoſe, could in the compaſs of one year be rid of him of courſe, without diſhonour or reproach to him, taking thereby a warning to come no more there; was this a proceeding to favour malice? or ſuch an one as, removing the cauſe of malice, left no root for ſuch a branch or poſſibility of like effect? Certainly by this aſſertion the Prevaricator has jolted his preſumptuous Head not only againſt the prudence of antient Common-wealths, but of God himſelf in that of

Conſid. *p.* 90.

Iſrael.

Book I. *Iſrael.* VETURIUS, VARRO, and MANCINUS (tho' ſome of them cannot be at all points excus'd) by this mark upon them, may be thought hardlier of than is needful; for which cauſe there being that alſo in their Stories which is neither unpleaſant nor unprofitable, I ſhall endeavour to make the Reader ſomewhat better acquainted with them. One of the greateſt blows *Rome* ever receiv'd was by PONTIUS, Captain General of the *Samnites*, who having drawn her Conſuls, POSTHUMIUS and VETURIUS, by Stratagem into the Straits of *Caudium*, a Valley of narrow entrance, and ſhut up the mouth of it by poſſeſſing himſelf of the only Paſſage, the reſt being inviron'd with inſuperable Rocks, the *Samnit* came to have both the Armies, and ſo upon the matter the whole ſtrength (in thoſe days) of *Rome* inevitably at his diſcretion. Hereupon, having leiſure, and being deſirous (in a matter of ſuch moment) of good advice, he diſpatch'd a Meſſenger to his Father HERENNIUS, the ableſt Counſellor in *Samnium*, to know what might be his beſt courſe with the *Romans* now unavoidably at his mercy, who anſwer'd, *that he ſhould open the Paſs, and let them return untouch'd.* The young General amaz'd at this Counſel, deſir'd farther direction; whereupon HERENNIUS for the ſecond time made anſwer, *that he ſhould cut them off to a man.* But the General, upon the ſtrange diſagreement of ſuch opinions, having his Father's Age (for he was very old) in ſuſpicion, took a third courſe, which *neither* (according to the firſt advice of wiſe HERENNIUS) *making Friends, nor*, according to the ſecond, *deſtroying Enemies*, became as he propheſy'd the utter Ruin of the Common-wealth of *Samnium*. For the *Romans* being diſmiſt ſafe, but ignominiouſly, the Senate upon their return fell into the greateſt ſtrait and conſternation that had been known among them. On the one ſide, to live and not revenge ſuch an affront was intolerable; on the other, to revenge it was againſt the Faith of the Conſuls, whoſe neceſſity (the loſs of two Armies lying upon it) had in truth forc'd them to accept of a diſhonourable League with the *Samnites*. Now not the Armies, but the Senate it ſelf was in *Caudium*, not a man of them could find the way out of this Vale inviron'd with Rocks, but he only that could not find it out of the other; POSTHUMIUS, who having firſt ſhew'd, that neither War nor Peace could be ſo made, as to engage the Common-wealth *(injuſſu Populi)* without the Command of the People, declar'd that the Senate returning the Conſuls, with ſuch others as had conſented to ſo wicked and diſhonourable a Peace, naked, and bound to the *Samnites*, were free: nor ceas'd he till the Senate (thereto preſt by the neceſſity of the Common-wealth) reſolving accordingly, He, VETURIUS, and ſome of the Tribunes were deliver'd to the *Samnites*; who, nevertheleſs, to hold the *Romans* to their League, diſmiſs'd them with ſafety. The Diſputes on either ſide that aroſe hereupon, and, coming to Arms, ended with the deſtruction of *Samnium*, I omit. That which as to the preſent occaſion is material, is the Reputation of the Conſuls; and VETURIUS, tho' he were not the leading man, being for the reſt as deep in the Action as POSTHUMIUS, the People were ſo far from thinking themſelves deceiv'd in this choice, that the Conſuls were more honour'd in *Rome* for having loſt, than PONTIUS in *Samnium* for having won the day at *Caudium*.

Liv. l. 9.

I DO not rob Graves, nor ſteal Winding-ſheets; my Controverſies are not but with the Living, with none of theſe that have not ſhew'd themſelves beſt able for their own defence; nor yet with ſuch but in the proſecution of Truths oppos'd by them to the damage of Mankind: yet the Prevaricator accuſes me of rude charges. What are his then in defence of Falſhood, and againſt ſuch as cannot bite? or whether of theſe is the more noble? Chap. 12.

FOR VARRO, who being Conſul of *Rome*, loſt the battle of *Cannæ* to HANNIBAL, Captain General for the *Carthaginians*, tho' without Cowardice, yet by Raſhneſs, he is not ſo excuſable.

BUT for MANCINUS, brought (as was POSTHUMIUS by the *Samnites*) to diſhonourable conditions by MEGERA, Captain General of the *Numantines*, there be excuſes: As firſt, the *Numantines*, for their number not exceeding four thouſand fighting men, were the gallanteſt of ſo many, on which the Sun ever ſhone. Florus, l. 2. c. 18.

FOURTEEN years had their Common-wealth held tack with the *Romans*, in Courage, Conduct, and Virtue, having worſted POMPEY the Great, and made a League with him, when ſhe might have made an end of him, e're ever MANCINUS (of whom CICERO gives a fair Character) came in play: So his Misfortunes, having great examples, cannot want ſome excuſe. But ſuppoſe none of them deſerv'd any excuſe, what is it at which theſe examples drive? againſt a Common-wealth? Sure the *Samnites*, the *Carthaginians*, the *Numantines* were as well Common-wealths as the *Romans*; and ſo wherever the advantage goes, it muſt ſtay upon a Common-wealth: or if it be Rotation that he would be at (for we muſt gueſs) granting PONTIUS the *Samnite*, and MEGERA, the *Numantine*, to have been no more upon Rotation, than HANNIBAL the *Carthaginian*; yet is it plain that *Rome* upon her Rotation overcame not only PONTIUS, HANNIBAL and MEGERA, but *Samnium*, *Carthage*, and *Numantia*. So much for *Rome*; but, ſays he, *No leſs appears by the Rabble of Generals often made uſe of by the* Athenians, *while men of Valour and Conduct have lain by the walls.* Conſid. p. 91.

A RABBLE of Generals did I never hear of before; but not to meddle with his Rhetoric, whereas each of his Objections has at leaſt ſome one Contradiction in it, this has two (one *à priori*, another *à poſteriori*) one in the ſnout, another in the tail of it. For had there been formerly no Rotation in *Athens*, how ſhould there have been *men of Valour and Conduct to lie by the Walls?* And if Rotation thenceforth ſhould have ceas'd, how could *thoſe men of Valour and Conduct* have done otherwiſe than *lie by the Walls?* So this inavoidably confeſſes, that Rotation was the means whereby *Athens* came to be ſtor'd with Perſons *of Valour and Conduct*, they to be capable of Employment, and the Common-wealth to employ the whole Virtue of her Citizens: And it being, in his own words, an *Argument of much imperfection in a Government not to dare to employ the whole Virtue of the Citizens*, this wholly routs a ſtanding General; for the Government that dares employ but the Virtue of one, dares not employ the Virtue of all. Yet he jogs on.

THOSE Orders muſt needs be againſt Nature, which, excluding Perſons of the beſt Qualifications, give admiſſion to others, who have nothing to commend them but their Art in canvaſſing for the ſuffrage of the People. He never takes notice that the Ballot bars Canvaſſing beyond all poſſi- Conſid. p. 91.

Book. I. bility of any ſuch thing; but we will let that go. Canvaſſing, it is confeſt, was more frequent in *Rome* and *Athens* than is laudable, where nevertheleſs it is the ſtronger Argument for the integrity of popular Suffrage, which, being freed from any aid of Art, produc'd in thoſe Common-wealths more illuſtrious examples (if a man goes no further than PLUTARCH's Lives) than are to be found in all the reſt of Story.

Conſid. p. 91. *YET*, ſays he, *this Law has been as often broken as a Common-wealth has been brought into any exigence; for the hazard of truſting Affairs in weak hands then appearing, no ſcruple has been made to trample upon this Order, for giving the Power to ſome able man at that time render'd incapable by the Vacation this Law requires. The continuation of the Conſulſhip of* MARIUS *is ſufficient to be alledg'd for the proof of this, tho', if occaſion were, it might be back'd by plenty of examples.* His choice confutes his pretended variety, who jeſts with edg'd tools: this example above all will cut his fingers; for by this prolongation of Magiſtracy, or, to ſpeak more properly, of Empire (for the Magiſtracy of the Conſul was Civil, and confer'd by the People *Centuriatis Comitiis*, but his Empire was Military, and confer'd *Curiatis*) *Rome* began to drive thoſe wheels of her Rotation heavily in MARIUS, which were quite taken off in CÆSAR.

I HAVE heretofore in vain perſuaded them upon this occaſion, to take notice of a Chapter in MACHIAVEL, ſo worthy of regard, that I have now inſerted it at length, as follows:

Mach. Diſcor. B. 3. c. 24. " THE Proceedings of the *Roman* Common-wealth being well conſider'd, two things will be found to have been the cauſes of her " diſſolution. The Contention that happen'd thro' the endeavour of " the People (always oppos'd or eluded by the Nobility) to introduce " an Agrarian, and the damage that accru'd from the prolongation of " Empire; which miſchiefs, had they been foreſeen in due time, " the Government by application of fit Remedies might have been of " longer life and better health. The Diſeaſes which this Common-" wealth, from contention about the Agrarian, contracted, were acute " and tumultuous; but thoſe being ſlower, and without tumult, which " ſhe got by prolungation of Empire, were Chronical, and went home " with her, giving a warning by her example, how dangerous it is to " States that would enjoy their Liberty, to ſuffer Magiſtracy (how de-" ſervedly ſoever confer'd) to remain long in the poſſeſſion of the ſame " man. Certainly if the reſt of the *Romans*, whoſe Empire happen'd " to be prolong'd, had been as virtuous and provident as LUCIUS " QUINTIUS, they had never run into this inconvenience. Of ſuch " wholeſome example was the goodneſs of this man, that the Senate " and the People, after one of their ordinary Diſputes, being come " to ſome accord, whereas the People had prolong'd the Magiſtracy of " their preſent Tribunes, in regard they were Perſons more fitly op-" pos'd to the Ambition of the Nobility, than by a new Election they " could readily have found; when hereupon the Senate (to ſhew " they needed not be worſe at this game) would have prolong'd the " Conſulate to QUINTIUS, he refus'd his conſent, ſaying that ill ex-" amples were to be corrected by good ones, and not encourag'd by " others like themſelves; nor could they ſtir his Reſolution, by which " means they were neceſſitated to make new Conſuls. Had this Wiſ-" dom and Virtue, I ſay, been duly regarded, or rightly underſtood, it might

" might have ſav'd *Rome*, which thro' this neglect came to ruin. The Chap. 12.
" firſt whoſe Empire happen'd to be prolong'd was PUBLILIUS PHILO,
" his Conſulate expiring at the Camp before *Palæpolis*, while it ſeem- Liv. l. 8.
" ed to the Senate that he had the Victory in his hand *(actum cum*
" *Tribunis Plebis eſt, ad Populum ferrent ut cum Philo Conſulatu*
" *abiiſſet, Proconſul rem gereret)* they ſent him no Succeſſor, but pro-
" long'd his Empire, by which means he came to be the firſt Pro-
" conſul. An Expedient (tho' introduc'd for the public good) that
" came in time to be the public bane: For by how much the *Roman*
" Armies march'd further off, by ſo much the like courſe ſeeming to
" be the more neceſſary, became the more cuſtomary; whence en-
" ſu'd two pernicious conſequences: The one, that there being fewer
" Generals, and Men of known Ability for Conduct, the Art with
" the reputation of the ſame came to be more ingroſt, and obnoxious
" to Ambition: the other, that a General ſtanding long, got ſuch
" hold upon his Army, as could take them off from the Senate, and
" hang them on himſelf. Thus MARIUS and SYLLA could be fol-
" low'd by the Soldiery to the detriment of the Common-wealth, and
" CÆSAR to her perdition. Whereas had *Rome* never prolong'd Em-
" pire, ſhe might perhaps not ſo ſoon have arriv'd at Greatneſs or Ac-
" quiſition, but would have made leſs haſte to deſtruction.

ALL the *Dilemma* that MACHIAVEL obſerves in theſe words is, that if a Common-wealth will not be ſo ſlow in her acquiſition as is requir'd by Rotation, ſhe will be leſs ſure than is requiſite to her preſervation. But the Prevaricator (not vouchſafing to ſhew us upon what reaſons or experience he grounds his Maxim) is poſitive, *That* Conſid, *p.* 92.
the Dilemma into which a Common-wealth is in this caſe brought, is very dangerous; for either ſhe muſt give her ſelf a mortal blow by gaining the habit of infringing ſuch Orders as are neceſſary for her preſervation, or receive one from without.

THIS ſame is another *Parakeetiſm:* theſe words are ſpoken by me, after MACHIAVEL, in relation to Dictatorian Power, in which they are ſo far from concluding againſt Rotation, that this in caſe of a Dictator is more eſpecially neceſſary *(maxima libertatis cuſtodia eſt,* Mamercus a-
ut magna imperia diuturna non ſint, & temporis modus imponatur, qui- pud Liv. l. 4.
bus juris imponi non poteſt) which could not be more confirm'd than by him, who in the example of MARIUS ſhews that the contrary courſe ſpoil'd all.

THE *Romans*, if they had ſent a Succeſſor to PUBLILIUS PHILO at *Palæpolis*, it may be might have let the Victory ſlip out of his hands, it may be not; however this had been no greater wound to the Common-wealth, than that her Acquiſition would have been ſlower, which ought not to come in competition with the ſafety of a Government, and therefore amounts not to a Dilemma, this being a kind of Argument that ſhould not be ſtub'd of one horn, but have each of equal length and danger. Nor is it ſo certain that increaſe is ſlower for Rotation, ſeeing neither was this interrupted by that, nor that by this, as the greateſt Actions of *Rome*, the Conqueſt of *Carthage* by SCIPIO AFRICANUS, of MACEDON by FLAMINIUS, and of ANTIOCHUS by ASIATICUS, are irrefragable Teſtimonies.

I WOULD be loth to ſpoil the Conſiderer's preferment; but he is not a ſafe Counſellor for a Prince, whoſe Providence not ſupplying the defect of Rotation, whether in civil or military affairs, with ſome-

thing

Book. I. thing of like nature, expoſes himſelf if not his Empire as much to danger as a Common-wealth. Thus the Sons of *Zerviah*, *Joab* Captain of the Hoſt, and *Abiſhai* his Brother, were too ſtrong for *David*; thus the Kings of *Iſrael* and of *Juda* fell moſt of them by their Captains or Favourites, as I have elſewhere obſerv'd more particularly. Thus *Brutus* being ſtanding Captain of the Guards, could caſt out *Tarquin*; thus *Sejanus* had means to attempt againſt *Tiberius*; *Otho* to be the Rival of *Galba*, *Caſperius Ælianus* of *Nerva*, *Caſſius* of *Antoninus*, *Perennis* of *Commodus*, *Maximinus* of *Alexander*, *Philippus* of *Gordian*, *Æmilianus* of *Gallus*; *Ingebus Lollianus*, *Aureolus*, of *Gallienus*; *Magneſius* of *Conſtantius*, *Maximus* of *Gratian*, *Arbogaſtes* of *Valentinian*, *Ruffinus* of *Arcadius*, *Stilico* of *Honorius*. Go from the Weſt into the Eaſt: upon the death of *Marcianus*, *Aſparis* alone, having the command of the Arms, could prefer *Leo* to the Empire; *Phocas* deprive *Mauritius* of the ſame; *Heraclius* depoſe *Phocas*; *Leo Iſaurius* do as much to *Theodoſius Adramittenus*; *Nicephorus* to *Irene*, *Leo Armenius* to *Michael Curopalates*, *Romanus Lagapenus* to *Conſtantine*, *Nicephorus Phocas* to *Romanus Puer*, *Johannes Ziſmiſces* to *Nicephorus Phocas*, *Iſaac Comnenus* to *Michael Stratioticus*, *Botoniates* to *Michael* the Son of *Ducas*, *Alexius Comnenus* to *Botoniates:* which work continu'd in ſuch manner till the deſtruction of that Empire. Go from the Eaſt to the North: *Guſtavus* attain'd to the Kingdom of *Sweden*, by his Power and Command of an Army; and thus *Secechus* came near to ſupplant *Boleſlaus* the Third of *Poland*. If *Walleſtein* had liv'd, what had become of his Maſter? In *France* the Race of *Pharamond* was extinguiſh'd by *Pipin*; and that of *Pipin* in like manner, each by the Major of the Palace, a ſtanding Magiſtracy of exorbitant Truſt. Go to the *Indies:* You ſhall find a King of *Pegu* to have been thruſt out of the Realm of *Tangu* by his Captain General. Nay go where you will, tho' this be pretty well, you ſhall add more than one example. But as to the Prevaricator, if he was not given to make ſuch mouths, as eat up nothing elſe but his own words, I needed not have brought any other Teſtimony to abſolve a Common-wealth of Malice in this order than his own, where he ſays, *that when ſome Perſon over-tops the reſt in Commands, it is a Diſeaſe of Monarchy which eaſily admits of this cure, that he be reduc'd to a leſs Volume, and level'd to an equality with the reſt of his Order.* Now a Prince can no otherwiſe level a Nobleman, that excels the reſt thro' Command, to equality with his Order, than by cauſing thoſe of the ſame Order to take their turns in like command. *Good Wits have ill Memories. But,* ſays he, *I know not what advantage Mr.* HARRINGTON *may foreſee from the Orders of this Rotation, for my part I can diſcover no other effect of it than this, that in a Common-wealth like that of* Oceana, *taking in the Many (for in* Venice *he confeſſes it to be otherwiſe) where every man will preſs forward towards Magiſtracy, this Law by taking off at the end of one year ſome Officers, and all at the end of three, will keep the Republic in a perpetual Minority: No man having time allow'd him to gain that Experience, which may ſerve to lead the Common-wealth to the underſtanding of her true Intereſt either at home or abroad.*

2. Sam. 3. 39.

Conſid. *p.* 47, 48.

Conſid. *p.* 93.

WHAT

WHAT I have confeſt to be otherwiſe in *Venice*, I have ſhewn already at leaſt ſo far as concerns the preſent occaſion, the cauſes of that defect being incompatible with a Common-wealth conſiſting of the Many; otherwiſe why was not the like found in *Athens* or *Rome?* where tho' every man preſt forward towards Magiſtracy, yet the Magiſtrates were, for illuſtrious examples, more in weight and number than are to be found in all the reſt of the world. Chap. 12.

IF where Elections were the moſt expos'd to the Ambition of the Competitor, and the humours of the People, they yet fail'd not to excel all others that were not popular, what greater Vindication can there be of the natural integrity of popular Suffrage even at the worſt? But this, where it is given by the Ballot, is at the beſt, and free from all that preſſing for Magiſtracy in the Competitor, or Faction of the People that can any ways be laid to the former: or let the Conſiderer conſider again, and tell me by what means either of theſe in ſuch a State can be dangerous or troubleſome; or if at worſt the Orders for Election in *Oceana* muſt not perform that part, better than a Crowd and a Sheriff. Well; but putting the caſe the Elections which were not quarrel'd much withal be rightly ſtated, yet this Law for Terms and Vacations, *by taking off at the end of one year ſome Officers, and all at the end of three, will keep the Republic in perpetual Minority no man having time allow'd him to gain that Experience, which may ſerve to lead the Common-wealth to the underſtanding of her true Intereſt at home or abroad.* Becauſe every man will preſs forward for Magiſtracy, therefore there ought not to be Terms and Vacations, leſt theſe ſhould keep the Common-wealth in perpetual Minority. I would once ſee an Argument that might be reduc'd to Mode and Figure. The next objection is, that theſe Orders *take off at the end of one year ſome Officers*, which is true, and *that at the end of three years they take off all*, which is falſe; for whereas the Leaders of the Common-wealth are all triennial, the Orders every year take off no more than ſuch only as have finiſh'd their three years term, which is not all, but a third part. Wherefore let him ſpeak out; three years is too ſhort a term for acquiring that knowledge which is neceſſary to the leading of a Common-wealth. To let the courſes of *Iſrael* which were monthly, and the annual Magiſtracies of *Athens* and *Rome* go; if three years be too ſhort a term for this purpoſe, what was three months? A Parliament in the late Government was rarely longer liv'd than three months, nor more frequent than once in a year; ſo that a man having been twelve years a Parliament-man in *England*, could not have born his Magiſtracy above three years, tho' he were not neceſſarily ſubject to any Vacation. Whereas a Parliament in *Oceana* may in twelve years have born his Magiſtracy ſix, notwithſtanding the neceſſity of his Vacations. Now which of theſe two are moſt ſtraiten'd in the time neceſſary to the gaining of due experience or knowledge for the leading of a Common-wealth? Nevertheleſs the Parliament of *England* was ſeldom or never without men of ſufficient Skill and Ability; tho' the Orders there were more in number, leſs in method, not written, and of greater difficulty than they be in *Oceana*. There, if not the Parliament-man, the Parliament it ſelf was upon Terms and Vacations, which to a Council of ſuch a nature is the moſt dangerous thing in the world, ſeeing Diſſolution, whether to a Body natural or political, is Death. For if Parliament happen'd to riſe again and again, this was

Book I. not ſo much coming to themſelves (ſeeing a Council of ſo different Genius had not been known) as a new Birth; and a Council that is every year new born indeed muſt keep a Common-wealth in perpetual Minority, or rather Infancy, always in danger of being overlaid by her Nurſe, or ſtrangl'd by her Guardian: whereas an Aſſembly continu'd by Succeſſion, or due Rotation regulated by Terms, giving ſufficient time for digeſtion, grows up, and is like a man, who tho' he changes his Fleſh, neither changes his Body nor his Soul. Thus the Senate of *Venice* changing Fleſh, tho' not ſo often as in a Common-wealth conſiſting of the Many were requiſite, yet oftenеſt of any other in the world, is, both in Body and Soul, or Genius, the moſt unchangeable Council under Heaven. Fleſh muſt be chang'd, or it will ſtink of it ſelf; there is a Term neceſſary to make a man able to lead the Common-wealth to her Intereſt, and there is a Term that may inable a man to lead the Common-wealth to his Intereſt. In this regard it is, that, according to MAMERCUS, the Vacations are *(maxima libertatis cuſtodia)* the Keepers of the Liberties of *Oceana*.

THE three Regions into which each of the leading Councils is divided, are three Forms, as I may ſay, in the School of State: for them of the third, tho' there be care in the choice, it is no ſuch great matter what be their Skill; the Ballot which they practiſ'd in the Tribe being that in the performance whereof no man can be out: and this is all that is neceſſary to their Novitiate or firſt year, during which time they may be Auditors. By the ſecond, they will have ſeen all the Scenes, or the whole Rotation of the Orders, ſo facile, and ſo intelligible, that at one reading a man underſtands them as a Book, but at once acting as a Play; and ſo methodical, that he will remember them better. Tell me then what it is that can hinder him for the ſecond year from being a Speaker; or why for the third, ſhould he not be a very able Leader.

THE Senate and the Prerogative, or Repreſentative of the People, being each of like conſtitution, drop annually four hundred, which in a matter of ten years amount to four thouſand experienc'd Leaders, ready upon new Elections to reſume their leading.

ANOTHER thing which I would have conſider'd is, whether our moſt eminent men found their Parts in Parliament, or brought them thither. For if they brought them, think you not the military Orders of the Youth, the Diſcipline of the Tribes, the eight years Orb of the Embaſſadors, the provincial Armies of *Oceana*, likely to breed men of as good Parts, as to ſuch matters? Nor have Aſtronomers that familiarity with the Stars, which men without theſe Orbs will have with ſuch as are in them. He is very dull, who cannot perceive that in a Government of this frame the Education muſt be univerſal, or diffus'd throughout the whole Body. Another thing which is as certain as comfortable, is that the pretended depth and difficulty in matters of State is a mere cheat. From the beginning of the World to this day, you never found a Common-wealth where the Leaders having honeſtly enough, wanted skill enough to lead her to her true Intereſt at home or abroad: that which is neceſſary to this end, is not ſo much skill as Honeſty; and let the leaders of *Oceana* be diſhoneſt if they can. In the leading of a Common-wealth aright, this is certain, Wiſdom and Honeſty are all one: and tho' you ſhall find defects in their Virtue, thoſe that have had the feweſt, have ever been, and for ever ſhall be, the wiſeſt.

ROME

ROME was never ruin'd, till her Balance being broken, the Nobility forſaking their antient Virtue, abandon'd themſelves to their Luſts; and the Senators, who, as in the caſe of JUGURTHA, were all brib'd, turn'd Knaves; at which Turn all their Skill in Government (and in this never men had been better ſkill'd) could not keep the Common-wealth from overturning. CICERO, an honeſt man, labour'd might and main; POMPONIUS ATTICUS, another, deſpair'd, CATO tore out his own Bowels; the Poigniards of BRUTUS and CASSIUS neither conſider'd Prince nor Father: But the Common-wealth had ſprung her Planks, and ſpilt her Ballaſt; the world could not ſave her. Chap. 12.

FOR the cloſe, the Prevaricator, who had judg'd before, that *there was much reaſon to expect ſome of the Clergy (againſt all of whom Mr.* HARRINGTON *has declar'd War) would undertake the Quarrel,* tells me in the laſt line, that *there be to whom he has recommended the Diſquiſition of the Jewiſh Common-wealth.* Confid. *p.* 36. *p.* 94.

IT is a miſerable thing to be condemn'd to the perpetual Budget; once turn an honeſt man to me. In the mean time, that it may be further ſeen, how much I am delighted in fair play, ſince ſome Divines, it may be, are already at work with me, and I have not ſo fully explain'd my ſelf upon that Point, which with them is of the greateſt concernment, that they can yet ſay, they have peep'd into my hand, or ſeen my game; as I have won this trick, Gentlemen, or ſpeak, ſo I play them out the laſt Card in the next Book for Up.

An Advertiſement to the Reader, or a Direction contained in certain Queries, how the Common-wealth of Oceana *may be examin'd or anſwer'd by divers ſorts of men, without ſpoiling their high Dance, or cutting off any part of their Elegance, or freeneſs of Expreſſion.*

To the Scholar that has paſs'd his Novitiate in Story.

I. WHETHER the Balance of Property in Land coming thro' Civil Viciſſitude by ſlow and undiſcern'd degrees, to alter as it did, and to ſtand as it does in *Oceana*, any other Government could have been introduc'd, otherwiſe than by the interpoſition of foreign Arms, that could have ſubſiſted naturally without Violence or Reluctancy, or ſteadily without frequent Changes, Alterations, and Plunges, except that only of the Common-wealth propos'd?

II. WHETHER the Balance in Land ſo ſtanding, as has been ſhewn, the Common-wealth propos'd, being once eſtabliſh'd, *were without the immediate hand of God, as by Peſtilence, Famine, or Inundation, to be alter'd or broken; and which way?*

To the Godly Man.

I. WHETHER Human Prudence be not a Creature of God, and to what end God made this Creature?

II. WHETHER the Common-wealth of *Iſrael* in her main Orders, that is to ſay, the Senate, the People, and the Magiſtracy, was not

not erected by the ſame Rules of human Prudence with other Common-wealths?

III. WHETHER JETHRO were not a Heathen?

IV. WHETHER God did not approve of the Advice of JETHRO, in the Fabric of the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*?

V. WHETHER the natural Body of a Godly Man can any otherwiſe be ſaid to ſupport and nouriſh it ſelf in the Air, or between Heaven and Earth, than by a figurative Speech? or whether it be any more poſſible for the Political Body of a People ſo to do, than for the natural Body of a Godly Man?

To the Grandee, or Learned Common-wealthſman.

I. WHETHER a noble Houſe-keeper has a Horſe-keeper, that is as well to live as himſelf; and whether the Houſe-keeper, ſhould he loſe his Eſtate, would not be a Horſe-keeper rather than want Bread?

II. WHETHER Riches and Poverty, more or leſs, do not introduce Command or Obedience, more or leſs, as well in a public as in a private Eſtate?

III. WHETHER the Introduction of Command or Obedience, more or leſs, either in a public or private Eſtate, does not form or change the Genius of a Man, or of a People accordingly? Or what is the reaſon why the Peaſant in *France* is baſe, and the lower People in *England* of a high Courage?

IV. WHETHER the Genius of the People of *Oceana* has been of late years, or be devoted or addicted to the Nobility and the Clergy as in former times?

V. WHETHER the Genius of the People of *Oceana*, not being addicted to the Nobility and Clergy as formerly, can be ſaid to be for Monarchy, or againſt it?

VI. WHETHER the People be not frequently miſtaken in Names, while as to Things they mean otherwiſe; or whether the People of *Oceana* deſiring Monarchy in Name, do not in Truth deſire a Government of Laws, and not of Men?

VII. WHETHER for theſe Reaſons, not to know how to hold the Balance or Foundation of a Government ſteady, nor yet to reform, or vary the Orders of the ſame (as the Foundation comes to vary) be not to deliver a Nation to certain Ruin and Deſtruction?

To the Rational Man.

I. WHETHER there be any thing in this Fabric or Model that is contradictory to it ſelf, to Reaſon, or to Truth?

II. WHETHER a Common-wealth that is fram'd intire or complete in all her neceſſary Orders, without any manner of contradiction to her ſelf, to Reaſon, or to Truth, can yet be falſe or inſufficient?

THE

SECOND BOOK:

OR, A

Political Diſcourſe

CONCERNING

ORDINATION:

Againſt

Dr. *H. HAMMOND,*

Dr. *L. SEAMAN,*

And the AUTHORS they follow.

Optat Aprum aut fulvum deſcendere monte Leonem:

E. W.

4 O

Advertiſement to the READER.

BOOKS, eſpecially whoſe Authors have got themſelves Names, are Leaders; wherefore in caſe any of theſe err in Leading, it is not only lawful, but matter of Conſcience to a man that perceives it, as far as he is able to warn others, this were Apology enough for my writing againſt Dr. HAMMOND and Dr. SEAMAN; and yet I have happen'd to be brought under a farther Obligation to this enterprize, their Books having been ſent me by way of Objection againſt what I have formerly ſaid of Ordination, and am daily more and more confirm'd I ſhall make good. However there can be no great hurt in this Eſſay, Truth being, like Veniſon, not only the beſt Quarry, but the beſt Game.

Order of the Diſcourſe.

TO manage the preſent Controverſy with the more Clearneſs, I have divided my Diſcourſe into five Parts or Chapters.

THE Firſt, explaining the Words Chirotonia *and* Chirotheſia, *paraphraſticaly relates the Story of the Perambulation made by the Apoſtles* PAUL *and* BARNABAS *thro the Cities of* Lycaonia, Piſydia, *&c. by way of Introduction.*

THE Second ſhews thoſe Cities, or moſt of them, at the time of this Perambulation, to have been under popular Government. In which is contained the whole Adminiſtration of a Roman *Province.*

THE Third ſhews the Deduction of the Chirotonia *from Popular Government, and of the Original Right of Ordination from the* Chirotonia. *In which is contained the Inſtitution of the* Sanhedrim *or Senate of* Iſrael *by* MOSES, *and of that at* Rome *by* ROMULUS.

THE Fourth ſhews the Deduction of the Chirotheſia *from Monarchical or Ariſtocratical Government, and the ſecond way of Ordination from the* Chirotheſia. *In which is contain'd the Common-wealth of the* Jews *as it ſtood after the Captivity.*

THE Fifth debates whether the Chirotonia, *us'd in the Cities mention'd, was (as is pretended by Dr.* HAMMOND. *Dr.* SEAMAN, *and the Authors they follow) the ſame with the* Chirotheſia, *or a far different thing. In which are contained the divers kinds of Church-Government introduced and exercis'd in the age of the Apoſtles.*

I AM entring into a Diſcourſe to run much, for the Words, upon a Language not vulgar, which therefore I ſhall uſe no otherwiſe than by way of Parentheſis, not obſtructing the Senſe; and for the Things, upon Cuſtoms that are foreign, which therefore I ſhall interpret as well as I can. Now ſo to make my way into the parts of this diſcourſe, that (whereas they who have heretofore manag'd it in *Engliſh*, might in regard of their Readers have near as well written it in *Greek*) I may not be above the vulgar capacity, I ſhall open both the Names whereof, and the Things whereupon we are about to diſpute, by way of Introduction.

A Political Diſcourſe CONCERNING ORDINATION.

The INTRODUCTION, OR FIRST CHAPTER.

THE Names or Words whereof we are about to diſpute are *Greek*, the one *Chirotonia*, the other *Chirotheſia*. The firſt ſignification of the world *Chirotonia*, in SUIDAS, imports a certain lewd action of the hand, which ſeems alſo by the *Greek* that renders it by the ſame word, to have been intimated in *Iſa.* 5. 9. In the ſecond ſignification with SUIDAS, it is ψῆφος, πάντων χειροτονία, *Election* (that is to ſay of Magiſtrates) or *Ratification* (that is to ſay of Laws) *by the Many:* which amounts both by his Teſtimony, and that generally of antient Authors, to this, that the moſt uſual and natural ſignification of the word *Chirotonia* is *Popular Suffrage*, whether given, as when they ſpeak of *Athens*, by the holding up of hands; or as when they ſpeak (as does SUIDAS in the place mention'd) of *Rome*, and other Common-wealths (whoſe Suffrage was not given with this Ceremony) without holding up of hands.

CHIROTHESIA (ἐπίθεσις χειρῶν) is a word that in the ſtrict ſignification imports *laying on of hands*, and no more: but the *Jews* uſing to confer their Ordination moſt commonly by laying on of hands, and yet ſometimes by word of mouth, or by letter, the word both as it relates to the cuſtom of the *Jewiſh* Common-wealth, and Ordination thence tranſ-planted into the Church of CHRIST, ſignifies Ordination confer'd by one man, or a few men, that is to ſay, by ſome diſtinct Order from the People, whether with impoſition of hands, or without it.

THESE words thus interpreted, I ſhall throughout my diſcourſe (which elſe muſt have run altogether upon the *Greek*) preſume, as already I have done, to take for good *Engliſh*, and ſo proceed to the things whereof we are to diſpute; firſt, by opening the Scene of this Perambulation, which will be done beſt by the help of ERASMUS, a man as for his Learning not inferior to any, ſo for his freedom not addicted to Intereſts or Parties. For the remainder then of this Introduction, I ſhall begin with the nineteenth Verſe of the eleventh, and continue my diſcourſe to the end of the fourteenth Chapter of the *Acts*; interweaving the Text where it is darker with the Paraphraſe of that excellent Author, for light, and his Paraphraſe with the Text, where it is clearer, for brevity, in manner following.

THEY whom the heat of Perſecution from the Death of STEPHEN had diſpers'd, travel'd thro' the Cities and Villages as far as *Phenice*,

Book II. *nice*, and the adjacent Iſland of *Cyprus*; as alſo thro' *Antiochia*, which lies between *Phenice* and *Cilicia*, preaching the Goſpel receiv'd from
Acts 11. 19. the Apoſtles, which nevertheleſs they dar'd not to communicate but to ſuch only as were of the *Jewiſh* Nation, not out of Envy, but a kind of Superſtition, they believing that to do otherwiſe were to give the Childrens Bread to Dogs, which Chriſt had forbid.

BUT ſome of them that believ'd, being of *Cyprus* and *Cyrene*, when they came to *Antioch*, had the boldneſs to ſpeak of *Chriſt* to the *Greeks*, preaching the Lord *Jeſus*, in which they made ſuch progreſs thro' the Bleſſing of God upon them and their Labours, that a great number of theſe alſo believing the Goſpel, were turn'd to the Lord. The tidings of theſe things coming to the ears of the Church which was at *Jeruſalem*, a man of Apoſtolical Sincerity, *Barnabas* the *Levite*, a *Cyprian* born, was ſent by the Apoſtles to take a view of what was done upon the places; and if he found it to be according to the will of God, to approve of it, by authority of the Apoſtles. So great caution in receiving the *Gentils* to the Goſpel was not, that the thing was not greatly deſir'd by the Apoſtles; but leſt it ſhould afterwards be repeal'd or made void by the *Jews*, as done raſhly, or that the *Gentils* ſhould rely leſs upon what was done, as conceiving it needed ratification by the Law. Wherefore *Barnabas* ſo ſoon as he came to *Antioch*, and found the *Greeks* by Faith, and without profeſſion of the Law, to have receiv'd the ſame Grace of God with the *Jews*, was very much joy'd that the number of Believers increas'd, and exhorted them to remain conſtant in their Enterprize of adhering to the Lord. For he was a good man, and full of the Holy Spirit, and of Faith. Wherefore thro' his miniſtry it came to paſs, that a multitude of other Believers were added to the former. Now *Antioch* being not far from *Cilicia*, the Neighbourhood of the place invited him to ſeek *Paul*, the fitteſt helper in this work, as choſen by *Chriſt* to preach his Name to the *Gentils* and Kings of the Earth. For when *Paul* fled from *Jeruſalem*, the Diſciples had conducted him to *Ceſarea* of *Phenice*, whence he went to *Tarſus*; whom therefore when *Barnabas* had found there, he brought to *Antioch*, hoping in a City both famous and populous (but with a confus'd mixture of *Jews* and *Greeks*) to receive the better fruit thro' the aid of an Apoſtle more peculiarly deſign'd to this work. Theſe two being converſant a whole year in the Church of *Antioch*, which by the confluence both of *Jews* and *Greeks* became very numerous, ſo many were added by their preaching, that whereas hitherto, not expoſing the name of *Chriſt* to envy, they had been call'd *Diſciples*, they now began firſt at *Antioch* from the name of their Founder to be call'd *Chriſtians*. In theſe times certain Prophets came from the City of *Jeruſalem* to *Antioch*, whereof one named *Agabus* ſtanding up in the Congregation, ſignify'd by inſpiration, that there ſhould be a great Dearth thro' the whole world; which came to paſs under *Claudius Cæſar*, the Succeſſor of *Caligula*. At this time they at *Jeruſalem*, partly becauſe they were poor at their converſion to the Goſpel, partly becauſe they had depoſited their Goods in common, and partly becauſe they had been ſpoil'd by the Prieſt for their profeſſion of *Chriſt*, ordain'd that by the contribution of ſuch as had wherewithal, eſpecially among the believing *Gentils*, Money ſhould be ſent to the relief of the Chriſtians dwelling in *Judea*; but ſo that this Contribution was not to be forc'd but free, and according to every mans ability. This Money thus gather'd was ſent by *Paul* and *Barnabas* to the Elders at *Jeruſalem*, to be diſtributed at their diſcretion to ſuch

Chap. 1.

ſuch as were in need. While *Paul* and *Barnabas* were thus employ'd, King *Herod*, the ſame that beheaded *John*, and returned CHRIST cloth'd, thro' deriſion, in white, to *Pilate*, being griev'd to ſee this kind of People encreaſe, and the Name of *Jeſus* King of the *Jews* to grow famous in divers Nations, became concern'd to root out ſuch a Faction, and ſo ſpreading; wherefore he ſtretch'd forth his hand to vex certain of the Church, kill'd *James* the Brother of *John* with the Sword; and becauſe he ſaw it pleas'd the *Jews*, proceeded further to take *Peter* alſo, who being impriſon'd, was afterward miraculouſly deliver'd. But *Paul* and *Barnabas* having perform'd the Truſt committed to them by the Brethren, and deliver'd the Contribution for relief of the Poor to the Apoſtles, return'd from *Jeruſalem* to *Antioch*, taking with them *John*, whoſe Sirname was *Mark*.

NOW the Church of *Antioch* flouriſh'd in ſuch manner, that ſhe had ſome fill'd with the gift of Prophecy, and others with that of Teaching; among whom was *Barnabas* and *Simeon*, alias *Niger*, together with *Lucias* a *Cyrenian*, and *Manaen* who had been brought up with *Herod* the Tetrarch, whom he left to come to CHRIST: but the chief of them was *Saul*, endow'd with all the Gifts and Graces Apoſtolical. While all theſe were intent upon the Miniſtry of the Church, employing their ſeveral Gifts to the Glory of God, and in his moſt acceptable Service, the Salvation of Souls, with faſting and prayer, the Holy Ghoſt being ſtir'd up by their Zeal, ſignify'd his Will by the Prophets, ſaying, Separate me *Barnabas* and *Paul* for the Work whereto I have call'd them, namely, to be Doctors of the *Gentiles*, that by them I may propagate the Goſpel. The command of the Spirit was obey'd, and *Barnabas* with *Paul*, to the end that every one might ſee who were choſen, were ſeparated from the reſt; and when the Congregation had unanimouſly implor'd the favour of God by prayer and faſting, the moſt eminent in Authority among them laid their hands upon the Perſons ſo ſeparated, and ſent them wherever the Spirit of God ſhould direct them. By this impulſe therefore *Barnabas* and *Paul* went to *Seleucia*, being a Promontory of *Antiochia*, and thence ſail'd into the Iſland of *Cyprus*, where they landed at *Salamis*, a famous City upon the Eaſtern part of the Iſland; they preach'd not human Inventions, but the Word of God, nor that by ſtealth, but in the Synagogues of the *Jews*, whereof thro' the Neighbourhood of *Syria* there was ſtore. This Honour by the Commandment of CHRIST was always deferr'd to the *Jews*, that the Goſpel ſhould be firſt offer'd to them, leſt they being a querulous and repining Nation, ſhould complain that they were deſpis'd. Thus travel'd theſe Apoſtles thro' the whole Iſland, till they came to *Paphos*, a City conſecrated to *Venus* upon the Weſtern Coaſt of *Cyprus*. Here they found a certain Magician call'd *Barjeſus*, that is, the Son of *Jeſus* a *Jew*, both by Nation and Religion, under which colour he falſly pretended to the gift of Prophecy. This man follow'd the Court of *Sergius Paulus*, Pro-conſul or Governor of the Iſland for the *Romans*, otherwiſe a prudent man; but this ſort of Vermine inſinuates it ſelf into the beſt to chooſe, that ſo their Corruption may do the greater and more compendious miſchief to mankind. The Pro-conſul nevertheleſs having underſtood the Goſpel to be planting throughout *Cyprus*, not only forbore to ſtop the ears of others, but by ſending for *Barnabas* and *Paul* ſeem'd deſirous to open his own. Wherefore *Barjeſus* endeavouring to reſiſt the growth of the Word, as an Enemy to CHRIST, and reſiſting the Truth with Falſhood, a ſtrife aroſe between the true Prophets and a falſe one (for ſuch is the Interpretation of the *Syriac* word *Elymas*) whom *Paul* at length confuted of ſpiritual blindneſs, by tak-

Book II. ing away the eyes of his body, miraculouſly ſtruck in the preſence of the Pro-conſul, who at the ſame time receiving the light of the Goſpel, embrac'd the Chriſtian Faith. This being done at *Paphos*, *Paul* embark'd there with his Aſſociates for the leſſer *Aſia*, and came to *Perga*, being a City of *Pamphylia*; here *John*, whoſe Sirname was *Mark*, left them, and return'd to *Jeruſalem*, while they, when they had viſited *Pamphylia*, travel'd to *Antiochia*, a City of *Piſidia*, where having enter'd a Synagogue, they ſat after the uſual manner with the reſt, attentive to the Law and the Prophets; whereof when the Parts appointed were read, and no man ſtood up, the Rulers of the Synagogue perceiving that the Strangers by their habit were *Jews*, and ſuch as by their aſpect promis'd more than ordinary, ſent to them, deſiring that if they had any word of exhortation for the People, they would ſpeak. Whereupon *Paul* ſtanding up, preach'd to them CHRIST; whence came the Word of the Lord to be divulg'd throughout that Region, tho' the *Jews* out of envy to the *Gentiles*, ſtirring up the devouteſt Matrons *(An Art not unknown in theſe times)* and by them the chief of the City, rais'd ſuch Sedition in it, and Tumult againſt the Apoſtles, that *Paul* and *Barnabas* being caſt out, ſhook off the duſt from their feet againſt them, and went
Chap. 14.. thence to *Iconium* a City of *Lycaonia*. When they were come to *Iconium*, entring with the *Jews* after the cuſtom into the Synagogue, they preach'd, as they had at *Antioch*, the Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt, and with ſuch efficacy, that multitudes both of the *Jews* and *Greeks* believ'd. Here again the Envy of the *Jews* became the Author of Sedition, by which means the City was divided into two Parts or Factions, whereof one ſtood for the unbelieving *Jews*, and the other for the Apoſtles. At length when ſuch of the *Gentiles* as were join'd with the *Jews*, and the Rulers of the City, made an aſſault upon the Apoſtles, to offer violence and ſtone them; they being aware of it, fled to *Lyſtra* (a City of *Lycaonia*, which is a part of *Pamphylia)* and *Derbe*. At *Lyſtra* there was a man lame of his feet from the Womb, who having liſten'd to *Paul* with great Attention and Zeal, was miraculouſly cur'd by the Apoſtle; when the People ſeeing what *Paul* had done, cry'd out, The Gods were deſcended in the likeneſs of Men: a perſuaſion that might gain the more eaſily upon the minds of the *Lycaonians* for the Fable of *Jupiter* and *Mercury*, ſaid to have deſcended in human ſhape, and been entertain'd by *Lycaon*, from whom the *Lycaonians* receiv'd their name. Wherefore they call'd *Barnabas*, for the gravity of his aſpect, *Jupiter*; *Paul* for his Eloquence, *Mercury:* and the Prieſt of *Jupiter*, who dwelt in the Suburbs, brought Bulls and Garlands to the Gates of the Houſe where the Apoſtles were, to have offer'd Sacrifice with the People, which the Apoſtles abhorring, vigorouſly diſſuaded. In the mean time certain *Jews* by Nation that were Unbelievers, coming from *Antioch* of *Piſidia*, and *Iconium*, drew the People to the other extreme, who from ſacrificing to the Apoſtles fell on ſtoning them; a work which was brought ſo near to an end, that *Paul* being drawn by them out of the City, was left for dead, tho' he ſoon after recover'd, and went thence with *Barnabas* to *Derbe:* when they had propagated the Goſpel there alſo, they return'd to *Lyſtra*, *Iconium*, and *Antiochia*, confirming the Diſciples whom they had converted. Now becauſe the propagation of the Goſpel requir'd that the Apoſtles ſhould be moving thro' divers Nations, they *chirotonizing them Elders in every Congregation or Church*, that is, *ordaining them Elders by the Votes of the People in every City*, left them to perform the Duties of the abſent Apoſtles,

and

and when they had faſted and pray'd, commended them to the Lord. Chap. 2.
Theſe things being brought to a concluſion, or finiſh'd at *Antioch* in *Piſidia*, when they had perambulated this Country, they alſo viſited *Pamphylia*, ſowing the Goſpel where it was not yet ſown, and confirming thoſe who already believ'd, till they came to *Perga*: where having order'd their affairs, they proceeded to *Attalia*, being a maritime City of *Pamphylia*; and from thence they ſail'd back to *Antioch* of *Syria*, whence firſt they ſet out, with Commiſſion from the Elders, to preach the Goſpel to the *Gentiles*, and where by the *Chirotheſia*, or *Impoſition of hands*, Prayer and Faſting, they had been recommended to the Grace of God, and deſign'd to the Work now finiſh'd.

IN this Narrative you have mention both of the *Chirotonia* and of the *Chirotheſia*, or Impoſition of hands, but of the former as of Ordination; for by that ſuch were made Preſbyters or Church-Officers as were not ſo before: of the latter not, I think, as of Ordination, at leaſt in the ſenſe we now take it; but as of deſignation of Perſons to an occaſional and temporary employment, that had been ordain'd before, for ſo ſure had PAUL at leaſt. However, that which is offer'd by this Narrative to preſent conſideration, is no more than the bare Story.

CHAP. II.

That the Cities, or moſt of them nam'd in the Perambulation of the Apoſtles PAUL *and* BARNABAS, *were at that time under popular Government. In which is contain'd the Adminiſtration of a* Roman *Province.*

THE *Romans* of all Nations under Heaven were indow'd, as with the higheſt Virtues, ſo with the greateſt human Glory; which proceeded from this eſpecially, that they were in love with ſuch as were in love with their Liberty. To begin with their dawn, the *Privernates* (a free People inhabiting the City and Parts adjoining, which at this day is call'd *Piperno*, ſome fifty miles from *Rome*, and five from *Seſſe*) being the ſecond time conquer'd by the *Romans*, it was conſulted in the Senate what courſe ſhould be taken with them; where while ſome, according to the different temper of men, ſhew'd themſelves hotter, and others cooler, one of the *Privernates* more mindful of the condition wherein he was born, than of that wherein he was fallen, happen'd to render all more doubtful: for being ask'd by a Senator of the Severer judgment, what Puniſhment he thought the *Privernates* might deſerve, *Such* (ſays he) *as they deſerve who believe themſelves worthy of Liberty.* At the courage of which anſwer, the Conſul (perceiving in them that had been vehement enough before againſt the *Privernates* but the greater animoſity, to the end that by a gentler Interrogatory he might draw ſome ſofter anſwer from him) reply'd, *And what if we inflict no puniſhment at all, but pardon you; what Peace may we expect of you?* Why *if you gives us a good one* (ſaid the other) *a ſteady and perpetual Peace, but if an ill one, not long.* At which a certain Senator falling openly upon ruffling and threatening the *Privernate*, as if thoſe words of his tended to ſome practice or intention to ſtir up the Cities in Peace to Sedition, the better part of the Fathers being quite of another mind, declar'd, *That they had heard the voice of a Man, and of a Freeman. For why*, ſaid they, *ſhould*

Liv. l. 8. c. 21.

ſhould it be thought that any Man or People will remain longer under ſuch a Burden as they are not able to bear, than till they can throw it down? There a Peace is faithful, where it is voluntary; if you will have Slaves, you are not to truſt them, but their Fetters. To this opinion the Conſul eſpecially inclining, inclin'd others, while he openly profeſt, *That they who had no thought but upon their Liberty, could not but be thought worthy to be* Romans: whereupon the Decree paſt by authority of the Fathers, which was afterwards propos'd to the Congregation, and ratify'd by the Command of the People, whereby the *Privernates* were made Citizens of *Rome.* Such was the Genius of the *Roman* Common-wealth; where by the way you may alſo obſerve the manner of her Debate and Reſult *(Authoritate Patrum & Juſſu Populi)* by the Advice of the Senate, and the *Chirotonia* of the People.

BUT that which in this place is more particularly offer'd to conſideration, is her uſual way of proceeding in caſe of Conqueſt with other Nations: for tho' bearing a haughty brow towards ſuch as, not contented to enjoy their Liberty at home, would be her Rivals abroad, ſhe dealt far otherwiſe, as with *Carthage*; this caſe excepted, and the pilling and polling of her provinces, which happen'd thro' the Avarice and Luxury of her Nobility, when the Balance of popular Power being broken, her Empire began towards the latter end to languiſh and decline; the way which ſhe took with the *Privernates* was that which ſhe uſually obſerv'd with others throughout the courſe of her Victories, and was after the Change of Government made good at leaſt in ſome part by the *Roman* Emperors, under whom were now thoſe Cities mention'd in the preſent Perambulation of the Apoſtles PAUL and BARNABAS. STRABO for his credit among human Authors is equal to any; he liv'd about the time of this Perambulation, and being a *Greek*, is leſs likely to be partial: Of that therefore which I have affirm'd to have been the courſe of the *Romans* in their Victories, I ſhall make choice of this Author for a witneſs; firſt where he epitomizes the Story of

Strab. 1. 9. *Athens* after this manner: *When the* Carians *by Sea, and the* Bœotians *by Land waſted* Attica, CECROPS *the Prince, to bring the People under ſhelter, planted them in twelve Cities,* Cecropia, Tetrapolis, Epacrea, Decelea, Eleuſis, Aphydna, Thoricus, Brauron, Cytherus, Sphettus, Cephiſſia, Phalerus; which THESEUS is ſaid *to have contracted into one call'd* Athens. *The Government of this City had many changes; at firſt it was Monarchical then Popular: This again was uſurp'd by the Tyrants* PISISTRATUS *and his Sons, whence recover'd, it fell afterwards into the hands of the Few, as when the four hundred once, and again the thirty Tyrants were impos'd by the* Lacedemonians, *in the War of* Peloponneſus: *which Yoke the* Athenians (by means of their faithful Army) *ſhaking off, reſtor'd their popular Government, and held it till the* Romans *attain'd to the Dominion of* Greece. *Now tho' it be true that they were not a little diſturb'd by the Kings of* Macedon, *to whom they were forc'd to yield ſome kind of obedience; they nevertheleſs preſerv'd the form of their Common-wealth ſo intire, that there be who affirm it never to have been better adminiſtred, than at ſuch time as* Macedon *was govern'd by* CASSANDER: *for this Prince, tho' in other things more inclining towards the Tyrant, having taking* Athens *by ſurrender, us'd not the People ill, but made* DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS *the Diſciple of* THEOPHRASTUS *the Philoſopher, chief Magiſtrate among them; a man ſo far from ruining their popular State (as in the Commentaries he wrote upon this kind of Government*

vernment is atteſted) that he repair'd it. Nevertheleſs, whether ſuſpected or envy'd for his Greatneſs without ſupport by the Macedonians, *after the death of* CASSANDER *he fled into* Egypt, *while his Enemies breaking down his Statues (as ſome ſay) made homely Veſſels of them. But the* Romans *having receiv'd the* Athenians *under their popular form, left them their Laws and Liberties untouch'd, till in the War with* MITHRIDATES *they were forc'd to receive ſuch Tyrants as that King was pleas'd to give them; whereof* ARISTION *the greateſt, when the* Romans *had re-taken the City from him, being found trampling upon the People, was put to death by* SYLLA, *and the City pardon'd, which to this day* (he wrote about the Reign of TIBERIUS) *not only enjoys her Liberties, but is high in honour with the* Romans. This is the Teſtimony of STRABO agreeing with that of CICERO, where diſputing of Divine Providence, he ſays, that to *affirm the World to be govern'd by Chance, or without God, is as if one ſhould ſay that* Athens *were not govern'd by the* Areopagits. Nor did the *Romans* by the depoſition of the ſame Author (or indeed of any other) behave themſelves worſe in *Aſia* (the ſcene of our preſent Diſcourſe, where the ſame PAUL, of whom we are ſpeaking, being born at *Tarſus*, a City of *Cilicia*, that had acquir'd like or greater Privilege by the ſame bounty, was alſo a Citizen of *Rome)* than in *Greece*. *Aſia* is underſtood in three ſignifications: Firſt, for the third part of the World anſwering to *Europe* and *Africa*. Secondly, for that part of *Aſia* which is now call'd *Natolia*. Thirdly, for that part of it which ATTALUS King of *Pergamum*, dying without Heirs, bequeath'd and left to the People of *Rome:* this contain'd *Myſia*, *Phrygia*, *Æolis*, *Ionia*, *Caria*, *Doris*, *Lydia*, *Lycaonia*, *Piſidia*, and by conſequence the Cities whereof we are ſpeaking. To all theſe Countries the *Romans* gave their Liberty, till in favour of ARISTONICUS, the Baſtard of EUMENES, many of them taking Arms, they were recover'd, brought into ſubjection, and fram'd into a Province. Chap. 2.

WHEN a Conſul had conquer'd a Country, and the *Romans* intended to form it into a Province, it was the cuſtom of the Senate to ſend *(decem Legatos)* ten of their Members, who with the Conſul had power to introduce and eſtabliſh their provincial way of Government. In this manner *Aſia* was form'd by MARCUS AQUILLIUS Conſul; afterwards ſo excellently reform'd by SCÆVOLA, that the Senate in their Edicts us'd to propoſe his example to ſucceeding Magiſtrates, and the Inhabitants to celebrate a Feaſt to his Name. Nevertheleſs MITHRIDATES King of *Pontus* (all the *Romans* in this Province being maſſacred in one day) came to poſſeſs himſelf of it, till it was recover'd at ſeveral times by SYLLA, MURENA, LUCULLUS and POMPEY. The *Romans* in framing a Country into a Province, were not accuſtom'd to deal with all the Inhabitants of the ſame in a like manner, but differently according to their different merit. Thus divers Cities in this were left free by SYLLA, as thoſe of the *Ilienſes*, the *Chians*, *Rhodians*, *Lycians*, and *Magneſians*, with the *Cyzicens*, tho' the laſt of theſe afterwards for their practices againſt the *Romans* forfeited their Liberty to TIBERIUS, in whoſe Reign they were for this reaſon depriv'd of the ſame.

TAKING *Aſia* in the firſt ſenſe, that is, for one third part of the World, the next Province of the *Romans* in this Country was *Cilicia*, containing *Pamphylia*, *Iſauria*, and *Cilicia* more peculiarly ſo call'd. Here CICERO was ſometimes Pro-conſul, in honour to whom part of

Book II. *Phrygia*, with *Piſidia* and *Lycaonia*, were taken from the former, and added to this Juriſdiction, by which means the Cities whereof we are ſpeaking came to be of this Province. Adjoining hereto was the Commonwealth of the *Lycians*, which the *Romans* left free: into this alſo the City of *Attalia* by ſome is computed, but *Iconium* both by STRABO and CICERO; the latter whereof being Pro-conſul, in his Journey from *Laodicea*, was receiv'd by the Magiſtrates and Deputies of this City. *Lyſtra* and *Derbe*, being Cities of *Lycaonia*, muſt alſo have been of the ſame Province. Next to the Province of *Cilicia* was that of *Syria*, containing *Comagene*, *Seleucis*, *Phœnicia*, *Cæloſyria*, and *Judea* or *Paleſtin*. In *Seleucis* were the four famous Cities, *Seleucia*, *Antiochia*, *Apamea* (the laſt entire in her Liberty) and *Laodicea*. *Comagene* and *Judea* were under Kings, and not fram'd into Provinces, till in the time of the Emperors.

Epiſt.

THE fourth Province of the *Romans* in *Aſia* was that of *Bithynia* with *Pontus*: theſe were all acquir'd or confirm'd by the Victories of POMPEY the Great. STRABO, who was a *Cappadocian* born at *Amaſia*, relates a ſtory worthy to be remember'd in this place. "From the "time, *ſays he*, that the *Romans*, having conquer'd ANTIOCHUS, "became Moderators of *Aſia*, they contracted Leagues of Amity with "divers Nations; where there were Kings, the honour of addreſs was "defer'd to them, with whom the Treaties that concern'd their Coun-"tries were concluded. But as concerning the *Cappadocians*, they "treated with the whole Nation, for which cauſe the Royal Line "of this Realm coming afterwards to fail, the *Romans* gave the Peo-"ple their freedom or leave to live under their own Laws: and when "the People hereupon ſending Embaſſadors to *Rome*, renounc'd their "Liberty, being that to them which they ſaid was intolerable, and "demanded a King; the *Romans* amaz'd there ſhould be men that "could ſo far deſpair, permitted them to chooſe, of their Nation, "whom they pleas'd; ſo ARIOBARZANES was choſen, whoſe Line "again in the third Generation coming to fail, ARCHELAUS was "made King by ANTHONY (*where you may obſerve, in paſſing, that "the* Romans *impos'd not Monarchical Government, but for that mat-"ter us'd to leave a People as they found them*) Thus at the ſame time "they left PONTUS under King MITHRIDATES, who not contain-"ing himſelf within his bounds, but extending them afterwards as far "as *Colchis* and *Armenia* the Leſs, was reduc'd to his terms by POM-"PEY; who deveſting him of thoſe Countries which he had uſurp'd, "diſtributed ſome part of them to ſuch Princes as had aſſiſted the *Ro-"mans* in that War, and divided the reſt into twelve Common-wealths, "of which, added to *Bithynia*, he made one Province. When the "*Roman* Emperors became Monarchs, they alſo upon like occaſions "made other diſtributions, conſtituting Kings, Princes, and Cities, "ſome more, ſome leſs, ſome wholly free, and others in ſubjection "to themſelves." Thus came a good, if not the greater part of the Cities in the Leſſer *Aſia*, and the other adjoining Provinces, to be ſome more, ſome leſs free; but the moſt of them to remain Common-wealths, or to be erected into popular Governments, as appears yet clearer by the intercourſe of PLINY, while he was Pretor or Governor of *Bithynia*, with his Maſter the Emperor TRAJAN; a piece of which I have inſerted in the Letters following.

PLINY *to* TRAJAN.

SIR,

"IT is provided by POMPEY's Laws for the *Bithynians*, that no man under thirty years of Age be capable of Magiſtracy, or of the Senate: by the ſame it is alſo eſtabliſh'd, that they who have borne Magiſtracy may be Senators. Now becauſe by a latter Edict of AUGUSTUS, the leſſer Magiſtracies may be borne by ſuch as are above one and twenty; there remains with me theſe doubts, whether he that being under thirty, has borne Magiſtracy, may be elected by the Cenſors into the Senate; and if he may, whether of thoſe alſo that have not borne Magiſtracy, a man being above one and twenty, ſeeing at that age he may bear Magiſtracy, may not by the ſame interpretation be elected into the Senate, tho' he has not borne it: which is here practis'd and pretended to be neceſſary, becauſe it is ſomewhat better, they ſay, that the Senate be fill'd with the Children of good Families, than with the lower ſort. My opinion being ask'd upon theſe points by the new Cenſors, I thought ſuch as being under thirty have born Magiſtracy, both by POMPEY's Laws, and the Edict of AUGUSTUS, to be capable of the Senate; ſeeing the Edict allows a man under thirty to bear Magiſtracy, and the Law, a man that has borne Magiſtracy, to be a Senator. But as to thoſe that have not borne Magiſtracy, tho' at the age in which they may bear it, I demur till I may underſtand your Majeſty's pleaſure, to whom I have ſent the Heads both of the Law and of the Edict." Plin. Epiſt. l. 10.

TRAJAN *to* PLINY.

"YOU and I, deareſt PLINY, are of one mind. POMPEY's Laws are ſo far qualified by the Edict of AUGUSTUS, that they who are not under one and twenty may bear Magiſtracy, and they who have borne Magiſtracy may be Senators in their reſpective Cities: but for ſuch as have not borne Magiſtracy, tho' they might have borne it, I conceive them not eligible into the Senate till they be thirty years of age."

PLINY *to* TRAJAN.

SIR,

"POWER is granted to the *Bithynian* Cities by POMPEY's Law, to adopt to themſelves what Citizens they pleaſe, ſo they be not Foreigners, but of the ſame Province; by the ſame Law it is ſhewn in what caſes the Cenſors may remove a man from the Senate: Among which nevertheleſs it is not provided what is to be done in caſe a foreign Citizen be a Senator. Wherefore certain of the Cenſors have thought fit to conſult me, whether they ought to remove a man that is of a foreign City for that cauſe out of the Senate. Now becauſe the Law, tho' it forbids the adoption of a Foreigner, commands not that a Foreigner for that cauſe ſhould be remov'd out of the Senate, and I am inform'd there be foreign Citizens almoſt in every Senate; ſo that many, not only Men, but Cities might ſuffer Concuſſion by the reſti-

Book II. " reſtitution of the Law in that part, which thro' a kind of conſent
" ſeems to be now grown obſolete; I conceive it neceſſary to have
" your Majeſty's Reſolution in the caſe, to which end I have ſent a
" Breviate of the Law annex'd.

TRAJAN *to* PLINY,

" WITH good cauſe, deareſt PLINY, have you doubted what
" anſwer to return to the Cenſors, inquiring whether they
" ought to elect a man into the Senate that is of another City, tho' of
" the ſame Province; ſeeing on the one ſide the Authority of the Law,
" and of Cuſtom on the other to the contrary, might well diſorder
" you. To innovate nothing for the time paſt, I think well of this
" expedient: they who are already elected Senators, tho' not accord-
" ing to the Law, of what City ſoever they be, may remain for the
" preſent; but for the future POMPEY's Laws ſhould return to their
" full virtue, which if we ſhould cauſe to look back, might create
" trouble.

THIS might ſerve, but there will be no hurt in being a little fuller in the Diſcovery of Provincial Government.

THE Provinces ſo fram'd, as has been ſhewn, were ſubdivided into certain Circuits called *Dioceſes*; that of *Aſia* had ſix, *Alabandæ*, *Sardes* (antiently the Senate of CRÆSUS) *Smyrna*, *Epheſus*, *Adramytis*, *Pergamum*. That of *Cilicia* had alſo ſix, the *Pamphylian*, *Iſaurian*, and *Cilician*, the Metropolis whereof was *Tarſus*, a free City; to theſe were taken out of the Province of *Aſia*, *Cibyra*, *Sinnadæ*, *Apamea:* what were the Dioceſes of the other two SIGONIUS, whom I follow, does not ſhew. At theſe in the Winter (for the Summer was ſpent commonly with the Army) the People of the Province aſſembled at ſet times, as at our Aſſizes, where the *Roman* Governors did them Juſtice.

THE Governors or Magiſtrates, to whoſe care a Province was committed, were of two kinds: the firſt and chief was Conſul or Pretor, which appellations differ'd not in Power, but in Dignity, that of Conſul being more honourable, who had twelve Lictors, whereas the Pretor had but ſix; if the annual Magiſtracy of either of theſe came to be prorogu'd, he was call'd *Pro-conſul* or *Pro-pretor*.

THE ſecond kind of Magiſtrate in a Province was the Queſtor, Receiver or Treaſurer, who being alſo annual, was attended by Lictors of his own; if he dy'd within his year, the Conſul, Pro-conſul, or Pretor might appoint one for that time in his place, who was call'd Pro-queſtor. The Power of the Conſul, Pro-conſul, or Pretor, was of two kinds, the one Civil, the other Military; the former call'd Magiſtracy, the latter Empire.

THE Pomp of theſe aſſuming and exerciſing their Magiſtracy was reverend; the Conſul or Pro-conſul had Legates, ſometimes more, but never under three, appointed him by the Senate: theſe were in the nature of Counſellors to aſſiſt him in all Affairs of his Province; he had Tribunes, Colonels, or Field Officers, for the military part of his Adminiſtration; he had alſo Secretaries, Serjeants, Heralds or Criers, Lictors or Inſign-bearers, Interpreters, Meſſengers, Divines, Chamberlains, Phyſicians; and beſides theſe his Companions, which for the moſt

moſt part were of the younger ſort of Gentlemen or Gallants that accompany'd him for his Ornament, and their own Education. Into this the ſomewhat like Train of the Queſtor (who by the Law was in place of a Son to the Pro-conſul, and to whom the Pro-conſul was to give the regard of a Father) being caſt, it made the Pretorian Cohort or Guard always about the Perſon of the Pro-conſul, who in this Equipage having done his Devotions at the Capitol, departed the City *Paludatus*, that is in his Royal Mantle of Gold and Purple, follow'd for ſome part of the way with the whole Train of his Friends, wiſhing him much joy and good ſpeed. Chap. 2.

IN his Province he executed his twofold Office, the one of Captain General, the other of the ſupreme Magiſtrate. In the former relation he had an Army either receiv'd from his Predeceſſor, or new levy'd in the City; this conſiſted in the one half of the Legions (as I have elſewhere ſhewn) and in the other of Aſſociates: for the greatneſs of the ſame, it was proportion'd to the Province, or the occaſion; to an ordinary Province in times of Peace, I believe an Army amounted not to above one Legion with as many Auxilliaries, that is, to a matter of twelve thouſand Foot, and twelve hundred horſe. The Magiſtracy or Juriſdiction of the Proconſul, or Pretor, was executed at the Metropolitan City of each *Diæcis*, which upon this occaſion was to furniſh the Pretorian Cohort with Lodging, Salt, Wood, Hay, and Stableroom at the charge of the Country. Theſe, tho' CICERO would hardly receive any of them, were, towards the latter time of the Common-wealth, extended by the Provincial Magiſtrates to ſo great a burden to the People, that it caus'd divers Laws to be paſs'd in *Rome (de repetundis)* for reſtitution to be made to the Provinces, by ſuch as had injur'd them. Upon ſuch Laws was the proſecution of VERRES by CICERO. When and where this kind of Court was to be held, the Conſul, Pro-conſul, or Pretor, by Proclamation gave timely notice. Being aſſembl'd at the time, and the City appointed, in the Townhal ſtood a Tribunal; upon this the *Sella Curulis*, or Chair of State, in which ſat the Conſul, Pro-conſul, or Pretor, with his Pretorian Cohort or Band about him, furniſh'd with all manner of Pomp, and Officers requiſite to the Ornament or Adminiſtration of ſo high a Magiſtracy. The Juriſdiction of this Court was according to the Laws made for the adminiſtration of the Province; but becauſe they could not foreſee all things (as appear'd by the Queſtions which PLINY put upon the Laws of POMPEY, to TRAJAN) it came to paſs, that much was permitted to the Edicts of the Provincial Pretors, as was alſo in uſe at *Rome* with the Pretors of the City: and if any man had judg'd otherwiſe in his Province, than he ought to have done in the City, made an Edict contrary to the Law of his Province, or judged any thing otherwiſe than according to his own Edict, he was held guilty of, and queſtionable for a heinous Crime. But what the Law of this or that Province (which differ'd in each) was, would be hard particularly to ſay; only in general it was for the main very much reſembling that of *Sicily*, call'd *Rupilia*.

LEGE Rupilia, or by the Law of RUPILIUS, *a cauſe between one Citizen and another being of the ſame City, was to be try'd at home by their own Laws. A Cauſe between one Provincial and another being of divers Cities, was to be try'd by Judges whom the Pretor ſhould appoint by lot. What a private man claim'd of a People, or a People of a private man,*

Book. II. *was to be refer'd to the Senate of ſome third City. Upon what a* Roman *claim'd of a Provincial, a Provincial was to be appointed Judge. Upon what a Provincial claim'd of a* Roman, *a* Roman *was to be appointed Judge. For deciſion of other Controverſies, ſelect Judges from among the* Romans *(not out of the Pretorian Cohort, but out of ſuch* Romans, *or other Citizens free of* Rome, *as were preſent in the ſame Court) were to be given. In criminal Cauſes, as Violence, Peculate, or Treaſon, the Law, and the manner of proceeding was the ſame in the Provinces, as in* Rome.

FOR the Tributes, Cuſtoms, Taxes, levies of Men, Money, Shipping, ordinary or extraordinary, for the common defence of the *Roman* Republic, and her Provinces, the Conſuls, Pro-conſuls, or Pretors, proceeding according to ſuch Decrees of the Senate as were in that caſe ſtanding or renew'd upon emergent occaſions; in gathering theſe lay the Magiſtracy or office of the Queſtor: if the Pro-conſul were indiſpos'd, or had more buſineſs than he could well turn his hand to, Courts of this nature might be held by one or more of his Legates. With matters of Religion they meddl'd not; every Nation being ſo far left to the liberty of Conſcience, that no violence for this cauſe was offer'd to any man: by which means both *Jews* and Chriſtians, at leaſt till the time of the perſecuting Emperors, had the free exerciſe of their Religion throughout the *Roman* Provinces. This the *Jews* lik'd well for themſelves, nor were they troubl'd at the Heathens; but to the Chriſtians they always grudg'd the like privilege. Thus when they could no otherwiſe induce PILATE to put Chriſt to death, they accus'd Chriſt of affecting Monarchy, and ſo afrighted PILATE, being a mean condition'd fellow, while they threaten'd to let TIBERIUS know he was not *Cæſar*'s Friend that he comply'd with their ends. But when at *Corinth* where GALLIO (a man of another temper) was Pro-conſul of *Achaia*, they would have been at this ſport again, and with a great deal of Tumult had brought PAUL before the Tribunal, GALLIO took it not well, that they ſhould think he had nothing elſe to do than to judge of *Words, and Names, and Queſtions of their Law*; for he car'd no more for the Diſputes between the Chriſtians and the *Jews*, than for thoſe between the *Epicureans* and the *Stoicks*. Wherefore his Lictors drove them from the Tribunal, and the officious *Corinthians*, to ſhew their love to the Pro-conſul, fell on knocking them out of the way of other buſineſs.

NOW tho' the Common-wealth of the *Achæans*, being at this time a *Roman* Province under the Pro-conſul GALLIO, enjoy'd no longer her common Senate, *Strategus*, and *Demiurges*, according to the model ſhewn in the former Book; yet remain'd each particular City under her antient form of Popular Government, ſo that in theſe, eſpecially at *Corinth*, many of the *Greeks* being of the ſame judgment, the *Jews* could not diſpute with the Chriſtians without Tumult. Of this kind was that which happen'd at *Epheſus*, where Chriſtianity growing ſo faſt, that the Silver-ſmiths of DIANA's Temple began to fear they ſhould loſe their Trade; the *Jews* liking better of Heatheniſm than Chriſtianity, ſet ALEXANDER, one of their pack, againſt PAUL. Act. 19.

THIS place (in times when men will underſtand no otherwiſe of human ſtory than makes for their ends) is fallen happily into my hand; ſeeing that which I have ſaid of a *Roman* Province, will be thus no leſs than prov'd out of Scripture. For the Chancellor of *Epheſus* perceiving the *Eccleſia* (ſo it is in the Original) or Aſſembly

(as

(as in our Tranſlation) uncall'd by the Senate, or the Magiſtracy to be tumultuouſly gather'd in the Theatre (their uſual place, as in *Syracuſa* and other Cities, of meeting) betakes himſelf to appeaſe the People with divers arguments: among which he has theſe. Firſt, as to matter of Religion, *You have brought hither*, ſays he, *theſe men which are neither robbers of Temples* (*Churches* our Bible has it, before there was any Church to be robb'd) *nor yet blaſphemers of the Goddeſs:* In which words (ſeeing that they offering no ſcandal, but only propagating that which was according to their own Judgment, were not obnoxious to Puniſhment) he ſhews that every man had *liberty of Conſcience.* Secondly, as to Law: If DEMETRIUS *and the Craftsmen which are with him have a matter againſt any man, the Law*, ſays he, *is open.* Thirdly, as to the matter of Government, which appears to be of two parts, the one Provincial, the other Domeſtic: For the former, ſays he, there are (ἀνθύπατοι) Pro-conſuls (he ſpeaks in the plural number with relation to the Legates, by whom the Pro-conſul ſometimes held his Courts; otherwiſe this Magiſtrate was but one in a Province, as at this time for *Aſia* PUBLIUS SUILIUS) and to the latter, ſays he, *if you deſire any thing concerning other matters*, that is, ſuch as appertain to the Government of the City (in which the care of the Temple was included) *it ſhall be determin'd in a lawful* [illegible]*ſia, or Aſſembly of the People.* By which you may ſee that notwithſtanding the Provincial Government, *Epheſus*, tho' ſhe was no free City, (for with a free City the Pro-conſul had nothing of this kind to do) had (δημοκρατία) the Government of her ſelf (as thoſe other Cities mention'd in PLINY's Epiſtles) by the Senate, and the People; for whereever one of theſe is nam'd, as the Senate by PLINY, or the People by LUKE, the other is underſtood. When the Chancellor had thus ſpoken, he diſmiſs'd the *Eccleſia.* It is LUKE's own word, and ſo often as I have now repeated it, ſo often has he us'd it upon the ſame occaſion. Wherefore I might henceforth expect two things of Divines; firſt, that it might be acknowledg'd that I have good Authors, LUKE and the Chancellor of *Epheſus*, for the word *Eccleſia* in this ſenſe; and ſecondly, that they would not perſuade us, the word *Eccleſia* has loſt this ſignification, leſt they condemn this place of Scripture to be no more underſtood. The manner of Provincial Government being thus prov'd, not only out of profane Authors, but out of Scripture it ſelf; and the Cities that were leaſt free having had ſuch power over themſelves, and their Territories; why, if the *Romans* took no more of them for this protection, than was paid to their former Lords, did they *not rather undertake the patronage of the World than the Empire*; ſeeing *Venice*, and *Dantzic*, while the one was tributary to the *Turk*, the other to the King of *Poland*, were nevertheleſs ſo free Eſtates, that of a King, or a Common-wealth that ſhould have put the reſt of the world into the like condition, no leſs in our day could have been ſaid? And yet that the *Romans*, when the nature of the Eaſtern Monarchies ſhall be rightly conſider'd, took far leſs of theſe Cities than their old Maſters, will admit of little doubt. CICERO ſurely would not lie; he, when Pro-conſul of *Cilicia*, wrote in this manner concerning his Circuit, to his friend SERVILIUS: *Two days I ſtaid at* Laodicea, *at* Apamea *five, at* Sinnadæ *three, at* Pilomelis *five, at* Iconium *ten; than which Juriſdiction or Government there is nothing more juſt or equal.* Why then had not thoſe Cities their Senates and their

Eccleſiæ,

Book II. *Eccleſiæ*, or Congregations of the People, as well as that of *Epheſus*, and thoſe whereof PLINY gives an account to TRAJAN?

CORINTH was in *Achaia*; *Perga* of *Pamphylia*, *Antioch* of *Piſidia*, *Iconium*, *Lyſtra*, *Derbe* of *Lycaonia*, were in *Cilicia*; and with theſe, as ſome reckon, *Attalia*. *Epheſus* and the other *Antioch* were in *Syria*. *Achaia*, *Cilicia*, and *Syria*, were *Roman* Provinces at the time of this Perambulation of the Apoſtles: The Cities under Provincial Adminiſtration, whether free or not free, were under Popular Government; whence it follows, that *Corinth*, *Epheſus*, *Antioch* of *Syria*, *Antioch* of *Piſidia*, *Perga*, *Iconium*, *Lyſtra*, *Derbe*, *Attalia*, being at this time under Provincial Adminiſtration, were at the ſame time under Popular Government. There has been no hurt in going about, for the proof of this; tho' indeed to ſhew that theſe Cities (had *quandam* ἐκκλησίαν) were under Popular Government, we needed to have gone no further than the Text, as where the Chancellor of *Epheſus*, to get rid of a tumultuous *Eccleſia* or Aſſembly of the People, promiſes them a lawful one. In *Iconium*, *Lyſtra*, *Derbe*, and the reſt, you hear not of any King (as where HEROD ſtretch'd out his hand to pleaſe the *Jews*, and vex the Church) but of the People, of their Rulers, of their Aſſemblies, and of their Tumults. The People at *Lyſtra* are now agreed to give the Apoſtles divine Honours: and anon, both at *Iconium* and *Lyſtra*, to ſtone them. Now to determine of divine Honour, or of Life and Death, are acts of Sovereign Power. It is true, theſe nevertheleſs may happen to be uſurp'd by a mere Tumult; but that cannot be ſaid of theſe Congregations, which conſiſted as well of the Magiſtrates and Rulers, as of the People, and where the Magiſtrates ſhew that they had no diſtinct Power whereby to reſtrain the People, nor other means to prevail againſt them, than by making of Parties: Which Paſſages, as they prove theſe Common-wealths on the one ſide to have been ill conſtituted, evince on the other, that theſe Cities were under Popular Government.

CHAP. III.

The Deduction of the Chirotonia *from Popular Government, and of the Original Right of Ordination from the* Chirotonia. *In which is contain'd the Inſtitution of the Sanhedrim or Senate of* Iſrael *by* MOSES, *and of that of* Rome *by* ROMULUS.

DIVINES generally in their way of diſputing have a bias that runs more upon Words than upon Things; ſo that in this place it will be neceſſary to give the Interpretation of ſome other Words, whereof they pretend to take a ſtrong hold in their Controverſies. The chief of theſe has been ſpoken to already: *Chirotonia* being a word that properly ſignifies *the Suffrage of the People*, wherever it is properly us'd, implies Power; wherefore tho' the Senate decrees by Suffrage as well as the People, yet there being no more in a Decree of the Senate than Authority, the Senate is never ſaid to *Chirotonize*, or very ſeldom and improperly, this word being peculiar to the People. And thus much is imply'd in what went before.

THE

THE next Word in Controverſy is *Pſephiſma*, which ſignifies a *Decree* or *Law*; and this always implying Power, always implys the Suffrage of the People, that is, where it is ſpoken of popular Government: for tho' a *Pſephiſma* or Decree of the *Athenian* Senate was a Law for a year before it came to the Suffrage or *Chirotonia* of the People, yet the Law or Conſtitution of SOLON, whereby the Senate had this Power, was originally derived from the *Chirotonia* of the People. Chap. 2.

THE third Word (καθίςημι) ſignifys to *conſtitute* or *ordain*; this in the political ſenſe of the ſame implys not *Power*, but *Authority*: For a man that writes or propoſes a Decree or Form of Government, may be ſaid (καθίςημι) to *propoſe* or *conſtitute* it, whether it be confirm'd by the *Chirotonia* of the People or not; nay with HALICARNASSÆUS the Word ſignifys no more than barely to call or aſſemble the Senate, βουλὴν ὑπερ τινὸς καθίςαναι.

NOW if theſe Words be ſometimes otherwiſe taken, what Words be there in any Language that are not often us'd improperly? But that underſtood politically, they muſt of neceſſity be underſtood as I have ſhewn, or will ſo intangle and diſorder Government, that no man ſhall either make head or foot of it, is that which I make little queſtion to evince in the ſureſt way, that is, by opening the nature of the Things whence they derive, and whereof they are ſpoken by the beſt Authors.

And becauſe the Words (tho' the Things they ſignify were much more antient) derive all from *Athens*, I ſhall begin by this Conſtitution to ſhew the proper uſe of them. *Chirotonia* in *Athens*, as has been ſhewn out of SUIDAS (who ſpeaking of *Rome* refers to this) was Election of Magiſtrates, or enacting Laws by the Suffrage of the People: which, becauſe they gave by holding up their hands, came thence to be called *Chirotonia*, which ſignifys *holding up of hands*. The Legiſlative Aſſembly, or Repreſentative of the People, called the *Nomothetæ*, upon occaſion of repealing an old Law, and enacting a new one, gave the *Chirotonia* of the People: And yet ſays the *Athenian* Law (διαχειροτονίαν δεῖ ποιεῖν τοὺς πρυτάνεις περὶ τούτων τῶν νόμων) *Let the* Proedri *give or make the* Chirotonia *to either Law*. The *Proedri*, as was ſhewn in the former Book, were the ten Preſidents of the *Prytans*; which *Prytans* upon this occaſion were Preſidents of the *Nomothetæ*. Again whereas it was the undoubted Right and Practice of the People to elect their Magiſtrates by their *Chirotonia* (κἂν ὑμεῖς ἕνα, μᾶν πλείους, κἂν τὸν δεῖνα, κἂν ὁντινοῦν χειροτονήσητε στρατηγὸν) it is nevertheleſs ſhewn by POLLUX to have been the peculiar Office of the *Theſmothetæ* (στρατηγοὺς χειροτονεῖν) to *chirotonize* the Magiſtrates. For as the *Proedri* were Preſidents of the People in their Legiſlative Capacity, ſo were the *Theſmothetæ*, upon occaſion of Elections: thus the *Chirotonia* of the *Proedri* or of the *Theſmothetæ*, ſignifys nothing elſe but the *Chirotonia* of the People, by which they enacted all their Laws, and elected all their Civil or Eccleſiaſtical Magiſtrates or Prieſts, as the *Rex Sacrificus*, and the *Orgeones*, except ſome by the Lot; which Ordination, as is obſerv'd by ARISTOTLE, is equally popular. This, whether ignorantly or wilfully unregarded, has been, as will be ſeen hereafter, the cauſe of great abſurdity; for who ſees not that to put the *Chirotonia*, or Sovereign Power of *Athens* upon the *Proedri* or the *Theſmothetæ*, is to make ſuch a thing of that Government as can no wiſe be underſtood?

Demoſt. contra Timon.

Phil. 1.

L. 8. c. 8.

Book II. WHAT the People had paſt by their *Chirotonia*, was call'd *Pſephiſma*, an Act or Law. And becauſe in the *Nomothetæ* there were always two Laws put together to the Vote, that is to ſay, the old one, and that which was offer'd in the room of it, they that were for the old Law were ſaid (ἀποψηφίζειν) to pronounce in the Negative; and they that were for the new (καταψηφίζειν) to pronounce for the Affirmative.

THESE Laws, theſe Propoſitions, or this frame of Government, having been propos'd firſt by SOLON, and then ratify'd or eſtabliſh'd by the *Chirotonia* of the *Athenian* People; ARISTOTLE ſays of him (νῦ δὲ δημοκρατίαν καταζῆσαι) that he *inſtituted* or *conſtituted* the popular Government; which Conſtitution implies not any Power in SOLON, who abſolutely refus'd to be a King, and therefore the word καταζῆσαι as to him implies no more than Authority. I have ſhew'd you the Words in controverſy, and the Things together in the Mint; now whether they that as to *Athens* introduc'd them both, underſtood either, I leave my Reader by comparing them to judge.

IT is true that the Things expreſt by theſe Words have been in ſome Common-wealths more, in others leſs antient than the *Greek* Language; but this hinders not the *Greeks* to apply the Words to the like Conſtitutions or Things, wherever they find them, as, by following HALLICARNASSÆUS, I ſhall exemplify in *Rome*.

Lib. 2. ὉΔΕ Ῥώμυλος, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα διενεμήσατο, βουλευτὰς ἐκ φυλῆς ἑκάστης ἑκατὸν κατεστήσατο. ROMULUS, *when he had diſtributed the People into Tribes and Pariſhes, proceeded to ordain the Senate:* in this manner the Tribes were three and the Pariſhes thirty; out of every Tribe he elected three Senators, and out of every Pariſh three more all by the Suffrage of the People. Theſe therefore came to ninety nine choſen by the *Chirotonia*; to which he added one more, not choſen by the *Chirotonia*, but by himſelf only: Which Election we may therefore ſay was made by the *Chirotheſia*; for as in this Chapter I am ſhewing that the *Chirotonia* is Election by the many, ſo in the next I ſhall ſhew that the *Chirotheſia* is Election by one, or by the Few. But to keep to the matter in hand; the Magiſtrate thus choſen by ROMULUS was *(præfectus urbi)* the Protector of the Common-wealth, or he who, when the King was out of the Nation or the City, as upon occaſion of war, had the exerciſe of Royal Power at home. In like manner with the Civil Magiſtracy were the Prieſts created (tho' ſome of them not ſo antiently) for the *Pontifex Maximus*, the *Rex Sacrificus*, and the *Flamens*, were all ordain'd by the Suffrage of the People (*Pontifex Tributis, Rex Centuriatis, Flamines Curiatis)* the latter of which, being no more than Pariſh Prieſts, had no other Ordination than by their Pariſhes. All the Laws, and all the Magiſtrates in *Rome*, even the Kings themſelves, were according to the Orders of this Common-wealth to be created by the *Chirotonia* of the People; which nevertheleſs is by APPIAN ſometimes call'd δημάρχων χειροτονία, the *Chirotonia* of the Tribunes, whether theſe Magiſtrates were Preſidents of the Aſſemblies of the People, or elected by them. *Sic Romani Hiſtorici non raro loquuntur, Conſulem qui comitia habuerit creaſſe novos Magiſtratus, non aliam ob cauſam niſi quia ſuffragia receperit, & Populum moderatus eſt in eligendo.*

Calv. Inſt. L. 4. Cap. 3. §. 15.

WHAT paſt the *Chirotonia* of the People, by the *Greeks* is call'd *Pſephiſma:* μελλούσης δὲ διαλύεσθαι τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἀναστὰς ὁ Μάρκιος; ἔφη. ἃ μὲν ἐψήφισαι τὸ κοινὸν ὑμῶν ἔχει καλῶς. *When the Congregation of the People was to be diſmiſt,*

Dion. Hal. l. 8.

diſmiſt, MARCUS *ſtanding up, ſaid, Your* Pſephiſma, *that is your Act, is exceeding good*, &c. Book II.

THIS Policy, for the greater part, is that which ROMULUS (as was ſhewn) is ſaid (καταστῆσαι) to have *inſtituted* or *ordain'd*, tho' it be plain that he ordain'd it no otherwiſe than by the *Chirotonia* of the People.

THUS you have another example of the three words in controverſy (*Chirotonia*, χειροτονία, *Pſephiſma*) ſtill apply'd in the ſame ſenſe and to the ſame things. Have I not alſo diſcover'd already the original Right of Ordination, whether in civil or religious Orders? This will be ſcandalous. How! derive Ordination as it is in the Church of CHRIST, or as it was in the Church of the *Jews*, from the Religion, or rather Superſtition of the Heathens! I meddle not with their Religion, nor yet with their Superſtition, but with their Ordination which was neither, but a part of their Policy. And why is not Ordination in the Church or Common-wealth of CHRIST, as well a political thing as it was in the Churches or Common-wealths of the *Jews*, or of the Heathens? Why is not Election of Officers in the Church as well a political thing, as Election of Officers in the State? and why may not this be as lawfully perform'd by the *Chirotonia* in the one, as in the other?

THAT MOSES introduc'd the *Chirotonia*, is expreſly ſaid by PHILO; tho' he oppoſes it to the Ballot, in which I believe he is miſtaken, as not ſeeing that the Ballot including the Suffrage of the People, by that means came as properly under the denomination of the *Chirotonia*, as the Suffrage of the *Roman* People, which tho' it were given by the Tablet, is ſo call'd by *Greek* Authors. All Ordination of Magiſtrates, as of the Senators or Elders of the *Sanhedrim*, of the Judges or Elders of inferior Courts, of the Judge or Suffes of *Iſrael*, of the King, of the Prieſts, of the Levites, whether with the Ballot or *viva voce*, was perform'd by the *Chirotonia* or Suffrage of the People. In this (eſpecially if you admit the Authority of the *Jewiſh* Lawyers, and Divines call'd the Talmudiſts) the Scripture will be clear, but their Names are hard; wherefore not to make my Diſcourſe more rough than I need, I ſhall here ſet them together. The Authors or Writings I uſe, by way of Paraphraſe upon the Scripture, are the *Gemara Babylonia*, *Midbar Rabba*, *Sepher Siphri*, *Sepher Tanchuma*, *Solomon Jarchius*, *Chiſkuny*, *Abarbanel*, *Ajin Iſrael*, *Peſiktha Zotertha*. Theſe and many more being for the Election of the *Sanhedrim* by the Ballot, I might have ſpoken them more briefly; for the truth is, in all that is Talmudical I am aſſiſted by SELDEN, GROTIUS, and their Quotations out of the Rabbies, having in this Learning ſo little Skill, that if I miſ-call'd none of them, I ſhew'd you a good part of my acquaintance with them. Philo de Inſt. Princ.

NOR am I wedded to GROTIUS or SELDEN, whom ſometimes I follow, and ſometimes I leave, making uſe of their Learning, but of my own Reaſon. As to the things in this preſent Controverſy, they were no other in *Athens* and *Rome* than they had been in the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*.

WHEN MOSES came to inſtitute the Senate, he ask'd counſil of God. *And the Lord ſaid, Gather to me ſeventy men of the Elders of* Iſrael; *and* MOSES *went out and told the People the words of the Lord:* that is, propos'd the Dictate of the ſupreme Legiſlator to the *Chirotonia* of the Congregation. What elſe can we make of theſe words of Mo- Numb. 11. v. 16, 24.

SES

Book II.

Deut. 1. v. 13, 14, 15.

ses to the People? *Take ye wise men, and understanding, and known among your Tribes* (καὶ χειροτονήσατε ἄνδρας ἐφ' ὑμῶν ἡγουμένους ὑμῶν) *and I will constitute them Rulers over you.* Now how the People could otherwise take or chuse these Rulers or Magistrates thus propos'd, than by their *Chirotonia*, let Divines—shew; or notwithstanding the constitution of Moses, both the Senate of *Israel*, and the inferior Courts, were decreed by the *Chirotonia* of the People. For the People upon this Proposition resolv'd in the Affirmative, or *answer'd and said, The thing which thou hast spoken is good for us to do.* This then was the *Psephisma* or Decree of the People of *Israel*, whereupon says Moses (κατέστησα ἀυτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι) *I constituted or ordain'd them Governors.* In which example you have the three words, or the three things again; nor as to the things, is it, or ever was it, otherwise in any Common-wealth. Whence it is admirable in our Divines, who will have κατέστησα, *constituted*, to be the word of Power; that they do not see by this means they must make two Powers in the same Government; the κατέστησα or Constitution of the *Legislator*, and the *Chirotonia* or Suffrage of the People: or else say that the Common-wealth of *Israel* was instituted by the Power of the Legislator, and the Authority of the People, than which there is nothing more absurd. But the People staid not upon ther first *Psephisma*, or Result, that *the thing was good for them to do*, but did accordingly. The manner of their proceeding at different times was somewhat different; for it was sometimes *viva voce*, sometimes by the Lot, without the Suffrage, and sometimes by the Ballot, which consisted not of the Lot only, but of the Suffrage. Each of these are equally popular (for neither of them gives an advantage to any Person or Party) but not equally prudent ways of proceeding; the Lot committing too much to Fortune, except in some kinds of businesses, as first in the division of Lands, whence the Suffrage was properly excluded: for the Divisions being made by three Deputies out of each Tribe, if there happen'd to fall some advantage or disadvantage to any man by the Lot, it was equal or impartial; whereas if it had fallen by the Suffrage, it must have been inequal, or partial. Such was the cause why the Lot in the Division of the Land of *Canaan* was us'd without the Suffrage. In case of a Crime committed by an unknown Author, but among many of whom some one or more must have been guilty, as in the cases of Achan and Jonathan, the Lot was also us'd without the Suffrage, somewhat after the manner of Decimation in an Army, when many that are guilty throw the Dice, and he on whom the Lot falls is punish'd; yet with considerable difference, for whereas Decimation is not us'd but for punishment, where the Persons are as well known as the Guilt; this use of the Lot in *Israel* was for the discovery of the unknown Author of some known Crime, that some one of many being put to the question (who if either by his own confession, or other proof he were found guilty, was punish'd accordingly, otherwise not) Men might have less encouragement that their Crimes would be the more hidden, or less punishable for company, or the shadow of it.

WHEN the People were set upon the introduction of a new Magistracy, and car'd not at all who should be the man, as in the Election of Saul, at which time the *Philistines* lay hard upon them, and they look'd upon the Ease they hop'd from a King, without coveting the trouble which he was like to have; it seems to me there was a third use of the Lot without the Suffrage.

BUT

BUT that the common uſe of the Lot in *Iſrael* imply'd alſo the Suffrage, and was of the nature of the Ballot at this day in *Venice*, is little to be doubted; or you may ſatisfy your ſelf, when you have conſider'd the manner how the Senate or Sanhedrim was firſt elected (κατεστησεν) or conſtituted by MOSES. Chap. 3.

UPON the *Pſephiſma*, or decree of the Legiſlator and the People, *The thing which thou haſt ſpoken is good for us to do*, they proceeded to election of Competitors in this manner. Each of the twelve Tribes (to be hereafter as well locally, as they were yet but genealogically divided) were to make the Election, not excluding the Thirteenth, nor yet nominally taking it in; for LEVI, tho' genealogically as diſtinct a Tribe as any of them, yet was not deſign'd locally ſo to be, but to have the right of promiſcuous Inhabiting, Cohabiting, or Marriage with all or any of the reſt, and with right of Suffrage accordingly; for this cauſe the Tribes being Thirteen, are reckon'd but Twelve. So each of the twelve Tribes elected among themſelves by their Suffrages, ſix wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among them; who being elected, were written; and being written, were deliver'd each in a ſeveral Scrol to MOSES. MOSES having receiv'd all the Scrols, had ſeventy two Competitors, which caus'd a Fraction; for the Senate, as is plain by the Text *(gather me ſeventy men, that they may ſtand with thee)* was to conſiſt but of Seventy with MOSES, that is, in all, of ſeventy one. So MOSES having two Competitors more than he needed, caus'd two Urns to be brought, into one of which he caſt the ſeventy two Competitors, or Names written in the Scrols; and into the other ſeventy two Scrols, of which two were blanks, and ſeventy were inſcrib'd with the word *Presbyter*. This being done, the whole Congregation pray'd, and when they had pray'd, gave forth their Lots.

THE Lots were given forth after this manner. Firſt a Lot was drawn out of the Urn of the Magiſtracies, then another out of the Urn of the Competitors. The Competitor to whoſe name a Blank was drawn, departed: but he to whoſe name a Prize was drawn, or given forth, became a Magiſtrate.

THEY who had thus gain'd Magiſtracy were (συναριθμηθησαν) by this *Pſephiſma* decreed to be together of the number of ſeventy Elders. But whereas in the Urn of Magiſtracies there were two Blanks, two that had been written Competitors muſt of neceſſity have fail'd of Magiſtracy. So ELDAD and MEDAD being *of them that were written* Competitors by the *Tribes*, yet *went not up to the Tabernacle*; that is, attain'd not to be (συναριθμηθησαν) number'd among the ſeventy, who were to ſit in the Court of the Tabernacle; as afterwards they did in the Pavement, or ſtone-Chamber, in the Court of the Temple. Numb. 11. 26.

IN this place I ſhall mind you but once more of the three Words in controverſy. MOSES the Legiſlator (κατεστησεν) conſtituted, the People chirotoniz'd; and that which they had chirotoniz'd, was *Pſephiſma*, their Decree.

THERE be in theſe times that are coif'd with ſuch Opinions, that to ſhew Scripture to be Reaſon, is to make it loſe weight with them; and to talk of the *Talmudiſts*, is to profane it: Of theſe I ſhall only deſire to know how they underſtand that place of ELDAD and MEDAD; for if they can no otherwiſe make ſenſe of it than as

Book II. I have done, it is a ſufficient proof (letting the *Talmudiſts* go) of all that I have ſaid. What therefore has the Hierarchy, and the Preſbytery for their opinion that the Sanhedrim was inſtituted by the *Chirotheſia*, or Impoſition of Hands?

THERE is in the Old Teſtament no mention of laying on of Hands by way of Ordination, or Election, but only by MOSES in the deſignation of JOSHUA for his Succeſſor: and in this MOSES did firſt as ROMULUS afterwards in the Election of the Prefect or Protector of *Rome*, but upon a far greater exigence; for the Common-wealth of *Rome*, when ROMULUS did the like, was ſeated or planted, but the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*, when MOSES did this, was neither ſeated nor planted, nor indeed a Common-wealth, but an Army deſign'd to be a Common-wealth. Now between the Government that is neceſſary to an Army, and that which is neceſſary to a Common-wealth, there is a vaſt difference. The Government even of the Armies of *Rome*, when ſhe was a Common-wealth, was nevertheleſs Monarchical: in this regard MOSES himſelf exercis'd a kind of Dictatorian Power for his life; and the Common-wealth being not yet planted, nor having any Balance whereupon to weigh her ſelf, muſt either have been left at his death to the care of ſome Man whom he knew beſt able to lay her Foundation, or to extreme hazard. Wherefore this Ordination, which was but accidental, regarding the preſent military condition of the People, MOSES moſt prudently diſtinguiſhes from the other; in that he ſhew'd them how they ſhould manage their Common-wealth, in this he bequeaths them the Man whom he thinks the moſt likely to bring them to be a Common-wealth: of which judgment and undertaking of MOSES, JOSHUA the next illuſtrious Example, moſt worthily acquitted himſelf.

THERE is in theſe Elections another remarkable paſſage, but ſuch a one as, being ſo far from political that it is ſupernatural, does not properly appertain to this diſcourſe, and ſo I ſhall but point at it.

Numb. 11. 24, 25. When the Elders, thus choſen, were ſet *round about the Tabernacle, the Lord came down in a cloud, and took of the ſpirit of* MOSES, *and gave it unto the ſeventy Elders; and it came to paſs, that when the Spirit reſted upon them, they propheſy'd and did not ceaſe. So* JOSHUA *was*

Deut. 34. 9. *full of the ſpirit of Wiſdom, for* MOSES *had laid his hands upon him.*

1 Tim. 1. 6. And PAUL minds TIMOTHY, *Stir up the gift of God which is in thee by the laying on of my hands.* But the *Talmudiſts* themſelves do not pretend that their Ordination was further accompany'd with ſupernatural endowments than the firſt Inſtitution; and if Divines were as ingenuous, no leſs might be acknowleg'd of theirs. MOSES *was a Prophet, the like to whom has not been in* Iſrael; and has there been an Apoſtle like PAUL in the Chriſtian Church? Every body cannot do Miracles, we ſee they can't. Take heed how you deny Senſe, for then bread may be fleſh. If we be not to make choice of a political Inſtitution without a miraculous teſt or recommendation; either kind of Ordination was at firſt accompany'd with ſupernatural Gifts, and from thenceforth, as I conceive, neither. Divines methinks as ſuch ſhould not be ſo much concern'd in the Ordination of the Sanhedrim, or of JOSHUA, who were Magiſtrates, as the People or the Magiſtrate: yet if theſe ſhould hence infer that their Election, Ordination, or Deſignation of perſons confer'd ſupernatural Gifts, Divines would hardly allow of it; and why are the People, or the Magiſtrate oblig'd to allow more to that of a Clergy? To return.

SUCH

SUCH as I have ſhewn was the Ordination of the Senate, or great Sanhedrim, that of the leſſer Sanhedrim, or inferior Courts, was of like nature, for it follows; *I took the chief of your Tribes, wiſe men and known* (γνωστους) *and made them Heads over you, Captains of thouſands, and Captains of hundreds*, &c. which were other Magiſtrates than, according to our cuſtom, we ſhould readily expect to be intimated by ſuch words, for they were the Judges of the inferior Courts, thoſe that *ſat in the gates of each City*, and others that appertain'd to the Villages, as in the next Verſe: *And I charg'd your Judges at that time, ſaying, Hear the Cauſes, and judge righteouſly.* Chap. 3. Deut. 1. 15.

THE next Magiſtrate whoſe Election comes to be conſider'd is the Dictator, or Judge of *Iſrael*. Where it is ſaid of this People, that the *Lord rais'd them up Judges, which deliver'd them out of the hands of thoſe that ſpoil'd them*, it is to be underſtood, ſays SIGONIUS, that God put it into the mind of the People to elect ſuch Magiſtrates, or Captains over them. For example, when the Children of *Ammon* made war againſt *Iſrael*, God rais'd up JEPHTHA, whoſe Election was after this manner: *The Elders went to fetch* JEPHTHA *out of the Land of* Tob, *and when they had brought him to* Mizpeh (which in thoſe days was the place, where συναγωγη θεου, the Congregation of *Iſrael* uſually aſſembled) *the People made him Head and Captain over them*. Now that the Election of the King was as much in the *Chirotonia* of the People, as that of the Judge, is paſt all controverſy, ſeeing the Law ſpeaking of the People ſays thus: *One from among thy Brethren ſhalt thou ſet King over thee*; and accordingly when the Government was chang'd to Monarchy, it was not SAMUEL, but the People that would have it ſo; thus SAUL was choſen King by the Lot. Where the contradiction of GROTIUS is remarkable, who in this place to ſhew that the Lot is of Popular Inſtitution, quotes ARISTOTLE; and yet when he comes to ſpeak of the Lots that were caſt at the Election of MATTHIAS, ſays it was *that it might appear not whom the Multitude, but whom God had ordain'd*; as if the Magiſtrate lawfully elected by the People, were not elected by God, or that the Lot which thus *falls into the lap were not at the diſpoſing of the Lord*. But if the League by which the People receiv'd DAVID into the Throne, or the Votes by which firſt the People of *Jeruſalem*, and afterwards the Congregation of *Iſrael* (as was ſhewn in the former Book) made SOLOMON King, were of the Lord; then Election by the People was of the Lord, and the Magiſtrate that was elected by the *Chirotonia* of the People, was elected by the *Chirotonia* of God: for as the Congregation of *Iſrael* is call'd in Scripture (συναγωγη θεου) the *Eccleſia* or Congregation of God; ſo the *Chirotonia* of this Congregation is call'd by JOSEPHUS (θεου χειροτονια) the *Chirotonia* of God, who as I noted before out of CAPELLUS, was in this Common-wealth Political King, or Civil Legiſlator *(Sans comparaiſon)* as SOLON in *Athens*, and ROMULUS in *Rome*; that is to propoſe to the People *(Hæc eſt lex quam* MOSES *propoſuit)* and whatever was propos'd by God, or the lawful Magiſtrate under him, and chirotoniz'd or voted by the People, was Law in *Iſrael*, and no other. Nay, and the People had not only power to reject any Law that was thus propos'd, but to repeal any Law that was thus enacted: for if God intending Popular Government ſhould have ordain'd it otherwiſe, he muſt have contradicted himſelf; Ver. 10. Judg. 2. 16. De Rep. Heb. Judges 11. Deut. 17. 15. Ariſt. Pol. B. 6. c. 2. De Imp. S. P. c. 10. Judges 20. Joſ. l. 4.

Book II. himſelf; wherefore he plainly acknowledges to them this power, where (Θεὸν ἀποχειροτονοῦσι τῆς βασιλείας) *they rejected him* (whom they had formerly chirotoniz'd or choſen King) *that he ſhould not reign over them*; and elected SAUL. This if God had withſtood by his Power, he muſt have introduc'd that kind of Monarchy which he had declar'd againſt; wherefore he choſe rather to abandon this ſottiſh and ingrateful People to the moſt inextricable yoke of deſerv'd ſlavery, telling them, when he had warn'd them and they would not hear him, that they *ſhould cry to him and he would not hear them*, one title of whoſe words paſs'd not unfulfill'd.

Joſephus, l. 6. c. 5.

BY this time I have ſhewn that all the Civil Magiſtrates in *Iſrael* were choſen by the *Chirotonia* of the People, or, to follow JOSEPHUS, by the *Chirotonia* of God, which is all one; for the *Chirotonia* of the Preſident of the Congregation, as I have inſtanc'd in that of the *Proedri*, of the *Theſmothetæ*, of the Conſuls, of the Tribunes, and the *Chirotonia* of the Congregation is the ſame thing; and of the Congregation of *Iſrael* God, except only at the voting of a King, was Preſident.

TO come then from the Civil Magiſtrates to the Prieſts and Levites, theſe were choſen in two ways, either by the Lot, or by the *Chirotonia*.

THE office and dignity of the High Prieſt being the greateſt in *Iſrael*, and by the inſtitution to be hereditary, caus'd great diſputes in the Election: to this MOSES by the command of God had deſign'd AARON his Brother; which Deſignation, the Command of God being at firſt either not ſo obvious as that relation, or the ambition of others ſo blind that they could not or would not ſee it, caus'd great combuſtion. Firſt, thro' the conſpiracy of KORAH, DATHAN, and ABIRAM; and next by the murmuring of the Princes of the Tribes, all emulous of this Honour. KORAH being not only a great man, but of the Tribe of *Levi*, could not ſee why he was not as worthy of the Prieſthood, conſideration had of his Tribe, as AARON; and if any other Tribe might pretend to it, DATHAN and ABIRAM, being deſcended from REUBEN were not only of the elder Houſe, but troubl'd to ſee a younger prefer'd before them. Wherefore theſe having gain'd to their party three hundred of the moſt powerful men of the Congregation, accus'd MOSES of affecting Tyranny, and doing thoſe things which threaten'd the Liberty of the Commonwealth; as under pretence of Divination to blind the eyes of the People, preferring his Brother to the Prieſthood without the Suffrage of the Congregation: of which charge MOSES acquitting himſelf in the Congregation, tells the People that AARON *was choſen both by God, and* (κατὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν γνώμην αὐτοῦ τυγχάνων) *by their Suffrages*, which (KORAH being upon this occaſion miraculouſly deſtroy'd) were thereupon once more given by the People. Nevertheleſs the Princes of the Tribes continuing ſtill diſcontented, and full of murmur, God decided the Controverſy by a ſecond miracle, the *budding of* AARON's *Rod:* (and ſo ᾧ ὁ μὲν τρὸς αὐτὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ χειροτονίαν ἐβεβαίωσε· τιμὰς τὴν τιμὴν) *being thrice confirm'd by the* Chirotonia *of God, he was confirm'd in that honour.* Now that the *Chirotonia* of God in this place of JOSEPHUS ſignifies the *Chirotonia* of the People, is plain by that in Scripture, where they made SOLOMON King, and ZADOCK to be Prieſt. After the Captivity, as

Numb. 16. Joſephus l. 4.

1 Chron. 29. 22.

in

in other things, ſo in this power the Sanhedrim came, as I conceive, to over-reach the People: JOSHUA the Son of JOSEDECH being thus elected High Prieſt by the Sanhedrim, and this Honour thenceforth (as appears by MAIMONIDES) being at the diſpoſing of this Court. Nor could any inferior Prieſt ſerve at the Altar, except he had acquir'd that right by the Lot, as is not only deliver'd by the ſame Author, and by JOSEPHUS, but in Scripture. Now the Lot, as was ſhewn, giving no Prerogative either to any perſon or Party, is as popular an Inſtitution as the *Chirotonia*. So in election of Prieſts, the Orders of *Iſrael* differ'd not from human Prudence, nor thoſe of other Common-wealths, the Prieſt of JUPITER having been elected after the ſame manner in the Common-wealth of *Syracuſa*; the *Auguſtales*, and the *Veſtals* in that of *Rome*: and if the right of bearing holy Magiſtracy, being in *Iſrael* confin'd to one Tribe or Order, may ſeem to make any difference, it was for ſome time no otherwiſe in *Athens*, nor in *Rome*, where the Patricians or Nobility aſſum'd theſe Offices, or the greateſt of them to themſelves, till the People in thoſe Cities diſputed that Cuſtom, as introduc'd without their conſent, which the People of *Iſrael* could not fairly do, becauſe it was introduc'd by their conſent. Chap. 3.

Grot. ad Hag. 1. 1. Joſeph. de Bel. Jud. l. 4. Maimon. Hal. Cele Hamikdaſch, cap. 4, & 5. 2 Chron. 24. 5. & 25. 8. & 26. 13.

TO come to the *Levites* in their original Ordination, God commanded MOSES ſaying, *Thou ſhalt bring the Levites before the Tabernacle of the Congregation, and thou ſhalt gather the whole aſſembly of the Children of* Iſrael, *and they ſhall put their hands upon the Levites.* This in the ſound of the words may ſeem to imply the *Chirotheſia*, or Impoſition of Hands, but take heed of that; Divines will not allow the *Chirotheſia* to be an Act of the People; but in this proceeding the whole people acted in the Ordination of the *Levites*, wherefore the *Levites* alſo were ordain'd by the *Chirotonia*, Conſent, Vote, or Suffrage of the whole People imply'd in this action. But for the Ordination of Prieſts and Levites, whatever it was, it is not to the preſent purpoſe; Divines deriving not theirs from Prieſts and Levites, but from Dukes, Generals and Magiſtrates, from that of JOSHUA and of the Sanhedrim, always provided, that this were of the ſame nature with the former, that is, by the *Chirotheſia*, or Impoſition of hands, and not by the *Chirotonia* of the People. However the Ordination of the Magiſtracy was certainly Political; and ſo in this deduction they themſelves confeſs that their Ordination alſo is a Political Conſtitution: yet whereas MOSES is commanded by God to bring AARON and his Sons to the *door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation*, and having waſh'd them there, to adorn them with the Prieſtly Robes, with the Miter, and to anoint them; whereas he is commanded (the Children of *Iſrael* having firſt *laid their Hands upon the Levites*) to cleanſe them, and offer them for an Offering; Divines of the Hierarchy and the Presbytery (tho' it be otherwiſe with WALLÆUS and ſuch as acknowledge Popular Government) give the Congregation, or Conſent of the People for nothing, and put the whole Ordination of the Prieſts and Levites upon the waſhing and cleanſing, or other Ceremonies of Conſecration: as if to put the Ordination of SAUL upon the Ceremony of anointing by SAMUEL, tho' perform'd by the immediate Command of God, were not abſolutely contradictory to Scripture, and to the known Law of *Iſrael*, which ſpeaking of the People, expreſly ſays, *One from among thy Brethern ſhalt thou ſet King over thee*;

Numb. 8. 9, 10

Exod. 29.

Numb. 8.

Book II.

upon which place ſays PHILO, *Moſt wiſe* MOSES *never intended that the Royal Dignity ſhould be acquir'd by lot, but choſe rather that the Kings ſhould be elected by the* Chirotonia, *or Suffrage of the whole People. The Congregations of the People aſſembl'd upon this as upon other public affairs, and requir'd a ſign or confirmation from God: foraſmuch as by his will man is to the reſt of Nature, what the Face is to the Body.* Whereto agrees that of the Heathens, *Os homini ſublime dedit, Cœlumque tueri juſſit*, and their Divinations upon the like occaſions by Intrals, none of which were ever underſtood as deſtructive of the liberty of the People, or of the freedom of their *Chirotonia*.

Philo de inſt. principiis.

WHERE SOLOMON is made King, and ZADOCK Prieſt by the People, tho' the Ceremony of anointing was doubtleſs perform'd, and perhaps by the prophet NATHAN, it is wholly omitted in the place as not worth the ſpeaking of. The opinion that the Ordination of the Prieſts and Levites lay in the Ceremononies of their Conſecration, is every whit as ſober and agreeable to reaſon, as if a man ſhould hold the Kings of *England* to have been made by the Unction of the Biſhops. *Iſrael* from the Inſtitution of MOSES to the Monarchy, was a Democracy, or Popular Government; in Popular Government the Conſent of the People is the Power of the People, and both the Prieſts and Levites were ordain'd by the Conſent of the People of *Iſrael*.

TO bring theſe things to the Cities in the perambulation of the Apoſtles, which by the former Chapter I have prov'd to have been Popular Governments; it is acknowledg'd by GROTIUS to the Cities of *Aſia*, not only that they us'd the *Chirotonia*, but in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word, that is, to give their Suffrage by the holding up of Hands. And that they had the liberty of their Religion, the choice of their Magiſtrates, both Civil and Eccleſiaſtical in their *Eccleſiæ*, or Congregations, has been alſo undeniably evidenc'd; whence it muſt needs follow that there were Cities in *Aſia* (χειροτονήσαντες αὐτοῖς πρεσβυτέρους κατ' ἐκκλησίαν) *chirotonizing or ordaining them Elders*, that is, Magiſtrates and Prieſts in every Congregation (with Reverence be it ſpoken) long before CHRIST was in the fleſh, or the Apoſtles any of them were born. Wherefore to ſum up what in this Chapter I conceive to be ſufficiently prov'd, I may boldly conclude, *That the* Chirotonia *derives from popular Conſtitution, and that there was a way of Ordination by the* Chirotonia.

Ditm. c. 10.

CHAP. IV.

The deduction of the Chirotheſia *from Monarchical or Ariſtocratical Government, and of the ſecond way of Ordination from the* Chirotheſia. *In which is contain'd the Common-wealth of the* Jews *as it ſtood after the Captivity.*

WHAT *pleaſes the Prince*, ſays JUSTINIAN, *has the force of a Law, ſeeing the People in his Creation have devolv'd their whole Power upon his Perſon*; which is with the moſt. But when Popular Government is chang'd into Monarchical, either the whole Power of the People, or a great part of it muſt of neceſſity accrue to the King. Hence

Hence says SAMUEL, *he will appoint him Captains over Thousands, and Captains over Fifties:* in which words perhaps is intimated the Judges of the inferior Courts, or *Jethronian* Prefectures; so that hereby SAMUEL tells the People they shall no more have the Election of their Rulers, but the King will have it; who, it may be, chang'd the nature of some of these Magistracies, or added others: for when DAVID came to *reign over all* Israel, JOAB *was over the Host* (his Strategus or General) JEHOSHAPHAT *was Recorder*, ZADOC *and* ABIMELEC *were the Priests*, SERAIAH *was the Scribe, and* BENAIAH *was over the* Pelethits, *and the* Cherethits; that is, was Captain of his Regiments of Guard, call'd perhaps by these names, as those of ROMULUS were called *Celeres*. But it should seem that few or none of these Officers were elected by the *Chirotonia*, that is by the People, but by the Prince, which kind of Election, as will be shewn anon, may be call'd *Chirothesia*. For the deduction of this kind of Ordination, or Election, we shall do well to hearken first to Dr. HAMMOND; who in his Query, or Discourse concerning Ordination by the Imposition of Hands, puts it thus. *To lift up the Hands was a Ceremony in Prayer, and accordingly to lay hands on any (differing no otherwise from lifting up, than by the determining that Action to a peculiar Object, the Person that was pray'd for) was generally among the* Jews *a Ceremony of benediction us'd first by the Father to the Children, in bestowing the Blessing upon them (and with that the succession to some part of his Estate or Inheritance) as appears in* JACOB's *blessing the Children of* JOSEPH: he stretch'd out his right hand, and laid it upon EPHRAIM's head, and his left hand on MANASSES, and so he bless'd, *&c. From thence it was accommodated among them to the communicating of any part of Power to others as assistants, or to the deriving of any successive Office from one to another. Thus when* MOSES *had from Heaven receiv'd, and long us'd his Commission to be under God the Ruler of the People, the seventy Elders were by God's appointment assum'd to assist him: it being certain from the* Jewish *Writings, tho' the sacred Scripture has no occasion to mention it, that the succession of the seventy Elders, under the name of* Sanhedrim *or* Council, *was continu'd thro' all Ages by their creating others in the place of those that dy'd, by this Ceremony of Imposition of Hands. To this purpose are the clear words of* MAIMONIDES: MOSES our Master created the seventy Elders by Imposition of hands, and the Divine Majesty rested on them; and those Elders impos'd Hands on others, and others on others, *&c. So a little before the departure of* MOSES *out of this life, when a Successor was to be provided for him, God commands him* to take JOSHUA, and lay his hands upon him. And MOSES laid his hands upon him, and gave him a Charge as the Lord commanded by the hand of MOSES: *that is, deriv'd to him by this Ceremony the Authority which himself had, and constituted him his Successor in that Government. And so it is repeated,* JOSHUA was full of the spirit of Wisdom, for MOSES had laid his Hands upon him.

Chap. 4.

1 Sam. 8. 12.

2 Sam. 8. 15.

§. 10.

Exod. 17. 11.

Gen. 48. 14.

Numb. 11. 17.

Tit. Sanhed. c. 4.

Numb. 27. 18, 23.

Deut. 34. 9.

THIS is the Doctor's deduction of the *Chirothesia*, or Ordination by the laying on of Hands, from the Common-wealth of *Israel: and,* says he, *from the three Uses of this Ceremony there, that is, first in praying for another: secondly, in paternal benediction; thirdly, in creating Successors in power, either in whole, or in part, derive three sorts of things in the New Testament, to which this Ceremony of laying on of Hands is accom-*

Book II. *accommodated. That of Prayer ſimply taken was of two ſorts, either for the cure of Diſeaſes, or pardoning of Sins. For Diſeaſes:* They ſhall
Mar. 16. 18. lay hands on the ſick, and they ſhall recover. *For Sins they were done away alſo by this Ceremony in the abſolution of Penitents, to which belongs*
1. Tim. 5. 22. *that Exhortation of* PAUL *to* TIMOTHY, Lay hands ſuddenly on no man, *that is, not without due examination and proof of his Penitence,* leſt thou be partaker of other men's Sins. *From the ſecond, that of Pa-*
Mar. 10. 16. *ternal Benediction, was borrow'd, firſt that of bleſſing Infants with the Ceremony of Impoſition of Hands, as it differ'd from Baptiſm. And ſecondly, that of confirming thoſe of fuller age, that had been formerly baptiz'd. Laſtly, to the creating Succeſſors in any Power, or communicating any part of Power to others, as to Aſſiſtants, is anſwerable that Impoſition of Hands in Ordination ſo often mention'd in the New Teſtament, ſometimes*
Acts 6. 6. *in the lower degree, as in the ordaining of Deacons, elſewhere in the higheſt degree, ſetting Governors over particular Churches, as generally when by that laying on of Hands it is ſaid,* they receiv'd the Holy Ghoſt; *whereas the Holy Ghoſt contains all the* χαρίσματα *requir'd to the paſtoral*
Luke 24. 49. *Function, and ſo ſignifies Power from on high: the Authority and Function it ſelf, ſo it be given by Impoſition of Hands, makes the parallel exact between this of Chriſtian Ordination, and that obſerv'd in the creating Succeſſors in the* Jewiſh *Sanhedrim.* So far the Doctor.

Deut. 1. NOW ſay I, if the Scripture be ſilent as to the Ordination of the Elders in *Iſrael*, what means that place; *Take ye wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among your Tribes, and I will make them Rulers over you?* Once in their lives let them give us the ſenſe of it, or of that
Numb. 11. other, where ELDAD and MEDAD are *of thoſe that were written, and yet went not up to the Tabernacle:* Otherwiſe that we hear no more of theſe, is from the ſilence of Divines, and not of the Scripture. But if the Scripture be not ſilent in this point, is there not a great deal of fancy in going on to *cure the Sick, to pardon Sins, to bleſs Infants, confirm the Baptiz'd, ordain Miniſters, nay, give the Holy Ghoſt, and all the Graces belonging to the paſtoral Function,* from a place that has no ſuch thing in it? for if the Sanhedrim according to Scripture were not ordain'd by the *Chirotheſia*, there is no ſuch thing to be deriv'd by the *Chirotheſia* from the Sanhedrim. The firſt *Chirotonia* indeed of the Sanhedrim was accompany'd with miraculous endowments; wherefore if they will derive theſe Gifts and Graces from the Sanhedrim, why are they ſworn Enemies to the *Chirotonia?* Again, the Sanhedrim was a Civil Court or Senate; wherefore then by this Title ſhould not theſe Gifts and Graces be rather pretended to by the Civil Magiſtrate, than by Divines? what becomes of the Prieſt AARON and his Lots? is he left to the Civil Magiſtrate, while Divines derive themſelves from General JOSHUA and his *Chirotheſia?* But if the Sanhedrim and inferior Judicatories were otherwiſe ordain'd originally; then no Magiſtrate in *Iſrael* was originally ordain'd by the *Chirotheſia*, but only JOSHUA. It is admirable that Divines ſhould look upon God, as if in the inſtitution of a Common-wealth he had no regard at all to human Prudence, but was altogether fix'd upon their vain advantages. Who made human Prudence? or to what end was it made? Any man that underſtands the Politics, and conſiders that God was now proceeding according to this Art (as in his conſtitution of the Senate, and of the People or Congregation, is moſt obvious) muſt needs ſee that this Power he indulg'd to MOSES of making his own choice of one man,

man, could not possibly be intended as a permanent Constitution; for whereas he intended Popular Government, nothing is plainer than that a People not electing their own Magistrates can have no Popular Government. How absurd is it to conceive that God having already made an express Law, that the People if at any time they came under Monarchy, should yet have the election of their King, would now make a Law that the People being under a Common-wealth, should no longer have the election of their Magistrates? For who sees not that to introduce the *Chirothesia* as a standing Ordinance, had been to bar the People of this power? *Israel* at this time, tho' design'd for a Common-wealth, had no Land, no foundation to balance her self upon, but was an Army in a Wilderness, incompass'd about with Enemies. To permit to the People in this case, the choice of all their Civil Magistrates was nevertheless safe enough, nay best of all: for at the election of *wise men, and understanding, and known among their Tribes*, so far as was needful to civil administration, their skill must needs have been at any time sufficient; but the Common-wealth was yet in absolute necessity of a Protector, and of Dictatorian Power. Now to know who was fittest in this case to succeed MOSES, required the Wisdom of God, or of MOSES; and therefore was not yet safe to be ventur'd upon a People so new in their Government. For these reasons, I say, MOSES us'd the *Chirothesia* for once, and no more; or let them shew me among all the Dictators, Judges, or Kings, that succeeded JOSHUA, any one that was chosen by the *Chirothesia*, and be all Dictators. It is now above three thousand Years since the institution of the Sanhedrim, from which time the ambitious Elders first, then the Talmudists, and of latter ages Divines have been perpetually striving for, or possessing themselves of this same Oligarchical Invention of the *Chirothesia* pretended to be deriv'd from MOSES; tho' there be neither any such Precept of God or Christ in the Old or New Testament, nor any unanimous result upon the point, either by the Talmudists or Divines themselves. And for the clear words quoted by the Doctor out of MAIMONIDES, they are such to which I shall in due time shew MAIMONIDES to be elsewhere of a clear contrary Opinion. But in this Controversy, without some clearer deduction of the *Chirothesia*, we shall make no happy progress; in this therefore I shall follow SELDEN the ablest Talmudist of our age, or of any. Chap. 4.

THE Common-wealth of *Lacedemon* (if I could stand to shew it) has strange resemblances to that of *Israel*, not only in the Agrarian, which is nothing to the present purpose, but in the Senate, which to prevent catching another time, I do not say was a Judicatory only, but not only a Senate, but a Judicatory also. For LYCURGUS of all other Legislators was in this the likeliest to God, or to MOSES, that his work was so exquisitely perfected at once, and his Laws so comprehensive, that if the Senate had had no other function than to make or propose new Laws, there being little or nothing of that wanting, they would have had little or nothing to do. Now it being thus, and much more than thus in *Israel*, the Sanhedrim was not only the Senate, but the supreme Judicatory. And because one Court in a Territory of any Extent is no where sufficient to this end; therefore the Sanhedrim had divers branches distended not only to the Cities of *Judea*, but even to the Villages; these were call'd the *Lesser Sanhedrim*, or the *Jethronian Prefectures*.

Book II.

Selden de Syn.

THE Great Sanhedrim conſiſting, as has been ſhewn, of 70 Elders, ſat firſt in the Tabernacle, and afterwards in the Court of the Temple.

THE *Jethronian* Prefectures conſiſted ſome of three and twenty Elders, and others but of three. Of the former kind there were two in the gates of the Temple, and one ſitting in the gates of every City; of the latter there was one almoſt in every Village.

THE power of the *Jethronian* Court, conſiſting of twenty three Elders, was in matter of Judicature equal with that of the great Sanhedrim, only in caſes of Difficulty they obſerved this Precept. *If there ariſe a matter too hard for thee in judgment between Blood and Blood, between Plea and Plea, between Stroke and Stroke, being matter of Controverſy within thy gates; then ſhalt thou ariſe and get thee up into the place which the Lord thy God ſhall chooſe* (in the future, for the Common-wealth was yet but deſigned, not planted) *and thou ſhalt come to the Prieſts and the Levites, and to the Judge that ſhall be in thoſe Days, and inquire, and they ſhall ſhew thee the Sentence of Judgment:* That is, thou ſhalt conſult the Sanhedrim, or if there be no Sanhedrim, the *Suffes* or Judge of *Iſrael.* The Reaſon why the Sanhedrim in this Text is mention'd under the name of the *Prieſts* and *Levites* is, that theſe about the Beginning of this Common-wealth having (as were alſo the *Egyptian* Prieſts at the ſame time) been the learnedeſt Men, whether for Lawyers, or Phyſicians, there were ſcarce any other choſen into the Sanhedrim, tho' towards the latter end it happened to be far otherwiſe. For whereas ſacrificing was feaſting, the Prieſts enjoying a fat Idleneſs, became in latter times ſo heavy, that as to the Election of the Sanhedrim not only the *Levites* of inferior rank were upon the matter wholly laid by, but the High-prieſt himſelf ſometimes omitted, the reſt of the Tribes far excelling this in Learning.

Vid. Grot. ad Deut. 17. 8.

THE power of the *Triumvirates*, or the three Judges in the Villages extended no farther than to inflict ſtripes to a certain number, and pecuniary mulcts to a certain ſum. Theſe poſſibly had the ſame recourſe upon occaſion of difficulty to the Judges in the Gates, as the Judges in the Gates had to the Sanhedrim: but their power is not ſo much to the preſent purpoſe, which regards only their manner of Election. This having been inſtitutively exercis'd as has been ſhewn by the *Chirotonia*, or Ballot of the People, came ſooner or later (I find no man that can reſolve upon the certain time) to the *Chirotheſia*. For tho' when a Judge in the Gates was dead, that Court elected his Succeſſor out of their Diſciples (each Court in the Gates had 99 Diſciples that were their conſtant Auditors) or out of the Triumvirates; and when an Elder of the Sanhedrim dyed, the Sanhedrim elected his Succeſſor out of the Courts in the Gates, more particularly thoſe in the Gates of the Temple by Suffrages; yet no Man was capable of being elected into any of theſe Courts that was not a Presbyter, nor could any man confer the *Chirotheſia* that had not firſt received it, or been ſo ordained a Presbyter himſelf: nor tho' he were ſo ordained, could he confer the like Ordination, but in the preſence of two others, whether ordained or not ordained: and no ordination could be confer'd but either this way, or by ſome one of the Judicatories. The manner how this Ordination was confer'd, if the party were preſent, was either by laying on of Hands, or by ſaying a Verſe or Charm; or if he were abſent, by a Letter, or Patent.

Mikotzi Miſna Gemara.

Abr. Zacuth. Maimonides.

AN

Chap. 4.

A N Elder thus ordain'd was call'd *Rabbi*, might have Diſciples, teach, practiſe, or expound the Law, declare what was thereby free or forbidden (which with them was call'd *binding and looſing*) ordain others with the affiſtance mention'd, or be capable of Election into ſome one, or any Court of Juſtice, according to the nature of his Ordination, the Conditions mentioned at the conferring of the ſame, or *the gift that was in him by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery*; which in ſome extended no farther than to ſhew how Meat ſhould be kill'd and dreſs'd, how Uncleaneſs ſhould be purify'd, what were Vices of the Body, what might be eaten or drunk, and what not; in others it extended to ſome one or more, or the Faculties expreſs'd: But I am inclining to believe that a plenary Ordination us'd not to be conferr'd but by the great Sanhedrim, or at leaſt ſome one of the *Jethronian* Courts. Rab. Jonah. Rab. Nathan.

THEY us'd alſo to confer this Ordination ſome time occaſionally, and for a Seaſon in this manner. *Receive the gift of judiciary Ordination, or the right of binding and looſing, till ſuch time as you return to us in the City.* Where the Chriſtian *Jews* ſtill following their former Cuſtoms in higher matters, as the obſervation of the Sabbath, and of Circumciſion even to ſuch a Degree, that PAUL not to diſpleaſe them *took* TIMOTHY *and circumcis'd him*, ſeem to me to have follow'd this cuſtom, who when the Prophets at *Antioch* had informed them that PAUL and BARNABAS were to be ſeparated to an extraordinary work, *laid their hands upon them and ſent them away*: for otherwiſe as to Ordination PAUL and BARNABAS had that before; at leaſt PAUL by ANANIAS, and for any ſuch Precept in the Chriſtian Religion there was none. Maimon. Tit. San. cap. 4. Acts. 13. 3. Acts 9. 17.

JOSEPHUS, PHILO, and other Authors that tell us the Common-wealth of *Iſrael* was an Ariſtocracy, look no further than the introduction of the *Chirotheſia* by the Presbyterian Party, which muſt have taken date ſome time after the Captivity, or the reſtitution of the Common-wealth by EZRA, there being not one ſyllable for it in Scripture, but enough to the contrary, ſeeing God introduc'd the *Chirotonia*. By which it is demonſtrable that a Presbyterian Party may bring a Popular Government to Oligarchy, and deface even the work of God himſelf, ſo that it ſhall not be known to after ages; as alſo that Eccleſiaſtical Writers (for ſuch are the *Talmudiſts*) may pretend that for many hundred years together, as Divines alſo have done, to be in Scripture, which neither is, nor ever was there. But have I yet ſaid enough to ſhew that Ordination, eſpecially as in this Example, not of a Clergy, but of a Magiſtracy, whether by the *Chirotonia*, or *Chirotheſia*, is a Political Inſtitution? or muſt I rack my brains for Arguments to prove that an Order or a Law having ſuch influence upon the Common-wealth, that being introduc'd or repeal'd, it quite alters the whole frame of the Government, muſt needs be of a political nature, and therefore not appertain to Divines, or to a Clergy, but to the Magiſtrate, unleſs their Traditions may be of force to alter the Government as they pleaſe? All is one, they can abate nothing of it, let what will come of the Government, the *Chirotheſia* they muſt and will have. Then let them have Monarchy too, or Tyranny; for one of theſe, according as the balance happens to ſtand with or againſt their *Chirotheſia*, is the certain conſequence; either Tyranny as in *Iſrael*, or Monarchy as in the Papacy, and, from that or the like Principle, in all

Gothic

Book II. *Gothic* Empires: which Examples, to begin with *Iſrael*, well deſerve the pains to be ſomewhat more diligently unfolded.

ALL Elections in *Iſrael*, ſave thoſe of the Prieſts who were eligible by the Lot, being thus uſurp'd by the Presbyterian Party, and the People by that means deveſted of their *Chirotonia*; ſome three hundred years before CHRIST, HILLEL Senior High Prieſt, and Archon, or Prince of the Sanhedrim, found means to draw this Power of Ordination, in ſhew ſomewhat otherwiſe, but in effect to himſelf, and his *Chirotheſia*: for by his influence upon the Sanhedrim it was brought to paſs, that whereas formerly any man ordain'd might, in the manner ſhewn, have ordain'd his Diſciples; it was now agreed that no man ſhould be ordain'd without the Licence of the Prince, and that this Power ſhould not be in the Prince, but in the preſence of the Father of the Sanhedrim, or Speaker of the Houſe. Thus the Ariſtocracy of *Iſrael* becoming firſt Oligarchical, took (according to the nature of all ſuch Governments) long ſteps towards Monarchy, which ſucceeding in the *Aſmonean* Family, commonly call'd the *Maccabees*, was for their great merit, in vindicating the *Jews* from the Tyranny of ANTIOCHUS, confirm'd to them by the univerſal conſent and *Chirotonia* of the People. Nevertheleſs to him that underſtands the Orders of a Common-wealth, or has read the *Athenian*, *Lacedemonian*, or *Roman* Story, it will be plain enough that but for their Ariſtocracy they needed not to have been ſo much beholden to, or to have ſtood ſo much in need of one Family. It is true, both the merit of theſe Princes, and the manner of their free Election by the People, ſeem to forbid the name of Tyranny to this Inſtitution: but ſo it is that let there be never ſo much Merit in the Man, or Inclination of the People to the Prince, or the Government that is not founded upon the due balance, the Prince in that caſe muſt either govern in the nature of a Common-wealth, as did thoſe of this Family, reforming the policy after the *Lacedemonian* Model; or turn Tyrant, as from their time, who liv'd in the Age of the *Grecian* Monarchy, did all their Succeſſors, till under the *Romans* this Nation became a Province: From which time ſuch Endeavours and Inſurrections they us'd for the recovery of their antient Policy, that under the Emperor ADRIAN (who perceiv'd at what their Ordination, being not of Prieſts, but of Magiſtrates, and of a Senate pretending to Sovereign Judicature and Authority, ſeem'd to aim) there came, ſays the *Talmud*, *againſt the* Iſraelites *an Edict out of the Kingdom of the Wicked* (meaning the *Roman* Empire) *whereby whoſoever ſhould ordain, or be ordain'd, was to be put to death, and the School or City in which ſuch an Act ſhould be done, to be deſtroy'd: whereupon Rabbi* JEHUDA BEN BABA (leſt Ordination ſhould fail in *Iſrael*) *went forth, and ſtanding between two great Mountains, and two great Cities, and between two Sabbath-days journies from* Oſa *and* Sephara, *ordain'd five Presbyters.* For this Feat the Rabbi is remembr'd by the *Talmudiſts* under the name of Ordinator; but the ſame, as it follows, being diſcover'd by the *Roman* Guards, *they ſhot his Body thro' with ſo many Darts, as made it like a Sive:* Yet ſtaid not the buſineſs here, but ſo obſtinate continu'd the *Jews* in the Superſtition to which this kind of Ordination was now grown, that whereas by the ſame it was unlawful for them to ordain in a foreign Land, and at home they could not be brought to abſtain, the Emperor baniſh'd them all out of their own

Maimon. Tit. San. cap. 4.

own Country; whence happen'd their total Diſperſion. That of a thing which at the firſt was a mere deluſion, ſuch Religion ſhould come in time, and with education to be made that not only they who had receiv'd advantage could ſuffer Matrydom, but they that had loſt by it, would be utterly loſt for it, were admirable in the caſe of this People, if it were not common in the caſe of moſt in the World at this day: Cuſtom may bring that to be receiv'd as an Ordinance of God, for which there is no colour in Scripture. For to conſult MAIMONIDES a little better upon this point: *Whereas*, ſays he, *they grant, in caſe it ſhould happen that in all the Holy Land there remain'd but one Presbyter, that Presbyter, aſſiſted by two other* Iſraelites, *might ordain the ſeventy, or great Sanhedrim, and the Sanhedrim ſo conſtituted might conſtitute and ordain the leſſer Courts, I am of opinion that were there no Presbyter in the Land, yet if all the wiſe men of* Iſrael *ſhould agree to conſtitute or ordain Judges, they might do it lawfully enough. But if ſo, then how comes it to paſs that our Anceſtors have been ſo ſolicitous, leſt Judicature ſhould fail in* Iſrael? *Surely for no other cauſe than that from the time of the Captivity the* Iſraelites *were ſo diſperſed that they could not upon like occaſions be brought together.* Now I appeal whether the clear Words of MAIMONIDES, where he ſays, *that our Maſter* MOSES *ordain'd the* Sanhedrim *by the* Chirotheſia, be not more clearly and ſtrongly contradicted in this place, than affirm'd in the other, ſince acknowledging that if the People could aſſemble, they might ordain the *Sanhedrim*, he gives it for granted, that when they did aſſemble, they had Power to ordain it; and that MOSES did aſſemble them upon this occaſion, is plain in Scripture. Again, if the power of Ordination falls ultimately to the People, there is not a ſtronger argument in Nature that it is thence primarily deriv'd. To conclude, the *Chirotheſia* of the Preſbyterian Party in *Iſrael* is thus confeſs'd by the Author no otherwiſe neceſſary, than thro' the defect of the *Chirotonia* of the People: which Ingenuity of the *Talmudiſt*, for any thing that has yet paſt, might be worthy the imitation of Divines.

Chap. 4.

Halac. San. C. 4. S. 11.

IN tracking the *Jews* from the reſtitution of their Common-wealth after the Captivity to their diſperſion, it ſeems that the latter Monarchy in *Iſrael* was occaſion'd by the Oligarchy, the Oligarchy by the Ariſtocracy, and the Ariſtocracy by the *Chirotheſia*; but that this Monarchy, tho' erected by magnanimous and popular Princes, could be no leſs than Tyranny deriv'd from another Principle, that is, the inſufficiency of the balance: For tho' from the time of the Captivity, the Jubilee was no more in uſe, yet the Virgin MARY as an Heireſs, is affirm'd by ſome to have been marry'd to JOSEPH by Virtue of this Law: *Every Daughter that poſſeſſes an Inheritance in any Tribe of the Children of* Iſrael, *ſhall be Wife to one of the Family of the Tribe of her Fathers*, &c. By which the popular Agrarian may be more than ſuſpected to have been of greater vigour than would admit of a well-balanc'd Monarchy.

Numb. 27. 8.

THE ſecond Presbytery, which is now attain'd to a well-balanc'd Empire in the Papacy, has infinitely excel'd the pattern, the Lands of *Italy* being moſt of them in the Church. This, if I had leiſure, might be track'd by the very ſame ſteps: At firſt it conſiſted of the ſeventy Pariſh Prieſts, or Presbyters of *Rome*; now ſeventy Cardinals creating to themſelves a High Prieſt, or Prince of their Sanhedrim, the Pope, but for the Superſtition whereto he has brought Religion,

Book II. ligion, and continues by his *Chirotheſia* to hold it, a great and a Reverend Monarch, eſtabliſh'd upon a ſolid Foundation, and governing by an exquiſite Policy, not only well-balanc'd at home, but deeply rooted in the greateſt Monarchies of Chriſtendom, where the Clergy by virtue of their Lands are one of the three States.

THE Maxims of *Rome* are profound; for there is no making uſe of Princes without being neceſſary to them, nor have they any regard to that Religion which does not regard Empire. All Monarchies of the *Gothic* Model, that is to ſay, where the Clergy by virtue of their Lands are a third eſtate, ſubſiſt by the Pope, whoſe Religion creating a reverence in the People, and bearing an awe upon the Prince, preſerves the Clergy, that elſe being unarm'd, become a certain Prey to the King or the People; and where this happens (as in HENRY the Eighth) down goes the Throne; for ſo much as the Clergy loſes, falls out of the Monarchical into the Popular Scale. Where a Clergy is a third Eſtate, Popular Government wants Earth, and can never grow: but where they die at the root, a Prince may ſit a while, but is not ſafe; nor is it in nature (except he has a Nobility or Gentry able without a Clergy to give balance to the People) that he ſhould ſubſiſt long or peaceably: For wherever a Government is founded on an Army, as in the Kings of *Iſrael* or Emperors of *Rome*, there the ſaddeſt Tragedies under Heaven are either on the Stage, or in the Tiring-houſe. Theſe things conſider'd, the *Chirotheſia* being originally nothing elſe but a way of Policy excluding the People, where it attains not to a balance that is ſufficient for this purpoſe, brings forth Oligarchy or Tyranny, as among the *Jews:* And where it attains to a balance ſufficient to this end, produces Monarchy, as in the Papacy, and in all *Gothic* Kingdoms.

THE Prieſts of *Ægypt*, where (as it is deſcrib'd by SICULUS) their Revenue came to the third part of the Realm, would no queſtion have been exactly well fitted with the *Chirotheſia* pretended to by modern Divines. Suppoſe the Apoſtles had planted the Chriſtian Religion in thoſe Parts, and the Prieſts had been all converted, I do not think that Divines will ſay, that having alter'd their Religion they needed to have deſerted their being a third Eſtate, their over-balance to the People, their Lands, their Pre-eminence in the Government, or any part of their Policy for that: and I am as far from ſaying ſo as themſelves.

ON the other ſide, as PAUL was a Citizen of *Rome*, let us ſuppoſe him to have been a Citizen of *Athens*, and about (ωϛτεϱον) to conſtitute the Chriſtian Religion in this Common-wealth, where any Citizen might ſpeak to the People: Imagine then he ſhould have ſaid thus; *Men of* Athens, *that which you ignorantly ſeek I bring to you, the true Religion; but to receive this, you muſt not alter your former Belief only, but your antient Cuſtoms. Your Political Aſſemblies have been hitherto call'd* Eccleſiæ; *this word muſt loſe the antient ſenſe, and be no more underſtood but of Spiritual Conſiſtories; and ſo whereas it has been of a Popular, it muſt henceforth be of an Ariſtocratical, or Presbyterian ſignification. For your* Chirotonia, *that alſo muſt follow the ſame rule; inſomuch as on whomſoever one or more of the Ariſtocracy or Presbytery ſhall lay their hands the ſame is underſtood by virtue of that Action to be chirotoniz'd.* How well would this have ſounded in *Egypt*, and how ill in *Athens?* Certainly

tainly the Policy of the Church of CHRIST admits of more Prudence and Temperament in theſe things: Tho' the Apoſtles being *Jews* themſelves, ſatisfy'd the converted *Jews* that were us'd to Ariſtocracy, by retaining ſomewhat of their Conſtitutions, as the *Chirotheſia*; yet when PAUL and BARNABAS come to conſtitute in Popular Common-wealths, they are (χειροτονήσαντες αὐτοῖς πρεσβυτέρους κατ' ἐκκλησίαν) *Chirotonizing them Elders in every Congregation.* Chap. 5.

CHAP. V.

Whether the Chirotonia *mention'd in the fourteenth of the* Acts *be indeed, as is pretended by Dr.* HAMMOND, *Dr.* SEAMAN, *and the Authors they follow, the ſame with the* Chirotheſia, *or a far different thing. In which are contain'd the divers kinds of Church-Government introduc'd and exercis'd in the age of the Apoſtles.*

EITHER I have impertinently intruded upon the Politics, or cannot be ſaid ſo much to meddle in Church matters, as Church-men may be ſaid to have meddled in State matters: For if the *Chirotonia* be Election by the many, and the *Chirotheſia* be Election by one, or by the Few, the whole difference between Popular and Monarchical Government falls upon theſe two words; and ſo the queſtion will be, Whether the Scriptures were intended more for the advantage of a Prince, of a Hierarchy or Preſbytery, than of the People. But that God in the Old Teſtament inſtituted the *Chirotonia*, not only in the Common-wealth, as by the Election of the Sanhedrim, but in the Monarchy, as in the Election of the Kings, is plain: So if there remains any advantage in Scripture to Kings, to the Hierarchy or Preſbytery, it muſt be in the New Teſtament. *Iſrael* was God's choſen People, and God was *Iſrael*'s choſen King: That God was pleas'd to bow the Heavens, and come down to them, was his choice, not theirs; but in that upon his Propoſition, and thoſe of his Servant MOSES, they reſolv'd to *obey his Voice, and keep his Covenant*, they choſe him their King. In like manner, the Church is CHRIST's choſen People, and CHRIST is the Church's choſen King. That CHRIST taking fleſh was pleas'd to bow the Heavens, and come down in a more familiar capacity of propoſing himſelf to Mankind, was his own choice, not theirs: but in that the Church upon his Propoſition, or thoſe of his Apoſtles ſent by him, as he was ſent by the Father, reſolv'd to obey his Voice, and keep his Covenant, ſhe has choſen him her King. Whatever in Nature or in Grace, in Church or in State, is choſen by Man according to the Will of God, is choſen by God, of whom is both the Will and the Deed. Which things conſider'd, I wonder at Dr. HAMMOND, who ſays, *Sure the* Jewiſh *and Heathen Cities, to whom the Goſpel by* CHRIST's *Command was to be preach'd, were not to chooſe their Guides or Teachers.* CHRIST *was not choſen by them to whom he preach'd; for ſays he, ye have not choſen me. He came from Heaven, ſent by his Father on that Errand; and happy they whom he was thus pleas'd to chooſe, to call,* § 36.

and

Book II. *and preach to. And when his Apoſtles, after his example, go and preach to all Nations, and actually gather Diſciples, they choſe their Auditors, and not their Auditors them.* To make ſhort work, I ſhall anſwer by explaining his Words as they fall.

A *ROMAN* chooſing whether he would ſpeak to the Senate or the People, choſe his Auditors, and not they him: Nevertheleſs if it were the Conſul, they choſe him, and not he them. It is one thing to be a Speaker to a People, that have the liberty, when that's done, to do as they think fit; and another thing to be a Guide, whom the People have conſented, or oblig'd themſelves to follow: which diſtinction not regarded, makes the reſt of his Argumentation recoil upon himſelf; while he proceeds thus: *And they that give up their Names to the Obedience of the Goſpel* (choſe the Preachers, as I ſhould think, of that Goſpel their Guides) *one branch of this Obedience obliges them* (by their own conſent it ſeems, becauſe before they gave up their Names) *to obſerve thoſe that* (being thus plac'd over them by their conſent) *are plac'd over them by God: ſuch not only are their Civil Magiſtrates* (who ſucceed to their places by, and govern according to the Laws which the People have choſen) *but alſo their Paſtors, whom the Holy Ghoſt either mediately* (according to the Rules of Church Diſcipline in Scripture) *or immediately* (upon ſome ſuch miraculous Call, as the People ſhall judge to be no impoſture) *has ſet over them.* From which words the Doctor, not conſidering thoſe Qualifications I have ſhewn all along to be naturally inherent in them, concludes *that a Biſhop is made by the Holy Ghoſt, and not by the People.*

IF he would ſtand to this yet it were ſomething; for if the Holy Ghoſt makes a Biſhop, then I ſhould think that the Holy Ghoſt ordain'd a Biſhop, and ſo that the Election and Ordination of a Biſhop were all one. But this hereafter will appear to be a more dangerous Conceſſion than perhaps you may yet apprehend. Wherefore when all is done, you will not find Divines, at leaſt Dr. HAMMOND, to grant that the Holy Ghoſt can ordain: he may elect indeed, and that is all; but there is no Ordination without the *Chirotheſia* of the Biſhops, or of the Preſbytery. Take the Doctor's word for it.

§. 107. *WHEN St.* PAUL *ſays of the Biſhops of* Aſia, *that the Holy Ghoſt*
Acts 20. 28. *had ſet them Overſeers, I ſuppoſe that it is to be underſtood of their Election or Nomination to thoſe Dignities: for ſo* CLEMENT *ſpeaks of St.* JOHN, *who conſtituted Biſhops of thoſe that were ſignify'd by the Spirit; where the Spirit's Signification notes the Election or Nomination of the Perſons, but the conſtituting them was the Ordination of St.* JOHN.

GOD may propoſe, as the Electors do to the great Council of *Venice*; but the Power of the Council, that is, to reſolve or ordain, is in the Biſhop, ſays Dr. HAMMOND, and in the Preſbytery, ſays Dr. SEAMAN. Indeed that Election and Ordination be diſtinct things, is to Divines of ſo great importance, that loſing this hold, they loſe all: For, as I ſaid before, whatever is choſen by Man according to the Will of God, that is, according to Divine Law, whether natural or poſitive, the ſame, whether in State or Church, is choſen by God, or by the Holy Ghoſt, of whom is both the Will and the Deed. To evade this, and keep all in their own hands, or *Chirotheſia*, Divines have invented this diſtinction, that Election is one thing, and Ordination another: God may elect, but they muſt conſtitute; that is, God may propoſe, but they muſt reſolve. And yet GROTIUS,

who

who in theſe things is a great Champion for the Clergy, has little more to ſay upon this Point than this. *Whether we conſider antient or modern Times, we ſhall find the manner of Election very different not only in different Ages and Countries, but in different years of the ſame age, and places of the ſame Country; ſo uncertain it is to determine of that which the Scriptue has left uncertain. And while men diſpute not of Right but of Convenience, it is wonderful to ſee what probable Arguments are brought on all ſides. Give me* CYPRIAN *and his times, there is no danger in popular Election. Give me the* Nicene *Fathers, and let the Biſhops take it willingly. Give me* THEODOSIUS, VALENTINIAN, *and* CHARLES *the Great, than Royal Election there is nothing ſafer.* Upon the heels of theſe Words treads Dr. HAMMOND in this manner: *That Election and Ordination are ſeveral things, is ſufficiently known to every man that meaſures the nature of Words either by uſage or Dictionaries; only for the convincing of ſuch as think not themſelves oblig'd to the obſervation of ſo vulgar Laws, I ſhall propoſe theſe evidences. In the Story of the creation of the Deacons of* Jeruſalem, *there are two things diſtinctly ſet down, one propos'd to the multitude of Diſciples to be done by them, another reſerv'd to the Apoſtles; that which was propos'd to the multitude was to elect, &c. Election of the Perſons was by the Apoſtles permitted to them, but ſtill the* (χειροτονια) *conſtituting is reſerv'd to the Apoſtles.* Then comes Dr. SEAMAN: *Be it granted, as it is by Proteſtants generally, that* PAUL *and* BARNABAS *made Elders with the conſent of the People, their Conſent is one thing, and their Power another.*

Chap. 5.

De Imp. ſum. Pot. c. 10. §. 31.

§. 104.

Acts 6.

Of Ordinate. p. 13.

WHERE in the firſt place I for my particular, who have had the Books of Dr. HAMMOND and Dr. SEAMAN ſent to me by way of Objection, need not go a ſtep further. All that I have inſerted in my *Oceana* concerning Ordination, is in theſe three Votes acknowledg'd and confirm'd: For the Probationer to be there ſent by a Univerſity to a cure that is vacant, may by a Doctor, or the Doctors of the ſame Univerſity already ordain'd, receive Impoſition of Hands, if that be thought fit to be added, and then the Election of the ſame Probationer by the People does no hurt, nay, ſays GROTIUS, *is of the right of Nature; for it is naturally permitted to every Congregation to procure thoſe things which are neceſſary to their conſervation, of which number is the Application of Function. So Merchants have the right of electing of a Maſter of their Ship; Travellers of a Guide in their way, and a free People of their King.* The Merchant, it ſeems, does not make the Maſter of his Ship, the Traveller his Guide, nor the free People their King, but elect them. As if VAN TRUMP had been Admiral, a Robber upon the Highway had been a Scout, or the Guide of an Army, or SAUL a King before they were elected. The point is very nice, which inſtead of proving, he illuſtrates in the beginning of the ſame Chapter by theſe three ſimilitudes.

De Imp. c. 10.

THE firſt is this, *The Power of the Husband is from God, the Application of this Power to a certain Perſon is from conſent, by which nevertheleſs the right is not given; for if this were by conſent, the Matrimony might be diſſolv'd by conſent, which cannot be.* As if an apparent retraction of Matrimonal Conſent, as when a Wife conſents to another than her own Husband, or commits Adultery, did not deliver a man from the bond of Marriage by the Judgments of CHRIST. There is an imperfection or cruelty in thoſe Laws, which make marriage to

Book II. laſt longer than a man in humanity may be judg'd to be a Husband, or a Woman a Wife: to think that Religion deſtroys Humanity, or to think that there is any defending of that by Religion which will not hold in Juſtice, or natural Equity, is a vaſt error.

THE ſecond Similitude is this: *Imperial Power is not in the Princes that are Electors of the Empire; wherefore it is not given by them, but apply'd by them to a certain Perſon.*

1 Pet. 2. 13. THIS is anſwer'd by PETER, where he commands Obedience to every Ordinance of Man (or, as ſome nearer the Original, every Power created by men) whether it be to the *Roman* Emperor as Supreme, or to the Pro-conſuls of *Aſia* and *Phrygia*, as ſent by him; for this is the ſenſe of the *Greek*, and thus it is interpreted by GROTIUS. Now if the then *Roman* Emperor were a Creature of Man, why not the now *Roman* Emperor?

THE laſt ſimilitude runs thus: *The Power of Life and Death is not in the multitude before they be a Common-wealth; for no private Man has the right of Revenge; yet it is apply'd by them to ſome Man, or Political Body of Men.* But if a man invades the Life of another, that other, whether under Laws or not under Laws, has the right to defend his own Life, even by taking away that (if there be no other propable Remedy) of the Invader. So that men are ſo far from having been void of the power of Life and Death before they came under Laws, that Laws can never be ſo made as wholly to deprive them of it after they come under them: wherefore the power of Life and Death is deriv'd by the Magiſtrate from, and confer'd upon him by the conſent or *Chirotonia* of the People, whereof he is but a mere Creature; that is to ſay, an Ordinance of Man.

THUS theſe Candles being ſo far from lighting the Houſe, that they die in the Socket, GROTIUS has been no leſs bountiful than to grant us that the People have as much right (where there is no human Creature or Law to the contrary) to elect their Churchmen, as Merchants have to elect their Seamen, Travellers their Guides, or a free People their King; which is enough a conſcience. Nor is Dr. HAMMOND ſtraiter Handed: Election, ſays he, was permitted by the Apoſtles to the Multitude, and therefore the ſame may be allow'd, always provided the (χειροτονια) conſtituting be reſerv'd to the Paſtors, or ordain'd Doctors and Preachers. And Dr. SEAMAN, upon condition the People will not ſay that it was done by their power, but think it fair that it was done by their conſent, is alſo very well contented. So all ſtands ſtreight with what I have heretofore propos'd. Let no man then ſay, whatever follows, that I drive at any Ends or Intereſts, theſe being already fully obtain'd and granted; nevertheleſs for truth ſake I cannot leave this Diſcourſe imperfect. If a Politician ſhould ſay that the Election and the Ordination of a *Roman* Conſul or Pontifex were not of like nature; that the χειροτονια, Contract of the Senate of *Rome* with the People in the Election of NUMA (*ut cum populus regem juſſiſſet, id ſic ratum eſſet, ſi patres autores fierent*) included or imply'd the Sovereign power to be in the Fathers; that the Conſent of this People was one thing, and their Power another: if, I ſay, he ſhould affirm theſe or the like in *Athens*, *Lacedemon*, or any other Common-wealth that is or has been under the Sun, there would be nothing under the Sun more ridiculous than that Politician. But ſhould men pretending to Government of

Livy.

any

any kind be not oblig'd to ſome conſideration of theſe Rules in Nature and univerſal Experience; yet I wonder how the word (καθιζάνειν) to conſtitute, with which they make ſuch a flouriſh, did not lead them, otherwiſe than they follow; this, as it was ſaid of SOLON by ARISTOTLE, being that which I have already ſhewn to be us'd both in the *Greek* of the Scripture, for the conſtitution of the Sanhedrim by MOSES, and in other Authors for that of the Senate by ROMULUS, each of which was then elected by the People: whence it may appear plainly that this is no word, as they pretend, to exclude popular Suffrage, but rather to imply it. And indeed that it is of no ſuch nature as neceſſarily to include Power, could not have been overſeen in the New Teſtament, but voluntarily where (οἱ δὲ καθιζῶντες τὸν Παῦλον) they are ſignify'd by it that conducted PAUL. But they have Miracles: ſuch indeed as have neither words nor reaſon for them, had need of Miracles. And where are theſe ſame Miracles? why the Apoſtles by the *Chirotheſia* or laying on of Hands confer'd the Holy Ghoſt. So they did not only when they us'd that Ceremony in reference to Ordination, but when they us'd it not in that relation, as to thoſe that were newly baptiz'd in *Samaria*, Men and Women: now it is not probable, that theſe, who ſhould ſeem to have been numerous, were all ordain'd, at leaſt the Women; and ſo the Miracle is to be attributed to the Hands of the Apoſtles, and not to Ordination in general. JOSHUA *was full of the Spirit* (not becauſe he had been ordain'd by the *Chirotheſia*, for ſo had many of them that crucify'd CHRIST and perſecuted the Apoſtles, but) becauſe MOSES *had laid his hands upon him.* Chap. 5. Acts 17. 15. Acts 8.

WOULD Divines be contented that we ſhould argue thus; The *Chirotonia* or Suffrage of the People of *Iſrael* at the firſt inſtitution was follow'd with miraculous Endowments, therefore whoever is elected by the People ſhall have the like? Or what have they to ſhew why the Argument is more holding as to their *Chirotheſia*, ſeeing for above one thouſand years all the Hierarchy and Preſbytery laid together have done no more Miracles than a Pariſh Clerk?

A CONTINU'D Miracle, as that the Sea ebbs and flows, the Sun always runs his admirable courſe, is Nature. Intermitted Nature, as that the waters of the Red Sea were mountains, that the Sun ſtood ſtill in the Dial of AHAZ, is a Miracle. To continue the latter kind of Miracle were to deſtroy the former, that is, to diſſolve Nature. Wherefore this is a certain rule, that no continu'd external Act can be in the latter ſenſe miraculous. Now Government, whether in Church or State, is equally a continu'd external Act. An internal continu'd Act may indeed be natural, or ſupernatural, as Faith.

A NATURAL Man, being even in his own natural apprehenſion *fearfully and wonderfully made*, is by the continu'd Miracle of Nature convinc'd that the World had a Creator, and ſo comes to believe in that which is ſupernatural; whence it is that all Nations have had ſome Religion: and a Spiritual Man being convinc'd by the purity of CHRIST's Doctrine, and the Miracles whereby it was firſt planted, is brought to the Chriſtian Faith. However CHRIST may require ſuch continu'd Faith or Spiritual exerciſe of his Church as is ſupernatural, he requires not any ſuch continu'd Act or bodily exerciſe of his Church as is ſupernatural. But the Government of the Church is a continu'd Act, or bodily exerciſe. It ſhould be heeded that to delude the ſenſe is not to do Miracles, but to uſe Impoſture. Now to perſuade

Book II. ſuade us, That Monarchical, Ariſtocratical, Popular, or mixt Government have not always been in Nature, or that there has ever been any other in the Church, were to delude ſenſe. Wherefore give me leave (in which I am confident I ſhall uſe no manner of Irreverence to the Scripture, but on the contrary make the right uſe of it) to diſcourſe upon Church-Government according to the rules of Prudence.

THE Goſpel was intended by Chriſt to be preached to all Nations, which (Princes and States being above all things exceeding tenacious of their Power) is to me a certain Argument that the Policy of the Church muſt be ſo provided for, as not to give any of them juſt cauſe of Jealouſy, there being nothing more likely to obſtruct the growth of Religion: and truly the nearer I look to the Scripture, the more I am confirm'd in this opinion.

Firſt way of Ordination in the Church of Chriſt.

CHRIST being taken up into Heaven, the firſt Ordination that we find was that of the Apoſtle MATTHIAS after this manner.

Acts 1.

THE Ariſtocracy of the Church, that is the Apoſtles, aſſembl'd the whole Congregation of Diſciples or Believers at *Jeruſalem*, being in number one hundred and twenty, where PETER (it having as it ſhould ſeem been ſo agreed by the Apoſtles) was Propoſer; who ſtanding up in the midſt of the Diſciples, acquainted them, that whereas JUDAS was gone to his place, the occaſion of their preſent meeting was to elect another Apoſtle in his room: whereupon proceeding to the Suffrage, they appointed two Competitors, JOSEPH and MATTHIAS, whoſe names being written each in a ſeveral Scrol, were put into one Urn, and at the ſame time two other Lots, whereof one was a blank and the other inſcrib'd with the word *Apoſtle*, were put into another Urn; which done, they pray'd and ſaid, *Thou Lord which knoweſt the hearts of all men, ſhew whether of theſe two thou haſt choſen.* The Prayer being ended, they *gave forth their Lots, and the Lot fell upon* MATTHIAS (κ) συνκατεψηφίσθη μετὰ τῶν ἑνδεκα ἀποστόλων) and by this *Pſephiſma* (the very popular word, and not only ſo, but being apply'd to the Ballot, is the very literal and original ſignification) he was added to the eleven Apoſtles. So you have the firſt way of Ordination in the Church, after Chriſt was taken up into Heaven, perform'd by the Election or *Chirotonia* of the whole Church.

NOW except any man can ſhew that MATTHIAS ever receiv'd the impoſition of hands, theſe ſeveral things are already demonſtrated. Firſt, that the *Chirotonia* is not only the more antient way of Ordination in the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*, but in the Church of CHRIST. Secondly, that the *Chirotheſia* or impoſition of Hands is no way neceſſary to Ordination in the Chriſtian Church. Thirdly, that the Diſcipline of the Chriſtian Church was primitively Popular; for to ſay that in regard of the Apoſtles it was Ariſtocratical, is to forget that there is no ſuch thing, without a mixture of Ariſtocracy, that is without the Senate, as a Popular Government in Nature. Fourthly, that Ordination in the Common-wealth of *Oceana* being exactly after this pattern, is exactly according to the Diſcipline of the Church of CHRIST. And fifthly, that Ordination and Election in this example are not two, but one and the ſame thing.

§. 115.

THE laſt of theſe Propoſitions having been affirm'd by Mr. HOBS, Dr. HAMMOND tells him plainly, that his aſſertion is far from all truth: Let us therefore conſider the Doctor's Reaſons, which are theſe; *Seeing the Congregation,* ſays he, *is affirm'd by the Gentleman to have ordain'd,*

dain'd, and it is plain by the words of St. LUKE *that God elected, Election and Ordination by this Example muſt be diſtinct things:* which in another place going about to fortify with this Argument, *That it was done by Lottery, and* SOLOMON *ſays, The Lot is at the diſpoſing of the Lord,* he utterly overthrows without and beyond help; for in this SOLOMON not denying, but rather affirming that he was choſen King by the People, plainly ſhews that Election by the People is Election by God. Where it is affirm'd, that God rais'd up Judges in *Iſrael,* it is not deny'd that the People elected them. The Doctor is at it in MAIMONIDES more than once, *that the Divine Majeſty reſted upon ſuch as were ordain'd by Impoſition of Hands.* But whereas it is affirm'd by MAIMONIDES more often, that *when the People* (Eccleſia Dei) *or Congregation of* Iſrael *aſſembl'd, then the Divine Majeſty, or the Holy Ghoſt reſted upon them*; of this he never takes any notice. The People, whether in *Iſrael, Athens, Lacedemon,* or *Rome,* never aſſembl'd for enacting of Laws, or election of Magiſtrates, without Sacrifice and imploring the aſſiſtance of God, to whom when their work was perform'd, they always attributed the whole Reſult or Election: and would the Doctor have Chriſtians to allow him but a Piece? For whereas God electing there had in the ſenſe both of *Jews* and *Heathens,* his choice of all, God electing here had in the ſenſe of Divines, but his choice of two, which were next this or none, but that indeed where he has not the whole he has none at all. Is that then far from all truth, which the Gentleman, or that which the Divine has ſaid, either in this part, or where he adds, that the hundred and twenty in the Text are never mention'd but once, and then it is in a Parentheſis? I will but tranſcribe the place. Chap. 12. *Dr.* H. *of Impoſition.* §. 115.

AND in thoſe days PETER *ſtood up in the midſt of the Diſciples, and ſaid (the number of the Names together were about an hundred and twenty)* &c. Are the Diſciples in the Parentheſis, or out of it? Are they but once mention'd, and that is in a Parentheſis? Or are they but once number'd, and that is in a Parentheſis? If a Gentleman ſhould do thus, what would they ſay? Or, what were ill enough to be ſaid? But to mend the Text, and bring the Diſciples into the Parentheſis, they have more ways than one; whereas the Heathen People, while the Prieſts were willing, mix'd theſe Duties with Devotions, Divines will not ſuffer a Chriſtian People upon like occaſions to pray: for where it is ſaid, *They pray'd,* it went before, *they appointed two,* and it follows, *They gave out their Lots*; which antecedent and conſequent, if the People pray'd, muſt be equally underſtood of them, and ſo they could be no Parentheſis. Therefore pray they muſt not, or Divines are loſt. But how will they ſilence them? To ſhew you this art I muſt tranſcribe the Heads of the Chapter. Acts 1. 15.

THE Apoſtles being return'd from Mount *Olivet* to *Jeruſalem, went up into an upper room, where abode both* PETER *and* JAMES *and* JOHN, *and* ANDREW, JAMES *the Son of* ALPHEUS, *and* SIMON ZELOTES, *and* JUDAS *the Brother of* JAMES. Verſe 13.

AND in thoſe days PETER *ſtood up in the midſt of the Diſciples, and ſaid (the number of Names together were about one hundred and twenty)* 15.

MEN and Brethren, 16.

OF theſe men which accompany'd with us all the time that the Lord Jeſus went in and out among us, 21.

Book II.

MUST one be ordain'd to be a Witneſs with us of his Reſurrection.
AND they appointed two, JOSEPH *and* MATTHIAS.
AND they pray'd, and ſaid, Thou Lord which knoweſt the hearts of
all men, ſhew whether of theſe two thou haſt choſen.
AND they gave forth their Lots, and the Lot fell upon MATTHIAS,
καὶ συνκατεψηφίσθη μετὰ τῶν ἕνδεκα ἀποστόλων.

THEY whom PETER acquainted that one muſt be ordain'd, one would verily believe were the hundred and twenty Diſciples, in the midſt of whom he ſtood up, and made the Propoſition; and ſo much the rather, becauſe this was no more than the Apoſtles knew before, and (in all right underſtanding of Government and Senſe) were already agreed upon, it being the Office of the Ariſtocracy or Senate in a Common-wealth (and ſuch exactly were the Apoſtles in the Church) upon all new Orders or Elections to be made; firſt, to debate and determine by themſelves, and then to propoſe to the *Chirotonia* or ultimate reſult of the People. But Divines ſay abſolutely no, which word to make good, *They appointed two*, and *they pray'd*, and *they gave forth their Lots*, being ſentences that ſtand plainly together, or hunt in couples, muſt leap ſheer over nine Verſes, PETER's whole Oration (which by this means is no more than a Parentheſis neither) and over the hundred and twenty Diſciples, without touching a hair of their heads, to light plum upon the thirteenth Verſe and the eleven Apoſtles! Never man us'd his Grammar ſo ſince he threw it at a Pear tree! Yet that CHRYSOSTOM (who underſtood *Greek*) allows of no ſuch conſtruction, is confeſs'd by the learneſt of this opinion; and whereas they fly to the *Latin* Fathers, that retreat is wholly cut off by DAVID BLUNDEL in his very learned Treatiſe *of the right of the People in Church-Government.*

Grotius.

BUT what do we ſtand upon words? Are theſe ſuch whereof the things to which they relate may be Interpreters? Or to what things can they relate but the Inſtitution of the Sanhedrim by MOSES? That at the Inſtitution of the Sanhedrim the Competitors were elected by the Suffrage of the People, and from thence that the Ballot of *Iſrael* conſiſted not only of a Lot but of a Suffrage too, has been already demonſtrated out of Scripture; and that the Election of MATTHIAS was by the Ballot of *Iſrael* is no leſs apparent in it ſelf, than fully confeſs'd upon the place by GROTIUS.

Demonſtration that God never ordain'd any Policy Eccleſiaſtical or Civil, but upon the Principles of Human Prudence.

" THEY that under colour of Religion in matter of Government,
" ſlight Prudence, are miſtaken, or do not mean honeſtly. Neither
" GOD nor CHRIST ever inſtituted any Policy whatſoever upon any
" other Principles than thoſe of Human Prudence. The Embaſſadors
" ſent from the *Gibienites* to JOSHUA deliver their Meſſage in this
" manner; *The Elders and all the Inhabitants of our Country ſpake to*
" *us, ſaying, Go meet them, and ſay to them, We are your Servants;*
Joſh. 9. 11. " *therefore now make ye a League with us.* They that had Power to
" ſend Embaſſadors, and to make a League with a foreign Nation,
" had ſovereign Power; this ſovereign Power was in the Elders, or Se-
" nate, and in the People of *Gibeon:* wherefore God conſtituting his
" Common-wealth for the main Orders (that is to ſay, the Senate and
" the People) upon the ſame Principles on which the *Gibeonites* had
" long before built theirs, laid his Foundations upon no other than
" human Prudence. So for the inferior Courts they were tranſcrib'd
" by MOSES out of the Common-wealth of *Midian*, upon advice

" of

" of JETHRO his Father in Law. According to ſuch patterns was *Iſrael* framed, and by that of *Iſrael* this firſt Policy of the Church " of CHRIST ſo exactly, as *(ſans compariſon)* any man ſhall ſhew " the Common-wealth of *Oceana* to have been tranſcribed out of " *Rome* or *Venice*. Let them that would have the Government be " ſomewhat between Earth and Heaven, conſider this place. Chap. 5.

NOR is Eccleſiaſtical Policy only ſubject to human prudence, but to the ſame viciſſitudes alſo whereto Human Prudence is ſubject, both in her own nature, and as ſhe is obnoxious to the State wherein ſhe is planted, and that unavoidably; as I come now to demonſtrate by the Alterations which happened even in the Age of the Apoſtles themſelves: for this at the Election of MATTHIAS being altered, the next form of Eccleſiaſtical Policy introduced in their times, is reſembled by GROTIUS to that of *Athens*, of which, for the better clearing of what follows, it is neceſſary that I firſt ſay ſomething by way of Introduction.

THE *Theſmothetæ*, being in number ſix, were Magiſtrates of the higheſt dignity, power, and Rank in *Athens*. Theſe, ſays ARISTOTLE, were elected by the *Chirotonia* or Suffrage of the People; and ſays, POLLUX being elected underwent the Inquiſition of the Senate, where they were to anſwer to theſe Interrogatories, *Whether they worſhiped the God of their Countries? Whether they had been dutiful to their Parents? born Arms for the Common-wealth? paid Duties or Taxes?* In which Particulars the Senate being ſatisfyed, *They were ſworn and crowned with Mirtle*; which comes to this, that the (κατασταμι) or Conſtitution being reſerved to the Senate, the *Theſmothetæ* were elected by the *Chirotonia* of the People. Now tho' the Government of *Athens* throughout the Cities of *Aſia* (being moſt of them of the like Model) was moſt known, I will not ſay that the Apoſtles wrote their Orders out of *Athens*, but ſeeing all Political Inſtitutions muſt needs be according to human Prudence, and there is nothing to be written out of this but what will fall even with ſome other Government that is or has been, I may ſay, as GROTIUS has ſaid before me, that the frame of Church-Government in the inſuing Example was after the manner of *Athens*.

Ariſt. 2. lib. 2. c. 10.

Pol. lib. 8. c. 9.

WHEN the number of the Diſciples, or Believers, *was multiply'd, there aroſe a murmuring* among ſuch of the *Jews* as having been bred in *Alexandria* or other parts, were for their Language (which was *Greek*) partly ſtrangers, againſt the *Hebrews* or converted *Jews*, that ſpoke their own Language, as if theſe indeed uſed them like ſtrangers, their Widows being neglected, or not dealt ſo liberally withal, as thoſe of the *Hebrews* in the Contributions due for their conſtant maintenance.

Second way of Ordination in the Church of Chriſt.

HEREUPON the twelve Apoſtles after the manner of the Senate, having without all queſtion debated the buſineſs among themſelves, as appears by the Speech upon which they were agreed, aſſembled the People, which is ſtill Senatorian, or called the Multitude of the Diſciples to them, and ſaid, It is not reaſon that we ſhould leave preaching, or the Word of God, to be taken up with this, tho' charitable, nay, ſeeing we have introduced Community of goods, moſt juſt and neceſſary Employment of providing Food and Clothing for every one of our Fellowſhip or Community (the Chriſtians in theſe times, much after the manner of the *Lacedemonian* Convives us'd to eat in public and together) to do this as it ought to be done, were to become

Caterers,

Book II. Caterers, and be taken up in ſerving Tables. *Wherefore, Brethren,* (take the wiſe men and underſtanding, and known among you) *look out ſeven men of honeſt report, full of the Holy Ghoſt, and of Wiſdom* (ὃς καταςήσομεν ἐπὶ τῆς χρείας ταύτης) *whom we may appoint over this buſineſs.*

THIS Saying, that is, this Propoſition of the Senate or Apoſtles, pleaſed the whole Multitude (like that of MOSES, *the thing which thou haſt ſaid is good for us to do) So they choſe* STEPHEN, PHILIP, PROCHORUS, NICANOR, TIMON, PARMENAS, *and* NICHOLAS, whom being elected, *they ſet before the Apoſtles, who when they had prayed, laid their Hands upon them.*

WHAT fuller Demonſtration can be given of any thing, than that in this example Ordination and Election are one and the ſame, and that this was confer'd by the *Chirotonia* of the People? If there be any poſſible way of making this clearer, it muſt be by oppoſition: wherefore let us ſee what Divines have to ſay to the contrary.

GROTIUS gives us all we ask from this place, which he gives for nothing, becauſe it concerns not the Election of Paſtors, but of Deacons. As if STEPHEN and PHILIP had not only been Preachers of the Goſpel, but done Miracles. What Dr. SEAMAN denys or grants in relation to the ſame, I have endeavoured to underſtand, but it will not do. Dr. HAMMOND is ſo plain, that his Objections may be of uſe. He, to prove that the Ordination of theſe Deacons was not in the *Chirotonia* of their Diſciples, but in the *Chirotheſia* of the Apoſtles, has theſe Arguments,

" THERE be two things diſtinctly ſet down, Election permit-
" ted to the People, and the (καθίσομεν) conſtituting reſerved to the
" Apoſtles.

To which I anſwer, That there were two things ſet down by the *Athenian* Law, Election of the *Theſmothetæ* by the People, and the (καθίσομεν) conſtituting of them by the Senate; yet that the Ordination was in the Power, and that the Power was in the People of *Athens:* he that makes a doubt, is not reſolved whether the moſt popular Common-wealth that ever was were a Democracy.

" BUT, ſays he, this looking out of Men, or chooſing, was per-
" mitted to the Multitude by the Apoſtles with theſe three bounds:
" Firſt, to take ſeven, neither more nor fewer: Secondly, thoſe men
" generally known and well reputed of: And thirdly full of the Spi-
" rit, and of Diſcretion or Parts fit for Government." To which I anſwer, that the Election of the *Theſmothetæ* was permitted by the Law to the People of *Athens* with theſe three bounds; Firſt to take ſix, neither more nor fewer: Secondly, thoſe generally known and reputed of: Thirdly, in ſuch eſtimation for their honeſty and ability for Government, as in their conſciences (to which alſo they made Oath) they ſhould judge fitteſt for the Common-wealth. Yet is all this ſo far from any proof that *Athens* was no Democracy, or that the Sovereign Power, whether in enacting of Laws, or election of Magiſtrates by the Lot or the Suffrage (Inſtitutions equally popular) was not in the People, that it amounts to the ſtrongeſt argument that the People were Sovereign and the Common-wealth was Democratical. Could Truth deſire greater advantage than redounds from ſuch oppoſition? We have another example of the ſame Model, in which, becauſe it has been paraphraſed upon already in the Introduction I ſhall be briefer here. In the Church of *Antioch*, where the Diſciples were

Acts. 13.

now

now become ſo numerous, that they began to be call'd Chriſtians, there were among them Prophets: ſo being aſſembled on occaſion, as I conceive, of giving an extraordinary Commiſſion after the manner of the People of *Athens* when they elected Ambaſſadors, or (that I may avoid ſtrife upon a point ſo indifferent) to chuſe two new Apoſtles, *The Holy Ghoſt ſaid, Separate me* BARNABAS *and* SAUL *for the Work whereto I have appointed them:* that is (for ſo it is render'd by all Interpreters) the Holy Ghoſt ſpake thoſe Words by the mouths of the Prophets. Now the Prophets being well known for ſuch, this ſuffrage of theirs was no ſooner given, than (as one that can allow Prophets to be leading men may eaſily think) follow'd by all the reſt of the Congregation: So the whole multitude having faſted and pray'd, the moſt eminent among them, or the Senatorian Order in that Church, laid their hands upon PAUL and BARNABAS, who being thus ſent forth by the Holy Ghoſt, departed to *Seleucia*. Chap. 5.

TO evade this apparent Election, or *Chirotonia* of the whole Congregation, whereby theſe Apoſtles or Ambaſſadors to the Churches of the *Gentiles* were ordain'd, Divines have nothing to ſay, but *that they were elected by the Holy Ghoſt:* As if the *Chirotonia* of the People were more excluſive to election by the Holy Ghoſt, than the *Chirotheſia* of the Ariſtocracy, for which in the time they contend. But if neither of theſe were indeed excluſive of the Holy Ghoſt, how is it poſſible in this frame (where tho' of natural neceſſity an Ariſtocracy muſt have been included, yet the Ariſtocracy is not in the Text ſo much as diſtinguiſh'd from the People, or once nam'd) that the Power, and ſo the Ordination ſhould not have been in the People? The Council of the Apoſtles, of the Elders, and of the whole Church at *Jeruſalem*, and other Councils, not of Apoſtles, nor of the whole Church, in other times or places, us'd this form in their Acts: *It ſeems good to the Holy Ghoſt, and to us:* But does this, whether a true or a pretended ſtile, exclude that Act from being an Act of that whole Council? Or how comes it to paſs that becauſe PAUL and BARNABAS were ſeparated by the Holy Ghoſt, they were not ordain'd by the *Chirotonia* of the whole Chriſtian People at *Antioch?* Acts 15. 22.

THE *Chirotheſia* can be no otherwiſe underſtood in nature, nor ever was in the Common-wealth of the *Jews*, than Election by the few: And ſo even under the mere *Chirotheſia*, Ordination and Election were not two, but one and the ſame thing. If MOSES ordain'd JOSHUA his Succeſſor by the *Chirotheſia*, he elected JOSHUA his Succeſſor by the *Chirotheſia*; and for what reaſon muſt it be otherwiſe with the *Chirotonia?* That a Phariſee could do more with one hand, or a pair of hands, than a Chriſtian Church or Congregation can do with all their hands, is a Doctrine very much for the honour of the true Religion, and a ſovereign Maxim of Eccleſiaſtical Policy.

THE third Conſtitution of Church-Government in Scripture (whether conſiſting of Biſhops or Presbyters, between which at this time a man ſhall hardly find a difference) runs wholly upon the Ariſtocracy, without mention of the People, and is therefore compar'd by GROTIUS to the *Sanhedrim* of *Iſrael*, as that came to be in theſe days; from whence Divines alſo generally and truly confeſs that it was taken up: to which I ſhall need to add no more, than that it is an Order for which there is no Precept, either in the Old Teſtament of God, or in the New Teſtament of Chriſt. This therefore thus taken up by the *Third way of Ordination in the Church of Chriſt.* Grot. ad 1 Tim. 4. 14.

Book II. Apoſtles from the *Jews*, is a clear demonſtration that the Government of the Church, in what purity ſoever of the Times, nay tho' under the inſpection of the Apoſtles themſelves, has been obnoxious to that of the State wherein it was planted. The *Sanhedrim*, from the inſtitution of the *Chirotheſia*, for a conſtant Order, conſiſted of no other Senators than ſuch only as had been ordain'd by the Impoſition of Hands; which came now to be confer'd by the Prince, in the preſence, or with the aſſiſtance of the *Sanhedrim*. The ſame Order was obſerv'd by the *Jewiſh* Synagogues, of which each had her Archon; nor would the *Jews*, converted to the Chriſtian Faith, relinquiſh the Law of MOSES, whereto this way of Ordination, among other things tho' erroneouſly, was vulgarly attributed: whence in the Church, where it conſiſted of converted *Jews*, Ordination was confer'd by the Archon, or firſt in order of the Presbytery, with the aſſiſtance of the reſt. Hence PAUL, in one place, exhorts TIMOTHY thus: *Neglect not the Gift that is in thee, which was given thee by Prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery.* And in another thus: *Wherefore I put thee in remembrance, that thou ſtir up the Gift of God which is in thee by the putting on of my hands.*

Grot. ad Mat. 19. 13.

1 Tim. 4. 14.

2 Tim. 1. 6.

I GRANT Divines, that Ordination by this time was wholly in the Presbytery; what ſay they then to the diſtinction of Ordination and Election? Are theſe ſtill two diſtinct things, or may we hence, at leaſt, compute them to be one and the ſame? If they ſay Yes, why then might they not have been ſo before? If they ſay No, who in this place, but the Presbytery, elected? Why, ſays Dr. HAMMOND, it is plain that *the Spirit of Prophecy elected.* But to give account of no more than is already perform'd, were the ſpirit of Hiſtory rather than of Prophecy, to which it appertains to tell things before they be done; as did the Prophets now living in this Chruch, that TIMOTHY ſhould come to be ordain'd: So the place is interpreted by GROTIUS; and how it ſhould be otherwiſe underſtood I cannot ſee. But putting the caſe ſome Act preceded, as SAUL and DAVID were elected Kings by Propheſy; yet did ever man ſay that for this SAUL or DAVID were any whit the leſs elected Kings by the People? To the contrary in every well-order'd Common-wealth *(a Jove principium)* the depoſing of the Lot, and of the Suffrage too, has univerſally been attributed to God.

§. 106.

THE Piety of Divines in perſuading the People that God elects for them, and therefore they need not trouble themſelves to vote, is as if they ſhould perſuade them that God provides their daily Bread, and therefore they need not trouble themſelves to work. To conclude this point with Dr. HAMMOND'S own words upon the ſame occaſion; this diſtinction of Ordination and Election is in Divines *the procreative Miſtake, or Ignorance producing all the reſt.*

§. 134.

§. 111.

THE reaſon why PAUL ordain'd now after this manner among the *Jews*, is to me an irrefragable argument that he ordain'd not after this manner among the *Gentiles:* for whereas the firſt Ordination in the Chriſtian Church, namely that of MATTHIAS, was performed by the *Chirotonia*, which by degrees came now in complacence with the *Jews* to the *Chirotheſia*; it ſeems he was contented not to alter the worſt of political Inſtitutions or Cuſtoms, where he found them confirm'd by long and univerſal Practice: and if ſo, why ſhould any man think that he would go about to alter, or weed out the beſt, where

they

they had taken like root? That this Adminiſtration of the *Jews* was of the very worſt, is clear in the nature of the Politics, there being no example of a pure Ariſtocracy or of a Senate, ſuch as was now the Sanhedrim, without a popular balance, that ever govern'd with Juſtice, or was of any continuance. Nor was the *Chirotheſia*, by which means this work came to effect in *Iſrael*, introduc'd by the prudence of God, but by the corrupt arts of Men. Now that the Governments at the ſame time of the *Gentiles*, all balanc'd by the *Chirotonia* of the People, were in their nature more excellent, and indeed more accommodated to antient Prudence, as it was introduc'd by God himſelf in the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*, has been already ſufficiently prov'd: nevertheleſs, to refreſh your memory with one example more. Chap. 5.

CRETE having been (as is affirm'd by the Conſent of Authors) the moſt antient, and the moſt excellent Common-wealth in human Story, was founded by RHADAMANTHUS and MINOS, an Age before the *Trojan* War: Theſe were held to have learnt their Arts by familiar Diſcourſe with JUPITER, and from point to point to have fram'd their Model according to his direction. Nor, tho' all acknowledge MINOS to have been a King, did he found his Government upon any other than a popular Balance, or a fundamental regard to the Liberty of the People: For *the whole Common-wealth was made up of theſe three parts, the* College, *the* Senate *and the* People. *The College conſiſted of the annual Magiſtrates call'd the* Coſmi: *theſe had the whole extentive Power, ſome in leading forth the Armies, and others in judging the People; which Functions were accordingly aſſign'd by the Orders to each in particular. That which was common to them all, was to propoſe ſuch things as they had debated or prepar'd in their College or Council, to the Senate. The Senate being elective for life, was the Council, to which appertain'd the Debate of whatever was to be propos'd to the Congregation. The Congregation, or Aſſembly of the People of* Crete, *had not the right of Debate; but in enacting of Laws, and election of Magiſtrates, had the ultimate Reſult of the Common-wealth.* Such was the Copy after which LYCURGUS wrote himſelf ſo famous a Legiſlator. And thus ſtood this Frame to the ſix hundred and eighth year of *Rome*; when this People, having been too favourable to Pirates then infeſting thoſe Seas, turn'd the Arms of the *Romans* upon themſelves; and by theſe, under the conduct of QUINCTUS METELLUS, thence call'd CRETICUS, *Crete* was made a Province: tho' the chief Cities being firſt freed, it ſhould ſeem (by CICERO's ſecond Oration againſt *Anthony*) that the whole Iſland was at length reſtor'd to her antient Liberty. However by the manner obſerv'd by the *Romans*, as was ſhewn, in Provincial Government, the Cities under their Magiſtrates (who while the Common-wealth was a Province perhaps might have exercis'd the Office of the *Coſmi*) were not yet depriv'd of their popular Aſſemblies, at leaſt in their diſtinct Cities, electing all Magiſtrates for their (αὐτονομία) peculiar or domeſtic Government. Such was the State of *Crete*, when PAUL having appeal'd from the *Jews* to CÆSAR; and being thereupon conducted by Sea towards *Rome*, touch'd in his way upon this Iſland, where he left TITUS to conſtitute Elders in every City. The word (καταστήσῃς) *conſtitute*, our Divines will have to ſignify *ordain by Impoſition of Hands*, and Impoſition of Hands to ſignify an act of Power, excluding the People. But why PAUL, who among the *Jews* had comply'd with their Cuſtoms, ſhould enjoin; or how TITUS, had it been ſo enjoin'd,

Epitome of the Common-wealth of *Crete*.

Book II. enjoin'd, ſhould accompliſh this where the Power was Popular, they have not ſhewn nor conſider'd. To introduce Religion or Government there be but two ways, either by perſuaſion, or by force. To perſuade the people of *Crete*, in whom was the Power, to this new way of Ordination, TITUS muſt have ſpoken to this effect: " Men of *Crete*, MINOS being a " King, could not chooſe but have a natural inclination to popular Pow- " er; wherefore his pretence that JUPITER told him, Power was to be " in the People, may be ſuſpected to have been imagin'd merely for his " own ends: or this is a certain ſign that JUPITER is no true, but a feign- " ed God; ſeeing the true God will have it that the People ſhould have " no Power at all, but that ſuch, upon whom his Ambaſſadors ſhall con- " fer power, be without all diſpute obey'd. How! are you ſtarting at " this! are you ſolicitous for your Common-wealth! It is true, that up- " on carnal principles or human prudence, without Power in the Peo- " ple there can be no Common-wealth: but *Iſrael* was a Common- " wealth without power in the People; where MOSES made all the " Laws by the power inveſted in him by God, and created all the Ma- " giſtrates, not by popular ſuffrage, but by his *Chirotheſia*. Wherefore, " Men of *Crete*, know ye, that on whomſoever I lay my hands, the " ſame is in all ſpiritual Affairs, or matters of Church-Government, to " be obey'd by you, after the ſame manner that you have hitherto obey'd " ſuch Magiſtrates or Prieſts as have been ordain'd by your own Election, " or *Chirotonia*." Of what other nature the Arguments of TITUS to the pretended purpoſe could have been, I am not able to imagine; nor how this ſhould have done leſs than provoke the People to a dange- rous jealouſy of ſuch a Doctrine. But Divines, to ſet all ſtreight, think it enough to repeat the words of PAUL to TITUS in *Greek*?

Tit. 1. 5. *For this cauſe left I thee in* Crete (ἵνα καταστήσῃς κατὰ πόλιν πρεσβυτέρους) *that thou ſhouldſt ordain Elders in every City.* It is true that DEMOSTHENES

De Corond. ſpeaks ſomewhat like words concerning the Expedition of PHILIP of *Macedon* in *Peloponneſus* (ἐπειδὴ τυράννους ἐκεῖνος ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι κατέστησε) *when he had ordain'd Tyrants in every City:* but then PHILIP had an Army; what Army did PAUL leave with TITUS? Or if he ordain'd his Elders neither of theſe two ways, I ſee no other than that only by the known and legal *Chirotonia* or Suffrage of the People. But if this be clear, the Clergy come from *Crete*, not upon the Wings of TITUS, but of ICARUS, whoſe ambitious Wax is diſſolv'd by the Sun.

SO much, I conceive, is now diſcover'd concerning Church-Government, as may ſhew that it was not of one, but of three kinds, each obnoxious to the nature of the Civil Government under which it was planted; in as much as the *Chirotonia*, or Ballot of *Iſrael*, being firſt introduc'd pure, and without any mixture, as at the Ordination of MATTHIAS, came afterwards to receive ſome mixture of the *Chirotheſia*, as in the Ordination of STEPHEN; and laſt of all by excluding the People, to degenerate wholly into the *Chirotheſia* of the Preſbytery, as in the Ordination of TIMOTHY: all this by the teſtimony of Scripture, and in the pureſt times, even the age of the Apoſtles. Whence by Undertaking, to ſhew that as CHRIST intended his Doctrine ſhould be *preach'd to all Nations*, ſo he intended his Diſcipline ſhould be ſuch as might ſute with any Government (as indeed, if the choice of any of theſe three be lawful, it does exactly) is, I hope, per- form'd. For where the Government is Popular, it is the ſame with the firſt; where it is Ariſtocratical or Monarchical, it agrees with the laſt; and where it is mix'd, it is between both, and reſponſible to the ſecond.

ſecond. Of theſe three in the farther exerciſe of their natural and intended compliance with Human Prudence, it may be convenient to give ſome fuller Exemplification. Chap. 5.

THAT any other Ordination than that of the firſt kind for the original Authority or Practice of it, whether in the Common-wealth of *Iſrael* or in the Church of Chriſt, and indeed for the Prerogative of the ſame in nature, ſhould have been introduced by the Apoſtles, where it might, much leſs where the nature of the civil Policy would admit of no other, is neither probable by Scripture nor Reaſon; whence it is that in the Cities of *Lycaonia* and *Piſidia*, the Government of theſe being then popular, we do not find any mention at all of the *Chirotheſia*, the Apoſtles in theſe places (χειροτονήσαντες πρεσβυτέρους κατ' ἐκκλησίαν) *chirotonizing Elders in every Congregation.*

TO evade this place, our Adverſaries turn tail to the things, and make their whole flight at the words. In taking one of them into the Diſputation, I ſhall take in all, for they run all upon the ſame Quotations, or with little addition.

THAT the word Chirotonizing, ſays Dr. HAMMOND, *in this place ſignifys no more than ordaining by the Impoſition of Hands, is not ſo generally acknowledged by late Writers, but that it may be uſeful to give ſome few Teſtimonies out of thoſe Writers which were neareſt the times of the Scripture. Thus* PHILO JUDÆUS *of* JOSEPH (Ἰωσὴφ ὁ παρὼν χειροτονεῖτο) *he was ordained Governor of all* Egypt *under the King, ſo again of* MOSES (ἡγεμὼν χειροτονεῖται) *he was conſtituted their Ruler. So of* AARON's *Sons* (ἱερεῖς χειροτονεῖται) *God conſtituted them Prieſts.* ALEXANDER *Son of* ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES *writes to* JONATHAN (χειροτονοῦμέν σε ἀρχιερέα) *We (in the regal ſtile) conſtitute thee High Prieſt.* LUCIAN *ſays of* HEPHESTION (θεὸν χειροτονῆσαι τὸν τετελευτηκότα) *that* ALEXANDER *made him a God when he was dead.* APPIAN (which is added out of GROTIUS, whence moſt of the reſt is taken) to ſignify Election of Magiſtrates made by the *Roman* Emperors, uſes no other word; and later Writers ſpeak of ſome that were chirotoniz'd Emperors by their Fathers. *For the uſe of the word among Chriſtian Writers, take one place in the Author of the Conſtitutions for many;* CLEMENT *after the death of* LINUS (κεχειροτόνηται) *was ordain'd Biſhop of* Rome *by* PETER. *But what need any more?* CHRIST's *Diſciples are ſaid* (προκεχειροτονημένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ) *deſign'd or foreconſtituted by God the witneſſes of his Reſurrection:* by all which that of PAUL and BARNABAS (χειροτονήσαντες πρεσβυτέρους κατ' ἐκκλησίαν) is but conſtituting or creating Elders in every Church. *Wherefore they that have look'd ſo far back to the Original, as to think it neceſſary to render the word to create by Suffrages, are ſure guilty of a very impertinent nicety.* I promiſe you had this been againſt one of our Doctors it might have been a rude Charge; but it is only againſt ERASMUS, BEZA, DIODATI, and ſuch as took upon them to translate the *Switz, French Italian, Belgic,* and (till the Epiſcopal correction) the *Engliſh* Bibles. And what apparent cauſe is there of ſuch confidence? What neceſſity is there even in the places alledg'd why the word *Chirotonia* ſhould be underſtood in the ſenſe impos'd? The People of *Egypt*, till having ſold their Lands they came to loſe their Popular balance, were not Servants to PHARAOH; wherefore when JOSEPH was made Governor over all *Egypt* they were free:

§. 3

Joſeph. An. L. 13. c. 5.

L. 7. c. 45.

Acts 10. 41.

Book II. now that a King ſhould make a Governor of a free Peeple without their conſent, or ſome advice as we ſay of his Parliament, is altogether improbable, the rather becauſe a Protector, in the abſence or minority of the King, has been no otherwiſe made in *England*, nor pretends the preſent Protector to any other title than the like *Chirotonia*. But that MOSES is ſaid by the ſame Author, (who affirmed that he introduced the *Chirotonia* in *Iſrael*) to have been chirotonized Ruler of the People, can in my judgment be no otherwiſe than originally and literally taken, ſeeing God himſelf was no otherwiſe made King in *Iſrael* than by the Suffrage of the People. That the like muſt be underſtood of the Sons of AARON has been already ſhewn. The Doctor is the firſt has told me, that the plural number for the Royal Stile is ſo antient as EPIPHANES: Sure I am it was not derived from his *Macedonian* Predeceſſors, for in the Letters to the *Athenians* and the *Thebans* recited by DEMOSTHENES, PHILIP of *Macedon* writes in the ſingular number. But the Letter of EPIPHANES to JONATHAN muſt, it ſeems, import that he at ſingle hand (tho' the words carry double) had chirotonized a High Prieſt of the *Jews:* Who can help it? Some Princes have not only given out that their Prieſts have been chirotonized when they were not, but that themſelves have been chirotonized when there was no ſuch matter. When a Prince ſays that he was chirotonized or elected by the People, to talk of Rhetoric is to have none. Divines in this caſe commonly underſtand it to be proper, or literally meant; for to impoſe a new ſenſe is to ſpoil the word; and ſpoil the word, ſpoil the Prince. LUCIAN is a Drol, and intends a Jeſt, but not ſo good a one, as that he of all others ſhould come neareſt to help up with a Hierarchy. For the *Chirotonia*, or Election of the *Roman* Magiſtrates by the Suffrage of the People or of the Army, every man knows that it is literal: SUIDAS himſelf interpreting the word by this very example; where he affirms it to ſignify Election or Ratification by the Many. The Quotation out of the Conſtitutions, with thoſe of Biſhop BILSON, and others out of the *Greek* Fathers, and out of Councils, do not only imply the word *Chirotonia*, but the thing, while they all relate to that kind of Ordination, which being in thoſe Churches yet adminiſtered as at the Ordination of STEPHEN, was not confer'd without the conſent of the People. But it is above all, that labouring to prove the *Chirotonia* and the *Chirotheſia* to be the ſame thing, they ſhould rely moſt upon the place where the Apoſtles are ſaid (προκεχειροτονημένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ) to have been forechirotonized by God; as it were clear in this, that God ordained the Apoſtles by the laying on of Hands, for ſo it muſt be underſtood, or it makes no more for them than for us. Or if they mean it only to ſhew that the word *Chirotonia* or Suffrage is uſed for ſome Ordination that cannot be taken in our Senſe; ſo the word *Chirotheſia* (ἐπιθεσις χειρων) or laying on of Hands, where ANANIAS being neither Biſhop nor Presbyter, but only a Diſciple, that is, a Chriſtian, lays his hands upon PAUL, is us'd for ſome Ordination that cannot be taken in their ſenſe; or a man not ordained may ordain as well as they: for to ſay that the Call was extraordinary, where the like is, or is pretended, will avail little. But there is no need that we ſhould go ſo near the wind; wherefore to give them all theſe places in their own ſenſe, even till we come to the Cities in queſtion. What word in any Language is not ſometimes, nay frequently, us'd in ſome other than the proper

De Cor.

proper ſenſe? With what elegance, if this be forbidden, can any man write or ſpeak? Is a Word like a Woman that being taken with a Metaphor, it can never be reſtor'd to the Original Virtue? If *Chirotonia* has, as Divines pretend, loſt all other but their ſignification, how ſhall we underſtand it in *Iſaiah*, or where PAUL ſpeaks it of the Brother (χειροτονηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν) *chirotoniz'd*, or *choſen by the Churches?* Certainly in this one place at leaſt it is of our ſenſe, and in the word προκεχειροτονημένος it is but once yet in all the New Teſtament of any other; ſo that if we gain the place in controverſy, we have it twice of our ſenſe in Scripture for once not in theirs, but in any other: and in human Authors, they will not ſo much as pretend to have it once for them of 2 hundred times for us; which is pretty well for the vindication of the property of one word, and ſomewhat more perhaps than can be done for another. But in the ſenſe of words that are ſometimes properly and ſometimes improperly taken, may we admit of the things whereof they are ſpoken for Interpreters? Or if Lillies and Roſes have been almoſt as often ſaid of Ladies Cheeks, muſt we underſtand them no otherwiſe when we are ſpeaking of Gardens?

Chap. 5

2 Cor. 8. 19.

YES, ſays Dr. HAMMOND, and therefore to ſay of the Apoſtles PAUL and BARNABAS, "That they created Elders by their own Suffrages, is no more than to ſay that they jointly did create, and indeed "being but two, there could be no place for Suffrages; and to affirm "they did it by the Suffrages of others, is not agreeable to the pretended uſe of the word; for where it is us'd of chuſing by Suffrages, as "when the People are ſaid to chirotonize, it is certain that their own "and not others Suffrages are meant by it.

"IT were hardly poſſible to have contriv'd a greater number of Affirmations in ſo ſmall a compaſs, nor to have gone farther in them "from all truth." Pharaſees, as words, are to be underſtood according to the Rule and Law of Speech, which is Uſe: and thus that the Apoſtles created Elders by their own Suffrage, is not ſaid; that they did it by the Suffrage of others, is neceſſarily imply'd; as alſo that the People are underſtood to chirotonize as well when it is ſaid of the Preſidents of their Aſſemblies, as of themſelves

His own words to Mr. Hobbs, §, 118.

Diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis

WHEN a man is ſaid to build a Houſe, or marry a Daughter, he is not underſtood to be the Maſon, or the Bridegroom: but the Apoſtles built Churches in theſe Cities; therefore the People were not the Maſons. The Apoſtles marry'd CHRIST to theſe Nations; therefore the People gave not their Conſent or Suffrage: what a Conſtruction were this in ordinary diſcourſe or writing, and yet in the Language, as I may ſay, of a Common-wealth the Phraſe is more uſual. How often does DEMOSTHENES ſpeak of his Laws *(ſee my Pſephiſma, peruſe my Law)* and thoſe of other private men? after which Copy the *Parté*, or Laws in the Common-wealth of *Venice*, are call'd by the name of the Propoſers, as were thoſe of *Rome*, *Rupilia*, *Cornelia*, *Trebonia*; in which manner we have POYNING's Law, and ſome Statutes bearing no other Stile than *Enacted by the King's moſt Excellent Majeſty*, which nevertheleſs are known to have been all enacted by the Parliament. Thus the Laws of MOSES, RHADAMANTHUS, MINOS,

De Coron.

Book II. MINOS, LYCURGUS, SOLON, ROMULUS, King EDWARD, were (*leges & conſueudines quas vulgus elegerit*) ſuch as the People had confirm'd or choſen by their *Chirotonia*. But they may ſay, granting you this uſe of Speech in relation to Laws, what have you of this kind for Elections? The Exception is nice, but to leave none.

THE High Sheriffs in *England* propoſing to their Counties the Names of ſuch as ſtand, are ſaid to elect Parliament-men. They that thus propoſe Competitors to the Great Council in *Venice* are call'd Electors, and ſaid to elect the Magiſtrates. The *Proedri*, certain Magiſtrates to whom it belong'd to put the Queſtion in the Repreſentative of the People of *Athens*, conſiſting of one thouſand, were ſaid (διαχειροτονίαν ποιεῖν) to give or make the Suffrage. The *Theſmothetæ*, who were Preſidents at the creation of Magiſtrates, were ſaid (στρατηγὸς χειροτονεῖν) to chirotonize the Generals. JOSEPHUS renders thoſe words of God to SAMUEL, *Hearken to the Voice of the People* (πείθου δὴ τῷ χειροτονεῖν αὐτοῖς βασιλέα) *I command thee to chirotonize them a King*; which Authors vindicating LUKE for his underſtanding both of the *Grecian* Cuſtoms, and property of Speech, at each of which he was expert, come up to the full and genuine interpretation of the place in controverſy, where PAUL and BARNABAS (χειροτονήσαντες αὐτοῖς πρεσβυτέρους κατ' ἐκκλησίαν) *chirotonizing them Elders in every Congregation*, can be no otherwiſe underſtood than that they here, as MOSES at the inſtitution of the Sanhedrim, SAMUEL at the Election of the King, the *Proedri* at the paſſing of Laws, the *Theſmothetæ* at the creation of Magiſtrates, the Electors in the great Council of *Venice*, and the High Sheriffs in the Counties of *England*, were no more than Preſidents of that *Chirotonia*, which was given or made by the Suffrage of the People.

Demoſt. cont. Timocrat.

Pol. l. 8. c. 8.

Ant. l. 6. c. 4.

WHEREFORE the *Greek* is thus render'd by theſe ſeveral Tranſlations of the Bible.

That of *Zurich*,

WHEN they had created them Elders by Suffrages in every Congregation.

That of *Beza*,

WHEN they had created them Elders by Suffrages in every Congregation.

The *French*,

WHEN by the advice of the Aſſemblies they had eſtabliſh'd Elders.

The *Italian*,

WHEN by the advice of the Congregation they had conſtituted them Elders,

That of *Diodati*,

WHEN they had ordain'd them in every Church by the common votes of the Elders.

That appointed by the Synod of *Dort*,

WHEN in each Church, by the holding up of Hands, they had elected Presbyters.

That us'd in *England* from the time of the Reformation till the Epiſcopal correction of the ſame,

WHEN they had ordain'd them Elders by election in every Congregation.

INDEED

INDEED the circumſtance of the Place forbids any other conſtruction of the words; for if the Suffrage or *Chirotonia* (which were ſcarce ſenſe) related to the Apoſtles only, what needed they have done that in every Congregation or Church, which they might have done in any Chamber or Cloſet? The circumſtance of the Action forbids any other conſtruction; for the People were aſſembl'd upon occaſion of Election or Creation of Officers, which thing does not uſe to be done in Aſſemblies gather'd for Divine Service: beſides, theſe Congregations were not always of one mind, but ſometimes for ſacrificing to the Apoſtles, ſometimes for ſtoning them, which are acts of Power; wherefore they were Political Aſſemblies. Now theſe conſiſting alſo of a People, that had in their Cities *(quandam* ἀυτονομίαν) the government of themſelves, hence ariſes the ſtrongeſt circumſtance of all, forbiding any interpretation of the Text that might exclude them from election of their own Magiſtrates, Prieſts, or Eccleſiaſtical Elders, ſuch as had been the *Aſiarchs*, tho' Heathen Prelates, yet remember'd by the Sripture as affectionate Friends to PAUL; or ſuch as were thoſe, tho' Acts 19. 31. to a better end, now ordain'd by the Apoſtles. Wherefore GROTIUS, notwithſtanding all the art he uſes in other places to avoid this ſenſe, giving his note upon the Text, yields, "Tho' chirotonizing may be ſaid "of any Election made by one, or by the few; yet to the Election in "this place it is probable that the conſent of the People was given, no "leſs being imply'd in the beginning of the Chapter, where the Mul-"titude believ'd, where they were ſtir'd up, where they were evil af-"fected, and where part held with the *Jews*, and part with the Apo-"ſtles: "Which ſhews that the People were active in the buſineſs. But, ſays Dr. SEAMAN, *There is difference between the Conſent of the People, and the Power of the People:* which is not to underſtand the caſe in controverſy, nor to take notice that the People whereof we are ſpeaking were under Popular Government: for wherever the People are under Popular Government, between that which is done *by their conſent*, and that which is done *(juſſu populi) by their power*, there is no difference. How ſhould the People give their conſent, but by their Suffrage? or what difference, where they have Power, can there be between the Suffrage, and the Power of the People?

Chap. 5.

Dr. *HAMMOND* upon this point is far more quaint: where the Scripture ſays, that the *Multitude were evil affected*, and where *part held with the* Jews, *and part with the Apoſtles*, he thinks it e'en like enough: But where it is ſaid that *a great Multitude of the* Jews, *and alſo of the* Greeks *believ'd*, he ſeems to have no opinion of it: for, ſays he, "It is evident that Believers were at firſt but few in every Town or Ci-"ty; they were not whole Corporations at once converted, nor conſe-"quently could they act in a common capacity: but as CLEMENS "ROMANUS ſays, they that were by the Apoſtles conſtituted Biſhops "and Deacons in ſeveral Cities and Regions, were conſtituted over "thoſe that ſhould after believe, there were oft ſo few at the preſent. "And then, as faſt as any did come into the Faith, they readily ſub-"mitted themſelves to thoſe by and under whom they did come in, and "were not at all troubl'd *(honeſt men)* with the conſultation or delibe-"ration about the way of electing their Teachers and Guides." §. 134.

COME away, to leave the Scripture a while, and follow CLEMENS be it ſo for diſcourſe ſake, that in thoſe days there was no where any ſuch thing as *a great Multitude believing*, much leſs *whole States or*

Book II. *Common-wealths at once converted*, whereby they might ſtill *act in a common capacity*, but only ſome private or gather'd Congregations or Churches; and that in ſuch it was the Apoſtles PAUL and BARNABAS chirotoniz'd: yet theſe, as they were found, or as afterwards they came to be made, muſt of neceſſity have been Corporations; for what can a number of Men coming into a Society regulated by certain Laws, Conſtitutions, or Form, be but a Corporation? Some Eccleſiaſtical Policy or Diſcipline they muſt have had; and that probably, ſeeing the greateſt Legiſlators, even MOSES himſelf, have written after Copies, according to ſome Pattern: what was this Pattern, and whence came it?

§. 125. "*WHY, ſays he, not from their* Heathen Cuſtoms, but from the "Metropolis; for it muſt be remember'd, that whereſoever the Goſpel "was preach'd, it came originally from *Jeruſalem*; and then, as

§. 135. "AGRIPPA in PHILO ſays of that City, it was the Metropolis, not on- "ly of *Judea*, but many other Regions, becauſe of the Colonies thence "ſent into *Ægypt*, *Phenice*, and both the *Syria's*; nay, to *Pamphylia*, "*Cilicia*, and a great part of *Aſia*, as far as *Bithynia* and *Pontus*. So "in reaſon the Churches in *Lyſtra*, *Iconium*, and *Antioch*, where PAUL "and BARNABAS ordain'd Elders, were to follow the pattern at *Je-* "*ruſalem*; and there, we know, it was not by the Suffrage of the Peo- "ple, that an Elder was aſſum'd into the Sanhedrim, but the Prince "or Head of the Sanhedrim receiv'd him in by Impoſition of Hands. "It will be much more reaſonable to deduce the circumſtances of or- "daining Elders from the Cuſtoms familiar to them that preach'd the "Faith to them, than from the former uſages of them to whom it "was preach'd, who were not to diſpute, but to believe, and receive "the Inſtitutions as well as Doctrines which were brought them."

THESE, methinks, are ſtrange Arguments: The Goſpel came to us from *Rome*, is *Rome* therefore the Metropolis of *England?* It is true AGRIPPA being a *Jew*, and writing to CALIGULA in the behalf of the *Jews*, not of the Chriſtians, tells him, *That* Jeruſalem *is the Metropolis of the* Jews, *and of all their Colonies*; ſo is *London* of the *Engliſh*, and of all their Colonies: but does it follow from hence that either *Jeruſalem* or *London* is the Metropolis of Chriſtendom? *But the* Jews *had many Colonies in* Aſia; *and therefore the Churches of* Lyſtra, Iconium; *and* Antioch *were to follow the pattern at* Jeruſalem. The *Jews* indeed had Synagogues in *Iconium* and *Lyſtra*, as the *French* have Churches in *England*; but is this a good argument, The *French* have Churches in *England*, therefore the *Engliſh* are to follow the Orders of the *French* Church? The *Jews* withſtood the Goſpel at *Iconium*; for, ſays the Text, *the Multitude of the City was divided, and part held with the* Jews, *and part with the Apoſtles:* therefore the believing *Iconians* muſt have acknowledg'd *Jeruſalem* to be their Metropolis, and were to follow the pattern of that City: And what was that? Why *there we know it was not by the Suffrages of the People that an Elder was aſſum'd into the Sanhedrim, but the Prince or Head of the Sanhedrim receiv'd him in by Impoſition of Hands.* The Government of the *Iconians* was Popular, that of the *Jews* was Ariſtocratical; therefore the *Iconians* receiving the Chriſtian Faith, were bound to change their Democracy into Ariſtocracy. The Apoſtles, to comply with an Oligarchy, had alter'd that Ordination, which originally (as at the Election of MATTHIAS) was popular, to Ariſtocracy; therefore being now to plant the Goſpel in a free State, they might not alter it from Ariſtocracy to Democracy: To pleaſe the *Jews* they might change for the worſe;

Philo de legatione ad Caium.

Acts 14. 4.

therefore

therefore to pleaſe the *Iconians* they might not change for the better, but muſt tell the People plainly, *That they were not to diſpute, but to believe, and receive the Inſtitutions as well as Doctrines that were brought them* from the Metropolis. How would this ſound to a People that underſtood themſelves? Chap. 5.

Sic volo, ſic jubeo, ſtat pro ratione voluntas.

THE right temper of a Metropolitan, to whom Popular Power is a Heathen Cuſtom, and with whom nothing will agree but Princeing of it in the Senate: But with the Apoſtles it was otherwiſe, who making no words of the *Chirotheſia* where it was needleſs, were glad of this occaſion to chirotonize, or elect *them Elders in every Congregation* by Popular Suffrage. But this, they will ſay, is not to come off from the haunt, but to run ſtill upon the People in a common or public capacity. Tho' the Scripture ſpeaks of great Multitudes believing, believe it there is no ſuch thing: CLEMENS ſays they were very few, *their Aſſemblies private, and very ſcanty things.* As private as they were, by the judgment of Divines they were, it ſeems, to receive from their Pattern (if that were the Sanhedrim) a Form that was public enough; and why might not they have receiv'd this from that public Form whereto they were accuſtom'd, rather than from a foreign Policy, and one contrary to their Cuſtoms? why ſhould they ſuffer ſuch Power in new and private, as they would not indure in their old and public Magiſtrates? Or, if they receiv'd the Scriptures, why ſhould they chooſe that Ordination which would fit them worſt, rather than that which would fit them beſt? that of TIMOTHY rather than that of MATTHIAS? Or, let their Aſſemblies have been never ſo private or ſcanty, yet if the Apoſtles *chirotoniz'd them Elders in every Congregation*, is it not demonſtrable that they did receive that of MATTHIAS, and not that of TIMOTHY?

THUS much for the Propagation of the pure, or firſt kind of Eccleſiaſtical Policy to the Cities of *Lycaonia*. The mix'd or ſecond kind into which (the Chriſtian Preſbytery delighting to follow the ſteps of the *Jewiſh*) the former might ſoon degenerate, continu'd in the primitive Church, to ſpeak with the leaſt (for WALLEUS brings it down to CHARLES the Great) three hundred years after CHRIST: which Aſſertion in Mr. HOBS, prov'd out of AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, Dr. HAMMOND has either willingly overſeen, or includes in this Anſwer, it is *moſt viſibly void of all appearance of Truth.* Wherefore to the Quotation mention'd I ſhall add the words of PLATINA: DAMASUS *the ſecond, by Nation a* Bavarian, *firnam'd* BAGNIARIUS, *or as ſome will* POPO, *poſſeſs'd himſelf of the Papacy by force, and without conſent of the Clergy and of the People.* Now what can be clearer than that by this place the Clergy and the People had hitherto a right to elect the Pope? The Doctor comes near the word of defiance to Mr. HOBS, in a matter of fact ſo apparent to any judgment, that I need not add what goes before in the Life of CLEMENT the ſecond; where the *Emperor engages the People of* Rome *not to meddle with the Election of the Pope without his expreſs Command:* nor what follows after in LEO the Ninth, where *the whole power of Election was now conferr'd by the Emperor upon the Clergy.* Again, VICTOR *the ſecond*, ſays the ſame Author, *obtain'd the Papacy rather by favour of the Emperor, than by free Suffrages of the Clergy and the People of* Rome, *who apprehended the power of the Emperor, whoſe diſpleaſure they had ſometime incurr'd by creating Popes.* So then the People, it is clear, had hitherto §. 138.

created

Book II. created the Popes. The power of Election thus in the whole Clergy came afterwards, as at this day, to be reſtrain'd to the Cardinals only; and ſo to devolve into the third kind of Ordination exactly correſpondent to the Sanhedrim, and their *Chirotheſia*, as it was exercis'd among the converted *Jews*, when TIMOTHY was ordain'd *by the laying on of the Hands of the Presbytery.*

NOW this is that with which, of all others, Divines are ſo enamour'd, that they will not endure it ſhould be ſaid there is any other: It is alſo propitious above all the reſt to Monarchy, as that which according to the inherent nature or impotence of Oligarchy, muſt have a Prince at home or abroad to reſt upon, or become the inevitable Prey of the People. Herein lies the *Arcanum* or Secret of that Antipathy which is between a Clergy and a Popular Government, and of that Sympathy which is between the Miter and the Crown. A Prince receiving a Clergy with the Monopoly of their *Chirotheſia*, has no more to do than to make a Metropolitan, by whom he governs them, and by them the People, eſpecially if he endows them with good Revenues; for ſo they become an Eſtate of his Realm, and a more ſteady Pillar of his Throne than his Nobility themſelves, who as their dependence is not ſo ſtrong, are of a more ſtirring nature. This is the *Gothic* Model, from whence we had our Pattern, and in which *No Biſhop, no King.*

THUS for the dignity of Eccleſiaſtical Policies, whether in Scripture or Human Prudence, Popular Government you ſee is naturally inclin'd to the very beſt, and the ſpiritual Ariſtocracy to the very worſt. It is alſo remarkable that the Political Balance extends it ſelf to the deciſion of the queſtion about Ordination: For as a People never offer'd to diſpute with a well-balanc'd Clergy, ſo a Clergy diſmounted never gain'd any thing by diſputing with the People. As to the queſtion of Empire or Government *(I propheti diſarmati Rovivano)* the Apoſtles *became all things to all.*

His own words to Mr. *Hobs* §. 122.

THUS beyond all meaſure improſperous are this Divine's *Undertakings* againſt Mr. HOBS, and the *Undertakings* of Divines *upon this Subject.*

Advertiſement to the Reader, or Direction to the Anſwerer.

THE Anſwer of this Book muſt lie in proving that the Apoſtles at the ſeveral times and places mention'd, introduc'd but one way of Ordination, and that the ſame to which Divines now pretend: or if the Apoſtles divided, that is to ſay, introduc'd divers ways of Ordination, then the People or Magiſtrate may chooſe.

I HAVE taken the more leiſure and pains to ſtate, I think, all the Caſes of Controverſy that can ariſe out of the Common-wealth of *Oceana*, as you have ſeen in theſe two Books, to the end I may be no more oblig'd to write, and yet not omit writing on any occaſion that ſhall be offer'd; for if my Principles be over-thrown (which when I ſee, I ſhall moſt ingenuouſly confeſs with thanks to the Author) ſuch an acknowledgement will lie in a little room; and this failing, I am deceiv'd if I ſhall not now be able to ſhew any Writer againſt me that his Anſwer is none, within the compaſs of three or four ſheets.

THIS alſo will be the fitteſt way for Boys-play, with which I am ſure enough to be entertain'd by the quibling Univerſity men; I mean a certain buſy Gang of 'em, who having publickly vaunted that they would bring 40 examples againſt the Balance, and ſince laid their Caps together about it, have not produc'd one. Theſe vaunts of theirs offering prejudice to truth and good Principles, were the cauſe why they were indeed preſs'd to ſhew ſome of their ſkill; not that they were thought fit Judges of theſe things, but firſt that they had declar'd themſelves ſo, and next that they may know they are not.

An

An Answer to three Objections *against Popular Government, that were given me after these two Books were printed.*

MONARCHICAL *Government is more natural, because we see even in Common-wealths that they have recourse to this, as* Lacedemon *in her Kings*; Rome *both in her Consuls and Dictators*; *and* Venice *in her Dukes.* Object. 1.

GOVERNMENT, whether Popular or Monarchical, is equally artificial; wherefore to know which is more natural, we must consider what piece of Art comes neareſt to Nature: as for example, whether a Ship or a Houſe be the more natural; and then it will be eaſy to reſolve that a Ship is the more natural at Sea, and a Houſe at Land. In like manner where one man or a few men are the Landlords, a Monarchy muſt doubtleſs be the more natural; and where the whole People are the Landlords, a Common-wealth: for how can we underſtand that it ſhould be natural to a People, that can live of themſelves, to give away the means of their livelihood to one or a few men that they may ſerve or obey? Each Government is equally artificial in effect, or in itſelf; and equally natural in the cauſe, or the matter upon which it is founded. *Anſwer.*

A COMMON-WEALTH conſiſts of the Senate propoſing, the People reſolving, and the Magiſtracy executing; ſo the Power of the Magiſtrates (whether Kings as in *Lacedemon*, Conſuls as in *Rome*, or Dukes as in *Venice)* is but barely executive: but to a Monarch belongs both the Reſult, and Execution too; wherefore that there have been Dukes, Conſuls, or Kings in Common-wealths (which were quite of another nature) is no Argument that Monarchical Government is for this cauſe the more natural.

AND if a man ſhall inſtance in a mix'd Government, as King and Parliament; to ſay, that the King in this was more natural than the Parliament, muſt be a ſtrange Affirmation.

TO argue from the *Roman* Dictator (an Imperfection which ruin'd that Common-wealth, and was not to be found in any other) that all Common-wealths have had the like recourſe in exigencies to the like remedy, is quite contrary to the univerſal Teſtimony of Prudence or Story.

A MAN who conſiders that the Common-wealth of *Venice* has ſtood one thouſand years (which never any Monarchy did) and yet ſhall affirm that Monarchical Government is more natural than Popular, muſt affirm that a thing which is leſs natural may be more durable and permanent than a thing that is more natural.

WHETHER is a Government of Laws leſs natural than a Government of Men? or is it more natural to a Prince to govern by Laws or by Will? Compare the Violences and bloody Rapes perpetually made upon the Crown, or Royal Dignity in the Monarchies of the *Hebrews* and the *Romans*, with the State of the Government under either Common-wealth, and tell me which was leſs violent, or whether that which is more violent muſt therefore be more natural.

Object 2. *THE Government of Heaven is a Monarchy, ſo is the Government of Hell.*

Anſwer. *IN this,* ſays MACHIAVEL, *Princes loſe themſelves and their Empire, that they neither know how to be perfectly good, nor intirely wicked.* He might as well have ſaid, that a Prince is always ſubject to Error and Miſgovernment, becauſe he is a Man, and not a God, nor a Devil, A Shepherd to his Flock, a Plowman to his Team, is a better Nature; and ſo not only an abſolute Prince, but as it were a God. The Government of a better or of a ſuperior Nature, is to a worſe or inferior as the Government of God. The Creator is another and a better Nature than the Creature; the Government in Heaven is of the Creator over his Creatures, that have their whole dependence upon him, and ſubſiſtence in him. Where the Prince or the Few have the whole Lands, there is ſomewhat of dependence reſembling this; ſo the Government there muſt of neceſſity be Monarchical or Ariſtocratical: But where the People have no ſuch dependence, the cauſes of that Government which is in Heaven are not in Earth; for neither is the Prince a diſtinct or better Nature than the People, nor have they their ſubſiſtence by him, and therefore there can be no ſuch effect. If a Man were good as God, there is no queſtion but he would be not only a Prince but a God; would govern by Love, and be not only obey'd but worſhip'd: or if he were ill as the Devil, and had as much power to do miſchief, he would be dreaded as much, and ſo govern by Fear. To which latter, the Nature of Man has ſo much nearer approaches, that tho' we never ſaw upon Earth a Monarchy like that of Heaven, yet it is certain the perfection of the *Turkiſh* Policy lies in this, that it comes neareſt to that of Hell.

Object 3. *GOD inſtituted a Monarchy, namely in* MELCHIZEDEC, *before he inſtituted a Common-wealth.*

Anſwer. IF MELCHIZEDEC was a King, ſo was ABRAHAM too; tho' one that paid him Tithes, or was his Subject: for ABRAHAM made War, or had the power of the Sword, as the reſt of the Fathers of Families he fought againſt. So if CANAAN was a Monarchy in thoſe days, it was ſuch a one as *Germany* is in theſe; where the Princes alſo have as much the right of the Sword as the Emperor, which comes rather (as has been ſhewn already) to a Common-wealth. But whether it were a Monarchy or a Common-wealth, we may ſee by the preſent ſtate of *Germany* that it was of no very good Example; nor was MELCHIZEDEC otherwiſe made a King by God than the Emperor, that is, as an Ordinance of Man.

THE

ART

OF

LAW-GIVING:

In Three BOOKS.

The Firſt, ſhewing the Foundations and Superſtructures of all kinds of Government.

The Second, ſhewing the Frames of the Common-wealths of *Iſrael*, and of the *Jews*.

The Third, ſhewing a Model fitted to the preſent State, or Balance of this Nation.

The Order of the Work.

The Firſt Book.

THE Preface, *conſidering the Principles, or Nature of Family Governments.*
CHAP. I. *Conſidering the Principles, or Balance of National Governments; with the different kinds of the ſame.*
CHAP. II. *Shewing the variation of the* Engliſh *Balance.*
CHAP. III. *Of the fixation of the Balance, or of* Agrarian *Laws.*
CHAP. IV. *Shewing the Superſtructures of Governments.*
THE Concluſion, *obſerving that the Principles of Human Prudence being good without proof out of Scripture, are nevertheleſs ſuch as are proveable out of Scripture.*

The Second Book.

THE Preface, *ſhewing that there were Common-wealths before that of Iſrael.*
CHAP. I. *Shewing that* Iſrael *was a Common-wealth.*
CHAP. II. *Shewing what Common-wealth* Iſrael *was.*
CHAP. III. *Shewing the Anarchy, or ſtate of the* Iſraelites *under their Judges.*
CHAP. IV. *Shewing the State of the* Iſraelites *under their Kings to the Captivity.*
CHAP. V. *Shewing the ſtate of the* Jews *in Captivity, and after their return from Captivity; or the frame of the* Jewiſh *Common-wealth: and in that the Original of Ordination.*
CHAP. VI. *Shewing how Ordination was brought into the Chriſtian Church, and the divers ways of the ſame at divers times in uſe with the Apoſtles.*
THE Concluſion, *Shewing that neither God, nor Chriſt, or the Apoſtles ever inſtituted any Government Eccleſiaſtical or Civil, upon any other Principles than thoſe only of Human Prudence.*

The Third Book.

THE Preface, *Containing a Model of Popular Government, propos'd notionally.*
CHAP. I. *Containing the Civil part of the Model, propos'd practicably.*
CHAP. II. *Containing the Religious part of the Model, propos'd practicably.*
CHAP. III. *Containing the Military part of the Model, propos'd practicably.*
CHAP. IV. *Containing the Provincial part of the Model, propos'd practicably.*
THE Concluſion, *Shewing how the Model may be prov'd or examin'd; and giving a brief Anſwer to Mr.* WREN's *laſt Book, intitl'd,* Monarchy aſſerted, *&c.*

THE

FIRST BOOK,

SHEWING THE

FOUNDATIONS

AND

SUPERSTRUCTURES

Of all kinds of

GOVERNMENT.

If this Age fails me, the next will do me Juſtice.

The PREFACE,

Conſidering the Principles or Nature of Family Government.

DIVINES, and the like ſtudious Aſſertors of Monarchy, have not laid their Principles ſo fairly, while they have conceal'd one part from the right of Paternity, or from the Government of Families, which may be of two kinds; whereas they have taken notice but of one: For Family Government may be as neceſſarily Popular in ſome caſes, as Monarchical in others.

TO ſhew now the nature of the Monarchical Family. Put the caſe a man has one thouſand Pounds a year, or thereabouts; he marries a Wife, has Children and Servants depending upon him (at his good will) in the diſtribution of his Eſtate for their livelihood. Suppoſe then that this Eſtate comes to be ſpent or loſt, where is the Monarchy of this Family? But if the Maſter was no otherwiſe Monarchical then by virtue of his Eſtate, then the foundation or balance of his Empire conſiſted in the thouſand pounds a year. *Monarchical Family.*

THAT from theſe principles there may alſo be a Popular Family, is apparent: For ſuppoſe ſix or ten, having each three hundred pounds a year, or ſo, ſhall agree to dwell together as one Family; can any one of theſe pretend to be Lord and Maſter of the ſame, or to diſpoſe of the Eſtates of all the reſt? Or do they not agree together upon ſuch Orders, to which they conſent equally to ſubmit? But if ſo, then cer- *Popular Family.*

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tainly muſt the Government of this Family be a Government of Laws or Orders, and not the Government of one, or of ſome three or four of theſe men.

Government of Laws, and Government of Men.

YET the one Man in the Monarchical Family giving Laws, and the many in the Popular Family doing no more, it may in this ſenſe be indifferently ſaid, That all Laws are made by Men. But it is plain that where the Law is made by one Man, there it may be unmade by one man; ſo that the Man is not govern'd by the Law, but the Law by the Man; which amounts to the Government of the Man, and not of the Law: Whereas the Law being not to be made but by the Many, no man is govern'd by another man, but by that only which is the common intereſt; by which means this amounts to a Government of Laws, and not of Men.

The Facility that is in true Politicks.

THAT the Politicks may not be thought an unneceſſary or difficult Art, if theſe Principles be leſs than obvious and undeniable, even to any Woman that knows what belongs to houſe-keeping, I confeſs I have no more to ſay. But in caſe what has been ſaid be to all ſorts and capacities evident, it is moſt humbly ſubmitted to Princes and Parliaments, whether, without violence or removing of Property, they can make a Popular Family of the Monarchical, or a Monarchical Family of the Popular? Or, whether that be practicable or poſſible in a Nation, upon the like balance or foundation in Property, which is not in a Family? A Family being but a ſmaller Society or Nation, and a Nation but a greater Society or Family.

The difference between a Sovereign Lord, and a Magiſtrate, tho' ſupreme.

THAT which is uſually anſwer'd to this point, is, That the ſix or ten, thus agreeing to make one Family, muſt have ſome Steward; and to make ſuch a Steward in a Nation, is to make a King. But this is to imagine that the Steward of a Family is not anſwerable to the Maſters of it, or to them upon whoſe Eſtates (and not upon his own) he defrays the whole Charge: For otherwiſe this Stewardſhip cannot amount to Dominion, but muſt come only to the true nature of Magiſtracy, and indeed of annual Magiſtracy in a Commonwealth; ſeeing that ſuch accounts in the year's end, at fartheſt, uſe to be calculated, and that the Steward, Body and Eſtate, is anſwerable for the ſame to the Proprietors or Maſters; who alſo have the undoubted right of conſtituting ſuch another Steward or Stewards as to them ſhall ſeem good, or of prolonging the Office of the ſame.

Where the art of Lawgiving is neceſſary.

NOW, where a Nation is caſt, by the unſeen ways of Providence into a diſorder of Government, the duty of ſuch particularly as are elected by the People, is not ſo much to regard what has been, as to provide for the Supreme Law, or for the ſafety of the People, which conſiſts in the true Art of Law-giving.

The art of Lawgiving is of two kinds.

THE Art of *Law-giving* is of two kinds; the one (as I may ſay) falſe, the other true. The firſt conſiſts in the reduction of the Balance to Arbitary Superſtructures; which requires violence, as being contrary to Nature: The other in erecting neceſſary Superſtructures, that is, ſuch as are conformable to the Balance or Foundation; which, being purely natural, requires that all interpoſition of Force be remov'd.

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CHAP. I.

Conſidering the Principles or Balance of National Governments; with the different kinds of the ſame.

THE Heaven, ſays DAVID, *even the Heavens are the Lords; but the Earth has he given to the Children of Men:* Yet, ſays God to the Father of theſe Children, *In the ſweat of thy Face ſhalt thou eat thy Bread. Dii laborantibus ſua munera vendunt.* This Donation of the Earth to Man comes to a kind of ſelling it for INDUSTRY, a Treaſure which ſeems to purchaſe of God himſelf. From the different kinds and ſucceſſes of this Induſtry, whether in Arms, or in other Exerciſes of the Mind or Body, derives the natural equity of Dominion or Property; and from the legal eſtabliſhment or diſtribution of this Property (be it more or leſs approaching towards the natural equity of the ſame) proceeds all Government. Pſal. 115. 16. *The Original of Property.* Gen. 3. 19.

THE diſtribution of Property, ſo far as it regards the nature or procreation of Government, lies in the over-balance of the ſame: Juſt as a man, who has two thouſand pounds a year, may have a Retinue, and conſequently a Strength, that is three times greater than his who enjoys but five hundred pounds a year. Not to ſpeak at this time of Money, which in ſmall Territories may be of a like effect; but to inſiſt upon the main, which is Property in Land, the over-balance of this, as it was at firſt conſtituted, or comes inſenſibly to be chang'd in a Nation, may be eſpecially of three kinds; that is, in One, in the Few, or in the Many. *The balance of Empire conſiſts in Property.*

THE over-balance of Land, three to one or thereabouts, in one Man againſt the whole People, creates Abſolute Monarchy; as when JOSEPH had purchas'd all the Lands of the *Ægyptians* for PHARAOH. The Conſtitution of a People in this and ſuch caſes, is capable of entire ſervitude. *Buy us and our Land for Bread, and we and our Land will be Servants to* PHARAOH. *The generation of Abſolute Monarchy.* Gen. 47. 19.

THE over-balance of Land to the ſame proportion, in the Few againſt the whole People, creates Ariſtocracy, or Regulated Monarchy, as of late in *England:* And hereupon ſays SAMUEL to the People of *Iſrael,* when they would have a King, *He will take your Fields, even the beſt of them, and give them to his Servants.* The conſtitution of a People in this and the like caſes, is * neither capable of intire Liberty, nor of intire Servitude. *The generation of Regulated Monarchy.* 1 Sam. 8.

THE over-balance of Land to the ſame proportion in the People, or where neither one nor the few over-balance the whole People, creates Popular Government; as in the diviſion of the Land of *Canaan* to the whole People of *Iſrael* by lot. The conſtitution of a People in this and the like caſes, is capable of intire Freedom, nay, not capable of any other ſettlement; it being certain, that if a Monarch, or ſingle Perſon in ſuch a State, thro' the corruption or improvidence of their Councils, might carry it; yet by the irreſiſtible force of Nature, or the reaſon alledg'd by MOSES (*I am not able to bear all this People* *The generation of Popular Government.* Numb. 11. 14.

* Nec totam libertatem nec totam ſervitutem pati poſſunt. *Tacit.*

alone,

Book I. *alone, becauſe it is too heavy for me)* he could not keep it; but out of the deep Waters would cry to them, whoſe feet he had ſtuck in the mire.

Of the Militia, and of the Negative Voice.

WHEREVER the balance of a Government lies, there naturally is the Militia of the ſame; and againſt him or them wherein the Militia is naturally lodg'd, there can be no negative Vote.

IF a Prince holds the over-balance, as in *Turky*, in him is the Militia, as the Janizaries and Timariots. If a Nobility has the over-balance, the Militia is in them, as among us was ſeen in the Barons Wars, and thoſe of *York* and *Lancaſter*; and in *France* is ſeen, when any conſiderable part of that Nobility rebelling, they are not to be reduc'd, but by the major part of their Order adhering to the King.

Judg. 20. IF the People has the over-balance, which they had in *Iſrael*, the Militia is in them; as in the four hundred thouſand firſt decreeing, and then waging War againſt *Benjamin:* Where it may be enquir'd, what Power there was on earth having a Negative Voice to this Aſſembly? This always holds where there is Settlement, or where a Government is natural. Where there is no Settlement, or where the Government is unnatural, it proceeds from one of theſe two cauſes; either an imperfection in the Balance, or elſe ſuch a corruption in the Law-givers, whereby a Government is inſtituted contrary to the Balance.

Imperfect Government. IMPERFECTIONS of the Balance, that is, where it is not good or down weight, cauſe imperfect Governments; as thoſe of the *Roman* and of the *Florentine* People, and thoſe of the *Hebrew* Kings and *Roman* Emperors, being each exceeding bloody, or at leaſt turbulent.

Tyranny. Oligarchy, Anarchy. GOVERNMENT againſt the balance in One, is Tyranny, as that of the *Athenian* PISISTRATUS: in the Few it is Oligarchy, as that of the *Roman* DECEMVIRS; in the Many Anarchy, as that under the *Neapolitan* MAZINELLO.

The Divine right of Government. WHEREVER, thro' Cauſes unforeſeen by Human Providence, the Balance comes to be entirely chang'd, it is the more immediately to be attributed to Divine Providence: And ſince God cannot will the neceſſary cauſe, but he muſt alſo will the neceſſary effect or conſequence, what Government ſoever is in the neceſſary direction of the Balance, the ſame is of Divine Right. Wherefore, tho' of the *Iſraelites* God ſays,

Hoſ. 8. 4. *They have ſet up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I knew it not*; yet, to the ſmall Countries adjoining to the *Aſſyrian* Em-

Jer. 27. 6, 17. pire, he ſays, *Now have I given all theſe Lands into the hand of the King of* Babylon *my Servant*——*Serve the King of* Babylon, *and live.*

CHAP. II.

Shewing the variation of the Engliſh *Balance.*

THE Land in poſſeſſion of the Nobility and Clergy of *England*, till HENRY *7th*, cannot be eſteem'd to have over-balanc'd thoſe held by the People leſs than four to one. Whereas in our days, the Clergy being deſtroy'd, the Lands in poſſeſſion of the People over-balance thoſe held by the Nobility, at leaſt, nine in ten. In ſhewing how this change came about, ſome would have it that I aſſume to my ſelf more than my ſhare; tho' they do not find me delivering that which muſt rely upon Authority, and not vouching my Authors. But HENRY the Seventh being conſcious of infirmity in his Title, yet finding

finding with what ſtrength and vigour he was brought in by the Nobility, conceiv'd jealouſies of the like Power in caſe of a decay or change of Affections. *Nondum orbis adoraverat Romam.* The Lords yet led Country lives, their Houſes were open to Retainers, Men experienc'd in Military Affairs, and capable of commanding; their Hoſpitality was the delight of their Tenants, who by their Tenures or Dependence were oblig'd to follow their Lords in Arms. So that, this being the Militia of the Nation, a few Noblemen diſcontended could at any time levy a great Army; the effect whereof, both in the Barons Wars, and thoſe of *York* and *Lancaſter*, had been well known to divers Kings. This ſtate of Affairs was that which enabl'd HENRY the Seventh to make his advantage of troubleſome times, and the frequent unrulineſs of Retainers; while, under the pretence of curbing Riots, he obtain'd the paſſing of ſuch Laws as did cut off theſe Retainers, whereby the Nobility wholly loſt their Officers. Then, whereas the dependence of the People upon their Lords was of a ſtrict tie or nature, he found means to looſen this alſo by Laws, which he obtain'd upon as fair a pretence, even that of Population. Thus *Farms were ſo brought to a ſtandard, that the Houſes being kept up, each of them did of neceſſity enforce a Dweller; and the proportion of Land laid to each Houſe, did of neceſſity enforce that Dweller not to be a Beggar or Cottager, but a man able to keep Servants, and ſet the Plow on going. By which means a great part of the Lands of this Nation came in effect to be amortiz'd to the hold of the Yeomanry, or middle People,* whereof conſiſted the main body of the Militia, hereby incredibly advanc'd; and which henceforth, *like cleaner underwood leſs choak'd by their ſtaddles*, began to grow exceedingly. But the Nobility, who by the former Laws had loſt their Offices, by this loſt their Soldiery. Yet remain'd to them their Eſtates, till the ſame Prince introducing the Statutes for Alienations, theſe alſo became looſe; and the Lords leſs taken (for the reaſons ſhewn) with their Country lives, where their Trains were clip'd, by degrees became more reſident at Court, where greater pomp and expence by the Statutes of Alienations began to plume them of their Eſtates. The Court was yet at *Bridewell*, nor reach'd *London* any farther than *Temple-Bar*. The latter growth of this City, and in that, the declining of the Balance to Popularity, derives from the decay of the Nobility and of the Clergy. In the Reign of the ſucceeding King were Abbies (than which nothing more dwarfs a People) demoliſh'd. I did not, I do not attribute the effects of theſe things thus far to my own particular obſervation; but always did, and do attribute a ſenſe thereof to the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH, and the Wiſdom of her Council. There is yet living Teſtimony, that the ruin of the *Engliſh* Monarchy, thro' the cauſes mention'd, was frequently attributed to HENRY the Seventh by Sir HENRY WOTTON; which Tradition is not unlike to have deſcended to him from the Queen's Council. But there is a difference between having the ſenſe of a thing, and making a right uſe of that ſenſe. Let a man read PLUTARCH in the Lives of AGIS, and of the GRACCHI, there can be no plainer demonſtration of the *Lacedemonian* or *Roman* Balance; yet read his Diſcourſe of Government in his Morals, and he has forgot it: he makes no uſe, no mention at all of any ſuch thing. Who could have been plainer upon this point than Sir WALTER RALEIGH, where, to prove that the Kings of *Egypt* were not elective but hereditary, he alledges that if the

Chap. 2.

Verulam. H. 7

Book I. Kings of *Egypt* had been elective, *the Children of* PHARAOH *muſt have been more mighty than the King, as Landlords of all* Egypt, *and the King himſelf their Tenant?* Yet when he comes to ſpeak of Government, he has no regard to, no remembrance of any ſuch Principle. In Mr. SELDEN's Titles of Honour, he has demonſtrated the *Engliſh* Balance of the Peerage, without making any application of it, or indeed perceiving it there, or in times when the defect of the ſame came to give ſo full a ſenſe of it. The like might be made apparent in ARISTOTLE, in MACHIAVEL, in my Lord VERULAM, in all, in any Politician: there is not one of them in whom may not be found as right a ſenſe of this Principle as in this preſent Narrative; or in whom may be found a righter uſe of it than was made by any of the Parties thus far concern'd in this ſtory, or by Queen ELIZABETH and her Council. *If a Prince*, ſays a great Author, *to reform a Government were oblig'd to depoſe himſelf, he might, in neglecting of it, be capable of ſome excuſe; but reformation of Government being that with which a Principality may ſtand, he deſerves no excuſe at all.* It is not indeed obſerv'd by this Author that where by reaſon of the declination of the Balance to Popularity, the State requires Reformation in the Superſtructures, there the Prince cannot rightly reform, unleſs from Sovereign Power he deſcends to a Principality in a Common-wealth: nevertheleſs upon the like occaſions this fails not to be found ſo in Nature and Experience. The growth of the People of *England*, ſince the ruins mention'd of the Nobility and the Clergy, came in the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH to more than ſtood with the intereſt, or indeed the nature or poſſibility of a well founded or durable Monarchy; as was prudently perceiv'd, but withal temporiz'd by her Council, who (if the truth of her Government be rightly weigh'd) ſeem rather to have put her upon the exerciſe of Principality in a Common-wealth, than of Sovereign Power in a Monarchy. Certain it is, that ſhe courted not her Nobility, nor gave her mind (as do Monarchs ſeated upon the like foundation) to balance her great Men, or reflect upon their Power now inconſiderable; but rul'd wholly, with an art ſhe had to high perfection, by humouring and bleſſing her People. For this mere ſhadow of a Common-wealth is ſhe yet famous, and ſhall ever be ſo; tho' had ſhe introduc'd the full perfection of the Orders requiſite to Popular Government, her fame had been greater. Firſt, She had eſtabliſh'd ſuch a Principality to her Succeſſors, as they might have retain'd. Secondly, This Principality (the Common-wealth, as *Rome* of ROMULUS, being born of ſuch a Parent) might have retain'd the Royal Dignity and Revenue to the full, both improv'd and diſcharg'd of all Envy. Thirdly, It had ſav'd all the Blood and Confuſion, which thro' this neglect in her and her Succeſſors, has ſince enſu'd. Fourthly, It had bequeath'd to the People a Light not ſo naturally by them to be diſcover'd, which is a great pity. *For even as the many, thro' the difference of opinions that muſt needs abound among them, are not apt to introduce a Government, as not underſtanding the good of it: ſo the Many, having by trial or experience once attain'd to this underſtanding, agree not to quit ſuch a Government.* And laſtly, It had plac'd this Nation in that perfect felicity, which, ſo far as concerns mere Prudence, is in the power of human nature to enjoy. To this Queen ſucceeded King JAMES, who likewiſe regardleſs of this point (into which nevertheleſs he ſaw ſo far as not ſeldom to prophesy

Hiſt. of the World, *part* 1. *p.* 200.

M.D.l.1.b.10

The great Council of Venice *has the Sovereign Power, and the Duke the Sovereign Dignity.*

M.D.l.1.c.5.

propheſy ſad things to his Succeſſors) neither his new Peerage, which in abundance he created, nor the old avail'd him any thing againſt that dread wherein, more freely than prudently, he diſcover'd himſelf to ſtand of Parliaments, as now mere Popular Councils, and running to popularity of Government like a Bowl down a hill; not ſo much, I may ſay, of Malice prepens'd, as by natural inſtinct, whereof the Petition of Right, well conſider'd, is a ſufficient Teſtimony. All perſuaſion of Court Eloquence, all patience for ſuch, as but look'd that way, was now loſt. There remain'd nothing to the deſtruction of a Monarchy, retaining but the Name, more than a Prince who by contending ſhould make the People to feel thoſe advantages which they could not ſee. And this happen'd in the next King, who, too ſecure in that undoubted right whereby he was advanc'd to a Throne which had no foundation, dar'd to put this to an unſeaſonable trial; on whom therefore fell the Tower in *Silo*. Nor may we think that they upon whom this Tower fell, were Sinners above all men; but that we, unleſs we repent, and look better to the true foundations, muſt likewiſe periſh. We have had latter Princes, latter Parliaments. In what have they excel'd, or where are they? The Balance not conſider'd, no effectual work can be made as to ſettlement; and conſider'd, as it now ſtands in *England*, requires to ſettlement no leſs than the Superſtructures natural to popular Government: and the Superſtructures natural to popular Government require no leſs than the higheſt skill or art that is in Political Architecture. The ſum of which Particulars amounts to this, That the ſafety of the People of *England* is now plainly caſt upon skill or ſufficiency in Political Architecture: it is not enough therefore, that there are honeſt men addicted to all the good ends of a common-wealth, unleſs there be skill alſo in the formation of thoſe proper means whereby ſuch Ends may be attain'd. Which is a ſad, but a true account; this being in all Experience, and in the judgment of all Politicians, that whereof the Many are incapable. And tho' the meaneſt Citizen, not informing the Common-wealth of what he knows, or conceives to concern its ſafety, commits a heinous Crime againſt God and his Country; yet ſuch is the temper of later times, that a man, having offer'd any light in this particular, has ſcap'd well enough, if he be deſpis'd and not ruin'd. Chap. 3.

BUT to proceed: if the Balance, or ſtate of Property in a Nation, be the efficient cauſe of Government, and, the Balance being not fix'd, the Government (as by the preſent Narrative is evinc'd, muſt remain inconſtant or floating; then the proceſs in the formation of a Government muſt be firſt by a fixation of the Balance, and next by erecting ſuch Superſtructures as to the nature thereof are neceſſary.

CHAP. III.

Of Fixation of the Balance, or of Agrarian *Laws.*

FIXATION of the Balance of Property is not to be provided for but by Laws; and the Laws, whereby ſuch a Proviſion is made, are commonly call'd *Agrarian* Laws. Now as Governments, thro' the divers Balance of Property, are of divers or contrary natures,

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tures, that is Monarchical or Popular; ſo are ſuch Laws. Monarchy requires of the ſtandard of Property, that it be vaſt or great; and of *Agrarian* Laws, that they hinder receſs or dimunition, at leaſt in ſo much as is thereby intailed upon Honour: But Popular Government requires, that the ſtandard be moderate, and that its Agrarian prevent accumulation. In a Territory not exceeding *England* in Revenue, if the Balance be in more hands than three hundred, it is declining from Monarchy; and if it be in fewer than five thouſand hands, it is ſwerving from a Common-wealth: which as to this point may ſuffice at preſent.

It is at preſent in more hands; but without fixation may come into fewer.

CHAP. VI.

Shewing the Super-ſtructures of Governments.

The Super-ſtructures of Abſolute Monarchy.

THAT the Policy or Super-ſtructures of all abſolute Monarchs, more particularly of the Eaſtern Empires, are not only contained, but meliorated in the *Turkiſh* Government, requires no farther proof than to compare them: but becauſe ſuch a work would not lie in a ſmall compaſs, it ſhall ſuffice for this time to ſay, that ſuch Super-ſtructures of Government as are natural to an abſolute Prince, or the ſole Landlord of a large Territory, require for the firſt ſtory of the Building, that, what Demeans he ſhall think fit to reſerve being ſet apart, the reſt be divided into Horſe quarters or Military Farms, for life or at will, and not otherwiſe: And that every Tenant for every hundred pounds a year ſo held, be, by condition of his Tenure, obliged to attend his Sovereign Lord in Perſon, in Arms, and at his proper coſt and charges, with one Horſe, ſo often and ſo long as he ſhall be commanded upon ſervice. Theſe among the *Turks* are called *Timariots*.

Timariots.

Beglerbegs.

THE ſecond requires, that theſe Horſe Quarters, or Military Farms, be divided by convenient Precincts or Proportions into diſtinct Provinces; and that each Province have one Governor or Commander in chief of the ſame, at the will and pleaſure of his Grand Signior, or for three years and no longer. Such among the *Turks* (unleſs by additional honours they be called *Baſhaws* or *Viziers*) are the Beglerbegs.

Janizaries *and* Spahys.

FOR the third Story, there muſt of neceſſity be a Mercenary Army conſiſting both of Horſe and Foot, for the Guard of the Prince's Perſon, and for the Guard of his Empire; by keeping the Governors of Provinces ſo divided, that they be not ſuffer'd to lay their arms or heads together, or to hold correſpondence or intelligence with one another. Which Mercenary Army ought not to be conſtituted of ſuch as have already contracted ſome other Intereſt; but to conſiſt of Men ſo educated from their very childhood, as not to know that they have any other Parent, or native Country, than the Prince and his Empire. Such among the *Turks* are the Foot call'd *Janizarys*, and the Horſe call'd *Spahys*.

The Divan *and the* Grand Signior.

The Prince accommodated with a Privy Council, conſiſting of ſuch as have been Governors of Provinces, is the Topſtone: This Council among the *Turks* is call'd the *Divan*, and this Prince the *Grand Signior*.

THE

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THE Superſtructures proper to a regulated Monarchy, or to the Government of a Prince (three or four hundred of whoſe Nobility, or of whoſe Nobility and Clergy, hold three parts in four of the Territory) muſt either be by his perſonal influence upon the Balance, or by virtue of Orders. *The Superſtructures of Regulated Monarchy.*

IF a Prince, by eaſing his Nobility of Taxes, and feeding them with ſuch as are extorted from the People, can ſo accommodate their Ambition and Avarice with great Offices and Commands, that a Party rebelling, he can over-balance and reduce them by a greater part of their own Order, he may have greater Power and leſs Security, as at preſent in *France.*

THE ſafer way of this Government is by Orders; and the Orders proper to it eſpecially conſiſt of a Hereditary Senate of the Nobility, admitting alſo of the Clergy, and of a Repreſentative of the People made up of the Lords menial Servants, or ſuch as by Tenure and for Livelihood have immediate dependence upon them, as formerly in *England.*

AN Ariſtocracy, or State of Nobility, to exclude the People muſt govern by a King; or to exclude a King, muſt govern by the People: Nor is there, without a Senate or mixture of Ariſtocracy, any Popular Government. Whence, tho' for diſcourſe ſake Politicians ſpeak of pure Ariſtocracy, and pure Democracy, there is no ſuch thing as either of theſe in Nature, Art, or Example. *No ſuch thing as pure Ariſtocracy, or pure Democracy.*

WHERE the People are not over-balanc'd by one Man, or by the Few, they are not capable of any other Superſtructures of Government, or of any other juſt and quiet ſettlement whatſoever, than of ſuch only as conſiſts of a Senate as their Counſillors, of themſelves or their Repreſentatives as Sovereign Lords, and of a Magiſtracy anſwerable to the People, as diſtributers and executioners of the Laws made by the People. And thus much is of abſolute neceſſity to any or every Government, that is or can be properly call'd a Common-wealth, whether it be well or ill order'd. *The Superſtructures of Popular Government.*

BUT the neceſſary definition of a Common-wealth, any thing well order'd, is, That it is a Government conſiſting of the Senate propoſing, the People reſolving, and the Magiſtracy executing. *Definition of a well order'd Common-wealth.*

MAGISTRACY is a ſtile proper to the executive part: yet becauſe in a Diſcourſe of this kind it is hardly avoidable, but that ſuch as are of the propoſing or reſolving Aſſemblies, will be ſometimes compriz'd under this name or ſtile, it ſhall be enough for excuſe to ſay, that Magiſtracy may be eſteem'd of two kinds; the one proper or Executive, the other improper or Legiſlative. *Diſtinction of Magiſtracy.*

A SENATE may conſiſt of a Hereditary Order, elective for life by itſelf, or by ſome Magiſtrate or Magiſtrates of the ſame; as the Senate of *Rome* conſiſted of the Patrician Order thereinto eligible, firſt by the Conſuls, and then by the Cenſors. A Senate may conſiſt of Senators elected by the People for life, as that of *Lacedæmon:* It may conſiſt of Senators eligible by the People for terms, without any vacation or interval, as the Senate of *Venice*; or with intervals, as the Senate of *Athens*, which alſo for another difference was elected by lot. *Senates, and their kinds.*

A POPULAR Aſſembly may conſiſt of the whole People, as the great Council of *Venice* (for the *Venetians*, tho' call'd, in reſpect of their Subjects, Nobility, are all that free People which is compriz'd in that Common-wealth) or of a Repreſentative, as in *Iſrael.* Again, a Repreſentative *Popular Aſſemblies, and their kinds.*

preſentative of the People may be for life, as in the particular Cities or Sovereignties of *Holland*, improperly call'd Senates; or it may be upon Rotation, that is to ſay, by changes or courſes, as that of *Iſrael*, and the preſent Repreſentative in *England*; it may alſo be by lot, as the *Roman* Tribes call'd the Prerogative, and the *Jurevocatæ*.

Supreme Magiſtrates, and their kinds.

TO ſpeak of Magiſtrates in a Common-wealth, and all their kinds, were to begin an endleſs diſcourſe; the preſent I ſhall therefore confine to ſuch only as may be call'd Supreme Magiſtrates. The Supreme Magiſtracy of a Common-wealth may be in one or more; and it may be for life, or for terms and vacations. In one elective by the People for life; as in the Duke of *Venice*, whoſe Function is Civil and not Military. In two Hereditarily; as in the two Kings of *Lacedemon*, whoſe Function was rather Military than Civil. In nine annually elective by the People; as in the nine Princes or Archons of *Athens*. In two annually elected by the People; as the *Roman* Conſuls, whoſe Power was both Military and Civil. In a word, it may be in one or more, for life, or for terms and vacations, as ſhall beſt ſute with the occaſion.

Other differences in Common-wealths.

SOME Common-wealths conſiſt of diſtinct Sovereignties, as *Switzerland* and *Holland*; others are collected into one and the ſame Sovereignty, as moſt of the reſt. Again, ſome Common-wealths have been upon Rotation or Courſes in the Repreſentative only, as *Iſrael:* Others in the Magiſtracy only, as *Rome*. Some in the Senate and in the Magiſtracy, as *Athens* and *Venice:* Others in ſome part of the Magiſtracy, and in others not; as *Lacedemon* in the *Ephori*, and not in the Kings; and *Venice* not in the Duke, nor in the *Procuratori*, but in all the reſt. *Holland*, except in the Election of States Provincial (which is emergent) admits not of any rotation or courſes. There may be a Common-wealth admitting of Rotation throughout, as in the Senate, in the Repreſentative, and in the Magiſtracy; as that propos'd in *Oceana*.

Rotation, or Courſes.

ROTATION, if it be a perfect, is equal election by, and ſucceſſion of the whole People to the Magiſtracy by terms and vacations.

Popular Election.

EQUAL Election may be by Lot, as that of the Senate of *Athens*; by Suffrage, as that of *Lacedemon*; or by Ballot, as that of *Venice*, which of all others is the moſt equal.

The Ballot.

THE Ballot, as it is us'd in *Venice*, conſiſts of a Lot; whence proceeds the right of propoſing, and of an unſeen way of ſuffrage, or of reſolving.

The different Genius of Common-wealths.

FROM the wonderful variety of parts, and the difference of mixture (hitherto ſcarce touch'd by any) reſult thoſe admirable differences that are in the Conſtitution and Genius of Popular Governments; ſome being for defence, ſome for increaſe; ſome more equal, others inequal; ſome turbulent and ſeditious, others, like ſoft ſtreams, in a perpetual tranquillity.

The cauſe of Sedition in a Common-wealth.

THAT which cauſes innate Sedition in a Common-wealth, is Inequality; as in *Rome*, where the Senate oppreſt the People. But if a Common-wealth be perfectly equal, it is void of Sedition, and has attain'd to perfection, as being void of all internal cauſes of diſſolution.

Definition of an equal Common-wealth.

AN equal Common-wealth is a Government founded upon, a balance which is perfectly Popular, being well fix'd by a ſutable *Agrarian*; and which from the balance, thro' the free ſuffrage of the People given

given by the Ballot, amounts in the Superſtructures to a Senate debating and propoſing, a Repreſentative of the People reſolving, and a Magiſtracy executing: each of theſe three Orders being upon Courſes of Rotation; that is, elected for certain terms, enjoining like Intervals. Chap. 4.

SUCH Conſtitutions in a Government as regard the Frame or Model of it, are call'd Orders; and ſuch things as are enacted by the Legiſlative Orders, are call'd Laws. *The difference between Laws and Orders.*

TO undertake the binding of a Prince from invading Liberty, and yet not to introduce the whole Orders neceſſary to Popular Government, is to undertake a flat contradiction, or a plain impoſſibility.

A PEOPLE or Aſſembly not underſtanding true Principles, give leaſt credit to the beſt Orders, and ſo come to caſt themſelves upon particular perſons: for where Orders are not credited, there Men muſt be truſted; and where Men are truſted, they find themſelves ſo well in their power, that they are either for bringing in a Common-wealth by degrees, or more probably not at all. The deſire of bringing in a Common-wealth by degrees, ariſes from want of conſidering that the whole of a Common-wealth, as to charge or trouble, is leſs than the half. He who has a Journey to go, does not chooſe to have but half a Bridle, or but one Boot or Stirrup, tho' thereby he fewer things, and come but to half the charge; becauſe this would but neceſſitate him to procure more things, and perhaps more chargeable or dangerous. *Hazard thro' the want of Principles.*

Optimus ille animi vindex, lædentia pectus
Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque ſemel.

The CONCLUSION:

Obſerving that the Principles of Human Prudence being good without proof of Scripture, are nevertheleſs ſuch as are provable out of Scripture.

WHO imagines that the *Romans* govern'd by proof out of Scripture? Yet ſays PETER, *Submit your ſelves to* (Human Prudence, or) *every Ordinance of Man*; which relates more particularly to the Government of the *Romans*. The moſt frequent compariſon of a Common-wealth is to a Ship; but who imagines that a Ship ought not to be built according to the Art of the Ship-wright, or govern'd according to the Compaſs, unleſs theſe be prov'd out of Scripture? Nevertheleſs, as hitherto I have prov'd the principles of Human Prudence in the ſeveral parts out of Holy Scripture; ſo I undertake to vindicate them in the whole, as to the intire frame of Popular Government, in the enſuing Book, by the ſame Authority and undeniable Evidence. 1 Pet. 2. 13.

THE

THE

SECOND BOOK,

CONTAINING THE

COMMON-WEALTHS

OF THE

HEBREWS:

NAMELY

ELOHIM, or the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*;

AND

CABALA, or the Common-wealth of the *Jews*.

The PREFACE.

Shewing that there were Common-wealths before that of *Iſrael*.

HUMAN Prudence is originally a Creature of God, and, with reſpect to its exiſtence, as antient as human Nature; nor is it ſo much younger in any of thoſe Effects or Ends for which it was ordain'd by God, that we ſhould think *Iſrael* to have been the firſt Common-wealth, or the firſt Popular Government that ever was, or that was planted at leaſt in *Canaan*: for the like Governments, in the Countries thereabout, there were both before and at the ſame time. It was in *Canaan*, that MELCHISEDEC, King and Prieſt of *Salem*, had reign'd during the time of ABRAHAM, who paid him Tithes of all that he had. Now Tithes before *Iſrael* and the inſtitution of the *Levites*, belong'd not to any ſort of Clergy, but to the Prince or State. Whence SAMUEL in the deſcription of a King, tells the People that he will take the tenth of their Goods. Thus ABRAHAM in paying Tithes to MELCHISEDEC, acknowledg'd him for his Prince. Yet had ABRAHAM the right of the Sword, and made War with Kings, as thoſe of *Sodom*, at his own diſcretion; whence *Canaan* may ſeem to have been a Common-wealth

Tithes originally belonging to Kings. 1 Sam. 8. 15, 17.

The Common-wealth of Salem.

wealth in thoſe days, much after the manner of *Germany* in ours. The five Lords (perhaps five Tribunes) of the *Philiſtians* muſt needs have been ſome Ariſtocracy at leaſt of Princes joining in one Body or Common-wealth. So *Venice* in her firſt Age was under Lords or Tribunes. It is little to be doubted, but the Government of JETHRO, King and Prieſt of *Midian*, was of a like nature with that of MELCHISEDEC, or of the *Lacedemonian* Kings, who were alſo Prieſts; or that the Counſil he gave to MOSES (being for the inſtitution of ſuch Judicatories as are not proper in a Monarchy) was any other than according to the Orders of his own Common-wealth. And leſt theſe Governments ſhould ſeem leſs popular, the Embaſſadors of the *Gibeonites* coming to JOSHUA, ſay thus; *Our Elders* (or our Senate) *and all the Inhabitants of our Country* (or the popular Aſſembly of the ſame) *ſpoke to us ſaying, Go meet them, and ſay to them, We are your Servants: therefore now make a League with us.* To make a League with a foreign Nation evinces Sovereign Power; and that this League was made by the Senate and the People, evinces *Gibeon* to have been a Popular Government. Such a thing then as Popular Government moſt undeniably there was before *Iſrael*. Now whether *Iſrael* were a Popular Government or no, I ſhall refer to trial by the inſuing Chapter.

Chap. 1.

The Common-wealth of the *Philiſtians*.

The Common-wealth of *Midian*.

The Common-wealth of the *Gibeonites*. Joſhua 9. 11.

CHAP. I.

Shewing that Iſrael *was a Common-wealth.*

Sect. 1.

IT is ſaid of the *Iſraelites* that went firſt into *Egypt*, *All the Souls that came out of the loins of* Jacob *were ſeventy Souls.* Theſe becoming ſo many Fathers of Families, and governing their own Families by Paternal Right, it follows that at firſt they ſo govern'd the whole People; yet not with any Sovereign Power (as may be eaſily thought in a Country that had a Prince of its own) but by way only of direction and advice. The People being thus accuſtom'd to this way, as any of theſe ſeventy came to die, ſupplied his place with another of their Election; at leaſt for the probability of this opinion, we find mention of MOSES, NADAB, ABIHU, *and ſeventy of the Elders*, before the inſtitution of the *Iſraelitiſh* Senate or Sanhedrim. To theſe and to the People MOSES propos'd his Laws. So I am ſure in the * *Latin* it is expreſly ſaid, where by our *Engliſh* Tranſlation it is thus render'd, *This is the Law* (and by the Law here is meant no leſs than the whole Book of *Deuternomy*) *which* MOSES *ſet before the Children of Iſrael*, whoſe Aſſemblies were not always without faction. For KORAH, DATHAN, *and* ABIRAM, *with two hundred Princes of the Aſſembly, famous in the Congregation, Men of Renown*, bandyed themſelves againſt MOSES, and his intended Election of his Brother AARON to the hereditary Prieſthood, reproaching him (ſays JOSEPHUS) that he went about to diſpoſe of this Honour without the Suffrage of the Congregation, thereby affecting Tyranny, and a ſly

The riſe of the Iſraelitiſh Government.

Of the Princes of the Tribes, and Princes of Families.

Exod. 1. 5.

Exod. 24. 9.

Antiq. l. 4. c. 2.

* Hæc eſt lex quam Moſes propoſuit, Deut. 4. 44. *and whereas betwixt a Precept and a Command there is a large difference; in places more than I can ſtand to Number, where the Latin has it*, præcepit Moſes, *the Engliſh has it*, Moſes commanded.

uſurpation

Book II.

uſurpation of the Liberty of the People: which ſenſe alſo is imply'd by their upbraiding him in Scripture; *Is it a ſmall thing that thou haſt brought us up out of the Land that flows with Milk and Honey, to kill us in the Wilderneſs? except thou makeſt thyſelf altogether a Prince over us.* Numb. 16. 13. But whereas the Scripture in all this preſumes theſe Incendiaries to have bely'd Moses, ſome will have all they thus laid to his charge, to be no more, but leſs than truth; in as much as they will needs have Moses not only to have been a King, but to have been a King exerciſing Arbitrary Power, and ſuch Arbitrary Power as, being without any bounds, fully amounts to Tyranny.

That Moſes *was no King.*

Sect. 2. *That* Moſes *propos'd his Laws to the People and their Suffrage.*

THE word King is not a ſufficient definition of the Magiſtrate ſo ſtil'd: Between a *Lacedemonian* King and a *Perſian* King, or between either of theſe and a King of *England*, there was a vaſt difference. Both the Kings in *Lacedemon* were but as one Duke in *Venice*. The *Venetians* therefore, if it had ſo pleas'd them, might as well have call'd their Duke a King. Certain it is, that he is not ſo much in the Common-wealth, as are a few of his Counſellors; and yet all Acts of the Government run in his name, as if there were no Common-wealth.

Deut. 34. 4. *In what ſenſe* Moſes *may be call'd a King.*

IT is ſaid (according to our Tranſlation) Moses *commanded us a Law*, &c. according to the Original, Moses (propos'd, or) *gave us a Law, which is an Inheritance to the Congregation of* Jacob. The Duke of *Venice* has a right to propoſe or give Law in the Congregation or great Council of *Venice*; where he, who ſees him ſitting, would believe he were a King. And if Moses were King in *Jeſurun* (or *Iſrael*) it was *when the Heads of the People and the Tribes of* Iſrael *were gather'd together.* Ver. 5. Paul, epitomizing the ſtory of the People of *Iſrael* in his Sermon to the *Antiochian Jews*, ſhews how God *choſe their Fathers, exalted the People, deſtroy'd* (for their ſakes) *ſeven Nations in the Land of* Canaan, *and divided their Land to them by Lots:* but ſpeaks not a word of any King given to them, till expreſly after their Judges. Acts 13. But if Moses were a King, yet that he did not propoſe, but command by his power the Laws which he gave to *Iſrael*, does not follow. For David was a King, who nevertheleſs did no otherwiſe make any Law than by Propoſition to the People, and their free Suffrage upon it. 1 Chron. 13. David *conſulted with the Captains of thouſands, and hundreds, and with every Leader* (of which Military Diſcipline of the Congregation of *Iſrael* more in due place will be ſhewn) *and* David *ſaid to all the Congregation, If it ſeems good to you, and that it be of the Lord our God* (tho' he was a King, and a man after God's own heart, he makes the People Judges what was of God) *let us ſend abroad to our Brethren every where that are left in all the Land of* Iſrael, *and with them alſo to the Prieſts and Levites that are in their Cities and Suburbs, that they* (to the end this thing may be perform'd with the greateſt ſolemnity) *may gather themſelves to us, and let us bring the Ark of God to us: for we inquir'd not at it in the days of* Saul. In the days of Eli the Ark was taken by the *Philiſtians*, who being ſmitten till there was a deadly deſtruction throughout all the City, and their Divines attributing the cauſe thereof to the detention of the Ark, after ſeven Months ſent it to *Bethſhemeſh*; whence it was brought to *Kirjath-jearm*, and there lodg'd in the houſe of Aminadab, before Saul was King, where it remain'd till ſuch time as David propos'd (in the manner ſhewn) to the People the reduction of the 1 Sam. 4.

ſame.

ſame. Upon this Propoſition, the People giving Suffrage are unanimous in their reſult; *All the Congregation ſaid, that they would do ſo* (not that they could do no otherwiſe by a King, for they did not the like by REHOBOAM, but that) *the thing was right in the eyes of all the People. Moreover*, DAVID *and the Captains of the Hoſt ſeparated to the Service ſome of the Sons of* ASAPH, *and of* HEMAN, *and of* JEDUTHUN, *who ſhould propheſy with Harps, with Pſalteries and with Cymbals*; that is, propos'd theſe Laws for Church Diſcipline, or Offices of the Prieſts and Levites, to the ſame Repreſentative of the People: of which more in other places. Thus much in this, to ſhew, that if MOSES were a King, it does not follow that he propos'd not his Laws to a Congregation of the People having the power of Reſult. To ſay that the Laws propos'd by MOSES were the Dictate of GOD, is not to evade, but to confirm the neceſſity of propoſing them to the People, ſeeing the Laws or Dictates of GOD or of CHRIST, can no otherwiſe be effectually receiv'd or embrac'd by a People, or by a private man, than by the free ſuffrage of the Soul or Conſcience; and not by Force or Rewards, which may as well eſtabliſh the Laws of the Devil. Chap. 1. 1 Chron. 13.4. Chap. 25.

BUT for another way, ſuch a one as it is, of crowning MOSES, ſome are poſitive that there lay an appeal from the ſeventy Elders to Him. Now the Command of God to MOSES for the inſtitution of the Seventy, is this: *Gather to me ſeventy men of the Elders of* Iſrael—*that they may ſtand with thee.* Upon which words let me aſk, whether had MOSES thenceforth a diſtinct or a joint political Capacity? If the Seventy ſtood with MOSES, or it were a joint Capacity, then MOSES was no King in their ſenſe; and if it were diſtinct, then lay there to MOSES no appeal, even by his own Law: for thus in the caſe of Appeals it is by him directed. *If there ariſes a Controverſy too hard for thee in Judgment—thou ſhalt come to the Prieſts and Levites* (that is, to the ſeventy Elders)——*According to the ſentence of the Law which they*——*ſhall tell thee, thou ſhalt do*——*And the man that will do preſumptuouſly, and will not hearken—even that man ſhall die.* In which words all colour of appeal from the ſeventy Elders is excluded. Sect. 3. *That there lay no appeal from the 70 Elders to* Moſes. Numb. 11.16. Deut. 6.

BUT whether MOSES were a King or no King, either his Power was more than that of King DAVID; or without propoſition to, and reſult of the People it is plain that he could paſs no Law. Now the Senate, Sanhedrim, or ſeventy Elders, came in the place of MOSES, or ſtood with him; therefore their Power could be no more than was that of MOSES. So that if the Power of MOSES were never more in the point of Law-giving, than to propoſe to the People; then the power of the Sanhedrim could be no more in the point of Law-giving, than to propoſe to the People. Nor will it be found in Scripture that the Sanhedrim ever made any Law without the People, yet it is found in Scripture that the People made a Law without the Sanhedrim, or levy'd War without them, which is all one: for where there is a power to levy War, there will be the power of making Law. And the occaſion upon which this is found, is the War levy'd againſt BENJAMIN by the Congregation conſiſting of four hundred thouſand. Again, If the Sanhedrim inherited the whole power of MOSES, and yet had no larger power in Law-making than to propoſe to the People, then had MOSES never any larger power in Law-making than to propoſe to the People. Now where there is no King, Sect. 4. Judg. 20.

or

Book II. or no King in a diſtinct capacity from the Senate; and where the Senate has no farther power in Law-making than to propoſe to the free ſuffrage of the People; the Government there is a Common-wealth. Thus having ſhewn that *Iſrael* was a Common-wealth, I come next to ſhew what Common-wealth *Iſrael* was.

CHAP. II.

Shewing what Common-wealth Iſrael *was.*

Sect. 1. *Diviſion of the Children of* Iſrael; *firſt Genealogical.*

ALL Political Methods that are collective of the People, muſt neceſſarily begin with a diſtribution or diviſion of the People. FOR the diviſion of the People of *Iſrael*, it was firſt Genealogical, and then local. *Now theſe are the Names* (of the Anceſtors of the Tribes, or) *of the Children of* Iſrael *which came into* Egypt, *every man and his Houſhold came with* JACOB: REUBEN, SIMEON, LEVI, *and* JUDAH, ISSACHAR, ZEBULUN, *and* BENJAMIN, DAN *and* NAPHTALI, GAD, *and* ASHER. Theſe being eleven in number, were the Sons of JACOB, who had alſo one more, namely JOSEPH. *And to* JOSEPH *were born two Sons before the years of Famine came, which* ASENAH *the Daughter of* POTIPHERAH *Prieſt of* On, *bore to him. And* JOSEPH *call'd the name of the firſt-born* MANASSEH — *and the name of the ſecond call'd he* EPHRAIM. Which two (tho' but Grandchildren) were adopted by JACOB for his Sons, in theſe words: *Let my name be nam'd on them, and the name of my Fathers* ABRAHAM *and* ISAAC; *and let them grow into a multitude in the midſt of the Earth.* From which addition to the former came the Tribes of *Iſrael*, genealogically reckon'd, to be in number thirteen. In the genealogical diſtribution of the Tribes there were alſo obſerv'd certain Ranks, Qualities, or Degrees, as appears by the Poll made of *Iſrael* in the *Wilderneſs of* Sinai, and *in the Tabernacle of the Congregation* by MOSES. Theſe Degrees were of two ſorts: firſt, Phylarchs, or Princes of Tribes; and ſecondly, Patriarchs, or Princes of Families: all hereditary Honours, and pertaining to the Firſt-born of the Tribe or of the Family reſpectively. That this Poll be more perfectly underſtood, will be uſeful; for which cauſe I ſhall be ſomewhat more particular. Firſt, for the Phylarchs, or Princes of the Tribes; and then for the Patriarchs, or Princes of Families. To begin with the Princes of the Tribes.

Exod. 1.

Gen. 41. 50, 51, 52.

Gen. 48. 16.

Num. 1.

Sect. 2. *Of the Princes of Tribes; or the Muſter Roll in* Sinai.

Num. 1. 17, 18.

MOSES and AARON——*aſſembl'd the Congregation* (or political Convention of the People) *together on the firſt day of the ſecond month, after their Families, by the houſe of their Fathers, according to the number of the names, from twenty years old and upward, by the poll.* Where every Phylarch or Prince of a Tribe, with the number of men at the age mention'd and upward, throughout his Tribe, are liſted much after this manner.

1. OF the Tribe of *Reuben*, *Elizur*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, forty ſix thouſand five hundred.

2. OF the Tribe of *Simeon*, *Shelamiel*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, fifty nine thouſand three hundred.

3. OF

Chap. 2.

3. OF the Tribe of *Judah*, *Naſhon*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, threeſcore and fourteen thouſand ſix hundred.
4. OF the Tribe of *Iſſachar*, *Nethaniel*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, fifty four thouſand four hundred.
5. OF the Tribe of *Zebulun*, *Eliab*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, fifty ſeven thouſand four hundred.
6. OF the Tribe of *Ephraim*, *Eliſhama*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, forty thouſand five hundred.
7. OF the Tribe of *Manaſſeh*, *Gemaliel*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, thirty two thouſand two hundred.
8. OF the Tribe of *Benjamin*, *Abidan*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe thirty five thouſand four hundred.
9. OF the Tribe of *Dan*, *Abiezer*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, threeſcore and two thouſand ſeven hundred.
10. OF the Tribe of *Aſher*, *Pagiel*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, forty one thouſand five hundred.
11. OF the Tribe of *Gad*, *Eliaſaph*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, forty five thouſand ſix hundred and fifty.
12. OF the Tribe of *Naphtali*, *Abira*, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, fifty three thouſand four hundred.

THE total ſum of which Muſter-roll in the twelve Tribes, amounts to Princes twelve; and men of military age ſix hundred and three thouſand five hundred and fifty, beſides the *Levites*.

Sect. 3. *The Levites Call, Order, or Tribe.*

ALL the firſt-born, ſays God, *are mine*. In which words is imply'd that the Prieſt-hood, or right of preaching, inſtructing, or adminiſtring divine things, belong'd, as it were, of natural right, to Fathers of Families, or the Firſt-born; till the Lord *took the* Levites *from among the Children of* Iſrael, *inſtead of the Firſt-born*. Theſe being thus taken, were ſet apart, and ſo liſted by themſelves (to omit their ſeveral Families, Functions, and Orders in the ſervice of the Tabernacle, and afterwards of the Temple, which would require a Volume) much after this manner. Num. 3. 12, 13

OF the tribe of LEVI, AARON High Prieſt. The number of all the Males of this Tribe, *from a month old and upwards, twenty and two thouſand*. The manner how God took the *Levites*, is thus expreſs'd. *Thou ſhalt bring the* Levites *before the Tabernacle of the Congregation, and thou ſhalt gather the whole Aſſembly together—and the Children of* Iſrael (after the manner that the *Levites* lay their hands upon the Bullocks, or Sacrifice) *ſhall put their hands upon the* Levites, in token that they are ſacrific'd or ſeparated by the free ſuffrage of the People to the Lord. For leſt the ſuffrage of the People be thought hereby to have been excluded, ſo DAVID *and the Captains of the Hoſt* or Army (which Army was the Repreſentative of the People) *ſeparated to the ſervice ſome of the Sons of* ASAPH, *of* HEMAN, *and of* JEDUTHUN—*who ſhould propheſy with Harps*. But of the Congregations of the People more in due place. v. 39. Num. 8. 9, 10, 11, 12. 1 Chr. 25.

Sect. 4. *The Military Orders.* Grot. ad Num. 10.

THE hereditary Right more ſpecially belonging to the Phylarchs, or Princes of the Tribes, conſiſted (as that of the Kings of *Lacedemon*, of *Athens*, and of *Rome*) in the leading of the Armies of the Common-wealth; which was diſtributed to them in this manner. The twelve tribes were divided into four Brigades, every Brigade conſiſting of three Tribes. The leading of the firſt Brigade pertain'd to

Book II. JUDAH, who in his Standard bore a Lion. The leading of the ſecond Brigade belong'd to REUBEN, who in his Standard bore a Man. The leading of the third Brigade belong'd to EPHRAIM, who in his Standard bore an Ox. The leading of the fourth Brigade belong'd to DAN, who in his Standard bore an Eagle. Theſe four by the text are term'd *Standards of the Camp*, which were as the *Roman* Eagles. Furthermore, as the ſub-diviſions of the *Roman* Legions had their proper Inſigns, ſo had the Tribes here, which had not the leading of a Brigade of the Camp. The Inſigns of theſe Tribes were call'd *Staves*; as the Staff of the Children of ISSACHAR, the Staff of the Tribe of ZEBULUN, which follow'd the Standard of JUDAH: The Staff of the Tribe of SIMEON, the Staff of the Tribe of GAD, which follow'd the Standard of REUBEN: The Staff of the Tribe of MANASSEH, the Staff of the Tribe of BENJAMIN, which follow'd the Standard of EPHRAIM: The Staff of the Tribe of ASHER, the Staff of the Tribe of NAPHTALI, which follow'd the Standard of DAN. All which Inſigns or Staves in our *Engliſh* Tranſlation are render'd *Hoſts*, or Armies.

Num. 10. 14, 18, 22, 25.

Num. 3. IN the midſt of theſe four Squadrons or Brigades ſtood the Tabernacle, with the *Levites* divided, and diſtributed by their diſtinct Families to the ſeveral uſes and carriages of the ſame, and lodg'd upon the four quarters.

WHEN the Ark ſet forward, or the Camp remov'd, theſe words were with ſolemnity pronounc'd by the General, or by the High Prieſt; *Riſe up Lord, and let thy Enemies be ſcatter'd, and let them that hate thee fly before thee.*

Num. 10. 35.

OF the Martial Diſcipline in which the Youth in *Iſrael* were educated to theſe ends, there was certainly more than is remaining in ſtory. But that their Popular Aſſemblies were all held in Military Order and Diſcipline, and that the deſerters of the Militia were anathematiz'd, confiſcated, or put to the ſword, will in due time be made ſufficiently apparent. For the preſent, you have the *Iſraelitiſh* Muſter-roll, being of a like nature with that in *Athens* call'd *Lexiarcha*, and that in *Rome* call'd *Cenſus*. Nor has any Common-wealth been well order'd in its Militia, which has not been diligent in the inſtitution and preſervation of the like Military Rolls or Regiſters. Hitherto of the Phylarchs, or Princes of the Tribes; the next rank or quality in this Government was that of the Patriarchs or Princes of Families.

Sect. 5. *The Patriarchs chief of the Fathers, or Princes of Families; with a Catalogue of the ſame.*

THE word *Family* in many places of Scripture, is not to be taken for a ſingle Houſhold; but as we take the word in Heraldry, that is, for a Lineage or Kindred. The Patriarchs in *Iſrael*, taken in this ſenſe, were ſuch as, till of late years in *Scotland*, were they that could lead the whole Name or Kindred, and be follow'd by them. The Families in *Iſrael* of this kind, that were greateſt about the plantation of the Common-wealth, were of REUBEN, the *Henochites*, the *Phalluites*, the *Heſronites*, and the *Charmites*.

Num. 26.

OF *Simeon*, the *Namuelites*, the *Jaminites*, the *Jachenites*, the *Zarites*, and the *Shaulites*.

OF *Gad*, the *Zephronites*, the *Haggits*, the *Shunites*, the *Oznites*, the *Erites*, the *Arodites*, and the *Arelites*.

OF *Judah*, the *Shelanites*, the *Pharzites*, the *Zarhites*, the *Heſronites*, and the *Hamulites*.

OF *Iſſachar*, the *Tholaites*, the *Punites*, the *Shubites*, and the *Shimranites*.

OF

Chap. 2.

OF *Zabulun*, the *Sardites*, the *Elonites*, and the *Jahleelites*.

OF *Manaſſeh*, the *Machirites*, the *Galeadites*, the *Jeezrites*, the *Helekites*, the *Aſrielites*, the *Sechemites*, the *Shemidaites*, and the *Hepherites*.

OF *Ephraim*, the *Shuthalaites*, the *Bachtites*, the *Tahanites*, and the *Eranites*.

OF *Benjamin*, the *Belaites*, the *Aſhbelites*, the *Ahiramites*, the *Shuphamites*, the *Huphamites*, the *Ardites*, the *Heredites*, and the *Naamites*.

OF *Dan*, the *Suhamites*.

OF *Aſher*, the *Jimnites*, the *Jeſſuites*, the *Briites*, the *Heberites*, and the *Melchielites*.

OF *Naphtali*, the *Jazrielites*, the *Gunites*, the *Jeſerites*, and the *Shillemites*.

OF *Levi*, the *Gerſonites*, the *Caharites*, and the *Merarites*. The heads of theſe were ſuch as are call'd Patriarchs, Princes, heads of Families, or chief of the Fathers.

FAMILIES, tho' far leſs ſubject than in other Governments to decay or encreaſe, might at divers times be different in *Iſrael*; as after BENJAMIN was deſtroy'd, or after DAVID had rais'd his own and many other: But thus were the Families at this time ſixty; the Tribes being, as was ſhewn before, thirteen.

IN the firſt inſtitution of the Tribes of *Rome*, that is, *Ramnenſes*, *Titienſes*, and the *Luceri*, they were alſo genealogical, but long it held not ſo; genealogical diviſions in a Common-wealth being for the moſt part of greater danger than uſe: but whether Genealogies be obſerv'd or not, the local way of diviſion is of abſolute neceſſity.

Sect. 6. *Of the Lot or Ballot of Iſrael.*

TO inſert the Geography of the *Iſraelitiſh* Tribes, would be as burthenſome both to the Reader and my ſelf, as needleſs to either. But the manner how the Tribes became local, was thro' the diſtribution of the Land of *Ganaan* by Lot, and intailing the Lands ſo diſtributed upon the Proprietors and their Heirs for ever, without power of alienation, in any ſuch manner as to deprive their Poſterity. The Lot or Ballot in *Iſrael* was ſpecially of three uſes; one for election of Magiſtrates, another for the diſcovery of ſome ſecret Malefactor, and a third for the diviſion of Lands. To which three heads I hope to reduce the whole Hiſtory of their Government: and this work once perform'd, it will be eaſy to repreſent the Common-wealth in its Political method.

TO begin with the election of Magiſtrates, it was perform'd ſometimes by the Lot, without Suffrage; and ſometimes by the Ballot, that is, by a mixture of Lot and Suffrage. For the clearer diſcovery of the Order in Elections, I muſt invert the Order of the Magiſtrates elected, and begin with the King; then proceed to the Judge, and come laſt of all to the Sanhedrim, and the inferior Courts.

THE Inſtruments us'd upon theſe occaſions, were firſt Lots, ſome Blanks and ſome Prizes; then Urns (that is, Pots) into which theſe Lots were caſt, and out of which they were afterwards drawn, or given forth; by what Officers, or with what farther Solemnity, does not appear.

Sect. 7. *Manner of electing the King.*

WHEN the People would needs have a King, SAMUEL being their Judge, did that, tho' againſt his will, which nevertheleſs was no more than his duty: that is, firſt, *hearken'd to the voice of the People*; or obey'd their Vote. Secondly, *Call'd the People together to the Lord to* Mizpeh. The political Aſſembly, or Congregation of the People

1 Sam. 8. 7, 22.

1 Sam. 10. 17.

of

Book II.

of *Iſrael* was call'd *Eccleſia Dei, the Congregation of the Lord*, as it ought to have been expreſt in the Trial of BENJAMIN, and is in ſome places by our Tranſlation; as where an *Eunuch* (or one unfit for marriage with a Daughter of *Iſrael*, which capacity was neceſſary to the being inrol'd of a Tribe) *a Baſtard* (as diſhonourable) *an* Ammonite *or* Moabite (as deſcended of perfidious Nations) *ſhall not enter into the Congregation of the Lord:* that is, ſhall not have right of ſuffrage with the People of *Iſrael*. So SAMUEL, by calling *the Congregation of the Lord*, or *the People together to the Lord in* Mizpeh (the place, before the taking of *Jeruſalem*, where they always held their Parliaments or political Aſſemblies) did the office of the like Magiſtrates in Common-wealths. The People being thus aſſembl'd (for to be brief, I muſt proceed with conjectures, which at firſt ſight will ſeem bolder than really they are) SAMUEL cauſing the Urns to be ſet forth, pronounc'd the ſolemn form of words in uſe upon the like occaſion, which were theſe: *Preſent your ſelves before the Lord by your Tribes, and by your thouſands.* The political Aſſemblies of the Children of *Iſrael* were held, or gather'd (as we ſay) with Drums beating, and Colours flying; and if it were an extraordinary Congregation, that is, a Congregation conſiſting of the whole People, as this, and that for the trial of BENJAMIN, the Princes of the Tribes with their Staves, and the Standards of the Camp (in the order ſhewn) led up the People to the Urns, or Ballot. Wherefore upon theſe words of SAMUEL, the Princes march'd in their known diſcipline to the Urns. The Urns were two: in the one were twelve Lots inſcrib'd with the names of the twelve Tribes; in the other were alſo twelve other Lots, whereof eleven were Blanks, and the twelfth inſcrib'd with ſome word. What the *Iſraelitiſh* word was, does not appear; the *Roman* word upon the like occaſion was *Prerogative:* wherefore ſeeing that which is loſt muſt have been of a like nature, we may, for diſcourſe ſake, preſume it to have been the ſame in *Iſrael* as in *Rome*. And *when* SAMUEL *had caus'd all the Tribes of* Iſrael *to come near, the Tribe of* BENJAMIN *was taken:* That is, the name of this Tribe being drawn out of the one Urn, to it was drawn the word *Prerogative* out of the other Urn; which being done, the Urns were chang'd, or at leaſt the Lots. And whereas in the enumeration of the Patriarchs, I ſhew'd by a catalogue of their Names, that the whole Tribe of BENJAMIN conſiſted of ſeven Families; ſeven names by that account ſhould have been caſt into the one Urn, and as many Lots into the other; one of them being inſcrib'd with the word *Prerogative*, and the other ſix being Blanks. But both the names, and the number of Families at this Ballot, are moſt likely to have been quite otherwiſe than in the Catalogue; becauſe ſince that time the Tribe of BENJAMIN had in the far greater part been deſtroy'd, and piec'd up again out of a Remnant: ſo for the number of the Families, or the names of them, I can ſay nothing. But the Urns being thus prepar'd, came BENJAMIN, as now the Prerogative Tribe, to the Urns by Families. *And when* SAMUEL *had caus'd the Tribe of* BENJAMIN *to come near by their Families, the Family of* MATRI (which is a new one) *was taken:* that is, lighting, in the manner ſhewn, upon the Prize, became the Prerogative Family. This done, the Lots were again chang'd, and ſo many others as there were Houſholds in the Family of MATRI (for ſo you will find it in the trial of ACHAN) were caſt into the Urns.

Judg. 20.
Deut. 23.

For the Aſſembly of the Congregation at Mizpeh, *ſee* Judg. 10. 17. & 11. 11. & 20. 1. & 21. 1.

1 Sam. 7. 6, 16.

1 Sam. 10. 19.

The Military Order of Political Congregations in Iſrael, *ſee* Chap. 3.

V. 20.

The Prerogative Tribe.

Judg. 20. 2.

Joſh. 7. 14, 16, 17, 18.

Thus

Thus the Houſhold of KISH, coming to be the Prerogative Houſhold, and ſo many Lots as there were men of that Houſhold, being caſt into the Urns, whereof the Prize was inſcrib'd *King*, came the Houſhold of KISH, man by man, and SAUL the Son of KISH was taken. Chap. 1.

We find it recorded by LIVY, of TARQUINIUS PRISCUS, and of SERVIUS TULLIUS, that before either of them was King, the one had his hat taken off, and carried up by an Eagle; the other had a flame reſting upon his Forehead, by which it was firmly believ'd, that each of them was deſign'd of the Gods to be King: yet was this never ſo underſtood by themſelves, or any other, as to exclude the right of popular Suffrage in their Election, by which PRISCUS reign'd; or to create an opinion that any man ought to be King of *Rome*, whom the People had not firſt commanded to reign over them, to whoſe Election therefore SERVIUS, tho' in poſſeſſion of the Throne, thought it his beſt way to refer himſelf. Far be it from me to compare Prodigies among Heathens, to Miracles in the Church: But each People had of each a like opinion. Both *Iſrael* and the *Heathens* began their popular Aſſemblies with Sacrifice. In order to the election of SOLOMON, the Repreſentative of *Iſrael* *ſacrific'd Sacrifices to the Lord*——*even a thouſand Bullocks, a thouſand Rams, and a thouſand Lambs, with their Drink-offerings, and Sacrifices in abundance, for all* Iſrael. And when they had thus done, what Magiſtrates ſoever the *Iſraelites*, or the *Heathens* elected, they always underſtood to be elected by God. *The Lot is caſt into the lap, but the whole diſpoſing thereof is of the Lord.* And indeed, whereas in this manner they made SOLOMON King, and ZADOC to be Prieſt, if we will hold otherwiſe, we muſt think that neither the King nor the Prieſt was elected by God. A man that is elected to ſome great Office, by a King rightly qualified, muſt have little Religion, or hold himſelf to be raiſed up by God. Why then ſhould it be otherwiſe, when a Magiſtrate is elected by a People rightly qualified? Or what conſequence is there in ſaying, that SAUL was anointed by SAMUEL before he was elected by the People, or that God rais'd them up Judges; therefore neither SAUL nor the Judges were elected by the People? That God elected the Kings in *Iſrael*, is certain; and that the People no leſs for that did alſo elect the Kings, is as certain. *One from among thy Brethren ſhalt thou* (that is, thou the People of *Iſrael*) *ſet King over thee.* That God rais'd up Judges in *Iſrael*, is certain; and that the People no leſs for that, did alſo elect the Judges, is as certain. When the Children of *Ammon* made War againſt *Iſrael*, Iſrael *aſſembl'd themſelves together, and incamp'd in* Mizpeh, *whence the Elders of* Gilead *went to fetch* JEPHTA *out of the Land of* Tob.— *Then* JEPHTA *went with the Elders of* Gilead, *and the People made him Head and Captain over them: and* JEPHTA *utter'd all his words before the Lord in* Mizpeh. But that SOLOMON was elected by the Lot, I do not affirm; it being moſt probable, that it was by Suffrage only, DAVID propoſing, and the People reſolving. Nor whether JEPHTA was elected by Suffrage, or by the Ballot, it is material; however that the ordinary Magiſtrates were elected by the Ballot, I little doubt.

Sect. 8. *That miraculous deſignation of Magiſtrates in a Common-wealth, was never underſtood to exclude the free Suffrage of the People in their Election.*

1 Chron. 29. 21, 22.

Prov. 10. 33.

Deut. 17. 15

Judg. 10. 17. Judg. 11. 5. 11.

THE ordinary Magiſtrates of this Common-wealth (as ſhall hereafter be more fully open'd) were the Sanhedrim, or the ſeventy Elders; and the inferior Courts or Judges, in the Gates of the Cities.

Sect. 9. *Election of Senators, and Judges of Inferior Courts.*

Book II. For the Inſtitution and Election of theſe, MOSES propos'd to the People, or the Congregation of the Lord, in this manner. *Take you*
Deut. 1. 13. *wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among your Tribes* (ϗ καταςήσω) *and I will make* (or conſtitute) *them Rulers over you.* Where, by the way, leſt MOSES in theſe words be thought to aſſume power, SOLON, ſays ARISTOTLE (δημοκρατίαν καταςῆσαι) made, or conſtituted the Popular Government of *Athens.* In which he implies, not that SOLON was a King, or had Sovereign Power, but that he was a Law-giver, and had Authority to propoſe to the People. Nor is there more in the words of MOSES; upon whoſe Propoſition, ſay *Jewiſh* Writers, each of the twelve Tribes, by free Suffrages, elected ſix Competitors, and wrote their Names in ſcrols, which they deliver'd to MOSES. MOSES having thus preſented to him by the twelve Tribes ſeventy and two Competitors for ſeventy Magiſtracies, had by conſequence two more Competitors than were capable of the Preferment to which they were elected by the People: Wherefore MOSES took two Urns, into the one he caſt the ſeventy two Names preſented by the People; into the other, ſeventy two Lots, whereof two were blanks, the reſt inſcrib'd with the word *Elder.* This done, he called the Competitors to the Urn, where the ſeventy, to whoſe Names came forth the Prizes, went up to the Tabernacle, the Seſſion-
See Number 11. 26. houſe being there provided: and the two that drew the blanks, namely ELDAD and MEDAD, tho' of them that were elected and written by the Tribes, *went not up to the Tabernacle, but remain'd in the Camp,* as not having attain'd to Magiſtracy. Thus, if this place in Scripture can admit of no other Interpretation, ſo much as I have cited out of the *Talmud* (tho' otherwiſe, for the moſt part, but a fabulous and indigeſted heap) muſt needs be good and valid. In this manner, one or more Senators happening to die, it was eaſy for each Tribe, chuſing one or more Competitors accordingly out of themſelves, to decide at the Urn which Competitor ſo choſen, ſhould be the Magiſtrate, without partiality, or cauſe of feud; which, if a man conſiders this Conſtitution, was not perhaps ſo readily to be done otherwiſe. The like, no doubt, was done for the inferior Courts, except that ſuch Elections (the Common-wealth being once ſettl'd) were more particular, and perform'd by that Tribe only in whoſe Gates that Court was ſitting.

Sect. 10. *The ſtory of the Sanhedrim, and of the inferior Courts, as to their firſt inſtitution.*

THE firſt inſtitution of theſe Courts came to paſs in the manner following. Before the People were under Orders, the whole Judicature lay upon the ſhoulders of MOSES, who being overburden'd, was adviſed by JETHRO. *And* MOSES *hearken'd to the voice of his Father-in-law---and choſe* (after the manner ſhewn) *able men out of all*
Exod. 18. 24, 25. Iſrael, *and made them Heads over the People, Rulers of thouſands, Rulers of hundreds, Rulers of fiftys, and Rulers of tens.* The number of which Rulers, compar'd with the number of the People, as in the muſter roll at *Sinai*, muſt in all have amounted to about ſix thouſand. Theſe thus inſtituted, while *Iſrael* was an Army, came to be the ſame when the Army was a Common-wealth: whereof it is ſaid,
Deut. 16. 18. *Judges and Officers ſhalt thou make thee in all thy Gates which the Lord thy God gives thee, throughout thy Tribes; and they ſhall judge the People with juſt Judgment.* Each of theſe Courts, by the practice of the *Jewiſh* Common-wealth, conſiſted of twenty three Elders. But JETHRO, in his advice to MOSES, adds concerning theſe Judicatories,

this

this Caution; *Let them judge the People at all ſeaſons: and it ſhall be, that every great matter they ſhall bring to thee, but every ſmall matter they ſhall judge:* So ſhall *it be eaſier for thy ſelf, and they ſhall bear the burden with thee.* Which nevertheleſs follow'd not according to JETHRO's promiſe, the Appeals being ſuch to MOSES that he goes with this complaint to God: *I am not able to bear all this People alone, becauſe it is too heavy for me.* Whereupon *the Lord ſaid to* MOSES, *Gather to me ſeventy men, of the Elders of* Iſrael, *whom thou knoweſt to be Elders of the People, and Officers over them; and bring them to the Tabernacle of the Congregation, that they may ſtand with thee*—(but Crowns will have no rivals) *and they ſhall bear the burden of the People with thee, that thou bear it not alone.* But a Monarch is one that muſt be alone. *And* MOSES *went out, and told the People the words of the Lord* (which a Monarch needed not to have done) *and gather'd the ſeventy men of the Elders of the People*; the manner whereof is already ſhewn. JETHRO, being a Heathen, informs MOSES of the Orders of his own Common-wealth, which alſo was *Heatheniſh.* Yet in Scripture is both JETHRO join'd with MOSES, and the Common-wealth of *Midian* with the Common-wealth of *Iſrael.* How then comes it to be irreverend, or atheiſtical, as ſome ſay, in Politicians (and while political Diſcourſes cannot otherwiſe be manag'd) to compare, tho' but by way of illuſtration, other Legiſlators, or Politicians, as LYCURGUS, SOLON, with MOSES; or other Common-wealths, as *Rome*, and *Venice*, with that of *Iſrael?* But the Authors of ſuch Objections had better have minded, that the burden whereof MOSES here complain'd, could in no manner be that of ordinary Judicature, of which he was eas'd before by the advice of JETHRO; and therefore muſt have been that of Appeals only: ſo either the Sanhedrim bore no burden at all with MOSES, or they bore that of Appeals with him. And if ſo, how ſay they that there lay an Appeal from the ſeventy Elders to MOSES?

Chap. 2.

Exod. 18. 22.

Numb. 11. 14. 16.

Ver. 24.

BUT I ſaid the Lot was of uſe alſo toward the diſcovery of conceal'd Malefactors. Of this we have an Example in the detection of ACHAN. The words of the Law, whereby the Fact of ACHAN was criminal, are theſe: *If thou ſhalt hear ſay in one of thy Cities, which the Lord thy God has given thee to dwell therein, ſaying, Certain men, the Children of* Belial, *are gone out from among you, and have withdrawn the Inhabitants of their City, ſaying, Let us go and ſerve other Gods, which you have not known: then ſhalt thou inquire, and make ſearch, and aſk diligently; and behold, if it be truth, and the thing certain, that ſuch Abomination is wrought among you, thou ſhalt ſurely ſmite the Inhabitants of that City with the edge of the Sword, deſtroying it utterly, and all that is therein, and the Cattle thereof with the edge of the Sword. And thou ſhalt gather all the ſpoil of it into the midſt of the ſtreet thereof, and ſhalt burn with fire the City, and all the ſpoil thereof, every whit, for the Lord thy God: and it ſhall be a heap for ever, and it ſhall not be built again, and there ſhall cleave nought of the accurs'd thing to thy hand.* Among the Cities that were given by God to *Iſrael*, was *Jericho.* Now tho' againſt this City, before it was taken, JOSHUA had ſolemnly and publickly denounc'd the *Anathema*, or Curſes contain'd in the foregoing Law; and after the taking of it, had, in all appearance, executed upon it the whole of the *Anathema* ſo pronounc'd: yet thro' ſubſequent loſſes before the City of *Ai*, being ſore afflicted, he enter'd into ſuſpicion, that there might have been ſome failure in the performance

Sect. 11. *Lot, Ordel, or Inquiſition by Lot.*

Deut. 13. 12, &c.

Joſh. 6. 17.

Book II. formance of the Law. Whereupon he *rent his Clothes, and fell to the Earth upon his face before the Ark of the Lord, till the even-tide, he and*
Joſh. 7. 6. *the Elders* (or Sanhedrim of *Iſrael*) *and put duſt on their heads.* The Sanhedrim, in difficult caſes of the Law, inquir'd of God by *Urim*; and the Sanhedrim, or the People, in caſes of high concernment to the State, as in the War againſt BENJAMIN, inquir'd of the Ark. When God was inquir'd of by *Urim*, he gave his Oracle by the ſhining of certain Stones or Jewels in the Breaſt-plate of the High Prieſt. When he was inquir'd of by the Ark, he gave his Oracle vocally from the Mercy ſeat, which was plac'd upon the Ark of the Covenant. Whence he who ſat between the Cherubims thus anſwer'd JOSHUA:
Joſh. 7. 10. *Get thee up; wherefore lieſt thou thus upon thy face?* Iſrael *has ſin'd—they have even taken of the accurs'd thing.* JOSHUA thus inform'd of the Crime, but not ſo particularly of the Malefactor as to know
Joſh. 7. 17. where to charge it, calls the whole People to the Urns; in one of which it may be thought that there were eleven white Stones, or Lots, with one black one; and in the other the twelve Names of the Tribes. So *Iſrael* coming firſt by Tribes to the Urns, the *Tribe of* JUDAH *was taken*; that is, this Tribe lighting upon the black Lot, was denoted for the Guilty Tribe: Which conſiſting (as appear'd by the Catalogue) of five Families, whereof the *Zarhites* were one, came next by Families to the Urn; wherein there might be four white Lots, and one black one, by which the *Zarhites* were taken. In like manner came the Family of the *Zarites* by Houſholds, and the Houſhold of ZABDI was taken: Laſt of all came the Houſhold of ZABDI man by man and ACHAN was taken. This kind of Inquiſition was perform'd with ſuch Religion and Solemnity, that a man thus taken, if he had any guilt, could have no face to conceal it; or, if there were any Witneſſes of his Crime, they could not any longer diſſemble it: and whether he were convicted by teſtimony, or by his own confeſſion (as now ACHAN) he was put to death. The like proceeding, in part,
1 Sam. 14. is imply'd to have been in caſe of JONATHAN; tho' in this, by agreement thereupon between SAUL and the People, it ſhould ſeem as if but two Lots were put into the Urn, whereof SAUL and JONATHAN, on the one part, drew the black: Or the Prince of the Tribe of JUDAH drawing for the whole People, on the other part, drew the white one; and that the ſame being put into the Urn again, to decide it between SAUL and JONATHAN, JONATHAN drew the black: whereupon, he being queſtion'd, confeſs'd the fact; and, but that the People reſcu'd him from SAUL, had been put to death.

Sect. 12. *Diſtribution of Lands, and Agrarian Laws in* Iſrael.

TO conclude with the uſe of the Lot, in the diviſion of the Land of *Canaan*. This (as implying the Foundation or Balance of the Government) ought to have been the firſt in order, but happens here to come laſt; becauſe theſe Orders were inſtituted in the Wilderneſs, and ſo before the People had any Lands to divide. Nevertheleſs, this alſo was propos'd by MOSES, and reſolv'd by the People: *By lot was their*
Joſh. 14. 2. *Inheritance, as the Lord commanded* MOSES; and now comes (as it was, or ſhould have been put in execution by JOSHUA) to be conſider'd.

IT may be true, that the *Roman* People were the wiſeſt that have been; and it is true, that they only of a People, did labour to introduce *Agrarian* Laws, tho' without effect: Otherwiſe, Levelling was never introduc'd, but by the Wiſdom and providence of ſome great Man,

as

as a MOSES, a JOSHUA or a LYCURGUS; or by ſome accident, or accidents, bringing a Nobility to ruin, as the Laws of HENRY VII. and the ways of HENRY VIII. in *England.* Chap. 2.

BETWEEN the Muſter Roll in *Sinai*, whereby the Men of military age, as was ſhewn, amounted to ſix hundred and three thouſand five hundred and fifty, in the twelve Tribes, and the Law for the diviſion of the Land of *Canaan*, there happen'd a Plague, by which the number of the People, upon a new Poll, came but to ſix hundred and one thouſand ſeven hundred and thirty. Upon this Poll was the Law made, which runs thus: *To theſe the Land ſhall be divided for an Inheritance, according to the number of names. To many thou ſhalt give the more Inheritance, and to fewer thou ſhalt give the leſs Inheritance: To every one ſhall his Inheritance be given, according to thoſe that were number'd of him. Notwithſtanding, the Land ſhall be divided by lot: according to the names of the Tribes of their Fathers, they ſhall inherit; according to the lot ſhall the poſſeſſion thereof be divided to many and few.* This Law, in another place, is repeated thus: *You ſhall divide the Land by lot, for an inheritance among your Families; and to many ye ſhall give the more Inheritance, and to the fewer ye ſhall give the leſs Inheritance: Every man's Inheritance ſhall be in the place where his Lot falls, according to the Tribes of your Fathers ye ſhall inherit.* Num. 1. 46. Num. 26. 51. V. 53, 54, 55, 56. Num. 33. 54.

IN the making of theſe Lots conſideration was as well had of the goodneſs of the Land, as of the meaſure. Now ſuppoſing this Law to have been in the whole and methodically executed, the *Canaanites* muſt firſt have been totally rooted out of the Land of *Canaan*; which Land, in that caſe (as ſome affirm) would have afforded to this Common-wealth a Root or Balance, conſiſting of *three millions of Acres.* Theſe, reckoning the whole People in the twelve Tribes, at ſix hundred and two thouſand (which is more than upon the later Poll they came to) would have afforded to every man four Acres; to every one of the Patriarchs (upon the poll of the foregoing Catalogue, where they are ſixty) four thouſand Acres; to every one of the Princes of the Tribes, fourteen thouſand Acres; to the *Levitical* Cities (being forty eight, each with its Suburbs, of four thouſand Cubits diameter) one hundred thouſand Acres; and yet for extraordinary Donations, as to JOSHUA and CALEB (of which kind there were but few) ſome eighty thouſand Acres might remain. Now it is true, four Acres to a man may ſeem but a ſmall Lot; yet the *Roman* People, under *Romulus*, and long after, had but two. And it may very well be, that one Acre in *Canaan* was worth two in *Italy*, eſpecially about *Rome*; and four in *England*, tho' of the beſt ſort: and if ſo it were that four Acres in *Paleſtine* were worth ſixteen of our beſt, ſuch a Lot, at our account, might be worth about thirty or forty pounds a year; which for a popular ſhare, holding that rate thro' the whole body of a People, was a large proportion. By this eſtimate, or what poſſibly could be allow'd to the Princes of the Tribes and of the Families, their ſhare came not to a ſixth of the whole: ſo the reſt remaining to the People, the Balance of this Government muſt have been purely popular. It is true that in the whole this Law of MOSES for the diviſion of the Land was never executed: but that in the parts ſome ſuch courſe was taken, is plain; for example, in the diviſion to ſeven Tribes, where JOSHUA propoſes to the People in this manner: *Give out from among you three men for each Tribe—and they ſhall go thro' the Land and deſcribe* Hecateus apud Joſeph. cont. Ap. Joſh. 18. 4.

Book II. *ſcribe it.* The People having reſolv'd accordingly, theſe *went, and paſs'd thro' the Land, and deſcrib'd it by Cities into ſeven parts in a Book, and came again to* JOSHUA *to the Hoſt at* Shiloh. And JOSHUA *caſt Lots for them in* Shiloh, *before the Lord: and there* JOSHUA *divided the Land to the Children of* Iſrael *according to their diviſions.* It were abſurd to think that this Lot determin'd of proportions; for ſo a mean man might have come to be richer than the Prince of his Tribe: but the proportions allotted to Tribes being ſtated, tho' at firſt but by gueſs, and enter'd into the Lot Book of the Surveyors (who, ſays JOSEPHUS, were moſt expert in Geometry) the Princes came firſt to the Urns, whereof the one contain'd the names of the Tribes that were to draw, the other the names of thoſe parcels of Land that were to be drawn firſt to a whole Tribe. Thus the name of a Tribe, for example BENJAMIN, being drawn out of one Urn, to that name a parcel was drawn out of the other Urn; for example, the Country lying between *Jericho* and *Bethaven.* This being done, and the Prince of the Tribe having choſen in what one place he would take his ſtated and agreed proportion, whether of fourteen thouſand Acres, or the like, the reſt of the Country was ſubdivided in the Lot Book, according to the number of Families in the Tribe of this Prince; and the Parcels ſubdivided being caſt into the one Urn, the names of the Patriarchs into the other, the ſame Tribe came again by Families. Thus every Patriarch making choice in what one part of this Lot he would take his agreed proportion, whether of four thouſand Acres, or the like: the remainder was again ſubdivided in the Lot Book, according to the number of names in his Family: if they were more than the parcel would furniſh at four Acres a man, then was that defect amended by addition out of the next parcel; and if they were fewer, then the overplus was caſt into the next parcel. By ſuch means the People came, or might have come in the whole, and in every part, to the Lot of their Inheritance; while every Tribe that was thus planted, became local, without removeal.

Num. 36. 3. *Neither ſhall the Inheritance remove from one Tribe to another Tribe; but every one of the Tribes of the Children of* Iſrael *ſhall keep himſelf to his own Inheritance.*

Sect. 13. THE Tribes thus planted, or to have been planted, were twelve.

The Portion of Levi. The thirteenth, or that of LEVI, came in the like manner to the Lot, for their forty eight Cities with their Suburbs, and receiv'd them accordingly; *as the Lot came forth for the Families of the* Kohathites, and the reſt. Theſe Iſrael *gave to the* Levites *out of their Inheritance:* That is, theſe were ſuch as the twelve Tribes, before the diviſion, ſet apart for the *Levites,* with the Tithes, and the Offerings; which, tho' this Tribe had no other Lands, made their Portion by far the beſt. The Tribes being henceforth reckon'd by their locality, and theſe forty eight Cities being ſcatter'd throughout the twelve Tribes, that of LEVI was no more computed as a diſtinct Tribe, but loſt as it were the name, yet with advantage: for to their promiſcuous abode they had the right of promiſcuous marriage, no more in this point being injoin'd any of them, than *to take Maidens of the ſeed of* Iſrael, or at leaſt *the Widows of Prieſts.* And as in the Tribes where they dwelt they had promiſcuous Marriage, ſo had they right of promiſcuous Election; that is, of electing, and being elected, into all the Magiſtracies and Offices of the Common-wealth: which they ſo frequently injoy'd, that the Sanhedrim is ſometimes underſtood by their

Joſh. 21. 4. 5, 6.
Num. 18. 20.
Deut. 10. 9.
Deut.. 18. 1.
Ezek. 44. 22.

names.

names. *If there ariſes a matter too hard for thee in judgment, thou ſhalt come to the Prieſts the Levites.* Between the Law, and the Religion of this Government, there was no difference; whence all Eccleſiaſtical perſons were alſo Political perſons, of which the *Levites* were an intire Tribe, ſet more peculiarly apart to God (the King of this Common-wealth) from all other cares, except that only of his Government. Thus MOSES did that with the ſafety of Liberty in *Iſrael*, which LYCURGUS could not do in *Lacedemon*, but by condemning the *Helots* to perpetual Slavery: For whereas without theſe to be Tillers of the Ground, the Citizens of *Lacedemon* could not be at leiſure for the Common-wealth; the Children of *Iſrael* might employ themſelves in their domeſtic Affairs, as they requir'd, with ſafety: while the *Levites* bore the burden of the Government; or, in caſe either their private Affairs permitted, or their Ambition prompted, were equally capable of Magiſtracy. Chap. 2. Deut. 17. 8.

OF the *Levitical* Cities, three beyond, and three on this ſide *Jordan*, were *Cities of Refuge*. If a man was ſlain, the next of kindred, by the Laws of *Iſrael*, was the Avenger of Blood; and to the Avenger of Blood it was lawful to ſlay him that ſlew his Kinſman, wherever he could find him, except only in a City of Refuge. For this cauſe, if a man had ſlain another, he fled immediately to one of theſe Sanctuaries; whence nevertheleſs, the Judges in the Gates, within whoſe proper verge the Crime was committed, caus'd the Malefactor to be brought before them by a Guard, and judg'd between the Slayer and the Avenger of Blood. If that which we call Murder, or Man-ſlaughter, was prov'd againſt him by two Witneſſes, he was put to death: but if it was found, as we ſay, Chance-medly, he was remanded with a Guard to the City of Refuge; whence if, before the Death of the High Prieſt, he was found wandring, it was lawful, not only for the Avenger of Blood, but for any man elſe to ſlay him. The High Prieſt being dead, he return'd, not home only, but to his Inheritance alſo, with liberty and ſafety. If a Prieſt had ſlain a man, his Refuge was the Sanctuary: whence nevertheleſs he was taken by the Sanhedrim; and, if upon trial he was found guilty of wilful Murder, put to death. *If a man comes preſumptuouſly upon his Neighbour to ſlay him with guile, thou ſhalt take him from my Altar, that he may die.* Sect. 14. *Cities of Refuge.* Num. 35. Exod. 21. 14.

INHERITANCES, being thus introduc'd by the Lot, were immovably intail'd on the Proprietors and their Heirs for ever, by the inſtitution of the Jubile, or the return of Lands, however ſold or engag'd, once in fifty years to the antient Proprietor, or his lawful Heir. Yet remain'd there two ways whereby Lots might be accumulated; the one by caſual Inheritance, the other by marriage with an Heireſs: as in the caſe of ZELOPHEDAD, or of his Daughters. Sect. 15. *The Jubile.* Num. 36.

NOW to bring the whole reſult of theſe hiſtorical parts, thus proved, to the true Political Method or Form, the Common-wealth inſtituted by MOSES was according to this Model. Sect. 16.

THE whole People of *Iſrael* (thro' a popular diſtribution of the Land of *Canaan* among themſelves by lot, and the fixation of ſuch a popular Balance by their *Agrarian* Law, or Jubile, intailing the inheritance of each Proprietor upon his Heirs for ever) was locally divided into twelve Tribes. *The Model of the Common-wealth of* Iſrael.

EVERY

Book II.

EVERY Tribe had a double capacity, the one Military, the other Civil.

A TRIBE, in its Military capacity, conſiſted of one Staff or Standard of the Camp, under the leading of its diſtinct and hereditary Prince, as Commander in chief; and of its Princes of Families or chief Fathers, as Captains of thouſands and Captains of hundreds.

A TRIBE, in its Political capacity, was next and immediately under the government of certain Judicatories, ſitting in the Gates of its Cities; each of which conſiſted of twenty three Elders, elected for life, by free ſuffrage.

THE Sovereign Power, and common Ligament of the twelve Tribes, was the Sanhedrim of *Iſrael*, and the *Eccleſia Dei*, or Congregation of the Lord.

THE Sanhedrim was a Senate, conſiſting of ſeventy Elders for life, ſo inſtituted by the free Election of ſix Competitors, in and by each Tribe; every Elder, or Senator of the Sanhedrim being taken out of this number of Competitors by the Lot.

THE Congregation of the Lord was a Repreſentative of the People of *Iſrael*, conſiſting of twenty four thouſand, for the term of one month; and perpetuated by the monthly Election of two thouſand Deputies of the People in each Tribe.

THE Sanhedrim, upon a Law made, was a ſtanding Judicatory of Appeal from the Courts in the Gates, throughout the Tribes; and upon a Law to be made, whatever was propos'd by the Sanhedrim, and reſolv'd in the affirmative by the Congregation of the Lord, was an Act of the Parliament of *Iſrael*.

Deut. 4. 5, 6.

OF this Frame ſays MOSES to the People (as well he might) *Behold, I have taught you Statutes and Judgments, even as the Lord my God commanded me, that ye ſhould do ſo in the Land whither you go to poſſeſs it. Keep therefore, and do them; for this is your Wiſdom, and your Underſtanding in the ſight of the Nations, which ſhall hear all theſe Statutes, and ſay, Surely this great Nation is a wiſe and underſtanding People.* In another place, upon the Peoples obſerving this form, he pronounces all the choiceſt Bleſſings; and in caſe of violation of the ſame, a long enumeration of moſt dreadful Curſes, among which he

Deut. 28. 36.

has this: *The Lord ſhall bring thee, and thy King which thou ſhalt ſet over thee, to a Nation which neither thou nor thy Fathers have known; and there ſhalt thou ſerve other Gods, Wood and Stone.* In which words, firſt he charges the King upon the People as a Creature of their own, and next oppoſes his Form point-blank to Monarchy; as is farther apparent in the whole Antitheſis running throughout that Chapter. To the neglect of theſe Orders may be apply'd thoſe words of DAVID: *I have ſaid that ye are Gods—but ye ſhall die like Men, and fall like one of the Princes.* But this Government can with no countenance of Reaſon, or teſtimony of Story, give any man ground to argue from the Frame thus inſtituted by MOSES, that a Common-wealth rightly order'd and eſtabliſh'd, may by any internal cauſe ariſing from ſuch Orders, be broken or diſſolv'd; it being moſt apparent, that this was never eſtabliſh'd in any ſuch part as could poſſibly be holding. MOSES dy'd in the Wilderneſs: and tho' JOSHUA, bringing the People into the promis'd Land, did what he could, during his Life, towards the eſtabliſhment of the Form deſign'd by MOSES; yet the hands of the People

People, ſpecially after the death of JOSHUA, grew ſlack, and they rooted not out the *Canaanites*, which they were ſo often commanded to do; and without which it was impoſſible their Common-wealth ſhould take any root. Nevertheleſs, ſettled as it could be, it was in ſome parts longer liv'd than any other Government has yet been; as having continu'd in ſome ſort from MOSES, to the diſperſion of the *Jews* in the Reign of the Emperor ADRIAN; being about one thouſand ſeven hundred years. But that it was never eſtabliſh'd according to the neceſſity of the Form, or the true intent of MOSES, is that which muſt be made farther apparent throughout the ſequel of the preſent Book; and firſt, in the ſtate of the *Iſraelites* under their Judges. Chap. 3.

CHAP. III.

Shewing the Anarchy, or State of the Iſraelites *under their Judges.*

THE Frame of that which I take to have been the ordinary Congregation or Repreſentative of the People of *Iſrael*, is not perfectly ſhewn in Scripture, till the time of DAVID; when, tho' it has nothing in it of a Monarchical Inſtitution, it is found intirely remaining, and perfectly deſcrib'd in theſe words: *Now the Children of* Iſrael *after their number, to wit, the chief Fathers, and Captains of thouſands and hundreds, and their Officers that ſerv'd the King in any matter of the Courſes, which came in, and went out month by month, throughout all the months in the year; of every Courſe were twenty and four thouſand men,* The Polls of the People, as they have been hitherto ſhewn, were taken before their Plantation in *Canaan*, where before they had Kings, they had grown (according to the account of PAUL) *four hundred and fifty years*; during which time, that they were exceedingly increas'd, appears by the Poll of Military age taken by DAVID, and amounting to one Million three hundred thouſand: yet could this Aſſembly of *the Children of* Iſrael *after their number*, in one year, by monthly rotation, take in the whole body of them. How theſe, being a Repreſentative of the People, and thus changeable, could be otherwiſe collected than by the monthly election of two thouſand in each Tribe, is not imaginable. And that both a Repreſentative of the People they were, and thus changeable, is by the clear words of Scripture, and the nature of the buſineſs upon which occaſion they are deſcrib'd, undeniably evinc'd: for DAVID propoſing, and the People reſolving, they make SOLOMON King, and ZADOC Prieſt. This Aſſembly (beſides the Military Diſcipline thereof, in which it differ'd little from the Cuſtoms of ſuch other Common-wealths as have been great and martial) had not only a Civil, but a Military Office or Function, as the ſtanding Guard or Army of this Country; which, tho' ſmall, and lying in the very Teeth of its Enemies, could thus, by taking in every man but for one month in a whole year, ſo equally diſtribute a Burden, to have been otherwiſe intolerable to all, that it might be born by a few, and ſcarce felt by any. This Epitome of that Body (already deſcrib'd under the leading of the ſeveral Princes of the Tribes, with their Staves, and Standards of the Camp) ſeems to have been commanded by Lieutenants of the Princes, or Tribunes of the reſpective Tribes:

Sect. 1. *A full Deſcription of the Repreſentative of the People of* Iſrael

1 Chron. 27.

Acts. 13. 20.

2 Sam. 24. 9.

1 Chr. 29 22.

Book II. For, *over the firſt courſe, for the firſt month, was* JASHOBEAM *the Son of* ZABDIEL (of the Children of PEREZ, or of the Family of the *Pharzites*, in the Catalogue of JUDAH) *and of his courſe were four and twenty thouſand.*

IN this caſe the Princes did not lead in perſon, but reſided in their Tribes for the Government of the ſame; whence, upon extraordinary occaſions, they ſent extraordinary Recruits: or in caſe of ſolemn War, or ſome weighty affair, as the trial of a Tribe or the like, led up in perſon, with their Staves and Standards; an Ordinance, whether we regard the military or civil uſe of it, never enough to be admir'd,

Sect. 2. *That this Repreſentative was us'd in the time of the Judges.*

IT is true, while, the whole People being an Army, MOSES could propoſe to them in body, or under their Staves and Standards of the Camp; as he needed not, ſo he us'd not any Repreſentative. But when JOSHUA *had let the People go, and the Childr en of* Iſrael *went every man to his Inheritance, to poſſeſs the Land*; how was it poſſible they ſhould poſſeſs any thing *(while the five Lords of the* Philiſtians, *and all the* Canaanites, *and the* Sidonians, *and the* Hivites, remain'd yet among them unconquer'd) without the wing of ſome ſuch Guard or Army as this, under which to ſhelter themſelves? How was it equal, or poſſible, that a few of the People upon the guard of the whole, ſhould be without relief, or ſuſtain all the burden? Or how could every man be ſaid to go *to his Inheritance to poſſeſs it*, unleſs they perform'd this or the like duty, by turns or courſes? Theſe things conſider'd, there is little doubt but this Congregation was, according to the Inſtitution of MOSES, put in practice by JOSHUA.

Judg. 2. 6.
Judg. 3. 3.

Sect. 3. *The Diſſolution of the Moſaical Common-wealth.*

THUS ſtood both the Sanhedrim, and the Congregation, with the inferior Courts, and all the Superſtructures of the *Moſaical* Common-wealth, during the life of JOSHUA, and the Elders of the Sanhedrim that outliv'd him; but without any ſufficient root for the poſſible ſupport of it (the *Canaanites* not being deſtroy'd) or with ſuch roots only as were full of worms. Wherefore, tho' *the People ſerv'd the Lord all the days of* JOSHUA, *and all the days of the Elders that outliv'd* JOSHUA; yet after the Death of theſe, they *did evil in the ſight of the Lord. And an Angel* (a Meſſenger or Prophet) *of the Lord came up from* Gilgal *to* Bochim, *and ſaid, I made you go up out of the Land of* Egypt, *and have brought you into the Land which I ſwore to your Fathers; and I ſaid, I will never break my Covenant with you. And ye ſhall make no League with the Inhabitants of this Land, ye ſhall throw down their Altars: but ye have not obey'd my Voice: Why have you done this? Wherefore I alſo ſaid, I will not drive them out from before you: but they ſhall be as Thorns in your ſides, and their Gods ſhall be a ſnare to you.* Upon the ſeveral Contents of which places, ſays JOSEPHUS, *The* Iſraelites (after the death of JOSHUA, and the Elders that outliv'd him) *neglecting their Arms, betook themſelves to Tillage; and effeminated with Peace, gave their minds rather to what was eaſy and pleaſing, than what was ſecure or honourable: forgetful of the Laws of God, and of their Diſcipline. Whereupon God being mov'd to anger, admoniſh'd them by a Prophet, that in ſparing the* Canaanites, *they had diſobey'd him; and that in caſe they perſiſted, for his Mercies neglected they ſhould taſt of his Juſtice. But they, tho' terrified with the Oracle, were altogether averſe to the War; both becauſe they were brib'd by the* Canaanites, *and thro' luxury were become unapt for labour: the form of their Common-wealth being now deprav'd, and the Ariſtocratical part thereof invalid; while neither the Senate was elected*

Judg. 2. 7. 11.
Judg. 2. 1. 2.
Deut. 7. 2.
ch. 12. 2.
Joſh. 23. 3.
Exod. 23. 33.
ch. 34. 12.
Antiq. l. 5. c. 2.

elected, nor the ſolemn Magiſtrates created as formerly. In which words, thenot electing of the Senate as formerly, being laid as a Crime by JOSEPHUS to the People; he is firſt clear enough, for his part, that the Senate was formerly elected by the People, and ought to have been ſo ſtill: And ſecondly, that henceforth the election of the Senate, or Sanhedrim, was neglected by the People. So this Common-wealth, which, thro' the not rooting out of the *Canaanites*, had never any Foundation, came now to fail alſo in her Super-ſtructures: for proof whereof, the Teſtimony of Scripture is no leſs pregnant in divers places. As where JUDAH *ſaid to* SIMEON *his Brother, Come up with me into my Lot, that we may fight againſt the* Canaanites, *and I likewiſe will go with thee into thy Lot: So* SIMEON *went with him.* In which words you have a League made by two Tribes, and a War manag'd by them, while other Tribes, that is, EPHRAIM, MANASSEH, with the reſt, ſat ſtill: whereas, if there had been now any common ligament, as while the Sanhedrim was in being, ſuch leaguing, and ſuch warring by particular Tribes at their own diſcretion, could not have been. Again, whereas to judge a Tribe pertain'd to the Sanhedrim; in the Judgment given againſt BENJAMIN, by the Congregation of four hundred thouſand, there is no mention of the Sanhedrim at all. Chap. 3. Judg. 1. 3, 27, 29, &c. Judg. 20.

NOW Government is of ſuch a nature, that where there is no Senate, there muſt be ſome King, or ſomewhat like a King, and ſuch was the Judge of *Iſrael*; yet is not their reckoning valid, who from hence compute the Monarchy of the *Hebrews*. Firſt, becauſe PAUL diſtinguiſhes between the Kings and the Judges. Secondly, becauſe GIDEON, when he was a Judge, in refuſing to be King, does the like. Thirdly, becauſe the Judges in *Iſrael* (as Dictators in other Common-wealths) were not of conſtant Election, but upon Emergencies only. Fourthly, becauſe complaint being made to the men of JUDAH of their Judge SAMSON, they deliver'd him to the *Philiſtines* bound; no leſs than did the *Romans* their Conſuls to the *Samnites*. And laſtly, becauſe SAMUEL, diſtinguiſhing to perfection between Dictatorian and Royal Power, or between the Magiſtracy of the Judge and of the King, ſhews plainly (in that he *hearken'd to the Voice of the People*) that the one being without any balance at all, was at the diſcretion of the People; and that the other (not to be founded but upon Property in himſelf, to which end he muſt *take the beſt of their Fields and give them to his Servants*) could no otherwiſe ſubſiſt than by having the People at the diſcretion of the King. This difference (being no ſmall one) excepted, the office of the King and of the Judge was much the ſame; each conſiſting in judging the People, and going forth with their Armies. Sect. 4. *No King, ſome Senate; no Senate, ſome King.* Calav. ap. Liv. Acts 13. Judg. 7. 23. Judg. 15. 13.

BUT whatever be the difference between theſe Magiſtracies, the State of the *Iſraelitiſh* Common-wealth under the Judges was both void of natural Super-ſtructures, and of the neceſſary Foundation; ſo the *Iſraelites*, when they were weak, ſerv'd the *Philiſtines*, as is imply'd in the ſpeech of the men of JUDAH to their Judge: *Knoweſt thou not that the* Philiſtines *are Rulers over us?—And it came to paſs when* Iſrael *was ſtrong, that they put the* Canaanites *to tribute, and did not utterly drive them out.* Which, as it was contrary to the Command of God, ſo was it point-blank againſt all Prudence; for thus neither made they to themſelves Friends, nor did they ruin their Enemies: which proceeding, as it far'd with Sect. 5. Beſognia vezzaro ſpegnere. Judg. 15. 11. Livy.

Book II. with this Common-wealth, and was obſerv'd by HERENNIUS in that of the *Samnites*, is the certain perdition of a People.

Sect. 6. *The Anarchy of* Iſrael.

OF the diſorder of this People upon the diſſolution of the Moſaical Common-wealth, it is often ſaid that *there was no King in* Iſrael: *every man did that which was right in his own eyes.* That is, at the times related to by theſe expreſſions, there was neither Sanhedrim, nor Judge in *Iſrael:* ſo every man, or at leaſt every Tribe govern'd it ſelf as it pleas'd. Which, nevertheleſs, is not ſo generally to be underſtood, but that the Tribes (without either Judge or Sanhedrim) marching up with their Standards and Staves of the Camp, not only aſſembl'd the Congregation in the uſual place at *Mizpeh*, but there condemn'd BENJAMIN for the rape of the *Levites* Concubine; and, marching thence to put their Decree in execution, reduc'd that obſtinate Tribe, or rather deſtroy'd it by a Civil War.

Judg. 17. 6. 18. 1. 19. 1. 21. 25. Judg. 20.

Sect. 7. *The riſe of the* Hebrew *Monarchy.*

WHEN in this, and divers other ways, they had pamper'd their Enemies, and exhauſted themſelves, they grew (as well they might) out of love with their Policy; eſpecially when after impious expoſtulation *(Wherefore has the Lord ſmitten us this day before the* Philiſtines?) they had, as it were, ſtak'd their God *(let us fetch the Ark—that it may ſave us)* and the Ark being taken by the Enemy, they fell to Idolatry. To this it happen'd, that tho' upon Repentance ſucceſs was better, God having miraculouſly diſcomfited the *Philiſtines* before them; yet SAMUEL their Judge was old, and had made his two Sons (being *takers of Bribes, and perverters of Juſtice)* Judges over *Iſrael.* Whereupon, there was no gainſaying, but a King they muſt and would have.

1 Sam. 4 3. 1 Sam. 7. 3.

CHAP. IV.

Shewing the State of the Iſraelites *under their Kings, to the Captivity.*

Sect. 1. *The Method of this part.*

FOR Method in this part, I ſhall firſt obſerve the Balance or Foundation, then the Super-ſtructures of the *Hebrew* Monarchies; and laſt of all, the Story of the *Hebrew* Kings.

Sect. 2. *The Balance of this Monarchy.*

THE Balance neceſſary to Kingly Government, even where it is regulated or not abſolute, is thus deſcrib'd by SAMUEL. *This will be the manner of the King that ſhall reign over you: He will take your Fields, your Vineyards, and your Oliveyards, even the beſt of them, and give them to his Servants.* That is, there being no proviſion of this kind for a King, and it being of natural neceſſity that a King muſt have ſuch an Ariſtocracy or Nobility as may be able to ſupport the Monarchy (which otherwiſe, to a People having equal ſhares in property, is altogether incompatible) it follows, that he muſt take your Fields, and give them to his Servants, or Creatures.

1 Sam. 8. 11, 14.

THIS notwithſtanding could not SAUL do, in whoſe time the Monarchy attain'd not to any balance, but was ſoon torn from him like the lap of a Garment. The Prince who gave that balance to this Monarchy, which it had, was DAVID: for beſides his other Conqueſts, by which he brought the *Moabites*, the *Syrians* of *Damaſcus*, the *Ammonites*, the *Amalekites*, the *Edomites*, to his Obedience, and extended his Border to the river *Euphrates*, *he ſmote the* Philiſtines, *and ſubdu'd them, and took* Gath *and her Towns, out of the hand of the* Philiſtines.

2 Sam. 8. 1. 1 Chron. 11.

liſtines. Now this Country which DAVID thus took, was part of the Land given to the People by God, and which was by the Law of MOSES to have been divided by Lot to them. Wherefore if this diviſion follow'd not, but DAVID having taken this Country, did hold it in his particular Dominion or property; then tho' he took not from the People any thing whereof they were in actual poſſeſſion, yet, as to their legal Right, took he from them (as SAMUEL had forewarn'd) *their Fields, their Vineyards, and their Oliveyards, even the beſt of them, and gave them to his Servants*, or to a Nobility, which by this means he introduc'd. Chap. 4.

THE firſt Order of the Nobility thus inſtituted, were, as they are term'd by our Tranſlators, DAVID's Worthies: to theſe may be added, the great Officers of his Realm and Court, with ſuch as ſprang out of both. But however, theſe things by advantage of foreign Conqueſt might be order'd by DAVID, or continu'd for the time of his next Succeſſor; certain it is, that the balance of Monarchy in ſo ſmall a Country muſt be altogether inſufficient to it ſelf, or deſtructive to the People. 2 Sam. 23. 1 Chron. 11.

THE Common-wealth of *Lacedemon*, being founded by LYCURGUS upon the like Lots with theſe deſign'd by MOSES, came, after the ſpoil of *Athens*, to be deſtroy'd by Purchaſers, and brought into one hundred hands; whereupon, the People being rooted out, there remain'd no more to the two Kings, who were wont to go out with great Armies, than one hundred Lords: nor any way, if they were invaded, to defend themſelves, but by Mercenaries, or making War upon the Penny; which, at the fartheſt it would go (not computing the difference in Diſcipline) reach'd not, in one third, thoſe Forces which the popular Balance could at any time have afforded without Money. This ſome of thoſe Kings perceiving, were of all others the moſt earneſt to return to the popular Balance. What Diſorders in a Country no bigger than was theirs, or this of the *Iſraelites*, muſt, in caſe the like courſe be not taken, of neceſſity follow, may be at large perus'd in the ſtory of *Lacedemon*; and ſhall be fully ſhewn, when I come to the ſtory of the preſent Kings. Sect. 3. *A Parallel of the Monarchical Balances in* Iſrael *and in* Lacedemon. Plutarch *in* Agis *and* Cleomenes.

FOR the Superſtructures of DAVID's Government, it has been ſhewn at large what the Congregation of *Iſrael* was; and that without the Congregation of *Iſrael*, and their Reſult, there was not any Law made by DAVID. The like in the whole, or for the moſt part, was obſerv'd till REHOBOAM, who, refuſing to redreſs the Grievances of the People, was depos'd by one part of this Congregation or Parliament, and ſet up by another; to the confuſion both of Parliament and People. And DAVID (as after him JEHOSHAPHAT) did reſtore the Sanhedrim; I will not affirm, by popular Election, after the antient manner. He might do it perhaps, as he made JOAB over the Hoſt, JEHOSHAPHAT Recorder, and SERAIAH Scribe. Certain it is, the *Jewiſh* Writers hold unanimouſly, that the ſeventy Elders were in DAVID's time, and by a good token; for they ſay, to him only of all the Kings it was lawful, or permitted, to enter into the Sanhedrim: which I the rather credit, for the words of DAVID, where he ſays, *I will praiſe the Lord with my whole Heart in the Council, and in the Congregation of the Upright*; which words relate to the Senate, and the Congregation of *Iſrael*. The final cauſe of the popular Congregation, in a Common-wealth, is to give ſuch a balance by their Sect. 4. *The Superſtructures of the* Hebrew *Monarchy.* 1 Sam. 8. 15. Pſal. 111. 1.

Book II. Reſult, as may, and muſt keep the Senate from that Faction and Corruption, whereof it is not otherwiſe curable, or to ſet it upright. Yet our Tranſlation gives the words cited, in this manner: *I will praiſe the Lord with my whole Heart in the Aſſembly of the Upright, and in the Congregation.* There are other Alluſions in the *Engliſh* Pſalms, of the like nature, ſhaded in like manner: As, *God is preſent in the Congregation of God* (that is, in the Repreſentative of the People of *Iſrael*) *he judges among the Gods*, that is, among the ſeventy Elders, or in the Sanhedrim. What the Orders of the *Iſraelitiſh* Monarchy in the time of DAVID were, tho' our Tranſlators throughout the Bible have done what they could againſt Popular Government, is clear enough in many ſuch places.

Pſal. 82. 1

Sect. 5. *The Story of the Hebrew Kings.*

TO conclude this Chapter with the ſtory of the *Hebrew* Kings: Till REHOBOAM, and the diviſion (thro' the cauſe mention'd) of the Congregation in his time, the Monarchy of the *Hebrews* was one, but came thenceforth to be torn into two: that of *Judah*, conſiſting of two Tribes, *Judah* and *Benjamin*; and that of *Iſrael*, conſiſting of the other ten. From which time this People, thus divided, had litt[illegible] or no reſt from the flame of that Civil War, which, once kindl'd betweeen the two Realms or Factions, could never be extinguiſh'd but in the deſtruction of both. Nor was Civil War of ſo new a date among them; SAUL, whoſe whole Reign was impotent and perverſe, being conquer'd by DAVID; and DAVID invaded by his Son ABSALOM ſo ſtrongly, that he fled before him. SOLOMON, the next Succeſſor, happen'd to have a quiet Reign, by ſettling himſelf upon his Throne in the death of ADONIJAH his elder Brother, and in the depoſing of the High Prieſt ABIATHAR; yet made he the yoke of the People grievous. After him, we have the War between JEROBOAM and REHOBOAM. Then, the Conſpiracy of BAASHA againſt NADAB King of *Iſrael*, which ends in the deſtruction of JEROBOAM's Houſe, and the Uſurpation of his Throne by BAASHA, which BAASHA happens to leave to his Son ASA. Againſt ASA riſes ZIMRI, Captain of the Chariots; kills him with all his kindred, reigns ſeven days; at the end whereof he burns himſelf for fear of OMRI, who upon this occaſion is made Captain by one part of the People, as is alſo TIBNI by another. The next Prize is paid between OMRI and TIBNI, and their Factions; in which TIBNI is ſlain. Upon this ſucceſs, OMRI outdoing all his Predeceſſors in Tyranny, leaves his Throne and Virtues to his Son AHAB. Againſt AHAB drives JEHU furiouſly, deſtroys him and his Family, gives the fleſh of his Queen JEZEBEL to the Dogs, and receives a Preſent from thoſe of *Samaria*, even ſeventy heads of his Maſters Sons in Baskets. To ASA and JEHOSHAPHAT, Kings of *Judah*, belongs much Reverence. But upon this Throne ſat ATHALIAH; who, to reign, murder'd all her Grand-children except one, which was JOASH. JOASH being hid by the High Prieſt, at whoſe command ATHALIAH was ſome time after ſlain, ends his Reign in being murder'd by his Servants. To him ſucceeds his Son AMAZIA, ſlain alſo by his Servants. About the ſame time ZACHARIAH King of *Iſrael* was ſmitten by SHALLUM, who reign'd in his ſtead: SHALLUM by MANAHIM, who reign'd in his ſtead: PEKAHA the Son of MANAHIM by PEKAH one of his Captains, who reign'd in his ſtead: PEKAH by

by HOSHEA. HOSHEA having reign'd nine years, is carry'd by SALMANAZZER King of *Aſſyria* with the ten Tribes into Captivity. Now might it be expected that the Kingdom of *Judah* ſhould enjoy Peace: a good King they had, which was HEZEKIAH; but to him ſucceeded his Son MANASSEH, a ſhedder of innocent Blood. To MANASSEH ſucceeded his Son AMMON, ſlain by his Servants. JOSIAH the next, being a good Prince, is ſucceeded by JEHOAHAZ, who being carry'd into *Egypt*, there dies a Priſoner, while JEHOIAKIM his Brother becomes PHARAOH's Tributary. The laſt of theſe Princes was ZEDEKIAH, in whoſe Reign was *Judah* led away captive by NEBUCHADNEZZAR. Thus came the whole Enumeration of thoſe dreadful Curſes denounc'd by MOSES in this caſe, to be fulfil'd in this People; of whom it is alſo ſaid, *I gave them a King in my anger, and took him away in my wrath.* Chap. 4. Deut. 28. Hoſ. 13. 11.

TO conclude this Story with the Reſemblances or Differences that are between Monarchical and Popular Government: What Parallel can there be beyond the Stories whereby each of them are ſo largely deſcrib'd in Scripture? True it is, that AHIMELEC uſurp'd the Magiſtracy of Judge in *Iſrael*, or made himſelf King by the men of *Sichem*; that the men of *Ephraim* fought againſt JEPTHA, and that there was a Civil War caus'd by *Benjamin:* yet, in a Popular Government, the very womb (as they will have it) of tumult, tho' never ſo well founded that it could be ſteady, or take any ſufficient root, can I find no more of this kind.

Sect. 6. *A Parallel of the Tribunitian Storms with thoſe in the Hebrew Monarchies.*

BUT the Tribunes of the People in *Rome*, or the *Romans* under the Magiſtracy of their Tribunes, throughout the whole Adminiſtration of that Government, were never quiet; but at perpetual ſtrife and enmity with the Senate. It is very true; but firſt, this happen'd not from a Cauſe natural to a popular Government, but from a Cauſe unnatural to Popular Government; yea, ſo unnatural to Popular Government, that the like has not been found in any other Common-wealth. Secondly, the Cauſe is undeniably diſcover'd to have conſiſted in a Faction introduc'd by the Kings, and foſter'd by the Nobility, excluding the Suffrage of the main body of the People thro' an Optimacy, or certain rank or number admitted not by the People or their Election, but by the value of their Eſtates, to the Legiſlative Power, as the Commons of that Nation. So the State of this People was as if they had two Houſes of Lords, and no Houſe of Commons. Thirdly, this danger muſt have been in any other Nation, at leaſt in ours, much harder to be incur'd, than Authors hitherto have made it to be ſeen in this. And laſt of all, this Enmity, or theſe Factions, were without Blood, which in Monarchies they are not, as you ſaw well in thoſe mention'd; and this Nation in the Baron's Wars, and in thoſe of *York* and *Lancaſter*, beſides others, has felt. Or, if at length they came indeed to Blood, this was not till the Foundations were deſtroy'd, that is, till the Balance of Popular Government in *Rome* was totally ruin'd; which is equally in caſes of the like nature unavoidable, be the Government of what kind ſoever, as of late years we have been ſufficiently inform'd by our own ſad Experience.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Shewing the State of the Jews *in the Captivity, and after their return out of it; with the Frame of the* Jewiſh *Common-wealth.*

Sect. 1. *The State of the* Iſraelites *in Captivity*

WE left the Children of *Iſrael* upon a ſad march, even into Captivity. What Orders had been antiently obſerv'd by them during the time they were in *Egypt* (one of which, as has been already ſhewn, was their ſeventy Elders) the ſame, ſo far as would be permitted by the Princes whoſe Servants they were, continu'd in practice with them during the time of their Captivity, out of which the ten Tribes never more return'd. The two Tribes, *when ſeventy years were accompliſh'd* from the time that they were carry'd away by NEBUCHADNEZZAR, and *in the firſt year of* CYRUS *King of* Perſia, return'd the beſt part of them, not only with the King's leave and liking, but with reſtitution of the Plate and Veſſels belonging to the Temple.

Jer. 25. 12. 2 Chr. 36. 22. Ezra 1.

Sect. 2. *The Balance of the Common-wealth reſtor-ed by* Zorobabel. Ezra 2. Ezra 8.

THE firſt Colony (as I may ſay) of the two Tribes, or thoſe that return'd under the Conduct of ZOROBABEL Prince of *Judah*, amounted to forty two thouſand three hundred and threeſcore, among which there were about one hundred Patriarchs or Princes of Families. To theſe, in the reign of ARTAXERXES, came ſixteen or twenty Princes more with their Families; among whom the Prophets HAGGAI, ZACHARIAS, and MALACHI were eminent. Some of them *could not ſhew their Father's Houſe and their Seed, whether they were of* Iſrael. But theſe were few; for it is ſaid of them in general, That *they went every one to his own City*, or to the Inheritance of his Fathers: In which you may note the reſtitution of the Balance of the *Moſaical* Common-wealth; tho' to what this might come without fixation, the Jubile being not after the Captivity in uſe, I cannot ſay. However, for the preſent, plain it is that the antient Super-ſtructures did alſo enſue: as in order to the putting away of the ſtrange Wives, which the People in Captivity had taken, is apparent.

Ezra 2. 59.

Sect. 3. *The Super-ſtructures of this Common-wealth in the time of* Ezra *and* Nehemia.

THEIR whole progreſs hitherto is according to the Law of MOSES; they return every man to his Inheritance by direction of his Pedegree, or according to the Houſe of his Fathers; they are led by Princes of their Families, and are about to put away ſtrange Wives: for what reaſon then ſhould a man believe that what follows ſhould not be according to the Orders of the ſame Law-giver? Now that which follows, in order to the putting away of theſe foreign Wives, is, *Proclamation was made throughout* Judah *and* Jeruſalem *to all the Children of the Captivity, that they ſhould gather themſelves to* Jeruſalem; *and that whoſoever would not come within three days, according to the council of the Princes and Elders, all his Subſtance ſhould be forfeited, and himſelf ſeparated from the Congregation of thoſe that had been carried away.* This plainly, by the penalty annex'd, is a Law for Baniſhment; of which kind there was none made by MOSES; and a Law made by the Princes and the Elders. What doubt then can remain, but theſe Elders were the Sanhedrim, or ſeventy Elders? But whereas neither the Sanhedrim, nor any other Senate of it ſelf has been found to make Laws, what others can theſe Princes be that are join'd with the Elders, than

Ezra 10. 8, 9.

thoſe

thoſe ſpoken of before; that is, the Princes of Families, or the chief Fathers in the Congregation of them that had been carried away? So the Princes and the Elders in this place may be underſtood of the Sanhedrim and the People: for thus DAVID propoſes to the Congregation of the People of *Iſrael, or the chief Fathers*, and muſt be underſtood of them; becauſe there is no ſuch thing throughout the Scripture to be found, as a Law made by the Sanhedrim without the People: and if ſo, then that the Sanhedrim with the People had power to make a Law, is by this place of Scripture undeniably evinc'd. But beſides the chief Fathers, which here are call'd *Rulers of the Congregation*, and in the time of DAVID were call'd *Captains of thouſands and Captains of hundreds*, mention is alſo made of the *Elders of every City, and the Judges thereof*; in which words you have the Judges in the Gates throughout the Tribes of *Iſrael*, as they were inſtituted by MOSES. All which particulars being rightly ſum'd up, come to this total; that the Common-wealth reſtor'd by EZRA, was the very ſame that originally was inſtituted by MOSES.

Chap. 5.

1 Chr. 27. 1.

Ezra. 10. 14.

SUCH was the Government reſtor'd by ZOROBABEL, EZRA, and NEHEMIA. Now whether the *Jewiſh* or Cabaliſtical Common-wealth, father'd by the Preſbyterian *Jews* of latter ages upon MOSES or EZRA, be the ſame, ſhall be ſhewn by reducing the invention of theſe Men to three heads: as firſt, their *Cabala*; ſecondly, their *Ordination*; and laſt of all, their great *Synagogue*.

Sect. 4. *A Tranſition to the* Cabaliſtical *or* Jewiſh *Common-wealth.*

THE *Cabala*, call'd alſo by the *Jews* the Oral Law, conſiſts of certain traditions by them pretended at the inſtitution of the Sanhedrim to have been verbally deliver'd to the ſeventy Elders by MOSES for the Government of the Common-wealth. Theſe were never written till after the diſperſion of the *Jews* by the Emperor ADRIAN; when, to ſave them from being loſt, they were digeſted into thoſe Volumes call'd the *Talmud*: which they hold to be, and indeed are as to matter of Fact, the authentic Records of their Government. Of the Traditions thus recorded ſays one of the *Rabbins* or *Jewiſh* Doctors: *Think not that the written Law* (or the Law of MOSES) *is fundamental, but that the Oral or Traditional Law is fundamental, it being upon this that God enter'd into a League with the* Iſraelites, *as it is written: After the tenour of theſe words, I have made a Covenant with thee, and with* Iſrael. *A man* (ſays another) *who returns from the ſtudy of the* Talmud *to the ſtudy of the* Bible, *can have no quiet conſcience, neither was there any peace to him that went out or came in.* The like whereof is the Talmudical way of applying Scripture throughout. And it was the common Bleſſing the *Phariſees* gave their Children: *My ſon, hearken to the words of a Scribe or Doctor, rather than to the Law of* MOSES. To whom ſays CHRIST hereupon, *You have made the Commandment of God of no effect by your tradition.*

Sect. 5. *The* Cabala.

Rabbi Corbulenſis.

Exod. 34. 27.

In codice juris Chagiga.

Zach. 8. 10.

Mat. 15. 6.

Now as true as the *Talmud*, or as this word of a Scribe, or that MOSES deliver'd the Oral Law to the ſeventy Elders and to JOSHUA, ſo true it is that MOSES ordain'd both the ſeventy Elders and JOSHUA by the impoſition of Hands; and that this Ordination by the impoſition of Hands, together with the Oral Law, came ſucceſſively, and hand in hand from the ſeventy Elders, and from JOSHUA downright to theſe Doctors. This indeed is ſo generally affirm'd by their *Talmudiſts*, that there is no denying of it; but, that as to the ſeventy Elders it is quite contrary to Scripture, has already been

Sect. 6. *Ordination by Impoſition of Hands.*

Book II. made ſufficiently apparent; for JOSHUA is acknowledged to have been ordain'd by MOSES with Impoſition of hands. But this Argument (beſides that the Act of MOSES was accompanied with a miracle, and that it is abſurd to think that a thing plainly miraculous ſhould or can be receiv'd as an Order in a Common-wealth) will go no farther than that JOSHUA, upon this Authority, might have elected his Succeſſor by impoſition of hands. Let them ſhew us then that he did ſo, or indeed that he left any Succeſſor at all; for certainly if JOSHUA left no Succeſſor ſo ordain'd, or no Succeſſor at all (which is the truth of the caſe) then deſcended there upon them no ſuch Ordination from JOSHUA; and ſo by conſequence none from MOSES. Whence it follows, that the Authority and Vogue of Ordination by the impoſition of hands among the *Jews* proceeds not from the Law of MOSES, but from the Oral Law; which how bad an Authority ſoever it be to us of right, is of fact, or of what the exerciſe of Ordination was among the *Jews*, a good and ſufficient teſtimony. Now thereby the condition of this Ordination (tho' in ſome times of the Common-wealth it was leſs reſtrain'd) was ſuch, that no man not having receiv'd the ſame from the great Sanhedrim, or ſome one of the inferior Courts by laying on of hands, by word of mouth, or by writing, could be a Preſbyter, or capable of any Judicature or Magiſtracy in the Common-wealth, or to give Counſil in the Law, or any part of the Law, or to be of the Aſſembly of the great Synagogue.

Sect. 7. *The great Synagogue.*

WHAT the Aſſembly of the Princes and Fathers was in the time of EZRA, has been ſhewn, and is left to the Judgment of others. But this is that which the *Talmudiſts* and their Anceſtors the Cabaliſtical *Jews* (among which the *Phariſees* were of the higheſt rank) unanimouſly affirm to have conſiſted of the ſeventy Elders, and of a Juncta of fifty Preſbyters not elected by the People; but by the laying on of hands by the Sanhedrim, or by ſome other Judicatory. This, they ſay, was the inſtitution of their great *Synagogue*, where I leave them: but that, according to the ſenſe wherein they cite their Authorities, the like with them was a conſtant practice, appears not only by their own Teſtimony and Records, but is plain in Scripture; as where CHRIST ſpeaks of the *Jews* to his Apoſtles in this manner, *They will ſcourge you in their Synagogues*: that is, the *Jews*, having as yet no Law made whereby they can invade the Liberty of Conſcience, or bring you for the practice thereof to puniſhment, will call their great Synagogue, wherein the Prieſts and the *Phariſees*, or the Sanhedrim, have at leaſt ſeven to five the over balancing Vote over the reſt. Which alſo are their Creatures, and by theſe will eaſily carry, or make ſuch Laws whereby they may inflict upon you corporal Puniſhment: which Interpretation of Chriſt's words, was fulfil'd even to a tittle, or rather with over meaſure. For upon this occaſion the High Prieſt, and *as many as were of the kindred of the High Prieſt, were gather'd together at* Jeruſalem. That this ſame Juncta, to be in this caſe added to the Sanhedrim, was to conſiſt but of fifty, thoſe fifty not elected by the People, but choſen by the Elders of the Sanhedrim; and not out of the body of the People, but out of ſuch only as had receiv'd Ordination by the Sanhedrim, or by ſome other Court, or indeed were actually Judges in ſome other Court, was not enough, unleſs they might conſiſt alſo of *as many as were of the kindred of the High Prieſt*. Which Rights and Privi-

Grot. ad Mat. 10. 17.

Acts 4. 6.

Acts 5. 21.

Privileges being all obſerv'd, *The High Prieſt came, and they that were with him, and call'd the Sanhedrim, and all the Presbytery of the Children of* Iſrael: that is, ſo many of them, as being aſſembl'd in the great Synagogue, repreſented *all the Presbytery of the Children of* Iſrael, or all the Children of *Iſrael* themſelves. In this Aſſembly you have the full deſcription of the great Synagogue: and *when* (in this Synagogue) *they had beaten* the Apoſtles PETER and JOHN, *they commanded them that they ſhould not ſpeak in the Name of* JESUS, *and let them go.* Upon theſe proceedings there are Conſiderations of good importance; as firſt, That the Cabaliſtical Doctors themſelves did never ſo much as imagine that MOSES had endu'd the Sanhedrim alone, or ſeparately conſider'd from the People, with any Legiſlative Power; nevertheleſs, that the Sanhedrim came into the place, and ſucceeded to the whole Power of MOSES, they unanimouſly held: whence, even upon their Principles, it muſt follow that in MOSES, diſtinctly and ſeparately taken from the People, there could be no Power of making any Law. The ſecond thing remarkable in this proceeding, is, That the moſt corrupt Common-wealth, and in her moſt corrupt Age, had not yet the face, without ſome blind, of pretending to Legiſlative Power in a ſingle Council. The laſt I ſhall obſerve, is, That no poſſible ſecurity is to be given to liberty of Conſcience, but in the ſecurity of Civil Liberty, and in that only not by Laws which are otherwiſe as periſhing as flowers or fruits, but in the roots or fundamental orders of the Government. What even in theſe times muſt have follow'd, as to the liberty of Conſcience, had there been an equal Repreſentative of the People, is apparent, in that the Captain and the Officers, employ'd by this Synagogue to apprehend the Apoſtles, *brought them without violence; for they fear'd the People, leſt they ſhould have been ſton'd.* It is true, there is nothing with us more cuſtomary, even in the ſolemneſt places, and upon the ſolemneſt occaſions, than to upbraid the People with giddineſs from the *Hoſanna* and the *Crucifige* of the *Jews.* What may be charg'd upon a multitude not under orders, the fouler Crime it be, is the fairer Argument for ſuch Orders, as where they have been once eſtabliſh'd, the People have not been guilty of ſuch Crimes; at leaſt, it ſhould ſeem, that in this caſe there is great ſcarcity of Witneſſes againſt them, ſeeing the Death of SOCRATES is more laid to one People, than that of all the Martyrs to Kings: yet were the falſe Witneſſes by whom SOCRATES ſuffer'd (and by the like whereto a man in the beſt Government may chance to ſuffer) no ſooner diſcover'd, than they were deſtroy'd by the People, who alſo erected a Statue to SOCRATES. And the People who, at the Arraignment of CHRIST, cry'd, *Crucify him, crucify him,* were ſuch as the chief Prieſts mov'd or prompted, and ſuch alſo as *fear'd the multitude.* Now that the People which could be prompted by the chief Prieſts, or the People which could fear the People, could be no other than this pretended Repreſentative of the People, but indeed a Juncta of Couſins and Retainers, is that which, for ought I know, may be poſſible; and the rather, for what happen'd before upon the Law call'd among the *Jews, The Law of the Zealot,* which was inſtituted by MOSES in theſe words: *If thy Brother, the Son of thy Mother—intice thee, ſaying, Let us go and ſerve other Gods—thy hand ſhall be firſt upon him to put him to death—and afterwards the hand of all the People.* By this Law it is plain that, as to the true intent thereof, it relates to no other caſe than that only of Idolatry. The execution

Chap. 5.

Act. 5. 40.

Acts 5. 26.

Mark 15. 11.

Mat. 21.

Deut. 13. 6.

Book II. execution of the ſame, according to the *Talmud*, might be perform'd by any number of the People, being not under ten, either apprehending the Party in the Fact, or upon the Teſtimony of ſuch Witneſſes as had ſo apprehended him: yet will it not be found to have been executed by the People, but upon inſtigation of the Prieſt, as where (they interpreting the Law as they liſt) STEPHEN is ſton'd. Now if the Prieſts could have made the People do as much againſt CHRIST, what needed they have gone to PILAT for help? and if they could not, why ſhould we think that the multitude which cry'd out, *Crucify him, crucify him*, ſhould be any other than the great Synagogue?

HOWEVER, that it was an Oligarchy, conſiſting of a Senate and a Presbytery, which not only ſcourg'd the Apoſtles, but caus'd CHRIST to be crucify'd, is certain. And ſo much for the great Synagogue.

Sect. 8. *The Model of the* Jewiſh *Common-wealth.*

THESE parts being hiſtorically laid down and prov'd, it follows that the Cabaliſtical or *Jewiſh* Common-wealth was much after this Model.

BE the capacity of bearing Magiſtracy, or giving Council upon the Law or any part of the Law of this Common-wealth, in no other than ſuch only as are Presbyters.

BE Presbyters of two ſorts: the one general, the other particular.

BE Presbyters general ordain'd by the laying on of hands of the Prince of the Sanhedrim with the reſt of the Elders, or Presbytery of the ſame, and by no other Court without a Licence from the Prince of the Sanhedrim; and be thoſe ordain'd in this manner eligible by the major vote of the ſeventy Elders into the Sanhedrim, or into any other Court by the major vote of the Elders or Presbytery of that Court.

BE Presbyters particular ordain'd by any Court of Juſtice; and be theſe capable of giving Counſil in the Law, or in ſome particular part of the Law, according to the gift that is in them by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery.

BE all Presbyters capable of nomination to the great Synagogue.

BE the Sanhedrim in Law made the ſupreme Magiſtracy or Judicatory; and with a Juncta of fifty Presbyters of their Nomination, the great Synagogue.

BE the great Synagogue the Legiſlative Power in this Common-wealth.

SUCH was the Government, where the word of a Scribe or Doctor was avowedly held to be of more validity than the Scripture; and where the uſual appellation of the People, by the Doctors and *Phariſees*, was *(populus terræ)* the Raſcally Rabble.

Regis ad exemplum totus componitur orbis.

Sect. 9. *Ordination in the leſſer Synagogue.*

THERE were other Synagogues for other uſes, as thoſe wherein the Law was read every Sabbath-day; each of which alſo had her Ruler and her Presbytery, with power to ordain others to this Capacity.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Shewing how Ordination was brought into the Chriſtian *Church, and the divers ways of the ſame that were at divers times in uſe with the Apoſtles.*

Sect. 1. *The form introduc'd by Chriſt into his Church.* Matth. 19. 28.

WE do not find that CHRIST (who gave little countenance to the *Jewiſh* Traditions) ordain'd his Apoſtles or Diſciples by the impoſition of hands: his Apoſtles were twelve, whom he compares to the twelve Princes of the Tribes of *Iſrael*; and his Diſciples were ſeventy, in which number it is receiv'd by Divines, that he alluded to the ſeventy Elders or Sanhedrim of *Iſrael*. So thus far the Government of the Church, inſtituted by CHRIST, was according to the form inſtituted by MOSES. But CHRIST in this form was King and Prieſt, not after the inſtitution of MOSES, who ſeparated the *Levites* to the Prieſt-hood; but as before MOSES, when the Royal and Prieſtly Function were not ſeparated, and after the order or manner of MELCHISEDEC, who came not to the Prieſt-hood by proving his Pedigree, as the High Prieſt in *Iſrael* by Father, or as the King Prieſt in *Athens* by Mother, but without Father and Mother. Or be what has been ſaid of MELCHISEDEC approv'd or rejected, ſuch for the reſt, as has been ſhewn, was the form introduc'd by CHRIST into his Church.

Vid. Grotium, & videat Grotius, in Epiſt. ad Hebræos.

Sect. 2. *The firſt way of Ordination.* Acts 1.

CHRIST being taken up into Heaven, his Diſciples or Followers in *Jeruſalem* increas'd to about one hundred and twenty names; and the Apoſtles decreas'd by one, or by JUDAS, who *was gone to his place*. PETER, whether upon the Council or Determination of the eleven Apoſtles (as is moſt probable) before-hand or otherwiſe, ſtood up and ſpoke both to the Apoſtles and Diſciples aſſembl'd upon this occaſion, That *one* out of the preſent Aſſembly might be *ordain'd* an Apoſtle: *and they* (that is, the Congregation, or why was this propos'd to them?) *appointed two* by Suffrage; for how otherwiſe can an Aſſembly appoint? Theſe were BARSABAS and MATTHIAS, which Names, being written in ſcrols, were caſt into one Urn; two Lots, whereof one was a blank, and the other inſcrib'd with the word *Apoſtle*, being at the ſame time caſt into another Urn. Which done, they pray'd that God would ſhew which of the Competitors by them ſo made, he had choſen: when they had thus pray'd, *they gave forth their Lots*, that is, a ſcrol out of the one Urn, and then a name to that ſcrol out of the other Urn; and *the Lot fell upon* MATTHIAS, or MATTHIAS was taken; whereupon MATTHIAS was *number'd*, or rather decreed *with the eleven Apoſtles*. For * *Pſephiſma*, being a word which properly derives from ſuch Stones or Pebbles, as popular Aſſemblies of old were wont to ballot with or give ſuffrage by, not only ſignifies a Decree, but eſpecially ſuch a Decree as is made by a popular Aſſembly. Now if this was Ordination in the Chriſtian Church, and of Apoſtolical Right, then may there be a way of Ordination in the Chriſtian Church, and of Apoſtolical Right, exactly conformable to the Ballot, or way us'd by MOSES in the inſtitution of the ſeventy Elders or Sanhedrim of *Iſrael*.

* Συγκαταψηφισθη. Septuag. verſion.

Book II.

Sect. 3. *The ſecond way of Ordination.*

AFTER the converſion of ſome thouſands more, moſt, if not all, of which were *Jews*, a People tho' converted, yet ſo tenacious of their Laws and Cuſtoms, that even Circumciſion (hitherto not forbidden by the Apoſtles) was continu'd among them; *the twelve Apoſtles call'd the multitude of Diſciples to them.* So MOSES, when he had any thing to propoſe, aſſembl'd the People of *Iſrael.* And when the twelve had thus call'd the Diſciples, *they ſaid, Look ye out among you ſeven men of honeſt report, full of the Holy Ghoſt and Wiſdom, whom we may appoint over this buſineſs.* So MOSES ſaid to the Congregation of *Iſrael, Take ye wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among your Tribes, and I will make them Rulers over you.* And the ſaying of the Apoſtles pleas'd the whole multitude. So the People of *Iſrael* were wont to anſwer to MOSES, *The thing which thou ſayeſt is good for us to do.* This ſaying of ths Apoſtles being thought good by the whole multitude, the whole multitude elected ſeven men *whom they ſet before the Apoſtles: and when they had pray'd, they laid their hands on them.* To ſay in this place (as they do) that the Act of the People was but a Preſentation, and that the Apoſtles had power to admit or refuſe the Perſons ſo preſented, is as if one ſhould ſay, That the act of electing Parliament-men by the People of *England*, was but a Preſentation, and that the King had power to admit or refuſe the Perſons ſo preſented. And ſeeing the *Deacons* henceforth had charge of the Word, to ſay, that by this choice the Deacons receiv'd not the charge of the Word, but the care to ſerve Tables, is as if one ſhould ſay, That Parliament-men by their Election receiv'd only the care to levy Money or Proviſion for the King's Table; but if upon ſuch Election they debated alſo concerning Laws, that Power they receiv'd from the King only.

Acts 4. 4.

Acts 6.

BUT if this was a way of Ordination in the Chriſtian Church, and of Apoſtolical Right, then there may be a way of Ordination in the Chriſtian Church, and of Apoſtolical Right, conſiſting in part of the Orders of the *Iſraelitiſh* Common-wealth, and in part of the Orders of the *Jewiſh* Common-wealth.

Sect. 4. *the third way of Ordination.*

LASTLY, PAUL writing to TIMOTHY concerning his Ordination, has in one place this expreſſion, *Neglect not the Gift that is in thee, which was given thee by propheſy, with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery.* So the Preſbytery of a *Jewiſh* Synagogue laid their hands on the Party ordain'd. And in another place he has this expreſſion: *Stir up the Gift of God which is in thee by the laying on of my hands.* So the Ruler of a *Jewiſh* Synagogue did lay his hands alſo on the Party ordain'd. Moreover, the Apoſtle in theſe words, *The Gift that is in thee by laying on of hands*, tho' in relation to Gifts beyond compariſon more excellent, uſes the Phraſe known upon the like occaſion to have been common with the *Jews.* Wherefore if this were a way of Ordination in the Chriſtian Church, and of Apoſtolical Right, then may there be a way of Ordination in the Chriſtian Church exactly conformable to the *Jewiſh* Common-wealth, and yet be of Apoſtolical Right. Nor is it ſo ſtrange that the Apoſtles in matters of this nature ſhould comply with the *Jews*, of which ſo many were converted, ſeeing it is certain that not only the Apoſtles, but all ſuch as in theſe times were converted, did obſerve the *Jewiſh* Sabbath; nay, and that PAUL himſelf took TIMOTHY and circumcis'd him, becauſe of the *Jews*; that is, to comply with them, or to give them no offence. Nor do our Divines any where pretend impoſition of hands to be deriv'd from CHRIST, but

1 Tim. 4. 14.

2 Tim. 1. 6.

unani-

unanimouſly confeſs, that it was taken up by the Apoſtles from the *Jewiſh* Sanhedrim.

Sect. 5. *The Providence of God in the different way of Apoſtolical Ordination.*

NOW in theſe ſeveral ways of Ordination, there is a moſt remarkable Providence of God. For whereas States and Princes in receiving of Religion are not at any point ſo jealous as of an incroachment upon their Power; the firſt way of Apoſtolical Ordination deſtroys Monarchical Power: the laſt wholly excludes the Power of the People: and the ſecond has a mixture which may be receiv'd by a Common-wealth, or by a Monarchy. But where it is receiv'd by a Common-wealth, the impoſition of hands comes to little; and where it is receiv'd by a Monarchy, the Election of the People comes to nothing, as may be farther conſider'd in the original and progreſs of the *Conge d' Elire.*

THE ways of Ordination or of Church Government lying thus in Scripture, the not receiving of the Chriſtian Religion is not that whereof any State or Prince thro' the whole world can be any ways excuſable.

The Concluſion:

Shewing, that neither GOD, *nor* CHRIST, *or the* APOSTLES, *ever inſtituted any Government Eccleſiaſtical or Civil upon any other Principles than thoſe only of Human Prudence.*

Sect. 1. *Uſes of this Book.*

TO ſum up this ſecond Book in the Uſes that may be made of it: Certain it is of the *Greek* and *Roman* Stories that he who has not ſome good Idea or Notion of the Government to which they relate, cannot rightly underſtand them. If the like holds as to the Scripture Story, ſome light may be contributed to it by this Book. Again, if ſome gifted Men happening to read it, ſhould chance to be of the ſame judgment, it is an Argument for acquir'd Learning, in that for the *means* of acquir'd Learning, and in the means of acquir'd Learning for Univerſities. For how little ſoever this performance be, had it not been the faſhion with the *Engliſh* Gentry, in the breeding of their Sons to give them a ſmack of the Univerſity, I ſhould not have done ſo much.

Sect. 2. *The preſent uſe of this Book.*

BUT letting theſe paſs. If there were Common-wealths, or Governments exerciſing Sovereign Power by the Senate and the People, before that of *Iſrael*, as namely, *Gibeon:* If the inferior Orders and Courts in *Iſrael*, as thoſe inſtituted by MOSES after the advice of JETHRO a Heathen, were tranſcrib'd out of another Government tho' Heathen, as namely, that of *Midian:* If the order of the Church introduc'd by CHRIST in his twelve Apoſtles and his ſeventy Diſciples, were after the pattern of *Iſrael*, namely, in the twelve Princes of the Tribes, and the ſeventy Elders: If there were three diſtinct ways of Ordination introduc'd by the Apoſtles; one exactly according to the Ballot of *Iſrael*, as namely, in the Ordination of MATTHIAS; another exactly according to the way of the *Jewiſh* Sanhedrim or Synagogue, as namely, that of TIMOTHY; and a third, compos'd of theſe two, as namely, that of the *Deacons:* Then is it a clear and undeniable reſult of the whole, That *neither* GOD, *nor* CHRIST,

or

Book II. *or the* APOSTLES, *ever inſtituted any Government Eccleſiaſtical or Civil upon any other Principles than thoſe only of Human Prudence.*

Sect. 3. *The Conſequence of this Uſe.*

AN Obſervation of ſuch conſequence, as, where it has been rightly conſider'd, there the truth of Religion and of Government once planted, have taken root and flouriſh'd; and where it has not been rightly heeded, there has Religion or the pretence of it been the hook and the line, and the State the prey of Impoſtors and falſe Prophets, as was ſhewn in the hypocritical *Phariſees*, for ever ſtigmatiz'd by the word of Truth.

AND for might, let her be never ſo much exalted in her ſelf, let her Sword be never ſo dreadfully brandiſh'd; the Government not founded upon Reaſon, a Creature of God, and the Creature of God whoſe undoubted right in this part is by himſelf undeniably avow'd and aſſerted, is a Weapon fram'd againſt God; and no Weapon fram'd againſt God ſhall proſper.

Sect. 4. *A tranſition to the next Book.*

THE Principles of Human Prudence, and in them the Art of Law-giving, being ſhewn in the firſt Book, and vindicated throughout the whole courſe of Scripture by this ſecond, I come in the third to ſhew a Model of Government, fram'd according to the Art thus ſhewn and the Principles thus vindicated.

THE

THE

THIRD BOOK:

CONTAINING A

MODEL

OF

Popular Government,

Practically propos'd according to Reaſon, confirm'd by the Scripture, and agreeable to the preſent Balance or State of Property in *England*.

The PREFACE.

Containing a Model of Popular Government, propos'd Notionally.

THERE is between the Diſcourſes of ſuch as are commonly call'd Natural Philoſophers, and thoſe of Anatomiſts, a large difference; the former are facil, the latter difficult. Philoſophers, diſcourſing of Elements for example, that the Body of Man conſiſts of Fire, Air, Earth and Water, are eaſily both underſtood and credited, ſeeing by common Experience we find the Body of Man returns to the Earth from whence it was taken. A like Entertainment may befal Elements of Government, as in the firſt of theſe Books they are ſtated. But the fearful and wonderful making, the admirable ſtructure and great variety of the parts of man's Body, in which the Diſcourſes of Anatomiſts are altogether converſant, are underſtood by ſo few, that I may ſay they are not underſtood by any. Certain it is, that the delivery of a Model of Government (which either muſt be of no effect, or embrace all thoſe Muſcles, Nerves, Arteries and Bones, which are neceſſary to any Function of a well order'd Common-wealth) is no leſs than political Anatomy. If you come ſhort of this, your Diſcourſe is altogether ineffectual; if you come home, you are not underſtood: you may, perhaps, be call'd a learned Author; but you are obſcure, and your Doctrine is impracticable. Had I only ſuffer'd in this, and not the People, I ſhould long ſince have left them to their humour; but ſeeing it is they that ſuffer by it, and not my ſelf, I will be yet more a fool, or they ſhall be yet wiſer. Now comes into my head what I ſaw long ſince upon

Book III. upon an *Italian* Stage, while the Spectators wanted Hoops for their ſides. A Country fellow came with an Apple in his hand; to which, in a ſtrange variety of faces, his Teeth were undoubtedly threaten'd, when enter'd a young Anatomiſt brimful of his laſt Leſſon, who, ſtopping in good time the hand of this ſame Country fellow, would by no means ſuffer him to go on with ſo great an Enterprize, till he had firſt nam'd and deſcrib'd to him all the Bones, Nerves, and Muſcles which are naturally neceſſary to that motion: at which, the good man being with admiration plainly chop-fallen, comes me in a third, who, ſnatching away the Apple, devour-ed it in the preſence of them both. If the People, in this caſe whereof I am ſpeaking, were naturally ſo well furniſh'd, I had here learn'd enough to have kept ſilence: but their eating, in the political way, of abſolute neceſ-ſity requires the aid of ſome political Anatomiſt; without which, they may have Appetites, but will be chop-fallen. Examples whereof they have had but too many; one I think may be inſiſted upon without envy.

THIS is that which was call'd *The Agreement of the People*, con-ſiſting in ſum of theſe Propoſitions:

The Anarchy of the Levellers. *THAT there be a Repreſentative of the Nation conſiſting of four hundred Perſons, or not above.*

WHICH Propoſition puts the Bar on the quite contrary ſide; this being the firſt example of a Common-wealth, wherein it was conceiv-ed, that five hundred thouſand men, or more, might be repreſented by four hundred. The Repreſentation of the People in one man, cauſes Monarchy; and in a few, cauſes Oligarchy: the Many cannot be otherwiſe repreſented in a State of Liberty, than by ſo many, and ſo qualify'd, as may within the compaſs of that number and nature em-brace the intereſt of the whole People. Government ſhould be eſtabliſh-ed upon a Rock, not ſet upon a Precipice: a Repreſentative conſiſting but of four hundred, tho' in the nature thereof it be popular, is not in it ſelf a Weapon that is fix'd, but has ſomething of the broken Bow, as ſtill apt to ſtart aſide to Monarchy. But the paucity of the num-ber is temper'd with the ſhortneſs of the term, it being farther provided.

THAT this Repreſentative be biennial, and ſit not above eight Months. But ſeeing a ſupreme Council in a Common-wealth is neither aſſembl'd nor diſſolv'd, but by ſtated Orders directing upwards an irre-ſiſtible ſtrength from the root, and as one tooth or one nail is driven out by another; how is it provided that this Biennial Council ſhall not be a perpetual Council? Whereas nothing is more dangerous in a Common-wealth than intire Removes of Councils, how is it provided that theſe ſhall be men ſufficiently experienc'd for the management of Affairs? And laſt of all, whereas diſſolution to Sovereign Power is death, to whom are theſe after their eight months to bequeath the Common-wealth? In this caſe it is provided.

THAT there be a Council of State elected by each new Repreſentative, within twenty days after their firſt meeting, to continue till ten days after the meeting of the next Repreſentative. In which the faults obſerv'd in the former Order, are ſo much worſe, as this Council conſiſts of fewer. Thus far this Common-wealth is Oligarchy: but it is provided,

THAT theſe Repreſentatives have Sovereign Power, ſave that in ſome things the People may reſiſt them by Arms. Which firſt is a flat con-tradiction, and next is downright Anarchy. Where the Sovereign Power is not as intire and abſolute as in Monarchy it ſelf, there can be no Govern-ment at all. It is not the limitation of Sovereign Power that is the

cauſe

cauſe of a Common-wealth, but ſuch a libration or poize of Orders, that there can be in the ſame no number of men having the intereſt, that can have the power; nor any number of men having the power, that can have the intereſt, to invade or diſturb the Government. As the Orders of Common-wealths are more approaching to, or remote from this Maxim (of which this of the Levellers has nothing) ſo are they more quiet or turbulent. In the Religious part only, propoſing a *National Religion and Liberty of Conſcience*, tho' without troubling themſelves much with the means, they are right in the end.

AND for the Military part, they provide,

THAT no man (even in caſe of Invaſion) be compellable to go out of the Country where he lives, if he procures another to ſerve in his room. Which plainly intails upon this Common-wealth a fit Guard for ſuch a Liberty, even a Mercenary Army; for what one does of this kind, may and will (where there is no bar) be done by all: ſo every Citizen by money procuring his man, procures his Maſter. Now if this be work of that kind which the People in like caſes (as thoſe alſo of *Rome*, when they inſtituted their Tribunes) do uſually make, then have I good reaſon not only to think, but to ſpeak it audibly, That to ſooth up the People with an opinion of their own ſufficiency in theſe things, is not to befriend them, but to feed up all hopes of Liberty to the ſlaughter. Yet the *Leveller*, a late * Pamphlet, having gather'd out of *Oceana* the Principles by him otherwiſe well inſinuated, attributes it to the Agitators, or that Aſſembly which fram'd this wooden agreement of the People: *That then ſome of that Council aſſerted theſe Principles, and the reaſon of them.*

BUT Railery apart, we are not to think it has been for nothing that the wiſeſt Nations have in the formation of Government as much rely'd upon the invention of ſome one man, as upon themſelves: for whereas it cannot be too often inculcated, that reaſon conſiſts of two parts, the one Invention, the other Judgment; a People or an Aſſembly are not more eminent in point of Judgment, than they are void of Invention. Nor is there in this any thing at all againſt the ſufficiency of a People in the management of a proper Form, being once introduc'd, tho' they ſhould never come to a perfect underſtanding of it. For were the natural Bodies of the People ſuch as they might commonly underſtand, they would be (as I may ſay) wooden Bodies, or ſuch as they could not uſe; whereas their Bodies being now ſuch as they underſtand not, are yet ſuch as in the uſe and preſervation whereof they are perfect.

THERE are in Models of Government things of ſo eaſy practice, and yet of ſuch difficult underſtanding, that we muſt not think them even in *Venice*, who uſe their Common-wealth with the greateſt prudence and facility, to be all, or any conſiderable number of them, ſuch as perfectly underſtand the true reaſon or Anatomy of that Government: nor is this a preſumptuous Aſſertion, ſince none of thoſe *Venetians*, who have hitherto written of their own form, have brought the truth of it to any perfect light. The like perhaps (and yet with due acknowledgment to *Livy*) might be ſaid of the *Romans*. The *Lacedemonians* had not the right underſtanding of their Model, till about the time of ARISTOTLE it was firſt written by DICEARCHUS one of his Scholars. How egregiouſly our Anceſtors

* A later Pamphlet call'd XXV *Queries*, uſing the balance of Property, which is fair enough, refers it to Sir *Thomas Smith*'s 15th chap. (*de Repub. populi ingenio accommodanda*) where the Author ſpeaks not one word of Property; which is very foul.

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Book II. (till thoſe foundations were broken which at length have brought us round) did adminiſter the *Engliſh* Government, is ſufficiently known. Yet by one of the wiſeſt of our writers (even my Lord VERULAM) is HENRY the Seventh parallel'd with the Legiſlators of antient and heroic times, for the inſtitution of thoſe very Laws which have now brought the Monarchy to utter ruin. The Common-wealths upon which MACHIAVEL in his Diſcourſes is incomparable, are not by him, any one of them, ſufficiently explain'd or underſtood. Much leſs is it to be expected from a People, that they ſhould overcome the like difficulties, by reaſon whereof the wiſeſt Nations (finding themſelves under the neceſſity of a change, or of a new Government) induc'd by ſuch offers as promis'd fair, or againſt which they could find no exceptions, have uſually acted as men do by new Clothes; that is, put them on, that, if they be not exactly fit at firſt, they may either fit themſelves to the body in wearing, or thereby more plainly ſhew wherein they can be mended even by ſuch, as would otherwiſe prove but bad workmen. Nor has any ſuch offer been thought to have more Preſumption, much leſs Treaſon in it, than if one conſcious of his skill in Architecture, ſhould offer himſelf to the Prince or State to build a more convenient Parliament-houſe. *England* is now in ſuch a condition, that he who may be truly ſaid to give her Law, ſhall never govern her; and he who will govern her, ſhall never give her Law. Yet ſome will have it, that to aſſert Popular Power, is to ſow the ſeed of Civil War, and object againſt a Common-wealth, as not to be introduc'd but by Arms; which by the undeniable teſtimony of later Experience, is of all other Objections the moſt extravagant: for if the good old Cauſe, againſt the deſire even of the Army, and of all men well affected to their Country, could be trod under foot without Blood; what more certain demonſtration can there be, that (let the deliberations upon, or changes of Government, be of what kind ſoever which ſhall pleaſe a Parliament) there is no appearance that they can occaſion any Civil War? Streams that are ſtop'd may urge their Banks; but the courſe of *England*, into a Common-wealth, is both certain and natural. The ways of Nature require Peace: The ways of Peace require Obedience to the Laws: Laws in *England* cannot be made but by Parliaments: Parliaments in *England* are come to be mere popular Aſſemblies: The Laws made by popular Aſſemblies (tho' for a time they may be aw'd, or deceiv'd, in the end) muſt be popular Laws: and the ſum of popular Laws muſt amount to a Common-wealth. The whole doubt or hazard of this Conſequence remains upon one queſtion, Whether a ſingle Council conſiſting but of four hundred, indu'd both with Debate and Reſult; the Keys of whoſe Doors are in the hands of ambitious men; in the crowd and confuſion of whoſe election the People are as careleſs as tumultuous, and eaſy, thro' the want of good Orders, to be deluded; while the Clergy (declar'd and inveterate Enemies of popular Power) are laying about, and ſweating in the throng, as if it were in the Vineyard; upon whoſe Benches Lawyers (being feather'd and arm'd, like ſharp and ſudden Arrows, with a private intereſt pointblank againſt the Publick) may and frequently do ſwarm, can indeed be call'd a popular Council. This, I confeſs, may ſet the whole ſtate of Liberty upon the caſt of a Dy; yet queſtionleſs it is more than odds on the behalf of a Common-wealth, when a Government labours in frequent or long ſtruggles, not thro' any certain biaſs of Genius or Nature that can be in ſuch a Council, but thro' the impotence of ſuch Concluſions as may go awry, and the external force or ſtate of property now fully introduc'd: whence

ſuch

ſuch a Council may wander, but never find any reſt or ſettlement, except only in that natural and proper Form of Government which is to be erected upon a mere Popular Foundation. All other ways of proceeding muſt be void, as inevitably guilty of contradiction in the Superſtructures to the Foundation; which have amounted, and may amount to the diſcouragement of honeſt men, but with no other ſucceſs than to imbroil or retard Buſineſs: *England* being not capable of any other permanent Form than that only of a Common-wealth; tho' her ſupreme Council be ſo conſtituted, that it may be Monarchically inclin'd. This contradiction in the Frame is the frequent occaſion of contradictory Expoſtulations and Queſtions. How, ſay they, ſhould we have a Common-wealth? Which way is it poſſible that it ſhould come in? And how, ſay I, can we fail of a Common-wealth? What poſſibility is there we ſhould miſs of it?

IF a man replies, he anſwers thus: No Army ever ſet up a Common-wealth. To the contrary, I inſtance the Army of *Iſrael* under MOSES; that of *Athens* about the time of ALCIBIADES; that of *Rome* upon the expulſion of the TARQUINS; thoſe of *Switzerland* and *Holland*. But, ſay they, other Armies have not ſet up Common-wealths. True indeed; divers other Armies have not ſet up Common-wealths; yet is not that any argument why our Armies ſhould not. For in all Armies that have not ſet up Common-wealths, either the Officers have had no Fortunes or Eſtates at all, but immediately dependent upon the mere Will of the Prince, as the *Turkiſh* Armies, and all thoſe of the Eaſtern Countries; or the Officers have been a Nobility commanding their own Tenants. Certain it is, that either of theſe Armies can ſet up nothing but Monarchy. But our Officers hold not Eſtates of Noblemen able upon their own Lands to levy Regiments, in which caſe they would take home their People to plow, or make Hay; nor are they yet ſo put to it for their Livelihood, as to depend wholly upon a Prince, in which caſe they would fall on robbing the People: but have good honeſt Popular Eſtates to them and their Heirs for ever. Now an Army, where the Eſtates of the Officers were of this kind, in no reaſon can, in no experience ever did ſet up Monarchy. Ay but, ſay they, for all that, their pay to them is more conſiderable than their Eſtates. But ſo much more muſt they be for a Common-wealth, becauſe the Parliament muſt pay: and they have found by experience, that the Pay of a Parliament is far better than that of a Prince. But the four hundred being Monarchically inclined, or running upon the Intereſt of thoſe irreconcilable Enemies of Popular Power, *Divines* and *Lawyers*, will rather pay an Army for commanding, or for ſupporting of a Prince, than for obeying. Which may be true, as was acknowledg'd before, in the way; but in the end, or at the long run, for the reaſons mention'd, muſt be of no effect.

THESE Arguments are from the Cauſe; now for an Argument to Senſe, and from the Effect: If our Armies would raiſe Money of themſelves, or, which is all one, would make a King, why have they not made a King in ſo many Years? Why did they not make one yeſterday? Why do thy not to day? Nay, why have they ever been, why do they ſtill continue to be of all others in this point the moſt averſe and refractory?

BUT if the caſe be ſo with us, that nature runs wholly to a Common-wealth, and we have no ſuch Force as can withſtand nature, why may we not as well have golden Dreams of what this Common-wealth may be, as of the *Indies*, of *Flanders*, or of the *Sound*? The Frame of a Common-wealth may be dreamt on, or propoſed two ways; the one in

Book III. Theory, or notionally, in which it is of eaſy underſtanding, but of difficult practice: The other practicably, in which it is of difficult underſtanding, but of facil uſe. One of theſe ways is a Shoeinghorn, and the other the Shoe; for which cauſe I ſhall propoſe both, as firſt notionally, thus:

The Model propos'd notionally.

1. THAT the native Territory of the Common-wealth be divided, ſo equally as with any convenience it may, into fifty Tribes or Precincts.

2. THAT the People in each Tribe be diſtinguiſh'd, firſt by their Age, and next by the valuation of their Eſtates: All ſuch as are above eighteen, and under thirty, being accounted Youth; and all ſuch as are thirty or upwards, being accounted Elders. All ſuch as have under one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Money, being accounted of the Foot; and all ſuch as have ſo much or upwards, being accounted of the Horſe.

3. THAT each Tribe elect annually out of the Horſe of their number two Elders to be Knights; three Elders out of the ſame, and four Elders more out of the Foot of their number, to be Deputies or Burgeſſes. That the Term of each Knight and Burgeſs, or Deputy ſo elected, be triennial; and that whoever has ſerv'd his triennial Term in any one of theſe Capacities, may not be re-elected into any one of the ſame, till a triennial Vacation be expir'd.

4. THAT in the firſt year of the Common-wealth there be a Senate ſo conſtituted, of three hundred Knights, that the term of one hundred may expire annually; and that the hundred Knights, annually elected by two in each Tribe, take in the Senate the places of them whoſe Term comes to be thus annually expir'd.

5. THAT in the firſt year of the Common-wealth there be a Repreſentative of the People, conſiſting of one thouſand and fifty Deputies; four hundred and fifty of them being Horſe, and the reſt Foot. That this Repreſentative be ſo conſtituted, that the term of two hundred of the Foot, and of one hundred and fifty of the Horſe, expire annually; and that the two hundred Foot, and one hundred and fifty Horſe elected annually, by four of the Foot, and three of the Horſe in each Tribe, take the places in this Repreſentative of them whoſe terms comes thus annually to be expir'd.

6. THAT the Senate have the whole Authority of Debate; that the Repreſentative have the whole power of Reſult, in ſuch a manner, that whatever (having been debated by the Senate) ſhall by their Authority be promulgated, that is, printed and publiſh'd, for the ſpace of ſix weeks; and afterwards (being propos'd by them to the Repreſentative) ſhall be reſolv'd by the People of the ſame in the Affirmative, be the Law of the Land.

THUS much may ſuffice to give implicitely a notional account of the whole frame. But a Model of Government is nothing as to uſe, unleſs it be alſo deliver'd practicably; and the giving of a Model practicably, is ſo much the more difficult, that men, not vers'd in this way, ſay of it (as they would of the Anatomy of their own Bodies) that it is impracticable. Here lies the whole difficulty: ſuch things, as, trying them never ſo often, they cannot make hang together, they will yet have to be practicable; and if you would bring them from this kind of ſhifts, or of tying and untying all ſorts of knots, to the natural nerves and ligaments of Government, then with them it is impracticable. But to render that which is practicable, facil; or to do my laſt endeavour of this kind, of which if I miſs this once more, I muſt hereafter deſpair:

I ſhall

I ſhall do two things; firſt, omit the Ballot, and then make ſome alert- Chap. I.
ration in my former method.

THEY who have interwoven the Ballot with the deſcription of a Common-wealth, have thereby render'd the ſame by far the more complete in it ſelf; but in the underſtanding of their Readers, as much defective: wherefore preſuming the uſe of the Ballot throughout the Orders of this Model, I ſhall refer it to practice; in which it will be a matter of as much facility, as it would have been of difficulty in writing. And for the method I have choſen, it is the moſt natural and intelligible, being no more than to propoſe the whole practicably: firſt, in the Civil; ſecondly, in the Religious; then in the Military; and laſt of all in the Provincial part of the Model.

CHAP. I.

Containing the Civil part of the Model, propos'd practicably.

SEEING it has been ſufficiently prov'd that Empire follows the Nature of Property; that the particular kind of Empire or Government depends upon the ſpecial diſtribution (except in ſmall Countries) of Land; and that where the Balance in Property has not been fix'd, the nature of the Government (be it what you will) has been floating: it is very reaſonable that, in the propoſition of a Common-wealth, we begin with a fixation of the Balance in Property; and this being not otherwiſe to be done than by ſome ſuch Laws as have been commonly call'd *Agrarian*, it is propos'd,

THAT every one holding above two thouſand pounds a year in Land, lying within the proper Territory of the Common-wealth, leave the ſaid Land equally divided among his Sons; or elſe ſo near equally, that there remain to the eldeſt of them not above two thouſand pound a year in Land ſo lying. That this Propoſition be ſo underſtood, as not to concern any Parent having no more than one Son, but the next Heir only that ſhall have more Sons; in ſuch ſort, as nothing be hereby taken from any man, or from his Poſterity, but that fatherly Affection be at all points extended as formerly, except only that it be with more Piety, and leſs Partiality. And that the ſame Propoſition, in ſuch Families where there are no Sons, concern the Daughter or Daughters in the like manner. 1. *Agrarian Laws.*

THAT no Daughter, being neither Heir nor Co-heir, have above fifteen hundred pounds in Portion, or for her preferment in Marriage. That any Daughter, being an Orphan, and having ſeven hundred pounds or upwards in Portion, may charge the State with it. That the State being ſo charg'd, be bound to manage the Portion of ſuch an Orphan for the beſt, either by due payment of the Intereſt of the ſame; or, if it be deſir'd, by way of Annuity for Life, at the rate of one hundred pounds a year, for every ſeven hundred pounds ſo receiv'd. *The manner whereof being elſewhere ſhewn, is not needful to be repeated.*

THAT theſe Propoſitions prevent the growing of a Monarchical Nobility, is their peculiar end: Wherefore that this ſhould hold the weight of an Objection in a popular Balance, already introduc'd thro' the failure of a Monarchical Nobility, or thro' a level made not by the People but by the Kings or themſelves, were prepoſterous. Yet upon this ſcore (for I ſee no other) is there ſuch Animoſity againſt the like

Laws,

Book III. Laws, that wiſe men have judg'd it an Indiſcretion, in ſuch as are affected to Popular Government, not to temporize in this point; at leaſt, till a Common-wealth were firſt introduc'd. To which Judgment I am by no means inclining: Firſt, Becauſe the whole ſtream of this kind of Government is ſo clear and pellucid, as to abhor having any thing in the bottom which may not appear at the very top. Secondly, Becauſe an *Agrarian*, not brought in with the introduction of a Common-wealth, was never yet known to be brought in after the introduction of a Common-wealth. And thirdly, Becauſe the change of Balances in States, thro' the want of fixation, has been ſo ſudden, that between the Reign of HENRY the Seventh, and that of Queen ELIZABETH, being under fifty years, the *Engliſh* Balance of Monarchical became Popular; and that of *Rome*, between the Lives of SCIPIO and of TIBERIUS GRACCHUS, being alſo under fifty years, of Popular became Monarchical. Nevertheleſs, if there remains any cure of Animoſity that may be ſafe, it muſt be prudent: And ſuch a cure (if we be not ſo abandon'd to mere fancy, as to ſacrifice all Prudence to it) there may be in the addition of this Clauſe;

Additional Clauſe to the Agrarian.

THAT no *Agrarian* Law hereby given to this Common-wealth, or to be hereafter given to the ſame, or to any Province of the ſame, be underſtood to be otherwiſe binding, than to the Generation to come, or to the Children to be born ſeven years after the enacting of the Law.

UPON the addition of this Clauſe, it may be ſafely ſaid of theſe *Agrarian* Laws, that they concern not any man living: and for Poſterity, it is well known, that to enact a Law, is no more in their regard, than to commend a thing to their choice; ſeeing they, if ſo pleas'd, can no more be deveſted of the Power to repeal any Law enacted by their Anceſtors, than we are of repealing ſuch Laws as have been enacted by ours.

TO this it may be objected, That *Agrarian* Laws, being once enacted, muſt have brought Eſtates to the ſtandard of the ſame, before Poſterity can come into a capacity to judge of them. But this is the only means whereby Poſterity can come to a true capacity to judge of them: Firſt, becauſe they will have had experience of the Laws whereof they are to judge: And ſecondly, becauſe they will be void of all ſuch imaginary Intereſts as might corrupt their Judgment, and do now certainly corrupt ours.

The firſt Parallel.

THE Balance of the Common-wealth of *Iſrael*, thro' the diſtribution of Lands at the introduction of the ſame, became Popular; and becoming Popular, was fix'd by the Law for the Jubile. *That which*

Deut. 25. 28. *was ſold, ſhall remain in the hands of them that bought it till the year of Jubile; and in the Jubile it ſhall go out, and he ſhall return to his poſſeſſion.* The ways in *Iſrael*, and in the Common-wealth propos'd, where the Popular Balance is not made but found, are divers; but the *Agrarian* Laws in each, as to the end, which is the preſervation of the Balance, are of a like effect.

TO riſe thus from true Foundations to proper Super-ſtructures, the firſt ſtep from the Balance thus fix'd into the Orders of a Common-wealth, is not otherwiſe to be taken than by certain Diſtributions or Diviſions of the People, whereof ſome are to be perſonal, and ſome local.

Freemen and Servants.

THE firſt perſonal diviſion of a People, is into Freemen and Servants. Freemen are ſuch as have wherewithal to live of themſelves; and Servants, ſuch as have not. This diviſion therefore is not conſtitutive, but naturally inherent in the Balance; nor, ſeeing all Govern-

ment

ment is in the direction of the Balance, is it poſſible for the Superſtructures of any to make more Freemen than are ſuch by the nature of the Balance, or by their being able to live of themſelves.

ALL that could in this matter be done, even by MOSES himſelf, is contain'd in this Proviſo: *If thy Brother that dwells by thee be grown poor, and be ſold to thee, thou ſhalt not compel him to ſerve as a bond-ſervant: but as a hir'd Servant, and a ſojourner he ſhall be with thee, and ſhall ſerve thee to the year of Jubile. And then he ſhall depart from thee, both he and his Children with him, and ſhall return to his own Family, and to the Poſſeſſion of his Fathers ſhall he return.* *The ſecond Parallel.* Levit. 25. 29.

THE nature of Riches conſider'd, this diviſion into Freemen and Servants is not properly conſtitutive, but as it were natural. To come to ſuch Diviſions as are both perſonal and conſtitutive, it is propos'd,

THAT all Citizens, that is, Freemen, or ſuch as are not Servants, be diſtributed into Horſe and Foot. That ſuch of them as have one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods or Money, or above that proportion be of the Horſe; and all ſuch as have under that proportion, be of the Foot. 3. *Horſe and Foot.*

THAT all Elders or Freemen, being thirty years of age or upwards, be capable of Civil Adminiſtration: and that the Youth, or ſuch Freemen as are between eighteen years of age and thirty, be not capable of Civil Adminiſtration, but of Military only; in ſuch a manner as ſhall follow in the Military part of this Model. 4. *Elders and Youth.*

NOW, beſides perſonal diviſions, it is neceſſary in order to the framing of a Common-wealth, that there be ſome ſuch as are local. For theſe therefore it is propos'd,

THAT the whole native, or proper Territory of the Common-wealth, be caſt, with as much exactneſs as can be convenient, into known and fix'd Precincts or Pariſhes. 5. *Precinct of the Pariſh.*

THAT the Elders, reſident in each Pariſh, annually aſſemble in the ſame; as for example, upon Monday next enſuing the laſt of *December*. That they then and there elect out of their own number every fifth man, or one man out of every five, to be for the term of the year enſuing, a Deputy of that Pariſh; and that the firſt and ſecond ſo elected be overſeers, or Preſidents, for regulating of all Parochial Congregations, whether of the Elders or of the Youth, during the term for which they were elected. 6. *Parochial Congregations and Deputies.*

THAT ſo many Pariſhes lying neareſt together, whoſe Deputies ſhall amount to one hundred or thereabout, be caſt into one Precinct call'd the Hundred. And that in each Precinct call'd the Hundred, there be a Town, Village, or place appointed to be the Capital of the ſame. 7. *Precinct of the Hundred.*

THAT the Parochial Deputies elected throughout the Hundred, aſſemble annually; for example, upon Monday next enſuing the laſt of *January*, at the Capital of their Hundred. That they then and there elect out of the Horſe of their number one Juſtice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Captain, one Inſign: and out of the Foot of their number, one other Juryman, one High Conſtable, &c. 8. *Aſſembly or Muſter of the Hundred.*

THO' our Juſtices of the Peace have not been annual, yet that they may ſo be is apparent, becauſe the high Sheriffs, whoſe Office is of greater difficulty, have always been annual: ſeeing therefore they may be annual, that ſo they ought in this Adminiſtration to be, will appear, where they come to be conſtitutive of ſuch Courts as, ſhould they conſiſt of a ſtanding Magiſtracy, would be againſt the nature of a Common-wealth. But the Precincts hitherto being thus ſtated, it is propos'd.

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THAT every twenty Hundreds, lying neareſt and moſt conveniently together, be caſt into one Tribe. That the whole Territory being after this manner caſt into Tribes, ſome Town, Village, or place be appointed to every Tribe for the Capital of the ſame. And that theſe three Precincts, that is, the Pariſh, the Hundred, and the Tribe (whether the Deputies, thenceforth annually choſen in the Pariſhes or Hundreds, come to increaſe or diminiſh) remain firm and inalterable for ever, ſave only by Act of Parliament.

9. *Precinct of the Tribe.*

THESE Diviſions, or the like, both perſonal and local, are that in a well order'd Common-wealth, which Stairs are in a good houſe; not that Stairs in themſelves are deſirable, but that without them there is no getting into the Chambers. The whole matter of Coſt and Pains, neceſſary to the introduction of a like Model, lies only in the firſt Architecture, or building of theſe Stairs; that is, in ſtating of theſe three Precincts; which done, they lead you naturally and neceſſarily into all the Rooms of this Fabric. For the juſt number of Tribes into which a Territory thus caſt may fall, it is not very eaſy to be gueſt: yet, becauſe for the carrying on of diſcourſe it is requiſite to pitch upon ſome certainty, I ſhall preſume that the number of the Tribes, thus ſtated, amounts to fifty; and that the number of the Parochial Deputies annually elected in each Tribe, amounts to two thouſand. Be the Deputies more or fewer by the alterations which may happen in progreſs of time, it diſorders nothing. Now to aſcend by theſe Stairs into the uper Rooms of this Building, it is propos'd,

10. *Aſſembly or Muſter of the Tribe.*

THAT the Deputies elected in the ſeveral Pariſhes, together with their Magiſtrates and other Officers both civil and Military, elected in their ſeveral Hundreds, aſſemble or muſter annually; for example upon Monday next inſuing the laſt of *February* at the Capital of their Tribe.

HOW the Troops and Companies of the Deputies, with their Military Officers or Commanders thus aſſembl'd, may, without expence of time, be ſtraight diſtributed into one uniform and orderly Body, has been elſewhere * ſhewn, and is not needful to be repeated. For their work, which at this meeting will require two days, it is propos'd,

* *In* Oceana.

11. *Magiſtrates of the Tribe.*

THAT the whole Body thus aſſembl'd, upon the firſt day of the Aſſembly, elect out of the Horſe of their number one High Sheriff, one Lieutenant of the Tribe, one *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, one Conductor, and two Cenſors. That the High Sheriff be Commander in chief, the Lieutenant Commander in the ſecond place, and the Conductor in the third, of this Band or Squadron. That the *Cuſtos Rotulorum* be Muſter-maſter, and keep the Rolls. That the Cenſors be Governors of the Ballot. And that the term of theſe Magiſtracies be annual.

THESE being thus elected, it is propos'd,

12. *The Prerogative Troop.*

THAT the Magiſtrates of the Tribe, that is to ſay, the High Sheriff, Lieutenant, *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, the Cenſors, and the Conductor, together with the Magiſtrates and Officers of the Hundreds, that is to ſay, the twenty Juſtices of the Peace, the forty Jurymen, the twenty High Conſtables, be one Troop, or one Troop and one Company apart, call'd the Prerogative Troop or Company. That this Troop bring in and aſſiſt the Juſtices of Aſſize, hold the Quarter Seſſions in their ſeveral Capacities, and perform their other Functions as formerly.

BY this means the Common-wealth at its introduction may embrace the Law as it ſtands, that is, unreform'd; which is the greateſt advantage of ſuch Reformations: for to reform Laws before the introduction

of

of the Government, which is to ſhew to what the Laws in Reformation are to be brought or fitted, is impoſſible. But theſe Magiſtrates of the Hundreds and Tribes being ſuch whereby the Parliament is to govern the Nation, this is a regard in which they ought to be further capable of ſuch Orders and Inſtructions as ſhall thereto be requiſite: For which cauſe it is propos'd. Chap. 1.

13. *The Phylarch.*

THAT the Magiſtrates of the Tribe, that is to ſay, the High Sheriff, Lieutenant, *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, the Cenſors, and the Conductor, together with the twenty Juſtices elected at the Hundreds, be a Court for the Government of the Tribe call'd the *Phylarch*; and that this Court proceed in all matters of Government, as ſhall from time to time be directed by Act of Parliament.

BY theſe Courts the Common-wealth will be furniſh'd with true Channels, whereby at leiſure to turn the Law into that which is ſufficiently known to have been its primitive Courſe, and to a perfect Reformation by degrees, without violence. For as the corruption of our Law proceeds from an Art enabled to improve its private Intereſt; or from the Law upon the Bench, and the Jury at the Bar: So the Reformation of our Law muſt come from diſabling it as an Art to improve its private Intereſt; or to a Jury upon the Bench, and the Law at the Bar, as in *Venice*.

The third Parallel. Deut. 16. 18.

JUDGES and Officers ſhalt thou make thee in all thy Gates which the Lord thy God gives thee throughout thy Tribes, and they ſhall judge the People with juſt Judgment. Theſe Courts, whoſe Seſſion-houſe was in the Gates of every City, were ſhewn each of them to have conſiſted of twenty three Elders, which were as a Jury upon the Bench, giving ſentence by plurality of Votes, and under a kind of appeal to the ſeventy Elders or Senate of *Iſrael*, as was alſo ſhewn in the ſecond Book. Book 2.

THIS, or the like, by all example and beyond any controverſy, has been, and is the natural way of Judicature in Common-wealths. The Phylarchs, with a Court or two of Appeals eligible out of the Senate and the People, are at any time with eaſe and very ſmall alteration to be caſt upon a triennial Rotation: which, in all things beſides proceeding after the manner of the *Venetian* Quarancies, will be in this caſe perfect Orders.

TO return: The firſt Day's Election at the Tribe being as has been ſhewn, it is propos'd,

14. *Knights and Burgeſſes.*

THAT the Squadron of the Tribe, on the ſecond day of their Aſſembly, elect two Knights and three Burgeſſes out of the Horſe of their number, and four other Burgeſſes out of the Foot of their number. That each Knight upon Election forthwith make Oath of Allegiance to the Common-wealth; or refuſing this Oath, that the next Competitor in Election to the ſame Magiſtracy, making the ſaid Oath, be the Magiſtrate: the like for the Burgeſſes. That the Knights, thus ſworn, have Seſſion in the Senate for the term of three years; and that the Burgeſſes thus ſworn be of the Prerogative Tribe, or Repreſentative of the People for the like term.

NOW whereas this Propoſition is ſufficient for the perpetuation of the Senate and the Aſſembly of the People, being once inſtituted, but not ſufficient for the full and perfect Inſtitution of them, it neceſſitates the addition in this place, not of a permanent Order, but of an Expedient for the firſt years Election only; which may be this:

" THAT

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Expedient for the first years Election.

" THAT for the full and perfect Inſtitution of the Aſſemblies " mention'd, the Squadron of the Tribe in the firſt year of the Com- " mon-wealth elect two Knights for the term of one year, two other " Knights for the term of two years, and laſtly, two Knights more " for the term of three years: the like for the Burgeſſes of the Horſe " firſt, and then for thoſe of the Foot.

BY this Expedient the Senate in fifty Tribes is conſtituted of three hundred Knights or Senators, whereof one hundred, by the expiration of their terms, come annually to fall; and another hundred at the ſame time to enter. The like for the Prerogative Tribe or Aſſembly of the People, which, conſiſting in the whole of one thouſand and fifty, ſuffers the like alteration in one third part, or in the yearly exchange of one hundred and fifty Burgeſſes: By which means the Motion or Rotation of theſe Aſſemblies is Annual, Triennial, and Perpetual. For the full diſpatch of the foregoing Elections there remains but one Propoſition more, which is this:

15. *Proviſo.* THAT a Magiſtrate or Officer elected at the Hundred be thereby excluded from being elected a Magiſtrate of the Tribe, or of the firſt days Election: that no former Election whatſoever exclude a man from the ſecond days Election at the Tribe, or to be choſen a Knight or Burgeſs. That a man being choſen a Knight or Burgeſs, who before was choſen a Magiſtrate or Officer of the Hundred or Tribe, delegate his former Office, or Magiſtracy in the Hundred or the Tribe, to any other Deputy being no Magiſtrate nor Officer, and being of the ſame Hundred and of the ſame Order, that is, of the Horſe or Foot reſpectively. That the whole and every part of the foregoing Orders for Election in the Pariſhes, the Hundreds, and the Tribes, be holding and inviolable upon ſuch Penalties in caſe of failure, as ſhall hereafter be provided by Act of Parliament againſt any Pariſh, Hundred, Tribe, Deputy or Perſon ſo offending.

WITHOUT ſome ſuch Proviſion as is contain'd in the former part of this Propoſition, men would be inconveniently excluded from preferment, or the Tribe oblig'd to return to the Ballot; and ſo to ſpend more time for trifles than is requir'd by their real buſineſs.

The fourth Parallel. 2 Chron. 27. THE Repreſentative of *Iſrael* collected monthly by the two thouſand out of each Tribe (if we conſider what Method muſt have been us'd in ſuch Elections) intimates, firſt, that there were Sub-diviſions to that end in each Tribe, perhaps of the nature of our Hundreds and Pariſhes: Secondly, that there were qualifications in thoſe Elections as to the Patriarchs or chief Fathers, and as to the People with their Captains of thouſands, and Captains of hundreds; which is enough thus far to approve and recommend the foregoing Propoſitions.

THE Senate, and the Congregation or Repreſentative of the People, are in every Common-wealth the main Orders. The Stairs or Degrees of aſcent to theſe being now mounted, it remains that I lead you into the Rooms of State, or the Aſſemblies themſelves: which ſhall be perform'd, firſt, by ſhewing their Frame, and next by ſhewing their Uſes or Functions. To bring you firſt into the Senate, it is propos'd,

16. *Frame of the Senate.* THAT the Knights of the Annual Election in the Tribes take their places on Monday next enſuing the laſt of *March* in the Senate. That the like number of Knights, whoſe Seſſion determines at the ſame time, recede. That every Knight or Senator be paid out of the public Revenue quarterly, one hundred twenty five Pounds during his term of Seſſion, and be oblig'd to ſit in purple Robes. THAT

THAT annually, upon the reception of the new Knights, the Senate proceed to the Election of new Magiſtrates and Counſillors. That for Magiſtrates they elect one General, one Speaker, and two Cenſors, each for the term of one year; theſe promiſcuouſly: and that they elect one Commiſſioner of the Great Seal, one Commiſſioner of the Treaſury, each for the term of three years, and out of the new Knights only. Chap. I. 17. *Senatorian Magiſtrates.*

THIS Propoſition ſuppoſes the Commiſſioners of the Seal and thoſe of the Treaſury to conſiſt each of three, wheel'd by the annual Election of one into each Order, upon a triennial Rotation. For farther explanation of the Senatorian Magiſtracies, it is propos'd,

THAT the General and Speaker, as CONSULS of the Common-wealth, and Preſidents of the Senate, be, during the term of their Magiſtracy, paid quarterly five hundred Pounds: That the Inſigns of theſe Magiſtracies be a Sword born before the General, and a Mace before the Speaker: That they be oblig'd to wear Ducal Robes; and that what is ſaid of the General in this Propoſition, be underſtood only of the General ſitting, and not of the General marching. 18. *The General ſitting, and the Speaker.*

THAT the General ſitting, in caſe he be commanded to march, receive Field pay; and that a new General be forthwith elected by the Senate to ſucceed him in the Houſe, with all the Rights, Inſigns, and Emoluments of the General ſitting: And this ſo often as one or more Generals are marching, 19. *The General marching.*

THAT the three Commiſſioners of the Great Seal, and the three Commiſſioners of the Treaſury, uſing their Inſigns and Habit, and performing their other Functions as formerly, be paid quarterly, to each of them three hundred ſeventy five Pounds. 20. *Commiſſioners of the Seal and of the Treaſury.*

THAT the Cenſors be each of them Chancellor of one Univerſity by virtue of their Election: that they govern the Ballot; that they be Preſidents of the Council for Religion; that each have a ſilver Wand for the Inſign of his Magiſtracy; that each be paid quarterly three hundred ſeventy five Pounds, and be oblig'd to wear ſcarlet Robes. 21. *The Cenſors.*

THAT the General ſitting, the Speaker, and the ſix Commiſſioners aboveſaid, be the Signory of this Common-wealth. 22. *The Signory.*

THIS for the Senatorian Magiſtrates. For Senatorian Councils it is propos'd.

THAT there be a Council of State conſiſting of fifteen Knights, five out of each Order or Election; and that the ſame be perpetuated by the annual Election of five out of the new Knights, or laſt elected into the Senate. 23. *Council of State.*

THAT there be a Council for Religion conſiſting of twelve Knights, four out of each Order, and perpetuated by the annual Election of four out of the Knights laſt elected into the Senate. That there be a Council for Trade, conſiſting of a like number, elected and perpetuated in the ſame manner. 24. *Councils of Religion, of Trade.*

THAT there be a Council of War, not elected by the Senate, but elected by the Council of State out of themſelves, That this Council of War conſiſt of nine Knights, three out of each Order, and be perpetuated by the annual Election of three out of the laſt Knights elected into the Council of State. 25. *Council of War.*

THAT in caſe the Senate adds nine Knights more out of their own number to the Council of War, the ſaid Council be underſtood by this addition to be DICTATOR of the Common-wealth for the term of three months, and no longer, except by farther Order of the Senate the ſaid Dictatorian Power be prolong'd for a like term. 26. *The Dictator.*

27. *The Propoſers general.* THAT the Signory have Seſſion and Suffrage, with right alſo jointly or ſeverally to propoſe, both in the Senate and in all Senatorian Councils.

28. *Provoſts, or particular Propoſers.* THAT each of the three Orders, or Diviſions of Knights in each Senatorian Council, elect one Provoſt for the term of one week; and that any two Provoſts of the ſame Council ſo elected may propoſe to their reſpective Council, and not otherwiſe.

29. *Academy.* THAT ſome fair Room or Rooms well furniſh'd and attended, be allow'd at the States charge for a free and open Academy to all comers at ſome convenient hour or hours towards the Evening. That this Academy be govern'd according to the Rules of good Breeding, or civil Converſation, by ſome or all of the Propoſers; and that in the ſame it be lawful for any man by word of mouth or by writing, in jeſt or in earneſt, to propoſe to the Propoſers.

FROM the frame or ſtructure of theſe Councils, I ſhould paſs to their Functions; but that beſides annual Elections, there will be ſome biennial, and others emergent: in which regard it is propos'd, firſt, for biennial Elections,

30. *Embaſſadors in ordinary.* THAT for Embaſſadors in ordinary, there be four Reſidences; as *France*, *Spain*, *Venice*, and *Conſtantinople*: that every Reſident, upon the Election of a new Embaſſador in ordinary, remove to the next Reſidence in the Order nominated, till having ſerv'd in them all, he returns home. That upon Monday next enſuing the laſt of *November*, there be every ſecond year elected by the Senate ſome fit Perſon, being under thirty five years of Age, and not of the Senate or popular Aſſembly: that the Party ſo elected, repair upon Monday next enſuing the laſt of *March* following, as Embaſſador in ordinary to the Court of *France*, and there reſide for the term of two years, to be computed from the firſt of *April* next enſuing his Election. That every Embaſſador in ordinary be allow'd three thouſand pounds a year during the term of his Reſidences; and that if a Reſident comes to die, there be an extraordinary Election into his Reſidence for his term, and for the remainder of his Removes and Progreſs.

31. *Emergent Elections.* THAT all emergent Elections be made by Scrutiny, that is, by a Council, or by Commiſſioners propoſing, and by the Senate reſolving in the manner following: That all Field-Officers be propos'd by the Council of War; that all Embaſſadors extraordinary be propos'd by the Council of State; that all Judges and Serjeants at Law be propos'd by the Commiſſioners of the Great Seal; that all Barons and Officers of Truſt in the Exchequer, be propos'd by the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury: and that ſuch as are thus propos'd, and approv'd by the Senate, be held lawfully elected.

THESE Elections being thus diſpatch'd, I come to the Functions of the Senate, and firſt, to thoſe of the Senatorian Councils: for which it is propos'd,

32. *Function of the Senatorian Councils.* THAT the cognizance of all matters of State to be conſider'd, or Law to be enacted, whether it be Provincial or National, Domeſtic or Foreign, pertain to the Council of State. That ſuch Affairs of either kind, as they ſhall judge to require more Secrecy, be remitted by this Council, and belong to the Council of War, being for that end a ſelect part of the ſame. That the cognizance and protection both of the National Religion, and of the Liberty of Conſcience equally eſtabliſh'd in this Nation, after the manner to be ſhewn in the Religious part of this Model, pertain to the Council for Religion. That all matters of Traffic, and the Regulation of the ſame belong to the Council of Trade. That in the exerciſe

of

of theſe ſeveral Functions, which naturally are Senatorian or Authoritative only, no Council aſſume any other Power than ſuch only as ſhall be ſettl'd upon the ſame by Act of Parliament. Chap. 1.

33. *Function of the Senate.*

THAT what ſhall be propos'd to the Senate by any one or more of the Signory or Propoſers general; or whatever was propos'd by any two of the Provoſts or particular Propoſers to their reſpective Council, and upon debate at that Council ſhall come to be propos'd by the ſame to the Senate, be neceſſarily debateable and debated by the Senate. That in all caſes wherein Power is committed to the Senate by a Law made or by Act of Parliament, the Reſult of the Senate be ultimate: that in all caſes of Law to be made, or not already provided for by an Act of Parliament, as War and Peace, levy of Men or Money, or the like, the Reſult of the Senate be not ultimate. That whatſoever is reſolv'd by the Senate, upon a caſe wherein their Reſult is not ultimate, be propos'd by the Senate to the Prerogative Tribe or Repreſentative of the People; except only in caſes of ſuch ſpeed or ſecrecy, wherein the Senate ſhall judge the neceſſary ſlowneſs or openneſs in this way of proceeding to be of detriment or danger to the Common-wealth.

34. *Function of the Dictator.*

THAT if upon the motion or propoſition of a Council or Propoſer General, the Senate adds nine Knights promiſcuouſly choſen out of their own number, to the Council of War; the ſame Council, as thereby made Dictator, have Power of life and Death, as alſo to enact Laws in all ſuch caſes of ſpeed or ſecrecy, for and during the term of three months and no longer, except upon a new Order from the Senate. And that all Laws enacted by the Dictator be good and valid for the term of one year, and no longer; except the ſame be propos'd by the Senate, and reſolv'd by the People.

THIS Dictatorian Council (as may already appear) conſiſts fundamentally of the Signory, with nine Knights elected by the Council of State, additionally of nine Knights more emergently choſen by the Senate, and of the four Tribunes of courſe; as will appear when I come to ſpeak of that Magiſtracy. Now if Dictatorian Power be indeed formidable, yet this in the firſt place is remarkable, that the Council here offer'd for a Dictator is of a much ſafer Conſtitution, than what among us hitherto has been offer'd for a Common-wealth; namely, a Parliament and a Council in the interim. For here is no interim, but all the Councils of the Common-wealth not only remaining, but remaining in the exerciſe of all their Functions, without the abatement of any; ſpeed and ſecrecy belonging not to any of them, but to that only of the Dictator. And if this Dictatorian Council has more in it of a Common-wealth than has hitherto among us been either practis'd or offer'd, by what Argument can it be pretended, that a Common-wealth is ſo imperfect thro' the neceſſity of ſuch an Order, that it muſt needs borrow of Monarchy; ſeeing every Monarchy that has any Senate, Aſſembly, or Council in it, thereby moſt apparently borrows more of a Common-wealth, than there is to be found of Monarchy in this Council?

The fifth Parallel.

TO diſmiſs this whole Senate with one Parallel: The inſtitution of the ſeventy Elders in *Iſrael* (as was ſhewn in the ſecond Book) for their number related to an Accident, and a Cuſtom thereupon antiently introduc'd. The Accident was that the Sons of JACOB who went into *Egypt* were ſo many; theſe, firſt governing their Families by natural right, came, as thoſe Families increas'd, to be for their number retain'd and continu'd in the nature of a Senatorian Council, while the People were yet in *Egyptian* Bondage. So we, having had no like Cuſtom,

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Custom, have as to the number no like Inducement. Again, the Territory of *Canaan* amounted not to a fourth of our Country; and in Government we are to fit our selves to our own proportions. Nor can a Senate, consisting of few Senators, be capable of so many distributions as a Senate consisting of more. Yet we find in the restitution of the Sanhedrim by JEHOSHAPHAT, that there was AMARIAH *chief in all matters of the Lord*, that is, in judgment upon the Laws, which, having been propos'd by God, were more peculiarly his matters; and ZEBADIAH *chief in all the Kings matters*, that is, in political debates concerning Government, or War and Peace. Lastly, *When the Children of* Ammon *made War against* Israel, *the People of* Israel *made* JEPHTHA *not only Captain*, but *Head over them.* So the Judge of *Israel*, being no standing Magistrate, but elected upon emergencies, supplies the Parallel as to Dictatorian Power in a Common-wealth.

2 Chr. 19. 11.

Judg. 11. 5. 11.

DEBATE is the natural Parent of Result; whence the Senate throughout the *Latin* Authors is call'd *Fathers*, and in *Greek* Authors the compellation of a popular Assembly is *Men*; as *Men of* Athens, *Men of* Corinth, *Men of* Lacedemon: nor is this Custom Heathen only, seeing these Compellations are us'd to the Senate and the People of the *Jews*, not only by STEPHEN, but also by PAUL, where they begin their speeches in this manner: *Men, Brethren, and Fathers.* To come then from the Fathers to the People, the Popular Assembly, or Prerogative Tribe; it is propos'd,

Act. 7. 2. & 22. 1.

Luke *throughout is perfectly well skill'd in the Customs of Common-wealths.*

35. *Fabric of the Prerogative Tribe.*

THAT the Burgesses of the annual Election return'd by the Tribes, enter into the Prerogative Tribe upon Monday next ensuing the last of *March*; and that the like number of Burgesses, whose term is expir'd, recede at the same time. That the Burgesses thus enter'd elect to themselves out of their own number, two of the Horse; one to be Captain, and the other to be Cornet of the same: and two of the Foot; one to be Captain, the other to be Insign of the same, each for the term of three years. That these Officers being thus elected, the whole Tribe or Assembly proceed to the Election of four annual Magistrates; two out of the Foot, to be Tribunes of the Foot: and two out of the Horse, to be Tribunes of the Horse. That the Tribunes be Commanders of this Tribe in chief, so far as it is a Military Body; and Presidents of the same, as it is a civil Assembly. And lastly, that this whole Tribe be paid weekly as follows. To each of the Tribunes of Horse, seven pounds. To each of the Tribunes of Foot, six pounds. To each of the Captains of Horse, five pounds. To each of the Captains of Foot, four pounds. To each of the Cornets, three pounds. To each of the Insigns, two pounds seven shillings. To every Horseman two pounds, and to every one of the Foot one pound ten shillings.

FOR the Salaries of the Senate and the People together, they amount not to three hundred thousand pounds a year; which is cheaper by near two parts in three, than the chief Magistracy ever did or can otherwise cost: for if you give nothing *(omnia dat qui justa negat)* men will be their own Carvers. But to proceed, it is propos'd,

36. *Offices of the Officers.*

THAT inferior Officers, as Captains, Cornets, Insigns, be only for the Military Discipline of the Tribe. That the Tribunes have Session in the Senate without suffrage; that they have Session of course in the Dictatorian Council, so often as it is created by the Senate, and with suffrage. That they be Presidents of the Court in all cases to be judg'd by the People.

THAT

THAT Peculate or Defraudation of the Public, and all caſes tending to the ſubverſion of the Government, be triable by this Repreſentative; and that there be an Appeal to the ſame in all Cauſes, and from all Magiſtrates, Courts, and Councils, whether National or Provincial. Chap. I. 37. *Appeal to the People.*

THIS Judicatory may ſeem large: but thus the Congregation of *Iſrael*, conſiſting of four hundred thouſand, judg'd the Tribe of *Benjamin*. Thus all the *Roman* Tribes judg'd CORIOLANUS. And thus Duke LOREDANO was try'd by the great Council of *Venice*, conſiſting yet of about two thouſand. *The ſixth Parallel.* Judg. 20. Halicar. Janotti.

THIS is as much as I have to ſay ſeverally of the Senate and the People; but their main Functions being joint, as they make one Parliament, it is farther propos'd,

THAT the right of Debate, as alſo of propoſing to the People, be wholly and only in the Senate; without any power at all of Reſult, not deriv'd from the People. 38. *The main Function of the Senate.*

THAT the power of Reſult be wholly and only in the People, without any right at all of Debate. 39. *The main Function of the Prerogative Tribe.*

THAT the Senate having debated and agreed upon a Law to be propos'd, cauſe promulgation of the ſame to be made for the ſpace of ſix weeks before propoſition; that is, cauſe the Law to be printed and publiſh'd ſo long before it is to be propos'd. 40. *Promulgation.*

THAT promulgation being made, the Signory demand of the Tribunes, being preſent in the Senate, an Aſſembly of the People. That the Tribunes, upon ſuch a demand of the Signory or of the Senate, be oblig'd to aſſemble the Prerogative Tribe in Arms by ſound of Trumpet, with Drums beating, and Colours flying, in any Town, Field, or Market place being not above ſix miles diſtant, upon the day and at the hour appointed; except the meeting, thro' any inconvenience of the weather or the like, be prorogu'd by the joint conſent of the Signory and the Tribunes. That the Prerogative Tribe being aſſembl'd accordingly, the Senate propoſe to them by two or more of the Senatorian Magiſtrates, thereto appointed at the firſt promulgation of the Law. That the Propoſers for the Senate open to the People the Occaſion, Motives, and Reaſons of the Law to be propos'd; and the ſame being done, put it by diſtinct Clauſes to the Ballot of the People. That if any material Clauſe or Clauſes be rejected by the People, they be review'd by the Senate, alter'd, and propos'd (if they think fit) to the third time, but no oftner. 41. *Manner of Propoſition.*

THAT what is thus propos'd by the Senate, and reſolv'd by the People, be the Law of the Land, and no other, except as in the caſe reſerv'd to the Dictatorian Council. 42. *Act of Parliament.*

THE Congregation of *Iſrael* being monthly, and the Repreſentative propos'd being annual and triennial, they are each upon Courſes or Rotation: the Congregation of *Iſrael* conſiſting of twenty four thouſand, in which the whole number of the Princes of the Tribes and of the Princes of the Familes amounted not, I might ſay, to one hundred, but will ſay to one thouſand; it follows, that the lower ſort in the Congregation of *Iſrael* held proportion to the better ſort, above twenty to one. Whereas in the Repreſentative propos'd, the lower ſort hold proportion to the better ſort but ſix to four; and that popular Congregation where the lower ſort hold but ſix to four, is by far the moſt Ariſtocratical that is or ever was in any well order'd Common-wealth, except *Venice*: but if you will have that Gentry to be all of one ſort, or if you allow them to be of a better and of a meaner ſort, *Venice* is not excepted. *The ſeventh Parallel.*

Book III. cepted. The Sanhedrim made no Law without the People; nor may the Senate in this Model: but the Sanhedrim with the Congregation,
Ezra 10. 8. might make Laws; ſo may the Senate, in our Model, with the Repreſentative of the People. Laſtly, as the Congregation in *Iſrael* was held either by the Princes in perſon, with their Staves and Standards of the Camp, or by the four and twenty thouſand in Military Diſcipline; ſo the Repreſentative propos'd is in the nature of a Regiment.

EXCEPTING *Venice*, where there is a ſhadow, and but a ſhadow, of Law made by the Senate (for the Sovereign Power is undeniably in the great Council) and *Athens*, where a Law made by the Senate was current as a Probationer for one year before it was propos'd to the People; there neither is nor has been any ſuch thing in a Common-wealth as a Law made by the Senate. That the Senate ſhould have power to make Laws, reduces the Government to a ſingle Council; and Government by a ſingle Council, if the Council be of the Many, is Anarchy, as in the Aſſembly of the *Roman* People by Tribes, which always ſhook, and at length ruin'd that Common-wealth: Or, if the Council be of the Few, it is Oligarchy, as that of *Athens* conſiſting of the four hundred, who nevertheleſs pretended to
Thucyd. lib. 8. propoſe to five thouſand, tho' they did not. Of which ſays THUCYDIDES, *This was indeed the form pretended in words by the four hundred; but the moſt of them, thro' private ambition, fell upon that by which an Oligarchy made out of a Democracy is chiefly overthrown: for at once they claim'd every one not to be equal, but to be far the chief.* Anarchy, or a ſingle Council conſiſting of the Many, is ever tumultuous, and does ill even while it means well. But Oligarchy, ſeldom meaning well, is a Faction wherein every one ſtriving to make himſelf, or ſome other from whom he hopes for advantage, ſpoils all. There is in a Common-wealth no other cure of theſe, than that the Anarchy may have a Council of ſome few, well choſen, and elected by themſelves, to adviſe them; which Council ſo inſtituted, is the Senate: Or that the Oligarchy have a popular Repreſentative to balance it; which both curing Tumult in the raſh and heady People, and all thoſe Corruptions which cauſe Factiouſneſs in the ſly and ſubtile Few, amount to the proper Superſtructures of a well order'd Common-wealth. As, to return to the example of the Oligarchy in *Athens*, where the four hundred (whoſe Reign, being very ſhort, had been as ſeditious) were depos'd; and the Sovereignty was decreed to a popular Council of five thouſand, with a Senate of four hundred annually elective upon Courſes, or by
Lib. 8. Rotation. Of this ſays THUCYDIDES, *Now firſt (at leaſt in my time) the* Athenians *ſeem to have order'd their State aright, it conſiſting of a moderate temper both of the Few and the Many. And this was the firſt thing that, after ſo many misfortunes, made the City again to raiſe her Head.* But we in *England* are not apt to believe, that to decree the Sovereignty to thouſands, were the way to make a City or a Nation recover of its Wounds, or to raiſe its Head. We have an averſion to ſuch thoughts, and are ſick of them. An Aſſembly of the People Sovereign! Nay, and an Aſſembly of the People conſiſting in the major vote of the lower ſort! Why, ſure it muſt be a dull, an unſkilful thing. But ſo is the Touch-ſtone in a Goldſmith's Shop, a dull thing, and altogether unſkill'd in the Trade; yet without this, would even the Maſter be deceiv'd. And certain it is, that a well order'd Aſſembly of the People is as true an Index of what in Government is good or great, as any Touch-ſtone is of Gold.

A COUN-

A COUNCIL (eſpecially if of a looſe Election) having not only the Debate, but the Reſult alſo, is capable of being influenc'd from without, and of being ſway'd by Intereſt within. There may be a form'd, and prejudic'd Party, that will haſten or out-baul you from the Debate to the Queſtion, and then precipitate you upon the Reſult: Whereas if it had no power of Reſult, there could remain to the ſame no more than Debate only, without any Biaſs, or cauſe of diverting ſuch Debate from Maturity; in which Maturity of unbiaſs'd Debate lies the final cauſe of the Senate, and the whole Light that can be given to a People. But when this is done, if your reſolving Aſſembly be not ſuch as can imbibe or contract no other Intereſt than that only of the whole People, all again is loſt: for the Reſult of all Aſſemblies goes principally upon that which they conceive to be their own Intereſt. But how an Aſſembly upon Rotation, conſiſting of one thouſand, where the Vote is ſix to four in the lower ſort, ſhould be capable of any other Intereſt than that only of the whole People, by which they are orderly elected, has never yet been, nor, I believe, ever will be ſhewn. In a like diſtribution therefore of Debate and Reſult, conſiſts the higheſt Myſtery of Popular Government; and indeed the ſupreme Law, wherein is contain'd not only the Liberty, but the Safety of the People. Chap. I.

FOR the remainder of the Civil part of this Model, which is now but ſmall, it is farther propos'd,

THAT every Magiſtracy, Office, or Election throughout this whole Common-wealth, whether annual or triennial, be underſtood of conſequence to enjoin an interval or vacation equal to the term of the ſame. That the Magiſtracy of a Knight and of a Burgeſs, be, in this relation, underſtood as one and the ſame; and that this Order regard only ſuch Elections as are National or Domeſtick, and not ſuch as are Provincial or Foreign. 43. *Rule for Vacations.*

THAT, for an exception from this Rule, where there is but one Elder of the Horſe in one and the ſame Pariſh, that Elder be eligible in the ſame without interval; and where there be above four Elders of the Horſe in one and the ſame Pariſh, there be not above half, nor under two of them eligible at the ſame Election. 44. *Exception from the Rule.*

OTHERWISE the People, beyond all manner of doubt, would elect ſo many of the better ſort at the very firſt, that there would not be of the Foot or of the meaner ſort enough to ſupply the due number of the Popular Aſſembly or Prerogative Tribe: and the better ſort being excluded ſubſequent Elections by their Intervals, there would not be wherewithal to furniſh the Senate, the Horſe of the Prerogative Tribe, and the reſt of the Magiſtracies; each of which Obſtructions is prevented by this Exception. Where, by the way, if in all experience ſuch has been the conſtant temper of the People, and can indeed be reaſonably no other, it is apparent what cauſe there can be of doubt, who in a Common-wealth of this nature muſt have the leading. Yet is no man excluded from any Preferment; only Induſtry, which ought naturally to be the firſt ſtep, is firſt enjoin'd by this Policy, but rewarded amply: ſeeing he, who has made himſelf worth one hundred Pounds a year, has made himſelf capable of all Preferments and Honours in this Government. Where a man from the loweſt ſtate may not riſe to the due pitch of his unqueſtionable Merit, the Common-wealth is not equal: yet neither can the People, under the Limitations propos'd, make choice (as ſome object) of any other than the

Book III. the better ſort; nor have they at any time been ſo inclining to do, where they have not been under ſuch Limitations. Be it ſpoken, not to the diſpargement of any man, but on the contrary to their praiſe whoſe Merit has made them great, the People of *England* have not gone ſo low in the election of a Houſe of Commons, as ſome Prince has done in the election of a Houſe of Lords. To weigh Election by a Prince with Election by a People, ſet the Nobility of *Athens* and *Rome* by the Nobility of the old Monarchy, and a Houſe of Commons freely choſen by the Nobility of the new. There remains but the *Quorum*, for which it is propos'd.

The 45. *Quorum.* THAT, throughout all the Aſſemblies and Councils of this Common-wealth, the *Quorum* conſiſt of one half in the time of Health, and of one third part in a time of Sickneſs, being ſo declared by the Senate.

HOW the City Government without any diminution of their Privileges, and with an Improvement of their Policy, may be made to fall in with theſe Orders, has * elſewhere been ſhewn in part, and may be conſider'd farther at leiſure. Otherwiſe the whole Common-wealth, ſo far as it is merely Civil, is in this part accompliſh'd. Now as of neceſſity there muſt be a natural Man, or a man indu'd with a natural Body, before there can be a ſpiritual Man or a Man capable of Divine Contemplation; ſo a Government muſt have a Civil, before it can have a Religious part: And if a man furniſh'd only with natural parts can never be ſo ſtupid as not to make ſome Reflections upon Religion, much leſs a Common-wealth; which neceſſitates the Religious part of this Model.

* *In* Oceana.

CHAP. II.

Containing the Religious Part of this Model, propos'd practicably.

THERE is nothing more certain or demonſtrable to common Senſe, than that the far greater part of Mankind, in matters of Religion, give themſelves up to the publick Leading. Now a National Religion rightly eſtabliſh'd, or not coercive, is not any publick driving, but only the publick leading. If the Publick in this caſe may not lead ſuch as deſire to be led by the Publick, and yet a Party may lead ſuch as deſire to be led by a Party; where would be the Liberty of Conſcience as to the State? Which certainly in a well order'd Common-wealth, being the publick Reaſon, muſt be the publick Conſcience. Nay, where would be the Liberty of Conſcience in reſpect of any Party which ſhould ſo proceed as to ſhew, that without taking their Liberty of Conſcience from others, they cannot have it themſelves? If the Publick refuſing Liberty of Conſcience to a Party, would be the cauſe of Tumult, how much more a Party refuſing it to the Publick? And how, in caſe of ſuch a Tumult, ſhould a Party defend their Liberty of Conſcience, or indeed their Throats from the whole or a far greater Party without keeping down or tyrannizing over the whole or a far greater Party by force of Arms? Theſe things being rightly conſider'd, it is no wonder that Men, living like men, have not been yet found without a Government, or that any Government has not been yet found without

out a National Religion; that is, ſome orderly and known way of public leading in divine things, or in the worſhip of God. Chap. 2

A NATIONAL Religion being thus prov'd neceſſary, it remains that I prove what is neceſſary to the ſame; that is, as it concerns the State, or in relation to the Duty of the Magiſtrate.

CERTAIN it is, that Religion has not ſeen corruption but by one of theſe three cauſes; ſome Intereſt therewith incorporated, ſome ignorance of the truth of it, or by ſome complication of both. Nor was ever Religion left wholly to the management of a Clergy that eſcap'd theſe Cauſes, or their moſt pernicious Effects; as may be perceiv'd in *Rome*, which has brought Ignorance to be the Mother of Devotion, and indeed Intereſt to be the Father of Religion. Now the Clergy not failing in this caſe to be dangerous, what recourſe but to the Magiſtrate for ſafety? ſpecially ſeeing theſe Cauſes, that is, Intereſt and Ignorance (the one proceeding from evil Laws, the other from the want of good Education) are not in the right or power of a Clergy, but only of the Civil Magiſtracy. Or if ſo it be that Magiſtrates are oblig'd in duty to be *nurſing Fathers and nurſing Mothers* to the Church; how ſhall a State in the ſight of God be excuſable that takes no heed or care leſt Religion ſuffer by Cauſes, the prevention or remedy whereof is in them only? To theſe therefore it is propos'd, Iſa. 49. 23.

THAT the Univerſities being prudently reform'd, be preſerv'd in their Rights and Endowments, for and towards the education and proviſion of an able Miniſtry. 46. *Univerſities.*

WE are commanded by CHRIST to *ſearch the Scriptures:* The Scriptures are not now to be ſearch'd but by skill in Tongues: The immediate gift of Tongues is ceas'd: How then ſhould skill in Tongues be acquir'd but mediately, or by the means of Education? How ſhould a State expect ſuch an Education (particularly for a matter of ten thouſand men) that provides not for it? And what proviſion can a State make for this Education, but by ſuch Schools ſo endow'd and regulated, as with us are the Univerſities? Theſe therefore are a neceſſary ſtep towards the prevention of ſuch Ignorance or Intereſt, as thro' the infirmities or biaſs of Tranſlators, Interpreters, and Preachers, both have and may frequently come to be incorporated with Religion; as alſo to the improvement or acquiſition of ſuch Light as is by the command of CHRIST to be attain'd or exercis'd in ſearching the Scriptures. Joſh. 5. 39.

THE excellent Learning of the *Levites* in all kinds, not ordinarily infus'd, but acquir'd (there having been among them *as well the Teacher as the Scholar*) leaves little doubt but their forty eight Cities were as ſo many Univerſities. Theſe with their Suburbs or Endowments contain'd in the whole (each of their Circuits in Land reckon'd at four thouſand Cubits deep) about a hundred thouſand Acres; that is, if their meaſure was according to the common Cubit: if according to the holy Cubit (as with *Levites* was moſt likely) twice ſo much; which, at the loweſt account, I conceive to be far above the Revenues of both our Univerſities. *The eighth Parallel.* 1. Chron. 25. 8. Mal. 2. 12.

THESE being order'd as has been ſaid, it is propos'd,

THAT the legal and antient proviſion for the National Miniſtry be ſo augmented, that the meaneſt ſort of Livings or Benefices, without defalcation from the greater, be each improv'd to the Revenue of one hundred pounds at leaſt. 47. *Augmentation of Livings.*

Book III.

The ninth Parallel.

THIS, in regard the way is by Tythes, comes up ſo cloſe to the Orders of *Iſrael*, as, in our day, may ſhew that a Common-wealth may come too near that pattern to be lik'd. We find not indeed that the Apoſtles either took or demanded Tythes; in which caſe the Prieſts, who were legally poſſeſt of them, might have had ſuſpicion that they, under colour of Religion, had aim'd at the violation of Property. But putting the caſe that generally the Prieſts had been converted to the Chriſtian Faith, whether the Apoſtles would for that reaſon have injoined them to relinquiſh their Tythes? Or what is there in the Chriſtian Religion to favour any ſuch ſurmiſe? To me there ſeems abundantly enough to the contrary. For if the Apoſtles ſtuck not to comply with the *Jews* in a Ceremony which was of mere human invention, and to introduce this, as they did Ordination by impoſition of hands, into the Chriſtian Church; that they would, upon a like inducement, have refus'd a ſtanding Law undoubtedly Moſaical, is in my opinion moſt improbable. So that, I conceive, the Law for Tythes now in being, may or may not be continu'd, at the pleaſure of the Law-givers, for any thing in this caſe to the contrary. Confident I am, that the introducing of this Model in the whole, which is thought impracticable, were not to willing minds ſo difficult a work as the abolition of Tythes.

BUT Benefices, whether by way of Tythes or otherwiſe, being thus order'd; it is propos'd,

48. *Ordination.*

THAT a Benefice becoming void in any Pariſh, the Elders of the ſame may aſſemble and give notice to the Vice-Chancellor of either Univerſity by a Certificate, ſpecifying the true value of that Benefice: that the Vice-Chancellor, upon the receipt of this Certificate, be oblig'd to call a Congregation of his Univerſity: that the Congregation of the Univerſity to this end aſſembl'd, having regard to the value of the Benefice, make choice of a Perſon fit for the Miniſterial Function, and return him to the Pariſh ſo requiring: that the Probationer thus return'd to a Pariſh by either of the Univerſities, exerciſe the Office, and receive the Benefits as Miniſter of the Pariſh for the term of one year: that the term of one year being expir'd, the Elders of the Pariſh aſſemble and put the Election of the Probationer to the Ballot: that if the Probationer has three parts in four of the Balls or Votes in the Affirmative, he be thereby ordain'd and elected Miniſter of that Pariſh; not afterwards to be degraded or remov'd, but by the Cenſors of the Tribe, the Phylarch of the ſame, or the Council of Religion in ſuch caſes as ſhall be to them reſerv'd by Act of Parliament: That in caſe the Probationer comes to fail of three parts in four at the Ballot, he depart from that Pariſh; and if he returns to the Univerſity, it be without diminution of the former Offices or Preferments which he there enjoy'd, or any prejudice to his future Preferment: and that it be lawful in this caſe for any Pariſh to ſend ſo often to either Univerſity, and it be the duty of either Vice-Chancellor upon ſuch Certificates to make return of different Probationers, till ſuch time as the Elders of that Pariſh have fitted themſelves with a Miniſter of their own choice and liking.

IN caſe it was thought fit that a Probationer thus elected ſhould, before he departs, receive impoſition of hands from the Doctors of the Univerſity, I cannot ſee what the moſt ſcrupulous in the matter of Ordination could find wanting. But let this be ſo, or otherwiſe, it is indifferent. The Univerſities by propoſing to the Congregation in every pariſh, do the Senatorian Office; and the People,

thus

thus fitting themſelves by their Suffrage or Ballot, reſerve that Office which is truly popular, that is the Reſult, to themſelves. Chap. 2.

MOSES (for ſo far back the Divines reach at Ordination) in the inſtitution of the Senate of *Iſrael*, wherein he can never be prov'd to have us'd impoſition of hands, performing the Senatorian Office, caus'd the People to take wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among their Tribes, whereof the Lot fell upon all but ELDAD and MEDAD. And the Apoſtles doing the Senatorian Office, in like manner without impoſition of hands, caus'd the whole Congregation to take two, whereof the lot of Apoſtleſhip fell upon MATTHIAS. So that this way of Ordination being that which was inſtituted by MOSES, and the chief or firſt of thoſe which were us'd by the Apoſtles, is both Moſaical and Apoſtolical. Nor has a well order'd Common-wealth any choice left of thoſe other ways of Ordination, us'd by the Apoſtles in complaiſance to worſe ſort of Government; but is naturally neceſſitated to this, that is, to the very beſt. *The tenth Parallel.* Deut. 1. Numb. 11. Acts 1. 26. *See Book 2. chap. 8.*

ORDINATION being thus provided for, it is propos'd.

49. *National Religion; and proviſion againſt ſcandalous Miniſters.*

THAT the National Religion be exercis'd according to a Directory in that caſe to be made, and publiſh'd by Act of Parliament. That the National Miniſtry be permitted to have no other public Preferment or Office in this Common-wealth. That a National Miniſter being convict of Ignorance or Scandal, be movable out of his Benefice by the Cenſors of the Tribe, under an appeal to the Phylarch, or to the Council for Religion.

50. *Liberty of Conſcience.*

THAT no Religion, being contrary to or deſtructive of Chriſtianity, nor the public exerciſe of any Religion, being grounded upon or incorporated into a foreign Intereſt, be protected by or tolerated in this State. That all other Religions, with the public exerciſe of the ſame, be both tolerated and protected by the Council of Religion: and that all Profeſſors of any ſuch Religion, be equally capable of all Elections, Magiſtracies, Preferments, and Offices in this Common-wealth, according to the Orders of the ſame.

UPON the whole of theſe Propoſitions, touching Church Diſcipline, we may make theſe Obſervations. Thus neither would the Party that is for gifted Men, and Enemies to Learning, thro' ignorance (which elſe in all probability they muſt) loſe Religion; nor the Clergy be able to corrupt it by Intereſt. But Decency and Order, with liberty of Conſcience, would ſtill flouriſh together; while the Miniſter has a Preferment he ſought, the Pariſh a Miniſter they choſe, the Nation a Religion according to the public Conſcience, and every man his Chriſtian Liberty. He therefore that endeavours to confute this Chapter, muſt either ſhew how theſe things may be omitted, or more effectually provided for; or tithe Mint and Cumin, and neglect the weightier things of Law-giving.

A COMMON-WEALTH having, in the eſtabliſhment of Religion, made reſignation of her ſelf to God, ought in the next place to have regard to the natural means of her defence; which introduces the Military part of this Model.

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CHAP. III.

Containing the Military part of this Model, propos'd practicably.

THE Military Part, on which at preſent I ſhall diſcourſe little, conſiſts in the Diſcipline of the Youth, that is, of ſuch as are between eighteen and thirty years of Age: and for the Diſcipline of the Youth it is propos'd,

51. *Diſcipline of the Youth.* THAT annually upon Wedneſday next enſuing the laſt of *December*, the Youth of each Pariſh (under the inſpection of the two Over-ſeers of the ſame) aſſemble and elect the fifth man of their number, or one in five of them, to be for the term of that year Deputies of the Youth of that Pariſh.

52. *Their Troops, and Sports.* THAT annually on Wedneſday next enſuing the laſt of *January*, the ſaid Deputies of the reſpective Pariſhes meet at the Capital of the Hundred (where there are Games and Prizes allotted for them, as has been ſhew'd * elſewhere) and there elect to themſelves out of their own number, one Captain, and one Enſign. And that of theſe Games, and of this Election, the Magiſtrates and Officers of the Hundred be Preſidents, and Judges for the impartial diſtribution of the Prizes.

* In *Oceana*.

53. *Their Squadrons, and Exerciſes.* THAT annually upon Wedneſday next enſuing the laſt of *February*, the Youth thro' the whole Tribe thus elected, be receiv'd at the Capital of the ſame, by the Lieutenant as Commander in chief, by the Conductor, and by the Cenſors; that under the inſpection of theſe Magiſtrates, the ſaid Youth be entertain'd with more ſplendid Games, diſciplin'd in a more military manner, and be divided by lot into ſundry parts, or Eſſays, according to the Rules * elſewhere given.

* In *Oceana*.

54. *The ſecond Eſſay, or the ſtanding Army.* THAT the whole Youth of the Tribe, thus aſſembl'd, be the firſt Eſſay. That out of the firſt Eſſay, there be caſt by lot two hundred Horſe, and ſix hundred Foot: that they whom their friends will, or themſelves can mount, be accounted Horſe, the reſt Foot. That theſe Forces (amounting in the fifty Tribes to ten thouſand Horſe, and thirty thouſand Foot) be always ready to march at a weeks warning: and that this be the ſecond Eſſay, or the ſtanding Army of the Common-wealth.

55. *Provincial Guards.* THAT for the holding of each Province, the Common-wealth in the firſt year aſſign an Army of the Youth, conſiſting of ſeven thouſand five hundred Foot, and one thouſand five hundred Horſe. That for the perpetuation of theſe Provincial Armies or Guards, there be annually, at the time and places mention'd, caſt out of the firſt Eſſay of the Youth in each Tribe ten Horſe, and fifty Foot: that is, in all the Tribes five hundred Horſe, and two thouſand five hundred Foot for *Scotland*; the like for *Ireland*; and the like of both orders for the Sea Guards: being each oblig'd to ſerve for the term of three years upon the States pay.

THE ſtanding Army of the Common-wealth conſiſting thus of forty thouſand, not Soldiers of fortune neither in body nor in pay, but Citizens at their Vocations or Trades, and yet upon command in continual readineſs; and the Provincial Armies each conſiſting of nine thouſand in pay in body, and poſſeſs'd of the Avenues and places of ſtrength in the Province, it is not imaginable how a Province ſhould be ſo ſoon able to ſtir, as the Common-wealth muſt be to pour forty thouſand men upon it, beſides the Sea Guards. Nor comes this Militia thus

thus conſtituted, except upon marches, to any charge at all; the ſtanding Army having no pay, and the Provinces, whereof the Sea thus guarded will be none of the pooreſt, maintaining their own Guards. Such is the military way of a Common-wealth, and the Conſtitution of its Armies, whether levy'd by Suffrage, as in *Rome*; or by Lot, as in *Iſrael*. Chap. 3.

The eleventh Parallel.

WE will go up by Lot againſt Gibeah. Judg. 20. 9.

STANDING Forces being thus eſtabliſh'd; for ſuch as are upon emergent occaſions to go forth, or march, it is propos'd,

56. *The third Eſſay, or Army marching.*

THAT the Senate and the People, or the Dictator having decreed or declar'd War, and the Field Officers being appointed by the Council of War; the General by Warrant iſſu'd to the Lieutenants of the Tribes, demand the ſecond Eſſay, or ſuch part of it as is decreed; whether by way of levy or recruit. That by the ſame Warrant he appoint his time and Rendevouz: that the ſeveral Conductors of the Tribes deliver him the Forces demanded, at the time and place appointed. That a General thus marching out with the ſtanding Army, a new Army be elected out of the firſt Eſſay as formerly, and a new General be elected by the Senate; that ſo always there be a General ſitting, and a ſtanding Army, what Generals or Armies ſoever be marching. And that in caſe of Invaſion the Bands of the Elders be oblig'd to like duty with thoſe of the Youth.

57. *Pœna ἀσρατείας, or the Guardian of Education and Liberty.*

THAT an only Son be diſcharg'd of theſe Duties without prejudice. That of two Brothers there be but one admitted to foreign Service at one time. That of more Brothers, not above half. That whoever otherwiſe refuſes his Lot, except upon cauſe ſhewn he be diſpens'd with by the Phylarch, or upon penitence be by them pardon'd and reſtor'd, by ſuch refuſal be uncapable of electing, or being elected in this Common-wealth; as alſo that he pay to the State a fifth of his Revenue for protection, beſides Taxes. That Divines, Phyſicians, and Lawyers, as alſo Trades not at leiſure for the Eſſays, be ſo far exempted from this Rule, that they be ſtill capable of all Preferments in their reſpective Profeſſions, with Indemnity, and without Military Education or Service.

A COMMON-WEALTH whoſe Militia conſiſts of Mercenaries, to be ſafe, muſt be ſituated as *Venice*, but can in no wiſe be great. The Induſtry of *Holland* is the mean Revenue of that State; whence not being able to ſpare hands to her Arms, ſhe is caſt upon Strangers and mercenary Forces, thro' which we in our time have ſeen *Amſterdam* neceſſitated to let in the Sea upon her, and to become (as it were) *Venice*. To a Popular Government that could not do the like, Mercenary Arms have never fail'd to be fatal; whence the laſt Propoſition is that which in every well order'd Common-wealth has been look'd to as the main guard of Liberty.

The twelfth Parallel.

IN this *Iſrael* was formidable beyond all other Common-wealths with a kind of Fulmination. SAUL when he heard the Cruelty of NAHASH the *Ammonite*, at the Leaguer of *Jabeth-Gilead*, *took a yoke of Oxen and hew'd them in pieces, and ſent them throughout the Coaſts of* Iſrael, *by the hands of Meſſengers, ſaying, Whoſoever comes not out after* SAUL, *and after* SAMUEL, *ſo ſhall it be done to his Oxen.* Which amounted not only to a confiſcation of Goods (the Riches of the *Iſraelites* lying moſt in their Cattle) but to a kind of *Anathema*, as more plainly appears, where it is ſaid, *Curſe ye* Meroz, *curſe ye bitterly the Inhabitants thereof, becauſe they came not forth to help the Lord againſt the Mighty.* Nay this (ἀσρατεία) deſertion of the

1 Sam. 11. 7.

Judg. 5. 23.

Book III. Military Orders and Services in *Iſrael*, was ſometimes puniſh'd with total extermination, as after the Victory againſt *Benjamin*, where *the Congregation* or Political Aſſembly of that People, making inquiſition *what one of the Tribes of* Iſrael *came not up to the Lord in* Mizpeh, (the place where before the taking of *Jeruſalem* they held, as I may ſay, their Parliaments) and finding that *there came none to the Camp from* Jabeſh-Gilead, *ſent thither twelve thouſand men of the valianteſt, ſaying, Go and ſmite the Inhabitants of* Jabeſh-Gilead *with the edge of the Sword, with the Women and the Children:* which was done accordingly.

Judg. 21.

BUT by this time men will ſhrink at this as a dreadful Order, and begin to compute that a Common-wealth, let her Prerogatives for the reſt be what they will, muſt at this rate be but a dear purchaſe: whereas indeed, if this way coſts ſomething, there is no other that does not hazard all; foraſmuch as diſcarding this Order, play your game as you can, you are ſometime or other a Prey to your Enemies, or to your Mercenaries. This certainly is that root in (the *Penetralia*) the bowels of a Common-wealth, whence never any Court Arts, or Politeneſs, could attain to the gallantry or ſplendor of the Education in Popular Governments. For let any man (remembring what it was to be a GIDEON, a MILTIADES, a TIMOLEON, a SCIPIO, or a Magiſtrate in a Common-wealth) conſider if there ſhould be no way with us to Magiſtracy, but by having ſerv'd three years at Sea, and three years at Land, how the whole face and genius of Education, both in the better and in the lower ſort, would of neceſſity be chang'd in this Nation, and what kind of Magiſtrates ſuch experience in thoſe Services muſt create to the Common-wealth. Conſider, whether the threaten'd Puniſhments of this Order, tho' thro' unaquaintance they may at firſt ſight have ſome brow, would not, as they have done in other Common-wealths of like ſtructure, even with low ſpirits, expire in ſcorn and contempt, or thro' the mere contemplation of the reward of Honour, nay of the Honour it ſelf, in which point where right has not been done, men, under Governments of this nature, have been much more apt to heats; as where the men of *Ephraim* fought againſt JEPTHA, for an affront in this kind which they conceiv'd him to have put upon them. *Wherefore paſſedſt thou over to fight againſt the Children of* Ammon, *and didſt not call us to go with thee? We will burn thy houſe upon thee with fire.* Nor is this way ſo expenſive of the Purſe, or of Blood. Not of the public Purſe, becauſe it deteſts Mercenaries; nor of the private Purſe, becauſe the ways of Education thus directed, are all aſſiſted with the States pay: ſo that a man in this road might educate three Children cheaper, and to the moſt ſolid ends, than he could any one to trifle in thoſe which among us hitherto have been uſual. And as to Blood, there is nothing more certain, than that Idleneſs, and its inſeparable companion Luxury, are exceedingly more waſteful as of the Purſe, ſo of Health, nay and of Life it ſelf, than is War; which nevertheleſs this Order is ſuch as does rather prevent than neceſſitate, in regard that to be potent in Arms is the way of Peace. But whereas in a Martial Common-wealth there may be men having exceeded the thirtieth year of their Age, who like thoſe of *Ephraim* would yet take it ill to be excluded the Liſts of Honour, and it muſt alſo be to the detriment of the Common-wealth that they ſhould; for theſe, whom we may call Volunteers, it is propos'd,

Judg. 12.

THAT

THAT upon Warants iſſu'd forth by the General for Recruits or Levies, there be an Aſſembly of the Phylarch in each Tribe; that ſuch Volunteers, or men being above thirty years of Age, as are deſirous of farther imployment in Arms, appear before the Phylarch ſo aſſembl'd. That any number of theſe, not exceeding one moity of the Recruits or Levies of that Tribe, may be taken on by the Phylarch, ſo many of the Youth being at the diſcretion of this Council diſbanded, as are taken on of the Volunteers. That the Levies thus made, be conducted by the Conductor of the reſpective Tribe to the Rendevouz appointed. And that the Service of theſe be without other term or vacation, than at the diſcretion of the Senate and the People, or ſuch Inſtructions to the General, as ſhall by them in that caſe be provided. Chap. 4. 58. Volunteers.

THUS much for the Military or Defenſive part of this Model. For Offences in general it is written, *Woe unto the world becauſe of Offences; for it muſt needs be that Offences come, but woe to that man by whom the Offence comes.* Among Offences are offenſive Wars: now it being out of queſtion, that for the righteous execution of this Woe upon him or them by whom the Offence comes, a War may be juſt and neceſſary, as alſo that Victory in a juſt and neceſſary War may intitle one Prince or one People to the Dominion or Empire of another Prince or People; it is alſo out of queſtion, that a Common-wealth, unleſs in this caſe ſhe be provided both to acquire, and to hold what ſhe acquires, is not perfect: which Conſideration brings me to the Provincial part of this Model. Mat. 18. 7.

CHAP IV

Containing the Provincial Part of this Model, propos'd practicably.

THE word *Province* is with *Roman* Authors of divers ſignifications. By theſe it is taken ſometimes for Magiſtracy; as that of the Conſul, which is call'd *His Province:* ſometime for any Religion or Country, in which a *Roman* Captain or General was commanded to make War; but ſpecially for ſuch a Country as was acquir'd and held by Arms, or by *Provincial Right.* The word is of the like different uſe in Scripture; as where it is ſaid, That AHASUERUS *reign'd over a hundred and ſeven Provinces*; by which are underſtood as well the diviſions of the native, as thoſe of the acquir'd Territories. But where TANAIS the Governor writes to the King of *Aſſyria* concerning the Province of *Judea*, it is underſtood a Country acquir'd and held by Arms; which comes to the uſual ſignification of the word with the *Romans*, it being in this ſenſe that the Governor FELIX ask'd PAUL of *what Province he was*, and came to underſtand that he was of *Cilicia*, then a Province of the *Roman* Empire: and this ſignification is that in which I take the word throughout this Chapter. Eſth. 1. 1. Ezra 5. 8. Acts 23. 34.

THE mighty load of Empire which happen'd to the Common-wealth of *Rome* thro' the Acquiſition of many and vaſt Provinces, is that whereto the Songs of Poets, and the opinions of more ſerious Writers attribute the weight which they ſay overſway'd her. But this Judgment, tho' in it ſelf right, is not in the manner they take it to be ſwallow'd without chewing. For how probable it is that the ſuc-

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ſucceeding Monarchy was able to ſupport a weight in this kind, which the Common-wealth could not bear, may at this diſtance be diſcern'd, in that the Provinces were infinitely more turbulent in the Reign of the Emperors, than in that of the Common-wealth, as having a far ſtronger Intereſt, thro' ambition of attaining to the whole, to tear the Empire in Pieces: which they did, while divers Provinces made divers Emperors, which before could not hope to make divers Common-wealths, nor to acquire ſafety by retreat to a petty Government. But in this, the acquiſition of Provinces devour'd the Common-wealth of *Rome*, that, ſhe not being ſufficiently fortify'd by *Agrarian* Laws, the Nobility, thro' the ſpoil of Provinces, came to eat the People out of their Popular Balance or Lands in *Italy* by Purchaſes; and the Lands that had been in the hands of the Many, coming thus into the hands of the Few, of natural and neceſſary conſequence there follows Monarchy.

Plutarch *in* Gracch.

NOW that *England*, a Monarchy, has been ſeiz'd of Provinces (one of them, while *France* was ſuch, being as great as any one of the *Roman)* is a known thing; and that the Militia propos'd by the preſent Model, contains all the cauſes of Greatneſs that were in that of *Rome*, is to ſuch as are not altogether ſtrangers to the former, no leſs than obvious. Now of like Cauſes not to preſume like Effects, were unreaſonable. The ſafety therefore of the foregoing *Agrarian*, as hitherto propos'd, or that Lands be divided in their deſcent, muſt in this caſe be none at all, unleſs there be ſome ſtop alſo given in their Accumulation by way of Purchaſe; leſt otherwiſe the ſpoil of ſome mighty Province be ſtill ſufficient to eat out the People by purchaſe.

TO ſubmit therefore in this place (for ought I perceive) to inevitable neceſſity, it is propos'd,

59. *Additional Propoſitions to the* Agrarian.

THAT (great Common-wealths having been overthrown by the ſpoil of Provinces) an Eſtate of two thouſand pounds a year in Land, be incapable of any Accumulation by way of purchaſe.

DONATIONS and Inheritances will be fewer than to be dangerous; and as ſome fall, others will be dividing in their deſcent. But to reſume the Diſcourſe upon the *Agrarian* Laws, which, becauſe they were not till in this Propoſition compleat, remains imperfect. That to *Agrarian* Laws ſome Standard is neceſſary, appears plainly enough. This Standard in a well founded Monarchy, muſt bar receſs; and in a well founded Common-wealth muſt bar increaſe. For certain it is, that otherwiſe each of the Policies does naturally breed that Viper which eats out the Bowels of the Mother: as Monarchy, by Pomp and Luxury, reduces her Nobility thro' debt to poverty, and at length to a level with the People, upon which no Throne ever ſtood or can ſtand: ſuch was the caſe of this Nation under her latter Princes. And a Common-wealth by her natural ways of frugality, of fattening and cockering up of the People, is apt to bring Eſtates to ſuch exceſs in ſome hands, as eating out the reſt, bows the Neck of a free State or City to the yoke, and expoſes her to the goad of a Lord and Maſter; which was the caſe of *Rome* under her perpetual Dictators. But why yet muſt this Standard of Land in the preſent caſe, be neither more nor leſs than juſt two thouſand pounds a year? Truly, where ſome Standard was neceſſary to be nam'd, I might as well ask why not this as well as any other? yet am I not without ſuch Reaſons why I have pitch'd upon this rather than

than any other, as I may ſubmit to the judgment of the Reader in the following computation or compariſon of the divers Effects or Conſequences of ſo many different Standards, as by the rules of proportion may give ſufficient account of the reſt. Chap. 4.

LET the dry Rent of *England* (that is, at the rate a man may have for his Land without ſweating) be computed at ten Millions: This preſum'd, if you ſet the Standard at ten thouſand pounds a year, the whole Territory can come into no fewer than one thouſand hands. If you ſet it at five thouſand pounds a year, it can come into no fewer than two thouſand hands; and if you ſet it at two thouſand pounds a year, it can come into no fewer than five thouſand hands. It will be ſaid, In which way you pleaſe, it will never come into ſo few hands as are capable of having it; which is certain: yet becauſe the Effects in their approaches would be ſuch as may be meaſur'd by their Extremes, I ſhall pitch upon theſe as the readieſt way to guide my Computation. The Balance in a thouſand hands might affect the Government with a hankering after Monarchy; in two thouſand hands it might uſurp it, as did the *Roman* Nobility, and thereby occaſion a feud between the Senate and the People. Theſe not only in the extremes, but with much of a like nature in the approaches.

BUT letting theſe paſs, as alſo the numbers or compaſs neceſſary to the Rotation of ſuch a Common-wealth (none of which inconveniences are incident to the Standard of two thouſand pounds a year, as that whereby Lands can come into no fewer than five thouſand Proprietors) we will ſuppoſe theſe Standards to be each of them, as to the ſafety of the Government, indifferently practicable.

YET it is recorded by Experience, and wiſe Authors, that the true cauſe whence *England* has been an over-match in Arms for *France*, lay in the communication or diſtribution of Property to the lower ſort; and for the ſame cauſe let it be conſider'd, if the Common-wealth upon the Standard of two thouſand pounds a year *(cæteris paribus)* muſt not neceſſarily be an over-match in the potency of its Militia for the other two. Such are the advantages, ſuch is the glory of the like moderation to the public. *Money* (ſays the Lord VERULAM) *is like muck, not good except it be ſpread.* Much rather in Popular Government is this holding as to Land, the latter having upon the State a far ſtronger influence, at leaſt in larger Territories, than Money: for in ſuch, Money, while ſcarce, cannot over-balance Land; and were Silver and Gold as plentiful as Braſs or Iron, they would be no more, nor would Land be leſs worth. And for private men, were it not that *it is eaſier to fill the belly of a Glutton than his eyes,* not only Virtue, but the Beatitude of Riches, would be apparently conſiſtent in a mean. But what need I play the Divine or the Philoſopher upon a Doctrine, which is not to diminiſh any man's Eſtate, not to bring any man from the Cuſtoms to which he has been inur'd, nor from any emergent expectation he may have; but regards only the Generation to come, or the Children to be born ſeven years after the paſſing ſuch a Law? Whence it muſt needs follow, that putting the caſe this *Agrarian* be introduc'd, it is to our Age as if there were none; and if there be no *Agrarian*, it is to our Age as if there was one. The difference is no more, than that in the one way the Common-wealth is at all points ſecur'd, and in the other it is left to its fortune even in the main. Of

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ſuch ſovereign effect are the like Laws, that I would go yet farther, and propoſe,

60. *Agrarian for* Scotland *and* Ireland.

THAT in *Scotland* the Standard be ſet at five hundred pounds a year; in *Ireland* at two thouſand pounds a year in Land; the reſt for each as for *England*.

NARROWNESS of an *Agrarian* for *Scotland*, being a Martial Country, would make the larger proviſion of a good Auxiliary Militia; and largeneſs of an *Agrarian* for *Ireland*, being leſs Martial, would caſt a Sop into the Jaws of the Avarice of thoſe who ſhould think it too much confin'd in *England*. And leſt the Provincials in this caſe ſhould think themſelves worſe dealt with than the Citizens themſelves, the ſum of the *Agrarian* Laws being caſt up together, any man in the three Nations may hold four thouſand five hundred pounds a year in Land; and any ſmall Parcel of Land, or mere Reſidence in *England*, makes a Provincial a Citizen. Should the Common-wealth increaſe in Provinces, the Eſtates at this rate both of the Citizens and Provincials, would be more and greater than ever were thoſe of the antient Nobility of theſe Nations; and without any the leaſt hazard to Liberty. For he, who conſidering the whole *Roman* Story, or that only of the GRACCHI in PLUTARCH, ſhall rightly judge, muſt confeſs, that had *Rome* preſerv'd a good *Agrarian* but in *Italy*, the Riches of its Provinces could not have torn up the Roots of its Liberty, but on the contrary muſt have water'd them. It may be ſaid, What need then of putting an *Agrarian* upon the Provinces? I anſwer: For two Reaſons: firſt is Indulgence to the Provincials; and the ſecond, Advantage to the Common-wealth. For the firſt, it is with ſmall foreſight apparent enough, that the Avarice of the Citizen being bounded at home, and having no limits in the Provinces, would in a few years eat up the Provincials, and bring their whole Countries (as the *Roman* Patricians did *Italy*) to ſound in their Fetters, or to be till'd by their Slaves or Underlings. And ſo, for the ſecond, the Common-wealth would by ſuch means loſe an Auxiliary Militia, to be otherwiſe in *Scotland* only more worth than the *Indies*. Theſe things therefore thus order'd, it is propos'd,

61. *Provincial Councils.*

THAT upon the expiration of Magiſtracy in the Senate, or at the annual Receſs of one third part of the ſame, there be elected by the Senate out of the part receding, into each Provincial Council four Knights for the term of three years; thereby to render each Provincial Council (preſuming it in the beginning to have been conſtituted of twelve Knights, divided after the manner of the Senate by three ſeveral Liſts or Elections) of annual, triennial, and perpetual Revolution or Rotation.

62. *Provincial Governors or Generals.*

THAT out of the ſame third part of the Senate annually receding, there be to each Province one Knight elected for the term of one year. That the Knight ſo elected be the Provincial General or Governor. That a Provincial Governor or General receive annually in *April* at his Rendevouz appointed, the Youth or Recruits elected in the precedent Month to that end by the Tribes, and by their Conductors deliver'd accordingly. That he repair with the ſaid Youth or Recruits to his Province, and there diſmiſs that part of the Provincial Guard or Army whoſe triennial term is expir'd. That each Provincial Governor have the conduct of Affairs of War and of State in his reſpective Province, with advice of the Provincial Council; and that he be Preſident of the ſame.

THAT

THAT each Provincial Council elect three weekly Propoſers, or Provoſts, after the manner, and to the ends already ſhewn in the conſtitution of Senatorian Councils; and that the Provoſt of the Senior Liſt, during his term, be Preſident of the Council in abſence of the General. 63. *Provincial Provoſts.*

THAT each Provincial Council proceed according to Inſtructions receiv'd from the Council of State, and keep intelligence with the ſame by any two of their Provoſts, for the Government of the Province, as to matters of War or State. That upon Levies of native or proper Arms by the Senate, and the People, a Provincial Council (having to that end receiv'd Orders) make Levies of Provincial Auxiliaries accordingly. That Auxiliary Arms upon no occaſion whatſoever exceed the proper or native Arms in number. That for the reſt, the Provincial Council maintain the Provincials, defraying their peculiar Guards and Council, by ſuch a known proportion of Tributes, as on them ſhall be ſet by the Senate and the People, in their proper Rights, Laws, Liberties and Immunities, ſo far as upon the Merits of the cauſe whereupon they were ſubdu'd, it ſeem'd good to the Senate and the People to confirm them, And that it be lawful for the Provincials to appeal from their Provincial Magiſtrates, Councils, or Generals, to the People of *England*. 64. *Subordination and Function of Provincial Councils.*

IN modelling a Common-wealth, the concernment of Provincial Government comes in the laſt place; for which cauſe I conceive any long Diſcourſe upon theſe Orders to be at preſent unneceſſary: But certain things there are in the way which I am unwilling to let ſlip without pointing at them.

SOME will have Men, ſome will have Money to be the Nerve of War, each of which Poſitions, in proper caſes, may be a Maxim: For if *France*, where the main Body of the People is imbas'd; or *Venice*, which ſtands upon a Mercenary Militia, want Money, they can make no War. But it has heretofore been otherwiſe with Common-wealths. *Roman* Hiſtorians (as is obſerv'd by MACHIAVEL) in their Military Preparations or Expeditions, make no mention of Money, unleſs what was gain'd by the War, and brought home into the Treaſury; as the Spoil of *Macedon* by EMILIUS PAULUS, being ſuch, as the People for ſome years after were diſcharg'd of their Tribute. Not that their Wars were made altogether without Money; for if ſo, why ſhould the People at any time before have paid Tribute? Or why, upon this occaſion were they excus'd? but that the Money in which thier Wars ſtood them was not conſiderable, in compariſon of that which is requiſite, where Money may be counted the Nerve of War; that is, where Men are not to be had without it. But *Rome*, by virtue of its Orders, could have rais'd vaſter numbers of Citizens and Aſſociates than perhaps it ever did, tho' during the Conſulate of PAPPUS and REGULUS, ſhe levied in *Italy* only ſeventy thouſand Horſe, and ſeven hundred thouſand Foot. Should we conceive the Nerve of this Motion to have been Money, we muſt reckon the *Indies* to have been exhauſted before they were found; or ſo much Braſs to have been in *Italy*, as would have made Stones to be as good Money. A well order'd Common-wealth does theſe things not by Money, but by ſuch Orders as make of its Citizens the Nerve of its Wars. The Youth of the Common-wealth propos'd are eſteem'd in all at five hundred thouſand. Of theſe there is an annual Band, conſiſting of one hundred thouſand. Of this one hundred thouſand there is a ſtanding Army, conſiſting of thirty thouſand Foot and ten thouſand Horſe, beſides ſuch as being above thirty *Whether Men or Money be the Nerve of War.*

Book III.

thirty years of age, ſhall offer themſelves as Volunteers; of which the number is in no wiſe likely to be few. To the ſtanding Army the Provinces, or that only of *Scotland*, being both Populous and Martial, can afford at any time an equal number of Auxiliaries.

THESE Orders, thus ſum'd up together, render this Commonwealth ordinarily able to wage War with fourſcore thouſand men; a Force which, it is known, not any Prince in Chriſtendom is able to match in Virtue, Number, or Diſcipline. For theſe the Commonwealth in her Sea Guard has always at hand ſufficient Waftage, or at leaſt ſuch a ſufficient Convoy as may make any Veſſels at hand a ſufficient Tranſportation: all this, I ſay, by Virtue of Orders. Not but that the March, the Equipage, the Waftage of ſo great an Army muſt coſt Money; but that it will come to no account in compariſon of a lingring War made by a matter of thirty thouſand Mercenaries, the very conſumption of a State: whereas fourſcore thouſand men ſo diſciplin'd and ſo furniſh'd, as has been ſhewn, being once tranſported, muſt ſuddenly come to be no Charge, or make the War defray it ſelf.

Whether a Common-wealth has conſiſted of more than one City or Town.

BUT 'tis objected, that to reckon upon ſuch a Militia were to ſuppoſe a large Country capable of being a Common-wealth; whereas we hold them learn'd, who ſay that no Common-wealth has conſiſted of more than ſome one City or Town. But in what Language or in what Geography, are the twelve Tribes of *Iſrael*; (δῆμοι) Peopledoms or Pritanies of *Athens*, which THESEUS gather'd into one body; the Tribes and Linages in *Lacedemon* inſtituted by LYCURGUS; the five and thirty *Roman* Tribes planted between the Rivers *Vulturnus* and *Arno*, or between the Cities now call'd *Capua* and *Florence*; the 13 Cantons of the *Switzers*; the ſeven United Provinces of the Low Countries, underſtood to have been or to be but one City or Town? Whether were not the People of *Iſrael* under their Common-wealth ſix hundred thouſand? What reaſon can be given why the Government that could take in ſix hundred thouſand, might not as well take in twice that number? How much ſhort came the Country, planted by the *Roman* Tribes, of 150 Miles ſquare? Or how much over is *England*? And what reaſon can be given why a Government, taking in 150 Miles ſquare, might not as well take in twice that Compaſs? Whether was our Houſe of Commons under Monarchy not collected from the utmoſt Bounds of the *Engliſh* Territory? And whether had the Laws by them enacted not their free courſe to the utmoſt limits of the ſame? And why ſhould that be impoſſible or impracticabie to a Repreſentative of the People in a Common-wealth, which was ſo facile and practicable to a Repreſentative of the People under Monarchy?

IT is a wonder how the Common-wealth of *Rome*, which held as it were the whole World by Provinces, ſhould be imagin'd by any man to have conſiſted but of one Town or City.

BUT to return: It is alledg'd by others, and as to Provincial Government very truly, that a Common-wealth may be a Tyranny: Nor do I think that *Athens*, in this point, came ſhort of any Prince: *Rome*, on the other ſide, was (according to the merits of the cauſe) as frequent in giving Liberty as in taking it away. The Provinces of *Venice* and of *Switzerland*, would not change their condition with the Subjects of the beſt Prince. However the poſſibility in a Common-wealth of tyrannizing over Provinces, is not to be cur'd; for be the Common-wealth or the Prince a State or a Man after God's own heart, there is no way of holding a Province but by Arms. WHEN

WHEN the Syrians *of* Damaſcus *came to ſuccour* HADADEZER *King of* Zobah, DAVID *ſlew of the* Syrians *two and twenty thouſand Men: then* DAVID *put Garriſons in* Syria *of* Damaſcus, *and the* Syrians *became Servants to* DAVID, *and brought Gifts: and the Lord preſerv'd* DAVID *whitherſoever he went.* *The thirteenth Parallel.* 2 Sam. 8, 5, 6.

WITH this Parallel I draw the Curtain, and cloſe (be it Comedy to ſuch as are for Tragedy) this Model; appealing to the preſent, or the next Age, whether throughout I have not had God himſelf for my Vouchee. In the mean time, there is nothing hereby propos'd which may not ſtand with a ſupreme Magiſtrate. *See the Corollary of* Oceana.

The Concluſion:

Shewing how the Model propos'd may be prov'd or examin'd; and giving a brief Anſwer to Mr. WREN'S *laſt Book, intitl'd,* Monarchy aſſerted againſt Mr. HARRINGTON'S *Oceana.*

FOR a Nation to be ſtill upon the caſt of a Die, to be ever in trepidation as to the main chance of Government, is a dreadful ſtate of things. Such indeed with us has been the Conſtitution of our late Governments, of which therefore not any can be call'd a Common-wealth. Yet has the like ſtate of things (in favour of Monarchs, and thro' the induſtry of the Clergy) been for many Ages, that whereof Common-wealths unheard are ſtill accus'd and condemn'd. For proof in this caſe, the Tribunitian Storms of the *Roman* People are thought abundantly ſufficient. But theſe having been without Blood, if with our Affairs they hold any parallel, are not to be compared with the Barons Wars, thoſe of *York* and *Lancaſter*, or the like; but with the Conteſts or Strivings of our Parliaments with their Kings, while ſuch Diſputes came not to Arms. Or if the *Roman* Fields from the time of the GRACCHI grew bloody, we have known a matter of a dozen years in which ours might have compar'd with them. The Seditions under the Common-wealth of *Rome* to thoſe under the Empire, hold ſuch a proportion, as the Seditions under the Common-wealth of *Iſrael* to thoſe under their Kings. I am contented at this time, for diſcourſe ſake, that the Seditions of *Venice* ſhould paſs as they are computed by Mr. WREN: Let thoſe alſo which have happen'd in the Common-wealths of of the *Switzers*, and of the United Provinces, by the ſkill of ſome Man who may be thought more impartial than my ſelf, be rightly enumerated and added. This being done, let the Seditions that have happen'd in the Monarchies of *England*, *France*, and *Spain*, be as impartially ſum'd up; and I may venture to promiſe you, That you ſhall not find the ſum of the Seditions which have happen'd in thoſe three Common-wealths, to balance the foot of the account with thoſe Seditions which have happen'd in any one of thoſe Monarchies: nor are we without ſufficient inducement to believe, that the whole account in this particular of thoſe Common-wealths which have been in the World, can come any whit nearer to that of the Monarchies. But this being ſo, be it alſo ſuppos'd, tho' not granted, that a Common-wealth is a ſeditious Government, yet muſt it

Sect. 1. *That a Common-wealth not rightly order'd, is leſs ſeditious than the beſt of Monarchies.*

See Book 2. chap. 4.

be the leaſt ſeditious Government. The Republic of *Corinth* never ſuffer'd but that one Sedition which is deſcrib'd by *Xenophon*; and this too from an external cauſe.

ἑλλην. Lib. 4.

Sect. 2. *That Mr. Wren's Oppoſition of Popular prudence amounts to a Confirmation of it.*

BUT I am the more confirm'd by the Aſſaults of Mr. WREN, to have no leſs than demonſtrated in the propos'd Model, that a Common-wealth rightly order'd is altogether incapable of Sedition, and ſo conſequently of Diſſolution, that is, from any internal cauſe. To render his confutation intire, and the truth of this Aſſertion the more conſpicuous, I ſhall firſt inſert thoſe Rules or Maxims whereby a Model of a Common-wealth may be exactly prov'd or examin'd, and then ſhew how they totally enervate and overturn thoſe Arguments, elaborated by Mr. WREN, towards the examination and confutation of the Model propos'd.

How a Model of Popular Government may be try'd or examin'd.

THE Maxims or Rules whereby a well order'd Model of Popular Government may be moſt exactly prov'd or examin'd, are ſpecially two:

1. *IT muſt be wholly void of any Contradiction or inequality.*
2. *IT muſt be ſuch in which no number of Men, having the Intereſt, can have the Power or Strength; and no number of Men, having the Power or Strength, can have the Intereſt to invade or diſturb the Government.*

IT is not in the power of Nature that there ſhould be an effect, where there is not the cauſe of that effect; and in a Frame of Government that is exactly according to the foregoing Maxims, there can be no cauſe of Sedition or Diſſolution. A Model of Government therefore that will hold examination by theſe Maxims, muſt (without oſtentation, or with Mr. WREN's patience) be perfect.

NOW let us obſerve how he beſtirs himſelf to examine and confute this Model. As to contradiction, he does not ſo much as pretend that there is any Guile in it; yet will not allow it to have any truth:

W. p. 78. *For*, ſays he, *as in a Fiction the ſeveral Members may be ſo contriv'd, as not to give one another the lie, but be all contain'd within the limits of Veriſimilitude, and yet the whole remain without the leaſt ſyllable of truth; ſo in a Model of Government.* To which I anſwer, that there being a truth of Nature, and a truth of Fact, this way of Mr. WREN's diſputing is mere equivocation. For the Model is not propos'd to ſhew the truth of Fact, or that there has been any ſuch exactly in practice; but to ſhew the truth of Nature, or that ſuch a Model is practicable: wherefore he needed not to have alledg'd that it has not the truth of Fact, which we all know; but was to ſhew where it fails of ſuch a truth in Nature as can any way render it impracticable. But inſtead of this, he is gone to the Moon; and will read us a Lecture in Politicks by the Planets or the Various Hypotheſes of Celeſtial Motions,

Ibid. *which may be excogitated including no abſurdity in themſelves, and yet perhaps not any one of them prove to be the true method of Nature.* But may a man therefore argue in this manner? It is very hard to know certainly which are the Highways of the Planets, therefore there can be no certain knowledge which are the Highways to *London*. Let us e'en ſay, Becauſe the Rotation of the World may as well go upon the Heavens as upon the Earth, therefore a man may as well go upon his Head as upon his Heels; and a Common-wealth as well ſtand upon a Milk-woman's Pattins, as upon the ſtrongeſt Intereſt, or the Intereſt of the ſtrongeſt.

SO

SO much for Contradiction. Now for Inequality, says Mr. WREN; W. p. 179.
Tho' it should be allow'd Mr. HARRINGTON, *that his Common-wealth has none in it, yet would it fail of attaining the perfection of Government, seeing there is an inequality in the Nature of man, which is not rectify'd by the Model of his Common-wealth.* As if the equality of a Government was pretended to be such, as should make a crooked man straight, a wicked man good, or a passionate man a Philosopher; and it were not perfect, in being sufficient to prevent any influence that Wickedness or Passion in a man or men, may have upon the Government. But for farther discovery of these Inequalities in the Nature of man, that are not rectify'd by the Model, Mr. WREN sends us to his eight and ninth Chapters, where he produces them in such order, as I shall observe in repeating him. *Whensoever*, says he, *under Popular Government the number of those whose Offences have render'd them liable to the severity of Laws, is considerable enough to qualify them for attempt, Popular Government has no more security than any other, of being free from Sedition.* It is very true: but Mr. WREN was oblig'd to shew how in an equal Common-wealth, or under the Model propos'd, it was possible that the number of such men should come to be considerable enough to qualify them for such an attempt. But in this kind he is no otherwise provided than to tell us, *That of this Original and Extraction, as to the main, was* CATILIN'S *attempt upon the* Roman *Common-wealth.* So undertaking against *Oceana*, or the most equal Common-wealth, he is come to arguing against *Rome*, or the most inequal Common-wealth; and at such a time too, when being no longer capable of Liberty, but ready for bonds, there were other parties besides CATILIN'S, and others besides such as were obnoxious to the Laws, that lay in wait for her: as POMPEY and his Party, or at least CÆSAR and his, who at length carry'd it; so that this feat was not so much perform'd by men otherwise *liable to severity of Laws*, as by men puff'd up by ambition. But let these have been of which sort he will, it remains with him to shew, how there should be of either kind enough in *Oceana* for a like attempt. It is known that long before this happen'd in *Rome*, the whole of that Common-wealth was in the hands of three men, CÆSAR, POMPEY, and CRASSUS: wherefore he should have first shewn, which way the whole of the Common-wealth of *Oceana* might come into the hands of three, or of a few men. But leaving this untouch'd, he runs making a dust, and a doubt where the sovereign Power of *Oceana* can be; which even in *Rome*, as inequal as it was, is acknowledg'd to have been in the Assemblies of the People; and in *Athens*, THUCYDIDES expresly says, That the Sovereignty was in the five thousand. Who ever doubted but where the ultimate Result is, there also must be the Sovereignty? and the ultimate Result of *Oceana* is in the Prerogative Tribe, or Representative of the People. Then says he, *This Representative thinking it their interest, may dissolve the Government, and perpetuate themselves, and may come to think it their interest. For the desire of Power being natural to man, a far greater share of Power remains with every particular man, when the Sovereign Power is divided among so many, than when the same Power is divided among two hundred thousand.* But I shew'd that this Representative has the whole Sovereign Power in themselves, not divided with any other, or with the five hundred thousand; which I suppose he means by the two hundred thousand he mentions. Now this Representative

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cannot

cannot be underſtood to have the Sovereign Power by over-balance of ſtrength, becauſe they are but one thouſand to five hundred thouſand; ſo it is plain that they have it by conſent, or by orders only: wherefore theſe Orders they have not the power, or ſtrength, nor the intereſt to break; becauſe breaking their Orders (by which only, and not by ſtrength, the Power is in themſelves) they come to divide the Power that was in themſelves, with the five hundred thouſand, as they, who, in defect of the Orders, have the far greater ſtrength, and no legal bar. Yet ſays he, *That a Repreſentative is not incapable of making ſuch an attempt as this, will (it is not improbable) eaſily find belief with thoſe who are acquainted with the Actions of theſe laſt eighteen years.* Which is as much as to ſay, That becauſe a Repreſentative, by and with the People, may have both the intereſt, and the power or ſtrength to free themſelves of a broken Monarchy; therefore a Repreſentative may, without and againſt the People, have both the intereſt, and the power or ſtrength to break the Orders of the moſt equal Common-wealth. But if the Repreſentative of *Oceana* has not the power or ſtrength to break their Orders, and perpetuate themſelves; much leſs the Senate. True it is, if we look upon ſome other Common-wealths, a Senate might have the intereſt to do it; but not where the Senate has been upon Rotation. To add then to Mr. WREN's faculty of oppoſition greater ſtrength than is in it; if the Senate of *Oceana* would do any thing of this kind, their readieſt way were by creating of the Dictator. The Dictator being created, has ſovereign Power in carrying on the Orders of the Common-wealth: but thoſe do not perpetuate their Power; this therefore cannot be done but by Force or Arms. The Arms of the Common-wealth are both numerous, and in a poſture or readineſs; but they conſiſt of its Citizens: and for the Dictator to bring the Citizen to break the Common-wealth, were for a General to command his Army to cut their own throats. It is true, the *Roman Decemvirs* put in for prolongation; but, tho' in the moſt inequal Common-wealth, they could not make it ſtand one year, becauſe of the Citizens in Arms: And for Mercenaries there are none in *Oceana*; is this news? there were none in *Iſrael*, there were none in *Athens*, there were none in *Lacedemon*, there were none in *Rome*, while thoſe Common-wealths flouriſh'd. But were there Mercenaries, as he might perhaps reckon Servants, they are unarm'd, undiſciplin'd; they cannot riſe thro' the vaſt bodies of Citizens in Arms both Elders and Youth; or if they would riſe, they could be nothing in their hands. The *Roman* Slaves, and the *Lacedemonian* Helots, being far of another and more dangerous nature, never roſe againſt their Lords but to their own deſtruction. All this while I ſay nothing of the ſecurity which is in the frame of this Dictator, beyond any example or intereſt of prolongation to be found either in the *Roman* Dictator or the *Venetian* Council of ten, each whereof having had the like power, did never diſcover any ſuch inclination. It is true, that in the time of SYLLA, the *Roman* Dictator began to be perpetual; but this is not to be attributed ſo much to the imperfection of the Order, as to the change of the Balance. But if the Dictator of *Oceana* cannot have the intereſt, or, having the intereſt, cannot have the power or ſtrength to perpetuate that Magiſtracy; much leſs can the Senate.

W. p. 85.

THE ſum of what has been ſaid, may be thus caſt up, as to the whole conſtitution. If Things or Perſons that have neither the right

right nor the might, may prevail againſt things and Perſons who have both the right and the might; then may one Order of this Common-wealth break the whole Syſtem: but the Might, thro' the foundation or popular balance of Property, being in the whole People, and the whole Super-ſtructures of this Common-wealth being nothing elſe but an equal diſtribution of common Right to the whole People, who are poſſeſt of the Might; they who have the Might, have not the intereſt to break, but to preſerve the Orders; which therefore no other can have the power or ſtrength to break, or ſome other breaking, muſt but loſe that which they pretend to gain, to wit, the Right, which in this caſe muſt ſtill fall to the might, devolving upon the People. That Mr. WREN will needs fancy the Tribes or Cities in *Oceana*, as thoſe in the united Provinces, or the Cantons of *Switzerland*, to be diſtinct Sovereignties, concerns not me, ſeeing the form of *Oceana* is far otherwiſe; nor indeed him, ſeeing neither do the Cities in *Holland*, nor the Cantons in *Switzerland* go about to diſſolve their Common-wealths or Leagues. The Champion having thus fail'd at the head, is contented to play low. *Tho' there be care taken*, ſays he, *that at the Aſſembly of the Hundred and the Tribe, ſuch and ſuch Magiſtrates ſhould be elected out of the Horſe, there is no neceſſary proviſion there ſhould be any Horſe there, out of which to elect.* And where can they be then, if not in ſome Pariſh? He might better have ſaid, that at the Pariſh there was no care taken, that the People ſhould not elect too many of the Horſe, which being indeed the defect of the former, is in this Edition rectify'd. His laſt exception is againſt the place where I ſay, that *They who take upon them the profeſſion of Theology, Phyſic or Law, are not at leiſure for the Eſſays, whereby the Youth commence for all Magiſtracies and Honours, in the Common-wealth.* To which reaſon he offers not ſo much as any Anſwer: nor pretends any other Argument againſt it, than that this excludes Divines, Lawyers, and Phyſicians, from thoſe Honours to which their Pariſh Clerks, their Scriveners, and their Apothecaries, nay Farriers and Coblers may attain. And what can I help that, if it ought nevertheleſs ſo to be, for a reaſon which he cannot anſwer? Nay, if ſo it be in common practice where the reaſon is nothing near ſo ſtrong, ſeeing a Pariſh Clerk, a Scrivener, an Apothecary, nay a Cobler or a Farrier, is not uncapable of being of the Common Council, nor yet of being an Alderman or Lord Mayor of *London*; which nevertheleſs that a Divine, a Lawyer, or a Phyſician ſhould be, were abſurd to think. Divines have a Plow from which they ought not to look back: they have above a tenth of the Territory, with which they ought to be contented; and more than all, Civil Intereſt contracted by a Clergy, corrupts Religion. For Lawyers, their Practice and Magiſtracies are not only the moſt gainful, but for life; and in a Common-wealth, neither is accumulation of Magiſtracy juſt or equal, nor the confounding of Executive and Legiſlative Magiſtracy ſafe. Will Mr. WREN believe one of our own Lawyers, and one of the learneſt of them upon this point? It is the Lord VERULAM: *They*, ſays he, *who have written* (de legibus) *of Law-making, have handl'd this Argument as Philoſophers, or as Lawyers. Philoſophers ſpeak higher than will fall into the capacity of practice* (to which may be refer'd PLATO's Common-wealth, Sir THOMAS MORE's *Utopia*, with his own *Atlantis*) *and Lawyers being obnoxious, and addicted each to the Laws of their particular Country, have no freedom nor ſincerity of Judgment, but plead*

W. p. 87.

W. p. 181.

See Propoſition 44. W. p. 183.

Verulam de Aug. Scien. lib. 8. cap. 3.

as it were in bonds. Certainly the cognizance of theſe things is moſt properly pertaining to political Perſons, who beſt know what ſtands with human Society, what with the ſafety of the People, what with natural Equity, with antient Prudence, and with the different Conſtitution of Commonwealths. Theſe therefore, by the Principles and Precepts of natural Equity and good Policy, may and ought to determine of Laws. For Phyſicians, who (as ſuch) have in the management of State Affairs no prejudice, if you open them the door, they will not at all, or very rarely, come in: whereby it appears, Firſt, that ſuch a bar may in ſome caſes be no violation of Liberty; and, ſecondly, that the Divines, who for better cauſes might be as well ſatisfy'd, and for more unanſwerable Reaſons ought to forbear, yet are impatient, and give a full teſtimony that their meaning is not good.

THUS is the Common-wealth by Mr. WREN oppos'd, by him aſſerted. There remains no more to the full confutation of his Book, than to ſhew how the Monarchy by him aſſerted is by him deſtroy'd. This is to be done by the examination of his ninth Chapter, which is the next of thoſe to which he refer'd us.

Sect. 3. *That Mr. Wren's Aſſertion of Monarchy amounts to the Subverſion of it.*

THE oppoſition made by Mr. WREN to a Common-wealth, and his pretended aſſerting of Monarchy, run altogether upon Mr. HOBS's Principles, and in his very words; but for want of underſtanding, much enervated: ſo that Mr. WREN's whole fate of Arms comes but to have given me a weaker Adverſary for a ſtronger. *In Sovereignty*, ſays he, *the diffus'd ſtrength of the Multitude is united in one perſon; which in a Monarchy is a natural perſon; in a State, an artificial one procreated by the majority of Votes.* W. p. 97. *This then is the grand ſecurity of all Sovereigns, whether ſingle Perſons or Aſſemblies, that the united Forces of their Subjects, with which they are inveſted, is ſufficient to ſuppreſs the beginnings of Seditions.* W. p. 99. Who reads Mr. HOBS, if this be news? But what proviſion is made by either of theſe Authors, that the Forces of the Subject muſt needs be united? Is Union in Forces, or in Government, an Effect whereof there is no Cauſe? Or to what cauſe are we to attribute this certain Union and grand Security? Why *let there be ſuch a Nobility as may be a Monarch's Guard againſt the People.* W. p. 103. And leſt *a Monarch ſtand in need of another Guard againſt this Nobility, let none of theſe excel the reſt of his Order in power or dignity.* Which Effects or Ends, thus commanded, vouchſafe not to acquaint us with their ways: Yes, *let the Nobility have no right to aſſemble themſelves for electing a Succeſſor to the Monarchy, or for making of War or Peace, or for nominating the great Miniſters of State, or for performing any other Act which by the nature of it is inſeparable from the Sovereign Power.* Ibid. But why then muſt ſuch a Nobility be a guard againſt the People, and not rather a guard for the People, ſeeing both their Intereſts and Sufferings at this rate are the ſame, and include thoſe very cauſes for which, in the Barons War, the Nobility became Incendiaries and Leaders of the People of *England* againſt their Kings, and ſo thoſe whereby their Captain came to excel the reſt of his order in power or dignity? But for this the Prince is to be provided, *by having always in pay a ſufficient Militia; and ſome places of ſtrength where a few may be ſecure againſt a number.* W. p. 105. For places of Strength, Citadels, or Caſtles, there were in the time of the Barons Wars, more than ſome; yet were they, as to this purpoſe, none. But a Militia is one thing, and a ſufficient Militia is another; where the Government conſiſts of a Nobility and of a People, what

ſufficient

ſufficient part of the Property or Revenue of the Territory can there remain to the Prince, whereby to have always in pay ſuch a Militia, as may be ſufficient to keep the Nobility and the People from joining, or to ſuppreſs them being join'd? If theſe be ſmall Armies, the like may befal them, which befel thoſe of the Kings in the Wars of the Barons. And if they be great Armies, the Prince has not wherewithal to ſupport or content them; nay if he had, Mr. WREN tells us plainly, W. p. 106. *That Princes who keep great Armies, as Guards to their Perſons or Empires, teach us that this is to walk upon Precipices; there being no poſſibility of preventing ſuch an Army (ſpecially if they lie ſtill without employment) from acquiring an intereſt diſtinct from that of the Prince.* Wherefore (to follow Mr. WREN, and no other Leader, in his own words againſt himſelf) this Militia being great, cannot be ſo inſtituted, as to have no intereſt beſides the pay it receives from the Monarch; nor ſo as to have no hopes of being ſafe in their own ſtrength, if they ſhould withdraw themſelves from the Service and Obedience due to him: and being not great, againſt the whole Order or Orders of the Nobility and the People they cannot be ſufficient. What then remains but to ſay, that Mr. WREN having declar'd *the perfection of Monarchical Government to conſiſt in a mixture of Monarchy by a Nobility, and a Monarchy by Arms,* W. p. 107. has as to his Model intirely ſubverted Monarchy? In this way of diſputing, I have rather follow'd my Leader than reaſon; the true Anſwer being that which was given in the Preface, namely, that an Army to be effectual in *England,* muſt be ſuch where the Officers have popular Eſtates, or where they have ſuch Eſtates as had the antient Nobility: in the latter caſe, they make a King; in the former a Common-wealth. But Mr. WREN will have his own way; and therefore, to conclude, let me but deſire him to lay his hand upon his heart, and then tell me, whether the condition of the Nobility (to whoſe favour in my excluſion he pretends a meritorious Title) ſharing eminently and according to their rank with the People in the Common-wealth by me propos'd; or the condition of the Nobility under the inſolence and burden of a mercenary Army, ſharing equally with the People in Oppreſſion and Slavery, or reviving the old Barons Wars for new Liberty, in the Monarchy by him propos'd; be the more deſirable. And to ſpeak a word for my Adverſary, we will ſubmit it wholly to the preſent Nobility, whether Mr. WREN or I be ſo extravagant in theſe things, that they have, or can have any other than the like choice. Yet *enters not Mr.* WREN *into deſpair of living to enjoy his ſhare* (which ought to be a good one) *of the Felicities which will belong to the Subjects of ſuch a Government.* Ibid. He looks upon Perſons, but things are invincible.

THE reſt of his Book (to which *The Prerogative of Popular Government* is ſtill a compleat Anſwer) conſiſts altogether of groſs evaſion or invective, or of drawing out of ſtory againſt Popular Prudence ſuch imaginary Swords as do but ſtand bent. To rectify or ſtreighten theſe, I may hereafter preſent him (if any man ſhall think it worth the while) with a fuller Anſwer.

A WORD *concerning a Houſe of* PEERS.

NO man knowing what is neceſſary to the Foundation or Being of a Popular Government, can hope or expect the introduction of any ſuch Form, where Monarchy is not impracticable. They (where Monarchy is impracticable) who come firſt to diſcover it, and be convinc'd of it, if reaſon be not altogether depos'd, are inevitable Leaders. Hence it is that our Common-wealthſmen are already renown'd throughout this Nation for their invincible Reaſons, even by the confeſſion of their Opponents, or ſuch as proceed nevertheleſs in other ways. But where Seed is ſo well ſown and rooted, intervening Poſſeſſion and Intereſts are like ſuch Weather as holding back the Spring, yet improves the Harveſt: Common-wealthſmen indeed may have a cold time on't, but upon the Common-wealth it muſt beſtow Fermentation. Had our incomparable Aſſertors of publick Liberty appear'd before a univerſal eviction of the neceſſity which enforces their Cauſe, it muſt have been thro' ſuch a reluctancy, as would have made them glad to do things by halves, which is the only Rock to a riſing Common-wealth of Scandal, or of Danger; the whole being ſuch againſt which there is nothing to be alledg'd, and the half what may be eaſily confuted. Theſe things conſider'd, what appearance is there but that it muſt redound to the greater advantage of our Common-wealthſmen, that we are under the force of a preſent Humour which abhors the very name of a Common-wealth? Seeing by this means one of two things muſt of neceſſity happen, and come ſhortly to publick view or diſcovery: either that Monarchy is practicable, or that it is not practicable; I mean, in our ſtate of Affairs, or in this preſent diſtribution of the Balance. If Monarchy be found practicable, Common-wealthſmen are ſatisfy'd in their Conſciences, and ſo ready in fair ways to return, and ſubmit not only for Wrath, but for Conſcience ſake. But (let Divines cry Atheiſm, and Lawyers Treaſon) if it be once diſcover'd to common Underſtanding that Monarchy is impracticable, then in comes the Common-wealth, not by halves, but with all its Tackling, full ſail, diſplaying its Streamers, and flouriſhing with Top and Topgallant.

THE ways whereby it is at hand to be diſcover'd whether Monarchy be practicable or impracticable, are particularly two; the one quicker, the other ſlower: The quicker way will be by the Workmen, the ſlower by the Work.

IF the Workmen, being willing, be yet overcome by the mere obſtinacy of their Matter, it amounts to a plain confeſſion, that Monarchy is impracticable. And if they give away the Liberties of the People, they are overcome by the obſtinacy of the Matter; for that is not their Work: nor any other Work than ſuch as muſt be uſeleſs, not ſo much in regard of itſelf (tho' that may be true enough) as by the want of any other Security than what the Prince had before, that

is,

is, an Army. And ſuch an Army, which for ſecurity is as good as none at all, nay the very contrary, as has been ſhewn already: nor to be alter'd with better ſucceſs than theirs, who became Princes in *Grecian* and *Sicilian* States. *Art of Lawgiving*, P. 433.

BUT if the Workmen give not away the Liberties of the People, then muſt they ſo limit their Prince, that he can in no manner invade thoſe Liberties; and this by any other means than the full and perfect introduction of a well order'd Common-wealth, they will find to be utterly impoſſible: So either way they are overcome by the mere obſtinacy of their Matter.

IF thro' ſome ſecret Dictate (as when the Senate of *Rome* was *Conviva Cæſaris)* or a haſte to make riddance, this be not perceiv'd by the Workmen, it will be but the more perceivable by the Work when it comes to wearing or in practice; and the Flaws or Grievances being found inſupportable, the next Parliament, thro' the mere want of any other remedy, muſt introduce a Common-wealth.

GOOD, and egregiouſly Prophetical! But what ſay you for all this, if we have a Houſe of Peers, and that even for the Lord's ſake, there being no other way to ſecure Liberty of Conſcience? Why I ſay, if we have a Houſe of Peers, it muſt be a Houſe of old Peers, or a Houſe of new Peers, or a Houſe of the one and the other. Moreover I ſay, Let it be which way you will, ſuch a Houſe may at ſome time, or for ſome reaſon, be perſonally affected to Liberty of Conſcience; but is a Conſtitution in it ſelf naturally averſe, and contrary to Liberty of Conſcience, and therefore can be no ſecurity to the ſame, whether the Lords be Spiritual, or Temporal, or partiperpale.

LORDS Spiritual are inſpir'd with a third Eſtate, or ſhare of a Realm, which gives no toleration to any Religion, but that only aſſerting this point, which is Monarchy. Setting this Oracle, and ſome like Reaſons of State aſide, we may think that every Sovereignty (as ſuch) has Liberty of Conſcience: This a King having, cannot give; and a People having, will not loſe. For Liberty of Conſcience is in truth a kind of State, wherein a man is his own Prince: but a Houſe of Peers ſets up another Prince; it cannot ſtand without a King. If the Balance be in the Lords, as before HENRY the Seventh, yet muſt they have a King to unite them, and by whom to adminiſter their Government; and if the Balance be not in the Lords, they ſtand or fall with the King, as the Houſe of Peers in the Long Parliament: and the King falling, their Government devolves to the People. Again, a Houſe of Peers having the over-balance, ſignifies ſomething; in which caſe it has not been known to be for Liberty of Conſcience: and not having the over-balance, ſignifies nothing; in which caſe it cannot ſecure the Liberty of Conſcience. Thus a Houſe of Peers, whether ſomething or nothing, is no way for the Liberty of Conſcience, but every way for a King: and a King is a defender of the Faith. The Faith whereof a King is defender, muſt be that which is, or he ſhall call his own Faith; and this Faith it concerns his Crown and Dignity, that he defend againſt all other Faiths. True it is, that a King for a ſtep to a Throne, may uſe what is readieſt at hand: Otherwiſe where there is Liberty of Conſcience, to aſſert Civil Liberty by Scripture can be no Atheiſm; which lames a Prince of one Arm. But where Liberty of Conſcience is not at all, or not perfect, Divines, who (for the greater part) are no fair Huntſmen, but love dearly to be poaching or clubbing

with the ſecular Arm (tho' if we, who deſire no ſuch Advantages, might proſecute them for abuſing Scripture, as they have done this thouſand years, to all the ends, intents, and purpoſes of Monarchy, they would think it a hard caſe) Divines, I ſay, not only brand the Aſſertors of Civil Liberty with Atheiſm, but are ſome of them ſtudious in Contrivances, and quaint in Plots to give a check or remove to this or that eminent Patriot, by the like pretences or charges; which ſucceeding accordingly by the power of a Parliament, they may at length come to have a Parliament in their power. Where there is no Liberty of Conſcience, there can be no Civil Liberty; and where there is no Civil Liberty, there can be no ſecurity to Liberty of Conſcience: but a Houſe of Peers is not only a neceſſary, but a declar'd check upon Civil Liberty; therefore it can be no ſecurity to Liberty of Conſcience. And ſo much for this particular.

NOW to make upon the other parts propos'd, and in a mere civil ſenſe, ſome farther conjecture.

WHEN a Houſe of Peers ſets up a Houſe of Commons, as in the Barons Wars, they will govern the Commons well enough for their own purpoſe, and not ſeldom the King too.

BUT we are to ſpeak of a thing without any example, a Houſe of Peers ſet up by a Houſe of Commons; nor, in the want of example, are we thought worthy by our Adverſaries to be furniſh'd with Reaſon: ſo the guidance of our Diſcourſe upon this point is committed to Mother Wit, a notable Goſſip, but not ſo good a Politician.

NEVERTHELESS, if this Houſe conſiſts of old Peerage only, we have direction enough to know how that will be; for either the ſingle Perſon, or the Commons will be predominant in the Government: if the Commons be ſo, then it will be with the Peers, as it was before their laſt Seclusion; that is, while they do as the Commons would have them, they may ſit; otherwiſe they are ſent home. And if the ſingle Perſon be predominant, it can be no otherwiſe than by an Army; in which caſe the old Peers being not in Arms, nor having any help that way, are as much under the Yoke as the Commons. By which it may be apparent, that it is the great intereſt of the preſent Peerage, that there be a well order'd Common-wealth; otherwiſe the Commons being in bondage, the Lords, whom that leaſt becomes, are but equal with them: and being free, the Lords are not the head, but at the foot of them; whereas in an equal Common-wealth, that the Nobility be not at the head, or have not the leading, is quite contrary to all Reaſon and Experience.

IF the Houſe conſiſts of new Peers only, it muſt conſiſt of the chief Officers in the Army; which immediately divides the Government into two diſtinct Governments: the one in the Houſe of Commons, whoſe Foundation is the Body of the People; the other in the Houſe of Peers, whoſe Foundation is the Army. This Army if it remains firm to the Peers, they not only Command the Commons, but make and unmake Kings as they pleaſe; or as ambitious Parties and Perſons among themſelves are diligent or fortunate: But if the Army (as is moſt and more than moſt likely) comes off to the Commons, the Peers are nothing, and the Commons introduce a Common-wealth.

IF the Houſe conſiſts of new Peers and old, the old Peers while they like it, are Cyphers to new Figures; and when they like it not, may go home again: Nor whether they ſtay or go, is this caſe ſo different from

from the former, as to be any greater obſtruction to a Common-wealth.

TO hate the very name of a Common-wealth, or not to ſee that *England* can be no other, is as if men were not in earneſt. It is aſk'd of the Commons what the Protector ſhall be, and he can be nothing but what they will. It is aſk'd of the Commons what the other Houſe ſhall be, and it can be nothing but what the Commons will. The Commons are aſk'd whoſe the Army, whoſe the Militia, whoſe the Negative Vote is; nor can theſe be otherwiſe determin'd than as they pleaſe. The Commons are aſk'd whether they will make ſuch a War, whether they will pay ſuch a Debt, whether they will advance ſuch a Sum; all which are intirely at their diſcretion: therefore actually and poſitively *England* is a Common-wealth. Nay, and that there remain not the leaſt doubt, whether it be ſafe for any man to ſay thus much, the preſent Government has either no legal denomination at all, or is legally denominated the Common-wealth: the queſtion of the future ſtate of it comes not one whit upon the matter, which is already granted, but upon the form only. A Common-wealth for the matter makes it ſelf; and where they will not beſtow upon it the Form neceſſary, fails not of coming to ruin, or, at leaſt, to diſgrace the Workmen: Or, to ſpeak more properly and piouſly, a Common-wealth is not made by Men, but by God; and they who reſiſt his holy Will, are Weapons that cannot proſper.

Feb. 20.
1659.

Six Political

TRACTS

Written on

Several Occaſions.

VIZ.

I. *Valerius* and *Publicola.* A Dialogue.

II. A Syſtem of Politics, delineated in ſhort and eaſy Aphoriſms, now firſt publiſh'd from the Author's own Manuſcript.

III. Political Aphoriſms.

IV. Seven Models of a Common-wealth, Antient and Modern, *&c.*

V. The Ways and Means of introducing a Common-wealth by the Conſent of the People.

VI. The humble Petition of divers well affected Perſons; with the Parliament's Anſwer thereto.

VALERIUS and *PUBLICOLA*:

Or, the True

FORM

OF A

POPULAR COMMON-WEALTH,

Extracted

Ex puris Naturalibus.

Quos perdere vult JUPITER, *hos dementat prius.*

To the READER.

THE way of Dialogue being not faithfully manag'd, is of all others the moſt fraudulent; but being faithfully manag'd, is the cleareſt and moſt effectual for conveying a man's ſenſe into the underſtanding of his Reader. There is nothing in this World, next the favour of God, I ſo much deſire as to be familiarly underſtood; which becauſe great men have thought below them, has prov'd hitherto but the ruin of themſelves, and the detriment of the Public: for which reaſon, having try'd all other means, I now add this. My work, if I be not given over to utter blindneſs, is the ſame with, or neareſt, that of the Nation; and the Work of the Nation being not underſtood, is in extreme danger of utter ruin.

Valerius.

DEAREST PUBLICOLA, how have I long'd to meet you, and in the favourable ſilence of this long Walk!

Publicola.

What has my noble Friend VALERIUS to command his faithful Servant?

Val. Why really, notwithſtanding the tumult of theſe extravagant Changes, your laſt Diſcourſe had ſo much of my attention then, and has had ſuch a digeſtion with me ſince, that I feel it running in my Veins.

Pub. Do you find in that any temptation to the buckling on of High-ſhoon?

Val. My thoughts, PUBLICOLA, are quite of another ſtrain; ſometimes I fancy I ſee *England* graſping at Empire, like *Rome* it ſelf.

Pub.

Pub. Why then VALERIUS, my Diſcourſes are not ſuch as they ſay; there runs nothing of them in your Veins, that has imbas'd your noble Blood.

Val. The Heraldry of them is of as high a pitch as the Policy; but I would have them be a little lower in ſome things.

Pub. What are thoſe?

Val. The Vulgar complain of you, that you are too learn'd.

Pub. I thought it was not you, VALERIUS.

Val. For all that, I could be contented to ſee you raiſe your Structure by your own ſtrength, and without the help of other Authors.

Pub. That I dare ſay you may, when you pleaſe.

Val. I muſt ſee it then, before I loſe the covert of theſe reverend Elms.

Pub. You take care that the Building ſhould be well ſituated; and for the Foundation, I may preſume by what has already paſt between you and me, that we are long ſince agreed.

Val. That the threefold Balance, or Diſtribution of Property is the cauſe of the triple way of Government, I fully conſent with you; as alſo, that the Balance now in *England* is in the People plainly, and excluſively both of a King and Lords.

Pub. You are not of them that grant this, and then aſk which way a Common-wealth ſhould be introduc'd in *England.*

Val. Why truly yes; ſeeing not only the People are ſo wholly unacquainted with the means, but their Leaders ſo averſe to it.

Pub. Think you that a Plant grows the worſe for not underſtanding the manner of its Vegetation?

Val. A Plant is not a free Agent; but among Men who are free Agents, the Introduction of Government ſeems to be Arbitrary.

Pub. What, where there is no more than *Hobſon*'s choice, this or none?

Val. It is true, that if they can have nothing elſe, they muſt at length have a Common-wealth; but tho' they can have nothing elſe to be holding, yet they will be trying other things.

Pub. There is all the miſchief.

Val. And enough to ruin the Nation.

Pub. To hurt it very ſore, but not to ruin it; nor yet to evade a Common-wealth, except they expoſe us to foreign Invaſion.

Val. I am glad of your Confidence.

Pub. You may let it paſs for Confidence, if you pleaſe; but if there be no other way except that only of Invaſion, whereby the preſent Balance can receive a change ſudden enough to admit of any other Form, the reaſon why we muſt have a Common-wealth is coercive.

Val. And putting the caſe it be the Will of God to defend us from foreign Invaſion, how long will it be ere they ſee at home the coerciveneſs of this Reaſon, or, which is all one, that all Power is in and from the People?

Pub. Good VALERIUS, how long is it ſince this was both ſeen and declar'd in Parliament?

Val. Perhaps as they meant, it might be admitted as a Principle even in Monarchy.

Pub. This with your pardon you will revoke, ſeeing you well remember that this their Declaration of Power in the People, has been excluſive of King and Lords, and that in expreſs terms.

Val.

Val. But in this they related not at all to the Diſtribution of Property.

Pub. Why then, there is not ſuch a difference between the growing of a Plant and of a Common-wealth, as you thought; ſeeing a Common-wealth knowing as little, does no leſs.

Val. This of all others is to me a Conſideration fulleſt of comfort.

Pub. It will in time proceed accordingly, thro' a mere neceſſity of nature, or by feeling; but your deſire, I ſuppoſe, is to know how it ſhould be rationally introduc'd, or by ſeeing, and that with more eaſe and greater ſpeed.

Val. If it might pleaſe God, I would live to have my ſhare of it, tho' I fear I never ſhall.

Pub. You carve for your ſelf ill: for by hope a man injoys even that which he never comes to attain; and by fear he is depriv'd even of that which he comes not to loſe.

Val. I muſt confeſs that our Army has it now in their power to introduce a Common-wealth.

Pub. And there is no other action in their power that can excuſe them.

Val. Putting the caſe they would hearken to you, what courſe would you adviſe?

Pub. The ſame that I have advis'd over and over.

Val. As how?

Pub. As how! is that yet a Queſtion? Let them divide the Territory into fifty equal parts.

Val. They will never make a new diviſion.

Pub. Why then they ſhall never have an equal Common-wealth.

Val. What ill luck is this, that the firſt ſtep ſhould be ſo difficult?

Pub. You ſpeak as if never any Territory had been divided, whereas there is none that has not; and Surveyors will tell you, it is a work to be perfectly perform'd in two months, and with eaſe.

Val. Putting the caſe this were done, what is next?

Pub. The next is, that the Common-wealth were compleat.

Val. Say you ſo? this indeed makes amends: but how?

Pub. With no more addition, than that the People in every diſtinct diviſion elect annually two Knights and ſeven Deputies.

Val. I dare ſay the People would never ſtick at this.

Pub. Not ſticking at this, they of their own power have inſtituted the two great Aſſemblies, of which every Common-wealth conſiſts.

Val. But in adviſing theſe things, you muſt adviſe men ſo that they may underſtand them.

Pub. VALERIUS, could I as eaſily have advis'd men how to underſtand, as what to do, there had been a Common-wealth ere this.

Val. Come, I will have you try ſomething of this kind, and begin upon ſome known Principle, as this, *All Power is in the People.*

Pub. Content. But the diffuſive Body of the People (at leaſt in a Territory of this extent) can never exerciſe any Power at all.

Val. That is certain.

Pub. Hence is the neceſſity of ſome form of Government.

Val. That is, the People of themſelves being in a natural incapacity of exerciſing Power, muſt be brought into ſome artificial or political capacity of exerciſing the ſame.

Pub. Right. Now this may be done three ways; as firſt, by a ſingle Perſon——

Val. How!

Pub. Nay, I am not likely to trouble you much upon this point: but as you were intimating juſt now, there are Royaliſts who derive the original Right of Monarchy from the conſent of the People.

Val. There are ſo.

Pub. And theſe hold the King to be nothing elſe, but the Repreſenter of the People and their Power.

Val. As the *Turk*.

Pub. Yes, as the *Turk*.

Val. The Peoples Power at that rate comes to the Peoples Slavery.

Pub. You ſay right; and ſo it may at other rates too.

Val. As how?

Pub. Why as I was about to ſay, The Power of the People may be politically brought into exerciſe three ways: by a ſingle Perſon; by an Aſſembly conſiſting of a few; or by an Aſſembly conſiſting of many.

Val. Or by a mixture.

Pub. Nay, I pray let that alone yet a while: for which way ſoever you go, it muſt come at length to ſome mixture, ſeeing the ſingle Perſon you nam'd but now, without his *Divan* or Council to debate and propoſe to him, would make but bad work even for himſelf. But as the Government comes to be pitch'd fundamentally upon one of theſe three, ſo it differs not only in name, but in nature.

Val. I apprehend you, as Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy.

Pub. Nay, you are out with your Learning, when you have forbidden it me. But in Countries where there is not a Nobility ſufficiently balanc'd or inrich'd, there can be none of your Ariſtocracy; and yet there may (as long as it will laſt) be a Government in a few.

Val. What call you that?

Pub. Nay, what ſay you?

Val. Come, it is Oligarchy: when all is done, ſome words of Art we muſt uſe.

Pub. I thought you would come to it; and yet ſeeing I have promis'd, I will be ſparing. But with your pardon, you have diſorder'd my Diſcourſe, or by this time I had ſhew'd, that if the Power of the People be committed to a ſingle Perſon, the common Intereſt is ſubmitted to that of a Family; and if it be committed to a few, it is ſubmitted to the Intereſt of a few Families.

Val. Which, ſo many times as they are more than one, is ſo many times worſe than Monarchy.

Pub. I am not ſorry that you are of that mind. For there is no ſuch thing as a Common-wealth, or, as you ſay, Democracy in nature, if it be not pitch'd upon a numerous Aſſembly of the People.

Val. What call you numerous?

Pub. Why, an Aſſembly ſuch for number as can neither go upon the intereſt of one ſingle Perſon or Family, nor the intereſt of a few Perſons or Families.

Val. How will you conſtitute ſuch an Aſſembly?

Pub. Common-wealths for the Conſtitution of their Popular Aſſemblies, have had two ways. The firſt by inrolling all their Citizens, and ſtating the *Quorum* in ſuch ſort, that all to and above the ſtated number repairing at the time and place appointed, are impower'd to give the Vote of the whole Common-wealth.

Val.

Val. The *Athenian Quorum* was ſix thouſand; which towards the latter end of that Common-wealth came to five.

Pub. So, ſo, you may quote Authors: But you may remember alſo, that *Athens* was a ſmall Common-wealth.

Val. How many would you adviſe for *England*?

Pub. Put the caſe I ſhould ſay, ten thouſand?

Val. They will laugh at you.

Pub. What can I help that? or how many would you adviſe?

Val. I would not go above five thouſand.

Pub. Mark you then: they only that are neareſt would come; and ſo the City of *London* would give Law to the whole Nation.

Val. Why really that ſame now is clear; but would there be leſs danger of it, in caſe you ſtated your *Quorum* at ten, at twenty, or tho' it were at a hundred or two hundred thouſand?

Pub. No: For which cauſe, as to *England*, it is a plain caſe, that this is no way for the inſtitution of a popular Aſſembly.

Val. Which way then?

Pub. For *England* there is no way but by Repreſentative, to be made to riſe equally and methodically by ſtated Elections of the People throughout the whole Nation.

Val. Needs this to be ſo numerous as the other?

Pub. No.

Val. Why?

Pub. Becauſe it is not obnoxious to a Party, to any certain Rank, or ſuch as are ſooneſt upon the ſpur, or that make leaſt account of their Pains or of their Money.

Val. Will you be ſo curious?

Pub. Do you think this a Curioſity? How elſe will you avoid improvement in the Intereſt of the better ſort, to the detriment of thoſe of meaner rank; or in the Intereſt of the Few, to the detriment of that of the Many?

Val. But even this way there is danger of that foul Beaſt the Oligarchy.

Pub. Look about you. The Parliament declares all Power to be in the People; is that in the better ſort only?

Val. Stay? the King was to obſerve *Leges & Conſtitutiones quas vulgus elegerit*: That *Vulgus* is to be underſtood of the Parliament; and the Parliament conſiſted wholly of the better ſort.

Pub. It is true; but then that Common-wealth acted in all things accordingly.

Val. It was, you will ſay, no Democracy.

Pub. And will you ſay it was?

Val. No truly: yet this deriv'd in part from the free Election of the People.

Pub. How free? ſeeing the People, then under Lords, dar'd not to elect otherwiſe than has pleas'd thoſe Lords.

Val. Something of that is true; but I am perſuaded that the People, not under Lords, will yet be moſt addicted to the better ſort.

Pub. That is certain.

Val. How then will you prevent the like in your Inſtitution?

Pub. You ſhall ſee preſently. The diffuſive Body of the People, in which the Power is, and is declar'd to be, conſiſts in the far greater part of the lower ſort: wherefore their Repreſentative, to riſe naturally,

ly, and to be exactly comprehenſive of the common Intereſt, muſt conſiſt alſo in the far greater part of the lower ſort.

Val. Of what number will you have this Repreſentative?

Pub. Suppoſe a thouſand, or thereabout.

Val. What proportion will you have the meaner ſort in it to hold to the better?

Pub. Suppoſe about ſix to four.

Val. How will you order it, that it ſhall be ſo conſtituted?

Pub. Why thus: Let the People in every Precinct or Shire at Election chuſe four under one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Money, together with three at or above that proportion.

Val. I ſee not but this Repreſentative muſt be exact.

Pub. It is yet none at all; that is, unleſs you preſume Changes: for one thouſand, without change governing the whole People, amounts neither to a Repreſentative nor to a Common-wealth, but comes ſtill to your hard name.

Val. How do you order your Changes?

Pub. By annual election of one third part for three years.

Val. So that every year one third part of your Aſſembly falls out of it, and a new third part at the ſame time enters into the ſame.

Pub. Even ſo.

Val. This cauſes the Repreſentative to be perpetually extant.

Pub. It does ſo: But to reſpit that a little, I ſhould be glad, before I ſtir farther, to know which way the Vote of a Repreſentative thus conſtituted, can go one hairs breadth beſide the common and publick Intereſt of the whole diffuſive Body of the People.

Val. No way in the Earth that I can imagine, except thro' ignorance.

Pub. No Human Ordinance is infallible; and what is done thro' mere ignorance or miſtake at one time, will be found and amended at another.

Val. A thouſand men, and ſix to four of the lower ſort perpetually extant! this muſt be a grievous Charge to the moſt of them; it will be hard to bring them, and impoſſible to hold them together.

Pub. Upon ſuch as are elected and come not, conſiderable Fines muſt be levy'd; and ſuch as come and ſtay together muſt have good Salaries.

Val. Salaries to ſo many! what will that come to?

Pub. Not, with the reſt of the Common-wealth, to three hundred thouſand pounds a year.

Val. Why? the Kings have rarely had above ſix.

Pub. And did *England* ever grudge them any part of that proportion?

Val. I muſt confeſs the Quarrel grew when they would not be contented with ſo little.

Pub. Now if *England* never did, nor needed grudge a King ſix hundred thouſand pounds a year, to be ſpent among Courtiers, why ſhould we imagine ſhe ſhould grudge a Common-wealth three hundred thouſand pounds a year, to be ſpent among Magiſtrates?

Val. But Parliament-men have taken nothing.

Pub. Have the People given nothing.

Val. That was for the maintenance of Armies.

Pub. And whether had you rather maintain Armies or Magiſtrates?

Val.

Val. But putting the caſe that this Aſſembly needed not to be perpetually extant, this Charge in the whole or in the far greater part might be abated.

Pub. I cannot tell: for how often think you fit that this Aſſembly ſhould convene?

Val. Parliaments at moſt met not above once a year.

Pub. If they had been perpetually extant, there would have been no King.

Val. No truly, except in name only.

Pub. Therefore the Popular Aſſembly in a Common-wealth ought not to be perpetually extant.

Val. To the end, you will ſay, that there may be ſome King.

Pub. Mock not: or what other guard of Liberty is there in any Common-wealth, but the Popular Aſſembly?

Val. Come, let them aſſemble twice a year upon their ordinary Guard.

Pub. And what if there be an extraordinary occaſion?

Val. Then, as often as there is any ſuch occaſion.

Pub. How much will this abate of their neceſſary Charge, or of the Salaries? And how much better were it for a Repreſentative to lead the Life of Stateſmen than of Carriers?

Val. Common-wealths, whoſe Aſſemblies have been of the former kind, have call'd them otherwiſe than at ſtated times, or upon extraordinary occaſions.

Pub. But then their Aſſemblies were not equal Repreſentatives, but conſiſted of ſuch as being next at hand were ſtill ready upon any occaſion.

Val. That makes indeed a conſiderable difference: But were this Repreſentative always extant, I cannot ſee but it would have nothiug to do.

Pub. And in caſe it be not always extant, you imagine that it may have ſomething to do.

Val. Yes.

Pub. Then whether goes it better with the Common-wealth when the Repreſentative has ſomething to do, or when it has nothing to do?

Val. This is very quaint.

Pub. No truly, VALERIUS, it is plain, that the Guard of Liberty perpetually extant, in doing nothing muſt do much; and not perpetually extant, in doing much may do nothing.

Val. I am afraid that having nothing to do, they will make work.

Pub. Such I warrant you as the Parliament and the Army made the other day.

Val. Nay, I am not ſo wide. A civil Council and a ſtanding Army muſt needs have Intereſts much more diſtinct than two civil Aſſemblies; and where there is not a like cauſe, I know well enough there cannot be the like effect.

Pub. I ſhall deſire no more, than that you will hold to this; and then tell me what Diſputes there us'd to be between the Senate of *Venice* and the great Council, which is perpetually extant, and conſiſts of about two thouſand.

Val. Nay, certain it is, that between thoſe two there never was any diſpute at all.

Pub. Then tell me for what cauſe ſuch a thing ſhould any more happen between the Aſſemblies propos'd; or, according to our own rule, from like cauſes expect like effects.

Val. You put me to it.

Pub. Nay, it is you that put me to it; for you will be preſuming that this Aſſembly can have nothing to do, before we come to conſider what are their proper Buſineſſes and Functions.

Val. I beg your pardon, and what are thoſe?

Pub. Why ſurely no ſmall matters; for in every Common-wealth truly popular, it is inſeparable from the aſſembly of the People that firſt they wholly and only have the right of Reſult in all matters of Law-giving, of making Peace and War, and in levying Men and Money: Secondly, That the ultimate Reſult in Judicature lie to them: and thirdly, That they have right to call to an account, and to puniſh their Magiſtrates for all matters of Mal-adminiſtration of Government.

Val. I aſſure you this muſt amount to a great deal of buſineſs.

Pub. Certain it is, that in ſome Common-wealths the Popular Aſſembly by this means has been perpetually employ'd.

Val. And ſo I think it might be in *England.*

Pub. It might; but I do not think it would. However, if it be in the undoubted right of the Popular Aſſembly to proceed againſt their Magiſtrates, for Mal-adminiſtration, would you leave it upon the hand of thoſe Magiſtrates, whether this Repreſentative ſhould aſſemble or no?

Val. Come, you have ſaid enough, it were not prudent: but as to the matter of Appeals, it is certain that in *Iſrael* the ultimate Reſort was to the Sanhedrim or 70 Elders.

Pub. I know it very well: nevertheleſs you ſhall find that the Congregation judg'd *Benjamin*; and if you mark the Appeal to the 70 Elders, you ſhall find that it was not an Appeal of the Party for Relief, but of the Judges in inferior Courts for further light and direction in difficult caſes of the Law.

Val. Let me but know in what manner this Aſſembly is to perform theſe Functions, and I have done.

Pub. Why as to matter of Law-giving, I told you that they wholly and only have the Right and power of Reſult.

Val. But to Reſult, there muſt neceſſarily go precedent Debate; ſeeing a Man, much leſs an Aſſembly, reſolves not upon any thing without ſome Conſiderations, Motives, or Reaſons thereto conducing, which ought to be firſt orderly and maturely debated: and how will you bring a thouſand men, eſpecially being ſix to four of the lower ſort, to debate any thing with order and maturity?

Pub. You ſay that the Popular Aſſembly in *Athens* conſiſted at the leaſt of five thouſand.

Val. And I ſaid true.

Pub. Yet this Aſſembly debated: Why may not a thouſand men debate as well as five thouſand?

Val. As well! Nay PUBLICOLA, if they debate no better in your Common-wealth than they did in that, you may know what will become of it. And to tell you true, I do not think that a thouſand men can debate any whit more orderly and maturely than five thouſand.

Pub. And ſo think I too.

Val. How then?

Pub.

Pub. How then? Why this is the reaſon of the Senate in every Common-wealth.

Val. So there muſt be a Senate, which amounts to thus much; without a Senate there can be no Common-wealth, and with a Senate there will always be Practices upon the Liberty of the People.

Pub. How prove you that?

Val. Why by the Senate of *Lacedemon* in the beginning, and by the Senate of *Rome* throughout.

Pub. But find you the like by the Senates of *Athens* and *Venice*?

Val. No.

Pub. Conſider then that theſe were by Election of the People, and upon frequent Removes, and that the former were defective in one or in both theſe circumſtances.

Val. You intend your Senate upon Removes then?

Pub. Right.

Val. And Elective by the People?

Pub. Yes.

Val. How? by the Popular Aſſembly, or by the body of the People in their Precincts?

Pub. By the body of the People in their Precincts, at the ſame time when they elect their other Deputies, and with the ſame circumſtances, except that theſe be all elected out of ſuch as have a hundred pounds a year real or perſonal.

Val. What hurt, if they were elected by the Popular Aſſembly?

Pub. They would not derive ſo immediately, nor riſe ſo equally from the People, as when choſen in the Precincts; becauſe this way every Shire comes neceſſarily to have a ſhare in the Senate: beſides, wiſe men and underſtanding are better known in their Tribes than they can be in an Aſſembly out of their Tribes, eſpecially while they are new comers; nor will the Popular Aſſembly afford ſo good a choice as the whole People. There are other Reaſons.

Val. Enough, enough. Of what number do you conſtitute this Senate?

Pub. Of three hundred.

Val. Why ſhould not one hundred be full enough for a debating Council, eſpecially ſeeing Debate is the more orderly where the Counſellors are fewer?

Pub. You are to bear it in mind, that this Senate is upon annual change in one third part.

Val. That is, every year one hundred having ſerv'd three years, go out, and a new hundred comes in.

Pub. Right: for which cauſe, to have one hundred well practis'd in debate, your Senate muſt conſiſt of three hundred.

Val. May not thoſe that go out come preſently in again by a new Election?

Pub. Not at all; for that were yet another way of continuing the Government in a few.

Val. Do you mean that no man ſhall ſerve in this Capacity, or in that of the Popular Aſſembly, but once in his life?

Pub. I mean that a man, having ſerv'd his term in one of theſe, may after a like vacation or interval be elected again to ſerve in either of them, and not before.

Val.

Val. At what age do you make a man capable of theſe Elections?

Pub. Not till thirty.

Val. He ſtays a great while ere he comes to preferment, and is ſoon out again: at which rate a man ſhould have much ado to attain to ſufficient knowledge for the leading of the Common-wealth.

Pub. This was never objected againſt Parliaments.

Val. It is true: but then the Election of Parliament-men was not oblig'd to any Interval, and divers have been of every Parliament that was ſummon'd during their Lives.

Pub. Parliaments when they were the moſt frequent, aſſembl'd not above once a year, very rarely ſo often; and how long, pray, did they uſually ſit?

Val. Some two or three months.

Pub. I allow you the moſt you aſk: at which rate a man that had ſat in twenty Parliaments, could not have ſat above four years complete.

Val. And in your Parliament, at one Election he ſits three.

Pub. Mark you that?

Val. Yes, and more: Whereas a Parliament-man without interval could in twenty years have ſat but four complete, in your Aſſemblies a man obſerving his intervals, may in twenty years ſerve ten years complete.

Pub. You allow that, I hope, to be ſome advantage towards acquiring knowledge in conduct; and yet antiently your Parliament-men were in this point thought able enough.

Val. Now would I deſire no more than to be as fully ſatisfy'd, that theſe Senators muſt be honeſt enough.

Pub. Which way can they be diſhoneſt?

Val. Indeed I am not yet acquainted with their ways: but if nothing can be propos'd to the popular Aſſembly, except by theſe only, they ſhould, I think, propoſe nothing but what is for their own advantage.

Pub. They are the Senate; and in that they have all the advantages that a well order'd Common-wealth can give to a Senate.

Val. But they will be ſtill hankering after more.

Pub. As what?

Val. Why Riches or Power.

Pub. All Magiſtrates are accountable to the Popular Aſſembly; and ſo, without acquiſition of Power, I cannot imagine which way they ſhould turn themſelves to the acquiſition of Riches.

Val. They will drive then at Power; they will be co-ordinate.

Pub. In the World there has never yet been any Senate that durſt ſo much as pretend to Power.

Val. No? Had not the Senate of *Iſrael*, and that of *Lacedemon* Power?

Pub. Executive Power they had, in as much as they were Judicatories; but Legiſlative or Sovereign Power (which is that whereof we ſpeak) they had none at all.

Val. Other Senates have had other power, as in the managing of foreign Affairs, and the like.

Pub. Which ſtill comes not to the point in hand, becauſe in theſe and the like matters, as the creation of divers Magiſtrates, the Senate uſes to be made Plenipotentiary by the Popular Aſſembly, that is, by Law.

Val.

Val. I hear them talk of making a co-ordinate Senate firſt, and without the People, and then of aſſembling a Parliament in the old way to govern with that Senate.

Pub. Things, VALERIUS, are ſoon ſaid; but if any Parliament whatever, ſo it be elected by the People (and, perhaps, if otherwiſe) do not make it one of their firſt works to pull down a co-ordinate Senate, I ask no credit to my Politicks.

Val. This is to propheſy.

Pub. Then, to reaſon the caſe: I ſay, That the Senate aſſuming Power, the popular Aſſembly falls immediately to debate; and the popular Aſſembly debating, the Senate is *ipſo facto* depos'd, there being no other neceſſary uſe or function of the Senate but debate only.

Val. You ſaid but now, That the Popular Aſſembly could not debate.

Pub. Not orderly and maturely: but upon ſuch an occaſion as this, they will do as they can; nor is it avoidable.

Val. Nay, if there be ſome occaſion in which you allow that the popular Aſſembly muſt and ought to debate, there will hardly be any in which they will be perſuaded that they may not. So this will come to the pulling down of the Senate as often as the People pleaſe.

Pub. Which is ſo much the rather to be be fear'd, becauſe you ſhall never find that popular Aſſembly which did ever actually depoſe their Senate.

Val. Our Army has pull'd down a good many Parliaments.

Pub. What is that to the purpoſe? Is our Army a popular Aſſembly? Yet let them pull down a Parliament as often as they pleaſe, they muſt ſet up another; and in this indeed there may be ſome reſemblance: for let a popular Aſſembly pull down the Senate as often as they pleaſe, they muſt ſet another.

Val. Or a ſingle Perſon.

Pub. Right: for that holds both ways too, and (as to our caſe) will ſtand neither.

Val. The People of *Athens* debated, yet for all that their Senate was not depos'd.

Pub. Not formally; but it remain'd little better than a Warren, wherein great Men did, as it were, ſtart hares, to be hunted in the tumult of the popular Aſſembly.

Val. Verily, PUBLICOLA, this Model of yours is a moſt intire thing.

Pub. This with the neceſſary conſequences, as the diviſion of the Senate into Senatorian Councils, the adorning and actuating of this and the other Aſſembly with fit Magiſtrates, whereof I have ſufficiently diſcours'd in other places, amounts to an intire thing.

Val. And you offer it freely.

Pub. I do.

Val Would it not grieve you to ſee them crop a little of it, and ſpoil it?

Pub. They had better take it to ſome purpoſe.

Val. Nay, what they take will be to ſome purpoſe, I warrant you. Come, there is a Party, a ſelect, a refin'd Party, a Nation in a Nation, that muſt and will govern.

Pub. That is it which I deſire to ſee.

Val. You are of a rare temper; happy in unhappineſs.

Pub. O I love frequent Changes.

Val. Is that any of your Virtues?

Pub. Yes, where we are certain never to go right, while there remains a way to go wrong.

Val. They are confident men. They cannot be perſuaded but they can govern the World.

Pub. Till they have try'd. Such as can govern the World, are ſuch as can be govern'd by Reaſon. Now there is no Party refin'd, ſelect, or what you will in *England*, amounting to one twentieth part of the whole People.

Val. One twentieth part of the People, for ought I know, may amount to a hundred thouſand; there is no Party any thing near this account, I dare ſay.

Pub. A twentieth part of the People can never govern the other nineteen, but by a perpetual Army.

Val. They do not like that the worſe.

Pub. The People having been govern'd by a King without an Army, and being govern'd by a Common-wealth with an Army, will deteſt the Government of a Common-wealth, and deſire that of a King.

Val. Yes, ſuch is the ſpirit of the Nation.

Pub. Such is the ſpirit in this caſe of any Nation.

Val. And yet they make it a particular quarrel.

Pub. They make every thing particular: if you ſpeak of *Iſrael*, *Athens*, *Rome*, *Venice*, or the like, they hear you with volubility of countenance; and will not have it that God ever minded the matter of Government, till he brought them in play. Nay, tho' they have come heels over head for this very thing, I know not how often, yet they are reſolv'd to take no warning.

Val. PUBLICOLA, you will be ſhent.

Pub. I am to perform my duty. To flatter is not my duty.

Val. But between you and me, Do you not think that the ſpirit of the Nation, or the main body of the People of this Land, deſires the reſtitution of their antient Government?

Pub. I make little doubt of it.

Val. How then in caſe of a Common-wealth are they to be truſted?

Pub. In caſe of a Common-wealth, it is not the People that are truſted, but the Orders of the Common-wealth.

Val. The Common-wealth muſt conſiſt of the People.

Pub. The People under the Monarchy, when that invaded them, invaded it.

Val. True, and in ſuch a manner as has caus'd the ruin of it.

Pub. What was the ſpirit of the People then?

Val. But it is now another thing.

Pub. Nay, the very ſame: for then it invaded a Government that invaded their Liberty, and now it would invade a Government that invades their Liberty.

Val. But how ſhould this be mended?

Pub. Do you not ſee that this ſhould not be mended, but encourag'd?

Val. How ſhould it be encourag'd then?

Pub. By giving them a Form that muſt preſerve their Liberty.

Val. I little doubt but there is in your Form a full ſecurity to the People of their Liberty; but do you think that there is in it any full

ſecurity

ſecurity that the People ſhall not caſt off this Form?

Pub. If it ſecures their Liberty, why ſhould they?

Val. My queſtion is not, why they ſhould, but whether they can.

Pub. They cannot, without going againſt their own intereſt.

Val. But they can go againſt their own intereſt.

Pub. Nay, remember your ſelf, whether the Form ſhewn be not ſuch, as you have already granted can in no wiſe go beſide the intereſt of the whole People.

Val. They that are now in power, have no truſt at all in Forms.

Pub. Do they ſail in Ships, not upon Planks? Do they ride Horſes, not Hogs? Do they travel in Coaches, not upon Hurdles? Do they live in Houſes, not in Ditches? Do they eat Bread, not Stones?

Val. Enough, enough.

Pub. But in ſo doing they acknowledge ſuch a Form to be ſecurity for ſuch a uſe or action. And muſt the form of a Common-wealth be the only form in which they can allow no ſecurity for the proper uſe and action?

Val. They obſerve none of this.

Pub. Do they obſerve that there is any ſecurity in Men?

Val. That, eſpecially in our times, were ſomewhat a hard matter.

Pub. And how many Securities are there?

Val. I know no more, than one perſonal, or in Men; another real, or in things.

Pub. Chuſe you whether you would have.

Val. Well, be the neceſſary action or uſe of your Form what it will, I would ſee it more plainly and particularly demonſtrated how the ſpirit of the Nation, or the whole People, being freely eligible into your Aſſemblies, muſt preſently loſe that Inclination which now plainly they have to ſet up Monarchy, or to perſecute for Conſcience.

Pub. You will allow no weight in the Argument, that a People in Liberty, unleſs the Orders of their Common-wealth were firſt fundamentally ruin'd, that is, broken in the balance or foundation, did never do either of theſe.

Val. What weight ſoever I allow to this Argument, it is no ways to my preſent purpoſe.

Pub. You will put me then beſide experience, and to ſhew by what reaſon it is that a Peartree muſt bear Peers, or why men gather not Grapes on Thorns, or Figgs on Thiſtles.

Val. Poor PUBLICOLA, be the taſk as hard as it will, I am for this time reſolv'd to hold you to it.

Pub. What is it then that any Government can be ſufficiently founded or balanc'd upon, but ſuch an Intereſt as is ſufficiently able to bear it?

Val. Good Sir, a Government ought to be founded upon Juſtice, I take it.

Pub. Right: and is not that Government which is founded upon an Intereſt not ſufficiently able to bear it, founded upon Injuſtice?

Val. I ſuſpect whither this will go. A Government founded upon the overbalance of Property, is legitimately founded, and ſo upon Juſtice; but a Government founded upon the under-balance of Property, muſt of neceſſity be founded upon Force, or a ſtanding Army. Is not this that which you mean by Intereſt ſufficient or not ſufficient to ſuſtain a Government?

Pub. You have it right.

Val.

Val. O Atheiſt! this damns the Government of the Saints.

Pub. Look you now, how irreligious a thing it may be made, to ſpeak but with common honeſty. Do you think that ſuch as are plainly Oligarchiſts, or ſhall exerciſe by a force, and without election by the People, ſuch a Power as is both naturally and declaredly in the People, and in them only, can eſtabliſh their Throne upon Juſtice?

Val. No.

Pub. Do you think that ſuch as are truly Saints, can eſtabliſh their Throne upon Injuſtice?

Val. No.

Pub. Why then you have granted, that ſuch as are plainly Oligarchiſts cannot be truly Saints. Again, do you ſtill think, as you once intimated, that a Government now introduc'd in *England*, exactly according to the Principles of Prudence and Juſtice, would rule the Earth?

Val. Yes.

Pub. Do you think, that ſuch as are truly Saints, if they introduce a Government, ought to introduce it exactly according to the Principles of Prudence and Juſtice?

Val. Yes.

Pub. Why then, let ſuch as are truly Saints but ſee what it is to rule the Earth, and take the rule of the Earth.

Val. They will not approve of this way.

Pub. How! not the Saints approve of Prudence and Juſtice! Who is the Atheiſt now, VALERIUS?

Val. Good PUBLICOLA, let us keep to the point in hand. You ſay, That the ſecurity of Liberty lies not in the People, but in the form of their Government; ſo I am yet to expect when you will ſhew, what there is in your form, why it muſt be impoſſible for the People under it to reſtore Monarchy, or to perſecute for Conſcience.

Pub. See you not, that to do either of theſe under ſuch a form, muſt be point blank againſt their Intereſt?

Val. But ſo either of theſe is now, and yet in this poſture you will confeſs that they would do both.

Pub. Mark how I am us'd. I ſpeak of a Form ſupported by an Intereſt ſufficiently able to bear it, and of an Intereſt contain'd under a Form ſufficiently able to ſecure it; and you inſtance in a Poſture which is no Form at all, but ſuch a confuſion among, and force upon the People, as creates an Intereſt in them to rid themſelves which way they can of ſuch a miſery.

Val. I did acknowledge and muſt confeſs, that your popular Aſſembly is ſuch as cannot err, except thro' ignorance; but thro' this, you your ſelf have acknowledg'd, and muſt confeſs, that it may err.

Pub. I retract nothing.

Val. Now firſt, or never, they will reſtore Monarchy thro' ignorance.

Pub. But they cannot do this firſt, therefore they can never do it.

Val. Why cannot the popular Aſſembly do this firſt?

Pub. Becauſe it muſt firſt be propos'd by a Senate, that can neither do any ſuch thing thro' ignorance nor thro' knowledge.

Val. Nay, then have at you; I will ſet this ſame Senate and Repreſentative of yours to work in ſuch a manner, that you ſhall confeſs they may ſet up Monarchy.

Pub.

Pub. Do your worſt.

Val. Your Senate being aſſembl'd (I will not have them make long Speeches;

Pub. Nor I)

Val. Riſes me up one of the Senators, and ſays, 'Mr. Speaker, 'this Nation has been long in labour, but now thro' the mercy of 'God, the Child is not only come to the Birth, but there is alſo 'ſtrength to bring forth: In the number of Counſellors there is 'ſtrength; the number of this Houſe is good (far better than has uſual-'ly been of late) and their Election has been very free and fair. Here 'is alſo, I know not how (but the Inventions of men are over-rul'd 'by the Providence of God) an extraordinary and exceeding great con-'fluence of honeſt men, who are not ſo well here; and if you determine 'any thing that is good for your Country, will go home and pray for 'you. Now, Sir, (to be brief) ſince our Government conſiſted of King, 'Lords, and Commons, the antient, the only, the moſt happy Go-'vernment that this Nation, nay, that the World ever knew, it is 'but too well known, that we have had no Government at all: where-'fore my opinion is, that we propoſe, as they call it, to theſe honeſt 'men (who you need not doubt will receive it with glad hearts) the 'reſtitution of Right, and of the Government in this Nation by King, 'Lords, and Commons.

As ſure as you live, PUBLICOLA, thus much being ſaid, your whole Senate will immediately agree to propoſe it to the Repreſentative: and thus much being propos'd to the Repreſentative, thoſe People will throw up their Caps for joy, and immediately return to their Houſes.

Pub. But VALERIUS, thus much has been ſaid in Parliament when the Houſe was fuller; when they who were for this Reſtitution were back'd by a ſingle Perſon in actual poſſeſſion of the Throne; when over and above the zeal of the *Presbyterians*, there were Parties that knew no other means of ſelf-preſervation; as without, Divines belabouring the Oak of every Pulpit; and within, Lawyers, Officers, and Penſioners: yet was it ſo far from being carry'd, that the ſingle Perſon has been forc'd to diſſolve Parliaments, and that thro' apparent danger of being over-run by the Principles of a Common-wealth not in being. But if this were ſo when a Common-wealth could ſcarce be hop'd, what will it be when the Common-wealth ſhall be in ſuch a condition as cannot be withſtood? for the Senate can never come to propoſe any thing to the People without firſt agreeing upon debating what it is they will propoſe; nor is it poſſible that ſuch Debate ſhould be brought to any end, but by reaſons thereto conducing: now it muſt not only be impoſſible to find reaſons for the reſtitution of Monarchy, but the reaſons why Monarchy ought not to be reſtor'd muſt be obvious; not only in regard that it is quite contrary to the intereſt of the Nation, and of theſe Aſſemblies, but to the intereſt ten to one of every particular man in either of theſe Aſſemblies: nor are or have the reaſons been leſs obvious, or leſs ventilated in Parliament, why Monarchy as to this Nation is impoſſible in it ſelf.

Val. Will you ſay the like for Liberty of Conſcience?

Pub. Yes; becauſe without Liberty of Conſcience, Civil Liberty cannot be perfect; and without Civil Liberty, Liberty of Conſcience cannot be perfect.

Val. Theſe things are true, but they never will ſee them, never, PUBLICOLA: you your ſelf ſay, That the People cannot ſee, but they can feel.

Pub. I meant that of the diffuſive Body of the People, not of the People under good Orders; in which caſe they are the ſharpeſt ſighted of any kind of Government whatſoever: and therefore it is not modeſt that you, or I, or any particular Man or Party, blinded with ſelf-conceit, ſhould pretend to ſee with ſuch a Conſtitution; or ſhew me that Eye under the Sun, that ſees like that of *Venice.* But putting the caſe it were otherwiſe as to ſeeing, theſe things are plainly palpable or obvious to feeling.

Val. I have indeed obſerv'd, that in Common-wealths there are very few that ſee or underſtand them, and yet their affection to that way of Government is exceeding vigorous.

Pub. Whence can this otherwiſe be than from feeling? But one thing, VALERIUS, I take at your hands extreme heavily.

Val. What is that, PUBLICOLA?

Pub. That you with one little Speech of a ſingle Senator ſhould run ſo regardleſly over theſe two Aſſemblies, without taking any notice at all of the neceſſary Courſe of them.

Val. What Courſe, PUBLICOLA?

Pub. Why you might eaſily have thought that among three hundred Senators there might have been at leaſt one hundred as good Speakers as yours.

Val. Have I ſaid any thing to the contrary?

Pub. And do you or I what we can, ten to one of them will be longer winded than you have allow'd.

Val. For that matter let them pleaſe themſelves.

Pub. Ay, but then you ſhould not have made an end of your Debate in a minute.

Val. What is all this?

Pub. Why I ſay, They would have been debating on that point at leaſt a fortnight.

Val. Well, and when that had been done, would never have agreed.

Pub. No.

Val. Did not you ſay that before?

Pub. Well, but I am now upon another point; that was to the matter in debate, this is to the manner of proceeding: imagine the matter had been ſuch upon which they could have agreed.

Val. What then?

Pub. Then ſuch an agreement had been a Decree of the Senate.

Val. Is a Decree of the Senate binding?

Pub. If it be upon a Law made, it is binding; if upon a Law to be made, it is to be propos'd to the People. Now every Propoſition to the People is to be promulgated, that is, printed and publiſh'd to the whole Nation ſix weeks before the time that the Repreſentative is to aſſemble and give the Vote of the Common-wealth, or that teſt without which no ſuch Propoſition can be any Law.

Val. By this means it muſt follow, that the whole People both by Diſcourſe and Letters, debate ſix weeks together upon the matter.

Pub. You are right.

Val. How is it then that you ſay, The Repreſentative of the People muſt not debate? You allow to theſe leſs privilege than to the whole People.

Pub.

Pub. No leſs, nor in this point any more.

Val. Yet does this amount to Debate in thoſe that are of the Repreſentative.

Pub. You ſay well, but not to any Debate at all in the Repreſentative.

Val. Why this Repreſentative is nothing elſe but an Inſtrument or Method, whereby to receive the Reſult of the whole Nation with order and expedition, and without any manner of tumult or confuſion.

Pub. And is that any thing the worſe?

Val. No; but I am glad you have told it me: for that thoſe of the Repreſentative would one way or other have Debate, I knew certainly.

Pub. In ſome, are you ſatisfy'd, that the Spirit of the Nation, or the People, however they may now under no Form at all, and in deteſtation of ſuch as having govern'd them by force, will let them ſee no way out of confuſion, deſire their old Government, as having never yet known any other; yet under ſuch a Form as is propos'd, can never go about to introduce Monarchy, without obvious diſcovery, that as to their Intereſt it is quite contrary, and as to itſelf impoſſible?

Val. The ſatisfaction is pretty good.

Pub. Pretty good! give me but half ſo good, that the ſpirit of the Army, not formerly obedient to Parliaments, and now dreading or deſpiſing them, muſt apprehend the reſtitution of Monarchy to be quite contrary to their intereſt.

Val. You ſurprize me: for if the Army will have no Parliament, and a King reſtor'd can now in *England* without an Army have no Government, they may imagine this their only way to Greatneſs and Continuance.

Pub. Had not the Oligarchy then, if they meant well, better to have us'd ſober expreſſions, and minded what thoſe true and real Intereſts are, which in the foundation and preſervation of every kind of Government are paramount, than to have overcaſt them with the miſt of new affected Phraſes, and fallen on conjuring up Spirits?

Val. You have conjur'd up a Spirit that will keep me waking.

Pub. Set him on pulling down the Law and the Miniſtry; when that is done, let him blow up *Windſor* Caſtle, *Hampton* Court, and throw *Whitehall* into the *Thames*.

Val. It is the only way, for then there can be no King.

Pub. You may be ſure of that, ſeeing the Count of *Holland*'s Domain, and his Houſes are yet not only ſtanding, but diligently preſerv'd by the *Hollanders*.

Val. PUBLICOLA, have you any more to tell me?

Pub. VALERIUS, have you any more to ask me?

Val. Not, except why you have not given the Parliament to underſtand thus much.

Pub. I have printed it over and over.

Val. They take no great notice of Books; you ſhould have laid it, as they ſay, in their diſh by ſome direct Addreſs, as a Petition, or ſo.

Pub. I did petition the Committee for Government.

Val. What anſwer did they make you?

Pub. None at all.

Val.

Val. I would have gone further, and have preſented it to the Houſe.

Pub. Towards this alſo I went as far as I could.

Val. How far was that?

Pub. Why, I think my Petition may have been worn out in the pockets of ſome two or three Members.

Val. Have you a Copy of it about you?

Pub. Let me ſee—here are many Papers; this ſame is it.

To the Parliament of the Common-wealth of England, &c.

The Humble PETITION, &c.

Sheweth,

THAT what neither is, nor ever was in Nature, can never be in Nature.

THAT without a King and Lords, no Government either is, or ever was in Nature (but in mere force) other than by a Senate indu'd with Authority to debate and propoſe; and by a numerous Aſſembly of the People wholly and only inveſted with the right of Reſult in all matters of Law-giving, of making Peace and War, and of levying Men and Money.

WHEREFORE your Petitioner (to disburden his Conſcicience in a matter of ſuch concern to his Country) moſt humbly and earneſtly prays and beſeeches the Parliament, to take into ſpeedy and ſerious conſideration the irrefragable truth of the Premiſes, and what thereupon muſt aſſuredly follow, that is, either the inſtitution of a Common-wealth in the whole People of *England* (without exception, or with exception for a time, of ſo few as may be) by way of a Senate, and a numerous Aſſembly of the People, to the ends, and for the reſpective Functions aforeſaid; or the inevitable ruin of this Nation, which God of his mercy avert.

And your Petitioner ſhall pray, &c.

Val. I would it had been deliver'd.

Pub. Look you, if this had been repreſented to the Houſe, I intended to have added this other Paper, and to have printed them together.

The PETITIONER to the READER.

Reader,

I SAY not that the Form contain'd in the Petition (if we had it, and no more) would be perfect; but that without thus much (which rightly introduc'd, introduces the reſt) there neither is, was, nor can be any ſuch thing as a Common-wealth, or Government without a King and Lords, in Nature.

WHERE

WHERE there is a co-ordinate Senate, there muſt be a King, or it falls inſtantly by the People; as the King failing, the Houſe of Peers fell by the Commons.

WHERE there is a Senate not elective by the People, there is a perpetual Feud between the Senate and the People, as in *Rome.*

TO introduce either of theſe Cauſes, is certainly and inevitably to introduce one of theſe Effects; and if ſo, then who are Cavaliers, I leave you to judge hereafter.

BUT to add farther reaſon to experience. All Civil Power among us (not only by declaration of Parliament, but by the nature of Property) is in and from the People.

WHERE the Power is in the People, there the Senate can legitimately be no more to the Popular Aſſembly, than my Council at Law is to me, that is *(auxilium, non imperium)* a neceſſary Aid, not a Competitor or Rival in Power.

WHERE the Aids of the People become their Rivals or Competitors in Power, there their Shepherds become Wolves, their Peace Diſcord, and their Government Ruin. But to impoſe a ſelect or co-ordinate Senate upon the People, is to give them Rivals and Competitors in Power.

SOME perhaps (ſuch is the temper of the times) will ſay, That ſo much human Confidence as is expreſs'd, eſpecially in the Petition, is Atheiſtical. But how were it Atheiſtical, if I ſhould as confidently foretel, that a Boy muſt expire in Nonage, or become a Man? I propheſy no otherwiſe; and this kind of Propheſy is alſo of God, by thoſe Rules of his Providence, which in the known Government of the World are infallible. In the right obſervation and application of theſe conſiſts all human Wiſdom; and we read that a poor man deliver'd a City by his Wiſdom, yet was this poor man forgotten. But if the Premiſes of this Petition fail, or one part of the Concluſion comes not to paſs accordingly, let me hit the other mark of this ambitious Addreſs, and remain a Fool upon Record in Parliament to all Poſterity. Eccleſ. 9. 14.

Val. Thou Boy! and yet I hope well of thy Reputation.

Pub. Would it were but as good now, as it will be when I can make no uſe of it.

Val. The Major of the Petition is in ſome other of your Writings; and I remember ſome Objections which have been made againſt it: As, that *à non eſſe nec fuiſſe, non datur argumentum ad non poſſe.*

Pub. Say that in *Engliſh.*

Val. What if I cannot? are not you bound to anſwer a thing, tho' it cannot be ſaid in *Engliſh?*

Pub. No truly.

Val. Well, I will ſay it in *Engliſh* then. Tho' there neither be any Houſe of Gold, nor ever were any Houſe of Gold, yet there may be a Houſe of Gold.

Pub. Right: but then, *à non eſſe nec fuiſſe in natura, datur argumentum ad non poſſe in natura.*

Val. I hope you can ſay this in *Engliſh* too.

Pub. That I can, now you have taught me. If there were no ſuch thing as Gold in nature, there never could be any Houſe of Gold.

Val. Softly. The frame of a Government is as much in Art, and as little in Nature, as the frame of a Houſe.

Pub. Both ſoftly and ſurely. The Materials of a Government are as much in Nature, and as little in Art, as the Materials of a Houſe. Now as far as Art is neceſſarily diſpos'd by the nature of its Foundation or Materials, ſo far it is in Art as in Nature.

Val. What call you the Foundation, or the Materials of Government?

Pub. That which I have long ſince prov'd, and you granted, The Balance, the diſtribution of Property, and the Power thence naturally deriving; which as it is in one, in a few or in all, does neceſſarily diſpoſe of the form or frame of the Government accordingly.

Val. Be the Foundation or Materials of a Houſe what they will, the Frame or Super-ſtructures may be diverſly wrought up or ſhapen; and ſo may thoſe of a Common-wealth.

Pub. True: but let a Houſe be never ſo diverſly wrought up or ſhapen, it muſt conſiſt of a Roof and Walls.

Val. That's certain.

Pub. And ſo muſt a Common-wealth of a Senate and of a Popular Aſſembly, which is the ſum of the Minor in the Petition.

Val. The Mathematicians ſay, They will not be quarelſome; but in their Sphere there are things altogether new in the World, as the preſent poſture of the Heavens is, and as was the Star in *Caſſiopæia.*

Pub. VALERIUS, if the Major of the Petition extends as far as is warranted by SOLOMON, I mean, that there is nothing new under the Sun, what new things there may be, or have been above the Sun, will make little to the preſent purpoſe.

Val. It is true; but if you have no more to ſay, they will take this but for ſhifting.

Pub. Where there is Sea, as between *Sicily* and *Naples*, there was antiently Land; and where there is Land, as in *Holland*, there was antiently Sea.

Val. What then?

Pub. Why then the preſent poſture of the Earth is other than it has been, yet is the Earth no new thing, but conſiſts of Land and Sea, as it did always; ſo whatever the preſent poſture of the Heavens be, they conſiſt of Star and Firmament, as they did always.

Val. What will you ſay then to the Star in *Caſſiopæia?*

Pub. Why I ſay, if it conſiſted of the ſame matter with other Stars, it was no new thing in nature, but a new thing in *Caſſiopæia*; as were there a Common-wealth in *England*, it would be no new thing in Nature, but a new thing in *England.*

Val. The Star you will ſay in *Caſſiopæia*, to have been a new thing in nature, muſt have been no Star, becauſe a Star is not a new thing in nature.

Pub. Very good.

Val. You run upon the matter, but the newneſs in the Star was in the manner of the generation.

Pub. At *Putzuoli* near *Naples*, I have ſeen a Mountain that roſe up from under water in one night, and pour'd a good part of the Lake antiently call'd *Lucrin* into the Sea.

Val. What will you infer from hence?

Pub. Why that the new and extraordinary generation of a Star, or of a Mountain, no more cauſes a Star, or a Mountain to be a new thing

thing in nature, than the new and extraordinary generation of a Common-wealth cauſes a Common-wealth to be a new thing in nature. ARISTOTLE reports, that the Nobility of *Tarentum* being cut off in a Battle, that Common-wealth became popular. And if the Powder Plot in *England* had deſtroyed the King and the Nobility, it is poſſible that Popular Government might have riſen up in *England*, as the Mountain did at *Putzuoli*. Yet for all theſe, would there not have been any new thing in nature.

Val. Some new thing (thro' the blending of unſeen cauſes) there may ſeem to be in ſhuffling; but Nature will have her courſe, there is no other than the old game.

Pub. VALERIUS, let it rain or be fair weather, the Sun to the diſſolution of Nature ſhall ever riſe; but it is now ſet, and I apprehend the miſt.

Val. Dear PUBLICOLA, your Health is my own; I bid you goodnight.

Pub. Goodnight to you, VALERIUS.

Val. One word more, PUBLICOLA: Pray make me a preſent of thoſe ſame Papers, and with your leave and licenſe, I will make uſe of my Memory to commit the reſt of this Diſcourſe to writing, and print it.

Pub. They are at your diſpoſing.

Val. I will not do it as has been done, but with your name to it.

Pub. Whether way you like beſt, moſt noble VALERIUS.

Octob. 22.
1659.

A

Syſtem of Politics

Delineated in ſhort and eaſy

APHORISMS.

Publiſh'd from the AUTHOR's own Manuſcript.

CHAP. I.

Of GOVERNMENT.

1. A PEOPLE is either under a ſtate of Civil Government, or in a ſtate of Civil War; or neither under a ſtate of Civil Government, nor in a ſtate of Civil War.

2. CIVIL Government is an Art whereby a People rule themſelves, or are rul'd by others.

3. THE Art of Civil Government in general is two-fold, National, or Provincial.

4. NATIONAL Government is that by which a Nation is govern'd independently, or within it ſelf.

5. PROVINCIAL Government is that by which a Province is govern'd dependently, or by ſome foreign Prince or State.

6. A PEOPLE is neither govern'd by themſelves, nor by others, but by reaſon of ſome external Principle thereto forcing them.

7. FORCE is of two kinds, Natural and Unnatural.

8. NATURAL Force conſiſts in the vigour of Principles, and their natural neceſſary Operations.

9. UNNATURAL Force is an external or adventitious oppoſition to the vigour of Principles, and their neceſſary working, which, from a violation of Nature, is call'd Violence.

10. NATIONAL Government is an effect of natural Force, or Vigour.

11. PROVINCIAL Government is an effect of natural Force, or Violence.

12. THE natural Force which works or produces National Government (of which only I ſhall ſpeak hereafter) conſiſts in Riches.

13. THE Man that cannot live upon his own, muſt be a Servant; but he that can live upon his own, may be a Freeman.

14. WHERE a People cannot live upon their own, the Government is either Monarchy, or Ariſtocracy: where a People can live upon

upon their own, the Government may be Democracy.

15. A MAN that could live upon his own, may yet, to ſpare his own, and live upon another, be a Servant: but a People that can live upon their own, cannot ſpare their own, and live upon another; but (except they be no Servants, that is, except they come to a Democracy) they muſt waſte their own by maintaining their Maſters, or by having others to live upon them.

16. WHERE a People that can live upon their own, imagine that they can be govern'd by others, and not liv'd upon by ſuch Governors, it is not the Genius of the People, it is the Miſtake of the People.

17. WHERE a People that can live upon their own, will not be govern'd by others leſt they be liv'd upon by others, it is not the Miſtake of the People, it is the Genius of the People.

18. OF Government there are three Principles; Matter, Privation, and Form.

CHAP. II.

Of the Matter of Government.

1. THAT which is the Matter of Government, is what we call an Eſtate, be it in Lands, Goods, or Money.

2. IF the Eſtate be more in Money than in Land, the port or garb of the Owner goes more upon his Monies than his Lands; which with private Men is ordinary, but with Nations (except ſuch only as live more upon their Trade than upon their Territory) is not to be found: for which cauſe over-balance of Riches in Money or Goods, as to the ſequel of theſe Aphoriſms, is altogether omitted.

3. IF the Eſtate be more in Land than in Goods or Money, the garb and port of the Owner (whether a Man or a Nation) goes more, if not altogether upon his Land.

4. IF a Man has ſome Eſtate, he may have ſome Servants or a Family, and conſequently ſome Government, or ſomething to govern: if he has no Eſtate, he can have no Government.

5. WHERE the eldeſt of many Brothers has all, or ſo much that the reſt for their Livelihood ſtand in need of him, that Brother is as it were Prince in that Family.

6. WHERE of many Brothers the eldeſt has but an equal ſhare, or not ſo inequal as to make the reſt to ſtand in need of him for their livelihood, that Family is as it were a Common-wealth.

7. DISTRIBUTION of ſhares in Land, as to the three grand Intereſts, the King, the Nobility, and the People, muſt be equal or inequal.

8. EQUAL diſtribution of Land, as if one man or a few men have one half of the Territory, and the People have the other half, cauſes privation of Government, and a ſtate of Civil War: for the Lord or Lords on the one ſide being able to aſſert their pretenſion or right to rule, and the People on the other their pretenſion or right to Liberty, that Nation can never come under any form of Government till that queſtion be decided; and, Property being not by any Law to be violated or mov'd, any ſuch Queſtion cannot be decided but by the Sword only.

9. INEQUAL diſtribution of ſhares in Land, as to the three grand Intereſts, or the whole Land in any one of theſe, is that which cauſes one of theſe three to be the predominant Intereſt.

10. ALL Government is Intereſt, and the predominant Intereſt gives the Matter or Foundation of the Government.

11. IF one man has the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, the Intereſt of one man is the predominant Intereſt, and cauſes abſolute Monarchy.

12. IF a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, the Intereſt of the Few or of the Nobility is the predominant Intereſt; and, were there any ſuch thing in nature, would cauſe a pure Ariſtocracy.

13. IT being ſo that pure Ariſtocracy, or the Nobility having the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, without a Moderator or Prince to balance them, is a ſtate of War, in which every one, as he grows eminent or potent, aſpires to Monarchy; and that not any Nobility can have Peace, or can reign without having ſuch a Moderator or Prince, as on the one ſide they may balance or hold in from being abſolute, and on the other ſide may balance or hold them and their Factions from flying out into Arms: it follows, that if a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, the Intereſt of the Nobility being the predominant Intereſt, muſt of neceſſity produce regulated Monarchy.

14. If the Many, or the People, have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, the Intereſt of the Many or of the People is the predominant Intereſt, and cauſes Democracy.

15. A PEOPLE neither under abſolute or under regulated Monarchy, nor yet under Democracy, are under a privation of Government.

CHAP III.

Of the Privation of Government.

1. WHERE a People are not in a ſtate of Civil Government, but in a ſtate of Civil War; or where a People are neither under a ſtate of Civil Government, nor under a ſtate of Civil War, there the People are under Privation of Government.

2 WHERE one Man, not having the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, yet aſſumes to himſelf the whole Power; there the People are under Privation of Government, and this Privation is call'd *Tyranny*.

3. WHERE a few men, not having the whole, or about two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, yet aſſume to themſelves the whole Power; there the People are under Privation of Government, and this Privation is call'd *Oligarchy*.

4. WHERE the Many, or the People, not having the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, yet aſſume to themſelves the whole Power; there the People are under Privation of Government, and this Privation is call'd *Anarchy*.

5. Where the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or the Anarchy, not having in the Land or Territory ſuch a full ſhare as may amount to the

the truth of Government, have nevertheleſs ſuch a ſhare in it as may maintain an Army; there the People are under privation of Government, and this Privation is a ſtate of Civil War. Chap. IV.

6. WHERE the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or the Anarchy, have not any ſuch ſhare in the Land or Territory as may maintain an Army, there the People are in privation of Government; which Privation is neither a ſtate of Civil Government, nor a ſtate of Civil War.

7. WHERE the People are neither in a ſtate of Civil Government, nor in a ſtate of Civil War, there the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or the Anarchy, cannot ſtand by any force of Nature, becauſe it is void of any natural Foundation; nor by any force of Arms, becauſe it is not able to maintain an Army; and ſo muſt fall away of itſelf thro' the want of a Foundation, or be blown up by ſome tumult: and in this kind of Privation the Matter or Foundation of a good orderly Government is ready and in being, and there wants nothing to the perfection of the ſame, but proper Super-ſtructures or Form.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Form of Government.

1. THAT which gives the being, the action, and the denomination to a Creature or Thing, is the Form of that Creature or Thing.

2. THERE is in Form ſomething that is not Elementary but Divine.

3. THE contemplation of Form is aſtoniſhing to Man, and has a kind of trouble or impulſe accompanying it, that exalts his Soul to God.

4. AS the Form of a Man is the Image of God, ſo the Form of a Government is the Image of Man.

5. MAN is both a ſenſual and a philoſophical Creature.

6. SENSUALITY in a Man is when he is led only as are the Beaſts, that is, no otherwiſe than by Appetite.

7. PHILOSOPHY is the knowledge of Divine and Human Things.

8. TO preſerve and defend himſelf againſt Violence, is natural to Man as he is a ſenſual Creature.

9. TO have an impulſe, or to be rais'd upon contemplation of natural things to the Adoration or Worſhip of God, is natural to Man as he is a Philoſophical Creature.

10. FORMATION of Government is the creation of a Political Creature after the Image of a Philoſophical Creature; or it is an infuſion of the Soul or Faculties of a Man into the body of a Multitude.

11. THE more the Soul or Faculties of a Man (in the manner of their being infus'd into the body of a Multitude) are refin'd or made incapable of Paſſion, the more perfect is the Form of Government.

12. NOT the refin'd Spirit of a Man, or of ſome Men, is a good Form of Government; but a good Form of Government is the refin'd Spirit of a Nation.

13. THE

Chap. IV.

13. THE Spirit of a Nation (whether refin'd or not refin'd) can neither be wholly Saint nor Atheiſt: Not Saint, becauſe the far greater part of the People is never able in matters of Religion to be their own Leaders; nor Atheiſts, becauſe Religion is every whit as indelible a Character in man's Nature as Reaſon.

14. LANGUAGE is not a more natural intercourſe between the Soul of one man and another, than Religion is between God and the Soul of a man.

15. AS not this Language, nor that Language, but ſome Language; ſo not this Religion, nor that Religion, yet ſome Religion is natural to every Nation.

16. THE Soul of Government, as the true and perfect Image of the Soul of Man, is every whit as neceſſarily religious as rational.

17. THE Body of a Government, as conſiſting of the ſenſual part of Man, is every whit as preſervative and defenſive of it ſelf as ſenſual Creatures are of themſelves.

18. THE Body of a Man, not actuated or led by the Soul, is a dead thing out of pain and miſery; but the Body of a People, not actuated or led by the Soul of Government, is a living thing in pain and miſery.

19. THE Body of a People, not led by the reaſon of the Government, is not a People, but a Herd; not led by the Religion of the Government, is at an inquiet and an uncomfortable loſs in itſelf; not diſciplin'd by the conduct of the Government, is not an Army for defence of it ſelf, but a Rout; not directed by the Laws of the Government, has not any rule of right; and without recourſe to the Juſtice or Judicatories of the Government, has no remedy of wrongs.

20. IN contemplation of, and in conformity to the Soul of man, as alſo for ſupply of thoſe his Neceſſities which are not otherwiſe ſupply'd, or to be ſupply'd by Nature, Form of Government conſiſts neceſſarily of theſe five parts: The Civil, which is the Reaſon of the People; the Religious, which is the Comfort of the People; the Military which is the Captain of the People; the Laws, which are the Rights of the People; and the Judicatories, which are the Avengers of their Wrongs.

21. THE parts of Form in Government are as the Offices in a Houſe; and the Orders of a Form of Government are as the Orders of a Houſe or Family.

22. GOOD Orders make evil men good, and bad Orders make good men evil.

23. OLIGARCHISTS (to the end they may keep all others out of the Government) pretending themſelves to be Saints, do alſo pretend that they in whom Luſt reigns, are not fit for Reign or for Government. But *Libido dominandi*, the Luſt of Government, is the greateſt Luſt, which alſo reigns moſt in thoſe that have leaſt right, as in Oligarchiſts: for many a King and many a People have and had unqueſtionable Right, but an Oligarchiſt never; whence from their own argument, the Luſt of Government reigning moſt in Oligarchiſts, it undeniably follows that Oligarchiſts of all men are leaſt fit for Government.

24. AS in Houſes not differing in the kinds of their Offices, the Orders of the Families differ much; ſo the difference of Form in different Governments conſiſts not in the kinds or number of the Parts, which

which in every one is alike, but in the different ways of ordering thoſe parts. And as the different Orders of a Houſe ariſe for the moſt part from the quantity and quality of the Eſtate by which it is defray'd or maintain'd, according as it is in one or more of the Family as Proprietors, ſo is it alſo in a Government. Chap. V.

25. THE Orders of the Form, which are the manners of the mind of the Government, follow the temperament of the Body, or the diſtribution of the Lands or Territories, and the Intereſts thence ariſing.

26. THE Intereſt of Arbitrary Monarchy is the abſoluteneſs of the Monarch; the Intereſt of Regulated Monarchy is the greatneſs of the Nobility; the Intereſt of Democracy is the felicity of the People: for in Democracy the Government is for the uſe of the People, and in Monarchy the People are for the uſe of the Government, that is, of one Lord or more.

27. THE uſe of a Horſe without his Provender, or of the People without ſome regard had to the neceſſities of Human Nature, can be none at all: nor are thoſe neceſſities of Nature in any Form whatſoever to be otherwiſe provided for than by thoſe five parts already mention'd; for which cauſe every Government conſiſts of five parts: the Civil, the Religious, the Military, the Laws, and the Judicatories.

CHAP. V.

Of Form in the Civil part.

1. THOSE Naturaliſts, that have beſt written of Generation, do obſerve that all things proceed from an Egg, and that there is in every Egg a *Punctum ſaliens*, or a part firſt mov'd, as the purple Speck obſerv'd in thoſe of Hens; from the working whereof the other Organs or fit Members are delineated, diſtinguiſh'd, and wrought into one Organical Body.

2. A NATION without Government, or fallen into privation of Form, is like an Egg unhatch'd; and the *Punctum ſaliens*, or firſt mover from the corruption of the Former to the generation of the ſucceeding Form, is either a ſole Legiſlator or a Council.

3. A SOLE Legiſlator, proceeding according to Art or Knowledge, produces Government in the whole piece at once and in perfection. But a Council (proceeding not according to Art, or what in a new caſe is neceſſary or fit for them, but according to that which they call the Genius of the People ſtill hankering after the things they have been us'd to, or their old Cuſtoms, how plain ſoever it be made in reaſon that they can no longer fit them) make patching work, and are Ages about that which is very ſeldom or never brought by them to any perfection; but commonly comes by the way to ruin, leaving the nobleſt Attempts under reproach, and the Authors of them expos'd to the greateſt miſeries while they live, if not their Memories when they are dead and gone to the greateſt infamy.

4. IF the *Punctum ſaliens*, or firſt mover in generation of the Form be a ſole Legiſlator, his proceeding is not only according to Nature, but according to Art alſo, and begins with the Delineation of diſtinct Orders or Members.

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5. DELINEATION of diſtinct Organs or Members (as to the Form of Government) is a diviſion of the Territory into fit Precincts once ſtated for all, and a formation of them to their proper Offices and Functions, according to the nature or truth of the Form to be introduc'd.

6. PRECINCTS in abſolute Monarchy are commonly call'd *Provinces*; and as to the delineation or ſtating of them, they may be equal or unequal. Precincts in regulated Monarchy, where the Lords or Nobility as to their Titles or Eſtates ought not to be equal, but to differ as one Star differs from another in Glory, are commonly call'd *Counties*, and ought to be unequal. Precincts in Democracy, where without equality in the Electors there will hardly be any equality in the Elected; or where without equality in the Precincts, it is almoſt, if not altogether impoſſible there ſhould be equality in the Commonwealth, are properly call'd *Tribes*, and ought by all means to be equal.

7. EQUALITY orParity has been repreſented an odious thing, and made to imply the levelling of men's Eſtates; but if a Nobility, how unequal ſoever in their Eſtates or Titles, yet to come to the truth of Ariſtocracy, muſt as to their Votes or participation in the Government be *pares regni*, that is to ſay Peers, or in parity among themſelves: as well likewiſe the People, to attain to the truth of Democracy, may be Peers, or in parity among themſelves, and yet not as to their Eſtates be oblig'd to levelling.

8. INDUSTRY of all things is the moſt accumulative, and Accumulation of all things hates levelling: The Revenue therefore of the People being the Revenue of Induſtry, tho' ſome Nobility (as that of *Iſrael*, or that of *Lacedemon)* may be found to have been Levellers, yet not any People in the World.

9. PRECINCTS being ſtated, are in the next place to be form'd to their proper Offices and Functions, according to the truth of the Form to be introduc'd; which in general is to form them as it were into diſtinct Governments, and to endow them with diſtinct Governors.

10. GOVERNMENTS or Governors are either Supreme or Subordinate. For abſolute Monarchy to admit in its Precincts any Government or Governors that are not ſubordinate but ſupreme, were a plain contradiction. But that regulated Monarchy, and that Democracy may do it, is ſeen in the Princes of *Germany*, and in the Cantons of *Switzerland:* Nevertheleſs theſe being Governments that have deriv'd this not from the Wiſdom of any Legiſlator, but from accident, and an ill diſpoſition of the matter, whereby they are not only incapable of Greatneſs, but even of any perfect ſtate of Health, they come not under the conſideration of Art, from which they derive not; but of Chance, to which we leave them. And, to ſpeak according to Art, we pronounce that, as well in Democracy and in regulated as in abſolute Monarchy, Governors and Governments in the ſeveral diviſions ought not to be Sovereignties, but ſubordinate to one common Sovereign.

11. SUBORDINATE Governors are at will, or for life, or upon Rotation or Changes.

12. IN abſolute Monarchy the Governors of Provinces muſt either be at will, or upon Rotation, or elſe the Monarch cannot be abſolute. In regulated Monarchy the Governors of the Counties may be for life or hereditary, as in Counts or Lords; or for ſome certain term

term and upon rotation, as in Viſcounts or Sheriffs. In Democracy the People are Servants to their Governors for life, and ſo cannot be free; or the Governors of the Tribes muſt be upon rotation and for ſome certain term, excluding the Party that have born the Magiſtracy from that term from being elected into the like again, till an equal interval or vacation be expired. Chap. V.

13. THE term in which a man may adminiſter Government to the good of it, and not attempt upon it to the harm of it, is the fitteſt term of bearing Magiſtracy; and three years in a Magiſtracy deſcrib'd by the Law under which a man has lived, and which he has known by the carriage or practice of it in others, is a term in which he cannot attempt upon his Government for the hurt of it, but may adminiſter it for the good of it, tho' ſuch a Magiſtracy or Government ſhould conſiſt of divers Functions.

14. GOVERNORS in ſubordinate Precincts have commonly three Functions: the one Civil, the other Judicial, and the third Military.

15. IN abſolute Monarchy the Government of a Province conſiſts of one *Beglerberg*, or Governor for three years, with his Council or *Divan* for Civil matters, and his Guard of *Janizaries* and *Spahys*; that is, of Horſe and Foot, with power to levy and command the *Timariots* or Military Farmers.

16. IN regulated Monarchy the Government of a County conſiſts of one Count or Lord for Life, or of one Viſcount or Sheriff for ſome limited term, with power in certain Civil and Judicial matters, and to levy and command the *Poſſe Comitatus*.

17. IN Democracy the Government of a Tribe conſiſts of one Council or Court, in one third part elected annually by the People of that Tribe for the Civil, for the Judicial, and for the Military Government of the ſame; as alſo to preſide at the Election of Deputies in that Tribe towards the annual ſupply, in one third part of the common and ſovereign Aſſemblies of the whole Common-wealth, that is to ſay, of the Senate and of the Popular Aſſembly; in which two theſe Tribes, thus delineated and diſtinguiſh'd into proper Organs or fit Members to be actuated by thoſe ſovereign Aſſemblies, are wrought up again by connexion into one intire and organical Body.

18. A PARLIAMENT of Phyſicians would never have found out the Circulation of the Blood, nor could a Parliament of Poets have written VIRGIL's *Æneis*; of this kind therefore in the formation of Government is the proceeding of a ſole Legiſlator. But if the People without a Legiſlator ſet upon ſuch work by a certain Inſtinct that is in them, they never go further than to chuſe a Council; not conſidering that the formation of Government is as well a work of Invention as of Judgment; and that a Council, tho' in matters laid before them they may excel in Judgment, yet Invention is as contrary to the nature of a Council as it is to Muſicians in conſort, who can play and judge of any Air that is laid before them, tho' to invent a part of Muſick they can never well agree.

19. IN Councils there are three ways of Reſult, and every way of Reſult makes a different Form. A Council with the Reſult in the Prince makes abſolute Monarchy. A Council with the Reſult in the Nobility, or where without the Nobility there can be no Reſult, makes Ariſtocracy, or regulated Monarchy. A Council with the Reſult

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ſult in the People makes Democracy. There is a fourth kind of Reſult or Council which amounts not to any Form but to Privation of Government; that is, a Council not conſiſting of a Nobility, and yet with the Reſult in it ſelf, which is rank Oligarchy: ſo the People, ſeldom or never going any further than to elect a Council without any Reſult but it ſelf, inſtead of Democracy introduce Oligarchy.

20. THE ultimate Reſult in every Form is the Sovereign Power. If the ultimate Reſult be wholly and only in the Monarch, that Monarchy is abſolute. If the ultimate Reſult be not wholly and only in the Monarch, that Monarchy is regulated. If the Reſult be wholly and only in the People, the People are in Liberty, or the Form of the Government is Democracy.

21. IT may happen that a Monarchy founded upon Ariſtocracy, and ſo as to the Foundation regulated, may yet come by certain Expedients or Intruſions (as at this day in *France* and in *Spain*) as to the Adminiſtration of it to appear or to be call'd abſolute; of which I ſhall treat more at large when I come to ſpeak of *Reaſon of State*, or of Adminiſtration.

22. THE ultimate Reſult in the whole body of the People, if the Common-wealth be of any conſiderable extent, is altogether impracticable; and if the ultimate Reſult be but in a part of the People, the reſt are not in Liberty, nor is the Government Democracy.

23. AS a whole Army cannot charge at one and the ſame time, yet is ſo ordered that every one in his turn comes up to give the Charge of the whole Army; ſo tho' the whole People cannot give the Reſult at one and the ſame time, yet may they be ſo ordered that every one in his turn may come up to give the Reſult of the whole People.

24. A POPULAR Aſſembly, rightly ordered, brings up every one in his turn to give the Reſult of the whole People.

25. IF the popular Aſſembly conſiſts of one thouſand or more, annually changeable in one third part by new Elections made in the Tribes by the People, it is rightly order'd; that is to ſay, ſo conſtituted that ſuch an Aſſembly can have no other Intereſt whereupon to give the Reſult, than that only which is the Intereſt of the whole People.

26. BUT in vain is Reſult where there is not Matter to reſolve upon; and where maturity of Debate has not proceeded, there is not yet matter to reſolve upon.

27. DEBATE to be mature cannot be manag'd by a Multitude; and Reſult to be popular cannot be given by a Few.

28. IF a Council capable of Debate has alſo the Reſult, it is Oligarchy. If an Aſſembly capable of the Reſult has Debate alſo, it is Anarchy. Debate in a Council not capable of Reſult, and Reſult in an Aſſembly not capable of Debate, is Democracy.

29. It is not more natural to a People in their own Affairs to be their own Chuſers, than upon that Occaſion to be provided of their Learned Council; in ſo much that the ſaying of PACUVIUS, That *either a People is governed by a King or counſil'd by a Senate*, is univerſally approved.

30. WHERE the Senate has no diſtinct Intereſt, there the People are counſilable, and venture not upon Debate: where the Senate has any diſtinct Intereſt, there the People are not counſilable, but fall into Debate among themſelves, and ſo into Confuſion.

31. Of

31. OF Senates there are three kinds: Firſt, A Senate eligible out of the Nobility only, as that of *Rome*, which will not be contented to be merely the Council of the People, but will be contented that they are Lords of the People, never quitting their pretenſions till they have ruin'd the Common-wealth. Secondly, a Senate elected for life, as that of *Sparta*, which will be a ſpecies of Nobility, and will have a kind of *Spartan* King, and a Senate upon rotation; which being rightly conſtituted is quiet, and never pretends more than to be the learned Council of the People.

32. THIRDLY, Three hundred Senators, for example, changeable in one third part of them annually by new Elections in the Tribes, and conſtituted a Senate to debate upon all Civil matters, to promulgate to the whole Nation what they have debated, this Promulgation to be made ſome ſuch convenient time before the matters by them debated are to be propos'd, that they may be commonly known and well underſtood, and then to propoſe the ſame to the Reſult of the Popular Aſſembly, which only is to be the Teſt of every public Act, is a Senate rightly order'd.

FORM of Government (as to the Civil part) being thus compleated is ſum'd up in the three following Aphoriſms.

33. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Civil part of the Form) conſiſts of diſtinct Provinces under diſtinct Governors, equally ſubordinate to a *Grand Signor* or ſole Lord, with his Council or Divan debating and propoſing, and the Reſult wholly and only in himſelf.

34. REGULATED Monarchy (for the Civil part of the Form) conſiſts of diſtinct Principalities or Counties under diſtinct Lords or Governors, which if rightly conſtituted are equally ſubordinate to the King and his Peerage, or to the King and his Eſtates aſſembl'd in Parliament, without whoſe Conſent the King can do nothing.

35. DEMOCRACY (for the Civil part of the Form) if rightly conſtituted, conſiſts of diſtinct Tribes under the Government of diſtinct Magiſtrates, Courts, or Councils, regularly changeable in one third part upon annual Elections, and ſubordinate to a Senate conſiſting of not above three hundred Senators, and to a popular Aſſembly conſiſting of not under a thouſand Deputies; each of theſe alſo regularly changeable in one third part upon annual Elections in the Tribes, the Senate having the Debate, and the Popular Aſſembly the Reſult of the whole Common-wealth.

CHAP. VI.

Of Form in the Religious part.

1. FORM for the Religious part either admits of Liberty of Conſcience in the whole or in part; or does not admit of Liberty of Conſcience at all.

2. LIBERTY of Conſcience intire, or in the whole, is where a man according to the dictates of his own Conſcience may have the

Chap. VI. free exerciſe of his Religion, without impediment to his Preferment or Imployment in the State.

3. LIBERTY of Conſcience in part is, where a man according to the dictates of his Conſcience may have the free exerciſe of his Religion; but if it be not the National Religion, he is thereby incapable of Preferment or Imployment in the State.

4. WHERE the Form admits not of the free exerciſe of any other Religion except that only which is National, there is no Liberty of Conſcience.

5. MEN who have the means to aſſert Liberty of Conſcience, have the means to aſſert Civil Liberty; and will do it if they are oppreſt in their Conſciences.

6. MEN participating in Property, or in Imployment Civil or Military, have the means to aſſert Liberty of Conſcience.

7. ABSOLUTE Monarchy, being ſole Proprietor, may admit of Liberty of Conſcience to ſuch as are not capable of Civil or Military Imployment, and yet not admit of the means to aſſert Civil Liberty; as the *Greek* Chriſtians under the *Turk*, who, tho' they enjoy Liberty of Conſcience, cannot aſſert Civil Liberty, becauſe they have neither Property nor any Civil or Military Imployments.

8. REGULATED Monarchy, being not ſole Proprietor, may not admit naturally of Liberty of Conſcience, leſt it admits of the means to aſſert Civil Liberty, as was lately ſeen in *England* by pulling down the Biſhops, who, for the moſt part, are one half of the Foundation of regulated Monarchy.

9. DEMOCRACY being nothing but intire Liberty; and Liberty of Conſcience without Civil Liberty, or Civil Liberty without Liberty of Conſcience being but Liberty by halves, muſt admit of Liberty of Conſcience both as to the perfection of its preſent being, and as to its future ſecurity: As to the perfection of its preſent being, for the Reaſons already ſhewn, or that ſhe do not enjoy Liberty by halves; and for future ſecurity, becauſe this excludes abſolute Monarchy, which cannot ſtand with Liberty of Conſcience in the whole, and regulated Monarchy, which cannot ſtand ſafely with it in any part.

10. IF it be ſaid that in *France* there is Liberty of Conſcience in part, it is alſo plain that while the Hierarchy is ſtanding this Liberty is falling, and that if ever it comes to pull down the Hierarchy it pulls down that Monarchy alſo: wherefore the Monarchy or Hierarchy will be beforehand with it, if they ſee their true Intereſt.

11. THE ultimate Reſult in Monarchy being that of one Man, or of a few Men, the National Religion in Monarchy may happen not to be the Religion of the major part of the People; but the Reſult in Democracy being in the major part of the People, it cannot happen but that the National Religion muſt be that of the major part of the People.

12. THE major part of the People, being in matters of Religion unable to be their own Leaders, will in ſuch caſes therefore have a public leading; or, being debar'd of their Will in that particular, are debar'd of their Liberty of Conſcience.

13. WHERE the major part of the People is debar'd of their Liberty by the minor, there is neither Liberty of Conſcience nor Democracy, but Spiritual or Civil Oligarchy.

14. WHERE

14. WHERE the Major part is not debar'd of their Liberty of Conſcience by the Minor, there is a National Religion.

15. NATIONAL Religion is either coercive, or not coercive.

16. RELIGION is not naturally ſubſervient to any corrupt or worldly Intereſt, for which cauſe to bring it into ſubjection to Intereſt it muſt be coercive.

17. WHERE Religion is coercive, or in ſubjection to Intereſt, there it is not, or will not long continue to be the true Religion.

18. WHERE Religion is not coercive, nor under ſubjection to any Intereſt, there it either is (or has no obſtruction why it may not come to be) the true Religion.

19. ABSOLUTE Monarchy pretends to Infallibility in matters of Religion, employs not any that is not of its own Faith, and puniſhes its Apoſtates by death without mercy.

20. REGULATED Monarchy comes not much ſhort of the ſame pretence; but conſiſting of Proprietors, and ſuch as if they diſſent have oftentimes the means to defend themſelves, it does not therefore always attain to the exerciſe of the like power.

21. DEMOCRACY pretends not to Infallibility, but is in matters of Religion no more than a Seeker, not taking away from its People their Liberty of Conſcience, but educating them, or ſo many of them as ſhall like of it, in ſuch a manner or knowledge in Divine things as may render them beſt able to make uſe of their Liberty of Conſcience, which it performs by the National Religion.

22. NATIONAL Religion, to be ſuch, muſt have a National Miniſtry or Clergy.

23. THE Clergy is either a landed or a ſtipendiated Clergy.

24. A LANDED Clergy, attaining to one third of the Territory, is Ariſtocracy; and therefore equally incompatible with abſolute Monarchy, and with Democracy: but to regulated Monarchy for the moſt part is ſuch a Supporter, as in that caſe it may be truly enough ſaid, that NO BISHOP, NO KING.

25. THE Sovereignty of the Prince in abſolute Monarchy, and of the People in Democracy, admitting not of any Counterpoiſe, in each of theſe the Clergy ought not to be landed; the Labourer nevertheleſs being worthy of his hire, they ought to be ſtipendiated.

26. A CLERGY, well landed is to regulated Monarchy a very great Glory; and a Clergy not well ſtipendiated is to abſolute Monarchy or to Democracy as great an Infamy.

27. A CLERGY, whether landed or ſtipendiated, is either Hierarchical or Popular.

28. A HIERARCHICAL Clergy is a Monarchical Ordination; a Popular Clergy receives Ordination from Election by the People.

FORM of Government (as to the Religious part) being thus compleated, is ſum'd up in the three following Aphoriſms.

29. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Religious part of the Form) conſiſts of a Hierarchical Clergy, and of an *Alcoran* (or ſome Book receiv'd in the nature of Scripture) interpretable by the Prince only and his Clergy, willingly permitting to them that are not capable of Imployments a Liberty of Conſcience.

30. REGU-

30. REGULATED Monarchy (for the Religious part of the Form) conſiſts of an Ariſtocratical Hierarchy, of the Liturgy, and of the Holy Scriptures (or ſome ſuch Book receiv'd for a Rule of Faith) interpretable only by the Clergy, not admitting Liberty of Conſcience, except thro' mere neceſſity.

31. DEMOCRACY (for the Religious part of the Form) conſiſts of a Popular Clergy, of the Scriptures (or ſome other Book acknowledg'd divine) with a Directory for the National Religion, and a Council for the equal maintenance both of the National Religion, and of the Liberty of Conſcience.

CHAP. VII.

Of Form in the Military part.

1. A MAN may periſh by the Sword; yet no man draws the Sword to periſh, but to live by it.

2. SO many ways as there are of living by the Sword, ſo many ways there are of a Militia.

3. IF a Prince be Lord of the whole, or of two parts in three of the whole Territory, and divides it into Military Farms at will and without rent, upon condition of Service at their own charge in Arms whenever he commands them, it is the Sword of an abſolute Monarchy.

4. IF the Nobility, being Lords of the whole, or of two parts in three of the whole Territory, let their Lands by good penny-worths to Tenants at will, or by their Leaſes bound at their Commands by whom they live to ſerve in Arms upon pay, it is the Sword of a regulated Monarchy.

5. IN Countries that have no Infantry, or Militia of free Commoners, as in *France* and *Poland*, the Nobility themſelves are a vaſt Body of Horſe, and the Sword of that Monarchy.

6. IF a People, where there neither is Lord nor Lords of the whole, nor of two parts in three of the whole Territory, for the common defence of their Liberty and of their Livelihood, take their turns upon the Guard or in Arms, it is the Sword of Democracy.

7. THERE is a fourth kind of Militia, or of men living more immediately by the Sword, which are Soldiers of Fortune, or a mercenary Army.

8. ABSOLUTE Monarchy muſt be very well provided with Court Guards, or a mercenary Army; otherwiſe its Military Farmers having no bar from becoming Proprietors, the Monarchy it ſelf has no bar from changing into Democracy.

FORM of Government (as to the Military part) being thus compleated, is ſum'd up in the three following Aphoriſms.

9. IN a regulated Monarchy where there is an Infantry, there needs not any Mercenary Army; and there the People live tolerably well.

10. IN a regulated Monarchy where there is no Infantry, but the Nobility themſelves are a vaſt Body of Horſe, there muſt alſo be a mer-

a mercenary Infantry, and there the People are Peaſants or Slaves. Ch. VIII.

11. THERE is no ſuch thing in nature as any Monarchy (whether abſolute or regulated) ſubſiſting merely by a mercenary Army, and without an Infantry or Cavalry planted upon the Lands of the Monarch, or of his whole Nobility.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Form in the Legal part.

1. IF Juſtice be not the Intereſt of a Government, the Intereſt of that a Government will be its Juſtice.

2. LET Equity or Juſtice be what it will, yet if a man be to judge or reſolve in his own caſe, he reſolves upon his own Intereſt.

3. EVERY Government, being not obnoxious to any Superior, reſolves in her own caſe.

4. THE ultimate Reſult in every Government is the Law in that Government.

5. IN abſolute Monarchy, the ultimate Reſult is in the Monarch.

6. IN Ariſtocracy, or regulated Monarchy, the ultimate Reſult is in the Lords or Peers, or not without them.

7. IN Democracy the ultimate Reſult is in the People.

8 LAW in abſolute Monarchy holds ſuch a diſproportion to natural Equity, as the Intereſt of one Man to the Intereſt of all Mankind.

9. LAW in Ariſtocracy holds ſuch a diſproportion to natural Equity, as the Intereſt of a few Men to the Intereſt of all Mankind.

10. LAW in Democracy holds ſuch a diſproportion to natural Equity, as the Intereſt of a Nation to the Intereſt of all Mankind.

11. ONE Government has much nearer approaches to natural Equity than another; but in caſe natural Equity and Self-preſervation come in competition, ſo natural is Self-preſervation to every Creature, that in that caſe no one Government has any more regard to natural Equity than another.

12. A Man may devote himſelf to death or deſtruction to ſave a Nation, but no Nation will devote itſelf to death or deſtruction to ſave Mankind.

13. *MACHIAVEL* is decry'd for ſaying, that *no conſideration is to be had of what is juſt or injuſt, of what is merciful or cruel, of what is honourable or ignominious, in caſe it be to ſave a State, or to preſerve Liberty*; which as to the manner of expreſſion is crudely ſpoken. But to imagine that a Nation will devote it ſelf to death or deſtruction any more upon Faith given or an Ingagement thereto tending, than if there had been no ſuch Ingagement made or Faith given, were not piety but folly.

14. WHERESOEVER the power of making Law is, there only is the power of interpreting the Law ſo made.

15. GOD who has given his Law to the Soul of that man who ſhall voluntarily receive it, is the only Interpreter of his Law to that Soul; ſuch at leaſt is the judgement of Democracy. With abſolute Monarchy, and with Ariſtocracy, it is an innate Maxim, That *the People are to be deceiv'd in two things, their* RELIGION *and their* LAW;

Chap IX. or that the Church or themſelves are Interpreters of all Scripture, as the Prieſts were antiently of the *Sibyls* Books.

FORM of Government (as to the Legal part) being thus compleated is ſum'd up in the three following Aphoriſms.

16. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Legal part of the Form) conſiſts of ſuch Laws as it pretends God has deliver'd or given the King and Prieſts power to interpret; or it conſiſts of ſuch Laws as the Monarch ſhall chuſe or has choſen.

17. ARISTOCRACY (for the Legal part of the Form) conſiſts of ſuch Laws as the Nobility ſhall chuſe or have choſen; or of ſuch as the People ſhall chuſe or have choſen, provided they be agreed to by their Lords, or by the King and their Lords.

18. DEMOCRACY (for the Legal part of the Form) conſiſts of ſuch Laws as the People, with the advice of their Council, or of the Senate, ſhall chuſe or have choſen.

CHAP. IX.

Of Form in the Judicial part.

1. MULTIPLICITY of Laws, being a multiplicity of Snares for the People, cauſes Corruption of Government.

2. PAUCITY of Laws requires arbitrary Power in Courts, or Judicatories.

3. ARBITRARY Power (in reference to Laws) is of three kinds. (1) In making, altering, abrogating, or interpreting of Laws, which belong to the Sovereign Power. (2) In applying Laws to caſes which are never any one like another. (3) In reconciling the Laws among themſelves.

4. THERE is no difficulty at all in judging of any caſe whatſoever according to natural Equity.

5. ARBITRARY Power makes any man a competent Judge for his knowledge; but leaving him to his own Intereſt, which oftentimes is contrary to Juſtice, makes him alſo an incompetent Judge, in regard that he may be partial.

6. PARTIALITY is the cauſe why Laws pretend to abhor Arbitrary Power; nevertheleſs, ſeeing that not one caſe is altogether like another, there muſt in every Judicatory be ſome arbitrary Power.

7. PAUCITY of Laws cauſes arbitrary Power in applying them; and Multiplicity of Laws cauſes arbitrary Power in reconciling and applying them too.

8. ARBITRARY Power where it can do no wrong, does the greateſt right; becauſe no Law can ever be ſo fram'd, but that without arbitrary Power it may do wrong.

9. ARBITRARY Power, going upon the Intereſt of One or of a Few, makes not a juſt Judicatory.

10. ARBITRARY Power, going upon the Intereſt of the whole People, makes a juſt Judicatory.

11. ALL Judicatories and Laws, which have been made by Arbitrary Power, allow of the Interpretation of Arbitrary Power, and acknowledge an appeal from themſelves to it.

12. THAT

12. THAT Law which leaves the leaſt arbitrary Power to the Judge or Judicatory, is the moſt perfect Law.

13. LAWS that are the feweſt, plaineſt, and briefeſt, leave the leaſt arbitrary Power to the Judge or Judicatory; and being a Light to the People, make the moſt incorrupt Government.

14. LAWS that are perplext, intricate, tedious, and voluminous, leave the greateſt arbitrary Power to the Judge or Judicatory; and raining ſnares on the People, make the moſt corrupt Government.

15. SEEING no Law can be ſo perfect as not to leave arbitrary Power to the Judicatory, that is the beſt Conſtitution of a Judicatory where arbitrary Power can do the leaſt hurt, and the worſt Conſtitution of a Judicatory is where arbitrary Power can do the moſt ill.

16. ARBITRARY Power in one Judge does the moſt, in a few Judges does leſs, and in a multitude of Judges does the leaſt hurt.

17. THE ultimate Appeal from all inferior Judicatories is to ſome ſovereign Judge or Judicatory.

18. THE ultimate Reſult in every Government (as in abſolute Monarchy, the Monarch; in Ariſtocracy, or Ariſtocratical Monarchy, the Peers; in Democracy, the Popular Aſſembly) is a ſovereign Judge or Judicatory that is arbitrary.

19. ARBITRARY Power in Judicatories is not ſuch as makes no uſe of the Law, but ſuch by which there is a right uſe to be made of the Laws.

20. THAT Judicatory where the Judge or Judges are not obnoxious to partiality or private Intereſt, cannot make a wrong uſe of Power.

21. THAT Judicatory that cannot make a wrong uſe of Power, muſt make a right uſe of Law.

22. EVERY Judicatory conſiſts of a Judge or ſome Judges without a Jury, or of a Jury on the Bench without any other Judge or Judges, or of a Judge or Judges on the Bench with a Jury at the Bar.

FORM of Government (as to the Judicial part) being thus compleated, is ſum'd up in the three following Aphoriſms.

23. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Judicial part of the Form) admits not of any Jury, but is of ſome ſuch kind as a *Cadee* or Judge in a City, or as we ſay in a Hundred, with an Appeal to a *Cadaliſkar* or a Judge in a Province, from whom alſo there lies an Appeal to the *Mupbti*, who is at the devotion of the *Grand Signor* or of the Monarch.

24 ARISTOCRACY or Ariſtocratical Monarchy (for the Judicial part of the Form) may admit of a Jury, ſo it be at the Bar only, and conſiſts of ſome ſuch kind as Delegates or ordinary Judges, with an Appeal to a Houſe of Peers; or ſome ſuch Court, as the Parliament at *Paris*, which was at the inſtitution in the reign of HUGH CAPET, a Parliament of ſovereign Princes.

25. DEMOCRACY (for the Judicial part of the Form) is of ſome ſuch kind as a Jury on the Bench in every Tribe, conſiſting of thirty perſons or more, annually eligible in one third part by the People of that Tribe, with an Appeal from thence to a Judicatory reſiding in the Capital City of the like Conſtitution, annually eligible in one third part out of the Senate or the popular Aſſembly, or out of both; from which alſo there lies an Appeal to the People, that is to the Popular Aſſembly.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of the Adminiſtration of Government, or REASON *of* STATE.

1. AS the Matter of a Ship or of a Houſe is one thing, the Form of a Ship or of a Houſe is another thing, and the Adminiſtration or Reaſon of a Ship or of the Houſe is a third thing; ſo the Matter of a Government or of a State is one thing, the Form of a Government or of a State is another, and the Adminiſtration of a Government (which is what's properly and truly call'd *Reaſon of State*) is a third thing.

2. THERE are thoſe who can play, and yet cannot pack the Cards; and there are who can pack the Cards, and yet cannot play.

3. ADMINISTRATION of Government, or Reaſon of State, to ſuch as propoſe to themſelves to play upon the ſquare, is one thing; and to ſuch as propoſe to themſelves to pack the Cards, is another.

4. *REASON of State* is that in a Kingdom or a Commonwealth, which in a Family is call'd THE MAIN CHANCE.

5. THE Maſter of a Family that either keeps himſelf up to his antient bounds or increaſes his Stock, looks very well to the main Chance, at leaſt if his play be upon the ſquare, that is, upon his own Abilities, or good Fortune, or the Laws; but if it were not upon the ſquare, yet an Eſtate however gotten, is not for that a leſs Eſtate in it ſelf, nor leſs deſcending by the Law to his Succeſſors.

6. IF a People thro' their own Induſtry, or the prodigality of their Lords, come to acquire Liberty; if a few by their Induſtry, or thro' the folly or ſlothfulneſs of the People, come to eat them out, and make themſelves Lords; if one Lord by his Power or his Virtue, or thro' their Neceſſity, their Wiſdom, or their Folly, can overtop the reſt of theſe Lords, and make himſelf King, all this was fair play and upon the ſquare.

7. *REASON of State*, if we ſpeak of it as fair play, is foreign or domeſtick.

8. *REASON of State*, which is foreign, conſiſts in balancing, foreign Princes and States in ſuch a manner, as you may gain upon them, or at leaſt that they may not gain upon you.

9. *REASON of State*, which is domeſtick, is the Adminiſtration of a Government (being not uſurp'd) according to the Foundation and Superſtructures of the ſame, if they be good, or ſo as not being good that they may be mended, or ſo as being good or bad they may be alter'd; or, the Government being uſurp'd, the *Reaſon of State*, then is the way and means whereby ſuch a Uſurpation may be made good or maintain'd.

10. *REASON of State*, in a Democracy which is rightly founded and rightly order'd, is a thing of great facility, whether in a foreign or in a domeſtick relation. In a foreign, becauſe one good Democracy, weighing two or three of the greateſt Princes, will eaſily give the balance abroad at its pleaſure; in a domeſtick, becauſe it conſiſts not of any

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more than giving ſuch a ſtop in accumulation that the State comes not to be Monarchical: which one Reaſon of State being made good, all the reſt goes well; and which one Reaſon of State being neglected, all the reſt comes in time to infallible ruin. Chap. X.

11. REASON of State in a Democracy, which is not right in its Foundations, may flouriſh abroad, and be one: but at home will languiſh or be two Reaſons of State, that is, the Reaſon of the State or Orders of the Nobility, which is to lord it over the People; and the Reaſon of the popular State or Order, which is to bring the Common-wealth to equality: which two Reaſons of State, being irreconcileable, will exerciſe themſelves againſt one another, firſt by Diſputes, then by Plots, till it comes at laſt to open Violence, and ſo to the utter ruin of the Common-wealth, as it happen'd in *Rome*.

12. REASON of State in an abſolute Monarchy (whether Foreign or Domeſtic) is but threefold; as firſt, to keep its Military Farmers or *Timariots* to the firſt Inſtitution; next to cut him that grows any thing above his due Stature, or lifts up his head above the reſt, by ſo much the ſhorter; and laſt of all to keep its Arms in exerciſe.

13. IN Ariſtocratical Monarchy Reaſon of State (as to the whole) is but one thing, that is, to preſerve the Counterpoiſe of the King and the two or the three, or the four Eſtates: For in ſome Countries, as in *Poland*, there are but two Eſtates, the Clergy and the Nobility; in others, as in *Sweden*, there are four, the Nobility, the Gentry, the Clergy, and the Commons; in moſt others there are but three, the Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, and the Commons.

14. IN Ariſtocratical Monarchy Reaſon of State (as to the parts) is a multifarious thing, every State having its peculiar Reaſon of State, and the King alſo his Reaſon of State: with the King it is to balance the Nobility, that he may hold them under; Reaſon of State with the Nobility is to balance the King, leſt he ſhould grow abſolute; Reaſon of State both with the King and the Nobility is to keep down the People; and Reaſon of State with the People is to drive at their Liberty.

15. IN Forms that are pure, or in Governments that have no more than an abſolute Prince or one State, as abſolute Monarchy and equal or pure Democracy, there is but one Reaſon of State, and that is to preſerve the Form intire. In Forms that are mix'd (as in an unequal Common-wealth where there are two Eſtates, and in Ariſtocratical Monarchy where there is a King and two if not three Eſtates) there are ſo many Reaſons of State to break the Form, that there has not been any unequal Common-wealth which either the People have not brought to Democracy, or the Nobility to Monarchy. And ſcarce was there any Ariſtocratical Monarchy, where (to omit the Wars of the Nobility with their King, or among themſelves) the People have not driven out the King, or where the King has not brought the People into Slavery. Ariſtocratical Monarchy is the true Theatre of Expedient-mongers and Stateemperics, or the deep Waters wherein that Leviathan the Miniſter of State takes his paſtime.

16. THE Complaint that the Wiſdom of all theſe latter times in Princes Affairs conſiſts rather in fine deliveries and ſhiftings of Dangers or Miſchiefs when they are near, than in ſolid and grounded courſes to keep them off, is a Complaint in the Streets of Ariſtocratical Monarchy; and not to be remedy'd, becauſe the Nobility being not bro-

Chap. X.

ken, the King is in danger, and the Nobility being broken, the Monarchy is ruin'd.

17. AN Abſurdity in the form of the Government (as that in a Monarchy there may be two Monarchs) ſhoots out into a miſchief in the Adminiſtration, or ſome wickedneſs in the Reaſon of State, as in ROMULUS's killing of REMUS, and the monſtrous Aſſociations of the *Roman* Emperors.

18. USURPATION of Government is a Surfeit that converts the beſt Arts into the worſt: *Nemo unquam imperium flagitio acquiſitum bonis artibus exercuit.*

19. AS in the privation of Virtue, and in Beggary, men are Sharks or Robbers, and the reaſon of their way of living is quite contrary to thoſe of Thrift; ſo in the privation of Government, as in Anarchy, Oligarchy, or Tyranny, that which is Reaſon of State with them is directly oppoſite to that which is truly ſo: whence are all thoſe black Maxims ſet down by ſome Politicians, particularly MACHIAVEL in his *Prince*, and which are condemn'd to the fire even by them, who, if they liv'd otherwiſe, might blow their fingers.

20. WHERE the Government from a true Foundation riſes up into proper Super-ſtructures or Form, the Reaſon of State is right and ſtreight; but give our Politician peace when you pleaſe, if your Houſe ſtands awry, your Props do not ſtand upright.

21. TAKE a Jugler, and commend his Tricks never ſo much, yet if in ſo doing you ſhew his Tricks you ſpoil him; which has been and is to be confeſs'd of MACHIAVEL.

22. CORRUPTION in Government is to be read and conſider'd in MACHIAVEL, as Diſeaſes in a man's Body are to be read and conſider'd in HIPPOCRATES.

23. NEITHER HIPPOCRATES nor MACHIAVEL introduc'd Diſeaſes into man's Body, nor Corruption into Government, which were before their times; and ſeeing they do but diſcover them, it muſt be confeſt that ſo much as they have done tends not to the increaſe but the cure of them, which is the truth of theſe two Authors.

POLI-

POLITICAL
APHORISMS.

Obſequium amicos, veritas odium parit. Terent.

1. THE Errors and Sufferings of the People are from their Governors.

2. WHEN the Foundation of a Government comes to be chang'd, and the Governors change not the Superſtructures accordingly, the People become miſerable.

3. THE Monarchy of *England* was not a Government by Arms, but a Government by Laws, tho' imperfect or ineffectual Laws.

4. THE later Governments in *England* ſince the death of the King have been Governments by Arms.

5. THE People cannot ſee, but they can feel.

6. THE People having felt the difference between a Government by Laws and a Government by Arms, will always deſire the Government by Laws, and abhor that of Arms.

7. WHERE the Spirit of the People is impatient of a Government by Arms, and deſirous of a Government by Laws, there the ſpirit of the People is not unfit to be truſted with their Liberty.

8. THE ſpirit of the People of *England*, not truſted with their Liberty, drives at the reſtitution of Monarchy by Blood and Violence.

9. THE Spirit of the People of *England*, truſted with their Liberty, if the Form be ſufficient, can never ſet up a King; and if the Form be inſufficient (as a Parliament with a Council in the intervals, or two Aſſemblies co-ordinate) will ſet up a King without Blood or Violence.

10. TO light upon a good Man, may be in Chance; but to be ſure of an Aſſembly of good Men, is not in Prudence.

11. WHERE the Security is no more than perſonal, there may be a good Monarch, but can be no good Common-wealth.

12. THE neceſſary Action or Uſe of each thing is from the nature of the Form.

13. WHERE the Security is in the Perſons, the Government makes good men evil; where the Security is in the Form, the Government makes evil men good.

14. ASSEMBLYS legitimately elected by the People, are that only Party which can govern without an Army.

15. NOT the Party which cannot govern without an Army, but the Party which can govern without an Army, is the refin'd Party, as to this intent and purpoſe truly refin'd; that is, by Popular Election, according to the Precept of Moses, and the Rule of Scripture:

Take

Chap. V. *Take ye wiſe men, and underſtanding, and known among your Tribes, and I will make them Rulers over you.*

16. THE People are deceiv'd by Names, but not by things.

17. WHERE there is a well order'd Common-wealth, the People are generally ſatisfy'd.

18. WHERE the People are generally diſſatisfy'd, there is no Common-wealth.

19. THE Parties in *England* declaring for a Common-wealth, hold every one of them ſomething that is inconſiſtent with a Common-wealth.

20. TO hold that the Government may be manag'd by a few, or by a Party, is inconſiſtent with a Common-wealth; except in a Situation like that of *Venice*.

21. TO hold that there can be any National Religion or Miniſtry without public Indowment and Inſpection of the Magiſtracy, or any Government without a National Religion or Miniſtry, is inconſiſtent with a Common-wealth.

22 TO hold that there may be Liberty, and not Liberty of Conſcience, is inconſiſtent with a Common-wealth that has the Liberty of her own Conſcience, or that is not Popiſh.

23. WHERE Civil Liberty is intire, it includes Liberty of Conſcience.

24. WHERE Liberty of Conſcience is intire, it includes Civil Liberty.

25. EITHER Liberty of Conſcience can have no ſecurity at all, or under Popular Government it muſt have the greateſt ſecurity.

26. TO hold that a Government may be introduc'd by a little at once, is to wave Prudence, and commit things to Chance.

27. TO hold that the Wiſdom of God in the formation of a Houſe or of a Government, goes not univerſally upon natural Principles, is inconſiſtent with Scripture.

28. TO hold that the Wiſdom of Man in the formation of a Houſe, or of a Government, may go upon ſuper-natural Principles, is inconſiſtent with a Common-wealth, and as if one ſhould ſay, God ordain'd the Temple, therefore it was not built by Maſons; he ordain'd the Snuffers, therefore they were not made by a Smith.

29. TO hold that Hirelings (as they are term'd by ſome) or an indow'd Miniſtry, ought to be remov'd out of the Church, is inconſiſtent with a Common-wealth.

30. NATURE is of GOD.

31. SOME part in every Religion is natural.

32. A UNIVERSAL Effect demonſtrates a univerſal Cauſe.

33. A UNIVERSAL Cauſe is not ſo much natural, as it is Nature it ſelf.

34. EVERY man, either to his terror or conſolation, has ſome ſenſe of Religion.

35. MAN may rather de defin'd a religious than a rational Creature; in regard that in other Creatures there may be ſomething of Reaſon, but there is nothing of Religion.

36. GOVERNMENT is of human Prudence, and human Prudence is adequate to man's Nature.

37. THE Prudence or Government that is regardleſs of Religion, is not adequate nor ſatisfactory to man's Nature.

38. WHERE

38. WHERE the Government is not adequate or ſatisfactory to man's Nature, it can never be quiet or perfect.

39. THE major part of Mankind gives it ſelf up in the matter of Religion to the publick leading.

40. THAT there may be a publick leading, there muſt be a National Religion.

41. WHERE the minor part takes away the National Religion, there the major part is deprived of Liberty of Conſcience by the minor.

42. WHERE the major part is deprived of Liberty of Conſcience by the minor, there they will deprive the minor of that Liberty of Conſcience which they might otherwiſe enjoy.

43. IN *Iſrael* there was an endow'd Clergy or Prieſthood, and a National Religion under inſpection of the Magiſtrate: whence the *Chriſtians* in Apoſtolick Times, defraying their own Miniſtry, could have Liberty of Conſcience; whereas if the *Chriſtians* by going about to take away Tithes, and aboliſh the National Religion, had endeavour'd to violate the Conſciences of the unconverted *Jews*, theſe being far greater in number, muſt needs have taken away the Liberty of Conſcience from the *Chriſtians*.

44. *PAUL* in *Athens* could freely and undiſturbedly convert DIONYSIUS and others; therefore in *Athens* there was Liberty of Conſcience; but if PAUL and his Converts had gone about to drive Hirelings, or an endow'd Prieſthood or Clergy out of that Church, who ſees not that the *Athenians* would have driven PAUL and his Converts out of *Athens*?

45. THAT there may be Liberty of Conſcience, there muſt be a National Religion.

46. THAT there may be a National Religion, there muſt be an endow'd Clergy.

47. COMMON-WEALTHS have had three ways of Union. As the *Athenians*, by bringing their Confederates to ſubjection: As the United Provinces by an equal League: or as the *Romans* by an inequal League. The firſt way is tyrannical. In the ſecond, one Common-wealth under the League is no more than another, and each one as to herſelf has a Negative: which kind of Union is not only obſtructive, but tends (as we have ſeen both in *Holland* and *Switzerland*) towards Diviſion. In the third way, the Common-wealth uniting other Common-wealths, retains to her ſelf the leading of the whole League, leaving to each of the reſt her own Laws, and her own Liberty.

48. TILL a Common-wealth be firſt fram'd, how ſuch a Common-wealth ſhould make an effectual Union with another Nation, is not poſſible to be ſeen.

49. THE new, unpractis'd, and heretofore unheard Union (as it is vulgarly ſpoken) with *Scotland*, by uniting Deputies of divers Nations, not in a Council apart, or by way of States General, as in the United Provinces, but in the ſtanding Councils of ſome one Common-wealth in the League, is deſtructive to Liberty both in *England* and in *Scotland*.

50. IF the Common-wealth of *England* receives Deputies from *Scotland* in a greater number than that of her own, ſhe receives Law from a foreign Intereſt, and ſo loſes her own Liberty.

51. If *Scotland* be received in an equal number, it obſtructs the freedom of both, or occaſions War or Diſſenſion.

52. IF *Scotland* be receiv'd in an inferior number, ſhe receives Law from *England*, and ſo loſes her Liberty. The like is underſtood of *Ireland*.

53. WHEREAS a well order'd Common-wealth ſhould give the Balance to her Confederates, and not receive it from them; the Councils, in which divers others are thus united, tho' in a far inferior number of Deputies, yet if theſe lie in wait, or lay their heads together, may be over-rul'd, obſtructed, or over-balanc'd by foreign Intereſts.

54. WHERE Countries are divers in their Laws, and yet are to receive Laws one from the other, neither the Common-wealth giving Law, knows what to give, nor the Common-wealth receiving Law, underſtands what ſhe receives: in which caſe the Union returns to force or Confuſion.

55. THE beſt way of holding a Nation different or not different in Laws, is the *Roman*, that is, by way of Province.

56. A PROVINCE, eſpecially if ſhe has ſtrong holds, may, by defraying of a ſmall Guard, be kept to a juſt League, and for the reſt enjoy her own Laws, her own Government, and her perfect Liberty. Other ways of Union will be found more chargeable, and leſs effectual, on both ſides: for if *England* has no Army in *Scotland*, *Scotland* will receive no Law from *England*; and if *England* has an Army there, her hold conſiſts not in the Union, but in the Force. The like is to be underſtood of *Ireland*.

57. IF a Country be very ſmall, and not able to ſubſiſt of itſelf, as *Wales*, it may be ſafely united and held: but the advantage that *Wales* has in participation of all Magiſtracies and Offices, is not that which *England* is able to afford to ſuch a Country as *Scotland*, without ſubjecting her neck to the yoke.

58. THE order of a Common-wealth requires, that it conſiſts, firſt, of a Civil; ſecondly, of a Religious; thirdly, of a Military; and fourthly, of a Provincial part. The manner of uniting Provinces or different Nations, pertains to the laſt part; and in the formation of a Common-wealth, to begin with that firſt, which is naturally laſt, is to invert the Order, and by conſequence the Common-wealth it ſelf, which indeed is nothing but Order.

59. WHERE there can be any other Government, there can be no Common-wealth.

60. WHERE there can be a Common-wealth, what Tumults ſoever there happen, and which ſoever prevail, there can be no other Government; that is to ſay, without foreign Invaſion, which throughout I muſt be underſtood to except.

61. IF Sir GEORGE BOOTH had prevail'd, he muſt either have introduced a Common-wealrh, or have reſtored the King.

62. IF the King were reſtored, he muſt either govern by an Army, or by Parliaments.

63. A KING governing now in *England* by an Army, would for the ſame Cauſes find the ſame Effects with the late Protector.

64. A KING governing now in *England* by Parliaments, would find the Nobility of no effect at all.

65. A PARLIMAENT, where the Nobility is of no effect at all, is a mere popular Council.

66. A

66. A MERE Popular Council will never receive Law from a King.

67. A MERE Popular Council giving Law to a King, becomes thereby a Democracy, or equal Common-wealth; or the difference is no greater than in the imperfection of the Form.

68. A COMMON-WEALTH or Democracy to be perfect in the Form, muſt conſiſt eſpecially of ſuch an Aſſembly, the Reſult whereof can go upon no Intereſt whatſoever, but that only which is the common intereſt of the whole People.

69. AN Aſſembly conſiſting of a few, may go upon the Intereſt of one man, as a King; or upon the Intereſt of one Party, as that of Divines, Lawyers, and the like; or the Intereſt of themſelves, and the perpetuation of their Government.

70. THE Popular Aſſembly in a Common-wealth may conſiſt of too few, but can never conſiſt of too many.

71. IN every Common-wealth there has been a Popular Aſſembly. This in *Iſrael* at leaſt conſiſted of twenty four thouſand, upon a monthly Rotation. In *Athens*, *Lacedemon*, *Rome*, it conſiſted of the whole Citizens, that is, of all ſuch as had a right in the Common-wealth, whether they inhabited in City or Country. In *Venice* it conſiſts of about two thouſand. In the Province of *Holland* only, which contains eighteen or nineteen Sovereignties, the Popular or reſolving Aſſemblies conſiſt at leaſt of five hundred Perſons: theſe in the whole Union, may amount to five or ſix thouſand; in *Switzerland* I believe they come to a greater number. And the moſt of theſe Aſſemblies have been perpetually extant.

72. IF the Popular Aſſembly conſiſts of ſo few, and ſo eminent Perſons as are capable of any orderly Debate, it is good for nothing but to deſtroy the Common-wealth.

73. IF the Popular Aſſembly conſiſts of ſo many, and for the greater part of ſo mean Perſons as are not capable of Debate, there muſt be a Senate to help this defect.

74. THE Reaſon of the Senate is, that a Popular Aſſembly rightly conſtituted, is not capable of any prudent debate.

75. THE Reaſon of the Popular Aſſembly is, that a Senate rightly conſtituted for Debate, muſt conſiſt of ſo few and eminent Perſons, that if they have the Reſult too, they will not reſolve according to the Intereſt of the People, but according to the Intereſt of themſelves.

76. A POPULAR Aſſembly without a Senate cannot be wiſe.

77. A SENATE without a Popular Aſſembly will not be honeſt.

78. THE Senate and the Popular Aſſembly being once rightly conſtituted, the reſt of the Common-wealth will conſtitute it ſelf.

79. THE *Venetians* having ſlain divers of their Dukes for their Tyranny, and being aſſembl'd by ſuch numbers in their great Council as were naturally incapable of Debate, pitch'd upon thirty Gentlemen who were call'd *Pregati*, in that they were pray'd to go apart, and, debating upon the Exigence of the Common-wealth, to propoſe as they thought good to the great Council: and from thence firſt aroſe the Senate of *Venice* (to this day call'd the *Pregati)* and the *Great Council*, that is, the Senate and the Popular Aſſembly of *Venice*. And from theſe two aroſe all thoſe admirable Orders of that Common-wealth.

80. THAT

80. THAT a People of themſelves ſhould have ſuch an underſtanding, as when they of *Venice* did inſtitute their *Pregati* or Senate, is rare.

81. THAT a Senate or Council of Governors having ſupreme Power, ſhould inſtitute a popular Aſſembly, and propoſe to it, tho' in all reaſon it be the far more facile and practicable, is that which is rarer.

82. THE diffuſive body of the People is not in a natural capacity of judging; for which cauſe the whole judgment and power of the diffuſive Body of the People muſt be entirely and abſolutely in their collective Bodies, Aſſemblies or Repreſentatives, or there can be no Common-wealth.

83. TO declare that the Aſſemblies or Repreſentatives of the People have power in ſome things, and in others not, is to make the diffuſive Body, which is in a natural incapacity of judging, to be in a political capacity of judging.

84. TO bring a natural incapacity of judging to a political capacity of judging, is to introduce Government. To bring a natural incapacity of judging to ſuch a collective or political capacity of judging, as yet neceſſarily muſt retain the Intereſt of the diffuſive Body, is to introduce the beſt kind of Government. But to lay any appeal whatſoever from a political capacity of judging, to a natural incapacity of judging, is to fruſtrate all Government, and to introduce Anarchy. Nor is Anarchy, whether impos'd or obtruded by the Legiſlator firſt, or by the People, or their Demagogs or Incendiaries afterwards, of any other kind whatſoever than of this only.

85. TO make Principles or Fundamentals, belongs not to Men, to Nations, nor to human Laws. To build upon ſuch Principles or Fundamentals as are apparently laid by GOD in the inevitable neceſſity or Law of Nature, is that which truly appertains to Men, to Nations, and to human Laws. To make any other Fundamentals, and then build upon them, is to build Caſtles in the Air.

86. WHATEVER is violent, is not ſecure nor durable; whatever is ſecure or durable, is natural.

87. GOVERNMENT in the whole People, tho' the major part were diſaffected, muſt be ſecure and durable, becauſe it waves Force, to found it ſelf upon Nature.

88. GOVERNMENT in a Party, tho' all of theſe were well affected, muſt be inſecure and tranſitory, becauſe it waves Nature, to found it ſelf upon Force.

89. COMMON-WEALTHS, of all other Governments, are more eſpecially for the preſervation, not for the deſtruction, of Mankind.

90. COMMON-WEALTHS, that have been given to cut off their diſeas'd Limbs (as *Florence)* have brought themſelves to impotence and ruin. Common-wealths that have been given to healing their diſeas'd Limbs (as *Venice)* have been healthful and flouriſhing.

91. *ATHENS* under the Oligarchy of four hundred, was infinitely more afflicted and torn with Diſtraction, Blood and Animoſity of Parties, than is *England*; yet by introduction of a Senate of four hundred, and a Popular Aſſembly of five thouſand, did thereupon, ſo ſuddenly as if it had been a Charm, recover Might and Glory. *See the*

the eighth Book of THUCYDIDES; *A Story in theſe Times moſt neceſſary to be conſider'd.*

92. TO leave our ſelves and Poſterity to a farther purchaſe in Blood or Sweat of that which we may preſently poſſeſs, enjoy, and hereafter bequeath to Poſterity in Peace and Glory, is inhuman and impious.

93. AS certainly and ſuddenly as a good ſtate of health diſpels the peeviſhneſs and peril of Sickneſs, does a good ſtate of Government the animoſity and danger of Parties.

94. THE Frame of a Common-wealth having firſt been propos'd and conſider'd, Expedients (in caſe ſuch ſhould be found neceſſary for the ſafe, effectual, and perfect introduction of the ſame) may with ſome aim be apply'd or fitted; as to a Houſe, when the Model is reſolv'd upon, we fit Scaffolds in building. But firſt to reſolve upon Expedients, and then to fit to them the Frame of a Common-wealth, is as if one ſhould ſet up Props, and then build a Houſe to lean upon them.

95. AS the chief Expedients in the building of a Houſe are Axes and Hammers; ſo the chief Expedient in the building of a Government, is a ſtanding Army.

96. AS the Houſe which, being built, will not ſtand without the perpetual noiſe or uſe of Axes and Hammers, is imperfect; ſo is the Government which, being form'd, cannot ſupport it ſelf without the perpetual uſe of a ſtanding Army.

97. WHILE the Civil and Religious parts of a Common-wealth are in forming, there is a neceſſity that ſhe ſhould be ſupported by an Army; but when the Military and Provincial parts are rightly form'd, ſhe can have no farther uſe of any other Army. Wherefore at this point, and not till then, her Armies are by the practice of Common-wealths, upon ſlighter occaſions, to have half pay for life, and to be diſbanded.

98. WHERE there is a ſtanding Army, and not a form'd Government, there the Army of neceſſity will have Dictatorian Power.

99. WHERE an Army ſubſiſts upon the Pay or Riches of a ſingle Perſon, or of a Nobility, that Army is always monarchical. Where an Army ſubſiſts not by the Riches of a ſingle Perſon, nor of a Nobility, that Army is always popular.

100. THE *Engliſh* Armies are popular Armies.

101. WHERE Armies are popular, and exerciſe Dictatorian Power in depoſing ſingle Perſons, and monarchical Aſſemblies, there can be no greater, nor needs any other Expedient for the introduction of a Common-wealth. Nevertheleſs to this may be added ſome ſuch moderate Qualifications as may prune the Common-wealth, not lop off her Branches. Whom theſe will not ſatisfy, it is not a Common-wealth, but a Party, that can.

102. IF the late King had freely permitted to the People the exerciſe of the Power inevitably devolv'd upon them by the change of the Balance, he had not been deſtroy'd. If either of the late ſingle Perſons had brought the People into an orderly exerciſe of the Power devolv'd upon them, he had been great. What Party ſoever ſhall hinder the People from the exerciſe of the Power devolv'd upon them, ſhall be certainly ruin'd: who or what Party ſoever ſhall introduce

troduce the People into the due and orderly exerciſe of the Power devolv'd upon them, ſhall be forthwith ſecure and famous for ever.

103 A MAN uſes, nouriſhes, and cheriſhes his Body, without underſtanding it; but he that made the Body underſtood it.

104. THE reaſon why the Nations that have Common-wealths, uſe them ſo well, and cheriſh them ſo much, and yet that ſo few Nations have Common-wealths, is, That in uſing a Common-wealth, it is not neceſſary it ſhould be underſtood; but in making a Common-wealth, that it be underſtood, is of abſolute neceſſity. *Caput Reipublicæ eſt noſſe Rempub.* CICERO.

105. AS the natural Body of a *Chriſtian* or Saint can be no other, for the frame, than ſuch as has been the natural Body of an *Iſraelite* or of a Heathen; ſo the political Bodies or Civil Governments of *Chriſtians* or Saints can be no other, for the frame, than ſuch as have been the political Bodies or civil Governments of the *Iſraelites*, or of the Heathens.

106. IT ſhall be as ſoon found when and where the Soul of a Man was in the Body of a Beaſt, as when or where the Soul or Freedom natural to Democracy, was in any other Form than that only of a Senate, and an Aſſembly of the People.

107. IN thoſe things wherein, and ſo far as Art is directed or limited by the nature of her Materials, it is in Art as in Nature.

108. THAT Democracy, or equal Government by the People, conſiſt of an Aſſembly of the People, and a Senate, is that whereby Art is altogether directed, limited, and neceſſitated by the nature of her Materials.

109. AS the Soul of Man can never be in the Body of a Beaſt, unleſs GOD make a new Creation; ſo neither the Soul or Freedom natural to Democracy in any other Form whatſoever, than that only of a Senate, and a Popular Aſſembly.

110. THE right Conſtitution, Coherence, and proper Symmetry of a Form of Government goes for the greater part upon Invention.

111. REASON is of two parts; Invention, and Judgment.

112. JUDGMENT is moſt perfect in an Aſſembly.

113 INVENTION is moſt perfect in one Man.

114. IN one Man, Judgment wants the ſtrength which is in a multitude of Counſillors.

115 IN a multitude of Counſillors, Invention is none at all.

116. THRO' the defect of Invention, the wiſeſt Aſſemblies in the formation or reformation of Government, have pitch'd upon a ſole Legiſlator.

117. IT is not below the dignity of the greateſt Aſſembly, but according to the practice of the beſt Common-wealths, to admit of any man that is able to propoſe to them, for the good of his Country.

118. TO the making of a well order'd Common-wealth, there goes little more of pains or charge, or work without doors, than the Eſtabliſhment of an equal or apt Diviſion of the Territory, and the propoſing of ſuch Election to the Diviſions ſo made, as from an equal Foundation may raiſe equal Superſtructures; the reſt being but paper-work, is as ſoon done, as ſaid or voted.

119. WHERE

119. WHERE ſuch Elections are propos'd, as being made by the People, muſt needs produce a well order'd Senate and Popular Aſſembly, and the People (who, as we have already found by experience, ſtick not at the like work) elect accordingly; there not the Propoſers of any Power in themſelves, but the whole People by their peculiar and natural right and power, do inſtitute and ordain their whole Commonwealth.

120. THE higheſt earthly Felicity that a People can ask, or GOD can give, is an equal and well order'd Common-wealth. Such a one among the *Iſraelites*, was the Reign of GOD; and ſuch a one (for the ſame reaſon) may be among *Chriſtians* the Reign of CHRIST, tho' not every one in the *Chriſtian* Common-wealth ſhould be any more *a Chriſtian* indeed, than every one in the *Iſraelitiſh* Common-wealth was an *Iſraelite* indeed.

Seven MODELS of a COMMON-WEALTH:

OR BRIEF

DIRECTIONS

Shewing how a fit and perfect MODEL of POPULAR GOVERNMENT may be made, found, or underſtood.

THERE is nothing more apparent, than that this Nation is greatly diſquieted and perplex'd thro' a complication of two Cauſes: The one, that the preſent ſtate thereof is not capable of any other Form than that only of a Popular Government; the other, that they are too few who underſtand what is the Form or Model naturally neceſſary to a Popular Government, or what is requir'd in that Form or Prudence for the fitting of it to the uſe of this Nation. For theſe Infirmities I ſhall offer ſome Remedy by a brief Diſcourſe or Direction conſiſting of two Parts.

THE firſt ſhewing thoſe Forms or Models of Popular Government, or of Common-wealths, which have been hitherto extant, whether fit or unfit for the preſent ſtate of this Nation: The ſecond, ſhewing a Model or Form of Popular Government fitted to the preſent ſtate of this Nation. In the firſt part I ſhall propoſe ſeven Models roughly and generally: In the ſecond one, but more particularly and exactly.

The FIRST PART.

IN every Frame of Government, either the Form muſt be fitted to the Property as it ſtands, and this only is practicable in this Nation; or the Property muſt be alter'd and fitted to the Frame, which without force has been ſometimes, but very ſeldom, practicable in any other Nation. Nevertheleſs, for the better knowledge of the one way, it will be beſt to propoſe in both ways.

THE

THE

FIRST MODEL

OF

POPULAR GOVERNMENT

PROPOS'D.

The Common-wealth of Iſrael.

THAT the Nobility, the Gentry, and the People, be perſuaded to give up their whole Lands to the Common-wealth.

THAT if the whole People ſhall ſo give up their Lands, they be divided into twelve equal Precincts, call'd Tribes.

THAT the man of greateſt quality in every Tribe have about ten thouſand pounds a year given to him and his Heirs, with the hereditary Dignity of Prince of his Tribe.

THAT ſome ten other men of the next quality under the Prince in every Tribe, have about two thouſand pounds a year in the ſame given to each of them and their Heirs, with the Hereditary Dignity of Patriarchs, or Chief of the Fathers.

THAT the remaining part of the Lands, except forty eight Cities and their Suburbs, be diſtributed to the whole People equally by Lots.

THAT it be not lawful for any Prince, Patriarch, or other, to ſell or allienate his Land, or any part thereof, in ſuch manner, but that upon every fiftieth year, being for this cauſe a year of *Jubilee*, all Lands within that compaſs ſold or alienated return to the antient Poſſeſſors or lawful Heirs.

THAT there be one other Tribe added to the twelve; that this Tribe ſo added be not local, nor ſuffer'd to have any Lands at all, except the forty eight Cities above reſerv'd, with their Suburbs, that is, with a quantity of Land to each of them, being in depth two thouſand Cubits round. That theſe be ſettl'd upon them and their Heirs for ever, beſides the annual Tithe of the whole Territory, and a piece of Money every year upon every Head under the notion of an Offering, in regard that other Offerings are now unlawful; and that this Tribe conſiſt of Clergy, having one hereditary Archbiſhop, or High Prieſt, for the Head and Prince of their Tribe.

THAT there be no other Law than that of the Word of God only; and that the Clergy being beſt ſkill'd in this Law, be eligible into all Courts of Juſtice, all Magiſtracies and Offices whatſoever.

THAT the Prince of a Tribe, together with one or more Courts, conſiſting of twenty three Judges elected by the People of that Tribe for life, be the Government of the ſame.

THAT the People of the twelve local Diviſions take by the Ballot wiſe men and underſtanding among their Tribes, and of theſe

conſtitute a Senate for the whole Common-wealth conſiſting of ſeventy Elders for life.

THAT every local Tribe monthly elect two thouſand of their own number; and that theſe Elections amounting in all to four and twenty thouſand, aſſemble at the Metropolis or Capital City, and be the monthly Repreſentative of the People.

THAT the Senate be a ſtanding Judicatory of Appeal from all other Courts, with power to ſhew the Sentence of the Laws of God.

THAT beſides the Law of God, whatever ſhall be propos'd by the ſeventy Elders, and reſolv'd by the monthly Repreſentative of the People, be the Law of the Land.

A SECOND MODEL

OF A

COMMON-WEALTH,

PROPOS'D.

THAT there be a King without Guards.

THAT the Word or Command of this King be the Law.

THAT this King ſtirring out of his Palace, it may be lawful for any man to ſlay him.

IN this Model there wants but Security, that while the People are diſpers'd the King can gather no Army, to demonſtrate, That either the People muſt be free, or the King a Priſoner.

A THIRD MODEL

OF A

COMMON-WEALTH,

PROPOS'D.

The Common-wealth of Sparta.

THAT the Nobility, the Gentry, and the People, having upon perſuaſion given up their Lands to the Public, the whole Territory be divided into one hundred thouſand equal Lots, and two more, being each of ten thouſand Acres.

THAT the inferior Lots be diſtributed to the People.

THAT every man poſſeſſing a Lot, be a Citizen.

THAT the reſt, except only the Children of Citizens, be Servants to, and Tillers of the ground for the Citizens.

THAT there be no profeſs'd Students.

THAT

THAT no Citizen exerciſe any Trade, but that of Arms only; and that the uſe of Money, except it be made of Iron, be wholly baniſh'd.

THAT there be two Kings hereditary: That each of them poſſeſs one of thoſe Lots of ten thouſand Acres.

THAT they be Preſidents of the Senate, with ſingle Votes; and that in War they have the leading of the Armies.

THAT there be a Senate conſiſting, beſides the Kings, of twenty eight Senators, elected for life by the People.

THAT whatever be propos'd by this Senate to the whole People, or any ten thouſand of them, and ſhall be reſolv'd by the ſame, be the Law.

THAT there be a Court conſiſting of five annual Magiſtrates elected by the People; and that this Court have power to bring a King, a Senator, or other, that ſhall openly or ſecretly violate the Laws, or invade the Government, to Juſtice.

A FOURTH MODEL

OF A

COMMON-WEALTH,

PROPOS'D.

The Common-wealth of Athens.

THAT there be a Repreſentative of the People, conſiſting of five thouſand.

THAT theſe annually elect by lot a Senate conſiſting of four hundred, and a Signory by ſuffrage conſiſting of nine annual Princes.

THAT each fourth part of the Senate, for one fourth part of their annual term, be a Council of State.

THAT the Council of State may aſſemble the Senate, and propoſe to the ſame: That the Senate may aſſemble the People, and propoſe to them. And that what is propos'd by the Senate, and reſolv'd by the People, be the Law.

THAT the executive Power of the Laws made, be more eſpecially committed and diſtributed in various Functions, and divers Adminiſtrations, to the nine Princes.

A FIFTH MODEL OF A COMMON-WEALTH, PROPOS'D.

The Common-wealth of Rome.

THAT the whole Nation be divided into three diſtinct Orders: the one *Senatorian*, or Nobility; the other *Equeſtrian*, or Gentry; and the third *Plebeian*, or Popular.

THAT the Equeſtrian Order be the Cavalry of the Common-wealth, and the Plebeian the Foot.

THAT there be a Senate conſiſting of the Senatorian Order, and of three hundred Senators for life.

THAT there be two Magiſtrates elected by the People, for five years term, call'd Cenſors.

THAT the Cenſors have power upon cauſe ſhewn to remove a Senator out of the Senate; and to elect a Nobleman, or ſometimes a Plebeian, thereby made Noble, into the Senate.

THAT there be two annual Magiſtrates elected by the People, call'd *Conſuls*.

THAT the Conſuls be Preſidents of the Senate, and have the leading of the Armies.

THAT the Senate (as they ſhall ſee occaſion) may nominate one perſon to be Dictator for ſome ſhort term.

THAT the Dictator for his term have Sovereign Power.

THAT there be a Diviſion of the whole People, of what Orders ſoever into ſix Claſſes, according to the valuation of their Eſtates. For example: That the firſt Claſſis conſiſt of all ſuch as have two thouſand pounds a year, or upwards; the ſecond of all ſuch as have one thouſand pounds a year, or upwards, under two; the third, of all ſuch as have ſix hundred pounds a year, or upwards, under one thouſand; the fourth, of all ſuch as have three hundred pounds a year, or upwards, under ſix hundred; the fifth, of all ſuch as have under the former proportion; the ſixth, of all ſuch as pay no Taxes, or have no Land, and that theſe be not us'd in Arms.

THAT the Senate propoſe all Laws to be enacted, to an Aſſembly of the People.

THAT all Magiſtrates be elected by the ſame.

THAT this Aſſembly of the People conſiſt of the five Claſſes, in ſuch manner, that if the Votes of the firſt and ſecond Claſſes be near equal, the third Claſſis be call'd; and if theſe agree not, the fourth be call'd; and ſo for the reſt.

THAT what is thus propos'd by the Senate, and reſolv'd by the People, be the Law.

IN

IN this Frame the Senate, by the optimacy of the first and second Classes (which seldom or never disagree) carries all, to the exclusion of the main Body of the People: whence arises continual feud or enmity between the Senate and the People; who consulting apart, introduce Popular Debate, set up some other way of Assembly, as by Tribes, or by Parishes, with more equality of Votes; elect Magistrates of their own, make Decrees binding the Senate or Nobility, endeavour to curb their Power by weakening their Balance, or diminishing their Estates: All these tumultuously, and to the alteration of the Government, with so frequent Changes under so divers shapes, as make a very Proteus *of the Common-wealth, till having been all her life time afflicted with Anarchy, she ends her days in Tyranny.*

A SIXTH MODEL OF A COMMON-WEALTH PROPOS'D.

The Common-wealth of Venice.

THAT the Sovereign Power be estated upon four thousand select men, to them and their Heirs for ever.

THAT there be a great Council consisting of these four thousand; and that their Sons at five and twenty years of age have right to the same.

THAT the great Council elect one Duke for life: That the Duke have a Royal Palace assign'd, with a Guard, at the States charge, and a Revenue of fifteen hundred pounds a year; and that he bear the Sovereign Dignity of the Common-wealth.

THAT this Duke have six Counsillors annually chosen by the great Council. That he have no power to sign any Writing, tho' in his own Name, nor to do any of his political Functions without his Counsillors. That his Counsillors have power to sign any Writing in the Duke's name, or to do any of his political Functions without him; and that the Duke with these six Counsillors be the Signory of the Common-wealth.

THAT the Signory of this Common-wealth have session and suffrage in all the Councils of the same, with right also to propose to each or any of them, either jointly or severally.

THAT one hundred and twenty elected annually by the great Council, together with other Councils and Magistrates, to whom of course the like Honour is appertaining, be the Senate.

THAT sixteen other Magistrates propos'd by the Senate, and confirm'd by the great Council for the term of six months, be a Council apart, with three weekly Provosts or Proposers, call'd the College.

THAT the Signory may assemble the College, and propose to them; that the College may assemble the Senate, and propose to them;

and that the Senate may aſſemble the great Council, and propoſe to them. And that whatever is reſolv'd by the Senate, and not contradicted, nor queſtion'd by the great Council, be the Law.

THAT there be a Council of ten elected annually by the great Council; and that this Council of ten, with the Signory, and ſome of the College, having right of Seſſion and Suffrage in the ſame, may upon occaſion exerciſe Dictatorian Power in this Common-wealth.

THAT the reſt of the People under the Empire of this Common-wealth, be diſarm'd, and govern'd by Lieutenants of Provinces. That the Common-wealth have a ſtanding Army of ſtrangers or others, in Diſcipline and Pay. *And that the City wherein ſhe ſhall reſide, be founded in the Sea, after ſuch a manner, that it can no more be approach'd by a Fleet, than by an Army without a Fleet. Otherwiſe, this Common-wealth is expos'd both to the Provinces, and to a mercenary Army.*

A SEVENTH MODEL

OF A

COMMON-WEALTH

PROPOS'D.

The Common-wealth of Holland.

THAT the People in every City, and in every Province or County within theſe three Nations, elect to every City, Province, or County of the ſame, a matter of twenty, thirty, or forty Magiſtrates for life. That theſe Magiſtrates being ſo elected, be the Senate of that reſpective City, Province or County.

THAT the Senates, thus elected, thenceforth have and enjoy the Sovereign Power within their reſpective Juriſdiction, for ever. That every Senate annually elect two or four Burgomaſters or Conſuls, to be Preſidents of the ſame. That they alſo elect ſeven Magiſtrates, or preſent fourteen perſons to the Governor of the Province; and that he elect ſeven. That the ſeven ſo elected be Judges, or have the Executive Power of the Laws for their term, and within their reſpective Juriſdiction.

THAT in caſe of Affairs of more public and general concern, as War or Peace, levy of Men or Money, and the like, the Governor of the Province give information of the things to be conſider'd, to the Nobility, and to the Senates of that Province; therewith appointing a time and place for the Aſſembly of the States Provincial. That each of the Senates, having debated the matter propos'd, delegate one Conſul with ſome other Senators well inform'd and inſtructed with their Will and Pleaſure, to the Aſſembly of the States Provincial. That the Nobility of the ſame Province delegate ſome of their Order likewiſe to the Provincial States. That the Delegates both of the Nobility and of the Senates, give the Vote of their Principals according to inſtruction;

and

and that neither the Nobility, nor any Senate or Sovereignty be otherwise bound, than by their own Vote.

THAT the Provincial Eſtates elect one Magiſtrate for life, or during pleaſure, to be Provincial Governor: That they elect one or more other Magiſtrates for life, or during pleaſure, to be States General.

THAT the States General being elected, and well inſtructed by their Provinces, have the direction of the whole League: That each give not his own Vote, but the Vote of his Province; and that no Province be otherwiſe bound, than by her own Vote.

IF theſe Models (in which I claim to be the firſt that has laid the whole, and the higheſt Myſteries of the antient Common-wealths, to the loweſt capacity of vulgar Debate) be not all in the mouths of great men, and in Pamphlets, for Chimeras *or* Utopias, *it is great Chance: Yet contain they no leſs than the whole Revolution of Popular Prudence. Nor is it more certain, that no one of them would fit the preſent ſtate of this Nation, than that he or they, whoſe Contemplation and Underſtanding is not well vers'd in the moſt, or in the beſt of theſe, ſhall never fit a Model of Popular Government to the preſent ſtate of this Nation, or of any other. In which aſſurance, I come to fulfil my promiſe in the* Second Part, *or to propoſe ſuch a Model as is fitted to the preſent ſtate of this Nation.*

THE

SECOND PART,

Propoſing a MODEL of a

COMMON-WEALTH

Fitted to the

Preſent State of this Nation.

BUT ſo it is ever, that the Humours or Intereſts of predominant Parties hold themſelves to be National: and that which fits them, can never fit a Nation; nor that which fits a Nation, ever fit them. This in the introduction of Government, is always the main difficulty. But where Parties are no better founded, or fitted for Uſurpation, than now in England, *they are rather to be ſlighted than conſider'd, as thoſe, the ſtouteſt whereof have but given this Example to the reſt, that they who in this ſtate of Affairs ſhall obſtruct an equal and well order'd Government, ſhall but ruin themſelves. For which cauſe it is propos'd:*

1. THAT all Citizens, that is, Freemen, or ſuch as are not Servants, be diſtributed into Horſe and Foot. That ſuch of them as have one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Money

ney, or above this proportion, be of the Horſe; and all ſuch as have under this proportion, be of the Foot.

2. THAT all Elders, or Freemen, being thirty years of age or upwards be capable of civil Adminiſtration; and that the Youth, or ſuch Freemen as are between eighteen years of age and thirty, be not capable of civil Adminiſtration, but of military only, in ſuch manner as ſhall follow in the military part of this Model.

3. THAT the whole native, or proper Territory of the Common-wealth be caſt with as much exactneſs as can be convenient, into known and fix'd Precincts, or Pariſhes.

4. THAT the Elders reſident in each Pariſh annually aſſemble in the ſame, for example upon Monday next enſuing the laſt of *December:* That they then and there elect out of their own number every fifth man, or one man of every five, to be for the term of the year enſuing a Deputy of that Pariſh; and that the firſt and ſecond ſo elected be Overſeers, or Preſidents for the regulating of all Parochial Congregations, whether of the Elders, or of the Youth, during the term for which they were elected.

5. THAT ſo many Pariſhes lying neareſt together, whoſe Deputies ſhall amount to one hundred or thereabouts, be caſt into one Precinct call'd the Hundred; and that in each Precinct call'd the Hundred, there be a Town, Village, or place appointed to be the Capital of the ſame.

6. THAT the Parochial Deputies elected throughout the Hundred aſſemble annually, for example upon Monday next enſuing the laſt of *January*, at the Capital of their Hundred. That they then and there elect out of the Horſe of their number one Juſtice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Captain, one Enſign; and out of the Foot of their number one other Juryman, one High Conſtable, *&c.*

7. THAT every twenty Hundreds lying neareſt, and moſt conveniently together, be caſt into one Tribe; that the whole Territory being after this manner caſt into Tribes, ſome Town or place be appointed to every Tribe for the Capital of the ſame; and that theſe three Precincts (that is, the Pariſh, the Hundred, and the Tribe) whether the Deputies thenceforth annually choſen in the Pariſhes or Hundreds, come to increaſe or diminiſh, remain firm and inalterable for ever, ſave only by Act of Parliament. *The Tribes are preſum'd throughout theſe Propoſitions to amount to fifty.*

8. THAT the Deputies elected in the ſeveral Pariſhes, together with their Magiſtrates and other Officers both Civil and military elected in the ſeveral Hundreds, aſſemble or muſter annually, for example upon Monday next enſuing the laſt of *February*, at the Capital of their Tribe for the ſpace of two days.

9. THAT this whole Body thus aſſembl'd, upon the firſt day of their Aſſembly elect out of the Horſe of their number, one high Sheriff, one Lieutenant of the Tribe, one *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, one Conductor, and two Cenſors. That the High Sheriff be Commander in chief, the Lieutenant Commander in the ſecond place, and the Conductor in the third place, of this band or Squadron: That the *Cuſtos Rotulorum* be Muſter-maſter, and keep the Rolls; that the Cenſors be Governors of the Ballot: and that the term of theſe Magiſtracies be annual.

10. THAT

10. THAT the Magiſtrates of the Tribe (that is to ſay, the High Sheriff, Lieutenant, *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, the Cenſors, and the Conductor, together with the Magiſtrates and Officers of the Hundreds, that is to ſay, the twenty Juſtices of the Peace, the forty Jurymen, the twenty High Conſtables) be one Troop, or one Troop and one Company apart, call'd the Prerogative Troop or Company. That this Troop bring in and aſſiſt the Juſtices of Aſſize, hold the Quarter Seſſion in their ſeveral Capacities, and perform their other Functions as formerly.

11. THAT the Magiſtrates of the Tribe (that is to ſay, the High Sheriff, Lieutenant, *Cuſtos Rotulorum*, the Cenſors, and the Conductor, together with the twenty Juſtices elected at the Hundreds) be a Court for the Government of the Tribe call'd the Phylarch; and that this Court proceed in all matter of Government as ſhall from time to time be directed by Act of Parliament.

12. THAT the Squadron of the Tribe on the ſecond day of their aſſembly, elect two Knights, and three Burgeſſes out of the Horſe of their number, and four other Burgeſſes out of the Foot of their number: that each Knight upon election forthwith make Oath of Allegiance to the Common-wealth, or refuſing ſuch Oath, the next Competitor in Election to the ſame Magiſtracy, making the ſaid Oath, be the Magiſtrate. The like for the Burgeſſes. That the Knights thus ſworn, have Seſſion in the Senate for the term of three years; and that the Burgeſſes thus ſworn, be of the Prerogative Tribe or Repreſentative of the People for the like term.

13. THAT for the full and perfect inſtitution of the Aſſemblies mention'd, the Squadron of the Tribe in the firſt year of the Common-wealth, elect two Knights for the term of one year, two other Knights for the term of two years, and laſtly two Knights more for the term of three years; the like for the Burgeſſes of the Horſe firſt, and then for thoſe of the Foot. And that this Propoſition be of no farther uſe than for the firſt years Election only.

14. THAT a Magiſtrate or Officer elected at the Hundred be thereby bar'd from being elected a Magiſtrate of the Tribe, or of the firſt day's Election; but that no former Election whatſoever bar a man of the ſecond day's Election at the Tribe, or to be choſen a Knight or Burgeſs. That a man being choſen a Knight or Burgeſs, who before was choſen a Magiſtrate or Officer of the Hundred, or Tribe, may delegate his former Office or Magiſtracy in the Hundred, or in the Tribe, to any other Deputy, being no Magiſtrate nor Officer, and being of the ſame Hundred, and of the ſame Order, that is, of the Horſe or Foot reſpectively.

15. THAT the Knights of the annual Election take their places on Monday next enſuing the laſt of *March* in the Senate; that the like number of Knights whoſe Seſſion determines at the ſame time, recede, That every Knight or Senator be paid out of the public Revenue quarterly, one hundred twenty five pounds during his term of Seſſion, and be oblig'd to ſit in purple Robes.

16. THAT annually on reception of the new Knights, the Senate proceed to election of new Magiſtrates and Counſillors. That for Magiſtrates they elect one General, one Speaker, and two Cenſors, each for the term of one year, theſe promiſcuouſly; and that they elect one Commiſſioner of the great Seal, and one Commiſſioner of the Treaſury, each for the term of three years, and out of the new Knights only.

17. THAT the General and the ſpeaker, as Conſuls of the Common-wealth, and Preſidents of the Senate, be during the term of their Magiſtracy paid quarterly out of the public Revenue five hundred pounds; that the Inſigns of theſe Magiſtracies be a Sword born before the General, and a Mace before the Speaker; that they be oblig'd to wear Ducal Robes. And that what is ſaid of the General in this Propoſition, be underſtood only of the General ſitting, and not of the General marching.

18. THAT the General ſitting, in caſe he be commanded to march, receive Field-pay; and that a new General be forthwith elected by the Senate to ſucceed him in the Houſe, with all the Rights, Inſigns and Emoluments of the General ſitting; and this ſo often as one or more Generals are marching.

19. THAT the three Commiſſioners of the Great Seal, and the three Commiſſioners of the Treaſury, uſing their Inſigns and Habit, and performing their other functions as formerly, have paid quarterly to each of them three hundred ſeventy five pounds.

20. THAT the Cenſors govern the Ballot; that they be Preſidents of the Council for Religion; that each have a ſilver Wand for the Inſign of his Magiſtracy; that each be paid quarterly three hundred ſeventy five pounds, and be oblig'd to wear ſcarlet Robes.

21. THAT the General ſitting, the Speaker, and the ſix Commiſſioners above-ſaid, be the Signory of this Common-wealth.

22. THAT there be a Council of State conſiſting of fifteen Knights, five out of each Order, Liſt, or Election; and that the ſame be perpetuated by the annual election of five out of the new Knights, or thoſe laſt elected into the Senate.

23. THAT there be a Council for Religion conſiſting of twelve Knights, four out of each Order, and perpetuated by the annual election of four out of the Knights laſt elected into the Senate. That there be a Council for Trade, conſiſting of a like number, elected and perpetuated in the ſame manner.

24. THAT there be a Council of War not elected by the Senate, but elected by the Council of State out of themſelves. That this Council of War conſiſt of nine Knights, three out of each Order, and be perpetuated by the annual election of three out of the Laſt Knights elected into the Council of State.

25. THAT in caſe the Senate add nine Knights more elected promiſcuouſly, or not promiſcuouſly, out of their own number, to the Council of War, the ſaid Council of War be underſtood by ſuch addition to be Dictator of the Common-wealth for the term of three months and no longer, except by farther Order of the Senate the ſaid Dictatorian Power be prolong'd for a like term.

26. THAT the Signory have ſeſſion and ſuffrage, with right alſo jointly or ſeverally to propoſe both in the Senate, and in all Senatorian Councils.

27. THAT each of the three Orders or Diviſions of Knights, in each Senatorian Council, elect one Provoſt for the term of one Week; and that any two Provoſts of the ſame Council ſo elected, may propoſe to the ſame Council for their term, and not otherwiſe.

28. THAT ſome fair Room, or Rooms well furniſh'd and attended, be allow'd at the States charge, for a free and open Academy to all comers, at ſome convenient hour or hours towards the Evening:

That

That this Academy be govern'd according to the rules of good Breeding, or civil Converſation, by ſome one or more of the Provoſts; and that in this Academy it be lawful for any man, by word of mouth, or by writing, in jeſt or in earneſt, to propoſe to the Propoſers.

29. THAT for Ambaſſadors in Ordinary, there be four Reſidences, as *France*, *Spain*, *Venice*, and *Conſtantinople*; and that every Reſident upon election of a new Ambaſſador in Ordinary, remove to the next Reſidence in order hereby mention'd, till having ſerv'd orderly in all the ſaid Reſidences, he returns home. That upon Monday next enſuing the laſt of *November*, there be every ſecond year elected by the Senate ſome fit perſon, being above twenty five and under thirty five years of age, and not of the Senate, nor of the Popular Aſſembly. That the Party ſo elected repair on Monday next enſuing the laſt of *March* following, as an Ambaſſador in Ordinary to the Court of *France*, and there reſide for the term of two years to be computed from the firſt of *April* next enſuing his election. That every Ambaſſador in Ordinary be allow'd three thouſand pounds a year during the term of his Reſidences. And that if a Reſident comes to die, there be an extraordinary Election into his Reſidence for his term, and for the remainder of his removes and progreſs.

30. THAT all emergent Elections be made by ſcrutiny, that is by a Council, or by Commiſſioners propoſing, and by the Senate reſolving in the manner following: That all Field Officers be propos'd by the Council of War: That all Ambaſſadors Extraordinary be propos'd by the Council of State: That all Judges and Serjeants at Law be propos'd by the Commiſſioners of the Great Seal: That all Barons and Officers of truſt in the Exchequer be propos'd by the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury; and that ſuch of theſe as are thus propos'd to, and approv'd by the Senate, be held lawfully elected.

31. THAT the cognizance of all foreign Negotiation, and of all matter of State to be conſider'd, or Law to be enacted, whether Provincial or National, Domeſtic or Foreign, pertain to the Council of State. That all ſuch Affairs of like kind as the Council of State ſhall judge fit to be carry'd with more than ordinary ſecrecy, be committed by them, and pertain to the cognizance and truſt of the Council of War, to this end conſiſting of a ſelect Part, or Committee of the Council of State. That the Cognizance and Protection both of the National Religion, and of the Liberty of Conſcience, equally eſtabliſh'd in this Nation, after the manner provided in the religious part of this Model, pertain to the Council for Religion. That all matter of Traffic, and regulation of the ſame pertain to the Council for Trade. That in the exerciſe of theſe ſeveral Functions, each being naturally Senatorian or Authoritative only, no Council aſſume any other Power than ſuch only as ſhall be particularly or expreſly eſtated upon the ſame by Act of Parliament.

32. THAT what ſhall be propos'd to the Senate by any one or more of the Signory, or of the Propoſers General; or whatever was propos'd by any two of the Provoſts, or particular Propoſers to their reſpective Council, and upon debate at that Council ſhall come to be propos'd by the ſame to the Senate, be neceſſarily debatable, and debated by the Senate.

33. THAT in all caſes wherein Power is deriv'd to the Senate by Law made, or by Act of Parliament, the reſult of the Senate be ultimate:

That

That in all caſes of Law to be made, or not already provided for by Act of Parliament, as ſome particular Peace or War, levy of Men or Money, or the like, the Reſult of the Senate be not ultimate, but preparatory only, and be propos'd by the Senate to the Prerogative Tribe, or Aſſembly of the People, except only in caſes of ſuch ſpeed or ſecrecy, wherein the Senate ſhall judge the neceſſary ſlowneſs or openneſs of like proceeding to be of detriment or danger to the Common-wealth.

34. THAT if upon the motion or propoſition of a Council, or Propoſer General, the Senate add nine Knights, promiſcuouſly or not promiſcuouſly choſen out of their own number, to the Council of War, the ſaid Council of War be thereby made Dictator, and have power of Life and Death, as alſo to enact Laws in all caſes of ſpeed or ſecrecy, for and during the term of three months and no longer, except upon new Order from the Senate: And that all Laws enacted by the Dictator, be good and valid for the term of one year, and no longer, except the ſame be propos'd by the Senate, and reſolv'd by the People.

35. THAT the Burgeſſes of the annual Election return'd by the Tribes, enter into the Prerogative Tribe on Monday next enſuing the laſt of *March*; and that the like number of Burgeſſes whoſe term is expir'd, recede at the ſame time. That the Burgeſſes thus enter'd, elect to themſelves out of their own number two of the Horſe, one to be Captain, and the other to be Cornet of the ſame; and two of the Foot, one to be Captain, the other to be Enſign of the ſame, each for the term of three years. That theſe Officers being thus elected, the whole Tribe or Aſſembly proceed to the election of four annual Magiſtrates, two out of the Foot to be Tribunes of the Foot, and two out of the Horſe to be Tribunes of the Horſe. That the Tribunes be Commanders in chief of this Tribe ſo far as it is a Military Body, and Preſidents of the ſame as it is a Civil Aſſembly. And laſtly, that this whole Tribe be paid weekly as follows: to each of the Tribunes of the Horſe ſeven pounds, to each of the Tribunes of the Foot, ſix pounds, to each of the Captains of Horſe five pounds, to each of the Captains of Foot four pounds; to each of the Cornets three pounds, to each of the Enſigns two pounds ſeven ſhillings; to every Horſeman one pound ten ſhillings, and to every one of the Foot one pound.

36. THAT inferior Officers, as Captains, Cornets, Enſigns, be only for the Military Diſcipline of the Tribe. That the Tribunes have Seſſion in the Senate without Suffrage: That of courſe they have Seſſion and Suffrage in the Dictatorian Council, ſo often as it is created by the Senate. That in all caſes to be adjudg'd by the People they be Preſidents of the Court or Judicatory.

37. THAT Peculate or Defraudation of the Public, and all Caſes or Crimes tending to the ſubverſion of the Government, be triable by the Prerogative Tribe or the Aſſembly of the People; and that to the ſame there lie an Appeal in all Cauſes, and from all Courts, Magiſtrates, or Councils, National or Provincial.

38. THAT the right of Debate, as alſo of propoſing to the People, be wholly and only in the Senate, without any power at all of Reſult not deriv'd from the People and eſtated upon the Senate by act of Parliament.

39. THAT the power of Reſult be wholly and only in the People, without any right at all of Debate.

40. THAT

40. THAT the Senate having debated and agreed upon a Law to be propos'd, cauſe promulgation of the ſaid Law to be made for the ſpace of ſix weeks before Propoſition; that is, cauſe the Law to be written fair, and hung up for the time aforeſaid in ſome of the moſt eminent places of the City, and of the Suburbs.

41. THAT promulgation been made, the Signory demand of the Tribunes ſitting in the Senate, an Aſſembly of the People. That the Tribunes upon ſuch demand of the Signory, or of the Senate, be obliged to aſſemble the Prerogative Tribe in Arms by ſound of Trumpet, with Drums beating, and Colours flying, in any Town, Field, or Market-place, being not above ſix miles diſtant upon the day, and at the Hour appointed, except the meeting, thro' inconvenience of the Weather, or the like, be prorogued by conſent of the Signory and of the Tribunes. That the Prerogative Tribe being aſſembl'd accordingly, the Senate propoſe to them by two or more of the Senatorian Magiſtrates thereto appointed, at the firſt promulgation of the Law. That the Propoſers for the Senate open to the People the occaſion, motives, and reaſons of the Senate for the Law to be propos'd; and that the ſame being done, they put the Law or Propoſition by diſtinct clauſes to the Ballot of the People. That if any material Clauſe or Clauſes of the Propoſition, or Law ſo propos'd, be rejected by the People, the Clauſe or Clauſes ſo rejected may be review'd, alter'd, and propos'd again to the third time, if the Senate think fit, but no oftner.

42. THAT what is thus propos'd by the Senate, and reſolv'd by the People, be the Law of the Land, and no other, except what is already receiv'd as ſuch, or reſerv'd to the Dictatorian Council.

43. THAT every Magiſtracy, Office, or Election throughout this whole Common-wealth, whether annual or triennial, be underſtood of courſe or conſequence to enjoin an interval or vacation equal to the term of the ſame. That the Magiſtracy or Office of a Knight, and of a Burgeſs, be in this relation underſtood as one and the ſame; and that this order regard only ſuch Elections as are National or Domeſtick, and not ſuch as are foreign, or contain'd in the Provincial part of this Model.

44. THAT for an Exception from this Rule, where there is but one Elder of the Horſe in one and the ſame Pariſh, that Elder be eligible in the ſame without interval; and where there be above four Elders of the Horſe in one and the ſame Pariſh, there be not above half, nor under two of them eligible at the ſame Election.

45. THAT throughout all the Aſſemblies and Councils of this Common-wealth, the *Quorum* conſiſt of one half in the time of health and of one third part in a time of ſickneſs, being ſo declar'd by the Senate.

THE uſe of the Ballot, being as full of prolixity and abſtruſeneſs in writing, as of diſpatch and facility in practice, is preſum'd throughout all Elections and Reſults in this Model, and for the reſt refer'd rather to practice than writing. There remain the Religious, Military and Provincial parts of this Frame: But the Civil part being approv'd, they follow, or being not approv'd, may be ſpar'd.

CONCLUSIONS,

Or, the Uſe of theſe

PROPOSITIONS.

THESE Propoſitions are ſo laid out to debate or examination, that a man having the mind to weigh, diſcourſe upon, or object againſt this Model, may do it in the parts with the greateſt convenience.

ANY examination of, or objection againſt the whole, or any part in print or in writing, the Author holds himſelf bound to acknowledge or anſwer: But as to mere diſcourſe upon matters of this compaſs, it is uſually narrow; beſides that in writing a man muſt put himſelf upon better aim than he can be oblig'd to take in diſcourſe.

ANY one objection lying in writing againſt any one Order in this part of the Model, after ſuch manner as to ſhew that the Part or Order ſo invaded ought to be expunged, altered or amended, unleſs it may be expunged, altered, or amended accordingly, deſtroys the whole.

AND any one or more Objections ſo lying againſt any one or more of theſe Orders or Propoſitions, that thereby they may be expunged, altered or amended, muſt in the whole or in part make a better Model.

IN this Caſe therefore, or in caſe no Objection lies, the uſe of theſe Propoſitions will be ſuch, as thereby any Man, or any Aſſembly of Men, conſidering or debating upon them in order, may find or make a true Model of a well-ordered Common-wealth.

AND that an Aſſembly can never make or frame a Model of any Government otherwiſe than in ſome ſuch manner, is provable firſt by a demonſtration from the effect; and ſecondly by a demonſtration from the cauſe.

THE demonſtration from the Effect is, that an Aſſembly no otherwiſe frames a Law or Order, than by having it firſt pen'd by ſome one man, and then judging upon it; and the Model of a Common-wealth muſt conſiſt of many Laws or Orders.

THE demonſtration from the Cauſe is, that whereas Reaſon conſiſts of two parts, the one Invention, and the other Judgment, a Man may be as far beyond any Aſſembly for Invention, as any Aſſembly can be beyond a Man for Judgment; or which is more, that the formation of a Model of Government requires a ſtrong faculty of Invention, and that an Aſſembly is naturally void of all manner of Invention.

Nov. 13.
1658.

THE

THE

WAYS and MEANS

Whereby an Equal and Lasting

COMMON-WEALTH,

May be ſuddenly introduced, and perfectly founded, with the free Conſent and actual Confirmation of the Whole People of *England*.

Scire tuum nihil eſt, niſi te ſcire hoc ſciat alter. Perſ.

A WORD fitly ſpoken is like Apples of Gold in Pictures of Silver.

THE Deſire of the People of *England* now runs ſtrongly to have a free Parliament.

LET there be a free Parliament.

TO the end that the People may be moſt equally repreſented, or that the Parliament may be freeſt,

LET there be a new Diviſion of *England* and *Wales*, with as much equality as may ſtand with convenience, into fifty Shires.

LET every Shire elect annually two Knights to be of one Houſe, and ſeven Deputies to be of another Houſe of Parliament, for the term of three years. For the firſt year only, let the Deputies in each Diviſion be elected triple, that is ſeven for the term of one year, ſeven for the term of two years, and ſeven for the term of three years. The like for the Knights, ſave only that the preſent Parliament remain; that is, let two Knights in each Diviſion be elected the firſt year only for the term of one year, two other Knights at the ſame time for the term of two years; and let the preſent Parliament be the triennial part of the Knights Houſe for the firſt Election.

THE Houſe of Knights and the Houſe of Deputies being aſſembled, let the Houſe of Knights debate and propoſe.

LET what is propoſed by the Houſe of Knights, be promulgated for the ſpace of ſix weeks.

PROMULGATION being thus made, let the Houſe of Deputies meet, and give their Reſult upon the Propoſition.

LET what was thus propoſed by the Senate or Houſe of Knights, and reſolv'd by the People or Houſe of Deputies, be the Law.

IN this Conſtitution theſe Councils muſt of neceſſity contain the Wiſdom, and the Intereſt of the Nation.

IN this method, Debate muſt of neceſſity be mature.

IF

IF it be according to the Wiſdom and the Intereſt of the Nation upon mature debate that there be a King, let there be a King.

IF it be according to the Wiſdom and the Intereſt of the Nation upon mature debate, that there be a Common-wealth; two Aſſemblies in this Order are actually a Common-wealth, and ſo far a well order'd Common-wealth, that they are capacitated and inclin'd to reach to themſelves whatever furniture ſhall be further neceſſary in more particular Orders, which alſo is at hand.

TILL this or the like be done, the Line of the late King and the People muſt be fellow-ſufferers; in which caſe the impatience of the People muſt be for the reſtitution of that Line at all Adventures.

BUT this or the like being once done, immediately the Line of the late King and the People become Rivals, in which caſe they will never reſtore Monarchy.

WILL never, may ſome ſay? But if the Senate and the Popular Aſſembly be both Royaliſts, they both will and can reſtore Monarchy.

THO' both Royaliſts, they neither will nor can: for let them, that look no further than home or ſelf, ſay what they will, to affirm that a Senate and a Popular Aſſembly thus conſtituted can procreate Monarchy, is to affirm that a Horſe and a Mare can generate a Cat; that Wheat being rightly ſown may come up Peaſe; or that a River in its natural channel may run upwards.

IN the preſent caſe of *England*, Common-wealthſmen may fail thro' want of Art, but Royaliſts muſt fail thro' want of Matter; the former may miſs thro' impotence, the latter muſt thro' impoſſibility. Or where the State is purely popular, that is, not overbalanc'd by a Lord or Lords; let there be one Example, or one Reaſon given that there is, was, or ever can be Monarchy. There will be this when all fails, for the after-game, tho' the work ſhould fall, as is like enough, into the hands of Royaliſts.

CERTAIN it is, that where any private Citizen or Freemen might not (ſome way or other) propoſe, there never was a well order'd Common-wealth.

Upon this incouragement I offer'd this Paper to good hands, but it was (according to cuſtom) thrown after me.

SO it went in the Protector's time, in every Revolution ſince. *La fortuna accieca gli animi de gli huomini*; but that is Atheiſm, that's MACHIAVEL.

WELL, but now ſays the Protectorian Family, O that we had ſet up the equal Common-wealth! So ſay broken Parliaments and Stateſmen; ſo ſay the ſadly miſtaken Sectaries; ſo ſay the caſhier'd Officers; ſo ſays he that would have no nay, but Oligarchy was a good word; and ſo will more ſay after theſe, except they learn to ſay after another, *Aut reges non exigendi fuerunt, aut plebi re, non verbo, danda libertas*; either the Kings ought not to have been driven out, or the People to have their Liberty not in word, but in deed: but that is Heatheniſm, that's CICERO; well this is *Chriſtian*, if there will be no ſuch ſaying, I would there might be no ſwearing.

Feb. 6. 1659.

THE

THE HUMBLE

PETITION

Of divers well affected

PERSONS,

Deliver'd the *6th* Day of *July*, 1659.

With the PARLIAMENT's Anſwer thereto.

TO THE

SUPREME AUTHORITY,

THE

Parliament of the Common-wealth of *England*;

The Humble Petition of divers well affected Perſons,

SHEWS,

THAT your Petitioners have for many years obſerv'd the breathings and longings of this Nation after Reſt and Settlement, and that upon miſtaken grounds they have been ready even to ſacrifice and yield up part of their own undoubted right, to follow after an appearance of it.

AND your Petitioners do daily ſee the bad effects of long continu'd Diſtractions, in the ruins and decays of Trade foreign and domeſtic, and in the advantages that are taken to make Confederacies to involve the Nation in Blood and Confuſion, under pretence of procuring a Settlement.

THAT it has been the practice of all Nations, on the ſubverſion of any form of Government, to provide immediately a new Conſtitution ſuitable to their condition; with certain Succeſſions and Deſcents, that ſo both their Law-givers and Magiſtrates might uſe their ſeveral Truſts, according to the eſtabliſh'd Conſtitution; and the Peoples minds be ſettl'd ſecure, and free from attempts of introducing ſeveral forms of Government, according to the variety of their Fancies, or corrupt Intereſts.

THAT God has preſerv'd this Nation wonderfully without example many years, ſince the diſſolution of the old form of Government by King, Lords and Commons; there having been no fundamental Conſtitutions of any kind duly ſettl'd, nor any certain Succeſſion pro-

vided for the Legiſlative Power; but even at this inſtant, if by any ſudden ſickneſs, deſign, or force, any conſiderable numbers of your Perſons ſhould be render'd incapable of meeting in Parliament, the Common-wealth were without form of ſucceſſive Legiſlature or Magiſtracy, and left to the mercy of the ſtrongeſt Faction. Yet we have reaſon to remember in theſe years of unſettlement, the inexpreſſible ſufferings of this Nation in their Strength, Wealth, Honour, Liberty, and all things conducing to their wel-being; and we have like reaſon now ſadly to apprehend the impending ruin. And we cannot diſcern a poſſibility of your Honours unanimous and expeditious proceedings towards our Countries preſervation, and relief from its heavy preſſures, while your minds are not ſettl'd in any known Conſtitution of Government or fundamental Orders; according to which, all Laws ſhould be made: but divers or contrary Intereſts may be proſecuted on different apprehenſions of the Juſtice and Prudence of different forms of Government, tho' all with good intentions.

YOUR Petitioners therefore conceiving no remedy ſo effectual againſt the preſent Dangers, as the ſettlement of the Peoples minds, and putting them into actual ſecurity of their Properties and Liberties, by a due eſtabliſhment of the Conſtitution under which they may evidently apprehend their certain enjoyment of them; and thereupon, a return of their Trade and free Commerce, without thoſe continual fears that make ſuch frequent ſtops in Trade, to the ruin of thouſands.

AND your Petitioners alſo obſerving, that the Intereſt of the late King's Son is cry'd up, and promoted daily, upon pretence, that there will be nothing but Confuſion and Tyranny, till he come to govern: and that ſuch as declare for a Common-wealth, are for Anarchy and Confuſion, and can never agree among themſelves, what they would have.

UPON ſerious thoughts of the Premiſes, your Petitioners do preſume with all humility, and ſubmiſſion to your Wiſdom, to offer to your Honours their Principles and Propoſals concerning the Government of this Nation: Whereupon, they humbly conceive, a juſt and prudent Government ought to be eſtabliſh'd, viz.

1. THAT the Conſtitution of the Civil Government of *England* by King, Lords, and Commons, being diſſolv'd, whatever new Conſtitution of Government can be made or ſettled according to any rule of Righteouſneſs, it can be no other than a wiſe Order or Method, into which the free Peoples Deputies ſhall be form'd for the making of their Laws, and taking care for their common ſafety and welfare in the execution of them: For, the exerciſe of all juſt Authority over a free People, ought (under God) to ariſe from their own Conſent.

2. THAT the Government of a free People ought to be ſo ſettl'd, that the Governors and Govern'd may have the ſame Intereſt in preſerving the Government, and each others Properties and Liberties reſpectively; that being the only ſure foundation of a Common-wealth's Unity, Peace, Strength, and Proſperity.

3. THAT

3. THAT there cannot be a Union of the Intereſts of a whole Nation in the Government, where thoſe who ſhall ſometimes govern, be not alſo ſometimes in the condition of the Govern'd; otherwiſe the Governors will not be in a capacity to feel the weight of the Government, nor the Govern'd to enjoy the advantages of it: And then it will be the intereſt of the major part to deſtroy the Government, as much as it will be the intereſt of the minor part to preſerve it.

4. THAT there is no ſecurity that the Supreme Authority ſhall not fall into factions, and be led by their private Intereſt to keep themſelves always in power, and direct the Government to their private advantages, if that Supreme Authority be ſettl'd in any ſingle Aſſembly whatſoever, that ſhall have the intire power of propounding, debating and reſolving Laws.

5. THAT the Sovereign Authority in every Government, of what kind ſoever, ought to be certain in its perpetual Succeſſions, Revolutions, or Deſcents; and without poſſibility (by the judgment of human Prudence) of a death or failure of its being, becauſe the whole form of the Government is diſſolv'd if that ſhould happen, and the People in the utmoſt eminent danger of an abſolute Tyranny, or a War among themſelves, or Rapine and Confuſion. And therefore where the Government is Popular, the Aſſemblies in whom reſide the Supreme Authority, ought never to die or diſſolve, tho' the Perſons be annually changing: neither ought they to truſt the Sovereign care of the ſtrength and ſafety of the People out of their own hands, by allowing a Vacation to themſelves, leſt thoſe that ſhould be truſted be in love with ſuch great Authority, and aſpire to be their Maſters, or elſe fear an Account, and ſeek the diſſolution of the Common-wealth to avoid it.

6. THAT it ought to be declar'd as a Fundamental Order in the Conſtitution of this Common-wealth, that the Parliament being the Supreme Legiſlative Power, is intended only for the exerciſe of all thoſe Acts of Authority that are proper and peculiar to the Legiſlative Power; and to provide for a Magiſtracy, to whom ſhould appertain the whole Executive Power of the Laws: and no Caſe either Civil or Criminal to be judg'd in Parliament, ſaving that the laſt Appeals in all Caſes, where Appeals ſhall be thought fit to be admitted, be only to the Popular Aſſembly; and alſo that to them be refer'd the Judgment of all Magiſtrates in Caſes of Male-adminiſtrations in their Offices.

AND in proſecution of theſe Principles,

YOUR Petitioners humbly propoſe for the ſettlement of this Common-wealth, that it be ordain'd,

1. THAT the Parliament or the ſupreme Authority of *England*, be choſen by the free People, to repreſent them with as much equality as may be.

2. THAT a Parliament of *England* ſhall conſiſt of two Aſſemblies, the leſſer of about three hundred, in whom ſhall reſide the intire power of conſulting, debating, and propounding Laws: the other, to conſiſt of a far greater number, in whom ſhall reſt the ſole power of reſolving all Laws ſo propounded.

3. THAT

3. THAT the free People of *England*, in their reſpective diviſions at certain days and places appointed, ſhall for ever annually chooſe one third part to each Aſſembly, to enter into their Authority, at certain days appointed: the ſame days, the Authority of a third of each of the ſaid Aſſemblies to ceaſe, only in the laying the firſt Foundation in this Common-wealth's Conſtitution: the whole number of both the Aſſemblies to be choſen by the People reſpectively, *viz.* one third of each Aſſembly to be choſen for one year, one third for two years, and one third for three years.

4. THAT ſuch as ſhall be choſen, having ſerv'd their appointed time in either of the ſaid Aſſemblies of Parliament, ſhall not be capable to ſerve in the ſame Aſſembly during ſome convenient interval or vacation.

5. THAT the Legiſlative Power do wholly refer the execution of the Laws to the Magiſtracy, according to the ſixth Principle herein mention'd.

6. THAT in reſpect to Religion and Chriſtian Liberty, it be ordain'd that the Chriſtian Religion by the appointment of all ſucceeding Parliaments, be taught, and promulgated to the Nation, and public Preachers thereof maintain'd: and that all that ſhall profeſs the ſaid Religion, tho' of different Perſuaſions in parts of the Doctrine, or Diſcipline thereof, be equally protected in the peaceable profeſſion, and public exerciſe of the ſame; and be equally capable of all Elections, Magiſtracies, Preferments in the Common-wealth, according to the order of the ſame. Provided always, that the public exerciſe of no Religion contrary to Chriſtianity be tolerated; nor the public exerciſe of any Religion, tho' profeſſedly Chriſtian, grounded upon, or incorporated into the Intereſt of any Foreign State or Prince.

THESE your Petitioners humbly conceive to be the Eſſentials of the form of a free Common-wealth, which if they were made fit for practice by your Honours appointing the numbers, times, places, and all other neceſſary circumſtances, and ſettl'd as the fundamental Orders of the Common-wealth, would naturally diſpoſe thoſe that ſhould hereafter be choſen into the Parliaments, from the love of their own intereſt to ſeek the common good, being oblig'd by the Conſtitutions here humbly offer'd to partake with the whole body of the People, of the good or evil that ſhall happen to the Common-wealth, having no probable temptations or means left to compaſs any private or factious ends in matters Religious or Civil. And your Petitioners cannot imagine a greater ſecurity for the Cauſe and Intereſt contended for with ſuch effuſion of Blood, than by diſpoſing the free People into this kind of order, whereby the ſame Cauſe would become their common Intereſt. Yet if your Honours ſhould think it neceſſary or convenient for ſecuring the minds of ſuch as are doubtful and jealous, that the People may betray their own Liberties, there may be inſerted into the fundamental Orders of the Common-wealth, theſe following Expedients, *viz.*

1. THAT for ſecuring the Government of this Common-wealth, and of the Religious and Civil freedom of the good People thereof, it may be for ever eſteem'd and judg'd Treaſon againſt the Common-wealth, for any Member of either Aſſembly of Parliament, or any other perſon whatſoever, to move or propoſe in either of the ſaid Aſſemblies, the reſtitution of Kingly Government, or the introduction of any ſingle Perſon to be chief Magiſtrate of *England*, or the alteration of that part of the fundamental Order herein contain'd that concerns

concerns the equal Freedom and protection of Religious perſons of different Perſuaſions.

2. THAT about the number of twelve perſons of the moſt undoubted Fidelity and Integrity, may be authoriz'd and impower'd, for ſome certain number of years next enſuing, to ſeize, apprehend, and in ſafe cuſtody to detain any perſon or perſons whatſoever, till he or they be in due form of Law deliver'd, as is hereafter ſpecify'd, that ſhall move or propoſe in either of the ſaid Aſſemblies of Parliament the reſtitution of Kingly Government, or the introduction of any ſingle Perſon to be chief Magiſtrate of this Common-wealth, or the alteration of that part of the fundamental Order herein contain'd, that concerns the equal freedom and protection of religious perſons of different perſuaſions; but for no other matter or cauſe whatſoever. And when it ſhall happen that any perſon or perſons ſhall be arreſted or ſeiz'd for any of the cauſes aforeſaid, in manner aforeſaid, then a Commiſſion of Oyer and Terminer may iſſue forth in due form of Law to the ſaid twelve, or any ſix of them, to proceed in due form of Law, within one month after the apprehenſion of any ſuch perſon or perſons, to the arraignment and publick trial of every ſuch perſon or perſons; and upon the legal conviction of him or them by the teſtimony of two ſufficient Witneſſes of any of the Treaſons herein declar'd, to condemn to the pains of death, and to cauſe the ſame Judgment to be duly executed: and the Keeper or Keepers of the Great Seal of *England* that ſhall be for the time being, may be authoriz'd and requir'd from time to time during the term of years, to iſſue out Commiſſions to the ſaid twelve or any ſix of them, authorizing them to proceed as aforeſaid.

AND if your Honours ſhall further judge it convenient, the fundamental Orders of the Government may be conſented to or ſubſcrib'd by the People themſelves, if their expreſs Pact ſhall be eſteem'd any additional Security; other Nations, upon the like Occaſions of expulſion of their Kings, having taken the Peoples Oaths againſt their returning: And the ſame may be proclaim'd as often as our Anceſtors provided for the proclaiming of *Magna Charta*, and any further ſecurity alſo added, if any can be found among men, that has a foundation in Juſtice.

NOW your Petitioners, having, with humble Submiſſion to your grave Wiſdoms, thus declar'd their apprehenſions of the preſent condition of this diſtracted Nation, and the only effectual means under God to prevent the impending Miſchiefs; They do muſt humbly pray,

THAT ſuch ſpeedy conſiderations may be had of the Premiſes as the Condition of this Nation requires; and that ſuch a method may be ſettled for the debating and conſulting about the Government, that your wiſe Reſults may be ſeaſonable for the healing all the breaches of the Common-wealth, and eſtabliſhing the ſure foundations of Freedom, Juſtice, Peace, and Unity.

And your Petitioners ſhall always pray, &c.

Wedneſday *July* the 6*th* 1659.

THE Houſe being inform'd that divers Gentlemen were at the door with a Petition, they were call'd in, and one of the Petitioners in behalf of himſelf and the reſt ſaid, We humbly preſent you a Petition, to which we might have had many thouſand hands, but the Matter rather deſerves your ſerious Conſideration than any publick Atteſtation; and therefore we do humbly preſent it to this Honourable Houſe. Which, after the Petitioners were withdrawn, was read, and was intitl'd, *The humble Petition of divers well affected Perſons.*

Reſolv'd,

THAT the Petitioners have the Thanks of the Houſe.

THE Petitioners were again call'd in, and Mr. *Speaker* gave them this Anſwer.

Gentlemen,

THE Houſe has read over your Petition, and find it without any private end, and only for the publick Intereſt; and I am commanded to let you know that it lies much upon them to make ſuch a Settlement as may be moſt for the good of Poſterity; and they are about that work, and intend to go forward with it, with as much expedition as may be. And for your parts they have commanded me to give you thanks: and in their names I do give you the thanks of this Houſe accordingly.

Tho. St. Nicholas Clerk of the Parliament.

PLATO REDIVIVUS:

OR, A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

GOVERNMENT,

Wherein, by Obſervations drawn from other KINGDOMS and STATES both Antient and Modern, an Endeavour is uſed to diſcover the preſent POLITICK DISTEMPER of our OWN, with the CAUSES, and REMEDIES.

Non Ego ſum Vates, ſed Priſci conſcius ævi.
Pluribus exemplis hæc tibi Myſta Cano.
Res nolunt male adminiſtrari.

The Third Edition, with Additions.

THE PUBLISHER TO THE READER.

Courteous Reader,

ALL the Account I can give thee of this Piece is, that about the Middle of *October* laſt it was ſent to me, accompanied with a Letter without a Name, and written in a Hand altogether unknown to me, though different from the Character of the Dialogue it ſelf, and the Argument. The Letter was very ſhort, and contained only, that the Writer having the Fortune to meet with this Diſcourſe (of which he denied to be the Author) he thought it very fit to be ſent to me, to the end if I thought it could be of any Advantage to me, and no Prejudice, I might publiſh it if I pleaſed, and make my beſt of it. When I had opened it, and perceived that it treated of Government, and of the preſent Times; I ſuppoſing it to be ſomething of the Nature of thoſe ſcurrulous Libels which the Preſs ſpawns every Day, was extreamly diſpleaſed with my Servant, for receiving in my Abſence, and in theſe dangerous Days, ſuch a Pacquet, without taking any account or notice of the Meſſenger who brought it: 'till he, to appeaſe me, aſſured me, that the Bearer did look like a Gentleman, and had a very unſuitable Garb to a Trapan; and that he did believe he had ſeen him often at my Shop, and that I knew him well. When I had begun to read it, and found no harm, I was reſolved to peruſe it in the Company of a Gentleman, a worthy Friend of mine; who, to his exact Skill and Learning in the Laws of his Country, hath added a very profound Knowledge in all other Literature; and particularly, the Excellence of *Platonick* Philoſophy. When we had jointly gone through it, he was clearly of Opinion, That although ſome might be angry with certain paſſages in it, yet the Diſcourſe reflecting upon no

particular Perſon, was very uncapable of bringing me into any danger for publiſhing it; either from the State, or from any private Man. When I had ſecured my ſelf againſt *Damnum Emergens*, we went about the Conſideration of the other part of the diſtinction of the Schools, which is *Lucrum ceſſans*, and I made ſome Objections againſt the probability of vending this Dialogue to Profit; which, in things of my Trade, is always my deſign, as it ought to be. My firſt Fear in that behalf was, that this Author would diſguſt the Reader, in being too confident and poſitive in matters of ſo high a Speculation. My Friend replied, that the Aſſurance he ſhewed was void of all Sawcineſs, and expreſſed with great Modeſty; and that he verily believed that he meant very faithfully and ſincerely towards the Intereſt of *England*. My next doubt was, that a conſiderable part of this Treatiſe being a Repetition of a great many Principles and Poſitions out of *Oceana*, the Author would be diſcredited for borrowing from another, and the Sale of the Book hindred. To that my Friend made anſwer, that before ever *Oceana* came out, there were very many Treatiſes and Pamphlets, which alledged the Political Principle, *That Empire was founded in Property*, and diſcourſed rationally upon it: Amongſt the reſt, one entitled, *A Letter from an Officer in* Ireland, *to His Highneſs the Lord Protector*, (which he then ſhewed me) printed in 1653. as I remember; which was more than three Years before *Oceana* was written: and yet, ſaid he, no Man will aver that the Learned Gentleman who writ that Book had ſtolen from that Pamphlet. For whoſoever ſets himſelf to ſtudy Politicks, muſt do it by reading Hiſtory, and obſerving in it the ſeveral Turns and Revolutions of Government: and then the Cauſe of ſuch Change will be ſo viſible and obvious, that we need not impute Theft to any Man that finds it out: it being as lawful, and as eaſy for any Perſon, as well as for the *Author* of *Oceana*, or that Pamphlet, to read *Thucidides*, *Polybius*, *Livy* or *Plutarch*: and if he do ſo with Attentiveneſs, he ſhall be ſure to find the ſame things there that they have found. And if this were not Lawful, when that any one Perſon has written in any Science, no Man muſt write after

after him: for in *Polity*, the Orders of *Government*; in *Architecture*, the ſeveral Orders of *Pillars*, *Arches*, *Architraves*, *Corniſhes*, &c. In *Phyſick*, the *Cauſes*, *Prognoſticks* and *Criſis* of *Diſeaſes*, are ſo exactly the ſame in all Writers, that we may as well accuſe all ſubſequent Authors to have been but Plagiaries of the Antecedent. Beſides this, the Learned Gentleman added, that *Oceana* was written (it being thought Lawful ſo to do in thoſe times) to evince out of theſe Principles, that *England* was not capable of any other *Government* than a *Democracy*. And this Author out of the ſame Maxims, or Aphoriſms of Politicks, endeavours to prove that they may be applied naturally and fitly, to the redreſſing and ſupporting one of the beſt *Monarchies* in the *World*, which is that of *England*. I had but one Doubt more, and that was an Objection againſt the Title, which I reſolved at the firſt not to mention, becauſe I could ſalve it by altering the Title Page. But ſince I had Opportunity, I acquainted the Gentleman with it: And it was, That certainly no Man would ever buy a Book that had in Front of it ſo inſolent and preſumptuous a Motto as *Plato Redivivus*; for that he muſt needs be thought not only vain in the higheſt degree, but void of Senſe and Judgment too, who compares himſelf with *Plato*, the greateſt *Philoſopher*, the greateſt *Politician* (I had almoſt ſaid the greateſt *Divine* too) that ever lived. My *Counſellor* told me that he had as great a Reſentment of any Injury done to *Plato* as *I*, or any Man could have. But that he was hard to believe that this Man intended to compare himſelf to *Plato*, either in Natural Parts or Learning; but only to ſhew that he did imitate his Way of Writing, as to the manner of it; (though not the matter) as he hath done exactly. For *Plato* ever writ theſe high Matters in eaſy and familiar Dialogues, and made the great Philoſophers, and learned Men of that Age; as *Simias Cebes*, *Timæus*, *Callias*, *Phædon*, &c. yea and *Socrates* himſelf, the *Interlocutors*, although they never heard any thing of it till the Book came out. And although talking of *State* Affairs in a *Monarchy* muſt needs be more offenſive than it was in the *Democracy* where *Plato* lived. And therefore our Author has forborn the naming the

Perſons

Perſons who conſtitute this *Dialogue*; yet he does make a pretty near Repreſentation and Character of ſome Perſons, who, I dare ſwear never heard of this Diſcourſe, nor of the Author's Deſign. This convinced me, and made me ſuffer the Title to paſs. So that I have nothing more to ſay to thee, courteous Reader, but to deſire thee to pardon the Faults in Printing, and alſo the plainneſs and eaſineſs of the Stile, and ſome Tautologies; which latter I could eaſily have mended, but that I thought the Author did not let them paſs out of neglect, but deſign: and intended that both they, and the familiarity of the Words and Expreſſions, ſuited better with his purpoſe of diſpoſing this matter to be treated in ordinary Converſation amongſt private Friends, than full Periods and ſtarch'd Language would have done; which might have been Impropriety. The next Requeſt I have to thee is, that if thou doſt believe this Diſcourſe to be a very fooliſh one, as it may be for ought I know (for I am no fit Judge of ſuch matters) that thou wilt yet vouchſafe to ſuſpend thy Cenſure of it for a while, till the whole Impreſſion is vended: that ſo, although neither the Publick nor thy ſelf may ever reap any Benefit or Profit by it, I may be yet ſo fortunate by thy favour as to do it. Which will make me ſtudy thy Content hereafter in ſomething better; and in the mean time remain,

Thy Friend and Servant.

The Argument.

A Noble Venetian, *not one of the young Fry, but a grave ſober perſon who had born Office and Magiſtracy in his own Common-wealth, having been ſome years ſince in* France *with a near Relation of his who was Ambaſſador at that Court, and finding himſelf out of Employment, reſolved to divert himſelf by viſiting ſome part of the World which he had never ſeen; and ſo paſſing through* Germany, Flanders, *and* Holland, *arrived in* England *about the beginning of* May *laſt, bringing Letters of recommendation to ſeveral* Engliſh *Gentlemen, who had been Travellers, and made Friendſhip in his Country. A Cuſtom uſually practiſed amongſt ſuch who travel into any part where they have no habitude or acquaintance. Amongſt the reſt, he was addreſſed to one of the Gentlemen who acts a part in this Dialogue: Who after he had waited upon him, and ſerv'd him for near two Months, had certain neceſſary occaſions, which call'd him for ſome time into the Country. Where he had not been above three Weeks, before he heard, by meer accident, that the Gentleman of* Venice *was fallen dangerous ſick of a malignant Fever. Which made him poſt away immediately to* London, *to aſſiſt and ſerve him in what he might. But he found him almoſt perfectly reſtored to his health by an eminent Phyſician of our Nation, as renowned for his Skill and Cures at home; as for his Writings both here and abroad: And who beſides his profound knowledge in all Learning, as well in other Profeſſions as his own, had particularly arriv'd to ſo exact and perfect a diſcovery of the formerly hidden parts of human Bodies, that every one who can but underſtand Latin, may by his means know more of Anatomy than either* Hypocrates, *or any of the Ancients or Moderns did, or do perceive. And if he had lived in the days of* Solomon, *that great Philoſopher would never have ſaid,* Cor hominis inſcrutabile. *This excellent Doctor being in the ſick man's Chamber, when the other* Engliſh *Gentleman, newly alighted, came to viſit him. After ſome Compliments and Converſation of courſe, they begun to talk of Political Matters, as you will better underſtand by the Introduction, and by the Diſcourſe it ſelf.*

The FIRST DAY.

The INTRODUCTION.

Engliſh Gentleman.

THE ſudden news I had of your ſad diſtemper, and the danger you were in, has been the cauſe of a great deal of affliction to me, as well as of my preſent and ſpeedy repair to *London*, ſome weeks ſooner than I intended: I muſt confeſs I receiv'd ſome comfort to hear at my arrival of your amendment, and do take much more now to find you up, and as I hope recover'd; which I knew would be a neceſſary conſequence of your ſending for this excellent Phyſician, the *Eſculapius* of our age, it being the firſt requeſt I had to make to you, if by ſeeing him here in your Chamber I had not found it needleſs.

For the Deſtiny of us *Engliſh*-men depends upon him, and we either live or die Infallibly, according to the Judgement or good Fortune we have, when we are ſick, either to call or not call him to our aſſiſtance.

Noble Venetian. I am Infinitely obliged to you, for your care of me, but am ſorry it has been ſo inconvenient to you, as to make you leave your Affairs in the Country ſooner than you propoſed to your ſelf to do: I wiſh I might be ſo fortunate in the courſe of my Life, as to find an opportunity of making ſome part of an acknowledgement, for this and all the reſt of your favours, but ſhall pray God it may not be in the ſame kind; but that your health may ever be ſo entire, that you never need ſo tranſcendent a Charity, as I now receive from your Goodneſs: And as to this incomparable Doctor; although, I muſt confeſs, that all the good which has happen'd to me in this Country, as well as the knowledge I have receiv'd of Perſons and Things, does derive from you; yet I muſt make an exception, as to this one point; for if I can either read, or hear, this Gentleman's excellent Writings, and the Fame he worthily enjoys in my Country, would have made it inexcuſable in me, to implore the help of any other; and I do aſſure you, that, before I left *England*, it was in my Ambition to beg your Mediation towards the bringing me into the acquaintance and favour of this Leaned Perſon, even before I had any thoughts of becoming the Object of his Care and Skill, as now I am the Trophy of both.

Doctor. Well, Gentlemen, you are both too great to be Flatterers, and I too little to be flattered and therefore I will impute this fine diſcourſe you both make about me, to the overflowing of your Wit, and the having no Object near you to vent it upon but me. And for you, Sir, if my Art fail me not, the voiding this Mirth, is a very good ſign that you are in a fair way to a perfect recovery. And for my Countryman here: I hope whilſt he has this vent, that his Hypocondriack diſtemper will be at quiet, and that neither his own thoughts, nor the ill poſture of our Publick Affairs will make him hang himſelf, for at leaſt this twelve Months: only, Gentlemen, pray take notice, that this does not paſs upon me, nor do I drink it like Milk (as the *French* phraſe it) being mindful of what a grave Gentleman at *Florence* reply'd to a young Eſquire, who anſwer'd his Compliments with, *Oh, Sir, you flatter me, i prencipi s' adulano i pari voſtri ſi coglionono*; That laſt word I cannot render well into *Latin.*

Engliſh Gentleman. Well, Doctor, we will not offend your Modeſty: The next time we do you Juſtice, it ſhall be behind your back, ſince you are ſo ſevere upon us. But you may aſſure your ſelf that my intention of recommending you to this Gentleman, was for his own ſake, and not for yours: For you have too many Patients already, and it were much better, both for you and us, that you had but half ſo many: For then we ſhould have more of your Writings, and ſometimes enjoy your good Converſation; which is worth our being ſick on purpoſe for. And I am reſolved to put my ſelf ſometimes into my Bed, and ſend for you, ſince you have done coming to our Coffee-Houſe.

But to leave this Subject now, I hear you ſay, that this Gentleman is in a perfect way of recovery; pray is he well enough to hear, without

out any prejudice to his convaleſcence, a reprehenſion I have to make him?

Doct. Yes, yes; you may ſay what you will to him, for your Repremands will rather divert than trouble him, and prove more a Cordial than a Corroſive.

Eng. Gent. Then, Sir, pray conſider what ſatisfaction you can ever make me, for the hard meaſure you have uſed towards me, in letting me learn from common Fame, and Fortune, the news of your Sickneſs, and that not till your recovery; and for depriving me of the opportunity of paying the debt I owe to your own merit, and to the recommendation of thoſe worthy Perſons in *Italy*, who did me the honour to addreſs you to me. And this Injury is much aggravated by the ſplendor of your Condition, and greatneſs of your Fortune, which makes it impoſſible for me ever to hope for any other occaſion to expreſs my faithful ſervice to you, or ſatisfy any part of the duty I have to be at your devotion. To be ſick in a ſtrange Country, and to diſtruſt the ſincerity and obedience of——

Noble Ven. Pray, Sir, give me leave to interrupt you, and to aſſure you, that it was not any diſtruſt of your goodneſs to me, of which I have had ſufficient experience; nor any inſenſibleneſs how much your care might advantage me; much leſs any ſcruple I had of being more in your debt; which if it had been poſſible for me to entertain, it muſt have been thought of long ſince, before I had received thoſe great Obligations, which I never made any difficulty to accept of. It was not, I ſay, any of theſe Conſiderations, which hindred me from advertiſing you of my Diſtemper; but the Condition and Nature of it, which in a moment depriv'd me of the exerciſe of thoſe Faculties, which might give me a Capacity of helping myſelf in any thing. But otherwiſe I aſſure you that no day of my life ſhall paſs, wherein I will not expreſs a ſenſe of your Favours, and——

Doct. Pray now, Sir, permit me to interrupt you; for this Gentleman, I dare ſay, looks for no Compliments; but that which I have to ſay, is; That the deſire you ſignified to me, to give you ſome account of our Affairs here, and the turbulency of our preſent State, will be much better placed, if you pleaſe to addreſs it to this Gentleman, whoſe Parts and Studies have fitted him for ſuch an Employment; beſides his having had a great ſhare in the managing Affairs of State here, in other times: And really no man underſtands the Government of *England* better than he.

Eng. Gent. Now, Doctor, I ſhould tell you, *i pari miei ſi coglionono*, for ſo you your ſelf have baptized this kind of Civility; But however, this is a Province that I cannot be reaſonably preſt to take upon me, whilſt you are preſent, who are very well known to be as ſkilful in the Nature and Diſtemper of the Body Politick, as the whole Nation confeſſes you to be in the concerns of the Natural. And you would have good ſtore of Practice in your former Capacity, if the wiſe Cuſtom amongſt the Ancient *Greeks* were not totally out of uſe. For they, when they found any Crazineſs or indiſpoſition in their ſeveral Governments, before it broke out into a Diſeaſe, did repair to the Phyſicians of State (who, from their Profeſſion, were called the Seven Wiſe Men of *Greece*) and obtain'd from them ſome good *Recipes* to prevent thoſe ſeeds of diſtemper from taking root, and deſtroying the public Peace. But in our days, theſe Signs or Fore-runners of Diſeaſes in State are

not

not foreſeen, till the whole Maſs is corrupted, and that the Patient is incurable, but by violent Remedies. And if we could have perceived the firſt Symptoms of our Diſtemper, and uſed good Alteratives, the curioſity of this worthy Gentleman had been ſpared, as alſo his command to you, to give him ſome light into our matters; and we unfortunate *Engliſhmen* had repoſed in that quiet, eaſe, and ſecurity, which we enjoy'd three hundred years ſince. But let us leave the conteſt who ſhall inform this Gentleman, leſt we ſpend the time we ſhould do it in unprofitably, and let each of us take his part; for if one ſpeak all, it will look like a ſtudied diſcourſe fitted for the Preſs, and not a familiar Dialogue. For it ought to be in private Converſation, as it was originally in the planting the Goſpel, when there were two ſorts of preaching; the one Concionary, which was uſed by the Apoſtles and other Miſſionaries, when they ſpoke to thoſe who had never heard of the Myſteries of Chriſtian Religion, poſſibly not ſo much as of the Jewiſh Law, or the Hiſtory of Chriſt: The duty of thoſe was to hear, and not reply, or any way interrupt the harrangue: but when the Believers (called the Church) aſſembled together, it was the Cuſtom of ſuch of the Auditors, to whom any thing occurred, or (as S. *Paul* calls it) was revealed, to interpoſe and deſire to be heard, which was called an Interlocutory Preaching, or Religious Converſation; and ſerved very much to the inſtructing and edifying thoſe who had long believed in Chriſt, and poſſibly knew as much of him as their Paſtor himſelf; and this is uſed ſtill amongſt many of our Independent Congregations.

Doct. I have (beſides the reaſon I alledged before, and which I ſtill inſiſt upon) ſome other cauſe to beg that you will pleaſe to give your ſelf the trouble of anſwering this Gentleman's Queries; which is, that I am very defective in my Expreſſions in the *Italian* Language; which though I underſtand perfectly, and ſo comprehend all that either of you deliver, yet I find not words at hand to ſignify my own meaning, and am therefore neceſſitated to deliver my ſelf in Latin, as you ſee. And I fear that our pronunciation being ſo different from that which is uſed in *Italy*, this worthy perſon may not ſo eaſily comprehend what I intend, and ſo be diſappointed in the deſire he hath to be perfectly inſtructed in our Affairs.

Noble Ven. Really, Sir, that is not all; for beſides that, I confeſs your pronunciation of the Latin Tongue to be very new to me, and for that reaſon I have been forced to be troubleſome to you, in making you repeat things twice, or thrice. I ſay beſides that your Latinity, as your Writings ſhew, and all the world knows, is very pure and elegant, which it is notorious to all, that we in *Italy* ſcarce underſtand: Gentlemen there never Learning more Latin, than what is neceſſary to call for Meat and Drink, in *Germany* or *Holland*, where moſt of the Hoſts ſpeak a certain *Franck*, compounded of *Dutch*, *Latin*, and *Italian*. And though ſome of us have *Latin* enough to underſtand a good Author, (as you have of our Language) yet we ſeldom arrive to ſpeak any better than this *Franck*, or can without ſtudy comprehend good *Latin*, when we meet with it in diſcourſe. And therefore it is your perfection in that Tongue, and my ignorance in it, that makes me concur with you, in deſiring this Gentleman, to take the pains of inſtructing my Curioſity in *Italian*.

Eng. Gent.

Eng. Gent. I ſhall obey you in this, and all things elſe, upon this condition, that both you and the Doctor will vouchſafe to interrogate me, and by that means give me the Method of ſerving you in this: And then that you will both pleaſe to interrupt and contradict me, when you think I ſay any thing amiſs, or that either of you are of a different Opinion, and to give me a good occaſion of explaining my ſelf, and poſſibly of being convinced by you, which I ſhall eaſily confeſs; for I hate nothing more than to hear diſputes amongſt Gentlemen, and men of ſenſe, wherein the Speakers ſeem (like Sophiſters in a College) to diſpute rather for Victory, than to diſcover and find out the Truth.

Doct. Well, all this I believe will be granted you; ſo that we have nothing to do now, but to adjourn, and name a time when to meet again. Which I, being this Gentleman's Phyſician, will take upon me to appoint, and it ſhall be to morrow morning about nine of the Clock, after he has ſlept well, as I hope he will, by means of a Cordial I intended to ſend him immediately. In the mean time, not to weary him too much, we will take our leaves of him for this Night.

Noble Ven. I ſhall expect your return with great impatience, and if your Cordial be not very potent, I believe the deſire of ſeeing you will make me wake much ſooner than the hour you appoint. And I am very confident, that my mind as well as my body, will be ſufficiently improved by ſuch Viſits. It begins to be darkiſh, Boy, light your Torch, and wait on theſe Gentlemen down.

Both. Sir, we wiſh you all good reſt and health.

Noble Ven. And I, with a thouſand thanks, the like to you.

The SECOND DAY.

Doctor.

WEll, Sir, how is it? Have you reſted well to Night? I fear we come too early.

Noble Ven. Dear Doctor, I find my ſelf very well, thanks to your Care and skill, and have been up above theſe two hours, in expectation of the favour you and this Gentleman promis'd me.

Doct. Well, then pray let us leave off Compliments and Repartees, of which we had a great deal too much yeſterday, and fall to our buſineſs, and be pleas'd to interrogate this Gentleman what you think fit.

Noble Ven. Then Sir, my firſt requeſt to you, is, That you will vouchſafe to acquaint me for what Reaſons this Nation, which hath ever been eſteemed (and very juſtly) one of the moſt conſiderable People of the World, and made the beſt Figure both in Peace, Treaties, War and Trade, is now of ſo ſmall regard, and ſignifies ſo little abroad? Pardon the Freedom I take, for I aſſure you it is not out of diſreſpect, much leſs of contempt that I ſpeak it: For ſince I arrived in *England*, I find it one of the moſt flouriſhing Kingdoms in *Europe*, full of ſplendid Nobility and Gentry; the comlieſt perſons alive, Valiant, Courteous, Knowing and Bountiful; and as well ſtored with Commoners, Honeſt, Induſtrious, fitted for Buſineſs, Merchandiſe, Arts, or Arms; as their ſeveral Educations lead them. Thoſe who

apply themſelves to ſtudy, prodigious for Learning, and ſucceeding to admiration in the perfection of all Sciences: All this makes the Riddle impoſſible to be ſolved; but by ſome skillful *OEdipus*, ſuch as you are; whoſe pains I will yet ſo far ſpare, as to acknowledge, that I do in that little time I have ſpent here, perceive that the immediate cauſe of all this, is the Diſ-union of the People and the Governors; the Diſcontentment of the Gentry, and Turbulency of the Commonalty; although without all Violence or Tumult, which is Miraculous. So that what I now requeſt of you, is, That you will pleaſe to deduce particularly to me, the Cauſes of this Diviſion, that when they are laid open, I may proceed (if you think fit to permit it) from the Diſeaſe, when known, to enquire out the Remedies.

Eng. Gent. Before I come to make you any Anſwer, I muſt thank you for the Worthy and Honourable Character you give of our Nation, and ſhall add to it, That I do verily believe, that there are not a more Loyal and Faithful People to their Prince in the whole world, than ours are; nor that fear more to fall into that State of Confuſion, in which we were twenty years ſince; and that, not only this Parliament, which conſiſts of the moſt Eminent Men of the Kingdom, both for Eſtates and Parts; but all the Inhabitants of this Iſle in general; even thoſe (ſo many of them as have their underſtandings yet entire) which were of the Anti-royal Party, in our late Troubles, have all of them the greateſt horror imaginable, to think of doing any thing, that may bring this poor Country into thoſe Dangers and Uncertainties, which then did threaten our Ruin; and the rather for this Conſideration; that neither the Wiſdom of ſome, who were engaged in thoſe Affairs, which I muſt aver to have been very great, nor the Succeſs of their Conteſt, which ended in an abſolute Victory, could prevail, ſo as to give this Kingdom any advantage; nay, not ſo much as any ſettlement, in Satisfaction and Requital of all the Blood it had loſt, Money it had ſpent, and Hazard it had run. A clear Argument why we muſt totally exclude a Civil War from being any of the Remedies, when we come to that point. I muſt add further, That as we have as loyal ſubjects as are any where to be found, ſo we have as gracious and good a Prince: I never having yet heard that he did, or attempted to do, any the leaſt Act of Arbitrary Power, in any publick Concern; nor did ever take, or endeavour to take from any particular perſon the benefit of the Law. And for his only Brother (although accidentally he cannot be denied to be a great motive of the People's unquietneſs;) all men muſt acknowledge him to be a moſt Glorious and Honourable Prince, one who has expoſed his life ſeveral times for the Safety and Glory of this Nation; one who pays juſtly and punctually his Debts, and manages his own Fortune diſcreetly; and yet keeps the beſt Court and Equipage of any Subject in Chriſtendom; is Courteous and Affable to all; and in fine, has nothing in his whole Conduct to be excepted againſt, much leſs dreaded; excepting, that he is believed to be of a Religion contrary to the Honour of God, and the Safety and Intereſt of this People, which gives them juſt Apprehenſions of their Future Condition: But of this matter, we ſhall have occaſion to Speculate hereafter; in the mean time, ſince we have ſuch a Prince, and ſuch Subjects, we muſt needs want the ordinary cauſe of Diſtruſt and Diviſion, and therefore muſt ſeek higher to find out the Original of this turbulent poſture we are in.

Doct.

Doct. Truly you had need ſeek higher or lower to ſatisfy us, for hitherto you have but enforced the Gentleman's Queſtion, and made us more admire what the Solution will be.

Eng. Gent. Gentlemen, then I ſhall delay you no longer: The *Evil Counſellors*, the *Penſioner-Parliament*, the *Thorow-pac'd Judges*, the *Flattering Divines*, the *Buſy* and *Deſigning Papiſts*, the *French Counſels*, are not the *Cauſes* of our *Misfortunes*, they are but the *Effects* (as our preſent Diſtractions are) of one *Primary Cauſe*; which is *the Breach and Ruin of our Government*; which having been decaying for near two hundred years, is in our Age brought ſo near to Expiration, that it lies agonizing, and can no longer perform the Functions of a *Political* Life, nor carry on the work of Ordering and Preſerving Mankind: So that the Shifts that our *Courtiers* have within ſome years uſed, are but ſo many Tricks, or Concluſions which they are trying to hold Life and Soul together a while longer; and have played Handy-Dandy with *Parliaments*, and eſpecially with the *Houſe of Commons*, (the only part which is now left entire of the old Conſtitution) by *Adjourning*, and *Proroguing*, and *Diſſolving* them (contrary to the true meaning of the *Law*) as well in the Reign of our *late King*, as during his *Majeſty's* that *now is*. Whereas indeed our *Counſellors* (perceiving they decay of the *Foundation*, as they muſt, if they can ſee but one Inch into the *Politicks*) ought to have Addreſt themſelves to the *King* to call a *Parliament*, the true Phyſician, and to lay open the Diſtemper there, and ſo have endeavour'd a Cure, before it had been too late, as I fear it now is: I mean the piecing and patching up the Old Government. It is true, as the Divine *Machiavil* ſays, That Diſeaſes in Government are like a *Maraſmus* in the Body Natural, which is very hard to be diſcovered whilſt it is Curable; and after it comes to be eaſy to diſcern, difficult if not impoſſible to be remedy'd; yet it is to be ſuppoſed that the *Counſellors* are, or ought to be skilful Phyſicians, and to foreſee the Seeds of State-Diſtempers, time enough to prevent the Death of the Patient; elſe they ought in Conſcience to excuſe themſelves from that ſublime Employment, and betake themſelves to Callings more ſuitable to their Capacities. So that although for this Reaſon the *Miniſters of State* here are inexcuſable, and deſerve all the Fury which muſt one time or other be let looſe againſt them, (except they ſhall ſuddenly fly from the wrath to come, by finding out in time, and adviſing the true means of ſetting themſelves to rights) yet neither *Prince* nor *People* are in the mean time to be blamed for not being able to Conduct things better. No more than the Waggoner is to anſwer for his ill guiding, or the Oxen for their ill drawing the Waggon, when it is with Age and ill uſage broken, and the Wheels unſerviceable: Or the Pilot and Mariners, for not weathering out a Storm, when the Ship hath ſprung a planck. And as in the body of Man, ſometimes the Head and all the Members are in good Order, nay, the Vital Parts are ſound and entire; yet if there be a Conſiderable Putrefaction in the humours, much more, if the Blood (which the Scripture calls the life) be impure and Corrupted; the Patient ceaſes not to be in great Danger, and oftentimes dies without ſome skillful Phyſician: And in the mean time the Head and all the parts ſuffer, and are unquiet, full as much, as if they were all immediately affected. So it is in every reſpect with the Body Politick, or Common-wealth, when their Foundations are moulder'd:

der'd: And although in both theſe Caſes, the Patients cannot (though the Diſtemper be in their own Bodies) know what they ail, but are forced to ſend for ſome Artiſt to tell them; yet they ceaſe not to be extremely uneaſy and impatient, and lay hold oftentimes upon unſuitable Remedies, and impute their Malady to wrong and ridiculous Cauſes. As ſome people do here, who think that *the growth of Popery* is our only Evil, and that if we were ſecure againſt that, our Peace and Settlement were obtain'd, and that our Diſeaſe needed no other Cure. But of this more when we come to the Cure.

Noble Ven. Againſt this Diſcourſe, certainly we have nothing to reply: but muſt grant, that when any Government is decay'd, it muſt be mended, or all will Ruin. But now we muſt Requeſt you to declare to us, how the Government of *England* is decay'd, and how it comes to be ſo. For I am one of thoſe Unſkilful Perſons, that cannot diſcern a State *Maraſmus*, when the danger is ſo far off.

Eng. Gent. Then no man living can: for your Government is this day the only School in the World, that breeds ſuch Phyſicians, and you are eſteemed one of the ableſt amongſt them: And it would be manifeſt to all the World for Truth; although there were no argument for it, but the admirable Stability and Durableneſs of your Government, which hath laſted above twelve hundred years entire and perfect; whilſt all the reſt of the Countries in *Europe*, have not only changed Maſters very frequently in a quarter of that time, but have varied and altered their Polities very often. Which manifeſts that you muſt needs have ever enjoy'd a Succeſſion of wiſe Citizens, that have had ſkill and Ability to forewarn you betimes of thoſe Rocks againſt which your excellently built Veſſels might in time ſplit.

Noble Ven. Sir, you over-value, not only me, but the Wiſdom of my Fellow Citizens; for we have none of theſe high Speculations, nor hath ſcarce any of our Body read *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, or *Cicero*, or any of thoſe great Artiſts, Ancient or Modern, who teach that great Science of the Governing and Increaſing great States and Cities; without ſtudying which Science no man can be fit to diſcourſe pertinently of theſe matters; much leſs to ſound or mend a Government, or ſo much as find the defects of it. We only ſtudy our own Government, and that too chiefly to be fit for advantagious Employments, rather than to foreſee our dangers. Which yet I muſt needs confeſs ſome amongſt us are pretty good at, and will in a Harangue made upon paſſing a Law, venture to tell us what will be the Conſequence of it two hundred years hence. But of theſe things I ſhall be very prodigal in my diſcourſe, when you have Leiſure and Patience to command me to ſay any thing of our Polity; in the mean time pray be pleaſed to go on with your edifying Inſtruction.

Eng. Gent. Before I can tell you how the Government of *England* came to be decayed, I muſt tell you what that Government was, and what it now is: And I ſhould ſay ſomething too of Government in General, but that I am afraid of talking of that Subject, before you who are ſo exact a Judge of it.

Noble Ven. I thought you had been pleaſed to have done with this Diſcourſe, I aſſure you, Sir, if I had more ſkill in that matter than ever I can pretend to, it would but ſerve to make me the fitter Auditor of what you ſhall ſay on that Subject.

Eng. Gent.

Eng. Gent. Sir, in the Courſe of my Reaſoning upon this Point, I ſhall have occaſion to inſiſt and expatiate upon many things, which both my ſelf and others have Publiſh'd in former times. For which I will only make this excuſe, that the Repetition of ſuch matters is the more pardonable, becauſe they will be at leaſt new to you, who are a ſtranger to our Affairs and Writings. And the rather becauſe thoſe diſcourſes ſhall be apply'd to our preſent condition, and ſuited to our preſent occaſions. But I will ſay no more, but obey you, and proceed. I will not take upon me to ſay, or ſo much as Conjecture, how and when Government began in the World, or what Government is moſt Ancient: Hiſtory muſt needs be ſilent in that point, for that Government is more Ancient than Hiſtory. And there was never any Writer, but was bred under ſome Government, which is neceſſarily ſuppoſed to be the Parent of all Arts and Sciences, and to have produced them. And therefore it would be as hard for a man to write an account of the beginning of the Laws and Polity of any Country, except there were memory of it, (which cannot be before the firſt Hiſtoriographer) as it would be to any perſon without Records to tell the particular Hiſtory of his own Earth.

Doct. Sir, I cannot comprehend you, may not Hiſtorians write a Hiſtory of Matters done before they were born? If it were ſo; no man could write but of his own Times.

Eng. Gent. My meaning is, where there are not Stories, or Records, extant; for as for Oral Tradition, it laſts but for one Age, and then degenerates into Fable: I call any thing in Writing, whereby the account of the Paſſages or Occurrences of former times is deriv'd to our knowledge, a Hiſtory, although it be not pen'd Methodically, ſo as to make the Author paſs for a Wit: And had rather read the Authentick Records of any Country, that is a Collection of their Laws and Letters concerning Tranſactions of State, and the like, than the moſt Eloquent and Judicious Narrative that can be made.

Noble Ven. Methinks, Sir, your diſcourſe ſeems to imply, that we have no account extant of the beginning of Governments; pray what do you think of the Books of *Moſes*, which ſeem to be pen'd on purpoſe to inform us how he, by God's Command, led that People out of *Egypt* into another Land, and in the way made them a Government? Beſides, does not *Plutarch* tell us, how *Theſeus* gathered together the diſperſed Inhabitants of *Attica*, brought them into one City, and under one Government of his own making? The like did *Romulus* in *Italy*, and many others in divers Countries.

Eng. Gent. I never ſaid that we had not ſufficient knowledge of the Original of particular Governments; but it is evident, that theſe great Legiſlators had ſeen, and lived under other Adminiſtrations, and had the help of learned Law-givers and Philoſophers, excepting the firſt who had the Aid of God himſelf. So that it remains undiſcovered yet, how the firſt Regulation of mankind began: And therefore I will take for granted that which all the Politicians conclude: Which is, That Neceſſity made the firſt Government. For every man by the firſt Law of Nature (which is common to us and brutes) had, like Beaſts in a Paſture, right to every thing, and there being no Property, each Individual, if he were the ſtronger, might ſeize whatever any other had poſſeſſed himſelf of before, which made a State of perpetual War. To Remedy which, and the fear that nothing ſhould be long enjoyed by any particular perſon (neither was any man's Life in ſafety) every man conſented to be debar'd of that Univerſal Right to all things,

and confine himſelf to a quiet and ſecure enjoyment of ſuch a part as ſhould be allotted him: Thence came in Ownerſhip, or Property; to maintain which it was neceſſary to conſent to Laws, and a Government to put them in execution. Which of the Governments now extant, or that have been formerly, was firſt, is not poſſible now to be known; but I think this muſt be taken for granted, that whatſoever the Frame or Conſtitution was firſt, it was made by the Perſuaſion and Meditation of ſome Wiſe and virtuous Perſon, and conſented to by the whole Number. And then, that it was inſtituted for the good and Preſervation of the Governed, and not for the Exaltation and greatneſs of the Perſon or Perſons appointed to Govern: The Reaſon why I beg this Conceſſion is, That it ſeems very improbable, not to ſay impoſſible, that a vaſt number of People ſhould ever be brought to conſent to put themſelves under the Power of others, but for the ends aboveſaid, and ſo loſe their Liberty without advantaging themſelves in any thing. And it is full as impoſſible that any perſon (or perſons ſo inconſiderable in number as Magiſtrates and Rulers are) ſhould by force get an Empire to themſelves. Though I am not ignorant that a whole people have in imminent Dangers, either from the Invaſion of a powerful Enemy, or from Civil Diſtractions, put themſelves wholly into the hands of one Illuſtrious Perſon for a time, and that with good Succeſs, under the beſt Forms of Government: But this is nothing to the Original of States.

Noble Ven. Sir, I wonder how you come to paſs over the Conſideration of Paternal Government, which is held to have been the beginning of Monarchies?

Eng. Gen. Really I did not think it worth the taking notice of, for though it be not eaſy to prove a Negative, yet I believe if we could trace all foundations of Polities that now are, or ever came to our knowledge ſince the World began; we ſhall find none of them to have deſcended from Paternal Power; we know nothing of *Adam's* leaving the Empire to *Cain*, or *Seth:* It was impoſſible for *Noah* to retain any Juriſdiction over his own three Sons; who were diſperſed into three parts of the World, if our Antiquaries Calculate right; and as for *Abraham*, whilſt he liv'd, as alſo his Son *Iſaac*, they were but ordinary Fathers of Families, and no queſtion govern'd their own Houſhold as all others do; but when *Jacob* upon his Death-bed did relate to his Children, the Promiſe Almighty God had made his Grandfather, to make him a great Nation, and give his Poſterity a fruitful Territory, he ſpeaks not one word of the Empire of *Reuben* his firſt-born, but ſuppoſes them all equal: And ſo they were taken to be by *Moſes*, when he divided the Land to them by Lot; and by Gods command made them a *Common-wealth*. So that I believe this fancy to have been firſt ſtarted, not by the ſolid Judgment of any man, but to flatter ſome Prince, and to aſſert, for want of better Arguments, the *jus Divinum* of Monarchy.

Noble Ven. I have been impertinent in interrupting you, but yet, now I cannot repent of it, ſince your Anſwer hath given me ſo much ſatisfaction; but if it be ſo as you ſay, that Government was at firſt Inſtituted for the Intereſt and Preſervation of Mankind, how comes it to paſs, That there are and have been ſo many abſolute Monarchies in the World, in which it ſeems that nothing is provided for, but the Greatneſs and Power of the Prince.

Eng.

Eng. Gent. I have preſumed to give you already my Reaſon, why I take for granted, that ſuch a Power could never be given by the conſent of any People, for a perpetuity; for though the People of *Iſrael* did againſt the will of *Samuel*, and indeed of God himſelf demand, and afterwards choſe themſelves a King; yet he was never ſuch a King as we ſpeak of; for that all the Orders of their Commonwealth, the Sanhedrim, the Congregation of the People, the Princes of the Tribes, *&c.* did ſtill remain in being, as hath been excellently proved by a learned Gentleman of our Nation, to whom I refer you; it may then be enquired into, how theſe Monarchies at firſt did ariſe. Hiſtory being in this point ſilent, as to the Antient Principalities, we will Conjecture, that ſome of them might very well proceed from the Corruption of better Governments, which muſt neceſſarily cauſe a Depravation in manners (as nothing is more certain than that Politick defects breed Moral ones, as our Nation is a pregnant Example) this Debauchery of manners might blind the underſtandings of a great many, deſtroy the Fortunes of others, and make them indigent, infuſe into very many a neglect and careleſneſs of the publick good, (which in all ſettled States is very much regarded) ſo that it might eaſily come into the Ambition of ſome bold aſpiring Perſon to affect Empire, and as eaſily into his Power, by fair pretences with ſome, and promiſes of advantages with others, to procure Followers, and gain a numerous Party, either to Uſurp Tyranny over his own Country, or to lead men forth to Conquer and Subdue another. Thus it is ſuppoſed that *Nimrod* got his Kingdom; who in Scripture is called a Great Hunter before God, which Expoſitors interpret, A great Tyrant. The Modern Deſpotical Powers have been acquired by one of theſe two ways, either by pretending by the firſt Founder thereof, that he had a Divine Miſſion and ſo gaining not only Followers, but even eaſy Acceſs in ſome places without Force to Empire, and afterwards dilateing their Power by great Conqueſt. Thus *Mahomet* and *Cingis Can* began, and eſtabliſhed the *Sarazan* and *Tartarian* Kingdoms; or by a long Series of Wiſdom in a Prince, or chief Magiſtrate of a mixt Monarchy, and his Council, who by reaſon of the Sleepineſs and Inadvertency of the People, have been able to extinguiſh the great Nobility, or render them Inconſiderable; and ſo by degrees taking away from the People their Protectors, render them Slaves. So the Monarchies of *France*, and ſome other Countries, have grown to what they are at this day; there being left but a Shadow of the three States in any of theſe Monarchies, and ſo no bounds remaining to the Regal Power; but ſince Property remains ſtill to the Subjects, theſe Govrnments, may be ſaid to be changed, but not founded or eſtabliſhed; for there is no Maxim more Infallible and Holding in any Science, than this is in the Politicks, *That Empire is founded in Property.* Force or Fraud may alter a Government; but it is Property that muſt Found and Eterniſe it: Upon this undeniable *Aphoriſm* we are to build moſt of our ſubſequent Reaſoning, in the mean time we may ſuppoſe, that hereafter the great power of the *King* of *France* may diminiſh much, when his enraged and oppreſſed Subjects come to be commanded by a Prince of leſs Courage, Wiſdom, and Military Virtue, when it will be very hard for any ſuch King to Govern Tyrannically a Country which is not entirely his own.

Doct.

Doct. Pray, Sir, give me leave to aſk you by the way, what is the Reaſon that here in our Country, where the Peerage is leſſened ſufficiently, the King has not gotten as great an Addition of Power as accrews to the Crown in *France?*

Eng. Gent. You will underſtand that, Doctor, before I have finiſhed this diſcourſe; but to ſtay your Stomach till then, you may pleaſe to know that in *France* the greatneſs of the Nobility which has been lately taken from them, did not conſiſt in vaſt Riches and Revenues, but in great Priviledges, and Juriſdictions, which obliged the People to obey them; whereas our great Peers in former times had not only the ſame great Dependences, but very Conſiderable Revenues beſides, in Demeſnes, and otherwiſe: This Vaſſallage over the People, which the Peers of *France* had, being aboliſh'd, the Power over thoſe Tenants, which before was in their Lords, fell naturally and of courſe into the Crown, although the Lands and poſſeſſions diveſted of thoſe Dependences did and do ſtill remain to the Owners; whereas here in *England*, though the Services are for the moſt part worn out, and inſignificant; yet for want of Providence and Policy in former Kings, who could not foreſee the danger a far off, Entails have been ſuffered to be cut off; and ſo two parts in ten of all thoſe vaſt Eſtates, as well Mannors as Demeſnes, by the Luxury and Folly of the Owners, have been within theſe two hundred years purchaſed by the leſſer Gentry and the Commons; which has been ſo far from advantaging the Crown, that it has made the Country ſcarce governable by Monarchy: But if you pleaſe, I will go on with my diſcourſe about Government, and come to this again hereafter?

Noble Ven. I beſeech you, Sir, do.

Eng. Gent. I cannot find by the ſmall reading I have, that there were any other Governments in the World Anciently than theſe three, *Monarchy*, *Ariſtocracy*, and *Democracy*. For the firſt, I have no light out of Antiquity to convince me, that there were in old times any other *Monarchies*, but ſuch as were abſolutely *Deſpotical*; all Kingdoms then, as well in *Greece* (as *Macedon*, *Epirus*, and the like; and where it is ſaid, the Princes exerciſed their Power moderately) as in *Aſia*, being altogether unlimited by any Laws, or any Aſſemblies of Nobility or People. Yet I muſt confeſs, *Ariſtotle*, when he reckons up the Corruptions of theſe three Governments, calls Tyranny the Corruption of Monarchy; which if he means a Change of Government, (as it is in the Corruptions of the other two) then it muſt follow, that the Philoſopher knew of ſome other Monarchy at the firſt, which afterwards degenerated into Tyranny, that is, into Arbitrary Power; for ſo the Word Tyranny is moſt commonly taken, though in modern Languages it ſignifies the ill Exerciſe of Power; for certainly Arbitrary Government cannot be called Tyranny, where the whole Property is in the Prince (as we reaſonably ſuppoſe it to have been in thoſe Monarchies) no more than it is Tyranny for you to govern your own Houſe and Eſtate as you pleaſe: But it is poſſible *Ariſtotle* might not in this ſpeak ſo according to Terms of Art, but might mean, that the ill Government of a Kingdom or Family is Tyranny. However we have one Example, that puzzles Politicians, and that is *Egypt*, where *Pharaoh* is called King; and yet we ſee, that till *Joſeph*'s time he had not the whole Property; for the Wiſdom of that Patriarch taught his Maſter away to make a new uſe of that Famine, by telling him, that

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if they would buy their Lives, and ſell their Eſtates (as they did afterwards, and preſerve themſelves by the King's Bread) they ſhall ſerve *Pharaoh*; which ſhews that *Joſeph* knew well, that *Empire was founded in Property*: But moſt of the Modern Writers in Polity, are of Opinion, that *Egypt* was not a Monarchy till then, though the Prince might have the Title of King, as the *Heraclides* had in *Sparta*, and *Romulus* and the other Kings had in *Rome*; both which *States* were inſtituted *Common-wealths*. They give good Conjectures for this their Opinion, too many to be here mentioned; only one is, That Originally (as they go about to prove) all Arts and Sciences had their Riſe in *Egypt*, which they think very improbable to have been under a Monarchy. But this Poſition, That all Kings in former times were abſolute, is not ſo Eſſential to the intent I have in this Diſcourſe, which is to prove, That in all States, of what kind ſoever, this Aphoriſm takes place: *Imperium fundatur in Dominio.* So that if there were mixed Monarchies, then the King had not all the Property; but thoſe who ſhared with him in the Adminiſtration of the Sovereignty, had their part, whether it were the Senate, the People, or both; or if he had no Companions in the Sovereign Power, he had no Sharers likewiſe in the Dominion or Poſſeſſion of the Land. For that is all we mean by Property, in all this Diſcourſe; for as for Perſonal Eſtate, the Subjects may enjoy it in the largeſt Proportion, without being able to invade the Empire: The Prince may when he pleaſes take away their Goods, by his Tenants and Vaſſals (without an Army) which are his Ordinary Force, and anſwers to our *Poſſe Comitatus.* But the Subjects with their Money cannot invade his Crown. So that all the Deſcription we need make of this Kind or Form of Government, is, That the whole poſſeſſion of the Country, and the whole power lies in the Hands and Breaſt of one man; he can make Laws, break and repeal them when he pleaſes, or diſpenſe with them in the mean time when he thinks fit; interpoſe in all Judicatories, in behalf of his *Favourites*, take away any particular man's perſonal Eſtate, and his Life too, without the formality of a Criminal Proceſs, or Trial; ſend a Dagger, or a Halter to his chief Miniſters, and command them to make themſelves away; and in fine, do all that his Will or his Intereſt ſuggeſts to him.

Doct. You have dwelt long here upon an Argumentation, That the Ancients had no Monarchies, but what were Arbitrary.

Eng. Gent. Pray give me leave to ſave your Objections to that point, and to aſſure you firſt, That I will not take upon me to be ſo poſitive in that; for that I cannot pretend to have read all the Hiſtorians and Antiquaries that ever writ; nor have I ſo perfect a memory as to remember, or make uſe of, in a Verbal and Tranſient Reaſoning, all that I have ever read; And then to aſſure you again, that I build nothing upon that Aſſertion, and ſo your Objection will be needleſs, and only take up time.

Doct. You miſtake me, I had no intent to uſe any Argument or Example againſt your Opinion in that; but am very willing to believe that it may be ſo. What I was going to ſay was this, that you have inſiſted much upon the point of Monarchy, and made a ſtrange deſcription of it, whereas many of the Ancients, and almoſt all the Modern Writers, magnify it to be the beſt of Governments.

Eng. Gent. I have ſaid nothing to the contrary. I have told you *de facto* what it is, which I believe none will deny. The Philoſopher ſaid it was the beſt Government; but with this reſtriction, *ubi Philoſophi regnant*, and they had an Example of it, in ſome few *Roman* Emperors; but in the moſt turbulent times of the Common-wealth, and Factions between the Nobility and the People, *Rome* was much more full of Virtuous and Heroick Citizens, than ever it was under *Aurelius* or *Antonius*: For the Moderns that are of that Judgement, they are moſt of them Divines, not Politicians, and ſomething may be ſaid in their behalf, when by their good Preaching, they can infuſe into their imaginary Prince (who ſeems already to have an Image of the Power of God) the Juſtice, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs too of the Deity.

Noble Ven. We are well ſatisfied with the Progreſs you have hitherto made in this matter; pray go on to the two other Forms uſed amongſt the Ancients, and their Corruptions, that ſo we may come to the Modern Governments, and ſee how *England* ſtands, and how it came to decay, and what muſt Rebuild it.

Eng. Gent. You have very good Reaſon to haſten me to that; for indeed, all that has been ſaid yet, is but as it were a Preliminary diſcourſe to the knowledge of the Government of *England*, and its decay: when it comes to the Cure, I hope you will both help me, for both your ſelf and the Doctor are a thouſand times better than I at Remedies. But I ſhall diſpatch the other two Governments. *Ariſtocracy*, or *Optimacy*, is a Common-wealth, where the better ſort, that is, the Eminent and Rich men, have the chief Adminiſtration of the Government: I ſay, the chief, becauſe there are very few ancient *Optimacies*, but the People had ſome ſhare, as in *Sparta*, where they had power to Vote, but not Debate; for ſo the Oracle of *Apollo*, brought by *Lycurgus* from *Delphos*, ſettles it; But the truth is, theſe people were the natural *Spartans*. For *Lycurgus* divided the Country or Territory of *Laconia* into 39000 Shares; whereof nine Thouſand only of theſe Owners were Inhabitants of *Sparta*; the reſt lived in the Country: ſo that although *Thucidides* call it an Ariſtocracy, and ſo I follow him, yet it was none of thoſe Ariſtocracies uſually deſcribed by the Politicians, where the Lands of the Territory were in a great deal fewer hands. But call it what you will, where ever there was an Ariſtocracy, there the Property, or very much the Over-balance of it, was in the hands of the *Ariſtoi*, or Governors, be they more or fewer; for if the People have the greateſt intereſt in the Property, they will, and muſt have it in the Empire: A notable example of it is *Rome*, the beſt and moſt glorious Government that ever the Sun ſaw; where the Lands being equally divided among the Tribes that is the People; it was impoſſible for the *Patricii* to keep them quiet, till they yielded to their deſires, not only to have their *Tribunes*, to ſee that nothing paſſed into a Law without their conſent, but alſo to have it declared, that both the *Conſuls* ſhould not only be choſen by the People (as they ever were, and the Kings too before them) but that they might be elected too, when the People pleaſed, out of *Plebeian* Families. So that now I am come to *Democracy*. Which you ſee is a Government where the chief part of the Sovereign Power, and the exerciſe of it, reſides in the *People*; and where the Style is, *Juſſu populi authoritate patrum*. And it doth conſiſt of three fundamental Orders.

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The Senate propoſing, the People reſolving, and the Magiſtrates executing. This Government is much more Powerful than an *Ariſtocracy*, becauſe the latter cannot arm the People, for fear they ſhoule ſeize upon the Government, and therefore are fain to make uſe of none but Strangers and Mercinaries for Soldiers; which, as the Divine *Machiavel* ſays, has hindred your Common-wealth of *Venice* from mounting up to Heaven, whither thoſe incomparable Orders, and that venerable Wiſdom uſed by your Citizens in keeping to them, would have carried you, if in all your Wars you had not been ill ſerved.

Doct. Well, Sir, pray let me aſk you one thing concerning *Venice*: How do you make out your *Imperium fundatur in dominio* there? Have the Gentlemen there, who are the Party governing, the poſſeſſion of the whole Territory? Does not property remain entire to the Gentlemen, and other Inhabitants in the ſeveral Countries of *Padua*, *Breſcia*, *Vicenza*, *Verona*, *Bergamo*, *Creman*, *Treviſi*, and *Friuli*, as alſo in the *Ultramarine* Provinces, and *Iſlands*? And yet I believe you will not deny, but that the Government of *Venice* is as well founded, and hath been of as long continuance as any that now is, or ever was in the World.

Eng. Gent. Doctor, I ſhall not anſwer you in this, becauſe I am ſure it will be better done by this Gentleman, who is a worthy Son of that honourable Mother.

Noble Ven. I thought you had ſaid, Sir, that we ſhould have done complimenting; but ſince you do command me to clear the Objection made by our learned Doctor, I ſhall preſume to tell you, firſt how our City began. The *Goths*, *Huns*, and *Lombards* coming with all the Violence and Cruelty imaginable, to invade that part of *Italy* which we now call *Terra firma*, and where our Anceſtors did then inhabit, forced them in great numbers to ſeek a ſhelter amongſt a great many little Rocks or *Iſlands*, which ſtood very thick in a vaſt Lake, or rather Marſh, which is made by the *Adriatick* Sea, we call it *Laguna*; here they began to build, and getting Boats, made themſelves Proviſions of all kind from the Land; from whence innumerable people began to come to them, finding that they could ſubſiſt, and that the barbarous people had no Boats to attack them, nor that they could be invaded either by Horſe or Foot without them. Our firſt Government, and which laſted for many years, was no more than what is practiſed in many Country Pariſhes in *Italy*, and poſſibly here too, where the Clerk, or any other perſon, calls together the chief of the Inhabitants to conſider of Pariſh-buſineſs, as chooſing of Officers, making of Rates, and the like. So in *Venice*, when there was any publick proviſion to be made by way of law, or otherwiſe, ſome Officers went about to perſons of the greateſt Wealth and Credit, to intreat them to meet and conſult; from whence our Senate is called to this day *Conſiglio de pregadi*, which in our barbarous Idiom is as much as *Pregati* in *Tuſcan* Language: Our ſecurity increaſed daily, and ſo by conſequence our Number and our Riches; for by this time there began to be another inundation of *Sarazens* upon *Aſia* Minor, which forced a great many of the poor people of *Greece* to fly to us for protection, giving us the poſſeſſion of ſome Iſlands, and other places upon the Continent: This opened us a Trade, and gave a beginning to our greatneſs; but chiefly made us conſider what Government was fitteſt to conſerve ourſelves, and keep our Wealth (for we did not then much dream of Conqueſts,

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elſe without doubt we muſt have made a popular Government) we pitcht upon an *Ariſtocracy*, by ordering that thoſe who had been call'd to Council for that preſent year, and for four years before, ſhould have the Government in their hands, and all their Poſterity after them for ever; which made firſt the diſtinction between Gentlemen and Citizens; the People, who conſiſted of divers Nations, moſt of them newly come to inhabit there, and generally ſeeking nothing but ſafety and eaſe, willingly conſented to this change, and ſo this *State* hath continued to this day; though the ſeveral Orders and Counſels have been brought in ſince, by degrees, as our Nobility encreaſed, and for other cauſes. Under this Government we have made ſome Conqueſts in *Italy*, and *Greece*, for our City ſtood like a Wall between the two great Torrents of *Goths* and *Sarazens*; and as either of their Empires declin'd, it was eaſy for us, without being very Warlike, to pick up ſome pieces of each ſide; as for the Government of theſe Conqueſts, we did not think fit to divide the Land amongſt our Nobility, for fear of envy, and the effects of it: much leſs did we think it adviſeable to plant Colonies of our People, which would have given the Power into their hands, but we thought it the beſt way for our Government to leave the People their Property, tax them what we thought fit, and keep them under by Governors and Citadels, and ſo in ſhort make them a Province. So that now the Doctors Riddle is ſolved; for I ſuppoſe this Gentleman did not mean that his Maxim ſhould reach to Provincial Governments.

Eng. Gent. No, Sir, ſo far from that, that it is juſt contrary; for as in National or Domeſtick Government, where a Nation is Governed either by its own People or its own Prince, there can be no ſettled Government, except they have the Rule who poſſeſs the Country. So in Provincial Governments, if they be wiſely order'd, no man muſt have any the leaſt ſhare in the managing Affairs of State, but ſtrangers, or ſuch as have no ſhare or part in the poſſeſſions there, for elſe they will have a very good opportunity of ſhaking off their Yoak.

Doct. That is true; and we are ſo wiſe here (I mean our Anceſtors were) as to have made a Law, That no Native in *Ireland* can be *Deputy* there: But, Sir, being fully ſatisfied in my demand, by this Gentleman; I beſeech you to go on to what you have to ſay before you come to *England*.

Eng. Gent. I ſhall then offer two things to your obſervation; the firſt is, That in all time and places, where any great Heroes or Legiſlators, have founded a Government, by gathering People together to build a City, or to invade any Country to poſſeſs it, before they came to dividing the conquered Lands, they did always very maturely deliberate under what Form or Model of Government they meant to live, and accordingly made the Partition of the Poſſeſſions; *Moſes*, *Theſeus*, and *Romulus*, Founders of *Democracies*, divided the Land equally: *Lycurgus* who meant an *Optimacy*, made a certain number of Shares, which he intended to be in the hands of the People of *Laconia*. *Cyrus*, and other conquering Monarchs before him, took all for themſelves and Succeſſors, which is obſerv'd in thoſe Eaſtern Countries to this day, and which has made thoſe Countries continue ever ſince under the ſame Government, though Conquered and poſſeſſed very often by ſeveral Nations: This brings me to the ſecond thing to be obſerved, which is, *That wherever this apportionment of Lands*

Lands came to be changed in any kind, the Government either changed with it, or was wholly in a ſtate of confuſion: And for this reaſon *Lycurgus*, the greateſt Politician that ever Founded any Government, took a ſure way to fix Property by Confunding it, and bringing all into Common: And ſo the whole number of the Natural *Spartans*, who inhabited the City of *Lacedemon*, eat and drank in their ſeveral *convives* together: And as long as they continued ſo to do, they did not only preſerve their Government entire, and that for a longer time than we can read of any Common-wealth that ever laſted amongſt the Ancients, but held as it were the principality of *Greece*. The *Atheenians*, for want of ſome Conſtitutions to fix Property, as *Theſeus* placed it, were in danger of utter ruin, which they had certainly encounter'd, if the good Genius (as they then call'd it) of that People, had not raiſed them up a ſecond Founder, more than ſix hundred years after the firſt, which was *Solon:* And becauſe the Hiſtory of this matter will very much conduce to the illuſtrating of this Aphoriſm we have laid down, I will preſume ſo much upon your patience as to make a ſhort recital of it, leaving you to ſee it more at large in *Plutarch* and other Authors. The Lands in the Territory of *Attica* which were in the poſſeſſion of the Common People (for what reaſon Hiſtory is ſilent) were for Debt all Mortgaged to the great Men of the City of *Athens*, and the Owners having no poſſibility of Redeeming their Eſtates, were treating to Compound with their Creditors, and deliver up their Lands to them: *Solon* (who was one of thoſe State Phyſicians we ſpeak of) was much troubled at this, and harangued daily to the Nobility and People againſt it, telling them firſt, that it was impoſſible for the *Grecians* to reſiſt the *Medes* (who were then growing up to a powerful Monarchy) except *Athens* the ſecond City of *Greece* did continue a Democracy; That it was as Impoſſible the People could keep their Empire, except they kept their Lands, nothing being more contrary to Nature, than that thoſe who poſſeſs nothing in a Country can pretend to Govern it. They were all ſenſible of his Reaſons, and of their own Danger, but the only Remedy (which was, that the great Men ſhould forgive the Common People their Debts) would not at all be digeſted; ſo that the whole City now fully underſtanding their Condition, were continually in an uproar, and the People flock'd about *Solon*, whenever he came abroad, deſiring him to take upon him the Government, and be their Prince, and they would make choice of him the next time they aſſembled. He told them no, he would never be a Tyrant, eſpecially in his own Country; meaning, that he who had no more ſhare than other of the Nobles, could not govern the reſt, without being an Uſurper or Tyrant: But this he did to oblige his Citizens, he frankly forgave all the Debts that any of the People owed to him, and releaſed their Lands immediately; and this amounted to fifteen *Attick* Talents of Gold, a vaſt ſum in thoſe days; and betook himſelf to a voluntary Exile, in which he viſited *Thales*, and went to the Oracle of *Delphos*, and offer'd up his Prayers to *Apollo* for the preſervation of his City: In return of which (as the People then believed) the hearts of the great ones were ſo changed and enlarged, that they readily agreed to remit all their Debts to the People, upon Conditition that *Solon* would take the pains to make them a new Model of Government, and Laws ſuitable to a Democracy, which he as readily accepted and performed; by

virtue of which that City grew and continued long the greateſt, the Juſteſt, the moſt Virtuous, Learned and Renowned of all that Age; drove the *Perſians* afterwards out of *Greece*, defeated them both by Sea and Land, with a quarter of their number of Ships and Men; and produced the greateſt Wits and Philoſophers that ever lived upon Earth. The City of *Athens* Inſtituted a Solemn Feaſt in Commemoration of that great Generoſity and Self-denial of the Nobility; who Sacrificed their own Intereſt to the preſervation of their Country: which Feaſt was called the Solemnity of the *Seiſactheia*, which ſignifies reciſion or abolition of Debts, and was obſerved with Proceſſions, Sacrifices and Games, till the time of the *Roman*'s Dominion over them (who encouraged it,) and ever till the change of Religion in *Greece*, and Invaſion of the *Sarazens*. The *Romans* having omitted in their Inſtitution to provide for the fixing of Property, and ſo the Nobility called *Patricii*, beginning to take to themſelves a greater ſhare in the conquer'd Lands than had been uſual (for in the firſt times of the Common-wealth under *Romulus*, and ever after, it was always practiſed to divide the Lands equally amongſt the Tribes) this Innovation ſtirred up *Licinius Stolo*, then Tribune of the People, to propoſe a Law; which, although it met with much difficulty, yet at laſt was conſented to; by which it was provided, that no *Roman* Citizen, of what Degree ſoever, ſhould poſſeſs above five hundred Acres of Land; and for the remaining part of the Lands which ſhould be conquer'd, it was ordered to be equally divided, as formerly, amongſt the Tribes: This found admittance, after much oppoſition, becauſe it did provide but for the future, no Man at that time being owner of more Lands than what was lawful for him to poſſeſs; and if this law had been ſtrictly obſerved to the laſt, that glorious Common-wealth might have ſubſiſted to this day, for ought we know.

Doct. Some other Cauſe would have been the Ruin of it, what think you of a foreign Conqueſt?

Eng. Gent. Oh *Doctor*, if they had kept their Poverty they had kept their Government and their Virtue too, and then it had not been an eaſy matter to ſubdue them, *Quos vult perdere Jupiter dementat*; Breach of Rules and Order cauſes Diviſion, and Diviſion when it comes to be Incurable, expoſes a Nation almoſt as much as a Tyrannical Government does. The *Goths* and *Vandals*, had they Invaded in thoſe days, had met with the ſame ſucceſs which befel the *Cymbri*, and the *Teutones*. I muſt confeſs, a foreign Invaſion is a Formidable thing, when a Common-wealth is weak in Territory and Inhabitants, and that the Invader is numerous and warlike: And ſo we ſee the *Romans* were in danger of utter ruin when they were firſt attacked by the *Gauls* under *Brennus*: The like hazard may be fear'd, when a Common-wealth is aſſaulted by another of equal Virtue, and a Commander of equal Addreſs and Valour to any of themſelves. Thus the *Romans* run the risk of their Liberty and Empire, in the War of *Hannibal*; but their Power and their Virtue grew to that heighth in that conteſt, that when it was ended, I believe, that if they had preſerved the Foundation of their Government entire, they had been Invincible: And if I were alone of this Opinion, I might be aſhamed; but I am backt by the Judgment of your Imcomparable Country-man *Machiavil*; and no Man will condemn either of us of raſhneſs, if he firſt conſider, what ſmall States, that have ſtood upon right bottoms, have done to defend their Liberty againſt

againſt great Monarcheis; as is to be ſeen in the example of the little Common-wealth of *Athens*, which deſtroyed the Fleet of *Xerxes*, conſiſting of a thouſand Veſſels, in the Streights of *Salamis*, and before the land army of *Darius* of three hundred thouſand in the Plains of *Marathon*, and drove them out of *Greece*; for though the whole Confederates were preſent at the Battle of *Platæa*, yet the *Athenian* Army ſingly under their General *Miltiades*, gain'd that renowned Battle of *Marathon*.

Noble Ven. I beſeech you, Sir, how was it poſſible, or practicable, that the *Romans* Conquering ſo many and ſo remote Provinces, ſhould yet have been able to preſerve their Agrarian Law, and divide all thoſe Lands equally to their Citizeens; Or if it had been poſſible, yet it would have ruin'd their City, by ſending all their Inhabitants away; and by taking in Strangers in their room, they muſt neceſſarily have had people leſs Virtuous and leſs Warlike, and ſo both their Government and their Military Diſcipline muſt have been corrupted; for it is not to be imagined, but that the People would have gone with their Families to the place where their Lands lay: So that it appears that the *Romans* did not provide, in the making and framing their firſt Polity, for ſo great Conqueſts as they afterwards made.

Eng. Gent. Yes, ſurely they did; from their firſt beginning they were founded in War, and had neither Land nor Wives but what they fought for; but yet what you object were very weighty, if there had not been a conſideration of that early: For as ſoon as that great and wiſe People had ſubdued the *Samnites* on the *Eaſt*, and brought their Arms as far as the *Greek* Plantations, in that part of *Italy* which is now called the Kingdom of *Naples*; and Weſtward, had reduced all the *Tuſcans* under their Obedience, as far as the River *Arnus*, they made that and the River *Volturnus* (which runs by the Walls of *Capua*) the two Boundaries of their Empire, which was called *Domicilium Imperii*. Theſe were the *ne plus ultra*, for what they Conquered between theſe two Rivers, was all confiſcated and divided amongſt the Tribes; the *Ruſtick* Tribes being twenty ſeven, and the *Urbane* Tribes nine, which made thirty ſix in all. The City Tribes were like our Companies in *London*, conſiſting of Tradeſmen. The Country Tribes were divided like Shires, and there was ſcarce any Landed Man, who Inhabited in the City, but he was written in that Tribe where his Eſtate lay; ſo that the *Ruſtick* Tribes (though they had all equal Voices) were of far more Credit and Reputation than the *Urbane*. Upon the days of the *Comtia*, which were very well known, as many as thought fit amongſt the Country Tribes, came to give their Voices, though every Tribe was very numerous of Inhabitants that lived in the City. Now the *Agrarian* did not extend to any Lands conquered beyond this Precinct, but they were left to the Inhabitants, they paying a Revenue to the Common-wealth; all but thoſe which were thought fit to be ſet out to maintain a *Roman* Colony, which was a good number of *Roman* Citizens, ſent thither, and provided of Lands and Habitations, which being Armed, did ſerve in the nature of a Citadel and Garriſon to keep the Province in Obedience, and a *Roman* Prætor, Proconſul, or other Governor, was ſent yearly to head them, and brought Forces with him beſides. Now it was ever lawful for any *Roman* Citizen to purchaſe what Lands he pleaſed in any of theſe Provinces; it not being dangerous to a City to have their People rich, but

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to have ſuch a Power in the governing part of the Empire, as ſhould make thoſe who managed the Affairs of the Common-wealth depend upon them; which came afterwards to be that which ruined their Liberty, and which the *Gracchi* endeavoured to prevent when it was too late; For thoſe Illuſtrious perſons ſeeing the diſorder that was then in the Common-wealth, and rightly comprehending the Reaſon, which was the intermiſſion of the *Agrarian*, and by conſequence the great Purchaſes which were made by the Men of *Rome* (who had enriched themſelves in *Aſia* and the other Provinces) in that part of *Italy* which was between the two Rivers, before mentioned, began to harrangue the People, in hopes to perſuade them to admit of the right Remedy, which was to confirm the *Agrarian* Law with a Retroſpect; which although they carried, yet the difficulties in the Execution proved ſo great, that it never took effect, by reaſon that the Common People, whoſe Intereſt it was to have their Lands reſtored; yet having long lived as Clients, and Dependents of the great ones, choſe rather to depend ſtill upon their Patrons, than to hazard all for an imaginary deliverance, by which ſupineneſs in them, they were prevail'd with rather to join (for the moſt part) with the Oppreſſors of themſelves and their Country, and to cut the throats of their redeemers, than to employ their juſt reſentment againſt the covetous Violators of their Government and Property. So periſhed the two renowned *Gracchi*, one ſoon after the other, not for any crime, but for having endeavoured to preſerve and reſtore their Common-wealth; for which (if they had lived in times ſuitable to ſuch an Heroick undertaking, and that the virtue of their Anceſtors had been yet in any kind remaining) they would have merited and enjoyed a Reputation equal to that of *Lycurgus*, or *Solon*, whereas as it happen'd they were ſometime after branded with the name of Sedition, by certain Wits, who proſtituted the noble flame of Poetry (which before had wont to be employed in magnifying heroick Actions) to flatter the Luſt and Ambition of the *Roman* Tyrants.

Noble Ven. Sir, I approve what you ſay in all things, and in Confirmation of it, ſhall further alledge the two famous Princes of *Sparta*, *Agis*, and *Cleomines*, which I couple together, ſince *Plutarch* does ſo; Theſe finding the Corruption of their Common-wealth, and the Decay of their ancient Virtue, to proceed from the neglect and inobſervance of their Founder's Rules, and a breach of that Equality which was firſt inſtituted; endeavour'd to reſtore the Laws of *Lycurgus*, and divide the Territory anew; their Victory in the *Peloponneſian* War, and the Riches and Luxury brought into their City by *Liſander*, having long before broken all the Orders of their Common-wealth, and deſtroyed the Proportions of Land allotted to each of the natural *Spartans:* But the firſt of theſe two excellent Patriots periſhed by Treachery in the beginning of his Enterprize, the other began and went on with incomparable Prudence and Reſolution, but miſcarried afterwards by the Iniquity of the times, and baſeneſs and wickedneſs of the People; ſo infallibly true it is, That where the Policy is corrupted, there muſt neceſſarily be alſo a corruption and depravation of Manners, and an utter abolition of all Faith, Juſtice, Honour, and Morality; but I forget my ſelf, and intrench upon your Province: there is nothing now remains to keep you from the Modern Policies, but that you pleaſe to ſhut up this Diſcourſe of the Ancient Governments, with

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ſaying ſomething of the Corruptions of *Ariſtocracy* and *Democracy*; for I believe both of us are ſatisfied that you have abundantly proved your Aſſertion, and that when we have leiſure to examine all the States or Policies that ever were, we ſhall find all their Changes to have turn'd upon this Hinge of Property, and that the fixing of that with good laws in the beginning or firſt Inſtitution of a ſtate, and the holding to thoſe Laws afterwards, is the only way to make a Common-wealth Immortal.

Eng. Gent. I think you are very right; but I ſhall obey you, and do preſume to differ from *Ariſtotle*, in thinking that he has not fitly called thoſe extremes (for ſo I will ſtile them) of *Ariſtocracy* and *Democracy*, Corruptions; for that they do not proceed from the alteration of Property, which is the *Unica corruptio politica:* For Example, I do not find that Oligarchy, or Government of a few, which is the Extream of an Optimacy, ever did ariſe from a few Men's getting into their hands the Eſtates of all the reſt of the Nobility: For had it began ſo, it might have laſted, which I never read of any that did. I will therefore conclude, that they were all Tyrannies; for ſo the *Greeks* called all Uſurpations, whether of one or more perſons, and all thoſe that I ever read of, as they came in either by Craft or violence, as the Thirty Tyrants of *Athens*, the Fifteen of *Thebes*, and the *Decem-viri* of *Rome* (though theſe firſt came in lawfully) ſo they were ſoon driven out; and ever, were either aſſaſſinated, or dyed by the Sword of Juſtice; and therefore I ſhall ſay no more of them, not thinking them worth the name of a Government. As for the Extreme of *Democracy*, which is *Anarchy*, it is not ſo: for many Common-wealths have laſted for a good time under that Adminiſtration (if I may ſo call a State ſo full of Confuſion.) An *Anarchy* then is, when the People not contented with their Share in the Adminiſtration of the Government, (which is the right of Approving, or Diſapproving of Laws, of Leagues, and of making of War and Peace, of judging in all Cauſes upon an Appeal to them, and chooſing all manner of Officers) will take upon themſelves the Office of the *Senate* too, in managing Subordinate Matters of State, Propoſing Laws Originally, and aſſuming Debate in the Market place, making their Orators their Leaders; nay, not content with this, will take upon them to alter all the Orders of the Government when they pleaſe; as was frequently practiſed in *Athens*, and in the Modern State of *Florence*. In both theſe Cities, when ever any great perſon who could lead the People, had a mind to alter the Government, he call'd them together, and made them vote a Change. In *Florence* they call'd it, *Chiamar il popolo a Parlamento e ripigliar lo Stato*, which is ſummoning the People into the Market-place to reſume the Government, and did then preſently inſtitute a new one, with new Orders, new Magiſtracies, and the like. Now that which originally cauſes this Diſorder, is the admitting (in the beginning of a Government, or afterwards) the meaner ſort of People, who have no Share in the Territory, into an equal part of ordering the Common-wealth; theſe being leſs ſober, leſs conſidering, and leſs careful of the Publick Concerns; and being commonly the Major part, are made the Inſtruments oft-times of the Ambition of the great ones, and very apt to kindle into Faction: but notwithſtanding all the Confuſion which we ſee under an Anarchy, (where the wiſdom of the better ſort is made uſeleſs by the fury of the People) yet many Cities have ſubſiſt-

ed hundreds of years in this condition; and have been more conſiderable, and performed greater Actions, than ever any Government of equal Extent did, except it were a well-regulated *Democracy*; But it is true, they ruin in the end, and that never by Cowardize or baſeneſs, but by too much boldneſs and temerarious undertakings, as both *Athens* and *Florence* did; The firſt undertaking the Invaſion of *Sicily*, when their Affairs went ill elſewhere; and the other by provoking the *Spaniard* and the *Pope*. But I have done now, and ſhall paſs to ſay ſomething of the Modern Policies.

Noble Ven. Before you come to that, Sir, pray ſatisfy me in a Point which I ſhould have moved before, but that I was unwilling to interrupt your rational Diſcourſe; How came you to take it for granted, that *Moſes*, *Theſeus* and *Romulus* were Founders of Popular Governments? As for *Moſes*, we have his Story written by an infallible Pen; *Theſeus* was ever called King of *Athens*, though he liv'd ſo long ſince, that what is written of him is juſtly eſteem'd fabulous; but *Romulus* certainly was a King, and that Government continued a Monarchy, though Elective, under ſeven Princes.

Eng. Gent. I will be very ſhort in my Anſwer, and ſay nothing of *Theſeus*, for the reaſon you are pleaſed to alledge: But for *Moſes*, you may read in Holy Writ, that when, by God's Command, he had brought the *Iſraelites* out of *Egypt*, he did at firſt manage them by acquainting the People with the Eſtate of their Government, which People were called together with the ſound of a Trumpet, and are termed in Scripture, the Congregation of the Lord; this Government he thought might ſerve their turn in their paſſage, and that it would be time enough to make them a better, when they were in poſſeſſion of the Land of *Canaan*; eſpecially having made them Judges and Magiſtrates at the inſtance of his Father-in-law, which are called in Authors, *Præfecti Jethroniani*; but finding that this Proviſion was not ſufficient, complained to God of the difficulty he had, to make that State of Affairs hold together; God was pleaſed to order him, to let ſeventy Elders be appointed for a Senate, but yet the Congregation of the Lord continued ſtill and acted: And by the ſeveral ſoundings of the Trumpets, either the Senate or popular Aſſembly were called together, or both; ſo that this Government was the ſame with all other *Democracies*, conſiſting of a Principal Magiſtrate, a Senate, and a People Aſſembled together, not by Repreſentation, but in a body. Now for *Romulus*, it is very plain, that he was no more than the firſt Officer of the Common-wealth, whatever he was called, and that he was choſen (as your *Doge* is) for Life; and when the laſt of thoſe ſeven Kings uſurpt the place, that is, did reign *injuſſu Populi*, and exerciſe the Government Tyrannically, the People drove him out (as all People in the World that have Property will do in the like Caſe, except ſome extraordinary qualifications in the Prince preſerve him for one Age) and afterwards appointed in his room two Magiſtrates, and made them Annual, which two had the ſame Command, as well in their Armies as in their Cities, and did not make the leaſt alteration beſides, excepting that they choſe an Officer that was to perform the King's Function in certain Sacrifices (which *Numa* appointed to be performed by the King) leſt the People ſhould think their Religion were changed: This Officer was called *Rex Sacrificulus*. If you are ſatisfied, I will go on to the conſideration of our Modern States.

Noble Ven.

Noble Ven. I am fully anſwered, and beſides am clearly of Opinion, that no Government, whether mixt Monarchy or Common-wealth, can ſubſiſt without a Senate, as well from the turbulent State of the *Iſraelites* under *Moſes* till the *Sanhedrim* was inſtituted, as from a certain Kingdom of the *Vandals* in *Africa*; where after their Conqueſt of the Natives, they appointed a Government conſiſting of a Prince and a Popular Aſſembly, which latter, within half a year, beat the King's brains out, he having no bulwark of Nobility or Senate to defend him from them. But I will divert you no longer.

Eng. Gent. Sir, you are very right, and we ſhould have ſpoken ſomething of that before, if it had been the buſineſs of this Meeting to Diſcourſe of the particular Models of Government; but intending only to ſay ſo much of the Ancient Policy as to ſhew what Government in General is, and upon what Baſis it ſtands, I think I have done it ſufficiently to make way for the underſtanding of our own, at leaſt when I have ſaid ſomething of the Policies which are now extant; and that with your favour I will do. I ſhall need ſay little now of thoſe Common-wealths, which however they came by their Liberty, either by Arms or Purchaſe, are now much what under the ſame kind of Policy as the Antients were. In *Germany*, the Free Towns, and many Princes make up the Body of a Common-wealth called the Empire, of which the Emperor is Head; this General Union hath its Diets or Parliaments, where they are all repreſented, and where all things concerning the ſafety and Intereſt of *Germany* in General, or that belong to Peace and War, are tranſacted; theſe Diets never intermeddle with the particular Concerns or Policies of thoſe Princes or States that make it up, leaving to them their particular Sovereignties: The ſeveral Imperial Cities, or Common-wealths, are divided into two kinds, *Lubeck's* Law, and *Collen's* Law, which being the ſame exactly with the ancient *Democracies* and *Optimacies*, I will ſay no more of them. The Government of *Switzerland*, and the Seven Provinces of the *Low-Countries* were made up in haſte, to Unite them againſt Perſecution and Oppreſſion, and to help to defend themſelves the better, which they both have done very gallantly and ſucceſsfully: They ſeem to have taken their Pattern from the *Grecians*, who when their Greatneſs began to decline, and the ſeveral Tyrants who ſucceeded *Alexander* began to preſs hard upon them, were forced to League themſelves (yet in ſeveral Confederacies, as that of the *Etolians*, that of the *Achaians*, *&c.*) for their mutual defence. The *Swiſſes* conſiſt of Thirteen Sovereignties; ſome Cities which are moſt *Ariſtocratical*, and ſome Provinces which have but a Village for their head Townſhip. Theſe are all *Democracies*, and are Govern'd all by the Owners of Land, who Aſſemble as our Free-Holders do at the County-Court. Theſe have their General Diets, as in *Germany*. The Government of the united Provinces has for its Foundation the Union of *Utrecht*, made in the beginning of their ſtanding upon their Guard againſt the Cruelty and Oppreſſion of the *Spaniard*, and patcht up in haſte; and ſeeming to be compos'd only for neceſſity, as a ſtate of War, has made Modern Stateſmen Conjecture that it will not be very practicable in time of Peace, and Security. At their General Diet, which is called the States General, do intervene the Deputies of the Seven Provinces, in what number their Principals pleaſe; but all of them have but one Vote, which are by conſequence Seven, and every

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one of the Seven hath a Negative; ſo that nothing can paſs without the Concurrence of the whole Seven. Every one of theſe Provinces have a Counſel or Aſſembly of their own, called the States Provincial, who ſend and Inſtruct their Deputies to the States-General, and perform other Offices belonging to the Peace and Quiet of the Province. Theſe Deputies to the States Provincial, are ſent by ſeveral Cities of which every Province conſiſts, and by the Nobility of the Province, which hath one Voice only: The Baſis of the Government lies in theſe Cities, which are every of them a diſtinct Sovereignty; neither can the States of the Province, much leſs the States General, intrench in the leaſt upon their Rights, nor ſo much as intermeddle with the Government of their Cities, or Adminiſtration of Juſtice, but only treat of what concerns their mutual Defence, and their Payments towards it. Every one of theſe Cities is a Sovereignty, governed by an *Optimacy*, conſiſting of the chief Citizens, which upon death are ſupplied by new ones Elected by themſelves; theſe are called the *Urnuſcaperie* or *Herne*, which Council has continued to Govern thoſe Towns, time out of mind; even in the times of their Princes, who were then the Sovereigns; for without the conſent of him, or his Deputy, called State-Holder, nothing could be concluded in thoſe days. Since they have Inſtituted an artificial Miniſter of their own, whom they ſtill call State-Holder, and make choice of him in their Provincial Aſſemblies, and for Form ſake defer ſomething to him, as the Approbation of their Skepen and other Magiſtrates, and ſome other Matters: This has been continued in the Province of *Holland*, which is the chief Province in the Succeſſion of the Princes of *Orange*, and in the moſt of the others too: The reſt have likewiſe choſen ſome other of the Houſe of *Naſſaw*. This Government (ſo oddly ſet together, and ſo compos'd of a State, intended for a Monarchy, and which, as Almanacks calculated for one Meridian, are made in ſome ſort to ſerve for another, is by them continued in theſe ſeveral *Ariſtocracies*) may laſt for a time, till Peace and Security, together with the abuſe which is like to happen in the choice of the *Herne*, when they ſhall Elect perſons of ſmall note into their Body, upon Vacancies, for Kindred or Relation, rather than ſuch as are of Eſtate and eminency, or that otherwiſe abuſe their power in the execution of it, and then it is believed, and reaſonably enough, that thoſe People (great in wealth, and very acute in the knowledge of their own Intereſt) will find out a better Form of Government, or make themſelves a prey to ſome great Neighbour-Prince in the attempting it; and this in caſe they in the mean time eſcape Conqueſt from this great and powerful King of *France*, who at this time gives Law to Chriſtendom. I have nothing now left to keep me from the modern Monarchies, but the moſt famous Common-wealth of *Venice*, of which it would be preſumption for me to ſay any thing whilſt you are preſent.

Noble Ven. You may very ſafely go on if you pleaſe; for I believe Strangers underſtand the Speculative part of our Government, better than we do; and the Doctrine of the Ballat which is our chief excellency: For I have read many Deſcriptions of our Frame, which have taught me ſomething in it which I knew not before; particularly, *Donato Gianotti* the *Florentine*, to whom I refer thoſe who are curious to know more of our Orders, for we that manage the Mechanical part of the Government are like Horſes who know their

their Track well enough, without conſidering *Eaſt* or *Weſt*, or what buſineſs they go about. Beſides, it would be very tedious, and very needleſs, to make any Relation of our Model, with the ſeveral Counſels that make it up, and would be that which you have not done in treating of any other Government: what we have ſaid is enough to ſhew what beginning we had, and that ſerves your turn, for we who are caled Nobility, and who manage the State, are the Deſcendants of the firſt Inhabitants, and had therefore been a *Democracy*, if a numerous Flock of Strangers (who are contented to come and live amongſt us as Subjects) had not ſwelled our City, and made the Governing party ſeem but a handful; ſo that we have the ſame foundations that all other *Ariſtocracies* have, who govern but one City, and have no Territory but what they Govern Provincially; and our People not knowing where to have better Juſtice, are very well contented to live amongſt us, without any ſhare in the Managing of Affairs; yet we have power to adopt whom we pleaſe into our Nobility, and I believe that in the time of the *Roman* greatneſs, there were five for one of the Inhabitants who were written in no Tribe, but look'd upon as Strangers, and yet that did not vitiate their *Democracy*, no more than our Citizens and Common People can hurt our *Optimacy*; all the difficulty in our Adminiſtration, hath been to regulate our own Nobility, and to bridle their faction and ambition, which can alone breed a Diſeaſe in the Vital part of our Government, and this we do by moſt ſevere Laws, and a very rigorous execution of them.

Doct. Sir, I was thinking to Interpoſe concerning the Propriety of Lands in the Territory of *Padua*, which I hear is wholly in the poſſeſſion of the Nobility of *Venice*.

Noble Ven. Our Members have very good Eſtates there, yet nothing but what they have paid very well for, no part of that Country, or of any other Province, having been ſhar'd amongſt us as in other Conqueſts: 'Tis true, that the *Paduans* having ever been the moſt revengeful People of *Italy*, could not be deterr'd from thoſe execrable and treacherous Murders which were every day committed, but by a ſevere Execution of the Laws as well againſt their Lives as Eſtates: And as many of their Eſtates as were Confiſcated, were (during our neceſſities in the laſt War with the *Turks*) expoſed to ſale, and ſold to them that offered moſt, without any conſideration of the perſons purchaſing; But it is very true that moſt of them came into the hands of our Nobility, they offering more than any other, by reaſon that their ſober and frugal living, and their being forbidden all manner of Traffick, makes them have no way of employing the Money which proceeds from their Parſimony, and ſo they can afford to give more than others who may employ their Advance to better profit elſewhere. But I perceive, *Doctor*, by this Queſtion, that you have ſtudied at *Padua*.

Doct. No really, Sir, the ſmall learning I have was acquired in our own Univerſity of *Oxford*, nor was I ever out of this Iſland.

Noble Ven. I would you had, Sir, for it would have been a great honour to our Country to have contributed any thing towards ſo vaſt a knowledge as you are Poſſeſſor of: But I wiſh that it were your Country, or at leaſt the place of your Habitation, that ſo we might partake not only of your excellent Diſcourſe ſometimes, but be the better for your skill, which would make us Immortal.

Doct. I am glad to ſee you ſo well that you can make your ſelf ſo merry, but I aſſure you I am very well here; *England* is a good wholeſome Climate for a Phyſician: But, pray let our Friend go on to his Modern Monarchies.

Eng. Gent. That is all I have now to do: Thoſe Monarchies are two, Abſolute, and Mixt; for the firſt kind, all that we have knowledge of, except the Empire of the *Turks*, differ ſo little from the ancient Monarchies of the *Aſſyrians* and *Perſians*, that having given a ſhort Deſcription of them before, it will be needleſs to ſay any more of the *Perſian*, the *Mogul*, the King of *Pegu*, *China*, *Preſter-John*, or any other the great Men under thoſe Princes, as the *Satrapes* of old; being made ſo only by their being employed and put into great places and Governments by the Sovereign; But the Monarchy of the Grand Seignor is ſomething different; they both agree in this, that the Prince is in both abſolute Proprietor of all the Lands, (excepting in the Kingdom of *Egypt*, of which I ſhall ſay ſomething anon) but the diverſity lies in the Adminiſtration of the Property; the other Emperors as well Ancient as Modern uſing to manage the Revenue of the ſeveral Towns, and Pariſhes, as our Kings, or the Kings of *France* do; that is, keep it in their hands, and Adminiſter it by Officers: And ſo you may read that *Xerxes* King of *Perſia* allow'd the Revenue of ſo many Villages to *Themiſtocles*, which Aſſignations are practiſed at this day, both to publick and to private uſes, by the preſent Monarchs. But the *Turks*, when they invaded the broken Empire of the *Arabians*, did not at firſt make any great alteration in their Policy, till the Houſe of *Ottoman* the preſent Royal Family did make great Conqueſts in *Aſia*, and afterwards in *Greece*; whence they might poſſibly take their preſent way of dividing their conquered Territories; for they took the ſame courſe which the *Goths* and other Modern People had uſed with their Conquered Lands in *Europe*, upon which they planted Military Colonies, by dividing them amongſt the Soldiers for their pay or maintenance. Theſe Shares were call'd by them *Timarr's*, which ſignifies *Benefices*, but differ'd in this only from the *European* Knights-Fees, that theſe laſt Originally were Hereditary, and ſo Property was maintained, whereas amongſt the *Ottomans*, they were meerly at will; and they enjoy'd their ſhares whilſt they remained the *Sultan*'s Soldiers, and no longer; being turn'd out both of his Service, and of their *Timarr's*, when he pleaſes. This doubtleſs had been the beſt and firmeſt Monarchy in the World, if they could have ſtayed here, and not had a Mercenary Army beſides, which have often (like the Prætorians in the time of the *Roman* Tyrants) made the Palace and the Serraglio the Shambles of their Princes; whereas if the *Timariots*, as well *Spbais* or Horſe, as Foot, had been brought together to Guard the Prince by Courſes (as they uſed to do King *David*) as well as they are to fight for the Empire; this horrid flaw and inconvenience in their Government had been wholly avoided. For though theſe are not planted upon entire property as *David*'s were, (thoſe being in the nature of Trained-Bands) yet the remoteneſs of their Habitations from the Court, and the Factions of the great City, and their deſire to repair home, and to find all things quiet at their return, would have eaſily kept them from being infected with that curſed Diſeaſe of Rebellion againſt their Sovereign, upon whoſe favour they depend for the continuance of their livelihood: Whereas the

Janizaries

Janizaries are for life, and are ſure to be in the ſame Employment under the next Succeſſor; ſo ſure, that no Grand Seignior can, or dares go about to diſband them, the ſuſpicion of intending ſuch a thing having cauſed the death of more than one of their Emperors. But I ſhall go to the limited Monarchies.

Doct. But pray, before you do ſo, inform us ſomething of the *Roman* Emperors: Had they the whole Dominion or Property of the Lands of *Italy?*

Eng. Gent. The *Roman* Emperors I reckon amongſt the Tyrants, for ſo amongſt the *Greeks* were called thoſe Citizens who uſurp'd the Governments of their Common-wealths, and maintain'd it by force, without endeavouring to found or eſtabliſh it, by altering the Property of Lands, as not imagining that their Children could ever hold it after them, in which they were not deceived: So that it is plain that the *Roman* Empire was not a natural but a violent Government. The reaſons why it laſted longer than ordinarily Tyrannies do, are many; Firſt, becauſe *Auguſtus* the firſt Emperor kept up the Senate, and ſo for his time cajoled them with this bait of imaginary Power, which might not have ſufficed neither to have kept him from the fate of his Uncle, but that there had been ſo many Revolutions and bloody wars between, that all Mankind was glad to repoſe and take breath for a while under any Government that could protect them. And he gain'd the ſervice of theſe Senators the rather, becauſe he ſuffered none to be ſo but thoſe who had followed his Fortune in the ſeveral Civil Wars, and ſo were engaged to ſupport him for their own preſervation; Beſides, he confiſcated all thoſe who had at any time been proſcribed, or ſided in any Encounter againſt him; which, conſidering in how few hands the Lands of *Italy* then were, might be an over-balance of the Property in his hands. But this is certain, that what ever he had not in his own poſſeſſion, he diſpoſed of at his pleaſure, taking it away, as alſo the lives of his people, without any judicial proceedings, when he pleaſed: That the Confiſcations were great, we may ſee by his planting above ſixty thouſand Soldiers upon Lands in *Lombardy*; That is, erecting ſo many *Beneficia*, or *Timarr's*, and, if any Man's Lands lay in the way, he took them in for Neighbourhood, without any delinquency. *Mantua væ miſeræ nimium vicina Cremonæ.* And it is very evident that if theſe *Beneficia* had not afterwards been made Hereditary, that Empire might have had a ſtabler Foundation, and ſo a more quiet and orderly progreſs than it after had; for the Court Guards, call'd the Prætorians, did make ſuch havock of their Princes, and change them ſo often, that this (though it may ſeem a Paradox) is another reaſon why this Tyranny was not ruin'd ſooner; for the People, who had really an Intereſt to endeavour a change of Government, were ſo prevented by ſeeing the Prince, whom they deſigned to ſupplant, removed to their hand, that they were puzzled what to do, taking in the mean time great recreation to ſee thoſe wild Beaſts hunted down themſelves, who had ſo often prey'd upon their Lives and Eſtates; beſides that, moſt commonly the frequent removes of their Maſters, made them ſcarce have time to do any miſchief to their poor oppreſſed Subjects in particular, though they were all Slaves in general. This Government of the later *Romans* is a clear Example of the truth and efficacy of theſe Politick Principles we have been diſcourſing of. Firſt, that any Government (be it the moſt unlimitted and

arbitrary

arbitrary Monarchy) that is placed upon a right Baſis of Property, is better both for Prince and People, than to leave them a ſeeming Property, ſtill at his devotion, and then for want of fixing the Foundation, expoſe their Lives to thoſe dangers and hazzards with which ſo many Tumults and Inſurrections, which muſt neceſſarily happen, will threaten them daily: And in the next place, that any violent conſtraining of mankind to a ſubjection, is not to be called a Government, nor does ſalve either the Politick or Moral ends, which thoſe eminent Legiſlators amongſt the Ancients propoſed to themſelves, when they ſet Rules to preſerve the quiet and peace, as well as the plenty, proſperity, and greatneſs of the People; but that the Politicks or Art of Governing is a Science to be learned and ſtudied by Counſellors and States-men be they never ſo great; or elſe Mankind will have a very ſad condition under them, and they themſelves a very perplexed and turbulent life, and probably a very deſtructive and precipitous end of it.

Doct. I am very glad I gave occaſion to make this Diſcourſe; now I beſeech you, before you go to the mixt Monarchies, not to forget *Egypt*.

Eng. Gent. 'Twas that I was coming to, before you were pleaſed to interrogate me concerning the *Roman* Empire. The *Egyptians* are this day, for ought I know, the only People that enjoy Property, and are govern'd as a Province by any of the Eaſtern abſolute Princes. For whereas *Damaſco*, *Alleppo*, and moſt of the other Cities and Provinces of that Empire, whoſe Territory is divided into *Timarr*'s, are governed by a Baſhaw, who for his Guards has ſome ſmall number of Janizaries or Soldiers; the Baſhaw of *Egypt*, or of Grand *Cairo*, has ever an Army with him; and divers Forts are erected, which is the way *European* Princes uſe in governing their Provinces, and muſt be ſo where Property is left entire, except they plant Colonies as the *Romans* did. The reaſon why *Selim*, who broke the Empire of the *Mamalukes*, and conquered *Egypt*, did not plant *Timarr*'s upon it, was the Lazineſs and Cowardlineſs of the People, and the great Fruitfulneſs of the Soil, and Deliciouſneſs of the Country, which has mollify'd and rendered effeminate all the Nations that ever did inhabit it. So that a reſolution was taken to impoſe upon them, firſt the maintaining an Army by a Tax, and then to pay a full half of all the Fruits and product of their Lands (to the Grand Seignior) which they are to cultivate and improve: This is well managed by the Baſhaws, and their Officers, and comes to an incredible ſum; the goods being ſold, the Money is conveyed *in ſpecie* to the Port, and is the greateſt part of that Prince's Revenue. And it is believed, that if all the Lands had been entirely confiſcated, and that the Grand Seignior had managed them by his Officers, he would not have made a third part ſo much of the whole, as he receives now annually for one half: not only becauſe thoſe People are extremely induſtrious where their own profit is concerned: but for that, it is clear, if they had been totally diveſted of their Eſtates, they would have left their Country, and made that which is now the moſt populous Kingdom of the World, a Deſart, as is all the reſt of the *Turkiſh* Dominions, except ſome Cities. And if the People had removed as they did elſewhere, there would not only have wanted hands to have cultivated and improved the Lands, but mouths to conſume the product of it; ſo that the Prince's Revenue by the cheapneſs

cheapneſs of Victual, and the want of Labourers, would have almoſt fallen to nothing.

Noble Ven. Pray God this be not the reaſon that this King of *France* leaves Property to his Subjects; for certainly he hath taken example by this Province of *Egypt*, his Subjects having a Tax (which for the continuance of it, I muſt call a Rent or Tribute) impos'd upon them to the value of one full half of their Eſtates, which muſt ever encreaſe as the Lands improve.

Eng. Gent. I believe, Sir, there is another reaſon; for the Property there, being in the Nobility and Gentry, which are the hands by which he manages his Force both at home and abroad, it would not have been eaſy or ſafe for him to take away their Eſtates. But I come to the limited Monarchies. They were firſt introduced (as was ſaid before) by the *Goths*, and other northern People. Whence thoſe great ſwarms came, as it was unknown to *Procopius* himſelf, who liv'd in the time of their Invaſion, and who was a diligent ſearcher into all the circumſtances of their concernments, ſo it is very needleſs for us to make any enquiry into it, thus much being clear, that they came Man, Woman, and Child, and conquer'd and poſſeſs'd all theſe parts of the World, which were then ſubject to the *Roman* Empire, and ſince Chriſtianity came in have been ſo to the Latin Church, till honeſt *John Calvin* taught ſome of us the way how to deliver our ſelves from the Tyrannical Yoke, which neither we nor our Fore-fathers were able to bear. Whence thoſe People had the Government they eſtabliſh'd in theſe parts after their Conqueſt, that is, whether they brought it from their own Country, or made it themſelves, muſt needs be uncertain, ſince their Original is wholly ſo; but it ſeems very probable that they had ſome excellent perſons among them, though the ignorance and want of learning in that Age hath not ſuffered any thing to remain that may give us any great light; for it is plain, that the Government they ſettled, was both according to the exact Rules of the Politicks, and very natural and ſuitable to that Diviſion they made of their ſeveral Territories. Whenever then theſe Invaders had quieted any Province, and that the People were driven out or ſubdued, they divided the Lands, and to the Prince they gave uſually a tenth part, or thereabouts; to the great Men, or *Comites Regis* (as it was tranſlated into Latin) every one (as near as they could) an equal ſhare. Theſe were to enjoy an Hereditary right in their Eſtates, as the King did in his part and in the Crown; but neither he, nor his Peers or Companions, were to have the abſolute diſpoſal of the Lands ſo allotted them, but were to keep a certain proportion to themſelves for their uſe: and the reſt was ordered to be divided amongſt the Free-men, who came with them to conquer. What they kept to themſelves was called *Demeſnes* in *Engliſh* and *French*, and in *Italian*, *Beni Allodiali*. The other part which they granted to the Free-men, was called a *Feud:* and all theſe Eſtates were held of theſe Lords Hereditarily, only the Tenants were to pay a ſmall Rent annually, and at every Death or Change an acknowledgment in Money, and in ſome Tenures the beſt Beaſt beſides: But the chief condition of the *Feud* or Grant, was, that the Tenant ſhould perform certain Services to the Lord, of which one (in all Tenures of Free-men) was to follow him armed to the Wars for the Service of the Prince and Defence of the Land. And upon their admittance to their *Feuds*, they take an Oath

to be true Vaſſals and Tenants to their Lords, and to pay their Rents, and perform their Services, and upon failure to forfeit their Eſtates; and theſe Tenants were divided according to their Habitations into ſeveral Mannors, in every one of which there was a Court kept twice every year, where they all were to appear, and to be admitted to their ſeveral Eſtates, and to take the Oath above mention'd. All theſe Peers did likewiſe hold all their Demeſnes, as alſo all their Mannors of the Prince; to whom they ſwore Allegiance and Fealty: There were beſides theſe Freemen or Francklins, other Tenants to every Lord, who were called Villains, who, were to perform all ſervile Offices, and their Eſtates were all at the Lords diſpoſal when he pleaſed; theſe conſiſted moſtly of ſuch of the former Inhabitants of theſe Countries, as were not either deſtroyed or driven out, and poſſibly of others who were Servants amongſt them, before they came from their own Countries. Perhaps thus much might have been unneceſſary to be ſaid, conſidering that theſe Lords, Tenants, and Courts, are yet extant in all the Kingdoms in *Europe*, but that to a Gentleman of *Venice*, where there are none of theſe things, and where the *Goths* never were, ſomething may be ſaid in excuſe for me.

Noble Ven. 'Tis true, Sir, we fled from the *Goths* betimes, but yet in thoſe Countries which we recovered ſince in *Terra firma*, we found the Footſteps of theſe Lords, and Tenures, and their Titles of Counts; though being now Provinces to us, they have no influence upon the Government, as I ſuppoſe you are about to prove they have in theſe parts.

Eng. Gent. You are right, Sir; for the Governments of *France*, *Spain*, *England*, and all other Countries where theſe People ſettled, were framed accordingly. It is not my buſineſs to deſcribe particularly the diſtinct Forms of the ſeveral Governments in *Europe*, which do derive from theſe People (for they may differ in ſome of their Orders and Laws, though the Foundation be in them all the ſame) this would be unneceſſary, they being all extant, and ſo well known; and beſides, little to my purpoſe, excepting to ſhew where they have declined from their firſt Inſtitution, and admitted of ſome change. *France*, and *Poland*, have not, nor as I can learn, ever had any Freemen below the Nobility; that is, had no Yeomen; but all are either Noble, or Villains, therefore the Lands muſt have been Originally given, as they now remain, into the hands of theſe Nobles. But I will come to the Adminiſtration of the Government in theſe Countries, and firſt ſay wherein they all agree, or did at leaſt in their Inſtitution, which is, That the Sovereign power is in the States aſſembled together by the Prince, in which he preſides; theſe make Laws, Levy Money, Redreſs Grievances, puniſh great Officers, and the like. Theſe States conſiſt in ſome places of the Prince and Nobility only, as in *Poland*, and anciently in *France* (before certain Towns, for the encouraging of Trade, procured Priviledges to ſend Deputies; which Deputies are now called the third Eſtate) and in others, conſiſt of the Nobility and Commonality, which latter had and ſtill have the ſame right to Intervene and Vote, as the great ones have both in *England*, *Spain*, and other Kingdoms.

Doct. But you ſay nothing of the Clergy; I ſee you are no great friend to them, to leave them out of your Politicks.

Eng.

Eng. Gent. The truth is, *Doctor*, I could wiſh there had never been any; the purity of Chriſtian Religion, as alſo the good and orderly Government of the World, had been much better provided for without them, as it was in the Apoſtolical time, when we heard nothing of Clergy. But my omitting their Reverend Lordſhips was no neglect, for I meant to come to them in order; for you know that the Northern People did not bring Chriſtianity into theſe parts, but found it here, and were in time converted to it, ſo that there could be no Clergy at the firſt: but if I had ſaid nothing at all of this Race, yet I had committed no Soleciſm in the Politicks; for the Biſhops and great Abbots intervened in the States here, upon the ſame Foundation that the other Peers do, *viz.* for their great poſſeſſions, and the dependence their Tenants and Vaſſals have upon them; although they being a People of that great ſanctity and knowledge, ſcorn to intermix ſo much as Titles with us profane Lay-Ideots, and therefore will be call'd Lords Spiritual. But you will have a very venerable opinion of them, if you do but conſider how they came by theſe great poſſeſſions, which made them Claim a third part of the Government. And truely not unjuſtly by my rule, for I believe they had no leſs (at one time) than a third part of the Lands in moſt of theſe Countries.

Noble Ven. Pray, how did they acquire theſe Lands? was it not here by the Charitable donation of pious Chriſtians, as it was elſewhere?

Eng. Gent. Yes, certainly, very pious men; ſome of them might be well meaning People, but ſtill ſuch as were cheated by theſe holy men, who told them perpetually, both in publick and private, *that they repreſented God upon Earth, being ordained by Authority from him who was his Vicegoy here, and that what was given to them was given to God, and he would repay it largely both in this World and the next.* This wheedle made our barbarous Anceſtors, newly Inſtructed in the Chriſtian Faith (if this Religion may be called ſo, and ſucking in this fooliſh Doctrine more than the Doctrine of Chriſt) ſo zealous to theſe Vipers, that they would have pluckt out their eyes to ſerve them, much more beſtow, as they did, the fruitfulleſt and beſt ſituate of their poſſeſſions upon them: Nay, ſome they perſuaded to take upon them their Callings, vow Chaſtity, and give all they had to them, and become one of them, amongſt whom, I believe, they found no more ſanctity than they left in the World. But this is nothing to another trick they had, which was to inſinuate into the moſt notorious and execrable Villians, with which that Age abounded; Men, who being *Princes* and *other great Men* (for ſuch were the Tools they work'd with) had treacherouſly poiſoned, or otherwiſe murdered their neareſt Relations, Fathers, Brothers, Wives, to reign, or enjoy their Eſtates; Theſe they did perſwade into a belief, *that if they had a deſire to be ſav'd, notwithſtanding their execrable Villanies, they need but part with ſome of thoſe great poſſeſſions* (which they had acquired by thoſe acts) *to their Biſhopricks or Monaſteries, and they would pray for their Souls, and they were ſo holy and acceptable to God, that he would deny them nothing*; which they immediately performed, ſo great was the ignorance and blindneſs of that Age; and you ſhall hardly find in the ſtory of thoſe times, any great *Monaſtery*, *Abby*, or other *Religious Houſe* in any of theſe

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theſe Countries (I ſpeak confidently, as to what concerns our own *Saxons*) that had not its Foundation from ſome ſuch Original.

Doct. A worthy beginning of a worthy Race!

Noble Ven. Sir, you maintain a ſtrange Poſition here, That it had been better there had been no *Clergy*, would you have had no *Goſpel* preached, no *Sacraments*, no continuance of *Chriſtian Religion* in the World?, or do you think that theſe things could have been withuot a *Succeſſion* of the true *Prieſthood*, or (as you call it, of true *Miniſtry*) by means of *Ordination?* does not your own *Church* hold the ſame?

Eng. Gent. You will know more of my *Church*, when I have told you what I find the word *Church* to ſignify in *Scripture*, which is to me the only rule of *Faith*, *Worſhip*, and *Manners*; neither do I ſeek theſe additional helps, of *Fathers*, *Councils*, or *Eccleſiaſtical* hiſtory, much leſs *Tradition*: for ſince it is ſaid in the word of God it ſelf, *That Antichriſt did begin to work even in thoſe days*; I can eaſily believe that he had brought his Work to ſome perfection, before the word *Church* was by him applied to the *Clergy*: I ſhall therefore tell you what I conceive that *Church*, *Clergy*, and *Ordination*, ſignified in the *Apoſtolical* times. I find then the word *Church* in the New Teſtament taken but in two Senſes; the firſt, for the *Univerſal Inviſible Church*, called ſometimes of the *Firſt-born*; that is, the whole number of the true Followers of Chriſt in the World, wherever reſident, or into what part ſoever diſperſed. The other ſignification of *Church* is an *Aſſembly*, which though it be ſometimes uſed to expreſs any *Meetings* (even unlawful & tumultuous ones) as well in Scripture as prophane Authors; yet it is more frequently underſtood, for a gathering together to the Duties of *Prayer*, *Preaching*, and *Breaking* of *Bread*; and the whole Number ſo Congregated is, both in the Acts of the Apoſtles, and in their holy Epiſtles, called the *Church*; nor is there the leaſt colour for appropriating that word to the *Paſtors* and *Deacons*, who ſince the Corruptions of *Chriſtian Religion* are called *Clergy*; which word in the Old Teſtament is uſed, ſometimes for *God's whole People*, and ſometimes for the *Tribe of Levi*, out of which the Prieſts were choſen: for the word ſignifies a *Lot*; ſo that *Tribe* is called *God's Lot*, becauſe they had no ſhare alotted them when the Land was divided, but were to live upon *Tythe*, and ſerve in the functions of their *Religion*, and be *Singers*, *Porters*, *Butchers*, *Bakers*, and *Cooks*, for the Sacrifices, *&c.* So that this *Tribe* was ſtiled *Clergy* but figuratively, and the Allegory paſſed into the New Teſtament, where the Saints are ſometimes called *Clergy*, but never the *Paſtors* or *Deacons*, who were far from pretending in thoſe days to come in the place of the *Aaronical Prieſthood.* The word *Ordination* in Scripture ſignifies lifting up of hands, and is uſed, firſt, for the giving a *Suffrage*, which in all popular Aſſemblies was done by ſtretching out the hand (as it is in the Common-Hall of *London.*) In the next place it is applied to the Order or Decree made by the *Suffrage* ſo given, which was then (and is yet too in all Modern Languages) called an *Ordinance*, and the *Suffrage* it ſelf *Ordination*; which word proves that the firſt *Chriſtian Churches* were *Democratical*; that is, That the whole *Congregation* had the *Choice* in this, as well as the *Sovereign Authority* in all *Excommunications*, and all other matters whatſoever that could occur; for in all *Ariſtocratical Common-wealths* the word for choice, *is Keirotheſia*, or *Impoſition of Hands*, (for ſo the Election of all Magiſtrates and Officers was made)

made) and not *Keirotonia.* Theſe *Paſtors* and other *Officers* did not pretend to be by virtue of ſuch *Choice* of a peculiar profeſſion different from other Men, (as their *Followers* have done ſince *Antichriſt's* Reign) but were only called and appointed (by the *Congregations* approval of their gifts or parts) to inſtruct or feed the Flock, viſit the ſick, and perform all other *Offices* of a *true Miniſter* (that is, Servant) of the *Goſpel*: at other times they followed the buſineſs of their own *Trades* and *Profeſſions*; and the *Chriſtians* in thoſe times (which none will deny to have been the *pureſt* of the *Church*) did never dream that a true *Paſtor* ought to pretend to any *Succeſſion*, to qualify him for the *Miniſtry* of the word; or that the *Idle* and *Ridiculous Ceremonies* uſed in your *Church* (and ſtill continued in that which you are pleaſed to call mine) were any way eſſential or conducing to Capacitate a perſon to be a true *Preacher* or *Diſpencer* of the *Chriſtian Faith.* And I cannot ſufficiently admire why our *Clergy*, who very juſtly refuſe to believe the *Miracle* which is pretended to be wrought in *Tranſubſtantiation*, becauſe they ſee both the *Wafer* and the *Wine* to have the ſame *Subſtance*, and the ſame *Accidents* (after the *Prieſt* has mumbled words over thoſe *Elements*) as they had before, and yet will believe that the ſame kind of *Spell* or *Charm* in *Ordination* can have the Efficacy to Metamorphoſe a poor *Lay-Ideot* into a *Heavenly Creature*; notwithſtanding that we find in them the ſame *humane Nature*, and the ſame *Neceſſities* of it, to which they were ſubject before ſuch *Tranſformation*; nay, the ſame *Debauch*, *Profaneneſs*, *Ignorance*, and *Diſability* to preach the *Goſpel.*

Noble Ven. Sir, this diſcourſe is very new to me. I muſt confeſs I am much inclined to join with you in believing, that the power *Prieſts Exerciſe* over *Mankind*, with the *Juriſdiction* they pretend to over *Princes* and *States*, may be a uſurpation; but that they ſhould not have a *Divine Call* to ſerve at the *Altar*, or that any perſon can pretend to perform thoſe *Sacred Functions* without being duly *Ordained*, ſeems very ſtrange.

Eng. Gen. I am not now to diſcourſe of *Religion*; it is never very civil to do ſo in Converſation of perſons of a different belief; neither can it be of any benefit towards a *Roman Catholick*, for if his Conſcience ſhould be never ſo clearly convinc'd, he is not yet *Maſter* of his own *Faith*, having given it up to his *Church*, of whom he muſt ask *leave* to be a *Convert*, which he will be ſure never to obtain; But if you have the Curioſity when you come amongſt the learned in your own *Country* (for amongſt our *Ordination-Mongers*, there is a great ſcarcity of *Letters* and other *good Parts*) you may pleaſe to take the *Bible*, which you acknowledge to be the *Word* of *God* as well as we, and intreat ſome of them to ſhew you any paſſage, the plain and genuine ſenſe of which can any way evince this *Succeſſion*, this *Ordination*, or this *Prieſthood*, we are now ſpeaking of; and when you have done, if you will let your own excellent *Reaſon* and *Diſcourſe* judge, and not your *Prieſt*, (who is too much concerned in point of Intereſt) I make no doubt but you will be convinced that the pretence to the diſpenſing of *Divine things* by virtue of a *humane Conſtitution*, and ſo ridiculous a one too, as the *Ordination* practiſed by your *Biſhops* and ours (who deſcend and ſucceed from one and the ſame *Mother*) is as little Juſtifiable by *Scripture* and *Reaſon*, and full as great a *Cheat* and *Uſurpation*, as the Em-

pire which the *Eccleſiaſticks* pretend to over the *Conſciences* and *perſons* of men, and the Exemption from all *Secular power*.

Noble Ven. Well, Sir, though neither my *Faith* nor my *Reaſon* can come up to what you hold, yet the Novelty and the grace of this *Argument* has delighted me extreamly: and if that be a Sin, as I fear it is, I muſt confeſs it to my *Prieſt*; but I ask your pardon firſt, for putting you upon this long Deviation.

Eng. Gent. Well, this Digreſſion is not without its uſe, for it will ſhorten our buſineſs (which is grown longer than I thought it would have been) for I ſhall mention the Clergy no more, but whenever I ſpeak of Peerage, pray take notice that I mean both Lords Spiritual and Temporal, ſince they ſtand both upon the ſame foot of Property. But if you pleaſe, I will fall immediately to diſcourſe of the Government of *England*, and ſay no more of thoſe of our Neighbours, than what will fall in by the way, or be hinted to me by your Demands; for the time runs away, and I know the *Doctor* muſt be at home by noon, where he gives daily charitable audience to an Infinity of poor people, who have need of his help, and who ſend or come for it, not having the confidence to ſend for him, ſince they have nothing to give him; though he be very liberal too of his Viſits to ſuch, where he has any knowledge of them: But I ſpare his Modeſty, which I ſee is concerned at the Juſt Teſtimony I bear to his Charity. The Sovereign Power of *England* then, is in King, Lords, and Commons. The Parliaments, as they are now conſtituted, that is, the aſſigning a choice to ſuch a Number of Burroughs, as alſo the manner and form of Elections and Returns, did come in, as I ſuppoſe, in the time of *Henry* the third, where now our Statute-Book begins; and I muſt confeſs, I was inclined to believe, that before that time, our Yeomanry or commonalty had not formally aſſembled in Parliament, but been virtually included, and repreſented by the Peers, upon whom they depended: but I am fully convinced, that it was otherwiſe, by the learned Diſcourſes lately publiſht by Mr. *Petit* of the *Temple*, and Mr. *Attwood* of *Gray's-Inn*, being Gentlemen whom I do mention *honoris cauſa*; and really they deſerve to be honour'd, that they will ſpare ſome time from the Mechanical part of their Callings (which is to aſſiſt Clients with Counſel, and to plead their Cauſes, and which I acknowledge likewiſe to be honourable) to ſtudy the true Intereſt of their Country, and to ſhew how ancient the Rights of the People in *England* are, and that in a time when neither Profit nor Countenance can be hop'd for from ſo ingenious an undertaking. But I beg pardon for the deviation. Of the three branches of Sovereign Power which Politicians mention, which are Enacting Laws, Levying of Taxes, and making War and Peace, the two firſt of them are indiſputably in the Parliament; and when I ſay Parliament, I ever intend with the King The laſt has been uſually exercis'd by the Prince, if he can do it with his own Money: yet becauſe even in that Caſe it may be ruinous to the Kingdom, by expoſing it to an Invaſion, many have affirmed that ſuch a Power cannot be by the true and ancient free Government of *England*, ſuppoſed to be Intruſted in the hands of one man: And therefore we ſee in divers Kings Reigns, the Parliament has been Conſulted, and their advice taken in thoſe matters that have either concerned War or Leagues; And that if it has been omitted, Addreſſes have been made to the King by Parliaments, either to make war or peace, according to what they

they thought profitable to the publick. So that I will not determine whether that power which draws ſuch conſequences after it, be by the genuine ſenſe of our Laws in the Prince or no; although I know of no Statute or written Record which makes it otherwiſe. That which is undoubtedly the King's Right, or prerogative, is to Call and Diſſolve Parliaments, to preſide in them, to approve of all Acts made by them, and to put in Execution, as Supreme or Sovereign Magiſtrate, in the Intervals of Parliaments, and during their ſitting, all Laws made by them, as alſo the Common Law; for which Cauſe he has the nomination of all inferior Officers and Miniſters under him, excepting ſuch as by Law or Charter are eligible otherwiſe; and the Power of the Sword, to force Obedience to the Judgments given both in Criminal and Civil Cauſes.

Doct. Sir, You have made us a very abſolute Prince; what have we left us? if the King have all this Power, what do our Liberties or Rights ſignify whenever he pleaſes?

Eng. Gent. This Objection, *Doctor*, makes good what I ſaid before, that your ſkill did not terminate in the body natural, but extend to the Politick; for a more pertinent Interrogatory could never have been made by *Plato* or *Ariſtotle:* In anſwer to which, you may pleaſe to underſtand, that when theſe Conſtitutions were firſt made, our Anceſtors were a plain-hearted, well-meaning People, without Court-reſerves or tricks, who having made choice of this ſort of Government, and having Power enough in their hands to make it take place, did not foreſee, or imagine, that any thoughts of invading their Rights could enter into the Princes Head; nor do I read that it ever did, till the *Norman* Line came to Reign; which coming in by Treaty, it was obvious there was no Conqueſt made upon any but *Harold*, in whoſe ſtead *William* the Firſt came, and would claim no more after his Victory, than what *Harold* enjoy'd, excepting that he might confiſcate (as he did) thoſe great men who took part with the wrong Title, and *Frenchmen* were put into their Eſtates; which though it made in this Kingdom a mixture between *Normans* and *Saxons*, yet produced no Change or Innovation in the Government; the *Norman* Peers being as tenacious of their Liberties, and as active in the recovery of them to the full, as the *Saxon* Families were. Soon after the death of *William*, and poſſibly in his time, there began ſome Invaſions upon the Rights of the Kingdom, which begat Grievances, and afterwards Complaints and Diſcontents, which grew to that height, that the Peers were fain to uſe their Power, that is, arm their Vaſſals to defend the Government; whilſt the Princes of that Age, firſt King *John*, and then *Henry* the third, got Force together. The Barons call'd in *Lewis* the Dauphin, whilſt the King would have given away the Kingdom to the *Sarazens*, as he did to the Pope, and armed their own Creatures; ſo that a bloody War enſued, for almoſt forty years, off and on; as may be read in our Hiſtory: The ſucceſs was, that the Barons or Peers obtained in the cloſe two Charters or Laws for the aſcertaining their Rights, by which neither their Lives, Liberties, or Eſtates, could ever be in danger any more from any Arbitrary Power in the Prince; and ſo the good Government of *England*, which was before this time like the Law of Nature, only written in the hearts of Men, came to be expreſs'd in Parchment, and remain a Record in Writing; though theſe Charters gave us no more than what

was

was our own before. After theſe Charters were made, there could not chooſe but happen ſome encroachment upon them: but ſo long as the Peers kept their greatneſs, there was no breaches but what were immediately made up in Parliament; which whenever they aſſembled, did in the firſt place confirm the Charters, and made very often Interpretations upon them, for the benefit of the People; witneſs the Statute *de Tallagio non concedendo*, and many others. But to come nearer the giving the *Doctor* an anſwer, you may pleaſe to underſtand, that not long after the framing of theſe fore-mentioned Charters, there did ariſe a Grievance not foreſeen or provided for by them; and it was ſuch an one that had beaten down the Government at once, if it had not been redreſſed in an orderly way. This was the Intermiſſion of Parliaments, which could not be called but by the Prince; and he not doing of it, they ceas'd to be aſſembled for ſome years: if this had not been ſpeedily remedied, the Barons muſt have put on their Armour again; for who can imagine that ſuch briſk Aſſertors of their Rights could have acquieſced in an Omiſſion that ruin'd the Foundation of the Government, which conſiſting of King, Lords, and Commons, and having at that time marched near five hundred years upon three Legs, muſt then have gone on hopping upon one; which could it have gone forward (as was impoſſible whilſt Property continued where it was) yet would have rid but a little way. Nor can it be wonder'd at, that our great Men made no proviſion againſt this Grievance in their Charters, becauſe it was impoſſible for them to imagine that their Prince, who had ſo good a ſhare in this Government, ſhould go about to deſtroy it, and to take that burden upon himſelf, which by our Conſtitution was undeniably to be divided between him and his Subjects: And therefore divers of the great Men of thoſe times ſpeaking with that excellent Prince King *Edward* the firſt about it, he, to take away from his People all fear and apprehenſion that he intended to change the Ancient Government, called ſpeedily a Parliament, and in it conſented to a Declaration of the Kingdoms Right in that point; without the clearing of which, all our other Laws had been uſeleſs, and the Government it ſelf too; of which the Parliament is (at the leaſt) as eſſential a part as the Prince; ſo that there paſſed a Law in that Parliament that one ſhould be held every year, and oftner if need be; which like another *Magna Charta*, was confirmed by a new Act made in the time of *Edward* the third, that glorious Prince: nor were there any Sycophants in thoſe days, who durſt pretend Loyalty by uſing Arguments to prove that it was againſt the Royal Prerogative, for the Parliament to entrench upon the King's Right of calling and diſſolving of Parliaments; as if there were a Prerogative in the Crown, to chooſe whether ever a Parliament ſhould aſſemble, or no; I would deſire no more, if I were a Prince, to make me Grand Signior. Soon after this laſt Act, the King, by reaſon of his Wars with *France* and *Scotland*, and other great Affairs, was forced ſometimes to end his Parliaments abruptly, and leave buſineſs undone, (and this not out of Court-tricks, which were then unknown) which produced another Act not long after, by which it was provided, That no Parliament ſhould be diſmiſs'd, till all the Petitions were anſwered; That is, in the Language of thoſe times, till all the Bills (which were then ſtiled Petitions) were finiſhed.

Doct.

Doct. Pray, Sir, give me a little account of this laſt Act you ſpeak of; for I have heard in Diſcourſe from many Lawyers, that they believe there is no ſuch.

Eng. Gent. Truly, Sir, I ſhall confeſs to you, that I do not find this Law in any of our Printed Statute-Books; but that which firſt gave me the knowledge of it was, what was ſaid about three years ago in the Houſe of Commons, by a worthy and Learned Gentleman, who undertook to produce the Record in the Reign of *Richard* the Second; and ſince I have queſtioned many Learned Counſellors about it, who tell me there is ſuch a one; and one of them, who is counted a Prerogative-Lawyer, ſaid it was ſo, but that Act was made in Factious times. Beſides, I think it will be granted, that for ſome time after and particularly in the Reigns of *Henry* the *4th*, *Henry* the *5th*, and *Henry* the *6th*, it was uſual for a Proclamation to be made in *Weſtminſter-Hall*, before the end of every Seſſion, that all thoſe that had any matter to preſent to the Parliament, ſhould bring it in before ſuch a day, for otherwiſe the Parliament at that day ſhould determine. But if there were nothing at all of this, nor any Record extant concerning it; yet I muſt believe that it is ſo by the Fundamental Law of this Government, which muſt be lame and imperfect without it; for it is all one to have no Parliaments at all but when the Prince pleaſes, and to allow a power in him to diſmiſs them when he will, that is, when they refuſe to do what he will; ſo that if there be no Statute, it is certainly becauſe our wiſe Anceſtors thought there needed none, but that by the very Eſſence and Conſtitution of the Government it is provided for: and this we may call (if you had rather have it ſo) the Common-Law, which is of as much value (if not more) than any Statute, and of which all our good Acts of Parliament and *Magna Charta* it ſelf is but Declaratory; ſo that your Objection is ſufficiently anſwered in this, That though the King is intruſted with the formal part of ſummoning and pronouncing the Diſſolution of Parliaments, which is done by his Writ, yet the Laws (which oblige him as well as us) have determin'd how and when he ſhall do it; which is enough to ſhew, that the King's ſhare in the Sovereignty, that is, in the Parliament, is cut out to him by the Law, and not left at his diſpoſal. Now I come to the King's part in the Intervals of Parliament.

Noble Ven. Sir, before you do ſo, pray tell us what other Prerogatives the King enjoys in the Government; for otherwiſe, I, who am a *Venetian*, may be apt to think that our Doge, who is call'd our Prince may have as much Power as yours.

Eng. Gen. I am in a fine condition amongſt you with my Politicks: the *Doctor* tells me I have made the King Abſolute, and now you tell me I have made him a Doge of *Venice*; But when your Prince has Power to diſpoſe of the Publick Revenue, to name all Officers Eccleſiaſtical and Civil that are of truſt and profit in the Kingdom, and to diſpoſe abſolutely of the whole Militia by Sea and Land, then we will allow him to be like ours, who has all theſe Powers.

Doct. Well, you puzzle me extremely; for when you had aſſerted the King's Power to the heighth, in Calling and Diſſolving Parliaments, you gave me ſuch ſatisfaction, and ſhewed me wherein the Law had provided, that this vaſt Prerogative could not hurt the People, that I was fully ſatisfied, and had not a word to ſay; Now you come

about again, and place in the Crown ſuch a Power, which in my Judgment is inconſiſtent with our Liberty.

Eng. Gent. Sir, I ſuppoſe you mean chiefly the Power of the Militia, which was, I muſt confeſs, doubtful, before a late Statute declar'd it to be in the King: For our Government hath made no other diſpoſal of the Militia than what was natural, *viz.* That the Peers in their ſeveral Counties, or Juriſdictions, had the Power of calling together their Vaſſals, either armed for the Wars, or only ſo as to cauſe the Law to be executed by ſerving Writs; and in caſe of reſiſtance, giving poſſeſſion: which Lords amongſt their own Tenants did then perform the two ſeveral Offices of Lord-Lieutenant, and Sheriff; which latter was but the Earls Deputy, as by his Title of *Vice-Comes* does appear. But this latter being of daily neceſſity, and Juſtice it ſelf, that is, the Lives, Liberties and eſtates of all the People in that County depending upon it, when the greatneſs of the Peers decay'd (of which we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter) the Electing of Sheriff was referred to the County-Court, where it continued till it was placed where it now is by a Statute. For the other part of the Militia, which is, the Arming the People for War, it was *de facto* exerciſed by Commiſſion from the King, to a Lord-Lieutenant (as an image of the Natural Lord) and other Deputies; and it was tacitely conſented to, though it were never ſettled by Statute (as I ſaid before) till His Majeſty's happy Reſtoration. But to anſwer you, I ſhall ſay, That whatever Powers are in the Crown, whether by Statute or by old Preſcription, they are, and muſt be underſtood to be intruſted in the Prince, for the preſervation of the Government, and for the ſafety and intereſt of the People; and when either the Militia, which is given him for the execution and ſupport of the Law, ſhall be employed by him to ſubvert it (as in the caſe of Ship-Money it was) or the Treaſure ſhall be miſ-apply'd, and made the Revenue of Courtiers and Sycophants (as in the time of *Edward* the Second) or worthleſs or wicked People ſhall be put into the greateſt places, as in the reign of *Richard* the Second; In this caſe, though the Prince here cannot be queſtionable for it, (as the Kings were in *Sparta*, and your Doges I believe would be) yet it is a great violation of the truſt repoſed in him by the Government, and a making that Power, which is given him by Law, unlawful in the Execution. And the frequent examples of Juſtice inflicted in Parliament upon the King's Miniſters for abuſing the Royal Power, ſhews plainly that ſuch authority is not left in his hands to uſe as he pleaſes. Nay, there have befallen ſad troubles and dangers to ſome of theſe Princes themſelves, who have abuſed their Power to the prejudice of the Subjects; which although they are no way juſtifiable, yet may ſerve for an Inſtruction to Princes, and an example not to hearken to ruinous Councils: for men when they are enraged do not always conſider Juſtice of Religion, paſſion being as natural to man as reaſon and virtue, which was the Opinion of divine *Machiavel.* To anſwer you then, I ſay, That though we do allow ſuch Powers in the King, yet ſince they are given him for edification and not deſtruction, and cannot be abuſed without great danger to his Miniſters, and even to himſelf; we may hope that they can never be abuſed but in a broken Government: And if ours be ſo (as we ſhall ſee anon) the fault of the ill

execution

execution of our Laws is not to be imputed either to the Prince or his Miniſters; excepting that the latter may be, as we ſaid before, juſtly puniſhable for not adviſing the Prince to conſent to the mending the frame; of which we ſhall talk more hereafter: but in the mean time I will come to the Kings other Prerogatives, as having all Royal Mines, the being ſerv'd firſt before other Creditors where money is due to him, and to have a ſpeedier and eaſier way than his Subjects to recover his debts and his Rents, &c. But to ſay all in one word, when there ariſes any doubt whether any thing be the king's Prerogative or no, this is the way of deciding it, *viz.* To conſider whether it be for the good and protection of the people that the King have ſuch a Power; For the definition of Prerogative is a conſiderable part of the Common Law, by which Power is put into the Prince for the Preſervation of his People. And if it be not for the good of his Subjects, it is not Prerogative, not Law, for our Prince has no Authority of his own, but what was firſt intruſted in him by the Government, of which he is Head; nor is it to be imagin'd that that they would give him more Power than what was neceſſary to Govern them. For example, the power of pardoning Criminals condemned, is of ſuch uſe to the Lives and Eſtates of the People, that without it many would be expoſed to die unjuſtly; As lately a poor Gentleman, who by means of the Harangue of a Strepitous Lawyer was found guilty of Murder, for a Man he never kill'd; or if he had, the fact had been but Man-ſlaughter; and he had been inevitably murder'd himſelf, if his Majeſty had not been graciouſly pleaſed to extend his Royal Mercy to him; As he did likewiſe vouchſafe to do to a Gentleman convicted for ſpeaking words he never uttered; or if he had ſpoken them, they were but fooliſhly, not malitiouſly ſpoken. On the other ſide, if a controverſy ſhould ariſe, as it did in the beginning of the laſt Parliament, between the Houſe of Commons, and the Prerogative-Lawyers, about the choice of their Speaker, theſe latter having intereſted his Majeſty in the Conteſt, and made him, by conſequence, diſoblige, *in limine*, a very Loyal, and a very Worthy Parliament; and for what? for a Queſtion, which if you will decide it the right way, will be none: for ſetting aſide the Preſidents, and the Hiſtory when the Crown firſt pretended to any ſhare in the Choice of a Speaker, which Argument was very well handled by ſome of the Learned Patriots then, I would have leave to ask, what man can ſhew, and what reaſon canbe alledged, why the protection and welfare of the People ſhould require that a Prerogative ſhould be in the Prince to chuſe the Mouth of the Houſe of Commons, when there is no particular perſon in his whole Dominion that would not think it againſt his Intereſt, if the Government had given the King Power to nominate his Baliff, his Attorney, or his Referree in any Arbitration? Certainly there can be no advantage either to the Sovereign or his Subjects, that the perſon whoſe Office it is to put their deliberations into fitting words, and expreſs all their requeſts to his Majeſty, ſhould not be entirely in their own Election and appointment; which there is the more reaſon for too, becauſe the ſpeakers for many years paſt have received Inſtructions from the Court, and have broken the Priviledges of the Houſe, by revealing their Debates, Adjourning them without a Vote, and committed

mitted many other Miſdemeanors, by which they have begotten an ill underſtanding between the King and his Houſe of Commons, to the infinite prejudice both of his Majeſty's Affairs, and his People. Since I have given this rule to Judge Prerogative by, I ſhall ſay no more of it; for as to what concerns the King's Office in the Intervals of Parliament, it is wholly Miniſterial, and is barely to put in Execution the Common Law and the Statutes made by the Sovereign Power, that is, by Himſelf and the Parliament, without varying one tittle, or ſuſpending, abrogating, or neglecting the Execution of any Act whatſoever; and to this he is Solemnly Sworn at his Coronation: And all his Power in this behalf is in him by Common Law, which is Reaſon it ſelf, written as well in the hearts of rational Men, as in the Lawyers Books.

Noble Ven. Sir, I have heard much talk of the King's Negative Voice in Parliaments, which in my Opinion is as much as a Power to fruſtrate, when he pleaſes, all the endeavours and labours of his People, and to prevent any good that might accrue to the Kingdom by having the right to meet in Parliament: for certainly, if we in *Venice* had placed any ſuch Prerogative in our Duke, or in any of our Magiſtracies, we could not call our ſelves a free People.

Eng. Gent. Sir, I can anſwer you as I did before, that if our Kings have ſuch a Power, it ought to be uſed according to the true and genuine intent of the Government, that is, for the Preſervation and Intereſt of the people, and not for the diſappointing the Counſels of a Parliament, towards reforming Grievances, and making proviſion for the future execution of the Laws; and whenever it is applied to fruſtrate thoſe ends, it is a violation of Right, and infringement of the King's Coronation-Oath; in which there is this Clauſe, That he ſhall *Confirmare conſuetudines*, (which in the Latin of thoſe times is *leges*) *quas vulgus elegerit.* I know ſome Criticks, who are rather Grammarians than Lawyers, have made a diſtinction between *elegerim* and *elegero*, and will have it, That the King Swears to ſuch Laws as the people ſhall have choſen, and not to thoſe they ſhall chuſe. But in my Opinion, if that Clauſe had been intended only to oblige the King to execute the Laws made already, it might have been better expreſt by *ſervare conſuetudines*, than by *confirmare conſuetudines*; beſides that he is by another clauſe in the ſame Oath ſworn to execute all the Laws. But I ſhall leave this Controverſy undecided; thoſe who have a deſire to ſee more of it, may look into thoſe quarrelling Declarations, *pro* and *con*, about this matter, which preceded our unhappy Civil Wars. This is certain, that there are not to be found any Statutes that have paſſed, without being preſented to his Majeſty, or to ſome commiſſioned by him; but whether ſuch Addreſſes were intended for Reſpect and Honour to His Majeſty, as the Speaker of the Houſe of Commons and the Lord Mayor of *London* are brought to him, I leave to the Learned to Diſcourſe; only thus much we may affirm, That there never were yet any Parliamentary Requeſts, which did highly concern the Publick, preſented to any King, and by him refuſed, but ſuch denials did produce very diſmal effects, as may be ſeen in our Hiſtories ancient and late; it being certain, that both the Barons Wars, and our laſt diſmal Combuſtions, proceeded from no other cauſe than the denial of the Princes then reigning to conſent to the deſires of the States of the Kingdom: and ſuch hath been the wiſdom and goodneſs of our preſent gracious

gracious Prince, that in twenty years and ſomewhat more, for which time we have enjoy'd him ſince his happy Reſtoration, he hath not exercis'd his Negative Voice towards more than one publick Bill; and that too, was to have continued in force (if it had paſſed into an Act) but for ſix Weeks, being for raiſing the Militia for ſo long time; and as for the private Bills, which are matters of meer grace, it is unreaſonable his Majeſty ſhould be refuſed that Right that every *Engliſhman* enjoys, which is not to be obliged to diſpence his favours but where he pleaſes. But for this point of the Negative Vote, it is poſſible that when we come to diſcourſe of the Cure of our Political Diſtemper, ſome of you will propoſe the clearing and explanation of this matter, and of all others which may concern the King's Power and the People's Rights.

Noble Ven. But pray, Sir, have not the Houſe of Peers a Negative Voice in all Bills? how come they not to be obliged to uſe it for the Publick Good?

Eng. Gent. So they are, no doubt, and the Commons too; but there is a vaſt difference between a deliberative Vote which the Peers have with their Negative, and that in the Crown to blaſt all without deliberating. The Peers are Co-ordinate with the Commons in preſenting and hammering of Laws, and may ſend Bills down to them, as well as receive any from them, excepting in matters wherein the People are to be taxed: and in this our Government imitates the beſt and moſt perfect Common-wealths that ever were; where the Senate aſſiſted in the making of Laws, and by their wiſdom and dexterity, poliſht, fil'd, and made ready things for the more populous Aſſemblies; and ſometimes by their gravity and moderation, reduced the People to a Calmer State, and by their authority and credit ſtem'd the Tide, and made the Waters quiet, giving the People time to come to themſelves. And therefore if we had no ſuch Peerage now upon the old Conſtitution, yet we ſhould be neceſſitated to make an artificial Peerage or Senate inſtead of it: which may aſſure our preſent Lords, that though their Dependences and Power are gone, yet that we cannot be without them; and that they have no need to fear an annihilation by our Reformation, as they ſuffered in the late mad times. But I ſhall ſpeak a word of the people's Rights, and then ſhew how this brave and excellent Government of *England* came to decay.

The People by the Fundamental Laws, that is, by the Conſtitution of the Government of *England*, have entire freedom in their Lives, Properties, and their Perſons; neither of which can in the leaſt ſuffer, but according to the Laws already made, or to be made hereafter in Parliament, and duly publiſht: and to prevent any oppreſſion that might happen in the execution of theſe good Laws, which are our Birth-right, all Trials muſt be by twelve Men of our equals, and our Neighbourhood; Theſe in all Civil Cauſes judge abſolutely, and decide the matter of Fact, upon which the matter of Law depends; but if where matter of Law is in queſtion, theſe twelve Men ſhall refuſe to find a ſpecial Verdict at the direction of the Court, the Judge cannot controul it, but their Verdict muſt be recorded. But of theſe matters, as alſo of Demurrers, Writs of Error, and Arreſts of Judgment, *&c.* I have diſcours'd to this Gentleman (who is a Stranger) before now; neither does the underſtanding of the Execution of our Municipal Laws at all belong to this diſcourſe: Only it is to be noted, that theſe Juries, or

twelve Men, in all Trials or Cauſes which are Criminal, have abſolute Power, both as to matter of Law and Fact (except the Party by Demurrer confeſs the matter of Fact, and take it out of their hands.) And the firſt queſtion the Officer asks the Foreman, when they all come in to deliver their Verdict, is this, Is he Guilty in manner and form as he is Indicted, or not Guilty? which ſhews plainly, that they are to Examine and Judge, as well whether, and how far the Fact committed is Criminal, as whether the perſon charged hath committed that Fact. But though by the Corruption of theſe times (the infallible conſequences of a broken frame of Government) this Office of the Juries and Right of *Engliſhmen* have been of late queſtion'd, yet it hath been ſtrongly and effectually vindicated by a learned Author of late, to whom I refer you for more of this matter. I ſhall ſay no more of the Rights of the People, but this one thing, That neither the King, nor any by Authority from him, hath any the leaſt Power or Juriſdiction over any *Engliſhman*, but what the Law gives them; and that although all Commiſſions and Writs go out in the King's Name, yet his Majeſty hath no right to Iſſue out any Writ (with advice of his Council, or otherwiſe) excepting what come out of his Courts; nor to alter any Clauſe in a Writ, or add any thing to it. And if any perſon ſhall be ſo wicked as to do any Injuſtice to the Life, Liberty, or Eſtate of any *Engliſhman*, by any private command of the Prince, the perſon agrieved, or his next of kin (if he be aſſaſſinated) ſhall have the ſame remedy againſt the Offender, as he ought to have had by the good Laws of this Land, if there had been no ſuch Command given; which would be abſolutely void and null, and underſtood not to proceed from that Royal and lawful Power which is veſted in his Majeſty for the Execution of Juſtice, and the protection of his People.

Doct. Now I ſee you have done with all the Government of *England*; pray before you proceed to the decay of it, let me ask you what you think of the Chancery, whether you do not believe it a Soleciſm in the Politicks to have ſuch a Court amongſt a free People; what good will *Magna Charta*, the Petition of Right, or St. *Edward's* Laws do us to defend our Property, if it muſt be entirely ſubjected to the arbitrary diſpoſal of one man, whenever any impertinent or petulant perſon ſhall put in a Bill againſt you? How inconſiſtent is this Tribunal with all that hath been ſaid in defence of our rights, or can be ſaid? Suppoſe the Prince ſhould in time to come ſo little reſpect his own honour and the Intereſt of his People, as to place a covetous or revengeful perſon in that great Judicatory, what remedy have we againſt the Corruption of Regiſters, who make what Orders they pleaſe; Or againſt the whole Hierarchy of Knaviſh Clerks, whilſt not only the puniſhing and reforming miſdemeanors depend upon him, who may without controul be the moſt guilty himſelf, but that all the Laws of *England* ſtand there arraigned before him, and may be condemned when he pleaſes? Is there, or ever was there any ſuch Tribunal in the World before, in any Country?

Eng. Gent. Doctor, I find you have had a Suit in Chancery, but I do not intend to contradict or blame your Orthodox Zeal in this point: This Court is one of thoſe Buildings that cannot be repaired, but muſt be demoliſhed. I could inform you how excellently matters of Equity are Adminiſtred in other Countries; And this worthy Gentleman could tell you of the Venerable *Quaranzia*'s in his City, where the

the Law as well as the Fact, is at the Bar, and ſubject to the Judges, and yet no complaint made or grievance ſuffered: but this is not a place for it, this is but the ſuper-ſtructure; we muſt ſettle the foundation firſt; every thing elſe is as much out of Order as this. Trade is gone, Suits are endleſs, and nothing amongſt us harmonious: but all will come right when our Government is mended, and never before, though our Judges were all Angels: this is the *primum quærite*; when you have this, all other things ſhall be added unto you; when that is done, neither the Chancery (which is grown up to this ſince our Anceſtors time) nor the Spiritual Courts, nor the Cheats in trade, nor any other abuſes, no not the Gyant Popery itſelf, ſhall ever be able to ſtand before a Parliament, no more than one of us can live like a Salamander in the fire.

Noble Ven. Therefore, Sir, pray let us come now to the decay of your Government, that we may come the ſooner to the happy Reſtoration.

Eng. Gent. This harmonious Government of *England* being founded as has been ſaid upon Property, it was impoſſible it ſhould be ſhaken, ſo long as Property remain'd where it was placed: for if, when the ancient Owners the *Britains* fled into the Mountains, and left their Lands to the Invaders (who divided them, as is above related) they had made an *Agrarian* Law to fix it; then our Government, and by conſequence our Happineſs had been for ought we know Immortal: for our Conſtitution, as it was really a mixture of the three, which are *Monarchy*, *Ariſtocracy*, and *Democracy* (as has been ſaid) ſo the weight and predominancy remain'd in the *Optimacy*, who poſſeſſed nine parts in ten of the Lands; And the Prince but about a tenth part. In this I count all the People's ſhare to the Peers, and therefore do not trouble my ſelf to enquire what proportion was allotted to them, for that although they had an Hereditary Right in their Lands, yet it was ſo clog'd with Tenures and Services, that they depended, as to publick matters, wholly on their Lords, who by them could ſerve the King in his Wars; and in time of Peace, by leading the people to what they pleaſed: Could keep the Royal Power within its due bounds, and alſo hinder and prevent the people from invading the Rights of the Crown; ſo that they were the Bulwarks of the Government, which in effect was much more an *Ariſtocracy*, than either a *Monarchy* or *Democracy*: and in all Governments, where Property is mix'd, the Adminiſtration is ſo too: And that part which hath the greater ſhare in the Lands, will have it too in the Juriſdiction: And ſo in Common-wealths, the Senate or the People have more or leſs Power, as they have more or fewer poſſeſſions; as was moſt viſible in *Rome*, where in the beginning, the *Patricii* could hardly bring the People to any thing; but afterwards, when the *Aſiatick* Conqueſts had enrich'd the Nobility to that degree, that they were able to purchaſe a great part of the Lands in *Italy*, the People were all their Clients, and eaſily brought even to cut the throats of their Redeemers the *Gracchi*, who had carried a Law for reſtoring them their Lands. But enough of this before, I will not trouble my ſelf nor you, to ſearch into the particular cauſes of this change, which has been made in the poſſeſſions here in *England*; but it is viſible that the fortieth part of the Lands which were at the beginning in the hands of the Peers and Church, is not there now; beſides that not only

only all Villanage is long ſince aboliſhed, but the other Tenures are ſo altered and qualified, that they ſignify nothing towards making the Yeomanry depend upon the Lords. The conſequence is, That the natural part of our Government, which is Power, is by means of Property in the hands of the People, whilſt the artificial part, or the Parchment, in which the Form of Government is written, remains the ſame. Now Art is a very good ſervant and help to Nature, but very weak and inconſiderable, when ſhe oppoſes her, and fights with her: it would be a very *Impar congreſſus*, between Parchment and Power: This alone is the cauſe of all the diſorder you heard of, and now ſee in *England*, and of which every man gives a reaſon according to his own fancy, whilſt few hit the right cauſe: ſome impute all to the decay of Trade, others to the growth of Popery; which are both great Calamities, but they are Effects, and not Cauſes; And if in private Families there were the ſame cauſes, there would be the ſame effects. Suppoſe now you had five or ſix thouſand Pounds a year, as it is probable you have, and keep forty Servants, and at length, by your neglect, and the induſtry and thrift of your Domeſticks, you ſell one thouſand to your Steward, another to your Clerk of the Kitchen, another to your Bayliff, till all are gone; can you believe that theſe Servants, when they had ſo good Eſtates of their own, and you nothing left to give them, would continue to live with you, and to do their ſervice as before? It is juſt ſo with a whole Kingdom. In our Anceſtor's times, moſt of the Members of our Houſe of Commons thought it an honour to retain to ſome great Lord, and to wear his blew Coat: And when they had made up their Lord's train, and waited upon him from his own Houſe to the Lord's Houſe, and made a Lane for him to enter, and departed to ſit themſelves in the Lower Houſe of Parliament, as it was then (and very juſtly) called; can you think that any thing could paſs in ſuch a Parliament that was not ordered by the Lords? Beſides, theſe Lords were the King's great Council in the Intervals of Parliaments, and were called to adviſe of Peace and War; and the latter was ſeldom made without the conſent of the major part; if it were not, they would not ſend their Tenants, which was all the Militia of *England* (beſides the King's tenth part.) Can it be believed, that in thoſe days the Commons ſhould diſlike any thing the Lords did in the Intervals, or that they would have diſputed their Right to receive Appeals from Courts of Equity, if they had pretended to it in thoſe days, or to mend Money-bills? And what is the reaſon, but becauſe the Lords themſelves at that time repreſented all their Tenants (that is, all the People) in ſome ſort? and although the Houſe of Commons did aſſemble to preſent their Grievances, yet all great Affairs of high Importance concerning the Government, was tranſacted by the Lords; and the War which was made to preſerve it, was called the Baron's Wars, not the War of both Houſes: for although in antienter times the word *Baron* were taken in a larger ſenſe, and comprehended the *Franklins* or *Freemen*; yet who reads any Hiſtory of that War, ſhall not find that any mention is made of the concurrence of any aſſembly of ſuch men, but that *Simon Monford* Earl of *Leiceſter*, and others of the great ones, did by their Power and Intereſt manage that conteſt. Now if this Property, which is gone out of the Peerage into the Commons, had paſſed into the King's hands, as it did in *Egypt* in the time of *Joſeph*, as was before ſaid, the

Prince

Prince had had a very eaſy and peaceable reign over his own Vaſſals, and might either have refuſed, juſtly, to have aſſembled the Parliament any more; or if he had pleaſed to do it, might have for ever managed it as he thought fit: But our Princes have wanted a *Joſeph*, that is, a wiſe Counſellor; and inſtead of ſaving their Revenue, which was very great, and their expences ſmall, and buying in thoſe Purchaſes which the vaſt expences and luxury of the Lords made ready for them, they have alienated their own Inheritance; ſo that now the Crown-Lands, that is, the publick Patrimony, is come to make up the intereſt of the Commons, whilſt the King muſt have a precarious Revenue out of the Peoples Purſes, and be beholding to the Parliament for his Bread in time of Peace; whereas the Kings their Predeceſſors never asked Aid of his Subjects, but in time of War and Invaſion: and this alone (though there were no other decay in the Government) is enough to make the King depend upon his People; which is no very good condition for a Monarchy.

Noble Ven. But how comes it to paſs that other Neighbouring Countries are in ſo ſettled a State in reſpect of *England?* does their Property remain the ſame it was, or is it come into the hands of the Prince? You know you were pleaſed to admit, that we ſhould ask you, *en paſſant*, ſomething of other Countries.

Eng. Gent. Sir I thank you for it, and ſhall endeavour to ſatisfy you. I ſhall ſay nothing of the ſmall Princes of *Germany*, who keep in a great meaſure their ancient bounds, both of Government and Property; and if their Princes now and then exceed their part, yet it is in time of Troubles and War, and things return into their right Channel of Aſſembling the ſeveral States, which are yet in being every where: But *Germany* lying ſo expoſed to the Invaſion of the *Turks* on the one ſide, and of the *French* on the other; and having ever had enough to do to defend their ſeveral Liberties againſt the encroachments of the Houſe of *Auſtria* (in which the Imperial dignity is become in ſome ſort Hereditary) if there had been ſomething of extraordinary power exerciſed of late years, I can ſay *Inter arma ſilent leges:* but beſides their own particular States, they have the Diet of the Empire, which never fails to mediate and compoſe things, if there be any great oppreſſion uſed by Princes to their ſubjects, or from one Prince or State to another. I ſhall therefore confine my ſelf to the three great Kingdoms, *France*, *Spain*, and *Poland*; for as to *Denmark* and *Sweden*, the firſt hath lately chang'd its Government, and not only made the Monarchy Hereditary, which was before Elective, but has pull'd down the Nobility, and given their Power to the Prince; which how it will ſucceed, time will ſhew. *Sweden* remains in point of Conſtitution and Property exactly as it did anciently, and is a well-Governed Kingdom. The firſt of the other three is *France*, of which I have ſpoken before, and ſhall only add, That though it be very true, that there is Property in *France*, and yet the Government is Deſpotical at this preſent, yet it is one of thoſe violent States, which the *Grecians* call'd Tyrannies: For if a Lawfull Prince, that is, one who being ſo by Law, and ſworn to rule according to it, breaks his Oaths and his Bonds, and reigns Arbitrarily, he becomes a Tyrant and an Uſurper, as to ſo much as he aſſumes more than the Conſtitution hath given him; and ſuch a Government, being as I ſaid violent, and not natural, but contrary to the Intereſt of the

people, firſt cannot be laſting, when the adventitious props which ſupport it fail; and whilſt it does endure, muſt be very uneaſy both to Prince and People; the firſt being neceſſitated to uſe continual oppreſſion, and the latter to ſuffer it.

Doct. You are pleaſed to talk of the oppreſſion of the People under the King of *France*, and for that reaſon, call it a violent Government, when, If I remember, you did once to day extol the Monarchy of the *Turks* for well-founded and natural; Are not the people in that Empire as much oppreſſed as in *France?*

Eng. Gent. By no means; unleſs you will call it oppreſſion for the grand Signior to feed all his People out of the Product of his own Lands; and though they ſerve him for it, yet that does not alter the Caſe for if you ſet poor men to work and pay them for it, are you a Tyrant, or rather, are not you a good Common-wealths-man, by helping thoſe to live, who have no other way of doing it but by their labour? But the King of *France* knowing that his People have, and ought to have, Property, and that he has no right to their Poſſeſſions, yet takes what he pleaſes from them, without their conſent, and contrary to Law; So that when he ſets them on work he pays them what he pleaſes, and that he levies out of their own Eſtates. I do not affirm that there is no Government in the World, but where Rule is founded in Property; but I ſay there is no natural fixed Government, but where it is ſo; and when it is otherwiſe the People are perpetually complaining, and the King in perpetual anxiety, always in fear of his Subjects, and ſeeking new ways to ſecure himſelf; God having been ſo merciful to mankind, that he has made nothing ſafe for Princes, but what is Juſt and Honeſt.

Noble Ven. But you were ſaying juſt now, that this preſent Conſtitution in *France* will fall when the props fail; we in *Italy*, who live in perpetual fear of the greatneſs of that Kingdom, would be glad to hear ſomething of the decaying of thoſe props; What are they, I beſeech you?

Eng. Gent. The firſt is the greatneſs of the preſent King, whoſe heroick Actions and Wiſdom has extinguiſhed envy in all his Neighbour-Princes, and kindled fear, and brought him to be above all poſſibility of control at home; not only becauſe his Subjects fear his Courage, but becauſe they have his Virtue in admiration, and amidſt all their miſeries cannot chuſe but have ſomething of rejoicing, to ſee how high he hath mounted the Empire and Honour of their Nation. The next prop is the change of their ancient Conſtitution, in the time of *Charles* the Seventh, by Conſent: for about that time the Country being ſo waſted by the Invaſion and Excurſions of the *Engliſh*, The States then aſſembled Petitioned the King that he would give them leave to go home, and diſpoſe of Affairs himſelf, and Order the Government for the future as he thought fit. Upon this, his Succeſſor *Lewis* the Eleventh, being a crafty Prince, took an occaſion to call the States no more, but to ſupply them with an *Aſſemble des notables*, which were certain men of his own nomination, like *Barbones* Parliament here, but that they were of better quality: Theſe in ſucceeding reigns (being the beſt men of the Kingdom) grew Troubleſome and Intractable; ſo that for ſome years the Edicts have been verified (that is in our Language) Bills have been paſſed in the Grand Chamber of the Parliament at *Paris*, commonly called the *Chambre d' audience*, who lately, and ſince the Impriſonment of Preſident *Brouſelles* and others during this King's Minority,

Minority, have never refuſed or ſcrupled any Edicts whatſoever. Now whenever this great King dies, and the States of the Kingdom are reſtored, theſe two great props of Arbitrary Power are taken away. Beſides theſe two, the Conſtitution of the Government of *France* it ſelf, is ſomewhat better fitted than ours to permit extraordinary Power in the Prince, for the whole People there poſſeſſing Lands, are Gentlemen; that is, infinitely the greater part; which was the reaſon why in their Aſſembly of Eſtates, the Deputies of the Provinces (which we call here Knights of the Shire) were choſen by, and out of the Gentry, and ſate with the Peers in the ſame Chamber, as repreſenting the Gentry only, called *petite nobleſſe*. Whereas our Knights here (whatever their blood is) are choſen by Commoners, and are Commoners; our Laws and Government taking no notice of any Nobility but the perſons of the Peers, whoſe Sons are likewiſe Commoners, even their eldeſt, whilſt their Father lives: Now Gentry are ever more tractable by a Prince, than a wealthy and numerous Commonalty; out of which our Gentry (at leaſt thoſe we call ſo) are raiſed from time to time: For whenever either a Merchant, Lawyer, Tradeſman, Grafier, Farmer, or any other, gets ſuch an Eſtate, as that he or his Son can live upon his Lands, without exerciſing of any other Calling, he becomes a Gentleman. I do not ſay, but that we have men very Nobly deſcended amongſt theſe, but they have no preheminence, or diſtinction, by the Laws or Government. Beſides this the Gentry in *France* are very needy, and very numerous; the reaſon of which is, That the Elder Brother, in moſt parts of that Kingdom, hath no more ſhare in the diviſion of the Paternal Eſtate, than the Cadets or Younger Brothers, excepting the Principal Houſe, with the Orchards and Gardens about it, which they call *Voll de Chappon*, as who ſhould ſay, As far as a Capon can fly at once. This Houſe gives him the Title his Father had, who was called Signior, or Baron, or Count of that place; which if he ſells, he parts with his Baronſhip, and for ought I know becomes in time *roturier*, or ignoble. This practice divides the Lands into ſo many ſmall parcels, that the Poſſeſſors of them being Noble, and having little to maintain their Nobility, are fain to ſeek their Fortune, which they can find no where ſo well as at the Court, and ſo become the King's Servants and Soldiers, for they are generally Couragious, Bold, and of a good Mien. None of theſe can ever advance themſelves, but by their deſert, which makes them hazard themſelves very deſperately, by which means great numbers of them are kill'd, and the reſt come in time to be great Officers, and live ſplendidly upon the King's Purſe, who is likewiſe very liberal to them, and according to their reſpective merits, gives them often, in the beginning of a Campagne, a conſiderable ſum to furniſh out their Equipage. Theſe are a great Prop to the Regal Power, it being their Intereſt to ſupport it, leſt their gain ſhould ceaſe, and they be reduced to be poor *Provinciaux*, that is, Country-Gentlemen again: whereas, if they had ſuch Eſtates as our Country-Gentry have, they would deſire to be at home at their eaſe, whilſt theſe (having ten times as much from the King as their own Eſtate can yield them, which ſupply muſt fail, if the King's Revenue were reduced) are perpetually engaged to make good all exorbitances.

Doct. This is a kind of governing by Property too, and it puts me in mind of a Gentleman of good Eſtate in our Country, who took a

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Tenant's Son of his to be his Servant, whoſe Father not long after dying, left him a Living of about ten Pound a year: the young Man's Friends came to him, and aſked him why he would ſerve now he had an Eſtate of his own able to maintain him: his Anſwer was, That his own Lands would yield him but a third part of what his Service was worth to him in all; beſides, that he lived a pleaſant Life, wore good Cloaths, kept good Company, and had the converſation of very pretty Maids that were his Fellow-ſervants, which made him very well digeſt the name of being a Servant.

Eng. Gent. This is the very Caſe; but yet Service (in both theſe Caſes) is no Inheritance; and when there comes a peaceable King in *France*, who will let his Neighbours be quiet, or one that is covetous, theſe fine Gentlemen will loſe their Employments, and their King this Prop; and the rather, becauſe theſe Gentlemen do not depend (as was ſaid before) in any kind upon the great Lords (whoſe ſtanding Intereſt is at Court) and ſo cannot in a change, be by them carried over to advance the Court-deſigns againſt their own good and that of their Country. And thus much is ſufficient to be ſaid concerning *France*. As for *Spain*, I believe there is no Country (excepting *Sweden)* in Chriſtendom, where the Property has remained ſo entirely the ſame it was at the beginning; and the reaſon is, the great and ſtrict care that is taken to hinder the Lands from paſſing out of the old owners hands; for except it be by Marriages, no Man can acquire another Man's Eſtate, nor can any Grandee, or Titulado, or any other Hidalgo there, alienate or engage his Paternal or Maternal Eſtate, otherwiſe than for his Life; nor can alter Tenures, or extinguiſh Services, or diſmember Mannors: for to this the Prince's conſent muſt be had, which he never gives, till the matter be debated in the *Conſejo de Camera*, which is no *Junta* or ſecret *Conſejo de Guerras*, but one wherein the great Men of the Kingdom intervene, and wherein the great matters concerning the preſervation of the Government are tranſacted, not relating to Foreign Provinces or Governments, but to the Kingdom of *Caſtile* and *Leon*, of which I only ſpeak now. It is true, there have been one or two exceptions againſt this ſevere Rule, ſince the great calamities of *Spain*, and two great Lordſhips have been ſold, the *Marquiſate del Monaſtero*, to an *Aſſent iſta Genoeſe*, and another to *Sebaſtian Cortiza* a *Portugueſe*, of the ſame Profeſſion: but both theſe have bought the intire Lordſhips, without curtailing or altering the condition in which theſe two great Eſtates were before; and notwithſtanding, this hath cauſed ſo much repining amongſt the natural *Godos* (as the *Caſtilians* call themſelves ſtill for glory) that I believe this will never be drawn into an Example hereafter. Now the Property remaining the ſame, the Government doth ſo too, and the King's Domeſtick Government, over his natural *Spaniards*, is very gentle, whatever it be in his conquer'd Provinces; and the Kings there have very great advantages of keeping their great Men (by whom they govern) in good temper, by reaſon of the great Governments they have to beſtow upon them, both in *Europe* and the *Indies*; which changing every three years, go in an Age through all the Grandees, which are not very numerous. Beſides, *Caſtile* having been in the time of King *Roderigo* over-run and conquered by the *Moors*, who governed there deſpotically, ſome hundreds of years, before it could be recovered again by the old Inhabitants, who fled to the Mountains; When they

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were at length driven out, the Count of *Caſtile* found a Tax ſet upon all Commodities whatſoever, by the *Moors*, in their Reign, called *Alcaval*, which was an eaſy matter to get continued (when their old Government was reſtored) by the *Cortes*, or States; and ſo it has continued ever ſince, as the Exciſe has done here, which being impoſed by them who drove and kept out the King, does now ſince his happy Reſtoration remain a Revenue of the Crown. This *Alcaval*, or Exciſe, is a very great Revenue, and ſo prevented, for ſome time, the neceſſities of the Crown, and made the Prince have the leſs need of aſking Relief of his People, (the ordinary cauſe of diſguſt,) ſo that the *Cortes*, or Aſſembly of the States, has had little to do of late, though they are duly aſſembled every year, but ſeldom contradict what is deſired by the Prince; for there are no greater Idolaters of their Monarch in the World than the *Caſtilians* are, nor who drink deeper of the Cup of Loyalty: ſo that in ſhort, the Government in *Spain* is as ours was in Queen *Elizabeth*'s time, or in the firſt year after his now Majeſty's Return, when the Parliament for a time complimented the Prince, who had by that means both his own Power and the People's: which Days I hope to ſee again, upon a better and more laſting Foundation. But before I leave *Spain*, I muſt ſay a word of the Kingdom of *Arragon*, which has not at all times had ſo quiet a ſtate of their Monarchy as *Caſtile* hath enjoyed; for after many Combuſtions which happened there, concerning their *Fueros* and *Privilegios*, which are their Fundamental Laws, the King one day coming to his Seat in Parliament, and making his demands, as was uſual, they told him that they had a Requeſt to make to him firſt; and he withdrawing thereupon, (for he had no right of ſitting there to hear their Debates) they fell into diſcourſe how to make their Government ſubſiſt againſt the Encroachments of the Prince upon them, and went very high in their Debates, which could not chooſe but come to the King's ear, who walked in a gallery in the ſame Palace to expect the iſſue; and being in great Paſſion, was ſeen to draw out his Dagger very often, and thruſt it again into the Sheath; and heard to ſay, *Sangre ha de coſtar*; which coming to the knowledge of the Eſtates, they left off the Debate, and ſent ſome of their number to him, to know what blood it ſhould coſt, and whether he meant to murder any body. He drew out his Dagger again, and pointing it to his breaſt, he ſaid, *Sangre de Reys*; leaving them in doubt, whether he meant that his Subjects would kill him, or that he would do it himſelf. However, that Parliament ended very peaceably, and a famous ſettlement was there and then made, by which a great perſon was to be choſen every Parliament, who ſhould be as it were an Umpire between the King and his People, for the execution of the Laws, and the preſervation of their Government, their *Fueros* and *Privilegios*, which are their Courts of Juſtice, and their Charters. This Officer was called, *El Juſticia d' Arragon*, and his duty was to call together the whole Power of the Kingdom, whenever any of the aforeſaid Rights were by open force violated or invaded, and to admoniſh the King, whenever he heard of any clandeſtine Councils among them to that effect. It was likewiſe made Treaſon, for any perſon of what quality ſoever, to refuſe to repair upon due ſummons to any place where this *Juſticia* ſhould erect his Standard, or to withdraw himſelf without leave, much more to betray him, or to revolt from him: Beſides, in this *Cortes*,

or Parliament, the old Oath which at the first Foundation of their State was ordered to be taken by the King at his admittance, was again revived, and which is in these words: *Nos que valemos tanto camo nos, y podemos mas, os eligimos nuestro Rey, conque nos guardeys nuestros Fueros y Privilegios; y si no, no.* That is, We who are as good as you, and more Powerful, do choose you our King, upon condition that you preserve our Rights and Privileges; and if not, not. Notwithstanding all this, *Philip* the Second, being both King of *Castile* and *Arragon*, picked a quarrel with the latter, by demanding his Secretary *Antonio Perez*, who fled from the King's displeasure thither, being his own Country; and they refusing to deliver him (it being expresly contrary to a Law of *Arragon*, that a Subject of that Kingdom should be against his will carried to be tryed elsewhere) the King took that occasion to invade them with the Forces of his Kingdom of *Castile* (who had ever been Rivals and Enemies to the *Aragoneses)* and they to defend themselves under their *Justicia*, who did his part faithfully and couragiously; but the *Castilians* being old Soldiers, and those of *Arragon* but County-Troops, the former prevailed, and so this Kingdom in getting that of *Castile* by a Marriage (but an Age before) lost its own Liberty and Government: for it is since made a Province, and governed by a Vice-Roy from *Madrid*, although they keep up the formality of their *Cortes* still.

Doct. No man living that knew the hatred and hostility that ever was between the *English* and *Scots*, could have imagined in the years 1639, and 1640, when our King was with great Armies of *English* upon the Frontiers of *Scotland*, ready to invade that Kingdom, that this nation would not have assisted to have brought them under; but it prov'd otherwise.

Eng. Gent. It may be they feared, That when *Scotland* was reduced to slavery, and the Province pacified, and Forces kept up there, That such Forces and greater might have been employed here, to reduce us into the same condition; an apprehension which at this time sticks with many of the common People, and helps to fill up the measure of our Fears and Distractions. But the visible reason why the *English* were not at that time very forward to oppress their Neighbours, was the consideration, That they were to be invaded for refusing to receive from hence certain Innovations in matters of Religion and the worship of God, which had not long before been introduced here; and therefore the People of this Kingdom were unwilling to perpetuate a Mungrel Church here, by imposing it upon them. But I do exceedingly admire, when I read our History, to see how zealous and eager our Nobility and People here were anciently to assert the right of our Crown to the Kingdom of *France*; whereas it is visible that if we had kept *France* (for we Conquered it entirely and fully, to this day, we must have run the fate of *Arragon*, and been in time ruined and oppress't by our own valour and good Fortune; a thing that was foreseen by the *Macedonians*, when their King *Alexander* had subdued all *Persia* and the *East*; who weighing how probable it was, that their Prince having the possession of such great and flourishing Kingdoms, should change his *Domicilium Imperii*, and inhabit in the Center of his Dominions, and from thence Govern *Macedon*, by which means the *Grecians*, who by their Virtue and Valour had Conquered and subdued the *Barbarians*, should in time (even

(even as an effect of their Victories) be oppreſt and tyrannized over by them: And this precautious foreſight in the *Greeks* (as was fully believed in that Age) haſtened the fatal Cataſtrophe of that great Prince.

Doct. Well, I hope this conſideration will fore-arm our Parliaments, That they will not eaſily ſuffer their eyes to be dazzled any more with the falſe glory of Conquering *France.*

Noble Ven. You need no great cautions againſt Conquering *France* at this preſent, and I believe your Parliaments need as little admonition againſt giving of Money towards new Wars or Alliances, that fine wheedle having lately loſt them enough already; therefore, pray, let us ſuffer our Friend to go on.

Eng. Gent. I have no more to ſay of Foreign Monarchies, but only to tell you, That *Poland* is both Governed and Poſſeſſed by ſome very great Perſons or Potentates, called *Palatines*, and under them by a very numerous Gentry; for the King is not only Elective, but ſo limitted, that he has little or no Power, but to Command their Armies in time of War; which makes them often chuſe Foreigners of great Fame for Military Exploits: and as for the Commonalty or Countrymen, they are abſolutely Slaves or Villains. This Government is extremely confuſed, by reaſon of the numerouſneſs of the Gentry, who do not always meet by way of repreſentation as in other Kingdoms, but ſometimes for the choice of their King, and upon other great occaſions, collectively, in the Field, as the Tribes did at *Reme*; which would make things much more turbulent if all this body of Gentry did not wholly depend for their Eſtates upon the favour of the Palatines their Lords, which makes them much more tractable. I have done with our Neighbours beyond Sea, and ſhould not without your command have made ſo long a digreſſion in this place, which ſhould indeed have been treated of before we come to ſpeak of *England*, but that you were pleaſed to divert me from it before: However, being placed nearthe Portraicture of our own Country, it ſerves better (as *contraria juxta ſe poſita)* to illuſtrate it: but I will not make this Deviation longer, by Apologizing for it; and ſhall therefore deſire you to take notice, That as in *England* by degrees Property came to ſhift from the few to the many, ſo the Government is grown heavier and more uneaſy both to Prince and People, the complaints more in Parliament, the Laws more numerous, and much more tedious and prolix, to meet with the tricks and malice of men, which works in a looſe Government; for there was no need to make Acts *verboſe*, when the great Perſons could preſently force the Execution of them: for the Law of *Edward* the Firſt, for frequent Parliaments, had no more words than *A Parliament ſhall be holden every year*, whereas our Act for a Triennial Parliament, in the time of King *Charles* the Firſt, contained ſeveral ſheets of paper, to provide againſt a failer in the Execution of that Law; which if the Power had remained in the Lords, would have been needleſs: for ſome of them, in caſe of intermiſſion of Aſſembling the Parliament, would have made their Complaint and Addreſs to the King, and have immediately removed the obſtruction, which in thoſe days had been the natural and eaſy way: But now that many of the Lords (like the Biſhops which the Popes make at *Rome*, *in partibus infidelium)* are meerly grown Titular, and purchaſed for nothing but to get their Wives place, it cannot be

be wondred at if the King ſlight their Addreſſes, and the Court-Paraſites deride their Honourable undertakings for the ſafety of their Country. Now the Commons ſucceeding, as was ſaid, in the Property of the Peers and Church (whoſe Lands five parts of ſix have been alienated, and moſtly is come into the ſame hands with thoſe of the King and Peers) have inherited likewiſe, according to the courſe of nature, their Power; But being kept from it by the eſtabliſhed Government, which (not being changed by any lawfull Acts of State) remains ſtill in being formally, whereas virtually it is aboliſhed; ſo that for want of outward Orders and Proviſions, the people are kept from the Exerciſe of that Power which is fallen to them by the Law of Nature; and thoſe who cannot by that Law pretend to the ſhare, they had, do yet enjoy it by virtue of that Right which is now ceaſed as having been but the natural Effect of a Cauſe that is no longer in being; and you know *ſublata cauſa, tollitur.* I cannot ſay that the greater part of the people do know this their condition, but they find very plainly that they want ſomthing which they ought to have; and this makes them lay often the blame of their unſettledneſs upon wrong cauſes: but however, are altogether unquiet and reſtleſs in the Intervals of Parliament; and when the King pleaſes to aſſemble one, ſpend all their time in Complaints of the Inexecution of the Law, of the multiplication of an Infinity of Grievances, of Miſ-ſpending the Publick Monies, of the danger our Religion is in by practices to undermine it and the State by endeavours to bring in Arbitrary Power, and in queſtioning great Officers of State, as the Cauſers and Promoters of all theſe Abuſes; in ſo much, that every Parliament ſeems a perfect State of War, wherein the Commons are tugging and contending for their Right, very juſtly and very honourably, yet without coming to a Point: So that the Court ſends them packing, and governs ſtill worſe and worſe in the Vacancies, being neceſſitated thereunto by their deſpair of doing any good in Parliament; and therefore are forced to uſe horrid ſhifts to ſubſiſt without it, and to keep it off; without ever conſidering, that if theſe Counſellors underſtood their Trade, they might bring the Prince and People to ſuch an Agreement in Parliament, as might repair the broken and ſhipwrack'd Government of *England*; and in this ſecure the Peace, Quiet and Proſperity of the People, the Greatneſs and Happineſs of the King, and be themſelves not only out of preſent danger (which no other courſe can exempt them from) but be Renowned to all Poſterity.

Noble Ven. I beſeech you, Sir, how comes it to paſs, that neither the King, nor any of his Counſellors could ever come to find out the truth of what you diſcourſe? For I am fully convinced it is as you ſay.

Eng. Gent. I cannot reſolve you that, but this is certain, they have never endeavoured a Cure, though poſſibly they might know the Diſeaſe, as fearing that though the Effects of a Remedy would be, as was ſaid, very advantagious both to King and People, and to themſelves; yet poſſibly, ſuch a Reformation might not conſiſt with the Merchandize they make of the Princes favour, nor with ſuch Bribes, Gratuities and Fees as they uſually take for the diſpatch of all Matters before them. And therefore our Counſellors have been ſo far from ſuggeſting any ſuch thing to their Maſter, that they have oppoſed and quaſhed

quaſhed all Attempts of that kind, as they did the worthy Propoſals made by certain Members of that Parliament in the beginning of King *James*'s Reign, which is yet called the Undertaking Parliament. Theſe Gentlemen conſidering what we have been diſcourſing of, *viz.* That our old Government is at an end, had framed certain Heads, which, if they had been propoſed by that Parliament to the King, and by him conſented to, would, in their Opinion, have healed the Breach; and that if the King would perform his part, that Houſe of Commons would undertake for the Obedience of the People. They did believe that if this ſhould have been moved in Parliament before the King was acquainted with it, it would prove Abortive: and therefore ſent three of their number to his Majeſty; Sir *James a Croft*, Grandfather or Father to the preſent Biſhop of *Hereford*; *Thomas Harley*, who was Anceſtor to the Honourable Family of that Name in *Herefordſhire*; and Sir *Henry Nevill*, who had been Ambaſſador from Queen *Elizabeth* to the *French* King. Theſe were to open the matter at large to the King, and to procure his leave that it might be propoſed in Parliament: Which, after a very long Audience and Debate, that wiſe Prince conſented to, with a promiſe of Secreſy in the mean time, which they humbly begged of His Majeſty. However, this took Vent, and the Earl of *Northampton*, of the Houſe of *Howard*, who ruled the Roſt in that time, having knowledge of it, engaged Sir *R. Weſton*, afterwards Lord Treaſurer and Earl of *Portland*, to impeach theſe Undertakers in Parliament before they could move their matters; which he did the very ſame day, accompanying his Charge (which was endeavouring to alter the eſtabliſhed Government of *England*) with ſo eloquent an Invective, that if one of them had not riſen, and made the Houſe acquainted with the whole Series of the Affair, they muſt have been in danger of being impeached by the Commons: but however it broke their deſign, which was all that *Northampton* and *Weſton* deſired, and prevented Poſterity from knowing any of the particulars of this Reformation; for nothing being moved, nothing could remain upon the Journal. So that you ſee our Predeceſſors were not ignorant altogether of our condition, though the Troubles which have befallen this poor Kingdom ſince, have made it much more apparent: for ſince the Determination of that Parliament, there has not been one call'd, either in that King's Reign, or his Son's, or ſince, that hath not been diſſolved abruptly, whilſt the main buſineſſes, and thoſe of moſt concern to the publick, were depending and undecided. And although there hath happened in this Interim a bloody War, which in the cloſe of it, changed the whole Order and Foundation of the Polity of *England*, and that it hath pleaſed God to reſtore it again by his Majeſty's happy Return, ſo that the old Government is alive again; yet it is very viſible that its deadly Wound is not healed, but that we are to this day tugging with the ſame difficulties, managing the ſame Debates in Parliament, and giving the ſame diſguſts to the Court, and hopes to the Country, which our Anceſtors did before the Year 1640. whilſt the King hath been forced to apply the ſame Remedy of Diſſolution to his two firſt Parliaments, that his Father uſed to his four firſt, and King *James* to his three laſt, contrary to his own viſible Intereſt, and that of his people; and this for want of having Counſellors about him of Abilities and Integrity enough to diſcover to him the Diſeaſe of his

Government, and the Remedy: which I hope, when we meet to Morrow Morning you will come prepared to enquire into; for the Doctor ſays, he will adviſe you to go take the Air this afternoon in your Coach.

Noble Ven. I ſhall think it very long till the morning come: But before you go, pray give me leave to ask you ſomething of your Civil War here; I do not mean the Hiſtory of it (although the World abroad is very much in the dark as to all your Tranſactions of that time for want of a good one) but the grounds or pretences of it, and how you fell into a War againſt your King.

Eng. Gen. As for our Hiſtory, it will not be forgotten; one of thoſe who was in Employment from the Year 40. to 60. hath written the Hiſtory of thoſe 20 Years, a Perſon of good Learning and Elocution; and though he be now dead, yet his Executors are very unwilling to publiſh it ſo ſoon, and to rub a Sore that is not yet healed. But the Story is writ with great Truth and Impartiality, although the Author were engaged both in Councils and Arms for the Parliament's ſide. But for the reſt of your Demand, you may pleaſe to underſtand, that our Parliament never did, as they pretended, make War againſt the King; for he by Law can do no Wrong, and therefore cannot be quarrelled with: The War they declared was undertaken to reſcue the King's Perſon out of thoſe Men's hands who led him from his Parliament, and made uſe of his Name to levy a War againſt them.

Noble Ven. But does your Government permit, that in caſe of a diſagreement, between the King and his Parliament, either of them may raiſe Arms againſt the other?

Eng. Gent. It is impoſſible that any Government can go further than to provide for its own Safety and Preſervation whilſt it is in being, and therefore it can never direct what ſhall be done when it ſelf is at an end; there being this difference between our Bodies Natural and Politick, that the firſt can make a Teſtament to diſpoſe of things after his death, but not the other. This is certain, that wherever any two Co-ordinate Powers do differ, and there be no Power on Earth to reconcile them otherwiſe, nor any Umpire, they will, *de facto*, fall together by the Ears. What can be done in this Caſe *de jure*, look into your own Countryman *Machiavel*, and into *Grotius*, who in his Book *De jure Belli ac Pacis*, treated of ſuch matters long before our Wars. As for the ancient Politicians, they muſt needs be ſilent in the Point, as having no mixt Governments amongſt them; and as for me, I will not reſt my ſelf in ſo ſlippery a Place. There are great diſputes about it in the Parliaments Declarations before the War, and ſomething conſiderable in the King's Anſwers to them; which I ſhall ſpecify immediately, when I have ſatisfied you how our War begun; which was in this manner: The Long Parliament having procured from the King his Royal Aſſent for their Sitting till they were diſſolved by Act, and having paid and ſent out the Scottiſh Army, and disbanded our own, went on in their Debates for the ſettling and mending our Government: the King being diſpleaſed with them for it, and with himſelf for putting it out of his Power to diſſolve them, now the buſineſs which they pretended for their Perpetuation was quite finiſhed, takes an unfortunate Reſolution to accuſe five principal Men of the Commons Houſe, and one of the Peers, of High-Treaſon: which he proſecuted in a new unheard-of way, by coming with armed Men into the Commons

Houſe

Houſe of Parliament, to demand their Members; but nothing being done by reaſon of the abſence of the five, and Tumults of diſcontented Citizens flocking to *White-Hall* and *Weſtminſter*, the King took that occaſion to abſent himſelf from his Parliament. Which induced the Commons Houſe to ſend Commiſſioners to *Hampton-Court* to attend his Majeſty with *a Remonſtrance of the State of the Kingdom*, and an humble Requeſt to return to his Parliament, for the Redreſſing thoſe Grievances which were ſpecified in that Remonſtrance. But the King, otherwiſe Counſelled, goes to *Windſor*, and thence Northwards, till he arrived at *York*; where he ſummons in the *Militia*, that is, the Trained-Bands of the County; and beſides, all the Gentry, of which there was a numerous Appearance. The King addreſſed himſelf to the latter with Complaints againſt a prevailing Party in Parliament, which intended to take the Crown from his Head; that he was come to them, his loving Subjects, for Protection; and, in ſhort, deſired them to aſſiſt him with Monies to defend himſelf by Arms. Some of theſe Gentlemen petitioned His Majeſty to return to his Parliament, the reſt went about the Debate of the King's Demands; who, in the mean time, went to *Hull*, to ſecure the Magazine there, but was denied Entrance by a Gentleman whom the Houſe had ſent down to prevent the ſeizing it; who was immediately declared a Traytor, and the King fell to raiſing of Forces: which coming to the Knowledge of the Houſe, they made this Vote, *That the King, ſeduced by Evil Counſel, intended to levy War againſt his Parliament and People, to deſtroy the Fundamental Laws and Liberties of* England, *and to introduce an Arbitrary Government*, &c. This was the firſt time they named the King, and the laſt: For in all their other Papers, and in their Declaration to Arm for their Defence (which did accompany this Vote) they name nothing but Malignant Counſellors. The King's Anſwer to theſe Votes and this Declaration, is that which I mentioned; wherein His Majeſty denies any intention of invading the Government, with high Imprecations upon himſelf and Poſterity if it were otherwiſe: and owns that they have Right to maintain their Laws and Government. This is to be ſeen in the Paper it ſelf now extant; and this Gracious Prince never pretended (as ſome Divines have done for him) that his Power came from God, and that his Subjects could not diſpute it, nor ought he to give any Account of his Actions (though he ſhould enſlave us all) to any but him. So that our War did not begin upon a point of Right, but upon a matter of Fact; for without going to Lawyers or Caſuiſts to be reſolved, thoſe of the People who believed that the King did intend to deſtroy our Liberties, joined with the Parliament; and thoſe who were of opinion that the prevailing party in Parliament did intend to deſtroy the King or dethrone him, aſſiſted vigorouſly His Majeſty with their Lives and Fortunes. And the Queſtion you were pleaſed to ask never came; for both parties pretended and believed they were in the right, and that they did fight for and defend the Government: But I have wearied you out.

Noble Ven. No ſure, Sir, but I am infinitely obliged to you for the great care you have taken and ſtill have uſed to inſtruct me, and beg the continuance of it for to morrow morning.

Eng. Gent. I ſhall be ſure to wait upon you at nine a Clock, but I ſhall beſeech both of you to bethink your ſelves what to offer, for I

ſhall

ſhall come with a deſign to learn, not to teach: nor will I preſume in ſuch a matter to talk all, as you have made me do to day; for what I have yet to ſay in the point of Cure, is ſo little, that it will look like the Mouſe to the Mountain of this day's diſcourſe.

Doct. It is ſo in all Arts, the Corollary is ſhort, and in ours particularly. Thoſe who write of the ſeveral Diſeaſes incident to human Bodies, muſt make long Diſcourſes of the Cauſes, Symptoms, Signs and Prognoſticks of ſuch Diſtempers; but when they come to treat of the Cure, it is diſpatched in a few *Recipes*.

Eng. Gent. Well, Sir, for this bout, I humbly take my leave of you; nay, Sir, you are not in a condition to uſe ceremony.

Doct. Sir, I forbid you this door; pray retire: to ſtand here, is worſe than to be in the open air.

Noble Ven. I obey you both.

Doct. I ſhall wait on you in the Evening.

The THIRD DAY.

Noble Ven. GEntlemen, you are very welcome: what, you are come both together!

Doct. I met this Gentleman at the door: But methinks we ſit looking one upon another, as if all of us were afraid to ſpeak.

Eng. Gent. Do you think we have not reaſon, in ſuch a ſubject as this is? how can any Man, without Heſitation, preſume to be ſo confident as to deliver his private opinion in a point, upon which, for almoſt 200 years (for ſo long our Government has been crazy) no Man has ventured; and when Parliaments have done any thing towards it, there have been Animoſities and Breaches, and at length Civil Wars?

Noble Ven. Our work to day is, to endeavour to ſhew how all theſe troubles may be prevented for the future, by taking away the Cauſe of them, which is the want of a good Government; and therefore it will not be ſo much preſumption in you, as charity, to declare your ſelf fully in this matter.

Eng. Gent. The Cure will follow naturally, if you are ſatisfied in the Diſeaſe, and in the Cauſe of the Diſeaſe: for if you agree that our Government is broken, and that it is broken becauſe it was Founded upon Property, and that Foundation is now ſhaken; it will be obvious, that you muſt either bring Property back to your old Government, and give the King and Lords their Lands again, or elſe you muſt bring the Government to the Property as it now ſtands.

Doct. I am very well ſatisfied in your Grounds; but becauſe this Fundamental truth is little underſtood amongſt our People, and that in all converſations men will be offering their opinions of what the Parliament ought to do at their Meeting, it will not be amiſs to examine ſome of thoſe Expedients they propoſe, and to ſee whether ſome or all of them may not be effectual towards the bringing us to ſome degree of ſettlement, rather than to venture upon ſo great a change and alteration as would be neceſſary to model our Government anew.

Eng. Gent. Sir, I believe there can be no Expedients propoſed in Parliament that will not take up as much time and trouble, find as much difficulty in paſſing with the King and Lords, and ſeem as great a change of Government, as the true remedy would appear, at leaſt

leaſt I ſpeak as to what I have to purpoſe; but however, I approve your Method, and if you will pleaſe to propoſe any of thoſe things, I ſhall either willingly embrace them, or endeavour to ſhew reaſon why they will be of little fruit in the ſettling our State.

Doct. I will reduce them to two Heads (beſides the making good Laws for keeping out Arbitrary Power, which is always underſtood:) the hindering the growth of Popery, and conſequently the providing againſt a Popiſh Succeſſor; and then the declaring the Duke of *Monmouth*'s Right to the Crown, after it hath been examined and agreed to in Parliament.

Eng. Gent. As for the making new Laws, I hold it abſolutely needleſs, thoſe we have already againſt Arbitrary Power being abundantly ſufficient, if they might be executed; but that being impoſſible (as I ſhall ſhew hereafter) till ſome change ſhall be made, I ſhall *poſtpone* this point: and for the firſt of your other two, I ſhall divide and ſeparate the conſideration of the growth of Popery from that of the Succeſſion. I am ſorry that in the proſecution of this Argument, I ſhall be forced to ſay ſomething that may not be very pleaſing to this worthy Gentleman, we being neceſſitated to diſcourſe with prejudice of that Religion which he profeſſes; but it ſhall be with as little ill breeding as I can, and altogether without paſſion or invectives.

Noble Ven. It would be very hard for me to ſuſpect any thing from you that ſhould be diſobliging; but pray, Sir, go on to your Political Diſcourſe, for I am not ſo ignorant my ſelf, but to know that the conſervation of the National Religion (be it what it will) is eſſential to the well ordering a State: and though in our City the doctrinals are very different from what are profeſſed here, yet as to the Government of the State, I believe you know that the Pope or his Prieſts have as little influence upon it, as your Clergy have here, or in any part of the World.

Eng. Gent. I avow it fully, Sir, and with the favour you give will proceed. It cannot be denied but that in former times Popery has been very innocent here to the Government, and that the Clergy and the Pope were ſo far from oppoſing our Liberties, that they both ſided with the Barons to get a declaration of them by means of *Magna Charta:* It is true alſo, that if we were all Papiſts, and that our State were the ſame, both as to Property and Empire, as it was 400 years ago, there would be but one inconvenience to have that Religion National again in *England*, which is, That the Clergy, *quatenus* ſuch, had and will have a ſhare in the Sovereignty, and inferior Courts in their own Power, called Eccleſiaſtical; this is, and ever will be a Soleciſm in Government, beſides a manifeſt contradiction to the words of Chriſt our Saviour, who tells us, his Kingdom is not of this World: and the truth is, if you look into the Scriptures, you will find, that the Apoſtles did not reckon that the Religion they planted ſhould be National in any Country, and therefore have given no precepts to the Magiſtrate to meddle in matters of Faith and the Worſhip of God; but preach'd, That Chriſtians ſhould yield them obedience in all lawful things. There are many paſſages in Holy Writ which plainly declare, that the true Believers and Saints ſhould be but a handful, and ſuch as God had ſeparated, and as it were taken out of the World; which would not have been ſaid by them, if they had believed that whole Nations and People ſhould have been true Followers of Chriſt,

and of his Flock: for certainly none of them are to be damn'd, and yet Chriſt himſelf tells us, that few are ſaved, and bids us ſtrive to get in at the ſtrait gate; and therefore I conceive it not to be imaginable, that either Chriſt or his Apoſtles did ever account that the true Religion ſhould be planted in the World by the framing of Laws, Catechiſms, or Creeds, by the Sovereign Powers and Magiſtrates, whether you call them Spiritual or Temporal, but that it ſhould have a Progreſs ſuitable to its beginning: for it is viſible that it had its Original from the Power and Spirit of God, and came in againſt the ſtream, not only without a *Numa Pompilius*, or a *Mahomet*, to plant and eſtabliſh it by human Conſtitutions and Authority, but had all the Laws of the World to oppoſe it, and all the bloody Tyrants of that age to perſecute it, and to inflict exquiſite torments on the Profeſſors of it. In *Nero*'s time (which was very early) the Chriſtians were offered a Temple in *Rome*, and in what other Cities they pleaſed, to be built to Jeſus Chriſt, and that the *Romans* ſhould receive him into the number of their gods; but our Religion being then in its purity, this was unanimouſly refuſed, for that ſuch a God muſt have no Companions, nor needed no Temples, but muſt be worſhipped in Spirit and Truth. The Succeſſors to theſe good Chriſtians were not ſo ſcrupulous; for within ſome Ages after, the Prieſts to get Riches and Power, and the Emperors to get and keep the Empire (for by this time the Chriſtians were grown numerous and powerful) combined together to ſpoil our Holy Religion, to make it fit for the Government of this World, and to introduce into it all the ceremonious Follies and Superſtitions of the Heathen; and which is worſe the Power of Prieſts, both over the Perſons and Conſciences of Men. I ſhall ſay no more of this, but refer you to innumerable Authors who have treated of this Subject, particularly to a *French* Miniſter, who hath written a Book, Entituled, *La Religion Catholique Apoſtolique Romaine inſtituee par Nume Pompile*; and to the incomparable *Machiavel* in his *Poſthume* Letter, Printed lately in our Language, with the Tranſlation of his Works. But I have made a long digreſſion; and to come back again, ſhall only deſire you to take notice, when I ſay that anciently Popery was no inconvenience in this Kingdom, I mean only Politically, as the Government then ſtood, and do not ſpeak at all of the prejudice which Men's Souls did and will ever receive from the Belief of thoſe impious Tenets, and the want of having the true Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt preached unto them, but living in perpetual Superſtition and Idolatry: The conſideration of theſe Matters is not ſo proper to my preſent purpoſe, being to diſcourſe only of Government. Notwithſtanding therefore, as I ſaid before, that Popery might have ſuited well enough with our old Conſtitution, yet as to the preſent Eſtate, which inclines to Popularity, it would be wholly as inconſiſtent with it, and with the Power of the Keys, and the Empire of Prieſts (eſpecially where there is a Foreign Juriſdiction in the caſe) as with the Tyranny and Arbitrary Power of any Prince in the World. I will add thus much in Confirmation of the *Doctor*'s Aſſertion, That we ought to prevent the growth of Popery, ſince it is now grown a dangerous Faction here againſt the State.

Noble Ven.

Noble Ven. How can that be, I beſeech you, Sir?

Eng. Gent. Sir, I will make you Judge of it your ſelf; I will ſay nothing of thoſe fooliſh Writings that have been put forth by *Mariana*, *Emanuel Sa*, and ſome others, about the lawfulneſs of deſtroying Princes and States in caſe of Hereſy, becauſe I know all the conſcientious and honeſt Papiſts (of which I know there are great numbers in the World) do not only not hold, but even abhor ſuch curſed Tenets; and do believe, that when the Pope, by Excommunication hath cut off any Prince from the communion of the Church, can go no further, nor ought to pretend a Power to deprive him of his Crown, or abſolve his Subjects from their Oaths and Obedience: But I ſhall confine my ſelf to the preſent condition of our Papiſts here. You know how dangerous it is for any Kingdom or State to have a conſiderable, wealthy, flouriſhing party amongſt them, whoſe intereſt it is to deſtroy the Polity and Government of the Country where they live; and therefore if our Papiſts prove this Party, you will not wonder why this People are ſo eager to depreſs them. This is our Caſe: for in the beginning of Queen *Elizabeth's* reign, there was an alteration of Religion in our Country, which did ſufficiently enrage the Holy Father at *Rome*, to ſee that this good Cow would be milked no longer. He declares her an Heretick and a Baſtard, (his Sanctity not having declared null that inceſtuous Marriage which her Father had contracted before with his Brother's Wife, and which that King had diſſolved to Marry her Mother) and afterwards Excommunicated our Queen, depriving her, as much as in him lay, of the Kingdom; ſome of the Zealots of that Party (having a greater terror for thoſe Thunder-bolts than I believe many have now) began to conſpire againſt her; and Plots grew at length ſo frequent, and ſo dangerous, that it was neceſſary (as the Parliaments then thought) to ſecure the Queen, by making ſevere Laws againſt a People, who did not believe themſelves her Majeſty's Subjects; but on the contrary, many of them thought themſelves in Conſcience obliged to oppoſe and deſtroy her: and although that Excommunication, as alſo the pretended doubtfulneſs of the Title, both died with that renowned Queen, yet a new deſperate Conſpiracy againſt the King her Succeſſor and the whole Parliament enſuing, not long after her deceaſe, thoſe rigorous Laws have been ſo far from being repealed, that very many more, and far ſeverer, have been ſince made, and are yet in force. Now theſe Laws make ſo great a diſtinction between Proteſtants and Papiſts, that whereas the former are by our Government and Laws, the freeſt People in the World, the latter are little better than ſlaves, are confined to ſuch a diſtance from their Houſes, are not to come near the Court, which being kept in the Capital City, moſtly deprives them from attending their neceſſary occaſions; they are to pay two third parts of their Eſtates annually to the King, their Prieſts are to ſuffer as Traitors, and they as Felons for harbouring them; in fine, one of us, if he do not break the Municipal Laws for the good Government of the Country, need not fear the King's Power, whereas their being what they are, is a breach of the Law, and does put them into the Prince's hands to ruin them when he pleaſes; nay, he is bound by Oath to do it, and when he does it not, is complained againſt by his People, and Parliaments take it amiſs. Now judge you, Sir, whether it is not the intereſt of theſe People to deſire and endeavour a change, whilſt they remain under theſe diſcouragements, and whether

whether they are not like to join with the Prince (whoſe connivance at the inexecution of thoſe Laws is the only means and hope of their preſervation) whenever he ſhall undertake any thing for the increaſe of his own Power, and the depreſſing his Parliaments.

. *Noble Ven.* What you ſay is very undeniable, but then the Remedy is very eaſy and obvious, as well as very juſt and honourable, which is the taking away thoſe cruel Laws, and if that were done they would be one People with you, and would have no neceſſity, and by conſequence no deſire to engreaten the King againſt the Intereſt and Liberty of their own Country.

Eng. Gent. You ſpeak very well, and one of the Reaſons amongſt many which I have, to deſire a compoſure of all our troubles by a ſettled Government, is, that I may ſee theſe People (who are very conſiderable, moſt of them, for Eſtates, Birth and Breeding) live quietly under our good Laws, and increaſe our Trade and Wealth with their expences here at home; whereas now the ſeverity of our Laws againſt them, makes them ſpend their Revenues abroad, and enrich other Nations with the Stock of *England*; but as long as the State here is ſo unſettled as it is, our Parliaments will never conſent to countenance a Party, who by the leaſt Favour and Indulgence may make themſelves able to bring in their own Religion to be National, and ſo ruin our Polity and Liberties.

Noble Ven. I wonder why you ſhould think that poſſible?

Eng. Gent. Firſt, Sir, for the Reaſon we Firſt gave, which is he crazineſs of our Polity, there being nothing more certain, than that both in the Natural and alſo the Politick Body any ſiniſter accident that intervenes, during a very Diſeaſed habit, may bring a dangerous alteration to the Patient. An Inſurrection in a decayed Government, a thing otherwiſe very inconſiderable, has proved very fatal, as I knew a ſlight fleſh-wound bring a luſty Man to his Grave in our Wars, for that he being extremely infected with the *French* Diſeaſe, could never procure the Orifice to cloſe; ſo although the deſigns both at home and abroad, for altering our Religion, would be very little formidable to a well-founded Government, yet in ſuch an one as we have now, it will require all our care to obviate ſuch Machinations. Another Reaſon is the little Zeal that is left amongſt the ordinary Proteſtants, which Zeal uſes to be a great Inſtrument of preſerving the Religion eſtabliſh'd, as it did here in Queen *Elizabeth's* time; I will add the little Credit the Church of *England* hath amongſt the People, moſt men being almoſt as angry with that Popery which is left amongſt us (in Surplices, Copes, Altars, Cringings, Biſhops, Eccleſiaſtical Courts, and the whole Hierarchy, beſides an infinite number of Uſeleſs, Idle, Superſtitious Ceremonies, and the Ignorance and Vitiouſneſs of the Clergy in general) as they are with thoſe *Dogma's* that are aboliſhed; So that there is no hopes that Popery can be kept out, but by a company of poor People call'd Fanaticks, who are driven into Corners as the Firſt Chriſtians were; and who only in truth Conſerve the Purity of Chriſtian Religion, as it was planted by Chriſt and his Apoſtles, and is contained in Scripture. And this makes almoſt all ſober men believe, that the National Clergy, beſides all other good qualities have this too, that thy cannot hope to make their Hierarchy ſubſiſt long againſt the Scriptures, the hatred of mankind, and the Intereſt of this People, but by Introducing the *Roman* Religion,

Religion, and getting a Foreign Head and Supporter, which ſhall from time to time brave and hector the King and Parliament in their favour and behalf, which yet would be of little advantage to them, if we had as firm and wiſe a Government as you have at *Venice*. Another Reaſon, and the greateſt, why the *Romiſh* Religion ought to be very warily provided againſt at this time, is, That the lawful and Undoubted Heir to the Crown, if his Majeſty ſhould die without Legitimate Iſſue, is more than ſuſpected to Imbrace that Faith; which (if it ſhould pleaſe God to call the King, before there be any Remedy applied to our Diſtracted State) would give a great opportunity (by the Power he would have in Intervals of Parliament) either to Introduce immediately that profeſſion, with the help of our Clergy, and other *Engliſh* and Foreign Aids, or elſe to make ſo fair a way for it, that a little time would perfect the work; and this is the more formidable, for that he is held to be a very Zealous and Bigotted *Romaniſt*; and therefore may be ſuppoſed to act any thing to that end, although it ſhould manifeſtly appear to be contrary to his own Intereſt and Quiet; ſo apt are thoſe who give up their Faith and the Conduct of their Lives to Prieſts (who to get to themſelves Empire, promiſe them the higheſt Seats in Heaven; if they will ſacrifice their Lives, Fortunes, and Hopes, for the Exaltation of their Holy Mother, and preventing the Damnation of an innumerable company of Souls which are not yet born) to be led away with ſuch Erroneous and wild Fancies. Whereas *Philip* the Second of *Spain*, the Houſe of *Guiſe* in *France*, and other great Stateſmen, have always made their own greatneſs their firſt Aim, and uſed their Zeal as an Inſtrument of that; And inſtead of being cozen'd by Prieſts, have cheated them, and made them endeavour to Preach them up to the Empire of the World. So I have done with the Growth of Popery, and muſt conclude, that if that ſhould be ſtopt in ſuch manner, that there could not be one Papiſt left in *England*, and yet our Polity left in the ſame diſorder that now afflicts it, we ſhould not be one Scruple the better for it, nor the more at quiet; the Growth and Danger of Popery not being the Cauſe of our preſent Diſtemper, but the Effect of it: But as a good and ſettled Government would not be at all the nearer for the deſtruction of Popery, ſo Popery and all the Dangers and Inconveniences of it would not only be further off, but would wholly vaniſh at the ſight of ſuch a Reformation. And ſo we begin at the wrong end, when we begin with Religion before we heal our Breaches. I will borrow one Similitude more, with our Doctor's favour, from his Profeſſion. I knew once a man given over by the Phyſicans, of an incurable *Cachexca*, which they ſaid proceeded from the ill Quality of the whole Maſs of Blood, from great Aduſtion, and from an ill habit of the whole Body. The Patient had very often painful Fits of the Cholick, which they ſaid proceeded from the ſharpneſs of the humour which cauſed the Diſeaſe; and, amongſt the reſt, had one Fit which tormented him to that degree, that it was not expected he could out-live it; yet the Doctors delivered him from it in a ſmall time: Notwithſtanding, ſoon after the man died of his firſt Diſtemper. Whereas if their Art had arrived to have cured that (which was the Cauſe of the other) the Cholick had vaniſhed of it ſelf, and the Patient recovered. I need make no Application, nor ſhall need to ſay much of the Succeſſion of the Crown (which is my next Province)

but this I have ſaid already, That it is needleſs to make any Proviſion againſt a Popiſh Succeſſor if you rectify your Government; and if you do not, all the Care and Circumſpection you can uſe in that Particular, will be uſeleſs and of none effect, and will but at laſt (if it do not go off eaſily, and the next Heir ſucceed peaceably, as is moſt likely, eſpecially if the King live till the People's Zeal and Mettle is over) end probably in a Civil War about Title; and then the Perſon deprived may come in with his Sword in his Hand, and bring in upon the Point of it both the Popiſh Religion, and Arbitrary Power: Which, though I believe he will not be able to maintain long (for the Reaſons before alledged,) yet that may make this Generation miſerable and unhappy. It will certainly be agreed by all lovers of their Country, that Popery muſt be kept from returning, and being National in this Kingdom, as well for what concerns the Honour and Service of God, as the Welfare and Liberty of the People; and I conceive there are two ways by which the Parliament may endeavour to ſecure us againſt that danger; the firſt by ordering ſuch a change in the Adminiſtration of our Government, that whoever is Prince, can never violate the Laws, and then we may be very ſafe againſt Popery; our preſent Laws being effectual enough to keep it out, and no new ones being like to be made in Parliament that may introduce it; and this remedy will be at the ſame time advantagious to us againſt the Tyranny and Encroachments of a Proteſtant Succeſſor, ſo that we may call it an infallible Remedy both againſt Popery and Arbitrary power. The ſecond way is by making a Law to diſable any Papiſt by name or otherwiſe, from inheriting the Crown; and this is certainly fallible, that is, may poſſibly not take place (as I ſhall ſhew immediately;) and beſides, it is not improbable that an Heir to this Kingdom in future times, may diſſemble his Religion, till he be ſeated in the Throne; or poſſibly be perverted to the Roman Faith after he is poſſeſs'd of it, when it may be too late to limit his Prerogative in Parliament; and to oppoſe him without that, will I fear, be judged Treaſon.

Doct. But Sir, would you have the Parliament do nothing, as things ſtand, to provide (at leaſt, as much as in them lies) that whoever ſucceeds be a good Proteſtant?

Eng. Gent. Yes, I think it beſt in the firſt place to offer to his Majeſty the true Remedy; and if they find him averſe to that, then to purſue the other which concerns the Succeſſion, becauſe the People (who are their Principals, and give them their Power) do expect ſomething extraordinary from them at this time; and the moſt of them believe this laſt the only preſent means to ſave them from Popery, which they judge (and very juſtly) will bring in with it a change of Government. But then, I ſuppoſe, they may be encouraged to propoſe in the firſt place the true Cure; not only becauſe that is infallible, as has been proved, but likewiſe becauſe his Majeſty in probability will ſooner conſent to any reaſonable Demand towards the reforming of the Government, and to the ſecuring us that way, than to concur to the depriving his only Brother of the Crown. And poſſibly this latter (as I ſaid before) may be the only way the Parliament can hope will prove effectual: For if you pleaſe to look but an Age back into our Story, you will find that *Henry* the Eighth did procure an Act of Parliament, which gave him power to diſpoſe of the Crown by his laſt Will and Teſtament;

Teſtament; and that he did accordingly make his ſaid [redacted] and by it deviſe the Succeſſion to his Son *Edward* the Sixth, in [redacted] place, and to the Heirs of his Body; and for want of ſuch, to [redacted] Daughter *Mary*, and to the Heirs of her Body; and for want of which Heirs, to his Daughter *Elizabeth*, our once Sovereign of Immortal and Bleſſed Memory, and the Heirs of her Body [redacted] and for want of all ſuch Iſſue, to the right Heirs of his younger Siſter, who was, before he made this Will, married to *Charles Brandon* Duke of *Suffolk*, and had Iſſue by him. By this Teſtament he diſinherited his elder Siſter, who was married in *Scotland*; and by that means did, as much as in him lay, exclude his Majeſty (who now, by God's Mercy, reigns over us) as alſo his Father and Grandfather. And to make the Caſe ſtronger, there paſſed an Act long after, in the Reign of Queen *Elizabeth*, That it ſhould be Treaſon during that Queen's Life, and a Premunire afterwards, to aſſert that the Imperial Crown of *England* could not be diſpoſed of by Act of Parliament; yet after the Deceaſe of that Queen, there was no conſiderable Oppoſition made to the peaceable Reception and Recognition of King *James* of happy Memory. And thoſe who did make a little ſtir about the other Title, [redacted] Lord *Cobham*, Sir *Walter Rawleigh*, and a few others, were apprehended and condemn'd according to Law. And, notwithſtanding that, ſince, in the Reign of K. *Charles* the Firſt, there was a bloody Civil War, in which Men's Minds were exaſperated at a high rate; yet in all the Courſe of it, the Original Want of Title was never objected againſt his late Majeſty. I do not urge this to aver that the Parliament, with the King's Conſent, cannot do lawfully this, or any other great Matter; which would be an incurring the Penalty of that Law, and a Soleciſm in the Politicks: But to ſhew, that when the Paſſions of Men are quieted, and the Reaſons other than they were, it happens oftentimes that thoſe Acts which concern the Succeſſion fall to the Ground of themſelves, and that even without the Sword, which in this Caſe was never adoperated. And that therefore this Remedy in our Caſe may be likely never to take place, if it pleaſe God the King live till this Nation be under any other kind of Circumſtances.

Doct. Sir, you ſay very well: but it ſeems to me, that the laſt Parliament was in ſome kind of Fault, if this be true that you ſay; for I remember that my Lord Chancellor did once, during their Sitting, in his Majeſty's Name offer them to ſecure their Religion and Liberties any way they could adviſe of, ſo they would let alone medling with the Succeſſion, and invited them to make any Propoſals they thought neceſſary to that end.

Eng. Gent. Hinc ille lachrimæ. If this had been all, we might have been happy at this time; but this gracious Offer was *In limine*, accompanied with ſuch Conditions that made the Parliament conjecture that it was only to perplex and divide them; and did look upon it as an Invention of ſome new *Romanza*, (Counſellors and thoſe too, poſſibly, influenced by the *French*) to make them embrace the Shadow for the Subſtance, and ſatisfying themſelves with this Appearance, to do their ordinary Work of giving Money, and be gone, and leave the Buſineſs of the Kingdom as they found it. For it was propoſed, that whatſoever Security we were to receive, ſhould be both conditional and reverſionable: That is, Firſt, we ſhould not be put into Poſſeſſion of this new Charter (be it what it will) till after the death of his Majeſty

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Majeſty [illegible] now is; whereas ſuch a Proviſion is deſirable, and indeed neceſ[illegible] for this only reaſon, that when that unfortunate hour c[illegible]ght not be, in that Confuſion, unprovided of a Calm, ſt[illegible]d a[illegible] orderly, as well [illegible] legal way to keep out Popery. Whereas otherwiſe, if we be to ta[illegible]ſſeſſion in that Minute, it muſt either miſcarry, or be gotten by [illegible]ar, if it be true that Poſſeſſion be nine Points of the Law in oth[illegible] Caſes, it is [illegible] this the whole ten: and I ſhould be very unwilling, in ſuch a Di[illegible]r, to have no Sanctuary to fly to, but a piece of Parchment kept in the Pells; and to have this too as well as other Advantages, in the Power and Poſſeſſion of him in whoſe prejudice it was made: this had been almoſt as good an Expedient to keep out Popery, as the Bill which was thrown out that Parliament; which provided, that in the Reign of a King that ſhould be a Papiſt, the Biſhops ſhould chooſe one another upon Vacancies. Thoſe Counſellors who put my Lord Chancellor upon this Propoſal, were either very ſlender Politicians themſelves, or elſe thought the Parliament ſo. If *Magna Charta* and *The Petition of Right* had not been to take place till after the Deceaſe of thoſe Princes who confirmed them, neither had the Barons ſhed their Blood to ſo good purpoſe, nor the Members of the Parliament in *Tertio Caroli*, deſerved ſo glorious an Impriſonment after it was ended. The other Condition in this renowned Propoſal is, That all Proviſion and Security which is given us to preſerve our Religion, ſhall ceaſe immediately, whenever the Prince ſhall take a certain Oath to be penned for that purpoſe; and I leave it to all thinking Men to determine what that will avail us, when we ſhall have a King of that Profeſſion over us, who ſhall not have ſo much Zeal for his Religion, as he who is now the next Succeſſor hath; but ſhall poſſibly prefer his Ambition, and his deſire to get out of Wardſhip, before the Scruples of his Confeſſor; and yet may afterwards, by getting Abſolution for, and Diſpenſation from ſuch Oaths and Compliance, employ the Power he gets himſelf, and the Security he deprives us of, to introduce violently what Worſhip and Faith he pleaſes. This gracious Offer had the fatality to diſguſt one of the beſt Parliaments that ever ſate, and the moſt loyal; ſo that laying it aſide, they fell upon the Succeſſion, the only thing they had then left, and were ſoon after diſſolved, leaving the Kingdom in a more diſtracted Condition than they found it; and this can no way be compoſed, but by mending the Polity, ſo that whoever is King cannot (be he never ſo inclined to it) introduce Popery, or deſtroy whatever Religion ſhall be eſtabliſhed: as you ſee in the Example of the Dutchy of *Hanover*, whoſe Prince ſome fourteen Years ſince, was perverted to the *Roman* Church, went to *Rome* to abjure Hereſy (as they call the truth) return'd home, where he lived and governed as he did before, without the leaſt Animoſity of his Subjects for his Change, or any endeavour of his to introduce any in his Government or People, and dying this laſt Spring, left the peaceable and undiſturbed Rule of his Subjects to the next Succeſſor, his Brother the Biſhop of *Oſnaburg*, who is a Proteſtant, and this becauſe the Polity of that Dukedom has been conſerved entire for many years, and is upon a right Baſis: and if our Caſe were ſo, we ſhould not only be out of danger to have our Religion altered (as I ſaid before) whoever is King, but ſhould in other things be in a happy and flouriſhing condition.

But

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But I have made a long and tedious digreſſion to anſwer your demands: Now 'tis time you aſſiſt me to find the natural Cure of all our Miſchiefs.

Doct. Stay, Sir, I confeſs my ſelf to be wonderfully Edified your diſcourſe hitherto, but you have ſaid n[illegible]ing yet of the Du[illegible] of *Monmouth*.

Eng. Gent. I do not think you deſire it, t[illegible]h you were pleaſed to mention ſuch a thing, for I ſup[illegible] you can[illegible]think it poſſible, that this Parliament (which is n[illegible]dily to meet by his Majeſty's Gracious Proclamation) can ever ſuffer ſuch a thing to be ſo much as Debated amongſt them.

Doct. Sir, you have no reaſon to take that for granted, when you ſee what Books are Printed, what great and honourable Perſons frequent him in private, and countenance him in publick; what ſhoals of the middle ſort of people have in his Progreſs this Summer met him before he came into any great Town, and what Acclamations and Bon-fires have been made in places where he lodged.

Eng. Gent. Theſe things, I muſt confeſs, ſhew how great a Diſtemper the People are in, and the great reaſon we have to pray God of his Mercy to put an end to it by a happy Agreement in Parliament. But certainly this proceeds only from the hatred they have to the next Succeſſor and his Religion, and from the compaſſion they have to the Duke of *Monmouth* (who as they ſuppoſe, hath ſuffered baniſhment and diſ-favour at Court, at his Inſtance) and not from any hopes of expectations that the Parliament will countenance any pretence that can be made in his behalf to the Succeſſion.

Doct. It may be when we have diſcourſed of it, I ſhall be of your mind, (as indeed I am inclined already) But yet nothing in War is more dangerous than to contemn an Enemy; ſo in this Argumentation that we uſe to ſecure our Liberties, we muſt leave nothing unanſwered that may ſtand in the way of that, eſpecially the Duke of *Monmouth*'s Claim, which is pretended to confirm and fortify them, for (ſay ſome Men) if you ſet him up, he will preſently paſs all Bills that ſhall concern the Safety and Intereſt of the People; And ſo we ſhall be at reſt for ever.

Eng. Gent. Well, I ſee I muſt be more tedious than I intended; Firſt then, the reaſoning of theſe men you ſpeak of, does in my apprehenſion, ſuppoſe a thing I cannot mention without horror, which is, That this Perſon ſhould be admitted immediately to the Poſſeſſion of the Crown to do all theſe fine Matters; for otherwiſe, if he muſt ſtay till the Death of our Sovereign who now Reigns (which I hope and pray will be many years) poſſibly theſe delicate Bills may never paſs, nor he find hereafter the People in ſo good a humour to admit him to the Reverſion, which if it could be obtain'd (as I think it impoſſible Politically) yet the Poſſeſſion muſt be kept by a ſtanding Army, and the next Succeſſor cannot have a better Game to play, nor a better Adverſary to deal with, than one who leaps in over the Heads of almoſt all the Proteſtant Princes Families abroad, beſides ſome Papiſts who are greater; and when we have been harraſſed with Wars, and the miſeries that accompany it ſome few years, you ſhall have all theſe fine People, who now run after him, very weary of their new Prince: I would not ſay any thing to diſparage a Perſon ſo highly born, and of ſo early merit; but this I may ſay, That if a Lawful Title

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ſhould be ſet on foot in his favour, and a thouſand *Dutch* Hoſts, and ſuch like, ſhould ſwear a Marriage, yet no ſober Man, that is not blinded with prejudice, will believe, That our King (whom none can deny to have an excellent underſtanding) would ever Marry a Woman ſo much his Inferior as this great Perſon's Mother was; and this at a time when his Affars were very low, and he had no viſible or rational hopes to be reſtored to the Poſſeſſion of his Kingdoms, but by an aſſiſtance which might have been afforded him by means of ſome great Foreign Alliance. Well, but to leave all this, do theſe Men pretend that the Duke of *Monmouth* ſhall be declared Succeſſor to the Crown in Parliament, with the King's Concurrence or without it; if without it, you muſt make a War for it, and I am ſure that no Cauſe can be ſtated upon ſuch a point, that will not make the Aſſertors and Undertakers of it be condemned by all the Politicians and Moraliſts of the World, and by the Caſuiſts of all Religions, and ſo by conſequence, it is like to be a very unſucceſsful War. If you would have this declar'd with the King's Conſent, either you ſuppoſe the Royal aſſent to be given, when the King has his Liberty either to grant it, or not grant it, to Diſſolve the Parliament, or not Diſſolve it, without ruin or prejudice to his Affairs: If in the firſt Caſe, it is plain he will not grant it, becauſe he cannot do it without confeſſing his Marriage to that Duke's Mother, which he hath already declared againſt in a very ſolemn manner, and cauſed it to be Regiſtred in Chancery; and which not only no good Subject can chuſe but believe, but which cannot be doubted by any rational perſon; for it would be a very unnatural, and indeed a thing unheard of, that a Father who had a Son in Lawful Matrimony, and who was grown to perfection, and had ſignalized himſelf in the Wars, and who was ever intirely beloved by him, ſhould diſinherit him by ſo ſolemn an aſſeveration (which muſt be a falſe one too) to cauſe his Brother to ſucceed in his room. And whereas it is pretended by ſome, that His Majeſty's danger from his Brother's Counſels and Deſigns may draw from him ſomething of this; beſide that they do not much Complement the King in this, it is clear, his Brother is not ſo popular, but that he may ſecure him when he pleaſes, without hazard, if there were any ground for ſuch an apprehenſion. But we muſt in the next place ſuppoſe that the King's Affairs were in ſuch a poſture, that he could deny the Parliament nothing without very great miſchief, and inconvenience to himſelf and the Kingdom; then I ſay, I doubt not, but the Wiſdom of the Parliament will find out divers Demands and Requeſts to make to His Majeſty of greater benefit, and more neceſſary for the good of his People than this would be; which draws after it not only a preſent unſettledneſs, but the probable hazard of Miſery and Devaſtation for many years to come, as has been proved. So that as on the one ſide the Parliament could not make a more unjuſtifiable War than upon this Account, ſo they could not be diſſolved upon any occaſion wherein the People would not ſhew leſs diſcontent and reſentment, and for which the Courtiers would not hope to have a better pretext, to ſtrive in the next Choice, to make their Arts and Endeavours more ſucceſsful in the Election of Members, more ſuitable to their Deſigns for the continuance of this preſent miſ-government; For if this Parliament do miſ-ſpend the People's Mettle, which is now up, in driving that Nail which cannot go, they muſt look to have it cool,

cool, and ſo the Ship of this Common-wealth, which if they pleaſe may be now in a fair way of Entering into a ſafe Harbour, will be driven to Sea again in a Storm, and muſt hope for, and expect another favourable Wind to ſave them; and God knows when that may come.

Doct. But, Sir, there are others, who not minding whether the *Parliament* will conſider the Duke of *Monmouth*'s concern, ſo far as to debate it, do yet pretend, that there is great reaſon to keep up the people's affections to him; and poſſibly to foment the opinion they have of his *Title* to the *Crown*, to the end, that if the *King* ſhould die *re infectâ*, that is, before ſuch time as the Government is redreſt, or the Duke of *York* diſabled by Law to ſucceed, the people might have an Head, under whoſe Command and Conduct they might ſtand upon their Guard, till they had ſome way ſecured their *Government* and *Religion*.

Eng. Gent. What you have ſtarted is not a thing that can ſafely be diſcourſed of, nor is it much material to our deſign, which is intended to ſpeculate upon our Government, and to ſhew how it is decayed: I have induſtriouſly avoided the argument of *Rebellion*, as I find it coucht in modern Politicians, becauſe moſt Princes hold, that all Civil Wars in mixt Monarchies muſt be ſo, and a Politician, as well as an Orator, ought to be *Vir bonus*, ſo ought to diſcourſe nothing, how rational ſoever, in theſe points under a peaceable *Monarchy*, which gives him protection, but what he would ſpeak of his *Prince* if all his *Council* were preſent. I will tell you only, that theſe Authors hold, that nothing can be alledged to excuſe the taking Arms by any *People* in oppoſition to their *Prince* from being *Crimen Leſæ Majeſtatis*, but a claim to a lawful Juriſdiction, or Co-ordination in the Government, by which they may judge of, and defend their own Rights, and ſo pretend to fight for, and defend the Government; for though all do acknowledge, that *Populi ſalus* is, and ought to be the moſt Supreme, or Sovereign Law in the world; yet if we ſhould make private perſons, how numerous ſoever, judge of *Populi ſalus*, we ſhould have all the Riſings and Rebellions that ſhould ever be made, juſtified by that title, as happened in *France*, when *La Guerre du bien publique* took that name, which was raiſed by the inſatiable ambition of a few Noblemen, and by correſpondency and confederacy with *Charles*, Son of the Duke of *Burgundy*, and other enemies to that Crown.

Doct. But would you have our people do nothing then, if the King ſhould be Aſſaſſinated, or die of a natural death?

Eng. Gent. You ask me a very fine queſtion, *Doctor*: If I ſay, *I would have the people ſtir* in that caſe, then the King, and his Laws take hold of me; and if I ſhould anſwer, *that I would have them be quiet*, the people would tear me in pieces for a *Jeſuit*, or at leaſt, believe that I had no ſenſe of the Religion, Laws, and Liberty of my Country. *De facto*, I do ſuppoſe, that if the people do continue long in this heat which now poſſeſſeth them, and remain in ſuch a paſſion at the time of the King's death without ſettling matters, they may probably fall into tumults and Civil War, which makes it infinitely to be deſired, and prayed for by all good *Engliſh* men, that during the quiet and peace we enjoy, by the bleſſing of his Majeſty's life and happy Reign, we might likewiſe be ſo wiſe and fortunate, as to provide for the ſafety and proſperity of the next generation.

Doct.

Doct. But if you would not have the people in ſuch a caſe, take the Duke of *Monmouth* for their Head, what would you have them do?

Eng. Gent. Doctor, you ask me very fine queſtions; do not you know that *Machiavel*, the beſt and moſt honeſt of all the modern *Politicians*, has ſuffered ſufficiently by means of *Prieſts*, and other ignorant perſons, who do not underſtand his Writings, and therefore impute to him the teaching Subjects how they ſhould Rebel and conſpire againſt their Princes, which if he were in any kind guilty of, he would deſerve all the reproaches that have been caſt upon him, and ten times more; and ſo ſhould I, if I ventured to obey you in this. I am very confident, that if any man ſhould come to you, to implore your skill in helping him to a drug that might quickly, and with the leaſt fear of being ſuſpected, diſpatch an enemy of his, or ſome other, by whoſe death he was to be a gainer; or ſome young Laſs that had gotten a Surreptitious great Belly, ſhould come to you to teach her how to deſtroy the fruit; I ſay, in this caſe you would ſcarce have had patience to hear theſe perſons out; much leſs would you have been ſo wicked to have in the leaſt aſſiſted them in their deſigns, no more than *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, *Periander*, or any other of the *Sages* could have been brought to have given their advice to any perſons who ſhould have begged it, to enable them to ruin and undermine the government of their own Common-wealths.

Doct. Sir, this Reprehenſion would be very juſtly given me, if I had intended by this queſtion to induce you to counſel me, or any other how to rebel; my meaning was to deſire you (who have heretofore been very fortunate in propheſying concerning the events of our changes here) to exerciſe your faculty a little at this time, and tell us, what is like to be the end of theſe diſtractions we are under, in caſe we ſhall not be ſo happy as to put a period to them by mending our Government, and ſecuring our Religion and Liberty in a regular way.

Eng. Gent. Doctor, I will keep the Reputation of Propheſy, which I have gained with you, and not hazard it with any new predictions, for fear they ſhould miſcarry; yet I care not, if I gratify your curioſity a little in the point, about which you firſt began to Interrogate me, by preſaging to you, that in caſe we ſhould have troubles, and combuſtions here, after his Majeſty's deceaſe (which God avert) we muſt expect a very unſucceſsful end of them, if we ſhould be ſo raſh and unadviſed, as to make the great Perſon we have been lately ſpeaking of, our head; and that nothing can be more dangerous and pernicious to us than ſuch a choice. I have not in this diſcourſe the leaſt intention to except againſt, much leſs to diſparage the perſonal worth of the Duke of *Monmouth*, which the world knows to be very great, but do believe that he hath Courage and Conduct proportionable to any employment that can be conferred upon him, whether it be to manage Arms, or Counſels; but my opinion is, that no perſon in his circumſtance can be a proper head in this caſe; for the people having been already put on upon his ſcent of the *title* to the *Crown*, will be very hardly called off, and ſo will force the wiſer men, who may deſign better things, to conſent that he be proclaimed *King* immediately, except there be ſome other head, who by his Power, Wiſdom, and Authority, may reſtrain the forwardneſs of the multitude, and obviate the acts of ſome men, whoſe intereſt and hopes may prompt them

them to foment the humours of the People. Now the conſequences of hurrying a man to the Throne ſo tumultuouſly, without the leaſt deliberation, are very diſmal; and do not only not cure the politick diſtempers of our Country, which we have talked ſo much of, but do infinitely augment it, and add to the diſeaſe our State labours under already (which is a Conſumption) a very violent Feaver too; I mean War at home, and from abroad, which muſt neceſſarily follow in a few years: Nor is it poſſible to go back, when once we have made that ſtep; for our *new King* will call a *Parliament*, which being *ſummoned* by his *Writ*, neither will nor can queſtion his Title or Government, otherwiſe than by making Addreſſes, and by preſenting Bills to him, as they do to his now Majeſty.

Noble Ven. It ſeems to me, that there needs nothing more than that; for if he conſent to all Laws as ſhall be preſented to him, you may reform your Government ſufficiently, or elſe it is your own fault.

Eng. Gent. We have ſhewed already, and ſhall do more hereafter that no Laws can be executed till our Government be mended; and if you mean we ſhould make ſuch as ſhould mend that (beſides that it would be a better method to capitulate that, before you make choice of your *Prince*, as wiſe people have done in all ages, and the *Cardinals* do at *Rome* in the *Conclave* before they chooſe their *Pope*) I ſay beſides this, it is not to be taken for granted that any Bills that tend to make conſiderable alterations in the adminiſtration, (and ſuch we have need of, as you will ſee anon) would either in that caſe be offered or conſented to; both *Prince* and *People* being ſo ready to cry out upon *Forty-one*, and to be frighted with the name of a *Common-wealth*, even now when we think *Popery* is at the door; which ſome people then will think farther off, and ſo not care to make ſo great alterations to keep it out; beſides the great Men and favourites of the new *Prince* will think it hard that their King ſhould be ſo bounded and limited both in power and Revenue, that he ſhall have no means to exerciſe his liberality towards them, and ſo may uſe their intereſt and eloquence in both Houſes to diſſuade them from preſſing ſo hard upon a Prince, who is a true zealous Proteſtant, and has always headed that Party, and who is juſtly admired, if not adored by the People; and conſidering too that all the power they leave him, will ſerve but to enable him to defend us the better from Popery and Arbitrary power; for which moſt Monarchies was firſt Inſtituted. Thus we may exerciſe during a *Parliament* or two, love-tricks between the Prince and his people, and imitate the honey-moon that continued for about two years after his Majeſty's Reſtoration, till the ill management of affairs and the new grievances, that ſhall ariſe (which will be ſure never to fail till our true cure be effected, notwithſtanding the care of the new King and his Councellors) ſhall awaken the diſcontents of the people, and then they will curſe the time in which they made this election of a Prince, and the great men for not hindering them. Then men will be reckoning up the diſcontents of the Peers, ſometime after they had made a raſh choice of *H.* the 7th in the field, who (had then no title) when they ſaw how he made uſe of the power they gave him to leſſen their greatneſs, and to fortify himſelf upon their ruins; when it comes to this, and that the Governing party comes to be but a little faction, the people (who never know the true cauſe of their diſtemper) will be looking out abroad who has the Lawful

title (if the next Heir be not in the mean time with an Army of *Engliſh* and *Strangers* in the field here, as is moſt likely) and look upon the *Prince* of *Orange*, or the next of kin, as their future Saviour (in caſe the *Duke* be dead in the mean time, and ſo the cauſe of all their diſtruſt taken away) thus moſt men, not only diſcontented perſons, but the people in general, lookt upon his Majeſty that now is, as their future deliverer during our late diſtractions, when his condition was ſo weak that he had ſcarce wherewithall to ſubſiſt, and his enemies powerful at home and victorious abroad, which will not be I fear, our caſe. I Propheſy then (becauſe you will have me uſe this word) that if Nobles or People make any ſuch unfortunate choice as this during the diſtractions we may be in upon his Majeſty's death, we ſhall not only miſs our cure, or have it deferred till another Government make it; but remain in the confuſion we now ſuffer under; and beſides, that ſhall be ſure to feel, firſt or laſt, the calamity of a Civil and Foreign War, and in the mean time to be in perpetual fear of it, and ſuffer all the burden and charge which is neceſſary to provide for it, beſides all the other ill conſequences of a ſtanding Army. To conclude, I aſſure you in the Faith of a Chriſtian, that I have made this diſcourſe ſolely and ſingly out of zeal and affection to the Intereſt of my Country, and not at all with the leaſt intention to favour or promote the Cauſe or Intereſt of the D. of *York*, or to diſparage the Duke of *Monmouth*, from whom I never received the leaſt unkindneſs, nor ever had the honour to be in his Company; and to whom I ſhall ever pay reſpect ſuitable to his high birth and Merit.

Noble Ven. Well, Sir, your Reaſoning in this point has extremely ſatisfied me; and the Doctor, I ſuppoſe, was ſo before, as he averred; therefore pray let us go on where we left.

Eng. Gent. I cannot take ſo much upon me as to be Dictator in the Method of our Cure, ſince either of you is a thouſand times better qualified for ſuch an Office, and therefore ſhall henceforth deſire to be an Auditor.

Doct. Pray, Sir, let us not ſpend time in Compliments, but be pleaſed to proceed in this buſineſs, and we doubt not but as you have hitherto wonderfully delighted us, ſo you will gratify us in concluding it.

Eng. Gent. I ſee I muſt obey you, but pray help me, and tell me in the firſt place, whether you do not both believe, that as the *cauſa cauſarum* of all our Diſtractions is (as has been proved) the breach of our Government; ſo that the immediate Cauſes are two: Firſt, The great diſtruſt on both ſides between the King and his People and Parliament; the firſt fearing that his Power will be ſo leſſened by degrees, that at length it will not be able to keep the Crown upon his Head: And the latter ſeeing all things in diſorder, and that the Laws are not executed (which is the ſecond of the two Cauſes) fear the King intends to change the Government, and be Arbitrary.

Noble Ven. I am a Stranger, but (though I never reflected ſo much upon the Original Cauſe, as I have done ſince I heard you diſcourſe of it) yet I ever thought that thoſe two were the Cauſes of the Unquietneſs of this Kingdom: I mean the Jealouſy between the King and his People, and the Inexecution of the great Laws of calling Parliaments annually, and letting them ſit to diſpatch their Affairs: I underſtand

derſtand this in the time of his Majeſty's Grand-Father, and Father, more than in his own Reign.

Eng. Gent. Then whoever can abſolutely lay theſe two Cauſes aſleep for ever, will arrive to a perfect Cure; which I conceive no way of doing, but that the King have a great deal more Power or a great deal leſs: And you know that what goes out of the King muſt go into the People, and ſo *vice verſa:* Inſomuch that the People muſt have a great deal more Power, or a great deal leſs: Now it is no queſtion, but either of theſe two, would rather increaſe their Power than diminiſh it; ſo that if this cannot be made up by the Wiſdom of this Age, we may ſee in the next, that both the King will endeavour to be altogether without a Parliament, and the Parliament to be without a King.

Doct. I begin to ſmell, that you would be nibbling at the pretence which ſome had before his Majeſty's Reſtoration, of a Common-wealth or *Democracy.*

Eng. Gent. No, I abhor the thoughts of wiſhing, much leſs endeavouring any ſuch thing, during theſe Circumſtances we are now in; That is, under Oaths of Obedience to a Lawful King. And truly if any *Themiſtocles* ſhould make to me ſuch a Propoſal, I ſhould give the ſame Judgment concerning it, that *Ariſtides* did in ſuch a Caſe. The Story is ſhort; After the War between the *Greeks* and the *Perſians* was ended, and *Xerxes* driven out of *Greece*, the whole Fleet of the *Grecian* Confederates (except that of *Athens* which was gone home) lay in a great Arſenal (ſuch as were then in uſe) upon the Coaſt of *Attica*; during their abode there, *Themiſtocles* harrangues one day the People of *Athens* (as was then the Cuſtom) and tells them, that he had a Deſign in his head, which would be of infinite profit and advantage to the Common-wealth; But that it could not be executed without the Order and Authority of them, and that it did likewiſe require ſecreſy; and if it were declared there in the Market-place, where Strangers as well as Citizens might be preſent, it could not be concealed, and therefore propoſed it to their conſideration what ſhould be done in it: It was at length concluded that *Themiſtocles* ſhould propoſe it to *Ariſtides*, and if he did next morning acquaint the People that he gave his approbation to it, it ſhould be proceeded in: *Themiſtocles* informs him that the whole Fleet of their Confederates in the War againſt the *Medes* had betaken themſelves to the great Arſenal upon their Coaſt, where they might be eaſily fired, and then the *Athenians* would remain abſolute Maſters of the Sea, and ſo give Law to all *Greece*; when *Ariſtides* came the next day to deliver his Judgment to the People, he told them that the buſineſs propoſed by *Themiſtocles*, was indeed very advantageous, and profitable to the *Athenians*; But withal, the moſt wicked and villainous Attempt that ever was undertaken; upon which it was wholly laid aſide. And the ſame Judgment do I give, *Doctor*, of your *Democracy* at this time. But to return to the place where I was, I do believe that this difference may eaſily be terminated very fairly, and that our Houſe need not be pulled down, and a new one built; but may be very eaſily repair'd, ſo that it may laſt many hundred Years.

Noble Ven. I begin to perceive that you aim at this, That the King muſt give the People more Power, as *Henry* the third, and King *John* did, or the Parliament muſt give the King more, as you ſaid they did

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in *France* in the time of *Lewis* the eleventh; or elſe that it will come in time to a War again.

Eng. Gent. You may pleaſe to know, that in all times hitherto, the Parliament never demanded any thing of the King, wherein the Intereſt and Government of the Kingdom was concerned (excepting Acts of Pardon) but they founded their demands upon their Right, not only becauſe it might ſeem unreaſonable for them to be earneſt with him to give them that which was his own, but alſo becauſe they cannot chooſe but know, that all Powers which are fundamentally and lawfully in the Crown, were placed there upon the firſt Inſtitution of our Government, to capacitate the Prince to govern and protect his People: So that for the Parliament to ſeek to take from him ſuch Authority, were to be *felo de ſe*, as we call a Self-Homicide; but as in ſome Diſtempers of the Body the Head ſuffers as well as the inferior parts, ſo that it is not poſſible for it, to order, direct and provide for the whole Body as its Office requires, ſince the Wiſdom and Power which is placed there, is given by God to that end; In which Caſe, though the Diſtemper of the Body may begin from the Diſeaſe of ſome other part, or from the maſs of Blood, or putrefaction of other Humours; yet ſince that noble part is ſo affected by it, that Reaſon and Diſcourſe fails, therefore to reſtore this again, Remedies muſt be apply'd to, and poſſibly Humours or Vapours drawn from the Head it ſelf, that ſo it may be able to govern and reign over the Body as it did before, or elſe the whole Man, like a Slave, muſt be ruled and guided *ab extrinſeco*, that is by ſome Keeper: So it is now with us, in our Politick Diſeaſe, where granting (if you pleaſe) that the Diſtemper does not proceed from the Head, but the Corruption of other parts, yet in the Cure, Applications muſt be made to the Head as well as to the Members, if we mean poor *England* ſhall recover its former perfect Health; and therefore it will be found, perhaps, eſſential to our being, to aſk ſomething (in the condition we now are) to which the King as yet may have a Right; and which except he pleaſe to part with, the *Phenomena* of Government cannot be ſalved; That is, our Laws cannot be executed; nor *Magna Charta* it ſelf made practicable; and ſo both Prince and People, that is, the Polity of *England*, muſt die of this Diſeaſe, or by this *Delirium* muſt be governed, *ab extrinſeco*, and fall to the Lot of ſome Foreign Power.

Noble Ven. But, Sir, ſince the Buſineſs is come to this *Dilemma*, why may not the King aſk more Power of the Parliament, as well as they of him?

Eng. Gent. No queſtion but our preſent Counſellors and Courtiers would be nibbling at that bait again, if they had another Parliament that would take Penſions for their Votes; But in one that is come freſh from the People, and underſtand their Senſe and Grievances very well, I hardly believe they will attempt it; for both Council and Parliament muſt needs know by this time-a-day, that the Cauſe of all our Diſtractions coming (as has been ſaid an hundred times) from the King's having a greater Power already than the condition of Property at this preſent can admit, without Confuſion and Diſorder; It is not like to mend Matters for them to give him more, except they will deliver up to him at the ſame inſtant their Poſſeſſions, and Right to their Lands, and become naturally and politically his Slaves.

Noble Ven.

Noble Ven. Since there muſt be a voluntary parting with Power, I fear your Cure will prove long and ineffectual, and we Reconcilers ſhall, I fear, prove like our devout *Cappuchin* at *Venice*; this poor Man's name was *Fra. Barnardino da Udine*, and was eſteemed a very holy Man, as well as an excellent Preacher, inſomuch that he was appointed to Preach the *Lent* Sermons in one of our principal Churches, which he performed at the beginning with ſo much Eloquence, and Applauſe, that the Church was daily crowded three hours before the Sermon was to begin; the eſteem and veneration this poor Fryar was in, elevated his Spirit a little too high to be contained within the bounds of reaſon; but before his *Delirium* was perceived, he told his Auditory one day, that the true Devotion of that People, and the care they had to come to hear his word Preached, had been ſo acceptable to God, and to the Virgin, that they had vouchſafed to Inſpire him with the knowledge of an Expedient, which he did not doubt, but would make Men happy and juſt even in this Life, and that the Fleſh ſhould no longer luſt againſt the Spirit; but that he would not acquaint them with it at that preſent, becauſe ſomething was to be done on their parts to make them capable of this great Bleſſing, which was to pray zealouſly for a happy Succeſs upon his Endeavours, and to Faſt, and to viſit the Churches to that end; therefore he deſired them to come the *Wedneſday* following to be made acquainted with this bleſſed Expedient. You may Imagine how deſirous our People were, to hear ſomething more of this Fifth-Monarchy; I will ſhorten my Story, and tell you nothing of what crowding there was all night, and what quarrelling for places in the Church; nor with what difficulty the *Saffi*, who were ſent by the Magiſtrate to keep the Peace, and to make way for the Preacher to get into the Pulpit, did both; But up he got, and after a long preamble of deſiring more Prayers, and Addreſſing himſelf to our Senate to Mediate with the Pope, that a week might be ſet apart for a Jubilee and Faſting three days all over the Chriſtian World, to ſtorm Heaven with Maſſes, Prayers, Faſting and Alms to proſper his Deſigns; he began to open the Matter, That the Cauſe of all the Wickedneſs and Sin, and by Conſequence of all the Miſeries and Affliction which is in the world, ariſing from the enmity which is between God and the Devil, by which means God was often croſs'd in his Intentions of good to Mankind here, and hereafter, the Devil by his temptations making us uncapable of the Mercy and Favour of our Creator; therefore he had a Deſign (with the helps before mentioned) to mediate with Almighty God, that he would pardon the Devil and receive him into his Favour again after ſo long a time of Baniſhment and Impriſonment; and not to take all his power from him, but to leave him ſo much as might do good to Man, and not hurt; which he doubted not but he would employ that way, after ſuch reconciliation was made, which his Faith would not let him queſtion. You may judge what the numerous Auditory thought of this; I can only tell you, that he had a different ſort of Company at his return, from what he had when he came, for the Men left him to the Boys, who with great Hoops inſtead of Acclamations, brought him to the *Gondola*, which conveyed him to the *Redentor*, where he lodged; And I never had the curioſity to enquire what became of him after.

Doct. I thank you heartily for this Intermeſs; I ſee you have learnt ſomething in *England:* for, I aſſure you, we have been theſe twenty Years turning this, and all ſerious Diſcourſes into Ridicule; but yet your Similitude is very pat; for in every Parliament that has been in *England* theſe ſixty Years, we have had notable Conteſts between the Seed of the Serpent, and the Seed of the Woman.

Eng. Gent. Well Sir, we have had a *Michael* here in our Age, who has driven out *Lucifer*, and reſtored the true Deity to his Power: but where Omnipotency is wanting (which differs the Frier's Caſe and mine) the Devil of Civil War and Confuſion may get up again, if he be not laid by prudence and Virtue, and better Conjurers than any we have yet at Court.

Noble Ven. Well, Gentlemen, I hope you have pardoned me for my Farce. But, to be a little more ſerious, pray tell me how you will induce the King to give up ſo much of his Right as may ſerve your turn? Would you have the Parliament make War with him again?

Eng. Gent. There cannot, nor ought to be, any Change, but by his Majeſty's free Conſent; for beſides, that a War is to be abhorred by all Men that love their Country, any Conteſt of that kind in this caſe (*viz.* to take away the leaſt part of the King's Right) could be juſtified by no man living. I ſay, beſides that, a Civil War has miſcarried in our days, which was founded (at leaſt pretendedly) upon Defence of the People's own Rights: In which, although they had as clear a Victory in the end, as ever any Conteſt upon Earth had, yet could they never reap the leaſt advantage in the World by it: but went from one Tyranny to another, from *Barebone*'s Parliament, to *Cromwell*'s Reign; from that, to a Committee of Safety; leaving thoſe Grave Men, who managed Affairs at the beginning, amazed to ſee new Men, and new Principles Governing *England.* And this induced them to Co-operate to bring things back juſt where they were before the War. Therefore this Remedy will be either none, or worſe than the Diſeaſe: It not being now as it was in the Barons time, when the Lord who led out his Men, could bring them back again when he pleaſed, and Rule them in the mean time, being his Vaſſals. But now there is no Man of ſo much Credit, but that one who behaves himſelf bravely in the War, ſhall out-vye him; and, poſſibly, be able to do what he pleaſes with the Army and the Government: And in this corrupt Age, it is ten to one, he will rather do Hurt than Good with the Power he acquires. But becauſe you ask me how we would perſuade the King to this? I anſwer, by the Parliament's humbly Remonſtrating to His Majeſty, that it is his own Intereſt, Preſervation, Quiet and true Greatneſs, to put an end to the Diſtractions of his Subjects, and that it cannot be done any other way, and to deſire him to enter into debate with ſome Men Authorized by them, to ſee if there can be any other means than what they ſhall offer to compoſe things; if they find there may, then to embrace it, otherwiſe to inſiſt upon their own Propoſals: and if in the end they cannot obtain thoſe Requeſts, which they think the only eſſential means to preſerve their Country, then to beg their Diſmiſſion, that they may not ſtay, and be partakers in the Ruin of it. Now, my Reaſons why the King will pleaſe to grant this, after the thorough diſcuſſing of it, are two. Firſt, Becauſe all great Princes have ever made up Matters with their Subjects upon ſuch Conteſts, without coming to Extremities. The two greateſt, and

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moſt valiant of our Princes, were *Edward* the Firſt, and his Grandchild *Edward* the Third: theſe had very great Demands made them by Parliaments, and granted them all; as you may ſee upon the Statute-Book. *Edward* the Second, and *Richard* the Second, on the contrary, refuſed all things till they were brought to Extremity. There is a Memorable Example in the Greek Story of *Theopompus* King of *Sparta*; whoſe Subjects finding the Government in diſorder for want of ſome Perſons that might be a Check upon the great Power of the King, propoſed to him the Creation of the *Ephores* (Officers who made that City ſo great and Famous afterwards.) The King finding by their Reaſons (which were unanſwerable, as I think ours now are,) that the whole Government of *Sparta* was near its Ruin, without ſuch a Cure; and conſidering that he had more to loſe in that Diſorder than others, freely granted their deſires; for which being derided by his Wife, who asked him what a kind of Monarchy he would leave to his Son? anſwered, a very good one, becauſe it will be a very laſting one. Which brings on my Second Reaſon, for which I believe the King will grant theſe things; becauſe he cannot any way mend himſelf, nor his Condition, if he do not.

Noble Ven. You have very fully convinced me of two things: Firſt, That we have no reaſon to expect or believe that the Parliament will ever increaſe the King's Power: And then, that the King cannot by any way found himſelf a New, and more abſolute Monarchy, except he can alter the Condition of Property, which I think we may take for granted to be impoſſible. But yet, I know not why we may not ſuppoſe that (although he cannot eſtabliſh to all Poſterity ſuch an Empire) he may, notwithſtanding, change the Government at the preſent; and calling Parliaments no more, adminiſter it by force, as it is done in *France*, for ſome good time.

Eng. Gent. In *France* it has been a long Work; and although that Tyranny was begun, as has been ſaid, by Petition from the States themſelves, not to be aſſembled any more; yet the Kings ſince, in time of great Diſtraction, have thought fit to convocate them again; as they did in the Civil Wars thrice: Once at *Orleans*, and twice at *Blois*. I would not repeat what I have ſo tedioufly diſcourſed of concerning *France* already, but only to intreat you to remember that our Nation has no ſuch poor and numerous Gentry, which draw better Revenues from the King's Purſe, than they can from their own Eſtates; all our country people conſiſting of Rich Nobility and Gentry, of Wealthy Yeomen, and of Poor Younger Brothers, who have little or nothing, and can never raiſe their Companies, if they ſhould get Commiſſions, without their Elder Brother's Aſſiſtance amongſt his Tenants, or elſe with the free conſent and deſire of the People, which, in this caſe, would hardly be afforded them. But we will ſuppoſe there be idle People enough to make an Army, and that the King has Money enough to Arm and Raiſe them: And I will grant too, to avoid tedioufneſs (although I do not think it poſſible) that the people will at the firſt, for fear, receïve them into their Houſes, and Quarter them againſt Law; nay, pay the Money which ſhall be by illegal Edicts, impoſed upon the Subjects to pay them; Yet is it poſſible an Army can continue any time to enſlave their own Country? Can they reſiſt the Prayers, or the Curſes of their Fathers, Brothers, Wives, Mothers, Siſters, and of all Perſons wherever they frequent? Upon this Account all the *Greek* Tyrants were of very ſhort Continuance;

who

who being in chief Magiſtracy and Credit in their Common-wealths, by means of Soldiers and *Satellites*, uſurped the Sovereignty. But did ever any of them, excepting *Dionyſius*, leave it to his Son? Who was driven out within leſs than a year after his Father's death. Many Armies of the Natives have deſtroyed Tyrannies: So the *Decemvirate* was ruined at *Rome*, the *Tarquins* expelled before that: Our own Country has been a Stage, even in our time, where this Tragedy has been ſufficiently acted; for the Army, after the War was done fearing the Monarchy ſhould be reſtored again, held Councils, got Agitators; and though there were often very ſevere Executions upon the Ring-leaders, did at length, by their perſeverance, neceſſitate their Officers to join with them (having many good Head-pieces of the Party to adviſe them;) and ſo broke all Treaties. And the Parliament too, adhering to a ſmall Party of them who conſented to lay aſide Kingly Government, and afterwards drove them away too, fearing they would continue to Govern by an Oligarchy. I am far from approving this way they uſed, in which they broke all Laws, Divine and Human, Political and Moral: But I urge it only to ſhew how eaſily an Army of Natives is to be deluded with the Name of Liberty, and brought to pull down any thing which their Ring-leaders tell them tends to enſlaving their Country. 'Tis true, this Army was afterwards cheated by their General; who without their Knowledge, much leſs conſent, one Morning, ſuddenly made himſelf Tyrant of his Country. It is as true, that their Reputation (not their Arms) ſupported him in that State for ſome time; but it is certain that they did very often, and to the laſt, refuſe to be inſtrumental to levy Monies, though for their own pays: and ſo he, againſt his Will, was fain to call from time to time Parliamentary Conventions. And it is moſt certain that he did, in the Sickneſs of which he died, often complain that his Army would not go a ſtep farther with him: and, *de facto*, ſome Months after his death, they did dethrone his Son, and reſtore the Remainder of the old Parliament, upon promiſe made to them in ſecret (by the Demagogues of that Aſſembly) that a Common-wealth ſhould be ſpeedily framed and ſettled.

Noble Ven. Sir, I am ſatisfied that an Army raiſed here on a ſudden, and which never ſaw an Enemy, could not be brought to act ſuch high things for the Ruin of their own Government; nor poſſibly, would be any way able to reſiſt the Fury and Inſurrection of the people. But what ſay you of a Foreign Army, raiſed by your King abroad, and brought over, whoſe Officers and Soldiers ſhall have no Acquaintance or Relations amongſt the people here?

Eng. Gent. All Forces of that kind muſt be either Auxiliaries or Mercenaries: Auxiliaries are ſuch as are ſent by ſome Neighbour Prince or State, with their own Colours, and paid by themſelves: though poſſibly, the Prince who demands them may furniſh the Money. Theſe uſually return home again, when the occaſion, for which they were demanded, is over: But whether they do or not, if they be not mixed and over-ballanced with Forces which depend upon the Prince who calls them, but that the whole Weight and power lies in them, they will certainly, firſt or laſt, ſeize that Country for their own Sovereign. And as for Mercenaries, they muſt be raiſed ('tis true) with the Money of the Prince who needs them, but by the Authority and Credit of ſome Great Perſons who are to Lead and Command them:

And

And theſe, in all Occaſions, have made their own Commander Prince; as *F. Sforza* at *Milan* drove out by this trick the *Viſconti*, ancient Dukes of that State; and the *Mamalukes* in *Egypt* made themſelves a Military Common-wealth. So that the way of an Army here would either be no Remedy at all, or one very much worſe than the Diſeaſe to the Prince himſelf.

Noble Ven. Well Sir, I begin to be of Opinion, that any thing the King can grant the Parliament (eſpecially ſuch a Parliament as this is, which conſiſts of Men of very great Eſtates, and ſo can have no intereſt to deſire Troubles) will not be ſo inconvenient to him, as to endeavour to break the Government by force. But why may he not, for this time, by ſoothing them, and offering them great Alliances abroad for the Intereſt of *England*, and balancing Matters in *Europe* more even than they have been; and, in fine, by offering them a War with the *French*, to which Nation they have ſo great a hatred; lay them aſleep, and get good ſtore of Money, and ſtave off this ſevere Cure you ſpeak of, at leaſt, for ſome time longer?

Eng. Gent. There has been ſomething of this done too lately; and there is a Gentleman lies in the Tower, who is to anſwer for it. But you may pleaſe to underſtand, that there is ſcarce any amongſt the middle ſort of People, much leſs within the Walls of the Houſe of Commons, who do not perfectly know, that we can have no Alliance with any Nation in the World that will ſignify any thing to them, or to our ſelves, till our Government be redreſſed and new modelled. And therefore, though there were an Army Landed in this Iſland, yet that we muſt begin there, before we are fit to repulſe them, or defend our ſelves. And the fear and ſenſe of this People univerſally is, that if we ſhould have any War, either for our own Concerns, or for thoſe of our Allies, whilſt Matters remain as they do at home, it would certainly come to this paſs, that either being beaten, we ſhould ſubject this Kingdom to an Invaſion, at a time when we are in a very ill condition to repel it; or elſe, if we were Victorious, that our Courtiers and Counſellors *in fragrante* (or as the *French* cry, *d'emble*,) would employ that Mettle and good Fortune to try ſome ſuch Concluſions at home as we have been diſcourſing of. And therefore, if any War ſhould be undertaken without Parliament, you ſhould ſee the People rejoice as much at any diſaſter our Forces ſhould receive as they did when the *Scots* ſeized the four Northern Counties in 1639. Or before that, when we were beaten at the Iſle of *Rhee*, or when we had any Loſs in the laſt War with *Holland*. And this Joy is not ſo unnatural as it may ſeem to thoſe who do not conſider the Cauſe of it; which is the breach of our old Government, and the neceſſity our Governors are under to make ſome new experiments: And the fear we are in, that any Proſperity may make them able to try them, either with Effect, or at leaſt with Impunity. Which Conſideration made a Court-Droll ſay lately to His Majeſty, (who ſeemed to wonder why his ſubjects hated the *French* ſo much;) Sir, it is becauſe you love them and eſpouſe their Intereſt; And if you would diſcover this Truth clearly, you may pleaſe to make War with the King of *France*; and then you ſhall ſee, that this People will not only love them, take their parts, and wiſh them ſucceſs; but will exceedingly rejoice when they are Victorious in ſinking your Ships, or defeating your Forces.

And this is ſufficient to anſwer your propoſal for Alliances abroad, and for a War with *France*. Beſides this (to wind all up in a Word) it is not to be imagined, that ſo good and wiſe a Prince as we have at this time ſhould ever be induced (when he comes to underſtand perfectly his own Condition) to let his own Intereſt (granting his Power to be ſo, which is very falſe) conteſt with the Safety and Preſervation of his People, for which only it was given him; or that he will be any way tenacious of ſuch Prerogatives, as now, by a natural Revolution of Political Circumſtances, are ſo far from continuing uſeful to his Governing the People, that they are the only *Remora* and Obſtacle of all Government, Settlement and Order. For His Majeſty muſt needs know, that all Forms of regulating Mankind under Laws were ordained by God and Man, for the Happineſs and Security of the Governed, and not for the Intereſt and Greatneſs of thoſe who rule; unleſs where there is *Melior Natura* in the Caſe. So God Governs Man for his own Glory only, and Men Reign over Beaſts for their own uſe and Service; and where an Abſolute Prince rules over his own Servants whom he feeds and pays (as we have ſaid,) or the Maſter of a great and numerous Family Governs his Houſhold; they are both bound by the Law of God and Nature, and by their own Intereſt, to do them Juſtice, and not *Inſeviræ* or Tyrannize over them, more than the neceſſity of preſerving their Empire and Authority requires.

Doct. But Sir, conſidering the difficulty which will be found in the King, and poſſibly in the Parliament too, to come up to ſo great an alteration at the firſt, and the danger that may happen by our remaining long in this unſettled Condition, which does hourly expoſe us to innumerable hazards, both at home, and from abroad; why may we not begin, and lay the Foundation now, by removing all His Majeſty's preſent Council by Parliament; which is no new thing, but hath been often practiſed in many Kings Reigns?

Eng. Gent. Firſt, the Council, that is, the Privy Council which you mean, is no part of our Government, as we may have occaſion to ſhew hereafter; nor is the King obliged by any Fundamental Law, or by an Act of Parliament to hearken to their Advice, or ſo much as to aſk it; and if you ſhould make one on purpoſe, beſides that it would not be ſo effectual as what we may propoſe, it would be full as hard to go down either with King or Parliament. But beſides all this, you would ſee ſome of theſe Counſellors ſo nominated by Parliament, perhaps prove honeſt, and then they would be forced to withdraw as ſome lately did, becauſe they found, I ſuppoſe, that till the Adminiſtration be alter'd, it is impoſſible that their Councils can be imbraced, or any thing be acted by them which may tend to the good of their Country; thoſe who have not ſo great a ſenſe of Honour and Integrity, will be preſently corrupted by their own Intereſt, whilſt the Prince is left in poſſeſſion of all thoſe baits and means to anſwer ſuch Men's expectations: It being moſt certain, that if you have a muſty Veſſel, and by conſequence diſlike the Beer which comes out of it, and draw it out, cauſing the Barrel to be immediately fill'd with good and ſound Liquor, it is certain by experience, that both your new Drink, and all that ever you ſhall put into the Cask, till it be taken in pieces, and the Pipes ſhaved, and new model'd, will be full

full as muſty, and unſavoury as the firſt which you found fault with.

Noble Ven. Now, Sir, I think we are at an end of our Queſtions, and I for my part am convinced, that as the King cannot better himſelf any way by falling out with his People at this time, ſo that his goodneſs and wiſdom is ſuch, that he will rather chooſe to imitate the moſt glorious and generous of his Predeceſſors, as *Edward* the firſt, and *Edward* the third, than thoſe who were of leſs worth, and more unfortunate, as *Edward* the ſecond, and *Richard* the ſecond. And therefore we are now ready to hear what you would think fit to aſk of ſo excellent a Prince.

Eng. Gent. I never undertook to be ſo preſumptuous; there is a Parliament to ſit ſpeedily, and certainly they are the fitteſt every way to ſearch into ſuch matters; and to anticipate their wiſdom would be unreaſonable, and might give them juſt offence. But becauſe all this tittle tattle may not go for nothing, I ſhall preſume to give you my thoughts, how the Cure muſt be wrought, without deſcending to particulars. The Cauſe immediate (as we have ſaid) of our Diſeaſe, is the inexecution of our Laws; and it is moſt true, that when that is alter'd for the better, and that all our Laws are duly executed, we are in health; for as we can never have the entire benefit of them, till our Government is upon a right Baſis; ſo whenever we enjoy this happineſs, to have the full benefit of thoſe Conſtitutions, which were made by our Anceſtors for our ſafe and orderly living, our Government is upon a right Baſis; therefore we muſt enquire into the Cauſe why our Laws are not executed, and when you have found and taken away that Cauſe, all is well. The Cauſe can be no other than this, That the King is told, and does believe, that moſt of theſe great Charters or Rights of the People, of which we now chiefly treat, are againſt his Majeſty's Intereſt, though this be very falſe (as has been ſaid) yet we will not diſpute it at this time, but take it for granted, ſo that the King having the ſupreme Execution of the Laws in his hand, cannot be reaſonably ſuppoſed to be willing to execute them whenever he can chooſe whether he will do it or no; it being natural for every Man not to do any thing againſt his own Intereſt when he can help it; now when you have thought well what it ſhould be that gives the King a Liberty to chooſe whether any part of the Law ſhall be currant or no, you will find that it is the great Power the King enjoys in the Government; when the Parliament hath diſcovered this, they will no doubt demand of his Majeſty an abatement of his royal Prerogative in thoſe Matters only which concern our enjoyment of our All, that is our Lives, Liberties and Eſtates, and leave his royal Power entire and untouch'd in all the other Branches of it; when this is done, we ſhall be as if ſome great Hero had performed the adventure of diſſolving the Enchantment we have been under ſo many Years. And all our Statutes from the higheſt to the loweſt, from *Magna Charta* to that for burying in Woollen, will be current, and we ſhall neither fear the bringing in Popery, nor Arbitrary Power in the Intervals of Parliament, neither will there be any Diſſentions in them; all Cauſes of Factions between the Country and Court-party being entirely aboliſhed; ſo that the People ſhall have no reaſon to diſtruſt their Prince, nor he them.

Doct.

Dect. You make us a fine Golden Age; but after all this, will you not be pleaſed to ſhew us a ſmall proſpect of this *Canaan*, or Country of reſt; will you not vouchſafe to particularize a little what Powers there are in the King, which you would have diſcontinued? would you have ſuch Prerogatives aboliſhed, or placed elſewhere?

Eng. Gent. There can be no Government if they be aboliſhed. But I will not be like a Man who refuſes to ſing amongſt his Friends at their entreaty, becauſe he has an ill Voice; I will rather ſuffer my ſelf to be laugh'd at by you in delivering my ſmall Judgment in this Matter, but ſtill with this Proteſtation, that I do believe that an Infinity of Men better qualify'd than my ſelf for ſuch ſublime Matters, and much more the Houſe of Commons, who repreſent the Wiſdom as well as the Power of this Kingdom, may find out a far better way, than my poor Parts and Capacity can ſuggeſt. The powers then which now being in the Crown do hinder the Execution of our Laws, and prevent by conſequence our Happineſs and Settlement, are four; The abſolute Power of making War and Peace, Treaties and Alliances with all Nations in the World, by which means, by ignorant Counſellors, or wicked Miniſters, many of our former Kings have made Confederations and Wars, very contrary, and deſtructive to the Intereſt of *England*, and by the unfortunate management of them, have often put the Kingdom in great hazard of Invaſion: Beſides that, as long as there is a Diſtinction made between the Court-party and that of the Country, there will ever be a Jealouſy in the People, that thoſe wicked Counſellors (who may think they can be ſafe no other way) will make Alliances with powerful Princes, in which there may be a ſecret Article by which thoſe Princes ſhall ſtipulate to aſſiſt them with Forces upon a ſhort warning to curb the Parliament, and poſſibly to change the Government. And this apprehenſion in the People will be the leſs unreaſonable, becauſe *Oliver Cromwell* (the great Pattern of ſome of our Courtiers) is notoriouſly known to have inſerted an Article in his Treaty with Cardinal *Mazzarin*, during this King of *France*'s Minority, That he ſhould be aſſiſted with ten thouſand Men from *France*, upon occaſion, to preſerve and defend him in his uſurped Government, againſt his Majeſty that now is, or the People of *England*, or in fine, his own Army, whoſe revolt he often feared. The ſecond great Prerogative the King enjoys, is the ſole Diſpoſal and Ordering of the Militia by Sea and Land, raiſing Forces, garriſoning and fortifying places, ſetting out Ships of War, ſo far as he can do all this without putting Taxations upon the People; and this not only in the Intervals of Parliament, but even during their Seſſion; ſo that they cannot raiſe the Train-bands of the Country or City to Guard themſelves, or ſecure the Peace of the Kingdom. The third point is, That it is in his Majeſty's Power to nominate and appoint as he pleaſes, and for what time he thinks fit, all the Officers of the Kingdom that are of Truſt or profit, both Civil, Military, and Eccleſiaſtical, (as they will be called) except where there is *Jus Patronatus*; Theſe two laſt Powers may furniſh a Prince who will hearken to ill deſigning Counſellors, with the means either of invading the Government by Force, or by his Judges and other Creatures undermining it by Fraud; eſpecially by enjoying the fourth Advantage, which is the laying out and imploying, as he pleaſes, all the publick Revenues of the Crown or Kingdom, and that without having any regard (except he thinks fit)

to

to the neceſſity of the Navy, or any other thing that concerns the Safety of the Publick. So that all theſe four great Powers, as things now ſtand, may be adoperated at any time, as well to deſtroy and ruin the good Order and Government of the State, as to preſerve and ſupport it, as they ought to do.

Noble Ven. But if you diveſt the King of theſe Powers, will you have the Parliament ſit always to Govern theſe Matters?

Eng. Gent. Sir, I would not diveſt the King of them, much leſs would I have the Parliament aſſume them, or perpetuate their Sitting: They are a Body more fitted to make Laws, and puniſh the Breakers of them, than to execute them. I would have them therefore petition His Majeſty by way of Bill, that he will pleaſe to exerciſe theſe four great *Magnalia* of Government, with the Conſent of four ſeveral Councils to be appointed for that end, and not otherwiſe; that is, with the Conſent of the Major part of them, if any of them diſſent. In all which Councils His Majeſty, or who he pleaſes to appoint, ſhall preſide; the Councils to be named in Parliament; firſt all the number, and every Year afterwards a third part: So each Year a third part ſhall go out, and a Recruit of an equal number come in: And in three Years they ſhall be all new, and no Perſon to come into that Council, or any other of the four, till he have kept out of any of them full three Years, being as long as he was in. And this I learnt from your *Quarantia's* at *Venice*: and the Uſe is excellent; for being in ſuch a Circulation, and ſure to have their intervals of Power, they will neither grow ſo inſolent as to brave their King, nor will the Prince have any occaſion to corrupt them, although he had the means to do it, which in this new Model he cannot have. Theſe Men in their ſeveral Councils ſhould have no other inſtructions, but to diſpoſe of all things, and act in their ſeveral Charges, for the Intereſt and Glory of *England*; and ſhall be Anſwerable to Parliament, from time to time, for any malicious or adviſed Miſdemeanor; only that Council which manages the Publick Revenue, ſhall (beſides a very copious and Honourable Revenue which ſhall be left to His Majeſty's diſpoſal for his own Entertainment, as belongs to the Splendor and Majeſty of the Government) have Inſtructions to ſerve His Majeſty (if he pleaſes to command them, and not otherwiſe) in the regulating and ordering his Oeconomy and Houſhold; and if they ſhall ſee it neceſſary, for extraordinary Occaſions of treating Foreign Princes and Ambaſſadors, or Preſenting them, and the like Oſtentation of Greatneſs; to conſent with his Majeſty moderately to charge the Revenue to that end. I verily believe that this Expedient is much more effectual than either the *Juſtitia* of *Arragon* was, or the *Ephores* of *Sparta*: Who being to check the King almoſt in every thing, without having any ſhare in his Councils, or underſtanding them, could not chuſe but make a ſullen poſture of Affairs; whereas theſe both ſeem, and really are the King's Miniſters, only obliged by Parliament to act faithfully and honeſtly; to which, even without that, all other Councellors are bound by Oath. As for the other Council, now called the Privy Council, the King may ſtill pleaſe to continue to nominate them at his pleaſure, ſo they act nothing in any of the Matters properly within the Juriſdiction of theſe four Councils, but meddle with the Affairs of Merchants, Plantations, Charters, and other Matters, to which the Regal Power extendeth. And provided that His Majeſty call none of the Perſons employed in theſe other four

Councils during their being ſo, nor that this Council do any way intermeddle with any Affairs, Criminal or Civil, which are to be decided by Law, and do belong to the Juriſdictions of other Courts or Magiſtrates, they being no eſtabliſhed Judicatory, or Congregation, which either our Government or Laws do take notice of (as was ſaid before) but Perſons congregated by the King, as his Friends and faithful Subjects, to give him their Opinion in the Execution of his Regal Office. As for Example, the King does exerciſe, at this time, a Negative Voice as to Bills preſented to him by the Parliament, which he claims by Right; no Man ever ſaid that the Privy-Council had a Negative Voice; yet former Kings did not only ask their Advice as to the paſſing or not paſſing of ſuch Bills, but often decided the Matter by their Votes; which, although it be a high Preſumption in them, when they venture to give him Council contrary to what is given him by his greateſt Council, yet never any of them have been queſtioned for it; being looked upon as private Men, who ſpeak according to the beſt of their Cunning, and ſuch as have no publick Capacity at all. But if this be not ſo, and that this Council have ſome Foundation in Law, and ſome publick Capacity, I wiſh in this new Settlement it may be made otherwiſe, and that His Majeſty pleaſe to take their Counſel in private; but ſummon no Perſons to appear before them; much leſs give them Authority to ſend for in Cuſtody, or Impriſon any Subject, which may as well be done by the Judges and Magiſtrates; who, if Secrecy be required, may as well be ſworn to Secrecy as theſe Gentlemen; and I believe can keep Counſel as well, and give it too.

Noble Ven. But would you have none to manage State-Affairs, none Impriſoned for ſecret Conſpiracies, and kept till they can be fully diſcovered? you have make an Act here lately about Impriſonments, that every Perſon ſhall have his *Habeas Corpus*, I think you call it: ſo that no Man, for what occaſion ſoever, can lie in Priſon above a Night, but the Cauſe muſt be revealed, though there be great cauſe for the concealing it.

Eng. Gent. This Act you mention, and a great many more which we have to the ſame purpoſe, that is, againſt Illegal Impriſonments, ſhews that for a long time the Power over Men's Perſons has been exerciſed (under His Majeſty) by ſuch as were very likely, rather to employ it ill than well; (that is) would rather Impriſon ten Men for Honourable Actions; ſuch as ſtanding for the People's Rights in Parliament, refuſing to pay Illegal Taxes, and the like; than one for projecting and inventing Illegal Monopolies, or any other kind of oppreſſing the People. This made firſt *Magna Charta*, then the *Petition of Right*, and divers other Acts beſides this laſt, take that Power quite away, and make the Law and the Judges the only Diſpoſers of the Liberties of our Perſons. And it may be, when the Parliament ſhall ſee the Fruit of this Alteration we are now diſcourſing of, and that State-Affairs are in better hands, they may think fit to provide that a Return, or Warrant of Impriſonment from one of theſe Four Councils (which I ſuppoſe will have a Power of Commitment given them, as to Perſons appearing Delinquents before them) wherein it ſhall be expreſſed, That if the Publick is like to ſuffer or be defrauded, if the Matter be immediately divulged; I ſay in this Caſe, the Parliament may pleaſe to make it lawful for the Judge to delay the

Bailing

Bailing of him for ſome ſmall time, becauſe it is not to be judged, that theſe Counſellors ſo choſen, and ſo inſtructed, and to continue ſo ſmall a time, will uſe this Power ill; eſpecially being accountable for any abuſing of it to the next Parliament. And I ſuppoſe the Parliament, amongſt other Proviſions in this behalf, will require that there ſhall be a Regiſter kept of all the Votes of theſe ſeveral Councils, with the names as well of thoſe who conſented, as of ſuch who diſſented: And as to the former part of your Queſtion, whether I would have none to manage State Affairs; I think there are very few State Affairs that do not concern either Peace and War, and Treaties abroad, the management of the Arms, Militia, and *poſſe Comitatus* at home; the management of all the Publick Monies, and the Election of all Officers whatſoever; the other parts, of State Affairs, which are making and repealing of Laws, puniſhing high Crimes againſt the State, with Levying and Proportioning all manner of Impoſitions upon the People, this is reſerved to the Parliament it ſelf; and the Execution of all Laws to the Judges, and Magiſtrates; And I can think of no other Affairs of State than theſe.

Doct. Do you intend that the Council for chuſing Officers ſhall Elect them of the King's Houſhold, that is, his Menial Servants?

Eng. Gent. No, that were unreaſonable, except any of them have any Juriſdiction in the Kingdom, or any place or preheminence in Parliament annexed to ſuch Office; but in theſe things which concern the powers and Juriſdictions of theſe ſeveral Councils (wherein, *la guardia della laberta*, as *Machiavel* calls it, is now to be placed) I ſhall not preſume to ſay any thing, but aſſure your ſelf, if ever it come to that, it will be very well digeſted in Parliament, they being very good at contriving ſuch Matters, and making them practicable, as well as at performing all other Matters that concern the Intereſt and Greatneſs of the Kingdom.

Doct. I have thought that the *Ephores* of *Sparta* were an admirable Magiſtracy, not only for the Intereſt of the People but likewiſe for the preſervation of the authority of the Kings, and of their lives too; for *Plutarch* obſerves that the Cities of *Meſene* and *Argos* had the ſame Government with *Lacedemon*, and yet for want of erecting ſuch an Authority as was in the *Ephores*, they were not only perpetually in broils amongſt themſelves, and for that reaſon ever beaten by their Enemies, whereas the *Spartans* were always victorious, but even their Kings were the moſt miſerable of Men, being often call'd in queſtion Judicially, and ſo loſt their Lives, and many of them murdered by Inſurrections of the People: And at laſt in both theſe Cities, the Kings were driven out, their Families extirpated, the Territory new divided, and the Government turn'd into a *Democracy*. And I ever thought that this expedient you propoſe (for I have heard you diſcourſe of it often before now) would prove a more ſafe, and a more noble reformation than the Inſtitution of the *Ephores* was, and that a Prince who is a lover of his Country, who is Gracious, Wiſe and Juſt, (ſuch a one as it has pleaſed God to ſend us at this time) ſhall be ten times more abſolute when this Regulation is made, than ever he was or could be before; and that whatſoever he propoſes in any of theſe Councils will be received as a Law, nay, as an Oracle: And on the other ſide, ill and weak Princes ſhall have no poſſibility of corrupting Men, or doing either themſelves or their People any kind of harm or miſchief: But have you done now?

Eng.

Eng. Gent. No, Sir, when this Proviſion is made for the Execution of the Laws, (which I think very effectual, not to ſay infallible) although it is not to be doubted, but that there will be from time to time many excellent Laws enacted; yet two I would have paſſed immediately, the one concerning the whole Regulation of the Elections to Parliament, which we need very much, and no doubt but it will be well done; that part of it which is neceſſary to go hand in hand with our Settlement, and which indeed muſt be part of it, is, that a Parliament be elected every year at a certain day, and that without any Writ or Summons, the People meeting of courſe at the time appointed in the uſual place (as they do in Pariſhes at the Church-Houſe to chooſe Officers) and that the Sheriffs be there ready to preſide and to certify the Election. And that the Parliament ſo choſen ſhall meet at the time appointed, and ſit and adjourn as their Buſineſs is more or leſs urgent: But ſtill ſetting yet a time for their coming together again; but if there ſhall be a neceſſity (by reaſon of Invaſion or ſome other Cauſe) for their aſſembling ſooner, then the King to call the Counſellors of theſe four Councils all together, and with the conſent of the major part of them, intimate their meeting ſooner; but when the Day comes for the annual meeting of another Parliament, they muſt be underſtood to be diſſolved in Law, without any other Ceremony, and the new one to take their place.

Doct. I would have this conſidered too, and provided for, That no Election ſhould be made of any perſon who had not the majority of the Electors preſent to vote for him; ſo the Writ orders it, and ſo Reaſon dictates; for elſe, how can he be ſaid to repreſent the County, if not a fifth part have conſented to his choice, as happens ſometimes, and may do oftener? for where ſeven or eight ſtand for one vacant place, as I have known in our laſt Long Parliament, where the Votes being ſet in Columns, he who has had moſt Votes, has not exceeded four hundred of above two thouſand who were preſent.

Noble Ven. This is a ſtrange way; I thought you had put every Man by himſelf, as we do in our Government, and as I underſtood they do in the Houſe of Commons, when there is any nomination, and then, if he has not the major part, he is rejected.

Eng Gent. This is very material, and indeed eſſential; but I make no doubt, but if this Project ſhould come in play in Parliament, this and all other particulars (which would be both needleſs and tedious to diſcourſe of here) will be well and effectually provided for. The next Act I would have paſſed, ſhould be concerning the Houſe of Peers, that as I take it for granted, that there will be a Clauſe in the Bill concerning Elections, that no new Boroughs ſhall be enabled to ſend Members to Parliament, except they ſhall be capacitated thereunto by an Act; ſo it being of the ſame neceſſity as to the Liberty of Parliament, that the Peers (who do and muſt enjoy both a Negative and Deliberative Voice in all Parliamentary Tranſactions, except what concern levying of Money originally) be exempted from depending abſolutely upon the Prince, and that therefore it be declared by Act, for the future, that no Peer ſhall be made but by Act of Parliament, and then that it be Hereditary in his Male Line.

Noble Ven. I am not yet fully ſatisfied how you can order your Matters concerning this Houſe of Peers, nor do I ſee how the Conteſts between the Houſe of Commons and them, can be ſo laid aſleep but

that they will ariſe again: Beſides the Houſe of Commons muſt neceſſarily be extremely concerned to find the Houſe of Peers, which conſiſts of private perſons, though very great and honourable ones, in an inſtant daſh all that they have been ſo long hammering for the good of all the People of *England* whom they repreſent; were it not better now, you are upon ſo great alterations, to make an annual elective Senate, or at leaſt one wherein the Members ſhould be but for Life, and not Hereditary.

Eng. Gent. By no means, Sir, the leſs change the better, and in this Caſe the Metaphyſical Maxim is more true than in any, *viz. Entia non ſunt multiplicanda ſine neceſſitate*; for great alterations fright Men, and puzzle them, and there is no need of it at all in this Caſe. I have told you before, that there is a neceſſity of a Senate, and how ſhort this Government would be without it, and how confuſed in the mean time; the *Roman* Senate was Hereditary amongſt the *Patricii*, except the Cenſor left any of them out of the Roll during his Magiſtracy, for ſome very great and ſcandalous offence; and in that caſe too there was an Appeal to the People, as in all other Cauſes, witneſs the Caſe of *Lucius Quintius* and many others. To ſhew that there can be no need of ſuch a change here as you ſpeak of, you may pleaſe to conſider, that all Differences between the ſeveral parts of any Government, come upon the account of Intereſt; now when this Settlement is made, the Houſe of Peers, and the Houſe of Commons can have no Intereſt to diſſent; For as to all things of private Intereſt, that is, the Rights of Peers, both during the ſitting of Parliaments, and in the Intervals, is left to their own Houſe to judge of, as it is to the Houſe of Commons to judge of their own Priviledges; And as for the conteſt of the Peers Juriſdiction as to Appeals from Courts of Equity; Beſides that I would have that ſettled in the Act which ſhould paſs concerning the Lords Houſe; I believe it will never happen more, when the Government is upon a right Foundation; it having been hitherto fomented by two different Parties, the Court-party ſometimes blowing up that difference to break the Seſſion, leſt ſome good Bills for the People ſhould paſs, or that the King by rejecting them, might diſcontent his People; to avoid which *Dilemma*, there needed no more, but to procure ſome perſon to proſecute his Appeal before the Lords; ſome honeſt Patriots afterwards poſſibly might uſe the ſame policy which they learn'd from the Courtiers, to quaſh ſome Bill very deſtructive, in which they were out-voted in the Commons Houſe; otherwiſe it is ſo far from the Intereſt of the Commons to hinder Appeals from Courts of Equity, that there is none amongſt them, but know we are almoſt deſtroyed for want of it: And when they have conſidered well, and that ſome ſuch Reformation as this ſhall take place; they will find that it can never be placed in a more honourable and unbyas'd Judicatory than this, And I could wiſh that even in the Intermiſſion of Parliamentary Seſſions, the whole Peerage of *England*, as many of them as can conveniently be in Town, may ſit in their Judicial Capacities, and hear Appeals in Equity, as well as judge upon Writs of Error. Now as to your other Objection (which is indeed of great weight) that the Houſe of Commons muſt needs take it ill, that the Lords ſhould fruſtrate their Endeavours for the People's good by their Negative; If you conſider one thing, the force of this

Objection will vaniſh; which is, That when this new Conſtitution ſhall be admitted, the Lords cannot have any Intereſt or Temptation to differ with the Commons, in any thing wherein the publick good is concerned, but are obliged by all the ties in the World, to run the ſame courſe and fortune with the Commons, their Intereſt being exactly the ſame; ſo that if there be any diſſenting upon Bills between the two Houſes, when each of them ſhall think their own Expedient conduces moſt to the advantage of the Publick; this difference will ever be decided by right Reaſon at Conferences; And the Lords may as well convince the Commons, as be convinced by them; and theſe conteſts are and ever will be of admirable uſe and benefit to the Common-wealth; the reaſon why it is otherwiſe now, and that the Houſe of Peers is made uſe of to hinder many Bills from paſſing, that are ſuppoſed to be for the eaſe of the People, is, that the great Counſellors and Officers which ſit in that Houſe, do ſuggeſt (whether true or falſe) that it is againſt his Majeſty's Will and Intereſt that ſuch an Act ſhould paſs, whereupon it has found Obſtruction; but hereafter if our expedient take place it cannot be ſo, firſt, becauſe our King himſelf cannot have any Deſigns going (as was proved before) which ſhall make it his advantage to hinder any good intended his People, whoſe Proſperity then will be his own. And then becauſe in a ſhort time, the Peers being made by Act of Parliament, will conſiſt of the beſt Men of *England* both for Parts and Eſtates, and thoſe who are already made, if any of them have ſmall Eſtates, the King if he had the Intereſt, would not have the means to corrupt them, the publick Monies, and the great Offices being to be diſpenſed in another manner than formerly; ſo their Lordſhips will have no Motive in the World to ſteer their Votes and Councils, but their own Honour and Conſcience, and the preſervation and proſperity of their Country. So that it would be both needleſs and unjuſt to pretend any change of this kind. Beſides, this Alteration in the Adminiſtration of our Government being propoſed to be done by the unanimous conſent of King, Lords, and Commons, and not otherwiſe, it would be very prepoſterous to believe, that the Peers would depoſe themſelves of their Hereditary Rights, and betake themſelves to the hopes of being elected; it is true, they have loſt the Power they had over the Commons, but that has not been taken from them by any Law, no more than it was given them by any; but is fallen by the courſe of Nature, as has been ſhewn at large; But though they cannot lead the Commons by their Tenures, as formerly, yet there is no reaſon or colour that they ſhould loſe their Co-ordination, which I am ſure they have by Law, and by the Fundamental Conſtitution of the Government; and which is ſo far from being prejudicial to a laſting Settlement (as was ſaid) that it infinitely contributes to it, and prevents the Confuſion which would deſtroy it. If I ſhould have propoſed any thing in this Diſcourſe which ſhould have intrenched upon the King's Hereditary Right, or that ſhould have hindred the Majeſty and Greatneſs of theſe Kingdoms from being repreſented by his Royal Perſon, I ſhould have made your Story of the *Capuchine* Fryar very Applicable to me.

Noble Ven. I ſee you have not forgiven me that Novel yet; but pray give me leave to aſk you one Queſtion: Why do you make the Election of Great Officers, to be by a ſmall ſecret Council, that had been more

more proper for a Numerous Aſſembly; as it is in moſt Commonwealths?

Eng. Gent. It is ſo in Democracies, and was ſo in *Sparta*, and is done by your Great Council in *Venice*; but we are not making ſuch a kind of Government, but rectifying an ancient Monarchy, and giving the Prince ſome help in the Adminiſtration of that great Branch of his Regality; beſides, it is ſufficient, that our Parliament chuſes theſe Councils, (that is always underſtood the Lords and Commons, with the King's Conſent) beſides, it is poſſible, that if ſuch a Regulation as this come in Debate againſt them, the Parliament will reſerve to it ſelf the Approbation of the Great Officers, as Chancellor, Judges, General Officers of an Army, and the like; and that ſuch ſhall not have a ſettlement in thoſe Charges, till they are accordingly allowed of; but may in the mean time exerciſe them. As to particulars, I ſhall always refer you to what the Parliament will judge fit to Order in the caſe; but if you have any thing to Object, or to ſhew in general, that ſome ſuch Regulation as this cannot be effectual towards the putting our Diſtracted Country into better Order; I ſhall think my ſelf oblig'd to Anſwer you, if you can have Patience to hear me, and are not weary already; as you may very well be.

Noble Ven. I ſhall certainly never be weary of ſuch Diſcourſe; however I ſhall give you no further trouble in this matter; for I am very fully ſatisfied, that ſuch Reformation, if it could be compaſſed, would not only Unite all Parties, but make you very Flouriſhing at home, and very Great abroad: but have you any hopes that ſuch a thing will ever come into Debate? what do the Parliament-men ſay to it?

Eng. Gent. I never had any Diſcourſe to this purpoſe, either with any Lord, or Member of the Commons houſe, otherwiſe than as poſſibly ſome of theſe Notions might fall in at Ordinary Converſation: For I do not intend to intrench upon the Office of God, to teach our Senators Wiſdom. I have known ſome men ſo full of their own Notions, that they went up and down ſputtering them in every Man's Face they met; ſome went to great Men during our late Troubles; nay, to the King himſelf, to offer their Expedients from Revelation. Two Men I was acquainted with, of which one had an Invention to reconcile differences in Religion; the other had a project for a Bank of Lands to lie as a ſecurity for ſums of Money lent; both theſe were Perſons of great Parts and Fancy; but yet ſo troubleſome at all times, and in all Companies, that I have often been forced to repeat an Excellent Proverb of our Country: God deliver me from a man that has but one buſineſs; and I aſſure you there is no Man's Reputation that I envy leſs, than I do that of ſuch Perſons; and therefore you may pleaſe to believe that I have not imitated them in ſcattering theſe Notions, nor can I Propheſy whether any ſuch Apprehenſions as theſe will ever come into the Heads of thoſe Men who are our true Phyſicians. But yet to anſwer your Queſtion, and give you my Conjecture; I believe that we are not Ripe yet for any great Reform; not only becauſe we are a very Debauch'd People; I do not only mean that we are giving to Whoring, Drinking, Gaming an Idleneſs; but chiefly that we have a Politique Debauch, which is a neglect of all things that concern the publick welfare, and a ſetting up our own private

private Intereſt againſt it; I ſay, this is not all, for then the Polity of no Country could be Redreſt: For every Common-wealth that is out of order, has ever all theſe Debauches we ſpeak of, as Conſequences of their looſe State. But there are two other Conſiderations which induce me to fear that our Cure is not yet near. The firſt is, becauſe moſt of the Wiſe and Grave Men of this Kingdom are very ſilent, and will not open their Budget upon any terms: And although they diſlike the preſent Condition we are in as much as any Men, and ſee the Precipice it leads us to, yet will never open their Mouths to preſcribe a Cure; but being asked what they would adviſe, give a ſhrug like your Countrymen. There was a very conſiderable Gentleman as moſt in *England*, both for Birth, Parts, and Eſtate, who being a Member of the Parliament that was called, 1640. continued all the War with them; and by his Wiſdom and Eloquence (which were both very great) promoted very much their Affairs. When the Factions began between the Presbyters and Independents, he joined Cordially with the latter, ſo far as to give his Affirmative to the Vote of no Addreſſes; that is, to an Order made in the Houſe of Commons, to ſend no more Meſſages to the King, nor to receive any from him. Afterwards, when an Aſſault was made upon the Houſe by the Army, and divers of the Members taken violently away, and Secluded; he diſliking it (though he were none of them) voluntarily abſented himſelf, and continued retired; being exceedingly averſe to a Democratical Government, which was then declared for, till *Cromwell*'s Uſurpation; and being infinitely courted by him, abſolutely refuſed to accept of any Employment under him, or to give him the leaſt Council. When *Cromwell* was dead, and a Parliament called by his Son, or rather by the Army, the chief Officers of which did, from the beginning, whiſper into the Ears of the Leading Members that if they could make an honeſt Government, they ſhould be ſtood by (as the Word then was) by the Army. This Gentleman, at that time, neither would be Elected into that Parliament, nor give the leaſt Advice to any other Perſon that was; but kept himſelf ſtill upon the Reſerve. Inſomuch that it was generally believed, that although he had ever been oppoſite to the late King's coming to the Government again, though upon Propoſitions; yet he might hanker after the Reſtoration of His Majeſty that now is. But that Apprehenſion appeared groundleſs when it came to the pinch: for being conſulted as an Oracle by the then General *Monk*, whether he ſhould reſtore the Monarchy again or no, would make no Anſwer, nor give him the leaſt Advice, and, *de facto*, hath ever ſince kept himſelf from Publick Buſineſs; although, upon the Baniſhment of my Lord of *Clarendon*, he was viſited by one of the Greateſt Perſons in *England*, and one in as much Eſteem with His Majeſty as any whatſoever, and deſired to accept of ſome great Employment near the King; which he abſolutely refuſing, the ſame Perſon, not a Stranger to him, but well known by him, begged of him to give his Advice how His Majeſty (who deſired nothing more than to unite all his People together, and repair the Breaches which the Civil War had cauſed, now my Lord *Clarendon* was gone, who by his Counſels kept thoſe Wounds open) might perform that Honourable and Gracious Work: but ſtill this Gentleman made his Excuſes. And, in

ſhort,

ſhort, neither then, nor at any time before or after (excepting when he ſat in the Long Parliament of the Year 40.) neither during the diſtracted Times, nor ſince His Majeſty's Return, when they ſeemed more repoſed, would ever be brought, either by any private intimate Friend, or by any Perſon in Publick Employment, to give the leaſt Judgment of our Affairs, or the leaſt Counſel to mend them, though he was not ſhy of declaring his diſlike of Matters as they went. And yet this Gentleman was not only by repute, and eſteem a wiſe Man, but was really ſo, as it appeared by his management of buſineſs, and drawing Declarations, when he was contented to act; as alſo by his exceeding prudent managing of his own Fortune, which was very great, and his honourable Living and providing for his Family; his Daughters having been all married to the beſt Men in *England*; and his Eldeſt Son to the moſt accompliſht Lady in the World. I dare aſſure you, there are above an hundred ſuch Men in *England*, though not altogether of that eminency.

Noble Ven. Methinks theſe perſons are altogether as bad an extreme as the loquacious Men you ſpoke of before. I remember when I went to School, our Maſter, amongſt other Common-places in the commendation of ſilence, would tell us of a Latin ſaying, That a Fool whilſt he held his peace did not differ from a Wiſe man: but truly I think we may as truly ſay, That a wiſe man whilſt he is ſilent does not differ from a Fool; for how great ſoever his Wiſdom is, it can neither get him credit, nor otherwiſe advantage himſelf, his Friend, nor his Country. But let me not divert you from your other point.

Eng. Gent. The next Reaſon I have to make me fear that ſuch an Expedient as we have been talking of, will not be propoſed ſuddenly, is the great diſtruſt the Parliament has of men, which will make moſt Members ſhy of venturing at ſuch matters, which being very new, at the firſt motion are not perfectly underſtood, at leaſt to ſuch as have not been verſed in Authors who have written of the Politicks; and therefore the Mover may be ſuſpected of having been ſet on by the Court-party to puzzle them, and ſo to divert, by offering new Expedients, ſome ſmart mettleſome Debates they may be upon concerning the Succeſſion to the Crown, or other high matters: For it is the nature of all Popular Counſels (even the wiſeſt that ever were, witneſs the people of *Rome* and *Athens*, which *Machiavel* ſo much extols) in turbulent times, to like diſcourſes that heighten their paſſions, and blow up their Indignation, better than them that endeavour to rectify their Judgments, and tend to provide for their ſafety. And the truth is, our Parliament is very much to be excuſed, or rather juſtified in this diſtruſt they have of perſons, ſince there hath been of late ſo many and ſo ſucceſsful attempts uſed by the late great Miniſters, to debauch the moſt eminent Members of the Commons-Houſe, by Penſions and Offices; and therefore it would wonderfully conduce to the good of the Common-wealth, and to the compoſing our diſordered State, if there were men of ſo high and unqueſtionable a Reputation, that they were above all ſuſpicion and diſtruſt, and ſo might venture upon bold, that is (in this caſe) moderate Counſels, for the ſaving of their Country. Such men there were in the Parliament of 1640. at leaſt twenty or thirty, who having ſtood their ground in ſeven Parliaments before, which in the two laſt Kings Reigns had been diſſolved abruptly and in wrath, and having reſiſted the fear of Impriſonment and great Fines for their love to *England*, as well, as the temptation of

Money and Officers to betray it, both inferred by the wicked Counſellors of that Age, tending both to the ruin of our juſt Rights, and the detriment of their Maſters Affairs; I ſay, having conſtantly, and with great magnanimity and honour made proof of their Integrity, they had acquired ſo great a Reputation, that not only the Parliament, but even almoſt the whole People ſtuck to them, and were ſwayed by them in Actions of a much higher Nature than any are now diſcourſed of, without fear of being deſerted, or as we ſay, left in the lurch, as the people of *France* often are by their Grandees, when they raiſe little Civil Wars to get great Places, which as ſoon as they are offered, they lay down Arms, and leave their Followers to be hang'd; but although theſe two reaſons of the ſilence of ſome wiſe men, and the want of reputation in others, does give us but a ſad proſpect of our Land of Promiſe, yet we have one Conſideration, which does encourage us to hope better things e're long. And that is the Infallible Certainty that we cannot long continue as we are, and that we can never Meliorate, but by ſome ſuch Principles, as we have been here all this while diſcourſing of, and that without ſuch helps and ſuccours as may be drawn from thence, we muſt go from one diſtraction to another, till we come into a Civil War, and in the cloſe of it be certainly a prey to the King of *France*, who (on which ſide it mattters not) will be a Gameſter, and ſweep Stakes at laſt; the World not being now equally ballanced between two Princes alike powerful, as it was during our laſt Civil War; and if as well this danger, as the only means to prevent it, be underſtood in time, (as no doubt it will) we ſhall be the happieſt and the greateſt Nation in the World in a little time; and in the mean time, enjoy the beſt and moſt juſt eaſy Government of any People upon Earth. If you ask me whether I could have offer'd any thing that I thought better than this, I will anſwer you as *Solon* did a Philoſopher, who askt him whether he could not have made a better Government for *Athens*? Yes, but that his was the beſt, that the People would or could receive. And now I believe you will bear me witneſs, that I have not treated you as a Wiſe man would have done in ſilence; but it is time to put an end to this tittle-tattle which has nauſeated you for three days together.

Noble Ven. I hope you think better of our Judgments than ſo; but I believe you may very well be weary.

Doct. I am ſure the Pariſh Prieſts are often thanked for their pains, when they have neither taken half ſo much as you have, nor profited their Auditory the hundredth part ſo much.

Eng. Gent. The anſwer to thank you for your pains, is always, thank you, Sir, for your patience; and ſo I do very humbly both of you.

Noble Ven. Pray, Sir, when do you leave the Town?

Eng. Gent. Not till you leave the Kingdom. I intend to ſee you, if pleaſe God, aboard the Yacht at *Graveſend*.

Noble Ven. I ſhould be aſhamed to put you to that trouble.

Eng. Gent. I ſhould be much more troubled if I ſhould not do it; in the mean time I take my leave of you for this time, and hope to wait on you again to-morrow. What, *Doctor*, you ſtay to Conſult about the Convaleſcence? Adieu to you both.

Doct. Farewel, Sir.

Nullum numen abeſt ſi ſit prudentia.

F I N I S.

Harrington must indeed be he most neglected
figure in American history, for no other single
work could be said to have had s much influence
on the constitutional structure of America in the
18th century as OCEANA. (Thoma Jefferson's well-
used copy is in the Library of ongress.)

The influences on Harringt n's thought were
diverse; his sojourn in Venice, and the writings of
Contarini and Boccalini, were f rmative. (His effort
to explain the oligarchy of Ven ce as consistent
with republican principles is a piece of linguistic
legerdemain quite unworthy of H rrington.) He re-
mained a close and true friend f that most unre-

publican monarch Charles I, an tried desperately
and futilely to mitigate the a tagonisms engender-
ing the English Civil War. Se en years after the
execution of Charles, he publi hed the epochal re-
publican utopia OCEANA.

Ref: H. F. Russell-Smith sometimes catalogued
Smith), HARRINGTON AND HIS OCE NA; Charles Blitzer,
AN IMMORTAL COMMONWEALTH; Zera Fink, THE CLASSICAL
REPUBLICANS.